Category Archives: South America

Analysis related to USSOUTHCOM

The Uruguayan Navy: Preparing for the 21st century

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

In a speech to commemorate the service’s sea day (Día de la Fuerza de Mar) on August 21, Uruguayan Navy Captain Daniel Di Bono stated, “Starting today, it is time to start writing another page of this story. Ours, [the story] of the older ones, those of the Frigates, the Minesweepers, the [marine research vessel] Vanguardia, is already coming to an end. The period of modern, agile, and flexible ocean patrol vessels, coastal patrol vessels, and scientific vessels is approaching.”

Navies constantly evolve due to new challenges, objectives, visions, and realities. However, analysts rarely witness a sharp evolution of a Navy and its fleet. The Uruguayan Navy is undergoing that process, and as a reliable U.S. ally, Washington needs to understand what is going on and why.

Out With the Old, In With the New

For decades, the Uruguayan Navy operated one of the oldest fleets in South America. Aside from landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay and not considering Guyana and Suriname (more generally associated with the Caribbean), Uruguay is the only South American country that does not possess submarines. The fleet’s flagship is the Luneburg-class logistics vessel ROU 04 General Artigas, launched in the 1960s. The service has decommissioned several in recent years, including its only frigate, the former ROU 01 Uruguay – formerly Portugal’s Comandante Joao Belo (F480). In other words, currently, the Navy has no main combat ships.

On the other hand, the service is receiving new(ish) vessels. In late 2022, the Uruguayan Navy commissioned three Marine Protector-class patrol boats formerly operated by the United States Coast Guard. The three ships are already operating across Uruguayan waters: ROU 14 Río Arapey, ROU 15 Río de la Plata, and ROU 16 Río Yaguarón. Moreover, after around a decade of negotiations, brand-new ships are on the horizon. In July, the Ministry of Defense announced that two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) will be purchased from a Spanish shipyard. Crucially, the OPVs will be capable of carrying helicopters, an ability that the fleet currently lacks.

Three former Coast Guard cutters, now serving the Uruguay Navy as ROU-14 Rio Arapey, ROU-15 Rio de La Plata and ROU-16 Rio Yaguaron, stop at Coast Guard Sector San Juan Sept. 24, 2022, during their more than two-month transit from Baltimore to Uruguay. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Capt. Robert Pirone)

Uruguay is scheduled to hold general elections in October 2024. Therefore, one can only hope that the OPV acquisition will be confirmed and all necessary agreements signed so the deal does not fall victim to traditional election-related debates and delays.

Evolving Challenges

A fact mentioned earlier deserves more analysis – the Uruguayan Navy does not possess subs and currently does operate heavy warships in its fleet. As discussed in Captain Di Bono’s speech, that era is ending for this service. Geopolitics is a reason for this statement: Uruguay borders two countries, Argentina and Brazil, and bilateral relations are quite strong. For example, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has donated M41C Walker Bulldog tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery platforms to the Uruguayan Army. The likelihood of an inter-state war is minimal; therefore, as the Uruguayan officials have also stated, the Navy’s necessity to operate cruisers and minesweepers is similarly minimal. Dr. Andrea Resende, associate professor at Brazil’s University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNIBH), explained to CIMSEC that “there is some tension between Argentina and Uruguay, however not like in the previous decades. Yet, Brazil has always played a third party during conflicts and tensions in the region because the stability of its borders frontiers depends on a peaceful environment.”

To promote close military relations, from September 11-15, the navies of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay carried out a new iteration of an academic exercise on trilateral warfare (Juego de Guerra Trilateral) in Carrasco, Uruguay. “The Trilateral War Game, carried out annually, was designed to allow interaction in the formulation, analysis and solution of international crisis problems in the South Atlantic region, based on a fictitious situation, using naval forces,” explains the Argentine Navy’s publication Gaceta Maritima.

Nowadays, the Uruguayan Navy is evolving into a smaller, faster, more modern fleet. What are its challenges? Controlling the country’s vast maritime waters is critical to combat illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing and other maritime crimes like drug trafficking and smuggling. In other words, protecting Uruguay’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from non-interstate threats is critical.

