A Surfacing Strategy: Chinese Unconventional Oceanic Warfare

By Jack Lindstrom

The evolution of maritime warfare has largely moved in expanding the form of conflict and the direction of it. Originating from largely surface conflict and eventually amphibious assaults, maritime conflict shifted to expanded domains, attacks from below by submarines and above by aircraft carriers. However, in the continued evolution of maritime conflict since World War II, various new technologies and strategies have shifted the way war is conducted, as well as preparations for war. This is reflected most clearly in the case of China and Chinese maritime expansion. Although it began and evolved by replicating traditional naval strategy, adopted from Soviet Union systems and adapted for Chinese needs and limitations, it has since evolved dramatically to employ a vast array of unconventional methods.

This article will analyze these unconventional methods, focusing centrally on China’s evolving systems and strategies, while also drawing parallels to other unconventional strategies of other nations. That said, this article is centrally focused on Chinese maritime strategy evolution and its ramifications. These tools, by examining an undercurrent of strategy applied to different facets of the undersea domain, establish an argument on Beijing’s military-civil infrastructure, through research vessels, cargo fleets, fishing boats, and autonomous drones. In such a way, this infrastructure operates without acting as a clear and present threat or exigency for war; rather, it functions simply as an inconvenience or mild concern, one which becomes increasingly threatening, despite not acting as an obviously military entity. The article is in turn divided into key sections, focused on military-civil fusion, submarine strategies, the role of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and anchor dragging.

The underwater domain has seen a disproportionate advancement in large part due to its modern nature. Submarines are highly technical weapons of war, and as a result, see the most significant growth and unconventional adaptations. China’s newest submarine, the Type 095, is also referred to as a sail-less submarine because of its unique proportions, designed to be swifter and stealthier. These are, in fact, two separate hulls under parallel development rather than a single design: satellite imagery placed the Type 095 fitting out at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao in February 2026, sporting a conventional sail and a distinctive X-form rudder, while a separate, still-unnamed vessel of roughly 120 meters surfaced independently at Jiangnan Shipyard near Shanghai that June, evidence Beijing is now running simultaneous next-generation attack-submarine programs across at least two yards. By reducing noise, it is able to better avoid acoustic detection systems, such as those employed by the U.S. and Japan’s ‘Fish Hook’ detection system, specifically surrounding the First Island Chain.

This development has followed a striking increase in Chinese submarine production, including a 2+1 production of nuclear attack submarines per year. The undersea domain is not limited to submarines specifically; however, for example, the mapping and data collection of the ocean floor work to enable submarine piloting. His data has been gathered throughout the Indo-Pacific region as well as the Arctic, through military-civil fusion doctrine, established by Xi Jinping as a national strategy, and has seen systematic incorporation. UUVs in particular have been deployed by Chinese vessels to map the seafloor, under the International Seabed Authority’s designation; however, these UUVs were found to spend only about 6% of their time in these designated zones. Additionally, a majority of these vessels were found to be tied to state companies and were reported to have conducted suspicious activity. Such activity includes mapping undersea cable networks, potentially for sabotage purposes, as well as UUV data collection near the U.S. Pacific Submarine Fleet’s homeport in Guam.

This data collected under a scientific and civil guise has been reported to have been communicated with Chinese state systems such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Such data gathering under a civilian guise has been reflected in other reports, such as Chinese shipping systems, as recently as September 2026, wherein COSCO was accused of surveillance while transporting cargo. While the COSCO case has been denied publicly, the expansion of Chinese trade in the Arctic draws attention to such possibilities of espionage undertaken through trade, the very same trade which is expanding uniquely and without competition into the Arctic. These Arctic expeditions were preceded by years of icebreaker data recording. Such icebreakers are utilized with the technology required to map the saefloor and collect data to enable submarine piloting in the region. Buoys have been deployed with recording infrastructure to collect data in the Arctic, which has raised concern among Canadian officials.

Anchor dragging serves as a form of deep-sea sabotage unique to Russia and China, corresponding with seabed mapping. The maps of the seafloor enable a surgical strike specifically on undersea communications cables, such as those conducted in the Baltic and Taiwan. Anchor dragging and GUGI operations are unique because they specifically create kinetic conflict between nations with plausible deniability, and thereby not sparking any wars, while still acting in offensive operations.

There is also the case of shadow fleets to skirt sanctions, trade route chokepoints, Chinese sponsorship of pirates, fisherman harassment, the Batanes issues, so forth. The tools utilized by China rest not within traditional means of war but instead flow into a system of gray-zone maritime strategy adopted by Russia and China alike, to avoid open war. Through habituation, the subtle encroachment of Chinese vessels in waters around Taiwan, the Batans, and Alaska has slowly become accepted; Chinese actions, while never outright tolerated, have become increasingly accepted.

Russia’s shadow fleet illustrates such a case: after sanctions barred Russia’s traditional shipping fleets, the nation utilized other commercial ships for strategic ends. The assembled fleet is roughly 400 to 600 aging tankers, a range CSIS has independently tracked, which continue to transport the majority of Russia’s seaborne crude outside the reach of Western price caps, insurance regimes, and, of course, sanctions. These vessels sail under the guise of different nations, through shell-company ownership, and often without identification transponders- something paralleled in China’s expansion in the Arctic. China has also employed vessels without “functioning” transponders to deliver goods to the Arctic LNG 2, and reiterates the notion of commercial shipping as strategy.

The Shadow Fleet, as it’s come to be known, serves as an economic lifeline for the Kremlin as well as a weapon of war with no clear national association.  The Eagle S. is a tanker flagged under the Cook Islands and linked to the shadow fleet; however, it was seized by Finnish authorities after dragging its anchor for 66 miles across the Gulf of Finland in December of 2024. This anchor dragging severed the Estlink 2 power cable as well as a number of telecommunications cables; another merchant vessel under the Hong Kong flag served the Baltic connector gas pipeline in October 2023. The Chinese-owned Yi Peng 3 also severed cables between Sweden and Lithuania in November 2024, dragging an anchor for nearly 300 kilometers. CBS News’s 60 Minutes has documented this Eagle S-Balticconnector-Yi Peng 3 sequence in detail, tracing each vessel’s anchor-drag track via satellite data. Russia retains a Main Directorate of Underwater Research, an operational force tied to a variety of undersea sabotage operations and missions, such as anchor dragging. Known by the Russian acronym GUGI, the directorate answers directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, as opposed to participating in the Navy chain of command, as well as operating a vessel, the Yantar, equipped with submersibles capable of reaching the depths of undersea cables.

Western defense officials have tracked the Yantar loitering over transatlantic cable junctions from Ireland to the Baltic, per UK Ministry of Defence and Royal Navy monitoring reports, noting that the submersible remote-controlled vehicles are explicitly capable of tapping cables for intelligence, as well as laying explosives upon them for future sabotage. GUGI’s vessels deliberately survey and manipulate the seabed without an incident of any deliberate attack, under the guise of research and science, thus insulating any actions from sparking conflict. In other words, Russia’s strategy of a shadow fleet and research vessels conducting operations is an adoption of an existing Chinese strategy of military-civil fusion.

China’s undersea cable incidents work in tandem with the Russian operations- in 2025, a Togo-flagged vessel, the Hong Tai 58, crewed by Chinese personnel, loitered near the Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 cable, before releasing its anchor and serving the aforementioned cable. Taiwanese authorities detained the vessel and its captain in the aftermath of the incident. January of the same year saw a Cameroon-marked vessel, the Shunxin39, cut a cable near Keelung after loitering nearby, which Taiwan’s coast guard confirmed to be Chinese-owned despite its flag of convenience. Operations that rest just below the threshold to spark conflict, but work to erode and sabotage Western systems, degrading Western influence, power and regional capability.

