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Admiral Canaris: Hitler’s Slippery Spymaster

By CDR Christopher Nelson, USN

Author David Alan Johnson discusses his new book, Admiral Canaris: How Hitler’s Chief of Intelligence Betrayed the Nazis. It is a well-written synthesis of the life of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who served as the chief of military intelligence for Nazi Germany from 1935-1944. While Canaris might be less well-known than some of the more senior Nazi officials from World War II, his unique position and acts of sabotage make him among the most consequential resistance leaders during the war. Admiral Canaris’ excellent skills in deception, subterfuge, political infighting, along with his eventual distaste that turned into hatred of Hitler’s regime, make for a fascinating story.

To begin, provide us with a brief biographical sketch of Admiral Canaris. How do we place him in context among other Nazi and Wehrmacht leaders?

In common with the majority of German leaders during the Hitler era, both political and military, William Canaris had an excellent record as a junior officer during the First World War. He received commendation both as an active officer with the fleet and as an intelligence officer. He was presented with the Iron Cross 1st Class by Kaiser Wilhelm. Most of the leaders of the German forces were also decorated veterans, including Adolf Hitler. Canaris hated the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of Versailles. To Canaris’ way of thinking, the Weimar Republic was a foreign administration that had been forced upon Germany by the Allied powers, and the Versailles Treaty severely limited the size of the German navy and prohibited the building of submarines – Canaris had been a submarine commander during the war. When Hitler became Führer during the 1930s, he promised to re-arm Germany which included rebuilding the German Navy. Along with all other high-ranking German officers at the time, Wilhelm Canaris was in complete agreement with Hitler and his plans for a New Germany. Adolf Hitler was a strong-willed German nationalist who planned to form a new government in Germany, abolish the Versailles Treaty, and create another German fleet, complete with submarines. As far as Canaris was concerned, Hitler was exactly what Germany needed.

What specifically led to Canaris taking charge of the Abwehr – German military intelligence?

Wilhelm Canaris had been the intelligence officer aboard the cruiser Dresden during the First World War, which gave him a working background in that field. But his first link with the Abwehr came in 1934, when he was captain of the battleship Schlesien. Captain Canaris did not get along with his immediate superior, Rear Admiral Max Bastian. In an effort to get rid of Captain Canaris, Admiral Bastian recommended that Canaris be assigned to an administrative post – possibly the Abwehr. But instead, the German admiralty sent Canaris to Fort Sweinemünde, a seaport on the Baltic Sea coast. This turned out to be a dead-end job; Canaris was not happy with this assignment.

But less than a month after reporting for duty at Fort Sweinemünde, Canaris became the beneficiary of a happy accident – the head of the Abwehr, Captain Conrad Patzig, resigned his position because he was not able to get along with the director of the newly-created Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the ambitious Reinhard Heydrich. Before leaving his position, Captain Patzig recommended that Wilhelm Canaris replace him as the Abwehr’s director. Canaris not only had the qualifications for the job but, just as important, he had been friends with Reinhard Heydrich back in 1923, when Heydrich had been a 19-year-old naval cadet aboard Canaris’ training ship. Wilhelm Canaris became the Abwehr chief because of several coincidences. He became the official head of the Abwehr on January 1, 1935.

What made Canaris an exceptional intelligence officer?

Captain Conrad Patzig, Wilhelm Canaris’ predecessor as head of the Abwehr, noted that he did not know of anyone else who had Canaris’ talent for deception and subterfuge – two vital attributes for an intelligence officer, especially in wartime. During the First World War, when he was intelligence officer of the cruiser Dresden, Lieutenant Canaris informed a radio station in Brazil that the Dresden would soon be returning to Germany. He knew that this message would be picked up by British Intelligence. But the Dresden did not go back to Germany; she continued to operate in the vicinity of Montevideo, Uruguay. British Intelligence did not discover the ruse until the Dresden sank two British merchantmen off the coast of Uruguay. The Dresden’s captain was happy to learn that his young intelligence officer had such a talent for duplicity. Canaris would go on to use this talent against Hitler and the Nazi regime in years to come.

How did Canaris balance the Abwehr’s intelligence work with the Nazi Gestapo and Security Service?

He did not “balance” his intelligence work with the other agencies. He basically set out to confuse Hitler and his generals by sending reports that invalidated information supplied by other agencies. This not only served to confuse the high command, but also led to Hitler losing faith in his intelligence services in general. His first opportunity to mislead Hitler came early on during the war, in September 1939. Admiral Canaris advised Hitler that French troops and artillery were gathering in the vicinity of Saarbrücken, which indicated that a French offensive would be taking place nearby. This news took Hither completely by surprise. He replied that he could not imagine a French attack anywhere near Saarbrücken. German defenses were particularly strong in that region, he said, and refused to believe the admiral.