Having OPVs that carry helicopters will also be helpful for interdiction operations and search-and-rescue missions. Smaller craft can also operate along some of Uruguay’s rivers for security and patrol operations and to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions. It is worth noting that the Navy has created a tactical operations center (Centro de Operaciones Tácticas: COT) that oversees the deployment of surface and aerial assets to combat illegal maritime activities.

Dr. Resende warned of a potential spillover effect from the other side of the Atlantic: “While piracy, robbery, and hijacking are major problems in the Gulf of Guinea, they can overflow across the entire region, so there is a need for the South Atlantic navies to be ready and to participate in joint exercises and operations,” to maintain their readiness and to be able to work together. In other words, having a smaller fleet does not mean giving up some capabilities, particularly regarding maritime law enforcement and patrol.

With that said, there will always be a need for heavier, more specialized ships. Science is a good reason for having them. The Uruguayan Navy has an active role in scientific and oceanographic research, but unfortunately, the scientific vessel ROU 22 Oyarvide was decommissioned in 2022 without a replacement ready. While not a priority as compared to the OPVs, Montevideo must assign financial assets to acquire a new scientific vessel soon. Moreover, Uruguay has a robust presence in Antarctica, and General Artigas participated in the country’s recent 2022/2023 Antarctic campaign. Upon its return to Montevideo in February, Defense Minister Javier García noted, “[Artigas] was a ship that had not sailed since 2018, which was overhauled, the things that needed to be fixed were fixed, and it once again provided an essential service in an Antarctic mission.” In other words, the Uruguayan Navy has a critical role in scientific operations across Uruguayan and Antarctic waters; therefore, scientific and polar-capable vessels must be components of the future fleet.

The service has yet to disclose when the ancient Artigas will be decommissioned. The ship is currently the fleet’s heaviest vessel, so a similar platform will be needed to replace it for local transportation operations and Uruguay’s future Antarctic campaigns.

Montevideo-Washington Relations: Moving Forward

Finally, a word about U.S.-Uruguay naval relations is necessary. They may not be as constant as the U.S. Navy’s and U.S. Coast Guard’s presence across the Greater Caribbean, but they exist. The donation of the Marine Protector vessels to the Uruguayan Navy and helicopters to the Uruguayan Air Force over the past two years are an excellent example of close bilateral defense relations.

Moreover, in February, the U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter Stone’s (WMSL-758) visit to Montevideo port coincided with the 70th anniversary of the mutual defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1953. “The agreement served as the foundation for the long history of cooperation between the two democracies in defense equipment, training, and peacekeeping operations around the world that continues to thrive today,” explained the U.S. embassy in Uruguay in a press release.

Given the ongoing war in Ukraine (and news of successful attacks against Russian ships and submarines), tensions with China, and regular incidents at sea with Iran, it may appear puzzling for Washington that a Navy can operate without frigates or submarines. However, the geopolitics of Latin America and the Caribbean differ from other areas of the world. In particular, inter-state relations between Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil remain strong in the South Atlantic. The participation in joint exercises by these three militaries is an effective confidence-building mechanism.

“One can never predict the future [but a military service must be] prepared for whatever may come. And this is the case for Uruguay. Even if we live in a relative state of peace, the maritime space is threatened daily with cyberattacks, IUU fishing, piracy, and illegal trafficking,” concluded Dr. Resende. Smaller but faster and more modern ships, with more interdiction and surveillance capabilities, will be the pillars of the Uruguayan Navy’s fleet in the 21st century. The threats may be changing, but the mission remains the same.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

Featured Image: The Uruguayan naval frigate Uruguay (ROU 1) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker.)

Argentina Deploys New Patrol Vessels to Combat IUU Fishing

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

The Argentine Navy has deployed its two newest offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52), to monitor an international fishing fleet traveling close to the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) en route to the South Atlantic. While there have been no confirmed reports of these vessels engaging in illegal, unregulated, or unreported (IUU) fishing, recent history suggests that this is occurring or will occur soon.

