By W. Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

Analyses of the status and strength of the US Navy, the Chinese Navy, and other global navies focus not only on the size of their respective fleets but also on the modernity of their hulls and their new capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis integrating new technologies. But what happens to decommissioned platforms that global naval powerhouses no longer operate? Some are kept in reserve or sent to scrapyards. However, many decommissioned vessels find a second life when sold or donated to partners and allies.

As the author of this analysis has written for CIMSEC and other publications over several years (“The Rise Of The Latin American Shipyard”), Latin American shipyards are undergoing a golden age, with a variety of platforms being produced regionally. This trend includes submarines, frigates, corvettes, and patrol vessels. Brand-new platforms from extra-regional suppliers are also being procured. However, second-hand platforms are cost-effective alternatives that provide additional capabilities to the fleet and serve as a stopgap until other procurement projects are completed. Donation of vessels serves to strengthen alliances or create new partnerships.

Latin American Navies: A Brief Overview

Navies worldwide need to constantly evolve and acquire new hulls and technologies to maintain deterrence and win the next war. The US Navy, for example, is turning to uncrewed maritime systems (uncrewed surface vessels and uncrewed underwater vehicles) and aims to deploy them across the Asia-Pacific to support crewed ships. The US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle, has called this a “hedge strategy.” Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding its fleet, not just to challenge the US but to gain a bigger presence across the Western Pacific.

Latin American navies have their own strategies, though at a much more domestic and regional level. Geopolitics matter, as Latin America has not experienced interstate warfare in decades. The last armed conflict between two Latin American states was in 1995, between Peru and Ecuador, while the last inter-state conflict with a maritime theater of operations was the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The most recent inter-state military operation in the region was Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the extraction and arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

While there are some outstanding border disputes across Latin America and the Caribbean, there is no arms race, and inter-state relations are calm. There are also confidence-building mechanisms that promote good relations between civilian governments and militaries. For example, in early March in Uruguay, the Argentine Navy took command of the Coordination for the South Atlantic Area (Coordinación del Área Marítima del Atlántico Sur: CAMAS), a multinational entity created in 1957 composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The goal of CAMAS is to promote cooperation, peace, and stability in the South Atlantic.

Nowadays, the primary role of Latin American navies is to maintain basic deterrence capabilities and readiness in the event of an inter-state conflict. Navies are also heavily engaged in combating maritime crimes, particularly drug trafficking and illegal, undocumented, or unreported fishing. The fleets are also incredibly involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

It is beyond the objective of this analysis to discuss the strategies and aspirations of each Latin American navy. Suffice to say, regional navies are generally focused on operations within their borders. Ships and submarines regularly participate in regional multinational exercises, including the US-sponsored RIMPAC, UNITAS, and SUBDIEX.

Only the Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil: MB) has extra-regional and power projection aspirations. Brazil annually sends a warship to West Africa to train with regional navies. During its visit to Africa, the Brazilian ship participates in the US-sponsored regional exercise, Obangame Express, while the Brazilian Navy also sponsors its own exercise with African navies, Guinex. Dr. Andrea Resende, professor at Brazil’s University of Belo Horizonte (Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte: UNIBH) and Una Betim University (Centro Universitário Una Betim: UNA), told CIMSEC that Brazil “has also cooperated” with the Namibian Navy and Marine Corps and also worked alongside South Africa to develop the A-Darter missiles. Brazil also “signed an agreement with South Africa for defense, and there is a possibility to expand naval and technical cooperation with South Africa.”

Finally, Mexico and several South American shipyards are currently producing a variety of platforms and reducing reliance on extra-regional suppliers. Brazil has built four Scorpene-class submarines and is now building a nuclear-powered submarine as well as corvettes. Colombia’s COTECMAR (Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval, Marítima y Fluvial) and Peru’s SIMA (Servicios Industriales de la Marina) are manufacturing frigates as well as other vessels. Mexico’s ASTIMAR (Astilleros de la Secretaría de Marina) began construction of a patrol vessel, Ecuador’s ASTINAVE (Astilleros Navales Ecuatorianos) is slowly building a multipurpose vessel, and Chile’s ASMAR (Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada) is producing four multi-role transport vessels.

