Dr. Emma Salisbury joins the program to discuss her essay, “From Hulls to Pods: Why NATO’s Navies Should Beware of the Allure of Mission Modularity,” in the new book in the ISPK SeaPower Series Guardians of the North Atlantic: NATO Maritime Strategies and Naval Operations in Turbulent Times.
Dr. Emma Salisbury is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program, an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, and a Contributing Editor at War on the Rocks. She writes widely on military-industrial matters, geopolitics, and national security in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe, with a particular focus on the maritime. She is based just outside London in the United Kingdom.
The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is shifting rapidly as China’s shipbuilding hegemony endures. With the U.S. shipbuilding base in decline, the United States must take bold action to remain a credible maritime power and uphold the rules-based order that has underpinned peace and prosperity in Asia for decades. This order could be strengthened by a trilateral collaboration that unites the United States, Japan, and South Korea in co-developing and mass-producing a new class of fast-attack missile corvettes. From the outset, these vessels would be designed with a clear value proposition for the high-end fight, while also being tailored for maritime domain awareness and maritime security. They would bolster allied naval capacity and serve as an exportable platform to support ASEAN partners on the frontlines of illicit activity, maritime coercion, grey zone warfare, and great power competition.
To realize this initiative, the United States must reform outdated laws, attract foreign direct investment into dormant shipyards, and fully leverage the industrial strength of its allies. Congressional action, including targeted exemptions from the Jones Act, Buy American Act, and the Byrnes-Tollefson amendment, will be essential to unlock collaboration at speed and scale. This bold strategy will counter the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s quantitative edge with a qualitatively superior, coalition-driven maritime force, restoring American sea power while promoting Indo-Pacific stability.
The Collapse of American Maritime Power
Since the conclusion of World War II, the United States has embarked on a mission to protect global supply lines, project power abroad, and strengthen a rules-based order that would drive massive growth in the global economy —a feat not seen in human history.1 This dominance was mainly at sea through the efforts of the U.S. Navy, which ensured freedom of the seas and adherence to this newfound order. Eight decades later, this dominance is being challenged as the Navy sails listlessly, if not rudderless, due to shrinking budgets, failed platforms, and floundering shipyards. During World War II, the Navy had almost 1,300 ships in service; by 2003, it had less than 300.2
As fleet numbers dwindled due to the peace dividend, so did America’s shipyards. Since the late 1950s, U.S. shipbuilding output has declined by more than 85%, and the number of shipyards capable of producing large commercial vessels has decreased by over 80%.3 The U.S. has gone from building almost 5% of the world’s ocean-going ships in the 1970s to just 0.1% today. For comparison, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea make up almost 90% of global shipbuilding, with the PRC building the majority.4
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a sustained decline in America’s defense shipbuilding capacity. During the Cold War, the United States operated 11 shipyards dedicated to building naval combatants, but by 2005, seven shipyards were closed, and a once proud 70,000-strong workforce reduced to less than 30,000 workers (2012 estimate).5 U.S. shipyards continued to decline well into the 1990s and early 2000s as subsidies ceased, the labor market shrunk, geopolitical priorities shifted, and there was a significant lack of infrastructure investment.6 Currently, investment is so poor that there are not enough drydocks in the U.S. to support naval expansion. For example, one of the last publicly owned shipyards, Norfolk Naval Shipyard’s drydock number one, has been in use since before the Civil War. The newest publicly owned dry dock for the Navy was completed in 1962.7 When examining shipbuilding through a monetary investment lens, the US is woefully behind most nations, especially its primary strategic competitor. From 2010 to 2018, the PRC invested $132 billion in its shipbuilding capability, whereas the U.S. invested less than $80 million.8
Shipbuilding, shipyard infrastructure, and overall investment are not the only explanations for the Navy’s decline since the Cold War. The fault also lies with naval design and a failure of leadership to determine what the future Navy should look like. Programs like the Zumwalt class-guided missile destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program proved to be a heavy burden to the Navy and some would say were simply the wrong ships for the wrong time.9 Both programs were a product of the post-Cold War shift toward power projection immediately faced significant challenges.
The Zumwalt, initially envisioned to replace the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, had cost overruns that ballooned exponentially to $8 billion per ship as the program was truncated to only three ships (for reference, a Ford-class carrier costs $13.3 billion).10 Additionally, the Zumwalt weapons systems, notably the 155mm Advanced Gun System (AGS) projectiles, cost $800,000 per round.11 The LCS program was designed to be a “multi-mission jack of all trades” platform at a relatively affordable price. This affordability was more than $28 billion for 35 ships, with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimating that the cost of operating and maintaining the fleet throughout its lifespan would be upwards of $60 billion. Like the Zumwalt weapon system, the LCS’s combat effectiveness was inadequate. The Anti-Submarine Warfare package was canceled, and the Mine Hunting mission package was declared operational in 2023, 15 years after its development and a $700 million investment.12 Many high-profile incidents at sea have plagued the LCS program as a whole, leading to many being decommissioned early; a notable example is USS SIOUX CITY (LCS 11), which was transferred to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) after just five years in service.13
In 2017, naval leaders shifted their focus back to building traditional guided missile frigates (FFGs) to keep pace with rising threats, notably from the PRC. The Navy opted to use the FREMM frigate design currently employed by the Italian and French Navies. With almost 85 percent similarities, the FREMM offered the U.S. Navy a reliable platform with established supply chains and interoperability with European partners. Unfortunately, shaping the FREMM design to meet Navy survivability and growth margin requirements required extensive modification. The result was a design that accounts for barely 15 percent of the original.14 The former Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition Nickolas Guertin remarked, “Sometimes, you are just better off designing a new ship. It turns out modifying someone else’s design is a lot harder than it seems.”15 Workforce shortages at U.S. shipyards and a lack of design maturity have compounded the Constellation class frigate’s challenges. The lead ship was not expected to enter naval service until 2029, almost three years late, and at a cost of $1.4 billion.16 Meanwhile, America’s strategic competitor continues to grow the world’s largest Navy.
The Rise of PRC Shipbuilding Hegemony
The PRC’s ascent as a shipbuilding hegemon is a testament to its meteoric rise as an economic powerhouse. China’s defense industrial base, notably shipyards, has undergone an unprecedented transformation, making China the world’s premier shipbuilder. With dual-use (civilian-military) shipyards, the PRC has 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, meaning it could produce 23 million tons of vessels compared to less than 100,000 tons in the U.S.17 The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of this transformation. Since the end of the Cold War, the PLAN has rapidly evolved from a mere coastal defense force to the world’s largest blue water Navy.