Putting the new units to good use

Bouchard and Piedrabuena are assigned to the Argentine Navy’s maritime patrol division (División de Patrullado Marítimo: DVPM). Along with a Beechcraft B-200 Super King Air aircraft assigned to the naval air squadron for maritime surveillance (Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Vigilancia Marítima), the two units monitored vessels traveling through the Magellan Strait en route to open seas in the South Atlantic, according to a 23 December press release. After departing from Admiral Zar base in Trelew, Chubut Province, the B-200 flew over “the fishing fleet, in coordination with the patrol boats, maintaining surveillance… of the activities carried out by these ships of different nationalities.”

ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) conduct patrol and surveillance operations in the Argentine Sea (Photo credit: Argentine Navy)

The support vessel ARA Estrecho de San Carlos (A-22) has reportedly replaced Bouchard as the main vessel assigned to Ushuaia, the capital of Tierra del Fuego province, which is near the Beagle Channel and Argentina’s border with Chile.

Argentina has acquired four Gowind-class OPVs from France, manufactured by Naval Group. The third unit, ARA Storni (P-53), was delivered in October 2021, while the fourth and final ship, ARA Bartolomé Cordero, was launched in September 2021 and will likely be delivered sometime in early 2022. The four units will help the Argentine Navy improve its patrol and surveillance operations.

There have also been developments from a bureaucratic standpoint. In late February 2021, the Ministry of Defence created the Joint Maritime Command (Comando Conjunto Marítimo: CCM) to “patrol and control of [Argentina’s] maritime and fluvial areas.” The MoD announced that starting this past 1 January, the CCM assumed command of surveillance maritime operations, which includes monitoring the international fishing fleet that is sailing near the country’s EEZ.

Boarding teams from ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) inspect fishing vessels in the Argentine Sea (Photo credit: Argentine Navy)

Good and Bad News

The Argentine Navy will have additional air and surface units in the near future. In late December, the Argentine government announced that the local shipyard Tandanor will construct a new icebreaker for Antarctic operations to replace the aging icebreaker Almirante Irízar (Q-5). In the same month, the Ministry of Defence announced that two refurbished Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King medium helicopters will be acquired to improve capabilities and operations, including search and rescue, in the country’s southern areas and during Antarctic operations. The price of the two helicopters, including personnel training and spare parts, is USD 12.8 million.

Alas, the service still has no operational submarines. Moreover, apart from the four new OPVs, the rest of the fleet has yet to be modernized, which limits the service’s capabilities for constant, long-range patrol operations to monitor illegal activities by the international fishing fleet.

IUU Fishing

Argentina has a history of combating IUU fishing. For example, in 2016, the Mantilla-class patrol boat Prefecto Derbes (GC-28) shot and sank the Chinese fishing vessel Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010. The ship had reportedly ignored warning shots and attempted to flee, only to ram the Argentine patrol vessel. Lu Yan Yuan Yu was reportedly fishing without authorization in Argentina’s EEZ close to Chubut Province.

The author of this article has written several essays for CIMSEC about IUU fishing in Latin American waters (See 2016’s “Latin American Navies Combat Illegal Fishing,” and 2020’s “The Ecuadorian Navy’s Constant Struggle Against IUU Fishing.” Regional cooperation is vital to solving this security challenge, which can be achieved by modernizing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca: TIAR) into a 21st-century agreement that is also tasked with combating IUU fishing. Turning TIAR into TIAR 21, as the author suggested in a July 2021 Regional Insight paper for the William J. Perry Center for hemispheric Defense Studies at the US National Defense University, would be an essential step forward to more effectively monitor South America’s vast waters and prevent the ongoing maritime pillaging of precious marine resources by extra-regional fishing fleets.

An international fishing fleet, comprising vessels from countries such as China, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan, continuously operates throughout South America, moving with the season. For example, the same fleet operated around Ecuador, close to the Galapagos Islands, in July-August 2021, then traveled south through Peru and Ecuador. It is currently crossing the Magellan Strait to operate in the South Atlantic for the Summer months below the Equator. In Argentina, fishing vessels are focused on fishing squid, spider crab (centolla), and crab.

According to a December report by the Argentine daily La Nación, the “fishing season” commenced in early December, as some 180 vessels, “mostly from China,” crossed the Magellan Strait after operating in waters close to Chile and Peru. “By April, there will be approximately 500 ships operating in the area,” explained Major Néstor Alberto Kiferling, head of Argentina’s maritime traffic service. As modern as the Gowind class ships are, the international fishing fleet vastly outnumbers the Argentine Navy’s current capabilities, even with support from aerial units and other vessels.