These projects demonstrate the level of maturity regional shipyards have reached. However, even regional shipyards cannot build all the complex platforms navies require to modernize their fleets. Several Latin American navies cannot even produce their own vessels, namely the Central American states, Uruguay, and, surprisingly, Argentina (their shipyards have very limited capabilities). These countries will continue to rely on the acquisition of brand-new or second-hand vessels from external suppliers.

Why purchase a second-hand vessel?

There are several reasons why Latin American navies may choose to buy second-hand vessels. Providing additional capabilities is a major reason. Many Latin American navies seek capabilities such as submarine fleets for underwater operations or well-equipped warships for power projection and deterrence. However, in the case of submarines, building one sub alone is a complex engineering project and a long, arduous process. So far, Brazil is the only Latin American country to have mastered this technique via a partnership with France’s Naval Group. According to Resende, Brazil first announced its plans to build subs back in 2008, though the program dates back to the 1970s. It took almost 20 years to complete four conventional submarines, while the nuclear-powered submarine began construction only in 2023. Peru is also very interested in developing submarines via a partnership with South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries.

As it currently stands, other Latin American navies are likely to continue to buy used subs if new platforms are too expensive. For example, in 2012, Colombia purchased two of the German Navy’s U-206 subs, now called ARC Intrépido and ARC Indomable. Meanwhile, Argentina does not have an operational submarine: the ARA San Juan sank tragically in 2017, the ARA Santa Cruz has been rusting away in a hangar for over a decade, and the ARA Salta is over five decades old and probably not seaworthy. The service wants to regain its underwater capabilities, and some media reports have suggested Argentina is considering buying new subs from Naval Group or used ones as a short-term solution.

Other fleets have also acquired second-hand vessels to enhance their capabilities. Brazil has a history of using second-hand carriers: the NAeL Minas Gerais carrier was purchased from the United Kingdom in the late 1950s and served until the late 1990s. The next carrier was the NAe São Paulo, purchased from France. After São Paulo was decommissioned around 2018, the Marinha do Brasil still wanted a carrier as its flagship, so Brasilia purchased the HMS Ocean, a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) carrier previously operated by the Royal Navy. The ship has been renamed NAM Atlântico.

As for more recent acquisitions, Brazil purchased the HMS Bulwark, an Albion-class amphibious assault ship from the Royal Navy in 2025. Minister of Defense José Mucio Monteiro Filho traveled to Plymouth, United Kingdom, in February to supervise repairs and upgrades to Bulwark. The ship will be renamed NDM Oiapoque and is scheduled to arrive in Brazil in late June 2026. With a length of 176 meters and the capability to transport armored vehicles and as many as seven hundred troops, the second-hand ship will be the Brazilian fleet’s second-largest after the carrier, Atlântico.

Acquiring used warships also serves as a short-term solution for navies while they prepare to buy new platforms. For example, in 2020, Chile bought two frigates previously owned by the Royal Australian Navy. The two ships are now known as Capitán Prat and Almirante Latorre. The used-but-still modern frigates will help Chile maintain deterrence capabilities for the rest of the decade while the Chilean shipyard, ASMAR, completes other projects. During the current decade, ASMAR has manufactured the icebreaker Almirante Viel and is building four multi-role transport vessels. The Chilean Navy now aims to domestically manufacture frigates in the early 2030s, which means the two Australian frigates will continue to operate until future ships are commissioned.

Similarly, in 2014, the Peruvian Navy acquired the replenishment support vessel HNLMS Amsterdam, which was later renamed BAP Tacna. Tacna was the primary support ship of the Peruvian fleet for years until the commissioning of the landing platform docks BAP Pisco (2018) and BAP Paita (2025). The Tacna served as a heavy replenishment vessel until the Makassar-class ships, manufactured by the local shipyard SIMA, began operating.