China has employed commercial ships for espionage operations as well, with a Reuters 2026 report claiming that COSCO, the state-owned Chinese shipping conglomerate, has operated signals-intelligence equipment aboard its vessels, and thus collected military communications around the U.S., Europe, and throughout Asia, which U.S. officials confirmed to Reuters on the condition of anonymity. Correspondingly, the Pentagon had previously added COSCO to a list of companies linked to the Chinese military in January of 2025, per the Department of Defense’s Section 1260H designation,- the same year a U.S. Naval War College report concluded the PLA was utilizing China’s commercial fleets for intelligence. The Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute detailed the fishing fleet’s intelligence role specifically, identifying trained specialists embedded within militia crews. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law (Article 7, per China Law Translate’s official English translation) obliges Chinese state firms to assist state intelligence work when asked, in part fueling military-civil fusion doctrine, and providing Beijing with endless strategic assets for use across the world.

China’s maritime militia operates in the South China Sea to project state power through civilian forces; it is power projection through influence that is present, if in a non-evidently violently. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia act as civilian operators under governmental action, and utilize civilian boats, based primarily out of Hainan, which harass rival claimants and foreign naval vessels. As such, Beijing is not acting as a provocative, aggressive nation, but rather a nation that utilizes proxy forces, without sparking conflict.

Philippine officials have documented repeated incidents in which Chinese Coast Guard vessels, side by side with maritime militia boats, weaponized water cannons against Filipino fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal in December of 2025. The Philippines’ Batanes Islands have also seen increased Chinese aggression through diplomatic actions, as well as the Armed Forces of the Philippines has tracked a persistent presence of Chinese research vessels working around the Bashi Channel, akin to the Chinese UUV operations near Guam. UUVs, are alone, outside of their data collection, act as novel weapons of war- seen through AUVs and remote-controlled UUVs, or gliders. These systems include the AJX002, an extra-large UUV or XLUUV, which was synthesized for the strategic purposes of minelaying, particularly in and around the First Island Chain. The undersea drones that were functioning primarily for surveillance have been designed for military and destructive purposes.  The AJX002 has been paired with the HSU100, a reconnaissance variant of an XLUUV fitted with retractable masts, to turn the vessel into a glider design from an AUV, for long-range intelligence-gathering expeditions. Beijing has also experimented with at least five XLUUV designs; several are capable of ferrying torpedoes and mines across the ocean. These play a kinetic role in the prior wall of intelligence that detected submarines and underwater actions through the Underwater Great Wall, a network of seabed sensors, now utilizing long-range gliders, autonomous UUVs, and newly defended by military UUVs. The civilian seabed-mapping campaign using UUVs aforementioned only strengthens this notion of military-civil fusion, particularly utilized by UUVs and enabled by AI technology.

Additionally, this minelaying strategy, if deployed by a “research” expedition around Taiwan, would lead to a critical blockade crucial to overtaking the island nation. Should these mines be planted weeks or months in advance around chokepoints or ports, or planted subtly by UUVs, China would hold a keen advantage in the waters around the strait and island. While the captains of vessels can be detained and prosecuted, uncrewed drones, if unflagged or operating under a guise, such legal action cannot be successfully prosecuted.

Overall, the strategies of submarines, anchor-dragging, sanctions-evading, maritime militias, and autonomous underwater drones create an overarching image of Chinese unconventional means of warfare. While each act and method is uniquely deniable and non-escalatory by design, the culmination of each method of power projection creates a strong Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions, without a single warship present. Tankers with drag anchors across critical cables fly under false flags, while research vessels operate with designated permits, and a system of undersea infrastructure designed for submarine enabling and detection alike. Each development in this system of maritime power projection builds upon a structure that has already, evidently, been established. In such a way, the slow and subtle habituation to Chinese operations in the world’s oceans, through a civilian cover with military means, establishes a status quo wherein Chinese operations are capable from the Baltic to the Bashi Channel.

Western and allied responses have been primarily reactive, at the time of writing. NATO’s Baltic Sentry was launched in January 2025 to better patrol the undersea infrastructure in the Baltic, in large part a response to the Russian cable-cutting. However, there is no standing international posture to counter gray-zone maritime activity as a unified strategy, as it appears to be. Such an asymmetry of action- the limited responses of the West compared to wide options for Chinese engagement- is a critical design of the unconventional strategy. As Beijing’s own investment shifts from crewed research vessels toward uncrewed platforms like the AJX002, the political cost of coercion will only continue to fall, and the window for building deterrence around attribution, rather than around the presence of a detainable crew, is closing.

Jack Lindstrom is a graduate researcher from the University of California, San Diego, pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs. He is also a junior researcher for the Mackinder Forum, where he conducts research on great power strategy and historical shifts of international competition.

Featured image: The BRP Cabra of the Philippine Coast Guard and two vessels of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources approaches Chinese-flagged ships at Whitsun Reef (known as Julian Felipe Reef in the Philippines) during maritime patrol operations. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Mother of All Cutters

By Brian J. Dunn

Drawing a White-Hull Line in PACOM

The United States Navy seeks to prevail over a potential Chinese military threat before 2027 as the naval component of a joint force.1 Passing through the “Davidson Window” of China’s maximum military threat without China initiating a war could be interpreted as a victory of deterrence.2 The reality could be that the Navy focused on the expanding People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) instead of China’s actions to relentlessly expand its influence and control in the South China Sea through non-military means. To halt China’s subliminal war through use of non-military, civilian entities, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) should build the Mother of All Cutters (MOAC) based on a container ship with deck-mounted mission modules in standard shipping containers. MOAC will function as a very large cutter and power projection platform, adding joint, interagency, and allied and partner capabilities to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) for a full range of law enforcement missions.

This article will discuss China’s territorial claims and the problematic nature they pose; America’s objectives in the region; the nature of China’s subliminal war relying on the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the China Maritime Militia (CMM); military activities that have failed to halt China’s gradual advances; the risk of relying on military power to stop China; and how the USCG can use MOAC to contribute to PACOM plans and exercises in the non-military realm.

The South China Sea Tinderbox and China’s Dashed-Line Sparks

Dash Line
Source: CRS. Boundaries from U.S. Department of State. 3

America does not recognize China’s “dashed line” which is China’s claim of territorial ownership and encompasses most of the South China Sea.4 China uses its dashed line to justify its subliminal war to challenge the U.S. principles of freedom of the seas and settling territorial disputes between parties “without coercion and on the basis of international law.”5 America rejects excessive maritime territorial claims that are “unlawful and sweeping” or that advance “incoherent legal theories of maritime entitlement” undermining the rules-based international system.6

China distorts the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) provisions to justify treating the internationally recognized sea as an internal issue for China to define and resolve.7 Notably, China rejected a 2016 international tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines seeking relief under UNCLOS from China’s illegitimate territorial claims.8

China asserts core interests—so vital that they are “not subject to negotiations or compromise”—in the South China Sea, as well as for Taiwan and territory administered by Japan and India.9 Although the Philippines bears the brunt of China’s aggression, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam increasingly defy China by asserting their own South China Sea territorial claims.10