Conclusion

It has been argued that Argentina is in a better situation vis-à-vis IUU fishing today compared to five years ago. Indeed, the Argentine Navy is putting its two new OPVs to good use by deploying them to the Magellan Strait to monitor the international fishing fleet crossing through the country’s EEZs en route to the South Atlantic. As with many other South American countries, one of Argentina’s major environmental challenges is IUU fishing, But while IUU Fishing is problematic when perpetrated at low-scale by fishing vessels from Argentina or a neighboring country, it can become truly catastrophic when done so by hundreds of international fishing vessels with no interest in preserving the maritime environment.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Featured Image: ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) at Piriou’s Concarneau shipyard (Photo Credit: Naval Group)

Made in Latin America: Domestically Manufactured Ecuadorian and Peruvian Ships Meet in the Pacific

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“We focus on partnerships…Our partners want to work with us. They want the advantage of the United States education, training, exercises and military equipment. It’s the best in the world. And so it’s up to us to deliver that in a way that’s relevant and also provides a return on investment for American taxpayer. So that is our focus.” –Navy Adm. Craig S. Faller, commander of U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee July 9, 2019.

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

The Ecuadorian coast guard vessel Isla Santa Cruz escorted the Peruvian training vessel BAP Unión while the latter sailed through Ecuadorian waters as part of a training mission in mid-May. While cordial encounters at sea between ships belonging to friendly navies are quite common, a curious fact about this meeting is that both vessels were manufactured domestically by local state-run shipyards.

Isla Santa Cruz escorts the Peruvian training vessel BAP Unión (Ecuadorian Navy photo)

The significance of this encounter cannot be overstated. The navies of Ecuador and Peru, in addition to other Latin American fleets, will certainly continue to acquire vessels and submarines from extra-regional suppliers for the foreseeable future. But the era of “Made in Latin America” ships is here.

Made in Ecuador, Made in Peru

Isla Santa Cruz (LG 43) is one of four coastal patrol boats, class LP-AST-2606, produced by the Ecuadorian state-run shipyard ASTINAVE. The vessel and its sister ships, Isla Marchena (LG 42), Isla Pinta (LG 44), and Isla Balta (LG 45), are based on a Damen’s Stan Patrol 2606 model. The vessels are operated by the coast guard, a part of the navy, and operate in Ecuadorian waters, which include protecting the maritime biodiversity of the Galapagos Islands, listed on the UNESCO World Heritage list. Isla Santa Cruz was commissioned in 2012.

As for training vessel Unión, the ship was commissioned in 2016. Built by the Peruvian state-run shipyard SIMA’s main facilities in Callao, the ship measures 115 meters in length, displaces 3,200 tons, has a maximum speed of 12 knots and can transport up to 250 officers, crew and trainees. Unión, named after a Peruvian warship that fought in the 19th century War of the Pacific, is the largest training vessel in Latin America. As part of training missions with future naval officers, Unión has also participated in international sailing competitions. For example, in 2017 Unión participated in Rendez-Vous 2017 Tall Ships Regatta, where the vessel won the race from Boston, Massachusetts to Charlottetown, Canada.

How Often Do Such Meetings Happen?

It is unclear how often locally built vessels meet in Latin American waters. Such meetings can occur via passing exercises (PASSEX), one vessel escorting the other as it voyages through territorial waters, working together in counter-narcotic operations, or via multinational exercises like PANAMAX or UNITAS.

For example, for UNITAS LIX (2018), held in Colombia, the host’s patrol vessel ARC 20 de Julio (PZE-46), manufactured by the Colombian shipbuilding corporation COTECMAR, and the Chilean OPV Piloto Pardo (OPV-81), built by the Chilean shipyard ASMAR, were deployed together. Similarly, UNITAS LVII (2017), held in Peru, included the participation of patrol boats BAP Río Pativilca (PM 204) and BAP Río Cañete (PM 205), built by SIMA, and the Chilean OPV Comandante Toro (OPV 82), built by ASMAR. This author has not been able to find confirmation that these locally-built vessels directly interacted in these exercises, but it is plausible.