Since 2010, the PLAN has undergone significant modernization, with over 70 percent of its fleet comprising newly commissioned vessels, including corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. This rapid pace is evident in the larger shipbuilding apparatus, with China launching more ships than any other country in recent memory.18 While the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program has garnered significant attention, the more critical observation is its rapid production of multiple surface combatants with advanced anti-ship missile capabilities. The Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers, Type 052D Luyang III Destroyers, the Type 054B Jiangkai III-class frigates, and the Type 056 Jiangdao Corvette represent formidable additions to China’s naval arsenal. The Renhai-class, in particular, is equipped with 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells capable of firing a variety of missies, including long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles such as the YJ-18 and YJ-21.19
The type 054B represents a significant upgrade from the PLAN’s Jiangkai series workhorse FFGs, each having a VLS of 32 cells and eight dedicated launchers for anti-ship cruise missiles such as the YJ-83.20 The smaller Jiangdao corvette, meanwhile, tailored for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations is capable of disrupting U.S. undersea dominance in addition to “punching above its weight” when equipped with YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles is cause for concern.
PLA Navy Type 056A corvette Huangshi (Hull 655) during a maritime training exercise in May 2025. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn/by Wang Guangjie)
While it is clear that American shipbuilding capacity is at a numerical disadvantaged, a common argument persists that the U.S. has far superior quality in terms of overall ship size (measured in tonnage) and can employ far more missiles than the PLAN.21 While the aggregate displacement of PLAN ships is a little more than a third of the U.S. Navy, and with approximately 9,900 vertical launch system (VLS) cells compared to China’s 4,200, the U.S. holds a slight “advantage.” However, this gap is narrowing at an alarming rate.22 Beyond a VLS numbers game, the PLAN has already surpassed the U.S. fleet size, boasting over 370 ships as of 2024 compared to America’s 296 ships as of 2025, and is projected to reach 475 battleforce ships by 2035.23 This quantitative advantage cannot be dismissed, as history has shown that numerical superiority often proves decisive in combat. In an analysis of naval engagements ranging from the Peloponnesian Wars to the Cold War, only three out of a possible 28 engagements have seen a lesser force with superior technology overcome a fleet with superior numbers.24
The notion that quality will inevitably triumph over quantity is both naïve and dangerous. In some critical areas, such as anti-ship missiles, the United States is already behind: the U.S. surface fleet largely relies on the SM-6 with a range of 150 nautical miles, while the PLAN fields the YJ-18 (300 nm) and the YJ-21 hypersonic missile (est. 540-810 nm), not to mention Chinas large arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles.25 As the PRC continues to expand the worlds largest fleet while narrowing or surpassing the U.S. in key technologies, the United States must reassess its naval strategy. This begins with partnering with allies Japan and South Korea and leveraging the full weight of the trilateral alliance to co-develop and field fast-attack missile corvettes.
A Collaborative Approach
The challenges facing the United States and the shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific demand a fundamental reassessment of current maritime strategy. The U.S. can continue claiming it is the dominant maritime force only if it speaks historically. With declining shipbuilding capacity, failed platforms, and the PLAN’s continuing naval growth, a bold new maritime strategy fostering collaboration and innovation is needed. Continuing on the current course risks ceding further power and influence to the PRC, undermining regional stability and American interests. This collaborative approach must leverage the strength and quality of our premier Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. These nations possess innate shipbuilding expertise and share a vested interest in countering the PRC’s coercive and aggressive behavior.
Undeniably, the PRC has established itself as the global leader in merchant shipbuilding. In 2022, the PRC produced 1,794 ships.26 By 2024, it had 61.4 percent of the worldwide market, including 55 percent of backlog orders, equating to approximately 2,539 ships, positioning itself well for future shipbuilding initiatives.28 While Japan currently accounts for only 15 percent of the global market, it was still able to secure and fulfill orders for 587 large commercial vessels at the end of 2022.28 The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was able to procure multiple naval surface and subsurface combatants through the combined efforts of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), and Japan Marine United Corporation (JMU).29 South Korea meanwhile accounts for 28 percent of the global market and produced 734 large commercial ships by the end of 2022.30 The combined efforts of both Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and Hanwha Ocean enabled the South Korean Navy to procure upwards of ten naval surface vessels per year, in addition to providing a corvette/frigate export variant to the Philippines on budget and five months ahead of schedule.31 Meanwhile, Japan has taken a similar export approach with the inking of a deal to provide 11 Mogami class frigates to the Australian Navy. The first three will be built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan, while the remaining eight will be homegrown by Austal in Western Australia with the first frigate expected in 2029.32
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Mogami-class frigate JS Yahagi. (Photo by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force)
Combined with U.S. production at just 0.1 percent, the tri-lateral accounts for 43.1 percent of the worldwide market.33 With Japanese and South Korean FDI and a renewed U.S. commitment to shipbuilding through Congressional action, the tri-lateral global market share could reach as high as 53 percent.34 Collaboration between industry-leading Japanese and South Korean shipyards, such as MHI and HDHI, with renewed investment in declining American shipyards, offers a rare opportunity to disrupt Chinese shipbuilding hegemony and global influence.
The Tri-Lateral Solution: A Corvette for Asia
Collaboration in shipbuilding is no easy venture for any country, let alone three. It demands a compelling vision of what future conflict will entail, what type of naval combatant is required to prevail in said conflict, and the necessary resources to build at speed and scale. The United States, in particular, is running up against the clock, resource-constrained, and recovering from programs such as the LCS, Zumwalt, and the cancelled Constellation-class frigate.
Collaborative shipbuilding presents a strategic opportunity to act as we move increasingly closer to the “Davidson window” in which the U.S., Japan, and South Korea can accelerate naval production before the PLAN consolidates its quantitative and qualitative edge. Tri-lateral collaborative shipbuilding presents a common sense approach regarding ship design, procurement, and deployment. The idea of collaborative shipbuilding utilizing the tri-lateral alliance is not unique across the literature. Varying journal articles have advocated for a “JROKUS” architecture, in which Japan and South Korea assist the United States in building ships, notably a vessel based on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.35 The U.S. provided Japan and South Korea with the fundamental design for the U.S. workhorse, the Arleigh Burke, which both countries adapted and built to meet their respective requirements. For instance, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has fielded the Maya class DDG. In contrast, the ROK Navy has developed the Sejong the Great class, which utilizes both the Aegis Combat System and an American Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) design.
The ROK Navy Sejong the Great-class guided-missile destroyer ROKS Jeongjo the Great at Jeju Naval Base. (ROK Navy photo)
While building a class of vessels with a standard blueprint is valid, it negates cost, time, classified technology, and other special considerations. If the U.S. Navy aims to “put more players on the field,” smaller, cost-effective corvettes built at scale are viable.36 When built in the United States, the average cost of an Arleigh Burke destroyer is upwards of $3 billion. Even if Japan or South Korea could halve those costs to $1.5 billion or less and get the ship off the assembly line more quickly, the pace of production may still be eclipsed by China’s and not make a meaningful difference in the regional naval balance.
One possible design consideration is to use the Russian Steregushchiy III class as a template for a hybrid corvette design between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. The Steregushchiy balances firepower, maneuverability, survivability, and a shallow draft within a small displacement, employing a 12-cell Redut VLS for medium-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missile launchers, and layered defensive systems. Japan and South Korea could blend elements of the Steregushchiy with Japan’s Mogami-class and South Korea’s FFX Batch III program, integrated with the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS). The Mogami-class contributes stealth and advanced sensor capabilities, while the FFX Batch III provides survivability and flexibility to accommodate evolving mission requirements, such as maritime domain awareness systems and unmanned aerial or surface vehicles. Integration of a 24-32 cell Mk 41 VLS would provide multiple options to employ long-range surface-to-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine missiles carried by destroyers without sacrificing the cost. Furthermore, a VLS-equipped corvette introduces a capability the PLAN does not possess at this weight class.
