Warfighting

Contesting the Littoral Terrain: The Iran War and the Military Solution to Chokepoint Warfare

6 Comments

By Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired), Indian Army

The U.S.-Iran war has provided an operational test of American maritime power. Despite assembling a formidable naval force, conducting extensive strike campaigns and achieving consistent tactical success, the United States failed to control the Strait of Hormuz or sustain freedom of movement in the Red Sea. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), employing distributed fast attack craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, maritime mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munitions, along with the Houthis, effectively contest both waterways. In addition to restricting operations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, commercial shipping remains disrupted, generating global economic consequences, energy price spikes, supply chain delays and domestic inflation that continues to accumulate political pressure on the American war effort disproportionate to the military situation.

The core failure leading to this dilemma was one of strategic understanding. The United States applied a conventional maritime power-projection model built for adversaries with limited cost-tolerance and permissive maritime approaches, against an adversary fighting what it understood to be an existential conflict in its own littoral territory. Iran did and does not not need to defeat the U.S. Navy. It needs only to make the contest so long and costly that the United States will eventually choose to quit. Compounding this, the attempt to suppress Iran’s denial capability at its source failed structurally; the absence of a genuine alliance architecture from the outset removed the mechanism by which American cost-tolerance could have been collectively sustained. Below, this article discusses the  central lessons of the war.

The Cost-Tolerance Asymmetry and Why Conventional Responses Failed

When the decisive variable in a maritime contest is not firepower but the relative willingness of each party to absorb cost, conventional military responses will underperform regardless of their tactical effectiveness. This is the Iran war’s foundational lesson. The IRGCN’s asymmetric instruments –  cheap, dispersed, and rapidly reconstituting – were effective because they were difficult to destroy individually and because the aggregate cost of contesting them exceeded what the system, simultaneously absorbing the economic blowback of a contested strait, was prepared to sustain indefinitely. Iran, fighting existentially, had no equivalent constraint. This cost-exchange compounded the problem. Every Standard Missile which intercepted a cheap Iranian drone represented an exchange ratio that, sustained over months of operations, depleted American precision munitions stockpiles faster than industrial production can replenish. Every manned strike sortie against a dispersed fast boat concentration costed orders of magnitude more than the target it neutralized. The mathematics of attrition in asymmetric chokepoint warfare are designed deliberately, to favour the defender over time. A military solution to contested chokepoint warfare cannot be built on this exchange model but must seek to invert it.

The most direct military response to a distributed denial force is to destroy it at the source by striking command nodes, logistics networks, manufacturing facilities and supply chains. The United States and Israel attempted this comprehensively but did not achieve desired outcomes. Iran had spent four decades dispersing, hardening and building redundancy into its critical military infrastructure in anticipation of exactly this campaign. This was not adequately appreciated. The mobile launcher problem that frustrated Scud-hunting in the Gulf War was applied at institutional scale by the IRGCN: dispersed, mobile, and rapidly reconstituting systems are structurally resistant to suppression by strike, regardless of the precision or volume of fires applied.

Alliance Architecture – a Military Necessity

The United States entered the maritime contest without the alliance architecture that sustained chokepoint operations require. By committing to conflict without prior consultation with the allies most affected by the Hormuz Strait’s disruption, the United States created economic grievances among the partners whose naval capacity, basing access and political support were essential to sustaining the campaign. The operational consequence was an American force bearing the overwhelming majority of cost. The naval forces of allies, properly integrated under combined command with shared rules of engagement and equitable distribution of operational cost, would have materially changed the cost-tolerance equation. Alliance-building is therefore a military precondition for sustained chokepoint operations.

The Military Solution: Neutralising the Terrain

If suppression of the source fails and conventional power projection into the contested space is cost-unsustainable, the military solution must operate on a different logic entirely. The answer the Iran war points toward is the active neutralization of the geographic and asymmetric advantages the adversary has built within the contested terrain – contesting the chokepoint itself with instruments that impose on the adversary the same cost-exchange problem it has imposed. Iran achieved its strategic effects by positioning distributed, low-signature denial forces within and adjacent to the strait, making every American attempt to operate there expensive. The military solution is to do the same thing in reverse: make the adversary’s use of the terrain as costly.

Inverting the Cost Exchange: Directed Energy and Attritable Systems

The current exchange model of combat fiscally favours the adversary over any prolonged contest. Two complementary capabilities invert this ratio. Directed energy weapons, shipborne and shore-based laser systems and high-powered microwave emitters intercept drones and fast boat concentrations at a marginal cost once fielded, with no magazine depth constraint. Against the high-volume, low-cost threat that characterized IRGCN operations, directed energy offers the first cost-exchange model that structurally favours the contesting force rather than the denial force. Though these systems are still fledgling, the Iran war provides the operational urgency to field these systems at scale across the fleet and at shore-based positions adjacent to contested waterways.

Attritable unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and UAVs, deployed in large numbers as the primary friction-absorbers within the threat envelope, complete the inversion. When the platforms absorbing adversary fires are unmanned and genuinely expendable, costing a fraction of a destroyer or a manned aircraft, the adversary’s cost-exchange advantage disappears. At sufficient scale and combined with allied production-sharing, this model exhausts adversary precision munitions inventories faster than they can be replenished, reversing the attrition dynamic that has run against the United States throughout the conflict.

The Undersea Domain: Where Geography Cannot Canalize

The undersea domain is the one environment in which the littoral defender’s geographic advantage is most effectively neutralized. Attack submarines operating in the strait and its approaches can conduct surveillance, deliver precision strike and lay minefields without presenting the surface signature that activates adversary anti-access systems. Iran used maritime mines as a cheap denial instrument that imposed uncertainty and economic disruption across the entire commercial shipping community. The United States can apply the same instrument at greater scale and sophistication through submarine-delivered minefields contesting Iranian naval approach routes, complicating IRGCN fast boat operations, and imposing on Iran the same cost of uncertainty it has imposed on others. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) extend this capability further, operating in the shallowest and most geographically confined sections of the strait where manned submarines cannot easily go.

The undersea domain should be the primary domain of sea control operations in contested chokepoint environments. This is because submarines and UUVs present no viable target to the asymmetric denial systems that have proven most effective, and because the cost of undersea operations does not replicate the devastating exchange ratios that surface and air operations produce. Expanding submarine production capacity is the most direct and durable military response to the chokepoint problem this war has posed. It is a response whose value compounds as adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems become more sophisticated.

Contesting the Terrain: Land-Based Positioned Forces

The most structurally important military solution is also the one most directly derived from Iran’s own operational example. The relevance of small, low-signature Marine and special operations forces, positioned on islands and coastal terrain within or adjacent to contested chokepoints armed with long-range anti-ship missiles, drone swarms, electronic warfare systems and coastal surveillance networks is evident. These will impose a persistent, reconstituting threat on the adversary that cannot be suppressed without costly operations. Such forces positioned ashore within range of Iranian naval routes would cause the IRGCN to expend resources on suppression rather than on denial operations. Drone swarms launched from coastal positions degrade adversary surveillance and force dispersal rather than concentration. Electronic warfare embedded in the terrain contaminates the targeting networks on which adversary precision fires depend.

This concept does not replicate Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS) as it is not about projecting power onto inland objectives from a permissive maritime approach. Nor is it the Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept in its original Indo-Pacific framing. It is terrain contestation using the same geographic logic that Iran has exploited so effectively –  presence within the chokepoint, short supply lines, distributed and reconstitutable positioning, but as an offensive denial tool rather than a defensive one. The adversary that has made maritime terrain a weapon must find that terrain has become a shared burden rather than a private advantage.