Chilean OPV Piloto Pardo (OPV-81). (Chilean Navy photo)

Interestingly, even though there are a plethora of analyses in Spanish and Portuguese about what regional shipyards are producing and the status of regional navies, this author has not found previous research that discusses other instances of locally built vessels meeting at sea in Latin America. Figuring out how often these meetings occur would require exhaustive research through various news sources, including press releases and statements by regional navies, to keep track of when this type of meeting at sea occurs, and researching where each ship was built.

A Look at Ongoing Projects

In various analyses for CIMSEC (see the 2016 commentary “The Rise of the Latin American Shipyard”) this author has discussed the rise of Latin American shipyards, several of which are currently engaged in major construction projects.

Brazil is building four conventional submarines and one nuclear-powered submarine via the PROSUB program, in cooperation with the French shipyard Naval Group; the Chilean shipyard ASMAR is building an icebreaker and plans to construct at least two transport vessels, a project called Escotillón IV; and the Colombian shipbuilding corporation COTECMAR has manufactured a fleet of amphibious vessels (Buques de Apoyo Logistico y de Cabotage) for the local navy, while two units were sold to Honduras (FNH 1611 Gracias a Dios) and Guatemala (BL 1601 Quetzal). COTECMAR has also manufactured several patrol vessels based on a design by the German shipyard Fassmer. COTECMAR’s most recent project was the launch this past September of ARC Isla Albuquerque for the country’s Dirección General Marítima, commonly known as DIMAR, a part of the navy. 

Both Colombia’s COTECMAR and Chile’s ASMAR have ambitious projects for the near future as well, namely the construction of frigates. The Colombian Navy wants to domestically manufacture frigates (a project called Plataformas Estratégicas de Superficie or PES for short) via COTECMAR to replace its aging Almirante Padilla-class frigates, but the project has been delayed. Similarly, the Chilean Navy’s high command aims to also domestically manufacture frigates by 2030.

Even the internationally sanctioned and economically crippled Venezuela is building domestic vessels. Case in point, a 24 April tweet by a Venezuelan military Twitter account shows a video of Centinela, a locally-manufactured speedboat which will be utilized by the national guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana) for coastal operations. At the time of writing, the Iranian forward-basing ship IRINS Makra, formerly an oil tanker, is transporting seven fast attack craft, apparently to be transferred to Venezuela. If this happens, it would be the first time in years that the Venezuelan Navy obtains foreign-made vessels, and highlights the service’s current status in which international suppliers of new ships are very limited in number (this author ahs discussed the status of the Venezuelan navy in a May 10 commentary for Strife, The Venezuelan Navy: The Kraken of the Caribbean?”).

Both Ecuador and Peru have ongoing shipbuilding projects as well. ASTINAVE has teamed up with a German shipyard to build a multipurpose combat vessel. Even though the construction of the MPV70 MKII vessel has been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ecuadorian shipyard is upgrading and expanding its infrastructure. Specifically, the shipyard’s main facilities in Planta Centro will be expanded to cope with the new project as the combat ship will be manufactured and assembled in sections.

Similarly, Peru’s SIMA is building BAP Paita, a second landing platform dock (the first one, BAP Pisco, is already operational); while two coastal patrol vessels, BAP Río Tumbes and BAP Río Locumba, were commissioned this past March. SIMA’s facilities in Iquitos, in the Peruvian Amazon, also build vessels for the army’s and navy’s riverine operations.

BAP Río Tumbes and BAP Río Locumba (Peruvian Navy photo)

The Bad News: Argentina and Mexico

Unfortunately, there are shipyards in two countries that have been unable to move forward with new projects. After much fanfare, Mexico’s long range oceanic patrol project (Patrulla Oceánica de Largo Alcance or POLA) is not moving forward, as President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is not interested in having the local state-run shipyard ASTIMAR construct new units in partnership with Damen. Only one of this class has been built, the POLA ARM-101 “Benito Juárez.* On June 1, as part of the celebrations for the Mexican navy’s anniversary, the patrol vessel ARM Tabasco (PO-168) was commissioned. But this ship was originally launched in 2019 and it is unclear when ASTIMAR will receive orders for new ships (See Christian J. Ehlirch’s “The Evolution of the Mexican Navy Since 1980” analysis in Strife for more information about the status of the fleet.)