The Russian Federation Navy corvette Steregushchiy on Navy Day 2009 in the Neva River in St. Petersburg. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)
Mass-producing such corvettes would not only distribute significant naval fires across the first island chain but would also directly expand the U.S. and allied VLS inventory at scale. Finally, each new corvette’s ability to mask loadouts introduces operational uncertainty further complicating PLAN operations throughout Asia.
Pursuing a new collaborative ship design based on the input of Japan, South Korea, and regional partners does not have to be an arduous process. The European Union, specifically Italy, France, Spain, Greece, and Norway, have all agreed on a design for a European Patrol Corvette or “EPC” in which each country will utilize its supply chains, shipbuilding technologies, and common procurement strategies to build and outfit the vessel in multiple European shipyards.37 The seriousness of building a ship based on a new design is critical, especially given the challenges of the Constellation class, in which significant costs were incurred in design modifications.
In estimating the cost, size, and production timeline of a trilateral VLS-capable corvette, the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) provides a useful benchmark. EU member states anticipate a prototype by 2026–2027 after the critical design review was completed in 2025, with operational units expected to enter service around 2030. Projected costs, based on 2021 figures, range from €250–300 million per vessel.38 If the United States, Japan, and South Korea pursued a joint program leveraging Japan’s Mogami-class design and South Korea’s FFX Batch III program, the path from design maturity to fleet operations could reasonably fall within a 5–10 year window, depending on the agreed production scale. A target of 10–12 hulls is realistic, given Japan’s current ability to deliver two Mogami-class ships annually and Hyundai Heavy Industries’ steady pace of delivery for both the ROK Navy and export customers.39 Assuming a 10-year horizon and costs in the range of $275–325 million per ship, the trilateral initiative could field 10–12 corvettes by year twelve, with the potential for even greater output if dormant U.S. shipyards were reactivated. The projected timeline would include 0–4 years for collaboration and design, with lead ships arriving in years 4–6 (consistent with EPC estimates), followed by serial production ramping up from year six onward.40
The tri-lateral alliance is strategically positioned to provide corvettes to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), leveraging Asia-based shipbuilding to optimize procurement efficiency, supply chain management, and a “built-in Asia for Asia” mindset. This approach could reduce delivery times and promote collaboration amongst ASEAN nations in the corvette design process. Japan and South Korea, meanwhile, stand to gain significant strategic influence within ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific through this initiative. Simultaneously, U.S. participation in the tri-lateral Corvette design offers its Asian allies greater strategic flexibility while reaffirming America’s commitment to ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Congressional and Legal Hurdles
Multiple bills have been introduced regarding the use of foreign shipyards and foreign investment, notably the bipartisan SHIPS Act sponsored by Sens. Mark Kelly (D-Arizona), Todd Young (R-Indiana), and Reps. John Garamendi (D-California) and Trent Kelly (R-Mississippi).41 The second bill introduced by Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Senator John Curtis (R-Utah) seeks to implement the “Ensuring Naval Readiness Act.”42 Both sets of bills introduced in 2024 and 2025 have substantial merit in providing ships for the United States. The SHIPS Act seeks to rejuvenate America’s declining shipyard infrastructure amidst the rise of the PRC’s posture. Specifically, the bill calls for a Strategic Commercial Fleet of 250 US-flagged commercial ships to support international commerce and supply U.S. and allied forces during times of war.43 During this buildup, the SHIPS Act allows for interim foreign-built vessels within this strategic fleet until US-built vessels can relieve them.
Additionally, the act will expand the U.S. shipyard industrial base for civilian-military dual-use operations (perfected by the PRC) by establishing a 25 percent tax credit for shipyard investments and financial incentives to support innovative approaches to U.S. domestic shipbuilding capabilities.44 The Ensuring Naval Readiness Act is more specific to the construction of U.S. combatants abroad. The bill states that to achieve a 381-ship Navy, Congress must allow the option to construct vessels, components, or modules in shipyards of Indo-Pacific nations with which the U.S. has mutual defense agreements.45
While both bills have considerable merit, especially regarding the possibility of building a common fast-attack corvette among the Tri-Lateral partners, there are still significant hurdles that Congress must continue to overcome. Should the SHIPS Act and the Ensuring Naval Readiness Act be codified into law, other federal interlocking statutes remain in place that can quickly dampen any shipbuilding revolution. Notably, the Jones Act of 1920, the Buy American Act of 1933, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Berry Amendment. While the Ensuring Naval Readiness Act amends United States Code (USC) Title 10 section 8679 to “allow” for naval ships to be built abroad, it lacks significant substance concerning multiple federal laws. The Jones Act of 1920 requires that any ship sailing between U.S. ports be built in the United States and owned and operated by U.S. citizens or permanent residents, which complicates the goal of a strategic commercial fleet.
The Buy American Act (concerning naval combatants) requires that significant components and funds allocated to naval vessels can only be used for fabrication within the U.S. This act alone directly contradicts the Ensuring Naval Readiness Act, allowing the construction of naval combatants in foreign shipyards. Finally, the Defense Production Act of 1950 could hinder the building of ships overseas. While not explicitly limiting the construction of naval combatants abroad, it does focus significantly on strengthening the domestic industrial base, which could discourage overseas efforts in shipbuilding.46 Additionally, the Berry Amendment (preference given to domestically produced goods) and a 100% “Made in America” by 2033 clause within the NDAA have imposed restrictions on foreign-made components from allied nations, complicating a collaborative shipbuilding approach.47 Furthermore, the Byrnes-Tollefson Amendment prohibits foreign companies from constructing hulls or superstructures for navy ships, causing another detrimental hurdle to a U.S. shipbuilding revolution.48
Conclusion
The strategic imperatives facing the United States, Japan, and South Korea demand immediate, decisive action to secure enduring maritime security across the Indo-Pacific. Trilateral collaboration in naval shipbuilding is no longer optional, it is necessary. Together, the alliance has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to counter China’s expanding naval power, restore American shipbuilding strength, and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific for decades to come. By pooling resources, expertise, and industrial capacity, the alliance can design and produce a fast-attack missile corvette tailored to the region’s urgent needs: maritime domain awareness, deterrence, and enhanced interoperability among allies and partners. A corvette fleet, built with Asian shipyards and American innovation, will empower ASEAN partners on the frontlines of maritime coercion, illegal activities, grey-zone conflict, and Great Power Competition.