Together, these three elements constitute an integrated military approach to chokepoint warfare that does not depend on suppressing the source, does not require forward-deploying irreplaceable capital ships into the highest-threat zones, and generates a cost-exchange ratio that can sustain even against an adversary with existential stakes.

Force Structure Implications

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains the most capable maritime task force ever assembled and carrier aviation retains decisive value in permissive and semi-permissive environments. The Iran war does not invalidate that value but it clarifies its limits. In contested chokepoints, the CSG is the wrong primary instrument: too detectable, too valuable to risk and too dependent on approach conditions that asymmetric adversaries are specifically organized to prevent. The CSG should be held in depth, committed only after terrain-contesting and undersea forces have imposed sufficient cost on the adversary’s denial capability to open a corridor of reduced-threat access. CSG employment follows conditions; it does not create them.

Naval force structure for littoral or choke point combat should therefore be rebalanced accordingly around the three priorities brought out above, that this war has validated as operationally decisive. These three capabilities, operating in combination with genuinely integrated allied naval contributions, constitute a cost-exchange model that can be sustained. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) security mission that has organized American naval strategy for generations must be restructured around this model with a tiered approach that prioritizes SLOCs directly serving American economic interests, while building genuine allied burden-sharing for the broader global maritime commons whose security no single navy can now afford to guarantee alone.

The Taiwan Parallel: China’s Existential Calculus

The operational lessons of the Iran war carry their most consequential implications not in the Persian Gulf but in the Western Pacific. Beijing has observed this conflict with the same analytical intensity that military historians apply to transformative wars. The Taiwan question presents a structural parallel for China: a great power attempting maritime force projection against a regional adversary for whom the conflict is existential.

However, the reverse is also true. Taiwan is central to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s historical narrative, to the political identity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to the domestic political standing of the leadership in Beijing. A Chinese leadership that fails to act on Taiwan under sufficient provocation would face an internal political crisis of the first order. This means that in any serious confrontation over Taiwan, China’s cost-tolerance would be structurally elevated and the cost-exchange dynamics of the Iran war would repeat at enormously greater scale.

China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) architecture in the Western Pacific vastly exceeds the IRGCN’s capabilities in scale, sophistication and depth. The anti-ship ballistic missiles, with ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, hold CSGs at risk well beyond the first island chain. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) submarine force, land-based aviation massed on the Fujian coast, and an integrated maritime surveillance network combining space, cyber and undersea sensors, create a threat environment that makes the Strait of Hormuz look manageable by comparison. And crucially, as the Iran war has demonstrated, striking the source of this capability will not reliably degrade it. Chinese A2/AD infrastructure is distributed, hardened and redundant in ways that reflect decades of preparation for exactly the kind of suppression campaign would be attempted.

The strategic prescription that flows from the Iran war applies directly: the United States and its allies must prepare for a Taiwan contingency on the basis that CSG-forward operations inside the first island chain represent an unacceptable risk to irreplaceable assets. The only option that does not accept catastrophic risk but maintains credible deterrence requires the following elements: the distributed deterrence model with forward-positioned land-based anti-ship missiles with Japan, the Philippines and Australia; expanded undersea presence within the first island chain; attritable unmanned systems at scale; and Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial capability developed explicitly on the Iranian model.

Taiwan’s investment in land-based anti-ship missiles, coastal defense systems, sea mines and drone swarms – the precise instruments that gave Iran disproportionate leverage in the strait – raises China’s cost of coercion without requiring capital ships to enter the most prepared kill zones on Earth. The Iran war has demonstrated what a determined littoral defender with the right asymmetric instruments can impose on a conventionally superior adversary. The alliance architecture supporting Taiwan’s defense must be built before any confrontation begins, not assembled in its aftermath.

Conclusion: Reading the War Honestly

The Iran war was a failure of strategic understanding of the dynamics of asymmetric cost-tolerance in existential littoral conflict compounded by the absence of an alliance architecture that should have been the precondition for military action.

The military solution that emerges from honest analysis is specific and actionable. Directed energy and attritable unmanned systems invert the cost-exchange ratio that has run against the United States throughout the conflict. Submarine and UUV forces operating in the undersea domain can effectively contest the chokepoint as undersea geography provides no canalization advantage to the defender. Land-based positioned forces within the contested terrain flip the asymmetric logic, making the adversary’s geographic advantage a shared burden rather than a private weapon. And genuine alliance architecture, built before conflict rather than during it, distributes cost-tolerance across the coalition to a level that an existential adversary’s threshold cannot easily exceed.

These prescriptions apply with even greater urgency to the Taiwan contingency, where China’s nationalist cost-tolerance, vastly superior A2/AD architecture and decades of preparation for allied suppression campaigns create conditions that will replicate and exceed the Iran war’s dynamics. The time to build the distributed deterrence model, develop allied land-based strike networks, expand undersea capacity and ensure Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial is the time before the confrontation. The Iran war has provided the template, the warning and the operational data.The question now is its implementation.

Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired) is a decorated Indian Army officer with over 37 years of distinguished service. His operational experience included amphibious and littoral warfare in the subcontinent. He has held pivotal operational, strategic and advisory roles in India’s defense establishment and continues to shape discourse in homeland and international security. He is a graduate of premier military education institutions in India and abroad, including the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHDEDN) in Paris. Gen. Mann is a Ph.D. from Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, where he researched defense industrial policy, defense offsets and their role in national security.

Featured image: Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121) fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Economics and Trade

Asymmetric Spending: Taiwan’s Opportunities to Defend Against Economic Warfare

Leave a comment

By Joseph Hanacek and Josh Richards

Recent events in the Strait of Hormuz offer a timely reminder that economic warfare at sea rarely resembles the clean, declared naval cordons of the past. Blocking commercial shipping from transiting through one of the world’s most critical energy arteries has not required mass sinkings or a total closure. Instead, a combination of selective strikes, vessel harassment, insurance volatility, and uncertainty has been sufficient to disrupt traffic, reroute ships, and impose real economic costs. In many cases, ships do not need to be sunk to be stopped; owners, insurers, or crews need only to decide that continuing forward is no longer worth the risk.

This emerging pattern reflects a broader shift in how maritime coercion is exercised, and is directly relevant to Taiwan, where Beijing is developing a range of coercive options: from incremental pressure on commercial shipping to high-intensity operations designed to rapidly sever Taiwan’s external lifelines. This was made abundantly clear in late December 2025, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China staged its most geographically expansive and strategically audacious military exercises around Taiwan in years.1 Over two days, the PLA mobilized warships, fighter jets, bombers, missile units, unmanned aerial vehicles, and coast guard elements across multiple designated zones in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters, focusing in particular on the island’s major ports, including Keelung in the north and Kaohsiung in the south. Chinese authorities framed the exercises as “Justice Mission 2025,” and mark the latest iteration of a series of Taiwan focused exercises aimed to practice joint operations, port blockades, sea-air control, and deterring external intervention while disrupting maritime and air traffic in ways that would impede Taiwan’s ability to sustain normal commerce under crisis conditions.

Importantly, Chinese writings on a “Joint Blockade Campaign” do not present this concept as part of a gradual economic warfare campaign that can increasingly take on military characteristics as the situation escalates. PLA sources describe a campaign that may open with large-scale missile strikes on ports and infrastructure, mining operations, and rapid efforts to establish sea and air control while staving off any outside attempts to interfere. In this framing, a blockade is a direct component of kinetic conflict, rather than an alternative. Even so, it is worth considering how investments in the ability to conduct a blockade during a direct conflict widen the range of options for China as they navigate the road from competition to crisis and conflict. Preparing their military for direct action such as a Joint Blockade Campaign paired with a lightening style assault marks a straightforward path to reunification, but it also enables forms of economic warfare that form complimentary parallel paths to the same end. Channeling Sun Tsu’s maxim that the supreme art of war is to defeat your enemy without fighting, China will recognize that there may be a path to victory through imposing economic asphyxiation. If Taiwan is going to resist China’s reunification efforts, they must prepare for the widely discussed decisive and overwhelming lightening campaign, but they must be ready to face the subtler threat of economic warfare as well.