The National Security Strategy declares America’s commitment to “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” as “core, vital national interests”.11 The National Defense Strategy declares America’s commitment to “a decent peace in the Indo-Pacific, where trade flows openly and fairly.”12 On the ten-year anniversary of the international tribunal ruling, the Philippines was joined by the U.S., Japan, and 11 other countries to affirm the ruling as “final, legally binding, and definitive between China and the Philippines.”13

The South China Sea is “an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition.”14 Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, commander of PACOM, stated to Congress that “our strategy is clear: we must deny China the ability to achieve its objectives through military aggression while strengthening the network of alliances and partnerships that constitute our greatest asymmetric advantage.”15 Admiral John Aquilino, then commander of Indo-Pacific Command (now PACOM), told a U.S. House of Representatives committee that if China’s aggression “resulted in the death of a Philippine service member”—even with water cannons used by the CCG—the Philippines could trigger the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty.16 China warned America to keep out of the dispute and refrain from “stirring up trouble.”17

If China controls the South China Sea, America’s military deployments in the western Pacific will be constrained. American allies and partners might then “reexamine their own defense programs and foreign policies” that support the U.S. in ways that weaken America’s security network and accelerate China’s goal of regional hegemony.18

China’s Subliminal War: “Fishermen” Versus FONOPs

Admiral Paparo stated that his command embraces the need to address “a broad range of factors outside of the military realm” in its plans and exercises, including a “broader group of interagency partners.”19 Without addressing the perils of over-analyzing the useful shorthand term “DIME” (diplomatic, information, military, and economic),20 PACOM would benefit from other instruments to more effectively resist China’s subliminal war that relies on non-military means to methodically expand and entrench its unlawful South China Sea territorial claims.21

To reinforce international norms the U.S. conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through international waters and air space that China unlawfully claims.22 These overt actions are part of information operations through military means within the current DIME strategy. China’s subliminal war continues despite more countries deploying military forces to signal their rejection of China’s claims.23 China typically advances South China Sea objectives by using its CCG to confront foreign vessels, purportedly for “law enforcement” while the PLAN provides overwatch, deterring foreign military escalation.24

China’s naval strength includes the PLAN, the CCG, and the CMM. China has expanded the PLAN massively in size and sophistication. It is the largest navy measured by numbers and deploys modern multi-mission ships.25 The non-PLAN component of China’s naval strength includes the CCG and CMM.26 The CCG is the largest coast guard and includes newer ships with better armament and longer endurance than most CCG ships, plus numerous regional patrol combatants and coastal patrol craft.27 The CMM standing force mobilizes civilian fishing vessels that can be massed for months-long deployments, and trains with and supports the PLAN and CCG. China may have 1,000 fishing vessels available in the South China Sea alone, in addition to the standing component of the CMM.28

China employs DIME means to assert control in the South China Sea.29 While its military supports the effort, China keeps its actions “below the threshold of open warfare” but beyond the “boundaries of normal diplomatic and economic interaction.”30 The most innovative line of attack has been creating islands in the South China Sea from sea features that do not confer territorial claims. China describes its island-building as “routine domestic governance.”31 Admiral Paparo stated that China “uses coercive behavior and overt aggression to exert its excessive claims, including harassing the Philippines, Japan, and other Southeast Asian partners.”32

The CCG and CMM exploit “China’s significant maritime force advantage” to intimidate its targets in territorial disputes.33 Using non-PLAN ships for overt aggression makes it difficult for targeted states to define effective rules of engagement without giving the appearance of escalation.34 Advancing slowly spreads out the harm in small doses, none of which seems worthy of escalation by targets.35 China’s framing of their actions as its internal affairs promotes a favorable narrative about any clashes.36 China has focused on the Philippines to erode their ability to exercise sovereignty in its South China Sea territory and EEZ. The CCG has a massive ship that overpowers what the Philippines can deploy.37 In a trend already evident with its “monster ships” with superior crew size, weapons, and fuel capacity that dwarf USCG cutters, China decided to build a CCG mothership that may carry aircraft or drones.38

America and its allies resist China’s subliminal war

Over the past few years, the U.S. and it’s allies have taken deliberate actions to counter the Chinese narrative and reaffirm the legal precedents. These include:

  • The Philippines launched a media information campaign using journalists aboard its vessels to document Chinese aggression.39
  • America conducts FONOPs that prevent unlawful claims “from becoming accepted customary international law.”40
  • Allies from outside the western Pacific participate in FONOPs.41
  • Military activities in the region continue, such as the United States, Japan, and Canada joining Philippine forces in anti-ship exercises to defend the Philippines against military attack.42
  • The Philippines and its allies and partners have reminded China for ten years that their territorial claims violate international law.
  • The USCG expanded its presence to supplement the Navy in the western Pacific.43 This includes the 2026 transfer of the USCG “expeditionary cutter squadron” of six 154-foot fast response cutters to operate out of the Philippines and Singapore.44

Yet China has not restrained its claims or behavior:

  • China is not deterred by the information campaign.45
  • Periodic American FONOPs and displays of military power have not blunted China’s drive to intimidate neighbors.46
  • FONOPs have not stopped China’s island-building.47
  • Allied FONOPs have not stopped China, as its aggressive response to a Dutch frigate’s operation made clear. A China Southern Theater Command spokesman justified its actions couched as lawful territorial defense, saying Chinese forces used “necessary measures” that were “in accordance with laws and regulations.”48
  • China rejects FONOPs that undermine what China characterizes as its sovereignty and security.49

The U.S., Japan, and the Philippines view China’s actions with concern.50 U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called China’s actions inconsistent with international law, accusing China of undermining regional peace and stability.51 The American and Philippines defense secretaries jointly reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Philippines alliance “for upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”52 Because even a victory through a traditional military war could be ruinously costly, PACOM’s focus has been deterring China’s growing military power in the western Pacific.53 In this environment, China’s subliminal war raises the risk of Great Power War.

The U.S. seeks to deter aggression and ensure that force or coercion are not used to settle territorial disputes. America needs to “draw a balance between doing nothing and doing too much.”54 America is seemingly trapped between risking war by using military power to directly confront China’s civilian-led advances or seeing U.S. alliances fray as China advances without overt military aggression. The U.S. clarified the broad extent of its defense pact with the Philippines, but noted it has options short of shooting under the treaty.55 The missing piece in PACOM’s DIME effort is strengthening the capacity of the Philippines and other targets of China’s subliminal offensive to exercise sovereignty over their territory with civilian regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Recent expansion of USCG presence begins to provide the means to accomplish that.

The USCG is “a more relevant model for partner nation maritime forces than any [Department of Defense] branch and more effective than them in executing a host of international missions.”56 The service has the appropriate power and authority to defy China’s efforts to expand de facto control of the South China Sea to match its unlawful claims. The USCG seeks to be “bold, innovative, collaborative, and willing to act in new ways” to overcome challenges.57 A USCG line in the South China Sea would give America more options below the Navy threshold. Just as the PLAN provides overwatch for the CCG and CMM, PACOM’s objective of denying China escalation options could keep PACOM’s DIME campaign in the sub-military realm. The USCG remains ready for evolving missions, recognizing that it may need to develop new assets.58 MOAC can be the critical force multiplier for USCG and allied civilian agencies to exercise administrative and law enforcement powers in their recognized South China Sea territory.

