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The Rise Of The Latin American Shipyard

The Southern Tide

Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Introduction

In recent months various Latin American navies have either received or deployed new platforms. For example, Chile and Mexico have launched new Oceanic Patrol Vessels (OPVs) while Colombia has launched two amphibious landing vessels and two speedboats. In late July, Peru’s brand-new training vessel, the Union, left port for its first voyage.

While these acquisitions and deployments appear standard, there is one important detail that links them together: all these platforms were produced by Latin American shipyards.

The global shipbuilding industry is about to get more crowded as Latin America shipyards are making their presence felt. Their platforms are not solely produced for local navies, as exporting them is now an objective.

Current Projects

The most ambitious domestic naval project is found in Brazil. With assistance from the French company DCNS, the Brazilian Navy is constructing four Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines, as well as a nuclear-powered submarine, a dream of the Brazilian Navy for decades. Just this past July, the fourth section of the Humaitá was delivered to Itaguaí Construções Navais (ICN).  According to the Brazilian news agency Defesa Aerea & Naval the first submarine, the Riachuelo, will be launched in 2018 and delivered in 2020 while the Humaitá will be launched in 2020 and delivered in 2021.

Apart from the submarines themselves, Brazil is also constructing a submarine-building facility in Itaguaí, near Rio de Janeiro. These projects constitute the massive program known as Programa de Desenvolvimiento de Submarinos or Program Development for Submarines (PROSUB).

A photo of the team that worked on the production of the submarine's stern of the Humaitá. Planobrazil.com
A photo of the team that worked on the production of the stern of the Brazilian submarine Humaitá. (Planobrazil.com)

Other countries are manufacturing naval platforms, though not submarines. Specifically, regional shipyards are constructing OPVs, multipurpose vessels, and even training vessels. Case in point, in late July, the Colombian shipyard Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval Marítima y Fluvial (COTECMAR) delivered two new amphibious landing vessels, the Golfo de Morrosquillo and Bahía Málaga to the Colombian Navy, as well as two river patrol boats. COTECMAR has already delivered two similar ships (the Golfo de Tribuga and the Golfo de Uraba) to the Colombian Navy and plans to build an additional two more for a total of six vessels. The company has also constructed OPVs like the 7 de Agosto, which participated in operations Atalanta and Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa.

When it comes to other countries, in early August the Chilean shipyard Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR) launched the OPV Cabo Odger from its facilities in Talcahuano. The company has already delivered three similar vessels: Piloto Pardo, Comandante Toro and Marinero Fuentealba that were commissioned June 2008, August 2009, and November 2014, respectively.”

As for neighboring Peru, the state-run shipyard Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA) has, as previously mentioned, constructed the country’s new training vessel (the author has discussed Latin America’s training vessels in a 6 June commentary for CIMSEC). On 27 July, the BAP Union departed the port in Callao for its first multinational voyage, carrying aboard 93 Peruvian naval cadets. Moreover, two patrol vessels were launched earlier this year: the Rio Pativilca and the Rio Cañete; they were constructed in SIMA’s shipyard in Chimbote (northern Peru).

As a final example,the Mexican Secretariat of the Navy has announced that the shipyard Astillero de la Marina (ASTIMAR) has launched two new vessels in the past couple of months. The shipyard No.6 at Guaymas (state of Sonora) launched the logistics support vessel ARM Isla María Madre in late May while shipyard No.1 shipyard launched coastal patrol vessel ARM Monte Albán in mid July. IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly explains that “Secretary of Navy Admiral Vidal Soberón Sanz noted during the launch ceremony that the ship was entirely built by Mexican workers with local materials.”

In an interview with the author, Mr. Mario Pedreros Leighton, president of the Georgetown Consulting Group, LLC., based in Washington DC, highlighted the multipurpose functions that these domestically-manufactured platforms accomplish. As inter-state war is highly unlikely in Latin America, platform acquisition is not solely judged on traditional defense from a foreign military, but what other missions platforms can carry out, particularly to support civil society. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains how “there is no doubt that vessels today must fulfill a social role, like protecting natural resources and carrying out search and rescue operations. These uses make the vessels more attractive as their value is not based on traditional defense. In turn, governments find it easier to approve budgets and investments regarding these projects.” Hence, it is no surprise that the region has focused on constructing OPVs and multipurpose ships, as they are relatively inexpensive to operate and maintain, and can be utilized for patrol, support operations, as well as providing relief to coastal regions. 