Why economic warfare is so likely

China’s desire to unify Taiwan with the mainland is about far more than merely re-acquiring lost territory, blotting out a symbol of democratic resilience, or achieving a longstanding goal to reinforce the CCPs legitimacy. In a single stroke it is an opportunity to seize a structural pillar of the global economy, corner an immensely important maritime and information exchange route, and secure its ability to project power and maintain access to markets around the globe. While China’s massive military buildup includes enormous investments in amphibious warfare and air assault capabilities, an all-out attack to rapidly regain Taiwan risks a prolonged land battle that might destroy much of the island’s inherent value. By contrast, economic warfare can be an effective means by which China can avoid direct action against Taiwan and preserve much of the value already accrued by decades of global investment in Taiwanese critical technologies and trade infrastructure.

Economic warfare is also extremely flexible and scalable, presenting China with a set of options that can be adapted to fit the strategic and operational realities existing at the time of the attempted reunification, with opportunities to make adjustments as the situation evolves. This flexibility and scalability is best illustrated by categorizing economic warfare into four escalating tiers: trade embargo, police actions, quarantine, and blockade. Understanding these tiers and their intended goals is a critical first step in building resistance against them.2

The lowest tier, trade embargo, is already largely in place. Every day, China uses its massive economic and military influence to deter nations and corporations around the globe from establishing relationships with Taiwan, denying them access to modern military and economic technology that might help them resist Chinese influence. Having been in place for decades, this approach has blunted Taiwan’s economic development and contributed to significant social friction within a Taiwanese population that remembers the economic dynamism and the feeling of opportunity that resided in past generations of Taiwan’s citizenry. What China has yet to do but certainly could is present foreign companies ranging from McDonald’s to Disney to Boeing with a choice – if you do business with Taiwan, you cannot do business on the mainland. While such a move would hurt Beijing economically, the possibility of the PRC taking this route cannot be ruled out especially since in the past multi-national corporations have buckled under Beijing’s threats. Chinese leaders may calculate that profit driven corporations will bend to their demands if forced to do so.

The second tier of economic warfare is the “lawfare” approach, which is the declaration of an internal police action to seize or block critical supplies en route to Taiwan. This approach  is also already in practice, as China’s Taiwan Affairs Office declared in 2024 that, despite widespread recognition by the international community for decades, there is no such thing as Taiwan “prohibited” or “restricted” waters around the Taiwanese outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu.3 The Chinese coast guard then issued orders granting the authority for CCG ships to board foreign vessels suspected of “illegally entering waters on Chinese jurisdiction” around these islands, and to detain foreign nationals for up to 60 days without trial if they are suspected of “endangering national security.”

While the detention of only a limited number of merchant vessels inbound to Taiwan might not seem impactful, Taiwan’s enormous reliance on imported Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to power its electric grid is such that these selective boardings have the potential to bring economic activity on the island nearly to a stop. Taiwan typically receives one to two LNG tanker arrivals per day, and LNG storage can sustain electricity consumption for only 10–14 days under crisis conditions, so stopping inbound LNG ships for several weeks would cause Taiwan to quickly burn through stockpiles. As LNG provides approximately 50% of the total energy produced for the electric grid, and roughly 40% of the island’s energy is earmarked for residential and service sector consumption, Taiwan’s industrial sector would bear the brunt of the shortages. Even if significant war-time austerity measures and energy rationing were put in place, semiconductor manufacturing requires nearly uninterrupted power, and it is highly unlikely Taiwan could continue in its role at the center of global microchip manufacturing under these conditions.

The third tier of escalating economic warfare options is best described as quarantine, and it exists in both de jure and de facto forms. In its formal and legal sense, a quarantine is a peace-time enforcement measure that typically requires a UN Security Council resolution to stop the transport of materials to or from a place, but which can be declared without such a resolution if the nation justifies the action as a measure of self-defense. The clearest historical precedent for such an action is the U.S. quarantine of Cuba during the 1960’s Cuban Missile Crisis, an attempt to keep Russian ships from moving nuclear weapons to the island. While China might pursue this course, declaring that the movement of certain classes of cargo to and from the island of Taiwan is contrary to their national security, they could likely achieve the same or similar ends through a hybrid legal and economic approach. This could begin with China declaring inspection zones or “maritime safety advisories” in the Taiwan Strait, discouraging shipping firms from entering, and using diplomatic and economic leverage to reinforce them.4 During the 2022 live fire drills, during which China first conducted missile tests that flew over Taiwan, insurers such as Lloyd’s of London temporarily raised war-risk premiums for accessing Taiwanese waters.5 As Taiwan relies almost entirely on commercial shipping instead of a nationally flagged and crewed merchant marine, these increased insurance premiums would largely freeze commercial shipments to and from the island until new insurance coverages could be negotiated.

The fourth and final category would be China’s use of blockade to threaten and potentially destroy traffic to and from Taiwan. This is an act of war that requires formal declaration to the international community, and would also likely coincide with military actions taken against portions or the entirety of the Taiwanese Navy and Air Force. The unique strategic distinction of blockade over quarantine is that there is no rule that a blockade is unlawful if it disproportionately impacts the civilian population, so long as some military advantage is also being gained. As such, food, medicine, energy, and other critical resource transportation can be shut off. 6 By some estimates, Taiwan would face critical shortages of energy and food within 14 to 21 days if its ports were closed.7 Shutting down the manufacturing sector and significant national food and energy rationing could buy Taiwan several additional months of resistance, but conditions would be severe. The United States and partners could attempt to resupply Taiwan’s food and medical stores by air, an approach China might be less likely to challenge, but airlift capacity is orders of magnitude too small to replace port throughput when it comes to serving energy needs.8

For Beijing, embargo, lawfare, quarantine, and blockade all represent potentially decisive options that can also be downplayed as shows of restraint when considered next to the outright invasion of Taiwan that it has been preparing for. For Taipei, while Taiwan’s defenses have long been oriented toward stopping amphibious assault across the western beaches, the equal if not more likely threat of maritime asphyxiation has been largely neglected.

To negate a strategy of economic warfare, Taiwan must play the lead role in defending its own autonomy. Modern technologies and good government policy offer new opportunities to create a more resilient society in the face of increasing maritime pressure. Some of these opportunities focus on military investments, but to build resilience against economic warfare, many of the most important decisions Taiwan needs to make are tied to purely civil issues. By focusing on these opportunities, Taiwan has an opportunity to peacefully and asymmetrically prevent China from checkmating them economically before western nations could come to their aid.

Building resilience

To defeat the overwhelming logic driving China to pursue victory through economic warfare, Taiwan must look inwards and eastward. Inward, towards resilience through renewable energy investments, fossil fuel stockpiles, and a renewed merchant marine, and eastward, toward its pacific coastline and under-developed ports there. Long neglected in defense planning, these investments may be among Taiwan’s most important untapped strategic assets.

The most direct route Taiwan has to build resilience has to do with overhauling the national energy production by reducing investments that create overreliance on LNG and heavily subsidizing other sources of energy. As a benchmark, Taiwan should aim to ensure that at least 75% of its current energy demand is available via means other than natural gas, thereby achieving energy independence for residential use, general commercial and government services, and limited industrial production.