Donations

Donations serve different purposes. Donors can help reduce unwanted inventory and potentially cement alliances with receiving nations. The US military has a history of donating various technologies to partners across the Western Hemisphere. In February, US Southern Command donated M4 carbines, pistols, night-vision equipment, and other technology to the joint special forces battalion of the Paraguayan armed forces. The US government has also donated decommissioned US Coast Guard cutters to Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay. In fact, the US donated a cutter, formerly called the USCG Orcas, to Ecuador this past May. The ship is now called Isla Puná.

South Korea is also donating decommissioned vessels to Latin American navies. Over the past decade, South Korea has donated Pohang-class corvettes BAP Ferre and BAP Guise to Peru and two corvettes, the ARC Nariño (Donghae-class) and ARC Tono (Pohang-class), to Colombia. In 2024, the Uruguayan Navy received a PKM 318 Chamsuri-class patrol vessel, now operating as ROU 10 Huracán. South Korea also donated a multipurpose ship to Ecuador; the now-called BAE Jambelí was formally commissioned on 7 May. In a mid-April press release, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense labeled the Jambelí as a “mega warship and the first multi-role ship of the country” while the Navy similarly explained, during the recent commissioning ceremony, that Jambelí is the fleet’s first-ever multipurpose platform.

China and the US

The United States and China deserve a special discussion, though this analysis is not intended to examine the strategies, including procurement and decommissioning strategies, of either the US Navy or the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Besides Venezuela, and to a much lesser degree, Bolivia, China has not managed to find clients for its military technology in Latin America and the Caribbean. Of note, recent attempts to sell armored vehicles and warplanes to Argentina were unsuccessful. However, over the past decade, Beijing has donated non-lethal military technology to several regional armed forces to build goodwill and improve military relations. In the maritime realm, Beijing donated small patrol craft and speedboats to Ecuador and Guyana. It also sold one large, new patrol vessel to Trinidad and Tobago in 2014. It is worth highlighting that there are no readily available examples of the sale or donation of second-hand warships from Beijing to Latin America.

As for the United States, it is curious that recent transfers of decommissioned vessels are overwhelmingly Coast Guard cutters. Latin American navies were no strangers to acquiring decommissioned US warships several decades ago, many of which remain operational. For example, the Peruvian Navy still operates the landing vessel BAP Eten, formerly the USS Traverse County (LST-1160), which was acquired over four decades ago. Ecuador received the USS Chowanoc (ATF-100), a tugboat, and renamed it the BAE Chimborazo. Another example is the Mexican Navy’s landing ship, ARM Papaloapan, which was previously called the USS Newport (LST-1179). Papaloapan is still very much operational: it participated in the recent UNITAS 2025 multinational exercises.

There are no publicly available examples of decommissioned US warships sold or donated to Latin America in the past five years, excluding the Coast Guard cutters. This is intriguing as Washington continues to enjoy strong diplomatic and military relations with the majority of Latin American and Caribbean states. The acquisition of decommissioned Australian and British ships as well as German submarines indicates an ongoing preference for Western technology.

Discussion and conclusions

One notable detail that arose from this analysis is that there are few scholarly or in-depth analyses of the sale (or donation) of second-hand naval assets. Without a doubt, there is plenty of information about navies buying brand-new warships and submarines. Similarly, whenever a second-hand vessel is acquired (via sale or donation), the media of the respective Latin American country receiving the ship (or sub) will publish about it. However, a broad analysis of the market for second-hand warships and submarines is a missing link in discussions of maritime strategies and procurement trends. One of the few publicly available in-depth studies on this topic is the 2024 PhD dissertation by Dr. Eva Ziegler, titled “International Transfers of Second-Hand Major Conventional Weapons Patterns, Determinants and Consequences,” for the University of Munich. The defense news agency Defensa.com also wrote about this topic in 2019 while another defense news agency, Infodefensa, did so in 2023. It is worth noting that research for this analysis was conducted in English, Portuguese, and Spanish. It is very possible that this topic has been researched in other languages or that the research is not publicly available.