Swift legislative action must accompany this vision. Congress must urgently amend outdated laws, including the Jones Act, the Buy American Act, and the Byrnes-Tollefson Amendment, to unlock foreign direct investment, reactivate dormant U.S. shipyards, and reestablish American leadership in global shipbuilding. Streamlining procurement processes and embracing trilateral trade rules can significantly reduce costs, expedite production timelines, and position the new fleet for phased deployment before China’s projected military advantage reaches its apex later this decade. This strategy offers more than ships. It redistributes burden-sharing among allies, strengthens alliance unity under the 2023 Camp David Accords, and demonstrates a clear commitment to defend freedom in the Indo-Pacific. It also signals that the United States and its allies have learned from past naval procurement failures — and are now prepared to innovate, adapt, and lead once again.
Restoring sea power through this trilateral initiative is both an opportunity and a strategic necessity. Success will reaffirm U.S., Japanese, and South Korean leadership in safeguarding the maritime commons, strengthening the global rules-based order, and securing American interests throughout the twenty-first century.
Chase Harding is a Strategic Planner at United States Forces Japan and a former Political-Military Master’s Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of War, or the U.S. Government.
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[41] Brett Davis, “Lawmakers Introduce SHIPS Act to Revitalize Shipbuilding, Commercial Maritime Industries,” Seapower, December 19, 2024, https://seapowermagazine.org/lawmakers-introduce-ships-act-to-revitalize-shipbuilding-commercial-maritime-industries/.
[42] “Utah’s Senators Introduce Bills for Navy and Coast Guard Readiness,” Mike Lee US Senator for Utah, February 5, 2025, https://www.lee.senate.gov/2025/2/utah-s-senators-introduce-bills-for-navy-and-coast-guard-readiness.
[43] Lake Dodson, “The SHIPS Act: Domestic Shipbuilding With a Foreign Ally,” The National Interest, February 11, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/the-ships-act-domestic-shipbuilding-with-a-foreign-ally/.
[44] Lawmakers Introduce SHIPS Act to Revitalize Shipbuilding, Seapower
[45] “US Senators Introduce Bill on Leveraging Trusted Allies’ Shipyards to Build Naval Vessels,” The Korea Herald, February 12, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10417877.
[46] “The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress,” accessed March 22, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43767.
[47] “Senate NDAA Bans Allied Manufacturing Base From U.S. Navy Shipbuilding,” The Maritime Executive, accessed March 22, 2025, https://maritime-executive.com/article/senate-ndaa-bans-allied-manufacturing-base-from-u-s-navy-shipbuilding.
[48] Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress, n.d.)
Featured Image: Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) along with Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) guided-missile destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) and Republic of Korea Navy guided-missile destroyer ROKS Sejong The Great (DDG 991) conduct a trilateral Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) exercise in the Sea of Japan. (U.S. Navy photo)
Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.
This article will outline the reasons proponents feel the high north has increased value, examine the actual strategic value of each, and show that none is sufficient to divert scarce resources from higher value theaters. Strategy should serve as an appetite suppressant to keep the nation from committing to peripheral missions at the expense of critical ones.1
The 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy was justifiably “prudent and measured,” limiting DOD actions to enhancing domain awareness, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It planned to work with Allies and partners to uphold deterrence and homeland defense.2 The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy did not mention the Arctic.3 In contrast, proponents agitate for the United States to dedicate increased defense assets to maintain access to its vast natural resources, exploit the increased economic and shipping opportunities, and provide for national defense.
Unfortunately, the Joint Force is already overtasked in trying to meet its global and domestic missions while rebuilding the force. It is therefore prudent to examine the actual value of the far north before committing scarce resources to what is, at best, a strategic distraction.
A potential new trade route
The most exaggerated claim concerns the value of the Arctic as shortened and hence cheaper shipping routes between Asia and Europe. Many stories tout the speed and value of the shorter route for Asia to Europe shipping.4
While factual, these stories exaggerate both the volume and the value of shipping using the northern routes. To evaluate the real value of these routes, it is essential to understand their current usage and the limits that geography and oceanography impose. Figure 1, below, illustrates both routes.
“The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the ‘Northeast Passage’), along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in length…Most transits through the NSR are associated with the carriage of LNG from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula…The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands…potentially applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America, but it is less commercially viable than the NSR.”5
While this description sounds promising, it is important to understand the current and potential flow of shipping, the nature of containerized shipping, and the impact of oceanography on its future growth.
Almost all of the Northwest Passage lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Russia also claims that key straits on the route lie within its internal waters.6 See Figure 2, below.
Thus, almost all transits must pass through straits Russia claims as internal waters. Russia has assigned responsibility for managing the NSR to Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear power monopoly, which complicates obtaining the required permission for internal passage. In 2022, Russia also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, a subsea mountain range, as part of its continental shelf. This pushes its claimed EEZ boundaries to the edge of those areas claimed by Greenland and Canada. See Figure 3, below.
Figure 3: Arctic Nations Territorial Claims. (Photo source: Ian Birdwell, “Rival Claims to a Changing Arctic,” Maritime Executive, August 15, 2016.)
The percentage increase in shipping along these routes may sound very impressive, but only because the baseline was miniscule. Actual shipping remains minimal. The Centre for High North Logistics recorded only 97 voyages on the NSR during 2024.7 See Figure 4, below.
Despite continued official Chinese and Russian efforts to promote the route, as of August 31, 2025, only 52 vessels had transited the NSR. Container freight represented only 20 percent of the total. See Figure 5, below.
Further restricting traffic growth, in October 2025, four of the world’s five biggest container shipping companies — MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA CGM SA and Hapag-Lloyd AG — stated they will not use the NSR due to environmental, safe navigation, and transit issues. The fifth company, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese company, has not made a statement.8
The Northwest Passage supports even less shipping than the NSR. As the 2024 shipping season concluded only 18 ships completed the full journey – eight cruise ships, nine cargo ships and one tanker.9
Factors restricting the value of shipping via NSR or NWP
Several major and enduring factors – draft restrictions, unpredictable sea ice, the requirement for ice breakers, and higher cost per container–reduce the economic viability of these routes.
Draft restrictions
Arctic hydrography is particularly restrictive for commercial shipping. The NSR has a controlling draft of 12.5 meters and the NWP is limited to 10 meters. This means the Panamax-class (5,500 TEU maximum) is the largest that can use the NSR but they draw too much water for the NWP. In addition, ships may not have a beam of more than the ice breaker escorting them, or about 30 meters maximum.10
In August 2025, the NEWNEW company proudly announced it had increased its NSR traffic from 7 voyages in 2024 to 13 voyages in 2025. In those 13 trips, it carried a total of around 20,000 TEUs.11 For comparison, the Inira-class carries over 24,000 TEUs on a single voyage. From January 2022 to April 2024, over 800 ships per week transited the Cape of Good Hope and Suez Canal,12 for a yearly total of over 41,000 transits. More ships pass the Cape every 11 hours than use the NSR in a year and many are much larger than the Panamax-class.