Achieving this 75% benchmark requires an increase in non-LNG sources by approximately 11GW of daily production. Taiwan is already well on its way towards achieving these goals, with renewable and battery storage targets exceeding 11GW by 2030, but these increases do not take into account reductions in coal powered energy production over the same time period. With the threat of energy interdiction looming large, Taiwan should make every effort to increase these renewable energy targets, expedite their completion, and ensure that investments remain on track.

Industrial growth led by increased chip production and data center construction will challenge Taiwan’s political leadership’s attempts to prioritize renewable energy investments, as rapid growth in energy consumption from these sectors is being met today with plans to increase Taiwan’s LNG capacity. Taiwan should consider tethering any increase in LNG production capacity on the island to matching increases in renewables, coal, and fuel oils. In the renewables sector, prioritizing investments in rooftop solar and small-scale battery storage are particularly critical, as they represent the most resilient forms of energy Taiwan will have in the face of the more advanced stages of blockade. With regards to coal and fuel oils, rapid investments should be made in topping off and expanding stockpiles, and coal plants decommissioned as a part of Taiwan’s larger environmental efforts must be subsidized to be capable of being rapidly brought back online.

Taiwan’s internal investments in its merchant marine are the next major hurdle in achieving resilience in the face of economic warfare. Taiwanese companies own an enormous share of the world’s shipping vessels, but fewer than 30% of the crews that sail them are Taiwanese. Foreign flagging has drastically reduced operating costs and kept Taiwanese companies profitable and competitive but has resulted in a dramatic decline in Taiwan’s maritime workforce. In executing an economic warfare campaign, Beijing would likely exert diplomatic and economic pressure on foreign registries, insurers, ports operators, and labor pools in an effort to disrupt commercial shipping to the island. Taiwan and partner nations should therefore develop contingency frameworks for sustaining critical shipping operations, including the rapid re-crewing of essential vessels with Taiwanese or partner-nation personnel willing to operate in contested conditions.

The main case for investment in coastal infrastructure on the east side of Taiwan is that it asymmetrically increases the military difficulties China faces when creating a cordon around Taiwan. A deep-water port at Hualien and Taitung, hardened and connected by tunnel and rail through the mountains, would give Taiwan a second strategic coastline for energy imports. In the event of a non-firing blockade, these ports would force China to commit a much larger portion of its maritime forces to patrolling and boarding duties in the Philippine Sea, driving up the logistics footprint and reducing their availability for other tasking. Existing infrastructure already provides a foundation: Hualien hosts an active Air Force base and is connected to Taipei and Taichung via the Central Cross-Island Highway and North-Link Railway, both of which include tunnels through bedrock.9 In 2018, Taiwan’s CPC Corporation conducted feasibility studies for building an LNG terminal at Hualien to diversify energy imports away from Kaohsiung.10 The Japanese Ministry of Defense has also assessed Hualien and Su’ao as potential logistics nodes in a Taiwan contingency.11

The undersea and information dimensions are equally critical. Taiwan is connected to the world by 15 submarine internet cables, most of which currently land on its western coast.12 In 2023, two cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands to the main island were cut, likely by Chinese fishing vessels, disrupting communications for weeks.13 While increasing use of space based internet providers offers some increased resiliency, bandwidth projections over the next several years suggest that these services will only be able to handle approximately 10% of Taiwan’s peacetime levels of internet traffic.14 To ensure access to higher levels of bandwidth, US Naval Postgraduate School researchers have warned that ports should be integrated with maritime domain awareness (MDA) networks, seabed sonar arrays, and AUV patrol routes to monitor and defend vital seabed infrastructure.15 If deep-water eastern ports were built with adjacent cable landing stations and hardened underground control rooms, they could serve as both logistics hubs and digital fortresses.

Building eastern ports is a strategic reorientation that forces China to contest both the Strait and the Pacific approaches simultaneously.

Risks of Failing to Act

If Taiwan remains dependent on its western ports and shallow coastal infrastructure, the island could be cut off from the world long before an invasion fleet appears over the horizon. China will have re-ordered the global balance of power without firing a shot.

The first and most visible consequence would be a Chinese monopoly over the world’s most advanced chips. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) controls about 92 percent of global production of leading-edge chips under 7 nanometers, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, and 100% of chips under 2 nanometers.16 If Beijing asserted control, whether through occupation, coercion, or forced “reunification”, it would hold the world’s digital future in its hands. Even if Taiwan’s engineers sabotaged fabrication plants, simply removing Taiwan from global chip supply chains would cost the global economy up to $1 trillion within a year.17

The second consequence would be a dramatic shift in the military geography of Asia. With Taiwan under its control, China would be able to break through the First Island Chain and project power into the central Pacific.18 The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could position aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and submarines on Taiwan’s eastern shoreline, directly overlooking the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel, the two maritime gateways used by U.S. and Japanese forces to move between the East China Sea and Philippine Sea.19 From Taiwan, China could threaten Japan’s southern Ryukyu Islands, monitor U.S. submarines departing Guam, and exert pressure on the Philippines’ Batanes Islands at the northern tip of Luzon.20 It is no exaggeration to say that if Taiwan falls, the South China Sea becomes a Chinese lake, and the Western Pacific becomes contested water.

Finally, the fall or isolation of Taiwan would shatter confidence in U.S. security commitments across the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, Canberra, and European partners are watching not only what China does, but whether the United States allows it. In think tank simulations and classified defense discussions, Japanese and South Korean officials have privately warned that if Washington fails to defend Taiwan, their governments will consider acquiring nuclear weapons or making accommodations with Beijing.21

In short, the cost of inaction is not merely Taiwanese democracy. It is global technological stability, the military balance in the Indo-Pacific, and the credibility of U.S. led relationships that underpin peace.

Policy Recommendations

As the damage that an attempted Chinese reunification with Taiwan would cause to the global economy is assessed to exceed $1 Trillion USD within a year, solutions oriented around averting that outcome should be of a magnitude befitting of that danger, and should be a burden shared by the global community. A significant portion of those solutions should be oriented around deterrence, including investments by the United States, European, and Asian nations in military forces able to intervene in such a reunification attempt, but a maritime crisis in the Taiwan Strait will not be solved by deterrence alone. Geography cannot be negotiated, and Taiwan’s geography dictates that its survival depends on eastward connectivity, to the Pacific, to allied logistics, and to a hardened industrial and energy base. A forward-looking strategy must therefore treat energy investments, port construction, undersea infrastructure, and logistics resilience as the new frontier of deterrence. The following actions can anchor that strategy for Taiwan, the United States, and key allies.

For Taiwan

  • Increase renewable and battery storage capacity by at least 11GW as soon as possible and no later than 2030.
  • Ensure Taiwan retains the excess energy-generating capacity of all coal power plants brought offline by investing in programs to keep them maintained and staffed in a reserve capacity.
  • Require that all LNG electricity production increases are paired with renewable energy investments of equal scale.
  • Work with shipping companies to develop a plan to rapidly re-crew critical merchant ships with Taiwanese crew.
  • Construct deep-water, dual-use ports on the eastern coast, at Hualien, Taitung, or Su’ao, with at least 18–20 meters of draft, hardened breakwaters, underground fuel storage, and tunnel-linked rail and highway networks through the Central Mountain Range.22
  • Integrate ports with military infrastructure, including coastal anti-ship missile batteries, rapid runway repair units, and underground command centers resistant to missile strikes.
  • Establish maritime domain awareness (MDA) and seabed defense capabilities tied to port development: fixed sonar arrays, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and secured landing points for undersea cables and fuel pipelines.23

For the United States

  • Fund a Taiwan East Coast Resilience Initiative under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to support port deepening, fuel infrastructure, seabed surveillance, and logistics 24
  • Conduct joint logistics and sealift exercises using Taiwan’s east coast ports between the U.S. and Taiwanese forces, including roll-on/roll-off ship operations and distributed maritime sustainment exercises.
  • Integrate Taiwan into the U.S. Indo-Pacific undersea surveillance network, linking sonar systems, unmanned underwater sensors, and cable monitoring platforms from Japan to Guam.
  • Pre-position fuel, medical supplies, and emergency power generators in Japanese ports such as Yonaguni, Ishigaki, and Okinawa for rapid deployment via the Bashi Channel.