The outlook on the market for second-hand warships and submarines in Latin America remains positive. Argentina is a country to monitor as its navy seeks to regain underwater capabilities. There have been many rumors that Buenos Aires is purchasing decommissioned submarines from countries such as Brazil and Turkey to regain this capability. If a sale by Brazil were to occur, it would be a huge milestone as the two countries have been historical rivals vying to be leaders of South America. Meanwhile, countries with limited budgets and/or naval infrastructure will also continue to welcome donations of small, multi-role ships, such as patrol vessels, cutters, or corvettes, that can aid in monitoring territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

Moreover, the Brazilian Navy’s acquisition of the Oiapoque demonstrates that even the most advanced navy in the region has no qualms about acquiring a used-but-modern warship. The Brazilian government announced an ambitious defense expenditure plan of USD$151 billion (R$ 800 billion) over 15 years. The plan will likely focus heavily on the Brazilian defense industrial base and domestically produced equipment. However, certain high-tech, second-hand assets may also be purchased. Heavy multipurpose and transport vessels are two types of ships that Brazilian shipyards do not focus on producing, so they could be purchased, even second-hand.

Even though many Latin American shipyards are currently building new transport vessels, frigates, patrol vessels, and even submarines, the market for used hulls will remain attractive for regaining or augmenting capabilities by purchasing modern platforms at a lower cost or receiving them via donations. 

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of CSIS or any other organization with which the author is affiliated.  

Featured image: Chilean Navy Adelaide-Class guided-missile frigate CNS Capitán Prat and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Gridley steam together during a bilateral maritime engagement in the Pacific Ocean, April 21, 2026. Chile bought the frigate second-hand from the Royal Australian Navy in 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Matthew C. Wolf)

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

In late March, the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) and the Guyanese patrol vessel Shahoud carried out joint exercises in Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and international waters. Washington has many allies and partners across the Greater Caribbean, particularly among the region’s English-speaking nations. Despite having limited budgets and assets, the defense forces of the English-speaking Caribbean are training and increasing their capabilities to carry out missions, which aligns with US diplomatic and military objectives.

Ongoing Dialogue

The good news is that high-level interactions between the U.S. military and Caribbean militaries continue. U.S. Navy Admiral Alvin Holsey, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), traveled to Trinidad and Tobago last December to participate in the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) 2024.

In early January, U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Nathan Moore, Commander of the Atlantic Area, visited Barbados and met with Barbados Defence Force Chief of Staff Brigadier Carlos Lovell. The two senior officers discussed further cooperation on common threats, including transnational organized crime and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Subject Matter Experts from the U.S. military traveled to Jamaica in March and visited the Jamaica Defence Force’s Joint Information and Operations Centre.

More recently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname in late March. The tour was a chance to address Caribbean defense and security issues: during his stop in the Jamaican capital, Rubio also met with Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Stuart Young and discussed the bilateral security partnership and regional security issues.

Recent Acquisitions by Caribbean Forces

Improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) remains a priority for Caribbean governments and their defense forces. Hence, regional naval forces acquire new surface and aerial assets for these missions. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) has led the way over the past decade via the Sandy Bottom Project, which enabled the acquisition of a fleet of different Damen-made surface vessels, including patrol vessels. The RBDF has also acquired a fleet of drones. Similarly, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) has acquired four offshore patrol vessels, also manufactured by Damen, for the JDF Coast Guard; the HMJS Norman Manley arrived in late 2023.

More recently, the Antigua & Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) Coast Guard announced in late February the commissioning of a new speedboat for the fleet, hull number CG11-1 Swordfish. This acquisition demonstrates Saint John’s commitment to strengthening the ABDF and improving MDA. Suriname’s Navy is now operating the patrol vessel RSS Barracuda (P501), acquired through a lease-to-buy agreement with Damen Shipyard Group. The ship will have “a crucial role in the protection of the maritime area of ​​the country,” explained the Ministry of Defense. (Suriname’s official language is Dutch, not English, but I will mention it nonetheless).