Unpredictable Sea Ice
While Arctic Sea ice is steadily receding, this does not mean passages are necessarily or predictably clear. Sea ice moves with prevailing currents with thicker multi-year ice moving into areas where one year ice has melted. As such, moving multi-year ice often stacks up in restricted waters. The NASA image (Figure 6 below) shows how the melting ice on the NWP flows east and closes the route despite major reductions in total ice coverage. It led NASA to conclude:
“Despite overall declines in the thickness and extent of Arctic sea ice, shipping routes along the northern coast of North America have become less navigable in recent years.”13
The fact that the sea ice floats means it is very difficult to predict exactly where the passage will be blocked. This problem is not limited to the NWP. As late as September 2025, “a non ice-class Suezmax oil tanker has been forced to wait several days due to ice conditions before proceeding along Russia’s Northern Sea Route…at very slow speeds in close proximity to the shoreline to find a route through the ice.”14 Even ice rated ships are often delayed, the Buran, an Arc4 rated Liquid Natural Gas tanker “reached the Northern Sea Route north of the Bering Strait on October 29 and for the past three days has been struggling to find a path through early winter sea ice.”15
Compounding the problem of drifting ice, the routes have notoriously shallow water. The channels are not well marked and still surprise mariners. On September 7, 2025, the Thamesborg, a Dutch bulk freighter, ran aground in the remote Franklin Strait of the NWP. It required three salvage ships to refloat the Thamesborg.16 The vessel was not unloaded and refloated until October 9 – a delay of 33 days. Canadian Coast Guard inspections also revealed damaged ballast tanks.17
In addition to ice, Arctic weather ranging from storms to heavy fog often slows transiting ships. While delays are not a significant problem for bulk shipping, they have major impacts on the timeliness required for container freight.
Icebreaker requirements
Paradoxically, as the arctic ice cap is melting, the demand for icebreakers is surging. Russia has 47 in service with 15 under construction. Canada is funding two dozen new ones. Both nations require numerous ice breakers to support domestic industries in their EEZs.
In contrast, the United States currently has two icebreakers with one of those used primarily as a research vessel. The U.S. Coast Guard has also purchased a used icebreaker and hopes to have it in operation by 2026.18 Although the Coast Guard analysis indicated it would only need three heavy and three medium icebreakers, on October 10, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security announced the United States and Finland have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a Finnish company to produce four icebreakers with the next seven being produced in U.S. shipyards.19Given only 18 NWP passages in 2024, it is unclear why the United States needs to increase its icebreaker fleet from two to 11.
Cost
Proponents of Arctic shipping routes note that shorter northern routes will mean lower costs. Unfortunately, several factors mean the cost of shipping individual containers will often be higher. Draft restrictions, lack of ports enroute, slow emergency response, stricter construction requirements, specialized crew training, ice breaker escorts, and insurance costs all contribute to higher cost per container. While the cost of an individual ship’s voyage may be less on a shorter route, the Thamesborg and Lynx show a shorter route does not necessarily mean it is cheaper or even faster.
Bulk cargo is usually shipped point to point so can benefit from a shorter route. Obviously, it makes sense to ship coal, LNG, and oil that is produced in northern Russia to China or India via the NSR. However, due to economies of scale, bulk cargo originating elsewhere may be cheaper to ship via the much larger ships that can transit southern routes. Not only are Arctic-capable ships much smaller, but they must also meet strict construction, outfitting, and crew training requirements which make them more expensive to purchase and operate. Due to the route hazards, insurance rates are also higher. Further inflating the cost per voyage is the requirement for ice breaker escorts. Both Canada and Russia charge each vessel for icebreaking services.20
For its part, container shipping has different cost factors. The most important metric is the cost per container rather than the cost of the voyage for an individual ship. Thus, scale is an important factor.
A second critical metric for container freight is timeliness. Unlike either northern route, southern routes can be part of a shipping network. This is critical for on-time delivery and economy of scale. The desired standard for on-time delivery for containerized freight is 99%. To achieve this goal, container ships operate in networks with “strings” or routes of many ports serviced by multiple ships on a steady schedule. For example, a US east coast to Southwest Asia route taking 42 days round trip serviced by six ships means regular weekly service out of the ports serviced on that route.21
The network described limits delays to a week. Today, much of the global economy consists of subcomponents built in one country, shipped to a second for final assembly of the subcomponents, and then on to another country for inclusion in the final product. Such supply chains are based on just-in-time delivery. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, failure to deliver on time means production lines must be idled, making reliable delivery time critical. As noted, the unpredictable sea ice, infrequent sailings, and often brutal weather on the northern routes reduce reliability. Given the northern routes cover 2,500 miles with minimal infrastructure or support services, weeks-long delays are not unusual.
Access to natural resources
Minerals, particularly those yielding rare earth metals, are often touted as the primary resources of interest in the north. In fact, the Geological Survey of Norway estimated the value of rare earth minerals in the Arctic alone is $1.5-2 trillion.22 However, most of the minerals lie within the Exclusive Economic Zones of the six nations bordering the Arctic — Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the United States, and Iceland. Any exploitation will be done by those nations, and so there is no special urgency to secure them against competitors. Figure 3 shows how only a small slice of the Arctic Ocean lies outside national EEZs. A paper from the Institute for Security & Development Policy also noted:
“Overall, the High North’s … resources have long attracted global interest, but their exploitation is technologically difficult and capital-intensive, and often faces local resistance due to risks to nature-based livelihoods and cultural heritage. … In short, the Arctic’s mineral wealth is both enormous and yet largely untapped…”23
Just as important, rare earths are not rare. The High North is estimated to hold only 15 percent of the world’s supply.24 In fact, in the last year major deposits have been found in Wyoming and Arkansas; these deposits have the obvious advantage of easier access. The issue is not the ore but the refining process. Currently most rare earth minerals are shipped to China for refinement into rare earth metals. If the United States continues to invest in refining facilities, supplies of rare earths will not be an issue.
Oil is another driver of interest. According to the U. S. Geological Service “roughly 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable fossil fuel resources in the world” may remain in the Arctic with 84 percent of it outside the Exclusive Economic Zones of Arctic nations.25
However, the high production cost of High North oil meant the United States government received no bids in the January 2025 Alaska Wildlife Refuge lease sale.26 Apparently, oil firms have decided it makes no economic sense to invest in very high-cost production when there is still oil in fields with much lower production costs. Russian firms are the obvious exceptions. As state-controlled firms, they must continue to invest onshore in the north of the country. Oil revenues are essential to the Russian economy and government budget.
National Security
Two threads emerge from the discussion of the need for U.S. defense of the High North. The first is the need for surveillance to detect any Russian attack coming over the pole. The second concern is the security of Greenland, Svalbard, and the protection of shipping routes.
During the Cold War, the United States and Canada operated the Defense Early Warning (DEW) radars from 1957 to 1985 to provide warning of Soviet bomber and missile attacks over the pole. From 1985 to 1988, DEW transitioned to the North Warning System (NWS). The NWS provides surveillance for the atmospheric defense of North America. Today, the United States and Canada are working to improve the surveillance element of missile defense. Re-establishing the radar system in the High North will be an extremely difficult, very expensive, and time-consuming project.27 A potential alternative is space surveillance. The Pentagon is already exploring deploying space-based sensors as part of the Golden Dome. If this very expensive project continues, it will provide the surveillance aspect of the DOD tasks.