For Japan, Australia, and Allied Partners

  • Form a trilateral U.S.–Japan–Australia infrastructure group to co-finance Taiwan’s east coast port construction, modeled after their 2022 Pacific Islands cable funding mechanism.25
  • Link Taiwan’s eastern ports with Japanese bases in Yonaguni and Okinawa to create a logistics corridor stretching from Kyushu to Hualien.
  • Deploy multinational maritime patrols to deter cable cutting and seabed sabotage, using technologies already tested by NATO in the North Sea after the Nord Stream explosions.26
  • Encourage selective participation from European partners with Indo-Pacific interests, particularly in port hardening, cable-laying, and underwater repair capabilities.

Be opportunistic in quietly reminding partner nations that long term acquiescence to China comes with a price. These measures are not simply about infrastructure; they are about time. Building Taiwan’s eastern ports, hardening its seabed cables, and securing its fuel lines will take years, but deterrence is measured in the credibility of what is already underway. The window to act is narrowing, and each year of delay leaves the island and the global economy more exposed to the whims of the strait.

Conclusion: The Eastward Imperative

Every strategy is ultimately shaped by geography, and no geography in the Indo-Pacific is more decisive than Taiwan’s location between the Strait and the Pacific. For decades, Taiwan, its partners, and even its adversaries have assumed that the island’s fate will be decided westward, across the Taiwan Strait. But the Strait is no longer a protective moat; it is a narrowing corridor easily sealed by missiles, naval patrols, and even insurance premiums. The waters that once carried Taiwan to prosperity now form the most vulnerable seam in its defenses. Taiwan’s endurance depends on building resilience at home and reorienting its future growth eastward.

This is not only a question for Taiwan. The entire global economy hinges on Taiwan’s autonomy, as the effects of reunification with China would be global: supply chains fractured, energy routes reoriented, and the balance of power in Asia permanently altered. But that future is not inevitable. Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and like-minded partners have the resources and time, though not unlimited time, to act. The construction of eastern ports is not merely an engineering problem; it is a strategic decision. It is the difference between a Taiwan that must be rescued and a Taiwan that can endure.

Joseph Hanacek is a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He serves as a Warfare Tactics Instructor at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School detachment of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in San Diego, CA. The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or its components.

Josh Richards is the Chief Commercial Officer of Pacific Peering. He serves on the UN’s Joint Task Force on SMART Cables as a member of the Steering Committee, and chairs the Business Development Committee. He is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, a Tech Policy Fellow with the Aspen Institute, and a Senior Fellow with AI2030. He received his MBA from National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan, spending a year in Hsinchu, headquarters to TSMC.

References

1. Yimou Lee and Yew Lun Tian, “China Launches Missiles Around Taiwan in Largest-Ever Drills,” Reuters, August 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/suspected-drones-over-taiwan-cyber-attacks-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-04/

2. Biggs, Adam; Xu, Dan; Roaf, Joshua; and Olson, Tatana (2021) “Theories of Naval Blockades and Their Application in the Twenty-First Century,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 74 : No. 1 , Article 9. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/9/

3. Record Number of Chinese Ships Enter Taiwan Waters Near Kinmen Island.” Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2024 https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-kinmen-intrusion-05102024034553.html

4. Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China fires ballistic missiles around Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi’s trip,” Financial Times, August 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/15877208-4628-45fd-a8ff-2db7a3d57f1c

5. Lloyd’s List, “War Risk Insurance Premiums Rise Around Taiwan,” August 2022, https://www.lloydslist.com/-/media/lloyds-list/daily-pdf/2022/08-august/dailypdf090822.pdf

6. James Kraska, Raul Pedrozo, David Letts, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Rob McLaughlin, James Farrant, Yurika Ishii, Gurpreet S. Khurana, and Koki Sato, The Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, vol. 101 of International Law Studies (Newport, RI: Stockton Center for International Law, 2023) https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol101/iss1/1/

7. CSIS, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

8. RAND Corporation, How to Succeed in Deterring an Invasion of Taiwan Without Really Trying (Hard), 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/12/how-to-succeed-in-deterring-an-invasion-of-taiwan-without.html

9. Taiwan Highspeed Rail, Taiwan High Speed Rail Sustainability Report, 2022. https://en.thsrc.com.tw/Corp/9edfd684-60e2-4661-bf9e-bbbe1110b8b2/assets/28441302-5dfb-4206-9417-7d8e1e7cb34a.pdf

10. CPC Corporation (Taiwan), LNG Diversification Feasibility Study, Hualien, 2018. https://www.cpc.com.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=2720

11. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2023 https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_Digest_EN.pdf

12. TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Map, Taiwan, https://www.submarinecablemap.com

13. Global Taiwan Institute, “China’s Undersea Cable Sabotage and Taiwan’s Digital Vulnerabilities,” 2025 https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/06/taiwans-digital-vulnerabilities/

14. Joyu Wang, Micah Maidenberg, and Yang Jie, “Taiwan’s Race for Secure Internet Detours Around Musk’s Starlink,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2024 https://www.wsj.com/tech/taiwans-race-for-secure-internet-detours-around-musks-starlink-7c273912

15. Joseph Hanacek et al, Naval Postgraduate School, SEABED INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE ANALYSIS, 2019 https://calhoun.nps.edu/entities/publication/95ade676-aaa3-4d9e-a851-af0a3b9f5bb1

16. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain, 2023, https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BCG-x-SIA-Strengthening-the-Global-Semiconductor-Value-Chain-April-2021_1.pdf

17. OECD, Vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain, 2023, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/06/vulnerabilities-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain_f4de7491/6bed616f-en.pdf

18. Andrew Erickson, “China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China’s Navy and Other Maritime Forces,” China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, 2025 https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=sU-E-J0AAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=sU-E-J0AAAAJ:kz9GbA2Ns4gC

19. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Posture Statement to Congress, 2024, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/aquilino_statement.pdf

20. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan, 2024, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2024/pdf/DOJ2024_Digest_EN.pdf

21. Michishita Narushige, Japan’s New National Security Strategy, CSIS, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-new-national-security-strategy

22. Ministry of Transportation and Communications (Taiwan), Hualien Port Expansion Report, 2022 https://www.motc.gov.tw/en/app/news_list/view?module=news&id=158&serno=ff894f74-a317-479a-8183-0228caeff0be

23. Joseph Hanacek et al, Naval Postgraduate School, SEABED INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE ANALYSIS, 2019 https://calhoun.nps.edu/entities/publication/95ade676-aaa3-4d9e-a851-af0a3b9f5bb1

24. U.S. Department of Defense, Pacific Deterrence Initiative Budget Overview, 2024 https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf

25. Australian Department of Defence, Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership with Japan and the U.S., 2022 https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2022

26. McNamara, E. M. “Reinforcing resilience: NATO’s role in enhanced security for critical undersea infrastructure.” NATO Review 28 (2024) https://www.dvidshub.net/audio/82211/nato-review-reinforcing-resilience-natos-role-enhanced-security-critical-undersea-infrastructure

Featured image: The Taiwan Innotech Expo Innovation Economy Pavilion, 2025. (Wikimedia Commons)

Middle East

The Silent Threat : Overlooked Radiological Risk in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz

2 Comments

By Dr. Abdek Mahamoud Abdi

Introduction

Following American and Israeli strikes that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader on 28 February 2026, Iran’s naval forces have frequently declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, laid mines, and issued warnings that they would target unauthorized vessels. A ceasefire agreement on 14 June lasted only a few weeks. By late July, American strikes on Iran occurred almost every night, and tanker traffic through Hormuz had fallen well below pre-war levels. The Hormuz crisis has extended beyond the Gulf. On 20 July, the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, and two days later claimed responsibility for strikes on Saudi tankers, the Encelia and the Layla, in the Red Sea. Experts had long warned about this scenario. The simultaneous pressure on both chokepoints has now become a reality.