Guyana deserves special attention. In late 2024, Guyana finally received the 115-foot Defiant patrol vessel GDFS Berbice, produced by the U.S. shipyard Metal Shark. Berbice is the new flagship of the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Coast Guard and will support maritime operations. Given that Guyana has a border dispute with neighboring Venezuela over Guyana’s Essequibo region and oil-rich waters, acquiring new platforms for the GDF is a priority. In fact, in early March, the Venezuelan patrol vessel ABV Guaiqueiri PO-11 entered Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and harassed oil assets operating there. In a statement, the Guyanese government explained that, “The Venezuelan naval vessel communicated threateningly via radio communication that FPSO PROSPERITY was operating in Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone before continuing in a Southwestern direction towards other FPSOs, to which it delivered the same message.” The Venezuelan Ministry of Defense justified the operation, arguing it took place in contested waters.

The U.S. military and coast guard presence in the Caribbean

The U.S. military, particularly SOUTHCOM, its maritime component U.S. Fourth Fleet, and even U.S. Northern Command (with The Bahamas within its area of responsibility) continue to engage Washington’s English-speaking allies throughout the Caribbean. Engagement is not limited to meetings but also bilateral and multinational military training. For example, SOUTHCOM sponsors the annual exercise Tradewinds, specifically designed for the Caribbean – Trinidad and Tobago hosted Tradewinds 2024. Bilateral training occurs when U.S. warships visit the Caribbean. Passing exercises (PASSEX) are fairly common, case in point, at the time of this writing, in late March, the Normandy and the Shahoud carried out joint exercises, including PASSEX, “in international waters and the Guyana Exclusive Economic Zone to exercise communications and interoperability, and practice joint maneuvers,” according to the U.S. embassy in Guyana.

SOUTHCOM remains focused on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions across the Caribbean – and the rest of Latin America. The U.S. hospital ship Comfort is often deployed. However, in recent years, the Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport vessel USNS Burlington (T-EPF 10) has also traveled throughout the Caribbean to assist populations in need. HA/DR operations are already taking place this year.

The Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team (LAMAT) 2025, commenced on 24 February, during which U.S. military medical personnel will visit several Caribbean nations. While LAMAT 2025 does not involve vessels, the humanitarian exercise will provide invaluable medical services to the inhabitants of Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana. “All involved agree LAMAT’25 is a win-win scenario, benefiting both U.S. military personnel and partner nations. The mission enhances medical readiness and strengthens partnerships while improving healthcare infrastructure in underserved areas,” explained Air Forces Southern, the aerial component of SOUTHCOM.

The U.S. Navy deployed several assets over the past years throughout the Caribbean as regional countries were hit by deadly and destructive natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. (In previous commentaries for CIMSEC, this author suggested that SOUTHCOM deserves a permanently assigned hospital ship.)

As for security operations, U.S. Navy warships, particularly destroyers and littoral combat ships (LCSs), and U.S. Coast Guard cutters regularly patrol the Caribbean Sea to interdict illicit maritime activities, particularly drug trafficking via vessels and the infamous narco-submarines. Recent platforms deployed to the Command’s area of responsibility include the LCS St. Louis and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG 116). The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Valiant unloaded approximately 12,470 pounds (5,656 kilograms) of cocaine in early March at Coast Guard Base Miami Beach, worth an estimated $141.4 million. The contraband was seized thanks to six interdictions in the Caribbean Sea.

Finally, the Caribbean Sea is ideal for testing emerging technologies. At the time of writing, Operation Southern Spear is underway as the U.S. Navy is testing Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs). The objective is to test new systems to develop the future U.S. Navy’s hybrid fleet as part of the service’s Project 33. 