The sudden concern that the United States must field and deploy forces to physically defend Greenland, Svalbard, and the new shipping routes is a bit puzzling. By holding the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, NATO credibly defended the western exit from the High North throughout the Cold War against a highly capable Soviet Navy. Even with global warming, the Gap will remain Russia’s best exit to the west. In the east, the Bering Strait is about 50 miles wide with two islands in the middle.
In fact, the most significant change since the Cold War has been the steady decline of the Russian forces in the region. “Decades of attrition, neglect, and resource depletion have left Russia’s Arctic capabilities outdated and functionally broken.”28 Against the degraded Russian air and sea forces, land-based missiles and drones can provide an affordable option. There is no requirement for U.S. or allied forces to penetrate the NSR. Containerized land-based missiles, drones, radar, command and control systems integrated with space-based surveillance can allow U.S. and allied forces to engage surface ships and aircraft transiting the Arctic. In short, the United States and its allies can control traffic that attempts to leave the Arctic. These systems can also support the most challenging mission – tracking and, if needed, engaging Russian submarines.
Conclusion
Strategy should provide discipline to guide the investment of limited defense resources. Proponents of investing in capabilities focused on the High North point to defending Greenland and Svalbard; balancing the increased Chinese and Russian interests in the region; maintaining access to its vast natural resources; and taking advantage of the shortened shipping via the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Yet, the vastly increased range of land-based missiles supported by pervasive surveillance means it is easier and cheaper to defend the chokepoints at the exits to the Arctic Ocean than during the Cold War. And they will do so against vastly reduced Russian forces. The vast natural resources lie within the EEZs of the Arctic nations, so access requires diplomacy and businesses willing to make arrangements for western firms to exploit them. Military resources will not improve access. Finally, the shipping routes will, even with massive growth, never amount to more than a minor fraction of global trade. So, while there is some value in investing in High North capabilities, those resources will have to be taken from already under-resourced theaters with much higher strategic value. Strategy requires allotting scarce assets to priority missions – the High North is not one of them.
While there is essentially no need for major military investment in the High North, the United States should continue to engage concerning environmental issues and apply sanctions against violators. It should also reduce its icebreaker contract to the maximum of six suggested by the Coast Guard. While the current two icebreakers may be insufficient, the proposed buy is much too large. It will take shipbuilding resources away from the Navy at a time when the fleet is understrength and has no path to sufficient numbers of ships. The U.S. can continue to maintain a defense of the High North using the same terrain and maritime chokepoints used during the Cold War. The investments in new generations of cruise missiles and long-range drones necessary to support the priority theaters will also provide a flexible force to defend the north if needed. Lastly, it should not allocate limited DOD assets to the region because high-priority theaters like Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are already under-resourced. These measures can effectively manage Arctic interests within the appropriate context of focused national strategy.
T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He served 30 years in the U.S. Marine Corps.
Endnotes
1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategy as an Appetite Suppressant,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/strategy-as-appetite-suppressant/.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, “2024 Arctic Strategy,” https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF.
3. Donald J. Trump, “United States National Security Strategy, November 2025,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
4. “Arctic Shipping Update: 37% Increase in Ships in the Arctic Over 10 Years,” Arctic Council, January 31, 2024, https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/ and Malte Humpbert, “Chinese Containership ‘Istanbul Bridge’ Reaches UK via Arctic Route in Record 20 Days,” gCaptain, October 13, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-containership-istanbul-bridge-reaches-uk-via-arctic-route-in-record-20-days/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-5ee6139183-381157581&mc_cid=5ee6139183&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
5. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Updated July 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41153.
6. Cornell Overfield, “Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation,” Lawfare, October 17, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wrangling-warships-russias-proposed-law-northern-sea-route-navigation.
7. ”Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024, https://chnl.no/news/main-results-of-nsr-transit-navigation-in-2024/.
8. Brendan Murray and Danielle Bochove, “China Turns to Arctic Shortcut While Major Carriers Steer Clear,” gCaptain, October 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/china-turns-to-arctic-shortcut-while-major-carriers-steer-clear/.
9. “International Voyages on the Northwest Passage in 2024,” Aker Arctic, November 13, 2024, https://akerarctic.fi/news/international-voyages-on-the-northwest-passage-in-2024/.
10. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.
11. Malte Humpert, ”Chinese Companies Dispatch Multiple Container Ships Along Arctic Route for Faster European Trade,” High North News, August 4, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-companies-dispatch-multiple-container-ships-along-arctic-route-for-faster-europe-trade/.
12. ”Ship crossings through global maritime passage: January 2022 to April 2024,” Office of National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/bulletins/shipcrossingsthroughglobalmaritimepassages/january2022toapril2024.
13. ”Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024, https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/images/153166/sea-ice-chokes-the-northwest-passage.
14. Malte Humpert, “Sanctioned Suezmax Oil Tanker Without Ice Protection Stuck for Days on Russia’s Arctic Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, September 15, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/sanctioned-suezmax-oil-tanker-without-ice-protection-stuck-for-days-on-russias-arctic-northern-sea-route/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-245bcea0f7-381157581&mc_cid=245bcea0f7.
15. Malte Humpbert, ” Russia Pushes ‘Shadow Fleet’ to Limit as LNG Carrier Struggles Through Early Arctic Ice on Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, November 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/russia-pushes-shadow-fleet-to-limit-as-lng-carrier-struggles-through-early-arctic-ice-on-northern-sea-route/.
16. Malte Humpbert, ”Two Salvage Vessels Arrive in Canadian Arctic to Begin Refloating of Grounded ‘Thamesborg’,” gCaptain, September 23, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/two-salvage-vessels-arrive-in-canadian-arctic-to-begin-refloating-of-grounded-thamesborg/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-a458a9f7c7-381157581&mc_cid=a458a9f7c7&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
17. Malte Humpbert, ” Arctic Cargo Ship ‘Thamesborg’ Refloated AIS Data Show, Awaiting Company Confirmation,” gCaptain, October 9, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/arctic-cargo-ship-thamesborg-refloated-ais-data-show-awaiting-company-confirmation/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-400f2f7a4e-381157581&mc_cid=400f2f7a4e&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
18. Stew Magnusen, ” The Icebreaker Numbers Game,” National Defense, January 13, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/1/13/the-icebreaker-numbers-game.
19. ”DHS Celebrates Purchase of New Coast Guard Icebreakers as President Trump Signs Deal with Finland,” Department of Homeland Security, October 10, 2025, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/10/10/dhs-celebrates-purchase-new-coast-guard-icebreakers-president-trump-signs-deal.
20. Nouman Ali, “The Cost of Icebreaking Services,” SeaRates, Jun 11, 2020, https://www.searates.com/blog/post/the-cost-of-icebreaking-services.
21. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.
22. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.
23. Mia Landauer, Niklas Swanström, and Michael E. Goodsite, ”Mineral Resources in the Arctic: Sino-Russian Cooperation and the Disruption of Western Supply Chains,” Niklas Swanström & Filip Borges Månsson, editors, The “New” Frontier: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and its Geopolitical Implications, September 2025, Institute for Security and Development Policy, https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SP-Arctic-Sep-2025-final.pdf.