However, the focus on the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait mainly concerns conventional threats, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles, one-way attack drones, and waterborne explosive devices used by Houthi forces. Yet a lesser-discussed risk exists, which is diverting commercial radioactive material for use in a Radiological Dispersal Device, or dirty bomb. The security challenges in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, including radioactive cargo transportation, established smuggling networks, and limited naval resources, hinder the effectiveness of current maritime security measures.

Radiological Risk in Maritime Transport

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies radioactive sources into five categories based on the potential harm they could cause if left unshielded. Category 1 and 2 sources, elements such as cobalt-60 and cesium-137 used in cancer treatment and industrial irradiators, could kill someone within minutes to hours of exposure.

According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office analysis of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) risk assessments, Category 3 sources, commonly found in industrial gauges and well-logging equipment, are actually more likely to end up in a dirty bomb than Category 1 or 2 material. Not because they’re more dangerous, but because there are so many of them in ordinary commercial use, and the security around them is lighter. By contrast, Category 4 and 5 sources don’t have enough activity to pose much of a threat, even if fully dispersed. So when people talk about dirty bomb risk, the conversation should focus on Category 3.

The key concern, therefore, is not access to weapons-grade material but the possible misuse of legitimately used radioactive sources. From a security perspective, the consequences of such an incident could extend well beyond radiation exposure, potentially causing public panic, temporary disruption of affected areas, major economic losses, and costly decontamination operations. This disruption would result not from direct casualties but from strict international regulations and frameworks that require the immediate quarantine of any area with elevated radiation levels. Consequently, an attack targeting critical regional transport nodes would weaponize public anxiety to effectively paralyze maritime operations, transforming localized contamination into an indefinite, multi-billion-dollar trade bottleneck.

These sources are transported legally through the Red Sea corridor, including radiography equipment, well-logging tools, and medical isotopes destined for hospitals and industrial facilities across East Africa and the Middle East. That ordinary traffic is exactly what creates the opportunity for smugglers.

In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s fast-attack vessels pose significant risks to maritime navigation. The ongoing conflict has escalated this threat into open hostilities, involving the placement of mines and direct attacks on tankers. In addition, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have created a parallel security challenge, forcing vessels to reroute and increasing pressure on maritime-security forces. The volatility of this environment makes the seizure of such radioactive materials a starkly real possibility.

Even if no party deliberately attempts to get these radioactive materials for a planned attack, a conventional missile or mine hitting a standard commercial vessel carrying legal Category 3 cargo could breach its containment hulls. This would spill radioactive material directly into open waters or vital harbor shipping lanes, creating localized environmental hazards and forcing immediate, long-term closures of strategic maritime routes due to contamination fears. These developments demonstrate how security pressures in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa can interact and compound vulnerabilities across interconnected maritime routes.

Potential Diversion Vulnerability and Consequences

Research into sanctions evasion has documented a so-called dark fleet of tankers, predominantly transporting Russian and Iranian oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), that manipulate or deactivate their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders and follow irregular and complex ownership structures and routes to conceal their activity and destination details. Coupled with the dhow smuggling routes between Yemen and the Somali coast, monitored by UN authorities over several years as channels for arms delivery to Houthi forces, these networks could just as readily facilitate the movement of a stolen radioactive source as weapons. Although no such case has yet been identified, the conditions are conducive to this possibility. Oversight vulnerabilities and well-established smuggling routes abound, while coalition naval forces are stretched across two active fronts.

If a ship carrying legally declared Category 3 material were boarded, disabled, or hit, its cargo could vanish before anyone could establish a perimeter, especially since coast guards and coalition ships are already strained by the Hormuz crisis. Adding naval mines and loitering munitions in shallow, crowded waters raises the chances of a hull breach that could release radioactive cargo into a port or fishing area. This scenario directly aligns with Iran’s asymmetric maritime doctrine, which weaponizes key global shipping routes to compensate for its conventional military disadvantages. Tehran has explicitly demonstrated its intent to enforce total maritime leverage. Notably, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy recently reiterated its complete and decisive control over the Strait of Hormuz, warning that any vessel operating outside its authorized routes would face catastrophic consequences.

The IAEA monitors incidents involving nuclear and radioactive materials through its Incident and Trafficking Database. In 2025, 34 member states reported 236 incidents, up from 147 the previous year. The IAEA notes that most of this increase is due to late reports of older incidents, not an actual rise in trafficking, which is an important distinction when assessing trends. Since its inception in 1993, the database has recorded over 4,600 incidents, including about 730 involving theft or attempted theft. Importantly, approximately 55 percent of these thefts occurred during transport rather than storage.

Regarding the Red Sea specifically, the genuine threat does not lie in the possibility of Houthi-affiliated groups attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Such an endeavor necessitates resources and expertise that no non-state actor in the region currently possesses. The credible threat involves Houthi-affiliated groups, or other criminal networks operating within the same domain or zone, gaining access to an unsecured Category 1 to 3 radioactive source via channels already used for trafficking other illicit items. While the integration of radiological materials into maritime weaponry by Houthi forces remains an unverified capability, the operational motive and territorial precedents within the Yemeni conflict zone are well-established. Security assessments have long flagged the vulnerability of Yemen’s domestic infrastructure. As early as 2010, international intelligence raised alarms regarding the lack of physical security at a centralized Yemeni radiological facility which housed significant quantities of industrial and medical isotopes. This vulnerability underscored a persistent fear that non-state actors could seize localized commercial sources to fashion a radiological dispersal device (RDD).

The integration of such materials into naval mines or drone payloads would represent a significant development, signifying a shift from traditional sea-denial weaponry to the deliberate use of radiological contamination. To date, publicly available information does not confirm that this has been achieved. While not yet realized, the threat remains an area of grave concern, and should thus be communicated and addressed accordingly.

A radiological dispersal device detonated at key logistic regional hubs such as Djibouti or Jeddah would likely not result in a substantial number of fatalities directly attributable to radiation exposure. However, Djibouti serves as the operational logistics hub for foreign naval coalitions protecting the Bab-el-Mandeb and operating in the Red Sea, while Jeddah represents Saudi Arabia’s primary economic gateway on the Red Sea. Targeting these mega-terminals allows asymmetric actors to simultaneously disrupt U.S. military support and operations in the region, and inflict severe regional pressure. Consequently, it could nonetheless compel operators to suspend terminal operations for an extended period due to decontamination procedures, incurring costs to shipping, insurance, and regional commerce amounting to billions.

Recommendations for Radiological Maritime Security

Maritime security in the region remains predominantly focused on intercepting missiles and drones. There is limited insight into the actual movement of radioactive materials. The following three measures could help improve the current response to the crisis:

Expand radiation detection capabilities to smaller and informal ports. The United States National Nuclear Security Administration’s Megaports Initiative currently equips major seaports, including several in the Middle East, with radiation portal monitors and trained personnel. Extending similar coverage, including mobile units, to secondary ports in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as dhow landing sites, would address a significant gap.