Future Projects?

It is safe to say that Latin American shipyards will continue to produce vessels and submarines for local navies. As previously mentioned, Brazil is close to completing the construction of two Scorpene submarines, while it is expected that the two others will be delivered in 2022 and 2023. Even more, the highly anticipated nuclear submarine should be ready around 2023-2025.

Moreover, it appears that the Argentine shipbuilding industry is bouncing back after experiencing a difficult decade and a half of economic crisis and turbulent governance. The Rio Santiago shipyard in Buenos Aires province will now manufacture vessels that will be utilized to train naval cadets. Two are currently under construction, with a total of six expected to be ordered. According to the Argentine news agency Telam, the first will be delivered in 2018. Moreover, earlier this year Rio Santiago signed a deal with Daewoo to manufacture a Makassar-type landing dock platform vessel.

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Rio Santiago shipyard in Argentina. (Aandigital.com.ar)

It is important to highlight the assistance that other companies are providing to Latin American shipyards. Apart from DCNS in Brazil or Daewoo in Argentina, other examples include, Damen, which signed an agreement with Mexico so the country can construct in its own shipyards the aforementioned OPVs which are based on Damen’s Stan Patrol 4207. Similarly, while the Union was constructed in Peru, the Spanish company CYPSA Ingenieros Navales aided SIMA in the design of the vessel. As for future cooperation projects, representatives from Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems and Copower Ltda visited the facilities of Ecuador’s state-run shipyard Astilleros Navales Ecuatorianos (ASTINAVE) this past May.

The argument proposed here is that Latin American shipyards will continue to aim at domestically manufacturing platforms, which means that future deals with foreign shipyards will have to include some level of know-how and technical exchange.

The Ultimate Objective: Export

What is the ultimate goal for these shipyards? Manufacturing platforms for export, and not just to sell to local navies appears to be the answer. On this issue, Colombia’s COTECMAR reached a major milestone in April when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos carried out a diplomatic tour throughout Central America. During his stop in Honduras, President Santos signed a deal with the Honduran government where the latter will purchase a COTECMAR support vessel (the exact model and timeline for delivery are still unknown).

The significance of this deal cannot be underestimated as it is a Latin American shipyard exporting a platform to another regional state. (COTECMAR had previously supplied river boats to the Brazilian Army and Navy, however we are focusing on ocean-going platforms).

Colombia–Launch of the ARC Golfo de Uraba. (COTECMAR)

This deal also brings up the question of which countries are potential customers for Latin American shipyards. It makes sense that their primary targets would be countries with less developed naval industries, like for example Central America, Uruguay, and perhaps Caribbean states. If these hypothetical deals succeed, maybe some regional shipyard could attempt to export outside of the Western Hemisphere.

One plausible scenario is that, even if Latin American shipyards cannot sell brand-new platforms to the aforementioned nations, they could hypothetically still sell efficient, second-hand vessels from local navies at a much reduced cost. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains how “Chile, for example, could attempt to sell the OPV Piloto Prado [constructed by ASMAR and utilized by the Chilean Navy] which is almost a decade old and was constructed utilizing a Fassmer 80 design.” Second-hand platforms are always an attractive option when there are insufficient funds for brand-new equipment.

Potential Problems

Due to space considerations, we will provide a broad overview of the likely woes thatregional shipyards could face regarding future projects. Financial and technical problemsare obvious concerns, which are best exemplified by the construction of the Brazilian submarines. In 2009, the Navy’s objective was to have the first submarine, the Riachuelo, launched in 2015, but construction has been delayed by three years. Meanwhile, the delivery date for the nuclear submarine varies by a margin of two years. These changing delivery dates certainly do not help the image of the ICN shipyard and its supporting companies.

Another issue is finding customers, locally and abroad. The global shipbuilding industry is cluttered as shipyards compete with one another as well as government-to-government deals (e.g. Peru has recently obtained a new corvette, the Ferre, which was donated by South Korea).  Moreover, while Latin American shipyards can construct vessels, potential customers may continue to prefer more expensive platforms from well-known companies.