24. Ibid, p.109.
25. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.
26. ”Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program,” Congressional Research Service, updated July 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12006#:~:text=On%20January%208%2C%202025%2C%20DOI,the%20lease%20sale%20discouraged%20participation.
27. Sune Engel Rasmussen, ” Inside the West’s Race to Defend the Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/inside-the-wests-race-to-defend-the-arctic-0f04ca7a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAi4UrfELbN8TNIpkiANQ9qkJ409UcY7ybn1KHm71Es8FzKPdjCv2Sk3_6eJxEI%3D&gaa_ts=68efa5d0&gaa_sig=X9bLexZswY1r8pD8-BgF7-BUcPWUSkNZB5DFNXcqGswh-PVRHJkHIZ_O-GK6LEEDyK8b2uDpyvgFayIxLxTHnA%3D%3D.
28. Michael S. Brown, ”Rethinking the Arctic Threat Landscape,” Proceedings, November 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/november/rethinking-arctic-threat-landscape?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PWNov6-25&utm_id=PWNov625&utm_source=U.S.+Naval+Institute&utm_campaign=f01c9a3224-Proceedings_This_Week_2025_6_November&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_adee2c2162-f01c9a3224-223022301&mc_cid=f01c9a3224&mc_eid=e0ac270dd4.
Featured Image: The icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB 20) keeps station while conducting crane operations alongside a multi-year ice floe for a science evolution in the Beaufort Sea, Aug. 9, 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Briana Carter)
On September 13th, 2025, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel entered the restricted waters around the Republic of China’s (ROC) Dongsha Atoll, also known as the Pratas Island, located approximately 400 kilometers southwest of the ROC’s main island of Taiwan. The CCG intrusion prompted a swift response from the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), which consisted of a CGA vessel chasing the CCG intruder from the area. Over the next four days, the CCG mounted four separate incursions into the restricted waters around Dongsha, a worsening symptom of a wider Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maritime gray zone campaign against the ROC in which the CCG has a prominent tool of coercion.
This article employs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) definition of gray zone coercion, the “deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.”
The ongoing coercion by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) aims to erode the ROC’s sovereignty by sending a message to the international community that the CCP has both the capability and the will to exert control over the waters near Taiwan, but this activity also threatens the United States’ national security interests. It is in America’s interest that the ROC remains a political entity distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for two primary reasons. First, at the operational level, Taiwan is a key maritime terrain in the First Island Chain or FIC, forming the foundation of American strategy in East Asia to counter the CCP’s territorial revisionist ambitions from a geographic standpoint. Second, at the strategic level, a CCP takeover of Taiwan would severely undermine the confidence of key regional and treaty allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, in the United States’ ability to defend them against further CCP aggression.
In the immediate term, CCG gray zone activity also displays the potential to endanger hard US economic interests by threatening major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that enter the Taiwanese main island’s major ports at Kaohsiung, Keelung, Mailao, Taichung, and Taipei. Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced semiconductor chips and is the seventh-largest merchandise trading partner of the United States, underscoring the importance of SLOCs entering Taiwan for American economic welfare.
If the PRC expands its gray zone maritime activity in a manner that threatens SLOCs, potentially leading to a maritime quarantine of Taiwan, this presents the US and its Pacific partners with the decision of whether to employ a military response. Recognizing, at a minimum, the economic damage and escalatory risks tied to potential CCP attempts at threatening the vitality of SLOCs, it behooves American policymakers to take steps to deter the expansion of this CCG-spearheaded maritime gray zone campaign.
The Nature of the CCG Threat
Over the past two years, the CCP has taken substantial steps to intensify its maritime gray zone campaign in ROC waters. In February 2024, a Chinese motorboat violated Kinmen’s restricted waters, prompting a CGA-mounted chase, which resulted in the deaths of two Chinese nationals when their boat capsized. The PRC has since used the incident to justify mounting a concerted effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty over the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands–located four miles and six miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China, respectively–by routinely dispatching CCG vessels that violate the islands’ restricted waters: CCG activity reached a total of 85 violations around Kinmen inSeptember 2025.
While Kinmen and Matsu lie just a short boat ride away from the PRC mainland, the CCP’s effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty has more recently extended to Dongsha. According to the CGA, an “unprecedented” flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, numbering six “mother ships” and 29 “smaller boats,” entered restricted ROC waters around Dongsha on February 15th, 2025, prompting a swift response from local CGA vessels.
During this incident, a CCG vessel violated Dongsha’s restricted waters by attempting to intervene in the CGA’s law enforcement response. Since this incident, the CCG has sought to normalize this activity with consistent intrusions into the waters around Donghsa. Although Dongsha, like Kinmen and Matsu, lies on the ROC periphery, its recent targeting by the CCG is demonstrative of a graduated coercive campaign.
The CCG has also recently demonstrated its capacity to perform in a role that is specifically more dangerous to US interests. In a noticeable departure from past practice, the CCG, in what appears to be a PRC attempt to hybridize a potential blockade, debuted in PLA live-fire exercises around Taiwan during Joint Sword 2024-A in May 2024. This was followed up by Joint Sword 2024-B in October 2024, featuring approximately seventeenCCG vessels circumnavigating the Taiwanese main island as part of coordinated blockading drills with the PLAN.
During Joint Sword 2025-B, this year’s inaugural exercises in February, the CCG played a higher profile role that included carrying out mock vessel boardings and inspections–suggestive of potential actions that would interdict commercial shipping, a cardinal feature during a blockade or gray zone “quarantine”–in addition to violating, for thefirst time, the Taiwanese main island’s 24 nautical mile contiguous area.
Although the CCP has not yet made a serious effort to dispute SLOCs to Taiwan, its multi-pronged gray zone activities suggest an intensifying trend that makes this a growing concern for the future. One potential route entails mounting infrequent CCG patrols of SLOCs that evolve into routine patrols, activities the CCP has attempted to normalize in other places through consistent effort, justified under the auspices of a contrived or provoked maritime incident. Patrols could evolve into the boarding and inspection of international commercial vessels, setting the conditions for a partial or full and temporary or indefinite maritime quarantine of the main island.
From a US standpoint, whether such gray zone maritime activity forms a deliberate, calibrated irregular warfare strategy to achieve unification non-kinetically or broadly aims to isolate Taiwan economically and politically, wherever and whenever the PRC can, any attempt to threaten SLOCs in this manner jeopardizes hard US and partner-nation interests. Thus, taking preventive measures to preserve SLOCs prior to PRC efforts to sever them is necessary, especially since attempting to roll back the latter’s efforts after the fact is more difficult and could risk a more dangerous escalation.
Policy Recommendations
The US Government (USG) should pursue a nested set of policy goals to address the CCG threat to American interests. At the operational level in the immediate term, the objective should be to deter CCG activity that would threaten American SLOCs. At the political level in the immediate term, the USG should accept the unpleasant reality that the existing CCG activity erodes ROC sovereignty, as it lacks the capacity to substantially roll back CCG presence. At the operational and political levels in the future, the objective should be to have a coalition prepared to deter a PRC maritime quarantine of Taiwan.