POLA ARM-101 “Benito Juárez. (Photo via Damen Shipyards Group)

Similarly, Argentine shipyards like Rio Santiago and Tandanor are in limbo due to a lack of funds. Two outstanding projects include the construction of two training boats to train cadets (Lanchas de Instrucción de Cadetes or LICA), and one Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) hydrographic ship for the Argentine Navy. The Alberto Fernández administration is reportedly providing funds to finish both projects, however it is unclear when they will be launched.

Why Build at Home?

Navies and shipyards routinely advocate for the domestic construction of vessels, highlighting the advantages of such projects as compared to purchasing from international suppliers. The primary advantage is that domestically manufacturing ships, or submarines in the case of Brazil, means direct and indirect jobs for the citizens of the country where the shipyard is located. SIMA, for example has three facilities across Peru: Callao and Chimbote in the coast, and Iquitos in the Amazon. Similarly, ASTINAVE is preparing to expand its main assembly facility. More shipbuilding orders and new facilities mean more jobs.

For navies, building at home is also preferable as the naval officers and sailors can observe first-hand how a new vessel is built, from the keel laying to the launching of the ship. Shipyard employees are also more intimately aware of the technical aspects of new ships, which can considerately quicken maintenance and repair operations.

Moreover, building at home decreases a dependency on extra-regional suppliers. For example, a navy without a local functioning shipyard that plans to acquire new vessels in order to replace old units may have to settle for what is available on the international market (e.g. used or decommissioned vessels) depending on budgetary issues.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that building new vessels involves a learning curve. By building at home, technicians and the leadership of navies and shipyards will become more ambitious and will aim to build more complex platforms. A quick summary of ASTINAVE’s and SIMA’s projects in the past decade exemplify this learning curve, and also what one could call an “ambition curve.”

ASTINAVE built Isla Santa Cruz and three other small coastal patrol craft in the first half of the 2010s, then two 50 meter offshore patrol vessels (Isla San Cristóbal and Isla Santa Isabel, delivered in 2017), and now is preparing to build a multipurpose combat vessel. Similarly, in recent years, SIMA’s facilities in Callao and Chimbote have built six coastal patrol vessels, a training vessel, and now two complex landing platform docks (this list does not include riverine vessels built by SIMA-Iquitos).

Without a doubt, there is a level of technological capability and expertise that many shipyards do not possess. Hence it is highly implausible to assume that Latin American navies will stop relying on extra-regional suppliers for warships, submarines, coastal patrol vessels or transport ships in the near future. Even a second-hand warship from an “A-class” navy is more technologically advanced than what some regional navies currently operate or can hope to build domestically. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated in this commentary, many shipyards have the ambition which, if financially supported by their respective governments, will translate into more complex vessels being built in regional shipyards in the near future.

The Ambition for More “Made in Latin America” Ships

Nowadays, occasional tensions and some border disputes notwithstanding, the possibility of inter-state warfare in Latin America and the Caribbean is quite low. Nevertheless, navies must possess minimum deterrent capabilities. Moreover, they have other non-defense tasks, such as combating maritime crimes like illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; drug smuggling; participating in search and rescue; and HA/DR operations.

To carry out these numerous missions, navies must operate modern vessels with different capabilities. While many navies are acquiring brand new vessels – Argentina is acquiring four offshore patrol vessels manufactured by French shipyard Naval Group– due to budgetary issues or what is available in the international market, some services are sometimes forced to acquire decommissioned vessels or ships that do not exactly match the service’s requirements. The result are Frankenstein’s monster-type fleets, with ships of various origins. Over the past decade, Latin American shipyards like Ecuador’s ASTINAVE and Peru’s SIMA have provided an important alternative regarding the procurement of new ships.

The meeting of Ecuador’s patrol vessel Isla Santa Cruz and Peru’s training vessel Unión in Ecuadorian waters was not solely a standard encounter of two friendly navies. It highlights the current status and trajectory of many Latin American shipyards, which are building more technologically complex ships for their respective navies. By the time the young Peruvian cadets aboard Unión become senior officers, this type of meeting on the high seas may become the norm across Latin American waters.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong to the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

*The ARM Reformador (POLA-101) was renamed to POLA ARM-101 Benito Juárez.