MOAC, the Missing Piece of America’s Line in the Sea

The USCG must strengthen its primary lines of effort of “persistent presence, meaningful engagements, and maritime governance” in the Indo-Pacific.59 The USCG describes itself as America’s only multi-mission, military maritime service, bridging gaps between law enforcement, diplomacy, and defense capabilities. It provides a full spectrum of options in the gray zone world of China’s subliminal war.60 The USCG is the best service for employing non-shooting options in the broad spectrum between doing nothing and doing too much. In May 2026, the USCG cutter Midgett joined a maritime cooperative activity with the Philippine navy and coast guard. That joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal moved beyond mere presence or FONOP to active “law enforcement activities, including maritime interdiction of vessels and boarding actions.”61

Without sufficient USCG assets in the Western Pacific, instead of being a non-military force multiplier, the USCG could remain insignificant or even counter-productive if China’s subliminal war persists.62 A MOAC flagship would support formalizing persistent USCG deployments for law enforcement activities.63 Such a strengthened USCG would, as one analyst explained, “allow the U.S. to play on a broader spectrum” than the Navy can.64 By complementing fleeting FONOPs and military exercises, the USCG would establish itself as the “Global Coast Guard” it seeks to be.65

MOAC is modeled on the modularized auxiliary cruiser described in Military Review.66 Such a ship relies on a modified civilian container ship hull equipped with weapons and systems in standard shipping containers mounted on the deck. MOAC would require a flight deck for manned and unmanned  operations. It would have flexibility in the design to allow capabilities to be added or removed as the mission and scenario dictates. MOAC would resupply and provide overwatch for smaller USCG patrol boats and cutters which have difficulty operating far from support infrastructure in America.67 Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) could be deployed and sustained from MOAC using containerized systems, building on Navy experience integrating a Medium USV into a Carrier Strike Group.68 Joint and interagency vessels and aircraft plus allied and partner law enforcement assets could be sustained and supported by MOAC.

MOAC’s very size will convey power to reassure allies and partners who routinely face “monster” CCG vessels, and could sail alongside allies and partners in the South China Sea to bolster the rules-based international order founded on freedom of the seas.69 The following missions will strengthen capacity to assert sovereign maritime governance while raising the price China would pay for escalating to force with the CCG and CMM:

Humanitarian first responders. When natural disaster strikes, MOAC could initiate relief operations using onboard supplies and UAVs providing intelligence on devastated areas. It would conduct rescue missions, deliver supplies, and evacuate the injured.

Safety of life at sea. MOAC would conduct rescues at sea with helicopters or forward-deployed USCG vessels. Onboard medical facilities could provide emergency care.

Environmental stewards. Surveillance would identify and record evidence of actors threatening the sea environment. MOAC personnel could intervene alongside regional allies and partners.

Protecting natural resources. MOAC would help regional states protect their EEZs from poaching or illegal resource extraction. One mission could be to support the Philippine Kadiwa initiative to escort and resupply their fishermen operating near the Scarborough and Salina shoals.70 Whether the offender is a state or non-state actor, MOAC could support prompt diplomatic, law enforcement, or armed responses.

Law enforcement. Piracy, other crimes, or state interference in international maritime trade and civil air traffic would be more difficult with a well-armed MOAC “cop on the beat” identifying threats. 71 Increasing the capabilities of other nations to police their own waters strengthens maritime governance.72 The USCG has established a precedent away from the South China Sea.73

Securing maritime borders. International law provides standards to define maritime boundaries. Powers like China can ignore them if unopposed. MOAC would work with regional states to protect allied and partner territorial integrity, including support for outpost resupply missions. One PACOM commander stated that escorting supply ships is “an entirely reasonable option” under the U.S.-Philippines defense treaty.74

Promoting rule of law. MOAC would exercise with allies and partners to build collective law enforcement capacity that promotes a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”75 Allied law enforcement agencies deployed on MOAC could conduct “visit, board, search, and seizure operations” against what could be deemed privateers doing China’s bidding behind a façade of civilian status.76

Preventing terrorism. Terrorists threatening life and property from the sea may be thwarted with a persistent USCG armed presence, including its planned special operation organization, Special Missions Command.77 MOAC could be bolstered by intelligence personnel, regional assets, and other American military forces, including Marine Corps and Special Operations Command detachments.

Enhancing cyber and critical infrastructure security. MOAC could host training that shares best practices with regional partners and allies to harden defenses and preempt malign actors in the maritime domain.

Military force. As an armed service, the USCG would be the first line of defense if a crisis escalates beyond water cannons. MOAC would act as a deterrent to all but the most deliberate armed escalation.

Intelligence gathering and sharing. The USCG is an intelligence partner with other American armed services and friendly nations. All of the missions would be assisted by and contribute to joint and international intelligence on regional threats to the rules-based order.

These missions—and more as the USCG evolves to meet new challenges—will strengthen alliances and partnerships to defend the principles of freedom of the seas and settling territorial disputes without use of force or coercion.

A White Hull Line in International Waters

The USCG’s value was validated with a nearly $25 billion “historic investment” that then-Acting Commandant, Admiral Kevin Lunday, said “marks a new era for the Coast Guard.”78 Defending a “white hull” line in the South China Sea will be a bold demonstration of the U.S.’s “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific” and will protect the U.S.’s “powerful ties of commerce, culture, technology, and defense.”79 To hold the line against and roll back China’s subliminal DIME war before United States Navy “gray hulls” must intervene, the United States Coast Guard must build and deploy to the South China Sea the Mother of All Cutters to embark on its new era in PACOM.80

Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and a MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired from his job as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has written articles for publications such as Proceedings, Army, Military Review, and Joint Force Quarterly, and writes about defense and national security issues on Substack in The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

References

1. Sam LaGrone, “CNO Franchetti War Plan Preparing Navy for Pacific Conflict by 2027 With Flat Budgets, Static Fleet Size,” USNI News (September 18, 2024). 

2. Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in ‘Next Six Years’,” USNI News (March 9, 2021). 

3. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Primer: South China Sea Disputes,” In Focus No. 10607 (Congressional Research Service, Updated December 22, 2025), 1.

4. 2024 Worldwide Threat Assessment (Defense Intelligence Agency), 5. 

5. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Primer: South China Sea Disputes,” In Focus No. 10607 (Congressional Research Service, Updated December 22, 2025), 1.

6. Department of Defense Report to Congress: Annual Freedom of Navigation Report Fiscal Year 2023 (United States Department of Defense), 2. 

7. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, Updated May 1, 2025), 5-6.

8. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2025), 45.

9. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China (U.S. Department of Defense, December 2025), 1.

10. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023), 125. 

11. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2025), 5.

12. 2026 NDS: National Defense Strategy (United States Department of War, 2026), 18. 

13. Kiyoshi Takenaka and Beijing Newsroom, with editing by Emelia Sithole-Matarise and Mark Potter, “South China Sea joint statement says China’s maritime claims have no basis,” Reuters (July 12, 2026). 

14. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), 1.

15. “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture” (April 2026), 2. 

16. Parker Miller, “Pacific coalition tightens as China pressures the Philippines and Taiwan,” Washington Examiner (April 4, 2024). 

17. Liz Lee, et al., Ed. Muralikumar Anantharaman and Gerry Doyle, “China tells US to not take sides on South China Sea issue,” Reuters (March 20, 2024). 

18. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), 3.

19. Paparo, 10.

20. Matthew O’Connor, “The Problem With Thinking in DIME,” The War Room (April 10, 2025). 

21. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), 11.

22. Report to Congress: Annual Freedom of Navigation Report: Fiscal Year 2022 (United States Department of Defense). 

23. Miller; “JOINT STATEMENT: Australia-Japan-Philippines-United States Maritime Cooperative Activity,” (United States Department of Defense, April 5, 2024); and Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Warships from the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Japan Sail in Joint South China Sea Patrol”, USNI News (September 29, 2024). 