These policy goals rest on three key assumptions; if any of these is invalidated, the recommendations would no longer hold. First, the CCP does not deploy CCG assets in such numbers that they overwhelm our capacity to defend key SLOCs. Second, the CCP continues its salami-slicing strategy to degrade the operational environment around Taiwan, which involves minimizing direct confrontation between the PLA and foreign coast guard assets in waters that the party views as its own. Third, the CCP leadership thinks it still has time to achieve its political objective to gain control of Taiwan and therefore decides it does not now need to launch a maritime quarantine, blockade, or invasion.
The ROC, on its own, will likely struggle to preserve SLOCs. During a 2024 House Subcommittee Hearing on Transportation and Maritime Security, Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, Captain Eric M. Cooper, USCG (Ret.), estimated that there are a total of 700 CCG vessels operating in the Indo-Pacific. The entirety of the CCG’s complement is not dedicated to gray zone activity against Taiwan, but it has a growing presence deep in the South China and East China Seas. The CGA, on the other hand, maintains a smaller, but not insignificant force of approximately 250 vessels. Since 2018, the CGA has implemented a ten year indigenous shipbuilding program, with a target goal of 141 newly constructed vessels, but it remains and will remain overmatched by the sheer quantitative advantage retained by the CCG. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect the CGA to adequately deter potential CCG activity that jeopardizes SLOCs.
Recognizing the vulnerability of SLOCs, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to preserve them. Already, throughout the Indo-Pacific, the USG maintains a series of bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements (MLEA) that authorize the USCG to carry out activities such as conducting legally protected patrols to help safeguard a partner country’s maritime security.
Traditionally, bilateral MLEAs stipulate that the USCG dispatch personnel and or vessels to assist in maritime law enforcement within a partner country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles), and EEZs (200 nautical miles). For example, as provisioned under a bilateral MLEA, the USCG boarded six vessels illegally fishing within the Cook Islands’ EEZ this past June. The USCG also conducts maritime law enforcement exercises with regional partner countries.
In June 2024, the USCG trained alongside the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the South China Sea to buttress the latter’s law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities. The USCG has also scaled up exercises in the Indo-Pacific region into trilateral events: in June 2025, the USCG, PCG, and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) participated in drills outside Japan’s territorial waters for the first time. According to the senior participating USCG officer, Captain Brian Krautler, “By operating together, we strengthen our collective forces, ensuring readiness against threats to maritime safety and security.”
With the specific intent of maintaining SLOCs entering Taiwan, the USCG should seek to replicate similar activity with the CGA as would be provisioned in a bilateral MLEA. The USCG already has a pre-existing cooperative relationship with the CGA that is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in March 2021. Under this MOU, the USCG and CGA formed a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG) to establish a common understanding of maritime security priorities and advance cooperation between the USCG and CGA. In addition to the dialogues within the CGWG, instances of security cooperation have occurred. For example, in 2024, the USCG dispatched an International Port Security (IPS) Program team to Taiwan to exchange knowledge with CGA officials regarding how to enhance maritime cybersecurity and general port security.
Despite these positive developments, current USCG and CGA cooperation is inadequate, with it being limited to informal bilateral talks, workshops, and occasional practice sharing. Thus, the MOU should be updated to deepen security cooperation or an unofficial agreement, akin to a bilateral MLEA, established that extends USCG authorities in ROC waters, specifically granting the USCG the ability to conduct patrols along SLOCs, sending a clear message to the CCP that the US will protect its interests.
In line with past practice, whenever the US deepens security cooperation with the ROC, the CCP will likely vehemently protest such a move; however, given the recognizable and public economic interests at stake in preserving SLOCs, the USG should frame USCG presence patrols in Taiwanese waters within the context of that specific end rather than communicating an intent to buttress ROC claims to sovereignty, although this would be an undeniably favorable byproduct.
It must be acknowledged that, compared to the CCG, the current and near-term potential force posture of the USCG in the region is problematic. Presently, the USCG has eight vessels forward deployed in the region and possesses another 79 vessels capable of serving in the region, but this would practically amount to the USCG’s entire inventory of high seas vessels. Despite this modest vessel count, the USCG could afford to apportion a couple of cutters and a handful of smaller craft, based on existing deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, communicating the USG’s resolve concerning the preservation of SLOCs.
A comprehensive analysis is warranted to assess the impact this deployment would have on other USCG priorities in the theater. Still, such deployments would communicate the USG’s resolve to preserve SLOCs. This is especially the case due to the escalatory risks the CCP would incur by contemplating a confrontation with a USCG vessel performing its duties. The USG could also establish a shiprider agreement, a type of MLEA, with the CGA, permitting USCG personnel to board CGA vessels: the USG maintains twelve such agreements with regional partners such as Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Vanuatu. Although typically partner force personnel board USCG vessels, USCG personnel have boarded Royal Navy vessels under a shiprider arrangement, which can be replicated with the CGA.
Moreover, the USG should seek ways to internationalize any USCG efforts to preserve SLOCs entering Taiwan. USCG Captain (Ret.) Eric Cooperhas made compelling arguments for the establishment of a multilateral maritime law enforcement task force in the form of the US-led Bahrain Combined Maritime Force (CMF). Headquartered in Bahrain and consisting of 46 participating countries, the CMF maintains maritime security in major waterways around the Middle East. Organizing a task force akin to a CMF with the aim of preserving Taiwan’s SLOCs could include countries like Japan and the Philippines, especially when considering these two countries’ significant economic interests linked to these SLOCs and their recent combined participation in USCG-led exercises.
If these recommendations are implemented, the following would be benchmarks to measure success: In the immediate future, the continued absence of CCG vessels in key SLOCs. In the longer term, a stable rotational presence of up to three USCG cutters and between five and ten smaller craft regularly operating in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in areas proximate to Taiwan, in conjunction with a CMF-style task force.
The deteriorating security situation around Taiwan due to the CCP-initiated gray zone coercion shows no signs of improvement in the near future. In addition, the United States no longer enjoys being the unrivalled seafaring power in East Asia. In this security environment, the creative employment of USCG assets and personnel in combination with regional partner countries becomes an important policy pathway toward achieving American national interests.
Anthony Marco is a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and holds a BS from the United States Military Academy at West Point and an MA from Reichman University as an Anna Sobol Levy Scholar. He also serves as a special advisor on the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Proxies and Partners Special Project.
Nils Peterson is a Marshall Scholar studying for an MA in Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies and holds a BA in History and Chinese from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He previously led the China Team at the Institute for the Study of War as a War Studies Fellow.
The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or the Army. Appearance of, or reference to, any commercial products or services does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of those products or services. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of the linked websites, or the information, products or services therein.
Featured Image: The Wanshan Vessel formation conduct towing exercises in waters off Huangyan Dao in South China Sea in July, 2024. (China Coast Guard photo)