Discussion and Analysis

Some Greater Caribbean countries have governments that clash with U.S. diplomatic aims, namely Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. However, the region has many historical and trustworthy U.S. allies and partners. In a recent interview, Belize Defence Force commander Brigadier General Azariel Loria discussed training exercises with SOUTHCOM, including Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) and the Louisiana National Guard via the State Partnership Program. “We are eager to continue joint training exercises focused on countering transnational threats, with the goal of incorporating tactical operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and specialized training on counterterrorism and disaster response,” he said. BG Loria added that the BDF “looks forward to more innovated ways to take our partnership to another level to improve coordination between our land, air, and maritime units.” In other words, the commanding officers of the English-speaking Caribbean defense forces see the U.S. armed forces (including the Coast Guard) as important allies and partners for training and operating together to combat crimes in air, land, and sea. This relationship must not be lost.

The issue of equipment availability and serviceability is an obvious problem within the region. The Caribbean Sea is a large body of water, and Caribbean countries are not one single unified island nation. Depending on the country, each nation can include countless islands, islets, cays and atolls, and a vast maritime territory. Hence, regional naval forces require a fleet of surface vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to properly monitor and command their maritime territory. Certainly, more vessels demand additional expenses like port infrastructure, fuel, ammo, and crew, among other financial considerations, meanwhile defense budgets across the Caribbean remain limited, hamstringing fleets across the Caribbean. However, the examples mentioned in this analysis- the Bahamas and Jamaica acquiring several ships and the more modest acquisitions of Guyana and Antigua & Barbuda- demonstrate civilian authorities’ commitment to assign more budgets for maritime procurement programs.

Unfortunately, the threats of illicit activities and challenges across the Caribbean will remain ever-present. The sea is the preferred corridor for drug trafficking, while IUU fishing and human and weapons smuggling are also constant challenges and threats. An ongoing concern is the crisis in Haiti, which is forcing Haitians to migrate, often via vessels. Moreover, piracy is making a comeback. Last year, there were reports that two Haitian criminal entities, 5 Seconds and Taliban gangs (no relation to the Afghan Taliban), captured the freighter Magalie at Port-au-Prince’s Varreux terminal district, stealing one-sixth of the cargo of rice and took the crewmembers hostage. The situation was resolved when the police stormed the ship. Even though the incident occurred while the ship was docked, the situation in Haiti has become so dire that it now affects maritime shipping.

For the Caribbean, cooperation is the correct answer. Given the threat environment in the Caribbean Sea and limited surface and aerial assets to patrol this vast body of water, strengthening military-to-military relations advances U.S. and Caribbean interests. A lack of sufficient patrol vessels operated by Caribbean coast guards does not mean a lack of willingness to combat maritime crimes. The U.S. government should provide more tools, including a bigger budget for SOUTHCOM. Armed with a bigger budget, SOUTHCOM can expand its low-cost/ high-impact engagements, benefiting all partners across the Caribbean region.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: CARIBBEAN SEA (Mar. 27, 2025) – The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) conducts a passing exercise with Guyana Defence Force Defiant-class patrol ship GDSF Shahoud in the Caribbean Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dylan M. Kinee/Released)

By Aaron Delano-Johnson and Myles McCarthy

Introduction 

Sporting the distinctive racing stripe worn by many of the globe’s coast guards, the world’s newest polar-capable research vessel left the protected waters of the Gerlache Strait behind as it prepared to cross the Southern Ocean after completing its maiden voyage to Antarctica earlier this year. This cutting-edge vessel was not from a NATO country, Russia, or China, but Colombia, as it set sail from its homeport of Cartagena joining the ranks of South American countries operating ice-capable vessels and research stations on the seventh continent. As the United States and its allies struggle to project surface presence in the high latitudes, the ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) joins Chilean icebreaker CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) as the second domestically built polar-capable vessel to be commissioned in South America in the last 12 months. If the United States is serious about building capacity to operate at-sea in the high latitudes, it is time to look south. 

The challenge of building high latitude maritime capacity 

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region calls to expand the “U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to support persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic and additional presence as needed in the European Arctic.” Likewise, United States Policy on the Antarctic Region also identifies the need to expand the United States polar icebreaker fleet to maintain an active and influential presence in the region to support United States interests across the Antarctic Treaty System. 