Featured Image: March 2017 – COTECMAR delivers OPV ARC Victoria to the Colombian Navy (COTECMAR photo)

Friends from Afar: U.S. and South Korea Coast Guards Help South America Combat IUU Fishing

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“We focus on partnerships…Our partners want to work with us. They want the advantage of the United States education, training, exercises and military equipment. It’s the best in the world. And so it’s up to us to deliver that in a way that’s relevant and also provides a return on investment for American taxpayer. So that is our focus.” –Navy Adm. Craig S. Faller, commander of U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee July 9, 2019.

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Introduction

A deployment by the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Stone (WMSL-758) to the South Atlantic, and two coast guard patrol vessels donated by the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) to the Ecuadorian Navy, are some of the latest initiatives by South America’s partners to help regional navies combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. As large, extra-hemispheric fishing fleets continue to actively operate close to South American waters, often crossing into the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of regional states, navies require additional ships and the physical presence of partner navies to combat these crimes. In the vast waters of the South Pacific and South Atlantic, every ship counts.

The Current Status of the Extra-Regional Fleet

IUU is a constant problem across Latin American waters, both in the South Pacific and South Atlantic. At the time of this writing, the large, extra-hemispheric fishing fleet that operated in international waters close to Ecuador’s EEZ (see the author’s October 16, 2020 commentary “TIAR 21: Maritime security, the TIAR, and IUU fishing in the Western Hemisphere”) has crossed to the South Atlantic. The fleet gained international notoriety when it operated close to the Galapagos Islands, close to Ecuador, in mid-2020.

It has since then voyaged south, passing by Peru and Chile. After monitoring the fleet as it navigated close to its waters, the Chilean Navy reported that some 233 extra-hemispheric fishing vessels, mostly Chinese but also from South Korea and other nations, have crossed the Magellan Strait and Cape Horn to reach the South Atlantic. 

The U.S. Coast Guard Helps South American Partners 

The U.S. Coast Guard has deployed its new Legend-class cutter Stone to the South Atlantic to cooperate with the navies of Guyana, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, as well as Portugal, to help combat IUU fishing.

Stone departed from the U.S. in late December and has already passed by Guyana, where it carried out maneuvers with the coast guards of Guyana to combat IUU fishing in the area as part of Operation Southern Cross. In engaging with Brazil, the crew of the Stone “conducted engagements and training on communications and law enforcement procedures at the Mocangue Naval Complex in Rio de Janeiro. At sea, Stone worked with the patrol vessel Guaiba and the offshore patrol vessel Amazonas to patrol jointly and practice maneuvering together,” explained the U.S. Coast Guard to the author. Stone docked in Montevideo, Uruguay, in late January.

U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Jason McCarthey, operations officer of the USCGC Stone (WMSL 758), exchanges gifts with members of the Guyana Coast Guard off the coast of Guyana on Jan. 9, 2021. After enacting a bilateral agreement on Sep. 18, 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard and Guyana Coast Guard completed their first cooperative training exercise to practice combating illicit marine traffic. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class John Hightower) KCG retired Coast Guard ships are loaded onto a transport for delivery to Ecuador (Korean Coast Guard photo)

For Latin American states, it is always helpful when a (modern) vessel from one of its partners travels to the region to provide assistance with surveillance and, if necessary, interception operations of suspicious vessels that may be engaged in activities like IUU fishing, smuggling narcotics, among other maritime crimes. However, vessels like Stone cannot be in the South Atlantic perpetually, and so it is up to regional navies to cooperate with each other and improve their capacities to combat these crimes.

The Importance of Ports in the Fight Against IUU Fishing

A spokesperson from the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs explained to the author that the U.S. government “supports and promotes the implementation of the Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), a groundbreaking treaty designed to ensure catch from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels cannot be offloaded in ports and enter the global market.” If implemented in an effective manner, “the PSMA can ​close gaps and weak points so that fishing vessels conducting IUU fishing activities have minimal opportunities to circumvent the rules,” the spokesperson explained. South American countries like Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Uruguay are already parties to the PSMA.