ASTIMAR – OPV Chiapas. (imparcialoaxaca.mx)
OPV Chiapas in ASTIMAR shipyard in Mexico. (imparcialoaxaca.mx)

Another problem has to do with the volume of construction. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains that “building one vessel is very expensive, but manufacturing two or more makes the project less costly.” Unsurprisingly, shipyards prefer to have large orders, however they may have to settle for single units (e.g. COTECMAR and Honduras) in order to establish their brands with foreign customers. While this situation may diminish sales revenue, the offset would be achieving a stronger name brand.

A final point has to do with marketing and name brands. Colombia’s COTECMAR has had an aggressive marketing program in order to gain customers abroad such as Brazil and Honduras. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss marketing strategies among shipyards, however it is necessary to stress that Latin American shipyards will only export platforms if they manage to make their names become well-known regionally.

Concluding Thoughts

Latin American shipyards are currently enjoying a boom, as many of them are constructing vessels from Brazilian submarines to OPVs in Chile and Mexico, to multipurpose vessels in Colombia, and a training vessel in Peru. This is a positive development for regional navies as they can rely on domestic shipyards to construct new platforms and have the expertise to repair vessels already in service. Moreover, the sale by Colombia’s COTECMAR to Honduras of a support ship is a significant development as this means regional shipyards are now exporting platforms.

It is true that Latin American navies cannot manufacture heavy surface combatants or carriers; meanwhile Brazil is having trouble keeping its ambitious PROSUB submarine project on schedule. Nevertheless, the tides are changing and Latin America is no longer solely an importer of sea platforms, it is also once again a producer and, albeit in a very restricted breadth, an exporter. 

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Featured Image: Construction of the Brazilian submarine Riachuelo in Itaguaí (RJ) (Planobrazil.com)

Interview with Zoha Waseem: Pakistani Navy Remains Committed to Karachi

By Alex Calvo

In the Second World War, Karachi was a key component in the long logistics chain connecting unoccupied China with the United States. After decolonization and partition, the city retained her significance, at both the economic and political level. Among others, it was and still is the main base for the Pakistani Navy, as well as a shipbuilding centre. Often in the news due to a challenging security situation, no look at naval developments in the Indo-Pacific Ocean Region is complete without Karachi. We have thus interviewed Zoha Waseem, an expert in policing and counterterrorism and PhD candidate at King’s College London.

Calvo.- Is the situation in Karachi considered by the Pakistani Navy as a reason to push for further diversification away from the city, in terms of naval basing and construction?

Waseem.- The situation in Karachi in terms of the ongoing operation is linked with the need of the Military to keep investing in Karachi. The construction of military bases, infrastructure and training centres and accommodation does not appear to be decreasing. Karachi is an ATM machine, and a prime location for any stakeholder to have its assets here. Karachi is an important port, being connected to the Arabian Sea, connecting the city by water to Iran and India. That said, there does exist an alternative Naval base 200 kilometres away from Karachi (Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara, Balochistan). Heavy investments have been made into this base since the Navy came under threat in Karachi.

Railway (Karachi Port)
Railway (Karachi Port).

Calvo.- Are the demands of internal security preventing Pakistan from devoting enough funds and political attention to military modernization?

Waseem.- Military modernization is generally regarded not as falling within the domain of political actors but of the military. The Armed Forces appear to be devoting enough funds to military modernisation. Internal security operations take manpower away from the armed forces but their budgetary allocations come from different departments.

Calvo.- Are the Armed Forces, to the detriment of civilian police, seen by most citizens as the mainstay of security?

Waseem.- The general public appears to have bought into the narrative that armed forces are the only bodies capable of dealing with security issues. This is taking focus away from the police, especially in areas where armed forces have acquired policing powers of search and arrest. Nevertheless, there are voices on ground that call for the strengthening of police forces for internal security, law and order.

Karachi Port
Karachi Port.

Calvo.- What are the prospects for police reform in the mid-term? What are its main aspects, and most significant obstacles?

Waseem.- There were police reforms in 2002 which were reversed in 2011 in Sindh and Balochistan. No serious initiatives appear to be in place at the moment. Main obstacles for this are: political interferences, weak leadership, and corruption. Policing falls under the domain of the provincial governments and there will be no serious reforms implemented till the will of these governments is not present.

Calvo.- Does Beijing trust Islamabad’s promises to severely prosecute groups assisting Xinjiang activists? What about guarantees of better protection of Chinese nationals in Pakistan?