The struggles to meet either goal are well-documented with critiques of the U.S. Coast Guard’s current icebreaker fleet, Polar Security Cutter program, and the broader state of United States shipbuilding continually in the news. What is not addressed in this debate about icebreaker capacity at-sea is that once the United States polar icebreaker fleet is recapitalized through new construction, or commercially procured stop-gap options, who will operate and maintain these ships in the harshest of environments?

Partnerships with traditional Arctic allies are a natural fit to build knowledge, skills and abilities of high latitude operations, but with a dearth of opportunities onboard both United States and NATO vessels operating in the polar regions, where else should the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy turn to learn from those with these skills and platforms? Look south.

South America’s Efforts in Antarctica

Stories of the Arctic and Antarctic studied in the United States tend to focus on the achievements of polar explorers from Shackleton to Amundsen, Soviet nuclear icebreakers, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic or perhaps the U.S. Antarctic Program’s work at McMurdo Station. Few are aware of the high-latitude capacity possessed by nations across South America, the same countries who are the closest partners of the United States in countering transnational organized crime, operating in the joint naval domain, and addressing illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing at sea.

Amongst them are upwards of 30 research stations, to include year-round presence at 12, a variety of aircraft launching from Chile and Argentina to support operations on Antarctica, and numerous icebreakers or polar research vessels by their navies or respective maritime services.

In a flurry of activity over recent years, the domestic construction or commercial procurement across South America’s polar fleet includes: Argentina will double its heavy icebreaker fleet with the construction of a second Polar Class 4 vessel set for the late 2020s to sail alongside ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), the Peruvian Navy commissioned the BAP Carrasco (BOP-171) Polar Class 7 oceanographic and research vessel (2017), the Colombian General Maritime Directorate’s (DIMAR) ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) Lloyd’s Register Ice Class 1C FS (2023), the Chilean CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) Polar Class 5 was commissioned in July, while the Brazilian Navy awaits delivery of its next-generation, and domestically built icebreaker, dubbed the Antarctic Support Ship expected to be launched in 2025. Finally, Uruguay procured the R/V Mount Whitney, an ice-strengthened research vessel re-flagged in September as the Oyarvide (ROU-22), to reinvigorate support for scientific investigation and logistics for its Antarctic operations.

Polar expertise can also be found ashore. The School of Marine Sciences of the Argentine Navy hosts the International Maritime Organization (IMO) certified courses of Basic and Advance Navigation in Polar Waters while their Chilean Navy counterparts at the Maritime Training and Instruction Center offer a similar Basic and Advanced Polar Water Operations Course. Both courses are requirements for senior officers serving on their nations’ respective Polar Icebreakers, and each routinely welcomes international students, principally from Europe. 

While the United States’ ongoing attempt to recapitalize the ice breaking fleet languishes with delays, it is clear that United States Allies, partners, and adversaries continue, with greater frequency, to put ships into the ice.

Icy Operations: How U.S. Forces Are Engaging the Polar South

Collaborating with South American partners allows the United States to take advantage of a simple fact of geography: when summer precludes cold weather training in the Northern Hemisphere, opportunities abound south of the equator.

Who has looked south to expand opportunities for gaining proficiency in extreme conditions? The U.S. Army’s storied 10th Mountain Division, the 1st Marine Division, U.S. Special Operations Command South, and U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School have all attend the Chilean Mountain Warfare School while U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center instructors have trained alongside the Argentinian Marines in Ushuaia practicing cold weather tactics and exchanging experiences. Likewise, troops from the Argentinian Mountain Warfare School and Chilean Marines have trained with their U.S. Army counterparts at the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center. In addition to ongoing activities in Chile, recent key leader engagements with Argentina have advanced discussions on additional cold weather operations subject matter exchanges. 

The U.S. Coast Guard of course does have partnerships and conducts international engagements across the region from exercises to Security Cooperation. But for as much success as USCGC James’ had during its recent port visits along the east coast of South America as the ship conducted illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing operations in the South Atlantic, efforts by the U.S. to bolster polar cooperation in the region have been much more limited.