Enhance due diligence concerning the logistics of radioactive sources. Shipping and logistics companies operating in higher-risk jurisdictions should verify the recipients of Category 1 to 3 materials. This should build upon the cradle-to-grave principle outlined in the IAEA Code of Conduct, with support from the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security and its physical protection advisory missions where applicable.

Incorporate radiological threat scenarios into existing crisis planning. The Combined Maritime Forces, via Combined Task Force 153 in coordination with Operation Prosperity Guardian (a U.S.-led multinational coalition established to protect merchant shipping and counter asymmetric attacks in the Red Sea) and EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, should incorporate defensive scenarios involving a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) into their maritime frameworks and joint exercises with regional states such as Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This proactive approach ensures the development of a response plan before an incident occurs

The Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be evaluated solely in terms of missile, drone, or cyber risks. This conflict has already demonstrated that disruptions at one strategic chokepoint can spread to others. The Houthi blockade against Saudi shipping, which occurred within weeks of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, serves as evidence of this phenomenon. Diverting commercial radioactive materials would be a cost-effective and rational subsequent step within this pattern, even though such an action has not yet been undertaken.

For nations situated at this critical juncture, particularly Djibouti, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, developing a comprehensive radiological risk management framework is no longer a mere formality but an essential measure to ensure their national security and the continued operation of global maritime trade.

Dr. Abdek Mahamoud Abdi is an independent consultant in environmental and social safeguards, climate finance, blue economy and energy security, working across East Africa and the Middle East. He holds a Ph.D. in Global Engineering for Development, Environment and Society from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, with additional postgraduate certifications in nuclear safety, maritime environmental risk, and the blue economy.

Featured image: U.S. Marines and Sailors assigned to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit transport a simulated casualty across the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) during a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response drill while underway in the East China Sea, Oct. 5, 2024. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luis Agostini)

Middle East

Stepping Stones to Security: Pacifying the Tunb Islands

2 Comments

By Frank Bell

Introduction

Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb occupy positions of strategic importance disproportionate to their size. Situated near the Strait of Hormuz, the three islands provide forward positions for surveillance, missiles, unmanned systems, and maritime interdiction. A territorial dispute dating back more than five decades has become part of the military architecture, and the ongoing war between the United States and Iran, surrounding one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

This creates a problem separate from sovereignty. If forces operating from disputed territory threaten commercial navigation or neighboring states during an armed conflict, destroying those forces may solve the immediate tactical problem without solving the longer-term security problem. Weapons can be replaced. Abandoned positions can be reoccupied. Suppression can interrupt coercion without eliminating the geographic advantage that made it possible.

The United States should degrade Iran’s ability to defend and employ Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb as military positions. Afterwards, an Arab-led coalition should temporarily administer and demilitarize the islands while U.S. military power remains available as an external deterrent. Such an arrangement could prevent the regeneration of Iranian maritime coercive capabilities without determining the islands’ ultimate sovereignty.

The purpose would be limited: pacify the islands without annexing them and create conditions under which responsibility for security in the Strait can pass to the regional states that depend upon it.

Geography, Sovereignty, and Militarization

The dispute over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb predates the establishment of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. Before federation, the individual emirates conducted their territorial affairs under British protection. Sharjah claimed Abu Musa, while Ras al-Khaimah claimed Greater and Lesser Tunb. Sharjah became one of the six founding emirates of the UAE on December 2, 1971; Ras al-Khaimah joined the federation the following year. The UAE subsequently inherited and has maintained those territorial claims.1

The circumstances surrounding Iran’s assumption of control differed between Abu Musa and the Tunbs. As Britain prepared to end its treaty relationships with the Trucial States and withdraw its military presence from the Gulf, it sought settlements between Iran and the Arab rulers. Sharjah reached a last-minute memorandum of understanding with Iran concerning Abu Musa. Neither party surrendered its sovereignty claim, but the agreement permitted Iranian forces to occupy designated areas while Sharjah retained a presence on the island.2

No comparable agreement was reached over Greater and Lesser Tunb. On November 30, 1971, two days before the UAE was formally established, Iranian forces landed on the Tunbs after negotiations with Ras al-Khaimah failed. Armed resistance occurred on Greater Tunb and casualties resulted. Iran regarded the action as the restoration of Iranian sovereignty; the Arab side regarded it as a forcible seizure. Iran has controlled the islands since.3

The distinction remains important. Iran’s initial military presence on Abu Musa resulted from a negotiated arrangement that deliberately left sovereignty unresolved. Its control of Greater and Lesser Tunb followed military action without a comparable agreement with Ras al-Khaimah. Today, the UAE maintains the claims inherited through Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, while Iran claims sovereignty over all three islands.

Their contemporary strategic importance derives as much from geography as sovereignty. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has used the islands as military positions within Iran’s wider defense network surrounding Hormuz.4 Independent reporting has documented IRGC garrisons and military infrastructure on the islands, while recent U.S. military operations identified coastal-defense systems and cruise-missile storage and launch facilities on Greater Tunb among targets associated with threats to commercial navigation.5

This does not mean every component of Iran’s maritime-denial network is deployed on every island. Their significance comes from their contribution to a wider system of surveillance, missiles, unmanned systems, air defense, and maritime forces extending along Iran’s southern coast and into the approaches to Hormuz.

The three islands are also not identical military positions. Abu Musa is the most significant from a civilian standpoint, with a resident population generally estimated at around 2,000 alongside Iranian military facilities. Greater Tunb has a much smaller civilian footprint and an Iranian military presence, while Lesser Tunb is effectively a military outpost. Reliable public estimates of the current strength of the Iranian garrisons on the islands are scarce.6

That uncertainty matters in considering military options. Removing an isolated and degraded garrison presents a very different problem from assaulting intact defensive positions. Operations involving Abu Musa would also have to account for its civilian population. Intelligence on surviving forces, civilians, and island defenses would therefore shape how pacification was attempted.

The islands are thus two things at once: disputed territory whose sovereignty remains unresolved and military terrain capable of affecting international navigation. A workable policy must address the latter without pretending to resolve the former.

From Suppression to Pacification

Military action can destroy a missile launcher, radar installation, or drone facility. It cannot determine what happens to the position afterward.

If military infrastructure on the islands were neutralized during a wider conflict and Iranian forces subsequently returned, the problem could regenerate. New systems could replace those destroyed. Surveillance could resume. Fortifications could be rebuilt.

The policy question therefore extends beyond whether the islands constitute legitimate military targets during a conflict. It is what security arrangement should follow their neutralization. Simply destroying military installations provides suppression. It does not necessarily provide security.

Pacification describes the desired condition, not a prescribed method of assault. An opposed amphibious seizure by the United States should not be the automatic next step after strikes against the islands. Once a garrison has been isolated and its military capabilities sufficiently degraded, surviving personnel could first be offered an opportunity to surrender. If they refused, continued isolation, additional strikes, a raid, or ultimately seizure would remain options depending upon conditions at the time.

The distinction is important because territorial possession is not the strategic objective; denial of renewed military use is. Coalition forces do not require the islands as bases for further operations. The requirement is to remove the IRGC military presence and infrastructure and prevent the islands from again becoming forward positions for maritime coercion.

Temporary administration offers a middle course between restoring the military status quo and using military victory to impose a territorial settlement. Military systems could be removed or destroyed, remilitarization prohibited and monitored, and competing sovereignty claims preserved for peaceful resolution.

The strategic benefit is not simply the destruction of weapons. It is denying the positions from which those weapons can repeatedly return.