I’m not sure what Beijing is thinking at the moment, but Pakistan seems to be making efforts to curb any apprehensions on their part. For instance, both the armed forces and civilian government has decided to strengthen security measures of the Chinese in Gwadar, Balochistan. Plans for deploying 10,000 army personnel for their security and deweaponisation of Gwadar are underway too. Much of the reason for the escalation in the internal security operation in Karachi is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Zoha Waseem got her LLB from SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) and her MA in Terrorism, Security and Society from King’s College London. She has studied in Karachi, Chicago, and Washington DC, and interned at different Pakistani news channels. From 2012 to 2013 she was an intern at Interpol’s Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate, in Lyon (France). She is currently working on her PhD thesis, at King’s College, on “Enforcement, Encounters and the Everyday: Contemporary Policing in Karachi, Pakistan”. Waseem’s research interests include Pakistan, policing and security, urban violence, counterterrorism, and police culture. She tweets at @ZohaWaseem and recently wrote “Darkness in the city of light” on Paris’ terror attacks.

Interview by CIMSEC member Alex Calvo.

Polish Navy’s Small Steps Ahead

A competition is underway for the honor of landing on the Polish fleet's decks.
                    A competition is underway for the honor of landing on the Polish fleet’s decks.

The Polish Navy is expected to receive 6 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and 6 Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters starting in 2014-2015 as part of a much bigger yet-to-be-awarded deal, totaling 70 helicopters and more than $2.5 billion. The new fleet will replace 10 aging Mi-17 and 4 Kaman SH-2 helos used for ASW and SAR. Poland’s Ministry of Defense announced its intention to purchase the helicopters as a result of National Security Review, which calls for higher mobility in the armed forces. Another 10 of the 70 helos will go to the Air Force in SAR configuration, but most of the fleet, 48 in the troop transport version, will be troop transport versions for the Army. The Polish military speaks (in Polish) about “common-base airframe,” but it is not clear if that refers to all versions, as requirements between services differs significantly. It is also expected that the helicopters will at least in part be produced in Poland.

Potential contenders for the contract are Sikorsky, Eurocopter, Agusta Westland, and AW’s Polish subsidiary, PZL Swidnik, bidding separately. A brief look at the actual range of aircraft makes it interesting to see what the sales strategies of the companies will be. Sikorsky and AW already have production lines in Poland. Sikorsky and Eurocopter (specifically NH Industries) could offer common-base airframes. The closest replacement to the Mi-17 in terms of size is the Super Cougar from Eurocopter, but the short lead time makes it difficult to integrate ASW gear into a new airframe.

New ASW helicopters, in contrast with the Mi-17, are more likely to operate from the decks of Coastal Defense Ships (CDS), for which specifications are being drafted and should be ready this year. Their rather enigmatic name, according to Commander in Chief means ships that differ from classic corvettes in mission priorities and equipment. The ship should also be able to operate as part of allied task groups beyond the Baltic. Such a definition will certainly will hangers with the necessary facilities to support air operations .

The first new assets in the modernization of the Polish Navy will not be ships, but helicopters. Additionally, the ill-fated Gawron corvette program seems to have come to a reasonable end as the MoD approved the final configuration for the unfinished Meko A-100 corvette as a patrol ship. Under the name Slazak she will join the fleet in first quarter 2016.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Despite Lavish Funding, Russian Navy Dead In The Water

This Old House: The Russian navy HQ moves back to St. Petersburg.

As of 31 October, the Russian Navy moved its headquarters back to the Admiralty building in St. Petersburg where it had been based until 1925. This is further, if superficial, evidence of President Vladimir Putin’s desire to revitalize and modernize the Russian fleet, and “maintain Russia’s place as a leading sea power.” Also on 31 October, the head of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated that he expects to add “up to five warships and auxiliary ships every year” through 2020. That is not a particularly impressive figure, but it is nothing to scoff at either. The number of ships added to the Russian Navy’s lists is only half the story. If President Putin hopes to strengthen Russian sea power relative to other maritime powers, then the Russian shipbuilding plan must be competitive with what others are doing. After accounting for the rate of decommissioning of Russian ships and the amount actually budgeted for Russia’s shipbuilding plan to 2020, as compared to U.S. plans, for example, it quickly becomes apparent those five ships a year are insufficient to achieve Putin’s desired revitalization of the fleet.