24. Matthew Sperzel, et al., Special Report: Surprise PRC Military Exercise Around Taiwan (Institute for the Study of War, December 31, 2025). 

25. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 52.

26. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2025), 31-32.

27. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 79-80.

28. “China is using civilian ships to enhance navy capability and reach,” Associated Press (September 25, 2022). 

29. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), 9.

30. Todd C. Helmus, et al., “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations” Research Report RRA2954-1 (RAND, November 20, 2024), 1.

31. Jill Goldenziel, “China Seizes An Island While the World is Watching Iran,” Forbes (April 11, 2026). 

32. Paparo, 4.

33. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2025), 45.

34. “China is using civilian ships to enhance navy capability and reach.”

35. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), 9-10.

36. Goldenziel.

37. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Philippines Challenges ‘Monster’ China Coast Guard Cutter, U.S. Carrier Vinson Drills with Philippine Forces in South China Sea,” USNI News (January 20, 2025). 

38. Matthew Loh, “China shipbuilders are teasing a new coast guard ‘mothership,’ and there’s talk it could be an aircraft or drone carrier,” Business Insider (August 19, 2024). 

39. Joeal Calupitan and Aaron Favila, “China coast guard flexes its might against the Philippines in disputed waters as journalists watch,” Associated Press (March 7, 2024). 

40. Report to Congress: Annual Freedom of Navigation Report: Fiscal Year 2022 (United States Department of Defense), 2. 

41. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Chinese Use Electronic Warfare Attacks on Dutch Warship in South China Sea, Says PLA,” USNI News, May 27, 2026. 

42. “Sinking Ships in the South China Sea,“ USNI News (May 12, 2026).

43. Dan Lamothe, “To help counter China, U.S. turns to the Coast Guard,” The Washington Post (April 20, 2019). 

44. Mike Cherney, “China aggressively patrols disputed waters. Now the US Coast Guard is moving in,” The Wall Street Journal (July 14, 2026). 

45. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “China Attacks Philippine Ship, Injures Crew in Latest Escalation of South China Sea Standoff,” USNI News (March 23, 2024).

46. James Holmes, “Why the U.S. Navy Needs To Be In The South China Sea,” 1945 (July 16, 2022). 

47. Goldenziel.

48. Lariosa, USNI News (May 27, 2026).

49. “China opposes any country using freedom of navigation to undermines its sovereignty,” Reuters (May 29, 2026). 

50. Jeff Mason, Trevor Hunnicutt, and Michael Martina, “U.S., Japan, Philippines condemn Beijing’s South China Sea moves in summit,” Reuters (April 12, 2024). 

51. U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Rubio’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo” (January 22, 2025). 

52. U.S. Department of Defense, “United States-Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary Hegseth’s Inaugural Visit to the Philippines (March 28, 2025). 

53. Paparo, 3.

54. Chad de Guzman, “Why the U.S. Faces a Delicate Balancing Act on Countering China in the South China Sea,” Time (March 27, 2024). 

55. Mallory Shelbourne and Sam Lagrone, “China’s Attacks on the Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact,” USNI News (March 29, 2024). 

56. Commander Kevin Duffy, U.S. coast Guard (Retired), “Getting Real About the ‘Global Coast Guard’,” Proceedings Vol. 149/10/1,448 (October 2023). 

57. United States Coast Guard Strategy, 1 JUN 2022 (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard), 11.

58. United States Coast Guard Strategy, 3. 

59. U.S. Coast Guard: Indo-Pacific Strategic Intent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, November 26, 2024), 2. 

60. United States Coast Guard Strategy, 3-4.

61. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “U.S. Coast Guard Patrols Near Scarborough Shoal with Philippine Forces Amid Concerns of Potential Chinese Build-Up,” USNI News (May 31, 2026). 

62. Michael D. Armour, Ph.D., “The U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea: Strategy or Folly?” CIMSEC (November 6, 2017). 

63. Petty Officer Third Class Merrill A. Magowan, “Create ‘Patrol Forces Indo-Pacific’?” Proceedings Volume 146/08/1,409 (August 2020), 32-35.

64. Cherney.

65. Commander Kevin Duffy, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), “Getting Real About the “Global Coast Guard,” Proceedings Vol. 149/20/1,448 (October 2023). 

66. For the basic concept of a power projection platform based on civilian container ships, see Brian J. Dunn, “The AFRICOM Queen,” Military Review, May-June 2016 (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: US Army Command and General Staff College), 50-61. 

67. Commander Craig Allen Jr., US Coast Guard, “Expeditionary Cutter Deployments Should Not Be a Mission to Mars,” Proceedings Volume 148/8/1,434 (August 2022), 22.

68. Diana Stancy, “A Navy carrier is about to deploy with a robot ship. Could it change the service forever?” Breaking Defense (June 04, 2026). 

69. United States Coast Guard Strategy, 3.

70. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “U.S. Wants to Construct Philippine Coast Guard Maintenance Facility, Repair Fuel Depot in Palawan,” USNI News (May 20, 2026). 

71. Captain Joshua Taylor, US Navy, “A Campaign Plan for the South China Sea,” Proceedings Volume 148/8/1,434 (August 2022), 38-39.

72. United States Coast Guard Strategy, 4.

73. Kevin Knodell, “US Agrees to Expand Samoa and Coast Guard Cooperation,” The Honolulu Star-Advertiser (April 8, 2024). 

74. Chris Panella, “US ally says it expects America to intervene if China tries to take a rusting World War II warship in the South China Sea,” Business Insider (September 16, 2024). 

75. National Security Strategy (2025), 19.

76. Cadet Jeffrey W. Jaeger, U.S. merchant Marine, “One Nation’s Fishing Fleet, Another Nation’s Pirates: Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Proceedings Volume 150/4/1,454 (April 2024), 66.

77. Eve Sampson, “Coast Guard to stand up special force command, “Military Times (May 6, 2026). 

78. United States Coast Guard, “U.S. Coast Guard receives historic investment to rebuild under President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill,” Press Release (July 4, 2025). 

79. 2025 National Security Strategy, 19.

80. Lieutenant Commander Trevor Phillips-Levine, et al., “Use the Coast Guard for Freedom of Navigation Operations,” Proceedings Vol. 147/12/1,426 (December 2021). 

Featured image: The Normand Cutter, a Norwegian-flagged offshore construction and subsea support vessel. (Wikimedia Commons)

Tag, You’re It: Modernizing Naval Maintenance Starts with the Tagout Process

By Lieutenant Alana Davis, U.S. Navy

Introduction: When Maintenance Goes Wrong, or Doesn’t Go at All

In May of 2024 I was working as a Submarine Squadron Staff Officer when news of a submarine sailor’s death spread to our office. Sonar Technician 3rd Class Timothe Sanders was found dead onboard the in-port USS Helena after inadvertently touching an energized 440 Volt electrical panel improperly returned to service following a tagout for maintenance. Having spent the first year of my tour as a Submarine Division Officer assigned to a boat in shipyard drydock, and the following two years at sea, but in and out of continuous maintenance availabilities (CMAVs), I shudder to think STS3 Sanders could have easily been one of my sailors, or me.