This also gives the operation an endpoint. Once the IRGC military presence has been removed, the islands demilitarized, and safeguards against renewed military use established, direct American control would be unnecessary. The result would be narrower than conquest but more durable than suppression.

Legal and Diplomatic Obstacles

The proposal carries substantial legal and diplomatic risks.

Iran exercises effective control over the islands while the UAE maintains sovereignty claims. A military operation followed by an externally imposed administration could be interpreted as an attempt to alter territorial control through force rather than as a limited maritime-security measure.

Any temporary authority would need narrow limits. Participation could not confer sovereignty. Existing territorial claims would remain intact. The authority would be responsible for security, demilitarization, essential civil functions, and protection of civilian property and economic activity.

Regional governments may support the security objective while remaining wary of any mechanism that appears to transfer disputed territory through military action. Legitimacy will depend heavily on Arab state participation, preservation of the competing sovereignty claims, and a credible endpoint.

Without that endpoint, temporary administration risks becoming occupation by another name.

Who Governs the Islands?

Several administrative models are possible, but replacing Iranian military control with indefinite American administration would defeat the purpose of the proposal.

United Nations administration would offer formal international legitimacy but could prove politically difficult to establish. A broader multinational coalition would provide greater operational flexibility, yet an administration dominated by outside powers could gradually assume the characteristics of an open-ended foreign occupation.

An Arab-led regional coalition deserves greater consideration. Gulf states could provide the principal administrative and security presence following demilitarization, supported where useful by international observers and technical personnel. No participating state would exercise sovereignty through the coalition, and any forces deployed on the islands would remain limited to security, monitoring, and enforcement of demilitarization.

The UAE would necessarily have an important role because of its sovereignty claims, but participation should not itself constitute recognition of those claims. Involving other Arab states would help distinguish regional security administration from simply transferring disputed territory from one claimant to another.

The underlying principle is straightforward: security on the Arab side of the Gulf should increasingly become an Arab responsibility. American military power should support regional security institutions rather than substitute for them indefinitely. An Arab-led coalition administering the islands, supported by regional maritime forces and backed by American deterrence, would reflect that division of responsibility.

The United States would not need to administer or permanently garrison the islands. Its more useful role would remain outside them. American naval and air forces operating in the wider region could provide intelligence, surveillance, logistics, and credible deterrence against remilitarization without transforming the islands into permanent American bases.

An Iranian attempt to return personnel and military equipment would therefore become a problem of detecting and denying remilitarization, rather than necessarily defending the islands against a conventional counter-invasion.

The coalition would administer and monitor the islands. Regional states would increasingly secure the surrounding maritime environment. American military power would remain available as a strategic backstop.

This arrangement offers an alternative to abandoning the islands after destroying their military infrastructure or turning a limited security operation into an indefinite American occupation.

The Strait After Pacification

The consequences would extend beyond the islands.

The Strait of Hormuz is both a military operating environment and a commercial artery. Changes in its security posture affect naval calculations, shipping schedules, chartering decisions, insurance premiums, energy markets, and perceptions of regional risk.

Removing offensive military infrastructure from forward positions could reduce one source of uncertainty confronting commercial operators. Demilitarization would not eliminate the wider risks of conflict with Iran or guarantee unrestricted navigation. It could, however, reduce the ability to use the islands for surveillance, interdiction, or attacks against maritime traffic.

Greater regional responsibility for maritime security need not mean American disengagement. U.S. naval power, intelligence, logistics, and deterrence would remain important, but in support. American military action would create the conditions for an Arab-led regional security arrangement rather than becoming the arrangement itself.

The islands’ eventual disposition could also reshape the longer-term balance of maritime influence within Hormuz, particularly by limiting the ability of any single coastal state—or combination of states—to impose unilateral conditions upon commercial transit. Decisions made during a conflict could influence the maritime balance for decades afterward.

How Does It End?

The credibility of temporary administration depends upon a simple question: temporary until when?

An arbitrary deadline says little about whether the security problem has been resolved. Termination should instead be conditions-based.

Those conditions could include removal of offensive military infrastructure, a durable monitoring regime, limitations on future military deployments, sufficient regional capacity to maintain the security arrangement, and an accepted diplomatic or legal process through which sovereignty claims can proceed without threatening freedom of navigation.

Once those conditions are satisfied, the temporary authority should leave.

The aim is not permanent foreign control or indefinite demilitarization enforced by American troops. Temporary administration provides a bridge between military action and political settlement.

Conclusion

Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb present a strategic problem that military strikes alone cannot resolve. Offensive systems can be destroyed and military forces removed, but neither action prevents strategically valuable positions from being rebuilt and used again.

Temporary administration offers one possible bridge between military necessity and political settlement. Properly structured, it would neither determine sovereignty nor require permanent American occupation. Its narrower purpose would be to deny renewed IRGC military use while shifting responsibility for the islands’ security toward regional states.

The larger principle extends beyond these islands. Military operations around strategic maritime chokepoints should be judged not only by whether they destroy an immediate threat, but by whether the security arrangement that follows prevents that threat from returning.

If cleared during military operations in support of its war against Iran, the Tunbs and Abu Musa should not become permanent American positions, nor should their ultimate ownership be decided by the United States.

The objective is to pacify the positions, secure the maritime approaches, transfer responsibility to a sustainable Arab-led regional security arrangement, and leave sovereignty to diplomacy.

In that sense, these small islands could become stepping stones—not toward occupation, but toward a more durable security order in the Strait of Hormuz.

Francis J. Bell is a graduate of Temple University’s Fox School of Business. He works as a private consultant with interests in strategy and international security. His writing focuses on maritime doctrine, deterrence, and emerging operational concepts.

References

1. United Arab Emirates, “Letter dated 23 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/2014/759, October 24, 2014; United Arab Emirates, “Letter dated 14 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/2016/245, March 16, 2016. The UAE communications maintain the claims to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb and describe the historical claims of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah.

2. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, documents concerning British negotiations over Abu Musa and the Tunbs; United Arab Emirates, “Letter dated 23 October 2014,” S/2014/759. The latter reproduces the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Abu Musa, which preserved the competing claims while providing for an Iranian military presence in designated areas. Contemporary U.S. diplomatic records show Britain pressing Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah to reach accommodations with Iran before British withdrawal.

3. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, documents concerning the Persian Gulf islands dispute, 1971; United Arab Emirates, “Letter dated 23 October 2014,” S/2014/759. Contemporary diplomatic records document the failure to obtain an agreement over the Tunbs and Britain’s inability to compel Ras al Khaimah to relinquish its claim.

4. Jon Gambrell, “3 Islands Help Control Access to the Strait of Hormuz. They’re in the Crosshairs of the Iran War,” Associated Press, July 16, 2026. Gambrell describes Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps garrisons and military infrastructure on the islands, including missiles, fast boats, and air-defense systems on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb and a military presence on Lesser Tunb.

5. U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, “CENTCOM Conducts Morning Round of Strikes Against Iran,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, July 15, 2026. CENTCOM reported using precision munitions against coastal-defense systems and cruise-missile storage and launch sites on Greater Tunb and stated that the strikes were intended to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

6. Gambrell, “3 Islands Help Control Access to the Strait of Hormuz.” Recent reporting describes Abu Musa as containing a village alongside a substantial IRGC base, Greater Tunb as possessing comparable Iranian military infrastructure, and Lesser Tunb as having only a military presence. Reliable open-source estimates of current garrison strength remain limited.

Featured image: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb and the surrounding maritime approaches. Author-generated illustration created using multiple geographic references. Not for navigation. (Courtesy of Frank Bell)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.