Uruguay is an interesting case study of efforts to combat IUU fishing. The country has very limited naval assets and a vast sea that is plagued by IUU fishing (see the author’s October 12, 2016 commentary for CIMSEC: “The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy”). Therefore, in a positive development, “the government of Uruguay, consistent with the Port State Measures Agreement, will require certification from all large fishing ships to demonstrate they have not been engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by requiring Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) location data. Uruguay is also increasing the number of its fishing vessel inspectors by 33 percent,” explained the Bureau to the author. The announcement was made during the 25-27 January visit of Stone to the South American nation.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Washington has an “ongoing multiyear partnership in the Caribbean with the [Food and Agriculture Organization] to support PSMA implementation and other instruments to combat IUU fishing in the Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago.” Extra-hemispheric fishing fleets (e.g. from China) do not operate in Caribbean waters, but the region still has to combat IUU fishing. Therefore, support from the U.S., particularly via the U.S. Coast Guard, but also from other agencies, is key to protecting Caribbean marine life.

The KCG Ecuadorian-Partnership

In mid-December, the Ecuadorian Navy presented its two new secondhand patrol boats. The vessels were operated by the Korean Coast Guard from the early 1990s until they were decommissioned in 2019 and 2020. The Haeuri-class vessels have an overall length of 54 meters, a displacement of 300 tons, and were manufactured by Hyundai Heavy Industries.

The two ships were transported from South Korea to Ecuador aboard the general cargo ship Atlantic Harmony; they departed South Korea in mid-November and arrived in mid-December. It is expected that the vessels will be commissioned into the fleet in early 2021.

Retired Korean Coast Guard ships are loaded onto a transport for delivery to Ecuador (Korean Coast Guard photo)

Prior to their commissioning, maintenance for the new ships will be provided by the Ecuadorian state-run shipyard ASTINAVE, a shipyard spokesperson explained to the author. The shipyard’s operations, like building new vessels and maintaining the rest of the fleet, make ASTINAVE a critical pillar of the country’s defense strategy, the spokesperson explained.

The two ships are a welcome addition to the Ecuadorian fleet for patrol operations. In fact, according to reports, the ships will be utilized to patrol the Galapagos Islands in order to protect these natural reserves from IUU fishing.

In a statement, Commissioner General of the Korea Coast Guard Kim Hong Hee highlighted the importance of this transfer: “previously, the vessels 302 and 303 had successfully completed the missions of protecting the marine resources and safeguarding the maritime sovereignty surrounding the Jeju island, South Korea. They will be once again serving the cause after arriving at the Guayaquil Port of Ecuador.”

Commissioner General of the Korea Coast Guard Kim Hong Hee (Korean Coast Guard photo)

Final Thoughts

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is a global problem that requires short- and long-term strategies, including greater cooperation between the governments of nations whose waters are constantly suffering from predatory fishing. This is the case of many Latin American nations, as navies are monitoring their EEZs to locate, shadow, and if necessary, intercept extra-hemispheric fishing vessels.

In 2020, a major international fishing fleet of over 300 vessels, many of them from China, made global headlines as they operated close to the cherished Galapagos Islands. However, while global media attention has moved on to other issues, the fleet is still close to South American waters, with some 233 vessels reportedly crossing from the South Pacific to the South Atlantic. The vast number of fishing vessels means that regional navies require more ships, not to mention more maritime patrol aircraft, to maintain a vigilant presence across vast bodies of water.

This is why the deployment of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Stone, in addition to other support provided by Washington, and the donation by the Korea Coast Guard to the Ecuadorian Navy of two decommissioned patrol vessels, are welcome developments. “I hope that the two patrol vessels will become invaluable assets for Ecuador, which is also affected by the spread of the coronavirus, contributing to protecting the Galapagos islands designated as one of the UNESCO Natural Heritage sites,” commented KCG Commissioner General Kim Hong Hee in November as Atlantic Harmony departed for Latin America.

As extra-hemispheric fishing fleets will continue to operate in a predatory manner close, if not within the EEZs of South American nations, greater cooperation and an active physical presence in these vast waters will remain mandatory.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong to the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Featured Image: Guyana Coast Guard small boats patrol alongside the USCGC Stone (WMSL 758) off Guyana’s coast on Jan. 9, 2021. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class John Hightower)