When I reported to that submarine in shipyard I was assured we’d deploy again in a few months as the 1.5 year scheduled availability neared completion. One year later, we were finally “underway on nuclear power” with an overworked, mentally drained crew dangerously devoid of at-sea experience. Unfortunately, neither of these scenarios are unique to most U.S. Navy sailors. Standard onboard safety trainings involve cautionary stories of past injuries and deaths from electrocution or exposure to high pressures and temperatures from improper system line-ups. The Government Accountability Office published a study assessing from 2015-2020 75% of planned maintenance periods for submarines and aircraft carriers were delayed, with average delays at 225 days for subs and 113 for carriers. Two main causes identified include unplanned work and limited shipyard workforce capacity. Not assessed was the mental toll such delays take on sailors, with some studies estimating >50% increase of suicides for shipyard aircraft carrier crews versus crews at sea.

The U.S. Naval surface and submarine fleets continue to be plagued by two critical maintenance problems: danger and delays. From my perspective as a junior officer who coordinated, authorized, and supervised countless preventative and corrective maintenance procedures at sea and in shipyard, tackling these problems starts with tackling one essential aspect of nearly every maintenance item: the tagout process. Utilizing smart technologies including 3D Computer Aided Design (CAD) modeling and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) advancements to modernize the tagout process will make shipboard maintenance safer and faster, and will serve as a technological foundation for further advancements in maintenance optimization and prioritization.

The Shipboard Tagout Process Today

What does performing a tagout entail? You can start by reading the 100+ page NAVSEA published Tag-Out Users Manual or “TUM”. The stated purposes of utilizing the tagout method are to:

  • “Provide for personnel and ship safety and prevent damage to equipment.
  • Prevent improper operation when a component, equipment, system or portion of a system is isolated or in an abnormal condition.
  • Prevent improper operation when a freeze seal is applied to a system or when other safety devices such as blank flanges are installed for testing, maintenance, or casualty isolation.
  • Provide a procedure for use when an instrument is unreliable or not in its normal operating condition.
  • Provide standard tag-out procedures.
  • Provide a procedure for control of hazardous energy.”

In practice, a tagout starts with a procedure that requires making safe a fluid, air, or electrical system with components experiencing faults, or entering that system to conduct maintenance. To do so safely, typically multiple components within need to be re-positioned or de-energized. Some processes, like rigging a submarine for divers to enter the water around it in port, are routine enough that a written list of every component that must be repositioned and tagged exists in the procedure. By contrast, performing corrective maintenance on a broken component requires an individualized system line-up and tag-out plan. Enlisted sailors must identify and “prove” the validity and system isolations of the proposed tag-out to the Authorizing Officer, usually a junior officer. Sailors should develop this line-up by tracing through the system drawings, then get validation from a second, independent sailor that the isolations are adequate. The Authorizing Officer will review their work, verify the adequacy of the tag-out, and using her own system knowledge, hand trace the sailor’s work and either authorize or non-concur with the tagout. Especially high-risk repair evolutions may require additional approvals from either the relevant Department Head or the Commanding Officer.

From there, the process moves only slightly to the electronic. The sailor will list the components to be tagged for that maintenance item in eTagOut, the tag-out tracking software. The officer again reviews the list in comparison to the system drawing, signs off electronically and prints the component labels with their agreed upon positions to be placed to. She sticks those labels on physical tags, signs for their validity, then orders the sailor conducting the tagout to “reposition components and hang tags as briefed”. One sailor will hang a tag on every component he repositions and signs for the new positions. A second, independent sailor will then second check and sign for the accuracy of the new lineup. The new system lineup will be filed on paper in a binder and maintained until the tags are cleared to restore the system to a its regular line-up or a new tagout replaces the existing one. Some of these documents go back months, even years, and can be forgotten or go un-updated. Worse, with frequent turnover and high volumes of work, paper tracking and electronic tracking can develop differences, leaving the true status of the system in question.

It can take from hours to days for sailors to identify components, prove tagout adequacy, and safely align systems prior to starting even relatively routine maintenance items. The safety and effectiveness of the line-up also largely depends on the system understanding and attention to detail of the writer and approvers of the tagout. But no matter how bright, thorough, and well-trained sailors and repairmen are, we are fallible, particularly when confronted with a dizzying array of tagouts and maintenance items to be performed every day to meet operational deadlines.

Industry and Government Efforts

The tagout process is not unique to the Navy. Lockout/Tagout or “LOTO” is a standardized Occupational Health and Safety (OSHA) practice across industries. Much like the Navy, though, mishaps from procedural non-compliance also occur – to the order of 50,000 injuries U.S.-wide annually.

Software companies like Quentic are beginning to tackle LOTO deficiencies via advanced digital systems. Their technology focuses on implementing tracking monitors on shopfloors, providing LOTO-related training like workflows and checklists, and tracking equipment performance metrics like downtimes and protocol adherence. What these capabilities lack is the ability to address the validity of the planned tagout itself. Though the technology integrates with components, it does not provide a holistic system understanding and user-interface to check for safety compliance prior to conducting a LOTO procedure, vice after the equipment manipulations have taken place.

As of July 2026, the Department of Navy is directly partnering with software firms to modernize different aspects of maintenance practices. Two companies, Air and Fathom5, have been tasked to modernize how the Navy manages repair processes with the goal of achieving 90% fleet readiness. This collaboration focuses on implementing AI to existing enterprise logistics software to connect disparate maintenance systems help units get ahead of equipment failures by predictive algorithms, faster part identification, and automated work order processing. This integration should speed up maintenance efforts broadly, particularly regarding repair part location and procurement, but again does not tackle technologizing the time-intensive and error-fraught tagout process.

Naval Adoption of Model-based Systems Engineering (MBSE)

In February 2026, Congress amended the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act portion on Navy vessel design to require that functional design certification for crewed and undersea vessels be based on 3D modeling of the vessel to include all major distributive systems. Years prior, in 2020, the Navy and Marine Corps took a broader step towards digital modernization, releasing the Digital Systems Engineering Transformation Strategy, laying out the framework to transition traditional “document-centric” systems engineering practices to “digital-centric” ones. The strategy aims to apply data analysis and modeling via a modern Model-based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach thereby formalizing the use of integrated digital modeling, incorporating AI/ML into software development, and merging design and development tools with simulation and testing ones.

Since the early 2000s the Navy has been putting 3D CAD modeling technology to good use. The Virginia Class SSN was the first U.S. warship completely designed using CAD and visualization technology. The USS America and proceeding America Class LHAs utilized CAD software including ShipConstructor and Autodesk throughout the design and construction process capturing essential engineering components to include structural, C4I, electrical, propulsion, and auxiliary systems. It’s safe to say all future Naval vessel design efforts will continue to rely heavily on 3D CAD technologies. However, it is up to the government to appropriately negotiate Government Purpose Rights to ensure these models and accompanying technical data are appropriately accessible to the Department of War and the Department of the Navy.

MBSE Provides the Backbone for Tagout Process Revolution

How does this recent DoN embrace of digital MBSE practices in design enable modernization of the tagout process? It starts by providing confidence that high-fidelity digital systems models exist along with the software backbones to manipulate and test within them. Some of the broad functions of MBSE include to: “offer a scalable and traceable digital model of the system and it’s requirements… ensure that all requirements are validated in the operational environment of the system… (and) enable stakeholders to interact within the collaborative modeling environment…” These models and manipulation functions are exactly what ship’s force and shipyard repair activity will require to digitally address system line-ups for tagouts.