According to the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti, the Russian government set aside $156 billion for shipbuilding to 2020, or roughly $19.5 billion annually. This funding is expected to result in eight nuclear missile submarines, 14 frigates, 35 corvettes, six small artillery ships, and six landing ships – a total of 69 vessels. The average cost per unit under this plan is $2.26 billion, with only a handful of the hulls major combat assets. On the surface, the only major concern is the rather high cost for ships with limited capabilities. However, since Putin is concerned with improving the Russian Navy in both absolute terms and relative to its rivals – he wants Russia to be a great power again- it is a useful exercise to compare this shipbuilding plan with those of other leading sea powers.

A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the U.S. Navy’s 2013 30-year shipbuilding plan notes some interesting differences. The U.S. Navy plans to add 268 ships by 2042, at a CBO projected cost of $599 billion.1 This is just shy of $20 billion per year, with a mean 8.9 ships commissioned annually.2 The cost per ship, however, comes in at $2.23 billion on average, cheaper than their Russian counterparts.3 On top of this, the planned U.S. ships are much more capable vessels. The plan includes 70 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, 12 new ballistic missile submarines, 46 new attack submarines, 18 amphibious warfare ships, 46 logistics and support ships, and several aircraft carriers.4 Furthermore, these figures exclude the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), roughly equivalent to a Russian corvette. When the two plans are held up against each other – admittedly an inexact comparison given the different time frames – the Russian Navy will continue to decline vis-à-vis its U.S. counterpart.

If the Russian Navy is to match President Putin’s ambitions, the rate of construction will not only have to be competitive with other naval powers, but will also have to be sufficient to compensate for the number of vessels decommissioned annually. In 2011, for example, two SSBNs and five landing ships left the fleet while one frigate and six landing craft entered service.5 A net neutral quantitative change, but arguably a net negative qualitative change. In 2010, one SSBN, a cruiser, two destroyers, two frigates, nine patrol craft, 13 mine countermeasures vessels, and seven landing craft entered or re-entered Russian service. This is compared with the loss of one SSBN, 28 patrol craft, an amphibious ship, a landing ship, and 11 landing craft.6 That is a net loss of seven vessels, but an arguable gain in capabilities. In 2009, the Russian Federation Navy added four attack submarines, one destroyer, and a landing ship but lost one SSBN, a destroyer, six frigates, and a landing craft.7 This is a net loss of three vessels, and a definite decline in capabilities. Now, admittedly this is not a perfect record of the comings and goings in the Russian Federation Navy as The Military Balance could be inaccurate. The Russian military is not known for its transparency, after all. The trend over the last three years appears, however, to be a decline in the size of the Russian Navy with, perhaps, some countervailing improvement in capabilities in certain areas. In 2011, seven ships were decommissioned, in 2010, 42 left service, and in 2009, nine were removed from the lists. Given the age of the majority of Russian vessels, it is unavoidable that a significant portion of the current Russian fleet will have to be decommissioned over the next five to ten years. Some of the oldest ships in the Russian fleet happen to be some of the most capable, meaning the loss will not be simply quantitative. The addition of five ships a year until the end of the decade certainly will help rejuvenate the aging Russian fleet, but it will not counteract its decline to the extent desired.

The Russian Navy appears dead in the water at this point. President Putin may wish for Russia to “maintain its status [as] one of the leading naval powers,” but the fact is that the Russian fleet is in decline and present plans are insufficient to absolutely or relatively increase its size and capabilities.8 Russia may or may not be America’s – or any other state’s9 – main geopolitical foe, but in the naval arena it is not much of a contest. Without even more money, the Russian Navy looks set to continue its decades’ long decline.

Ian Sundstrom is a graduate of the War Studies Masters Program at King’s College London.  He is currently engaged on a research project for Imperial War Museum – Duxford in Cambridge, United Kingdom.


[1] Page 3.

[2] Page 7.

[3] Page 3.

[4] Pages 8-9.

[5] International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 and The Military Balance 2011

[6] International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 and The Military Balance 2010

[7] International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 and The Military Balance 2009

[8] The recent firing of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov may signal a change in Putin’s designs for the military, but it is too soon to tell.

[9] Space considerations have prevented me from discussing other navies’ shipbuilding plans. The reader may wish to consider the trajectory of the British, Japanese, and Chinese navies and how they compare to the Russian fleet. My very brief, preliminary look suggests Russia is set to make some quantitative headway against Britain and Japan, but Russia’s position sandwiched between four major seas renders the gains less than impressive. Compared to the Chinese Navy Russia is in clear decline.