Most recently, while returning from their annual mission to re-supply McMurdo Station during the 2023 Antarctic season, USCGC Polar Star deviated from their normal trans-Pacific route to visit Punta Arenas and Valparaiso, Chile. These were the first visits to Chile by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in over seven years and the first to Punta Arenas since 1987, and though the ship enjoyed a warm reception by their Chilean hosts including bilateral engagements, no repeat visit to the continent was made during the ship’s 2024 deployment. 

How to Build High Latitude Bench Strength at Sea

What would polar partnerships in South America offer to the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy? To begin, the need for added bench strength of operators with high latitude experience is real. Currently the U.S. Coast Guard’s high latitude efforts focus on preparing the heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Star and medium icebreaker USCGC Healy for annual missions to Antarctica and the U.S. Arctic respectively. Healy and Polar Star represent the only two platforms in the United States’ combined fleet capable of training ice pilots, the essential qualification for operating ships in ice. On average, each qualifies just four to five new ice pilots a year, and given the rate of attrition in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Cutterman community, this leaves a very small candidate pool from which to fill current command cadre needs. And projected forward, this trajectory will leave the service critically short of the crews necessary for the nation’s envisioned future icebreaking fleet of Polar Security Cutters.

Since 2018 the U.S Coast Guard has looked to the Afloat Ice Breaking Training Program to help fill these gaps. However, the program is imperfect, and proposals to expand it are stymied by a critical factor: in an average year the United States only has one ship breaking international ice at a time, limiting space for trainees. So why not look to the rapidly expanding South American polar fleet for assistance? Precedent already exists for personnel exchanges in the region. Currently, the U.S. Navy has Surface Warfare Officers participating in two year exchange programs in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, with some calling to expand the program even wider. 

And personnel exchanges should work in both directions, as the U.S. Coast Guard can offer invitations to join icebreaking deployments to officers from South American countries in the same way these opportunities are currently extended to their NATO, Australian, and New Zealand counterparts. Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet recently concluded Operation Nanook, a Canadian led multinational exercise that while focused on the Arctic and NATO partnerships would certainly offer many lessons learned to South American nations with Antarctic interests. Put another way, polar officers need to know more than just the mechanics of how to operate a ship in ice, they need to understand the interests, ideology, and capabilities of all partner nations in the rapidly evolving high-latitudes. 

Potential opportunities to build bench strength are not just limited to expanding the Icebreaking Training Program. Junior officers aboard Healy and Polar Star could take advantage of their ships’ lengthy annual maintenance periods to seek temporary duty opportunities either aboard a ship or even by attending the aforementioned polar navigation courses in Argentina or Chile.

Finally, it takes herculean efforts in logistics to keep the aging U.S. icebreakers on mission. Forging mission support partnerships is often an afterthought that operational commanders scramble to expedite in times of crises. Establishing strategic logistics relationships with partner maritime services that can facilitate spare parts deliveries, conduct at highly capable shipyards across South America, and streamlined agreements for diplomatic clearances should all be a priority for engagement in the region. 

Conclusion

Afloat operations in the polar regions are fraught with risk. The United States needs to come to the region with not just capable ships, but with strong international partnerships and well-trained crews. With an icebreaking fleet that has historically relied upon on-the-job training to qualify the next generation of polar explorers, the U.S. Coast Guard’s “red hull” community currently struggles to support that model due to a lack of assets and opportunities with traditional partners. But polar force projection is of growing national significance, and the United States needs to look at the White Continent with a wide aperture lens. Logistics, memorandums of understanding, alliances, and certainly world-class ships and crews will all be essential in achieving future high latitude goals.

Aaron Delano-Johnson is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. A ship captain and international affairs officer, he has served across Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Myles McCarthy is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard and an Olmsted Foundation Scholar completing a master’s degree at La Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. A ship captain, he hopes to return to sea upon completion of his studies.

The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: ARC ship “Simón Bolívar” conducts Antarctic operations. (Colombian Navy Photo)