Since interactive digital systems models already exist, if a digital tagout platform was built out of this, here’s what the tagout process could look like:

  • A shipboard maintenance item requires tags to be hung. The sailor preparing to conduct the maintenance opens the AI-enabled digital tagout generating software. She selects the appropriate digitized system diagram, the compent she intends to conduct maintenance on, and inputs additional information on other conditions for the maintenance like ship conditions, limitations, or specific safety requirements established by the Commanding Officer.
  • The software absorbs that information and outputs a recommended valve line-up and list of components to manipulate and hang tags on. This output can be visually verified with a testing function where flow paths could be demo-ed and relay a written risk assessment for conducting the repair based on its real-time record keeping of all the other maintenance and tagouts taking place onboard.
  • Once the sailor is content with the software’s recommendation, the results for the pending tagout are transmitted to enlisted divisional leadership and an officer for review and approval. Once the tagout is authorized and properly hung, the digital system is updated with the touch of a button to visually reflect every component’s new status.

Time to conceptualize and generate a tagout would now take minutes rather than hours. The additional manpower hours required to hand-route paper diagrams for review prior to starting a maintenance item are eliminated, drastically reducing lead-up time to commence work within any system. Besides reducing time and increasing confidence in safety, a digital process also relieves the headache and confusion of tracking every shipboard component position on paper. Currently, submarine officers on watch track the thousands of tags hanging across the boat via a massive binder full of paper logs and a few mounted, plastic covered diagrams of critical system components that get marked with grease pen whenever they’ve been manipulated from their “normal” status.

Beyond Tags: Further Opportunities for Smart System Integration into Maintenance Practices

The U.S. surface and submarine navies have already been using logistics-focused software for years to assist in shipboard maintenance tracking and preparation. This technology group includes:

  • Planned Maintenance System Management Information System (PMSMIS): Web application to track new and revised PMS documents.
  • Ships’ 3-M: Database for maintenance-related execution data.
  • Open Architecture Retrieval System (OARS): Enables 3-M reporting, analysis, and user metrics.
  • System Scheduler (SKED): Provides the capability to schedule and manage maintenance events and allows reporting of completed maintenance while providing sailors the ability to submit first-person technical feedback what was conducted.

Onboard a submarine is the crew’s “3MC” (Maintenance and Material Management Chief) who oversees the 3-M related systems data and upkeep. Department Heads, Division Officers, and enlisted divisional leadership monitor and update their required preventative and corrective maintenance plans within SKED. Divisions accomplish periodic (weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc) required maintenance items on schedule as well as document new material deficiencies as they arise.

But even with the help of logistics software, two critical problems remain:

  • The burden of maintenance, both at sea during shipyard availabilities, is immense and overwhelming. Perfectly planning maintenance sequences are nearly impossible, resulting in re-opening freshly closed systems and re-work due to poor sequencing and late-discovered equipment.
  • Surface and submarine crews are more accustomed to operating in a peacetime environment when “fighting hurt” is not required and returning to port for repairs is possible. Making quick decisions on how system damage should be triaged and how to best rig and repair a ship to keep fighting at sea vice when it would endanger the life of the vessel and crew is not a skillset submarine crews at sea regularly, or voluntarily, practice.

The existence of digital PMS-updated documentation and sailor-updated 3-M tracking in SKED means there is a rich digital data source of historic and current system and component level maintenance that is unique to every surface and submarine vessel. This detailed data is ideal for training AI/ML algorithms on ship-specific system and component intricacies and vulnerabilities. Combine this data-driven learning with smart 3D CAD system models and you have a ship-specific comprehensive maintenance planning tool in peacetime and a maintenance triage assistant in war.

  • AI/ML can advance maintenance planning by optimizing maintenance by need precedence and can eliminate system-entry redundancy by analyzing for optimal sequences of required maintenance and required testing. For example, assessing component age and likelihood of faulting means an AI-based planning tool could recommend conducting a testing procedure earlier which would likely ID the predicted component fault. Without this modeling, maintenance might have otherwise gone on within that system prior to the test, only to have to be re-conducted post a test failure.
  • AI/ML planning tools integrated into a user-friendly CAD system software that generates system line-ups and tagouts means Commanders can rapidly assess best and worst-case scenarios and rank system faults based on highest assessed risk to ship and crew. This software is a Commander’s decision aid when equipment fails or is damaged at sea and can provide rapid damage assessment. This tool can predict how much time the vessel might have to keep fighting or recommend the conservative system line-ups that might be required to make it back to port.

Conclusion: Not a Sailor Replacement, But a Lifesaving Tool

The nuclear submarine force instills a list of concepts in every sailor known as the “Watchstanding Principles”, which include: Integrity, Ownership, Level of Knowledge, Questioning Attitude, Forceful Back-Up, Formality, and Procedural Compliance. Modern advancements in 3D modeling, interactive software, and AI/ML will never negate the need for these principles, but they can support these principles as operator aids.

The Navy is taking steps toward a technical revolution in advanced 3D modeling for vessel design and construction and in logistics software integration enabling smarter maintenance planning. But the revolution is missing a critical objective: improve the day-to-day lives of the sailors maintaining these vessels by tackling what takes up too much of their time and incurs them too much unmitigated risk. This can be done by leveraging existing CAD models, user-interfaces, and AI/ML algorithms, to digitize the existing labor intensive and risk-fraught paper tagout process. Tackling the tagout process with smart software can lead to further time saving and risk reducing advancements in maintenance planning in port and better repair triage at sea.

The benefits don’t just stop with the Navy. There are nearly 2,800 reported incidents readable on OSHA’s database described by the key word “lockout/tagout”, too many of which also include the words injury or death. Sailors and industry workers alike do their best to keep systems running and keep people safe. But methods for doing so when conducting the ever-present maintenance and repairs that require tagouts rely on manual primitive processes. The digital era for maintenance is here. It’s time for the Navy to make a change. Tag, you’re it.

Lieutenant Alana Davis is a U.S. Navy submarine officer and a force manpower planner under the Chief of Naval Personnel. She was previously assistant operations officer aboard the USS Michigan (SSGN-727) and a staff officer at Task Force 54 in Bahrain. She holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering sciences from Harvard University and  an MBA from the University of Florida.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other organization with which the author is affiliated.

Featured image: Damage Controlman 3rd Class Dylan Hasley, a Sailor assigned to the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5), uses a portable exothermic cutting unit (PECU) to cut apart a detachable anchor chain link which needed to be replaced after its taper pin had become stuck, in the ship’s forecastle, Sept. 23, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Jackson C. Rott) 

Arming Taiwan: America First in Action

By Major Joseph Potter, U.S. Army

Taiwan’s ability to independently support itself is integral to its survival but also clearly aligns with America’s national interests. Arming Taiwan is an America First policy; the reinvigoration of American global power is enhanced by enabling Taiwan to defend itself. It is an explicit “end” mandated by the National Security Strategy and a key “way” identified in the Defense Strategy. The United States has maintained relations with Taiwan since 1949. While the nature of these relations has varied over the years, from official recognition in 1949 to a derecognition in 1979 and unofficial relations since that time, two things have been constant. The People’s Republic of Chinas’ (PRC) and American support for the pro-western government in Taipei. To advance American interests in Asia, the United States must continue its longstanding support of Taiwan by providing it military aid through Foreign Arms Sales (FAS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding whether or not the United States would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. This policy helps the United States defend its homeland, enhance prosperity, and reinvigorate American power. The United States can succeed in Asia by deterring Chinese aggression, increasing burden-sharing with allies, and reindustrializing its defense base in a critical sector, maritime manufacturing. These strategic ways can be pursued by providing military aid to Taiwan while mitigating the chances of escalating competition.

Fomenting a “porcupine” or “hellscape” strategy deters the PRC by creating a series of cost prohibitive dilemmas and strengthens American security. Containing China within the First Island Chain preserves a balance of power that secures America’s peripheries, maintains sea control, and protects global power projection. Military aid to Taiwan enhances the unfavorable conditions facing any Chinese invasion by increasing the costs of war and decreasing the probability of success. In combat modeling, success in a kinetic scenario favors the side with a numerical advantage in troops and the quality of forces, with situational variables (weather, surprise or fortification) playing a lesser role. Destruction of 20-40% of an enemy’s combat power has historically made them ineffective. Equipping Taiwan with lethal aid (Army Tactical Missile Systems, Javelins, or anti-ship missiles) will deter Chinese aggression by enabling the defenders to diminish invading forces before they reach their beachhead, limiting the likelihood of a successful invasion. Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) wargames confirm that American aid in arming Taiwan is critical in defeating a PRC invasion, and that only through vigorous Taiwanese resistance and their capability to act independently can China be defeated. To ensure its interests in Asia the United States must deter aggression in the Strait, and continue arms sales to Taiwan. This also shares the burden of defense with U.S. partners.

 In an era of strategic consolidation, the U.S. can no longer support the robust military footprint of the 20th century, instead it must share the burden of defense with its allies. America holds mutual defense arrangements with approximately 68 countries, offers extended deterrence to over 30, and maintains the freedom of navigation for the world. Amid escalating tensions with the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, providing lethal aid to partners like Taiwan sustains a global stabilizing presence with reduced strain on American power.  Selling interceptors to the UAE, F-35s to Norway, or assorted arms (HIMARS, ATACMS, Harpoon, Javelin missiles) to Taiwan empowers those allies to share the burden of security with the United States Following the annexation of Crimea, successive American presidents provided Ukraine the ability to defend itself through arms sales, transfers and material support. While this ultimately did not deter Russia it did enable the United States to protect its interests in Europe while avoiding direct conflict. Sharing the burden of defense with partners by equipping them through FAS/FMF creates a sense of ownership for one’s own defense while still achieving American interest abroad. At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reaffirmed this point when he stated that “America first does not mean America alone, but it means realist engagement with a clear eye toward defending our most vital national interest.” For the United States to compete effectively and efficiently in the 21st century it must reinvigorate its defense industrial base and strengthen its alliances.  Sharing the burden of defense with Taiwan provides it with the means of self-defense while also empowering the United States to remain prepared militarily to respond where needed and for it to reinvest.

Lastly, competition with the PRC requires a robust defense industrial base (DIB). Domestic consumption alone cannot sustain the DIB requirements, we need allies to facilitate the expansion. According to CSIS, in wargames with the PRC the United States is expected to expend 5,000 long-range missiles in the first three weeks. As a subcomponent of these numbers, it will fire an average of 450 anti-ship missiles, requiring 24 months to produce a single replacement. For the United States to effectively compete, it must leverage the sale of American defense material through programs like FAS to Taiwan. FAS and FMF provide dual capacity by first, ensuring that our allies are well-armed while also increasing DIB capacity, offsetting costs to American taxpayers by using foreign capital. The F-35 program provides an example of this argument. From 2018-2020 the sale of F-35 aircraft to partner nations for specified lots resulted in approximately $2.1 billion in savings.

Aid and military sales to Taiwan is not new.  Since 1949 the U.S has sold over $50 billion in equipment to Taiwan and since 2022 alone the U.S. has authorized the sale of almost $20 billion in military hardware, ranging from munitions to helicopters. The equipment sold has, as it should, change as the threat from the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and China has changed. For years, Taiwanese defense procurement prioritized legacy, high-visibility, high-end equipment such as M1A2T Abrams main battle tanks and advanced tactical fighters like the F-16. But with the PLA modernization, symmetry may no longer be appropriate. This has led to changes in what Taiwan wants and buys. Today Taiwan needs less tanks and more stopping power in the Strait. However, when looking at the sector where the greatest mutual benefit can be realized to both the United States DIB and Taiwanese security one domain is the clear outlier, maritime.

From the Middle East to Europe American air, cyber and ground capabilities all provide value in this fight, but each sector is already in globe spanning demand. The wars in the Middle East and Ukraine have led to a backlog of orders by both the United States and its partners within these industries and created the necessary demand signal to the producers. Less demand however exists within the unmanned surface and subsurface naval sectors. Naval defense coordination between the United States and Taiwan offers a novel avenue to each states’ desired end state. Of the approximately $20 billion authorized defense packages since 2022 only 0.7% of equipment is related to maritime operations and that consists mainly of antiship missiles and 30mm gun mounts for vessels. This is inadequate for Taiwan and an opportunity for the United States. Borrowing from renowned and foundational naval strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, naval power is core to economic prosperity and sea control is foundational to defending the homeland. To defend the homeland the United States needs to master unmanned naval power alongside conventional power. Likewise, the best way to deter a Chinese invasion by the Taiwanese would be to be able to sink as many vessels as possible in a sea denial strategy. Employing lethal American unmanned systems and munitions to destroy invading PLA forces before they can secure a beachhead.

The state of Americas maritime DIB is well recorded. Described as being on the cusp of a “national emergency” the Trump administration has renewed its efforts to revitalize the Maritime Industrial Base (MIB) in pursuit of “America’s Maritime Dominance”. Cooperating with Taiwan and leveraging FAS/FMS in maritime munitions and capabilities provides new markets for U.S. firms. Companies such as Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), BlackSea Technologies, or Anduril would see increasing demand for these systems and provide them with the opportunity to scale production for what is already a very contested domain. The U.S. Navy is actively accelerating the deployment of unmanned systems into its arsenal as it prepares for the changing character of war the future promises to bring. The PLA Navy is actively seeking to overturn American naval dominance; selling equipment to Taiwan expands domestic manufacturing capacity, enhances cross-strait interoperability, and shortens production timelines but it also provides America with a historic opportunity to reinvigorate its maritime character.

The defense of Taiwan is geostrategically indispensable to Americas overall interests. Providing military aid to Taiwan deters Chinese aggression, strengthens burden sharing with allies, and increases American defense production. Embracing the role as the “Arsenal for Democracy” means the U.S. needs to ensure it is providing value in every domain. Further, expanding DIB production capacity and sales also increases Taiwan security. To produce at the scale necessary to compete, the United States needs to revitalize its defense industrial base. FAS and FMF to states like Taiwan reduces the overall cost of the platform to the United States while increasing production output and security. This make it clear that the defense of Taiwan and arming the island is ultimately and clearly an America First strategy. Following Presidents Trump and Xi’s recent American summit, the United States must continue providing military aid to Taiwan; it is symbiotic. It enables Taiwan and America to achieve their interests while confounding those of America’s primary adversary, China.

Major Joseph Potter is an Instructor and Course Director within the Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) Department at the United States Military Academy. He is a 2015 graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara and holds a Master of Science degree in Geological Engineering from Missouri University of Science and Technology and a Master of Science degree in Political Science from Utah State University.

Major Potter has previously served as an Infantry Officer in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 75th Ranger Regiment (Fort Benning, GA), and the 2nd Infantry Division (Joint Base Lewis–McChord, WA). His military service has taken him to the Philippines and Taiwan, and he has deployed in support of NATO missions in Germany and Romania, as well as combat operations in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom Sentinel.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any other organization with which the author is affiliated.

Featured image: Taiwanese soldiers with a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. (Wikimedia Commons)

 

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.