Hitler’s opinion of Canaris would continue to deteriorate as the war went on and Canaris continued to make intelligence “mistakes.” He withheld information regarding “Operation Torch,” the Allied invasion of North Africa, which took place in November 1942. A task force of British and American warships and troop transports sailed right through the Straits of Gibraltar and landed on the North African beaches without the German High command knowing anything about the landings in advance. By the spring of 1943, all Axis forces had either surrendered or had been withdrawn from North Africa. A little over a year later, in January 1944, Admiral Canaris also contributed to the success of the landings at Anzio. He informed Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring that there was no need to fear an Allied invasion anytime in the near future. At that exact moment, about 250 British and American ships were approaching the town of Anzio on the western coast of Italy, carrying 50,000 men of the US Fifth Army and the British Fifteenth Army Group. Anzio was one of the largest amphibious operations of the war. Because of these apparent blunders, Hitler and his generals had lost all faith in the German intelligence services, not just in Admiral Canaris. Canaris had misled and misinformed them too many times.

Let’s dive into the reasons Canaris changed his mind about Hitler and began to subvert Nazi policies and goals. Canaris, initially it sounds, believed stridently in German nationalism and was a supporter of the Nazi regime. But he changed. What happened?

Admiral Canaris’ support of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime began to change during the early part of 1938. This change of heart was brought about by two separate incidents. The first incident involved the deliberate disgracing of Hitler’s highest-ranking general, Werner von Blomberg. General von Blomberg had recently married a much younger woman, Erna Gruhn. Because of von Blomberg’s position as Minister of Defense, the wedding was a leading social event; Adolf Hitler himself was one of the wedding guests. A short time after the wedding, Erna Gruhn was discovered to have quite a vivid police record – she was a convicted prostitute and had also been a model for pornographic photos. When Adolf Hitler was told of this, he was livid with anger, but he also realized that this incident created an opportunity for himself. He demanded von Blomberg’s resignation on the grounds that he had committed an immoral act by marrying a prostitute. After the general submitted his resignation, Hitler assumed his title of Defense Minister. Hitler had been looking for an excuse to solidify his control over the armed forces; the von Blomberg scandal gave him a ready-made excuse. General von Blomberg resigned in January 1938; Adolf Hitler immediately replaced him as supreme commander.

At the same time as the von Blomberg incident, the Wehrmacht’s commander-in-chief was removed from his post as the result of another scandal – this one was completely fabricated. General Werner von Fritsch did not agree with Hitler’s aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union. He was afraid that Hitler’s belligerence would lead to war with Russia, a war he knew Germany could not win. Hitler did not appreciate von Fritsch’s opposition, and decided that the general had to be dismissed from his post.

The method used to dispose of General von Fritsch was both simple and brutal. He was charged with having homosexual relationships, which was a criminal offense in Nazi Germany. A witness testified before both Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring that von Fritsch had a homosexual affair with a young boy in Potsdam. General von Fritsch vehemently denied the charge, and was allowed to be tried by a court of honor. The trial acquitted him of all charges, but the scandal ruined his reputation and ended his career – just as Hitler had planned. The accusations had been a complete set-up. It had been a different Captain von Frisch who had the homosexual affair, not the General von Fritsch. Hitler and the Gestapo knew this, but allowed the charges to be filed just the same. In February 1938, General von Fritsch resigned his position in disgrace. Hitler had taken another step toward solidifying his complete control of all German armed forces.

News of the Blomberg-Fritsch scandal was the leading story throughout Germany, as well as in the international press. American correspondent William L. Shirer was in Vienna at the time and read all about it. “Today’s papers say that Blomberg and Fritsch, the two men who have built up the German army, are out,” he wrote in his diary. “Hitler himself becomes a sort of ‘Supreme War Lord,’ assuming the powers of Minister of Defense.”

Admiral Canaris was absolutely stunned by the news that Hitler had ruined the careers and lives of two of his most senior officers, all for the purpose of supreme command of German forces. Until the Blomberg-Fritsch incident, the admiral admired Hitler and considered him an honorable and patriotic head of state who had restored Germany’s economy and military power. But Canaris no longer trusted Adolf Hitler, that although Hitler made many stirring speeches about Germany, he only had his own self-interest at heart. “This was the time when Canaris began to turn from Hitler,” a friend recalled. “If you have to mark any one event as the crisis of loyalty between Canaris and Hitler, this is it.”

Canaris as a Korvettenkapitän, circa 1924–31. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

But the incident that decisively turned Canaris against Hitler was Kristallnacht, or the “Night of Broken Glass,” which took place on November 9, 1938. On this night, coordinated attacks were carried out against synagogues and Jewish-owned businesses throughout Germany. Hundreds of synagogues were vandalized, along with thousands of Jewish shops and businesses. Fragments of broken glass from smashed windows covered the streets and pavements. The light reflected by the shards reminded bystanders of crystal ornaments, which gave rise to the name “Crystal Night.” Over the years, the name has become synonymous with the barbarity of the Hitler regime.

Along with the Blomberg-Fritsch scandal, Kristallnacht destroyed Admiral Canaris’ faith in both Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. Hitler ruined the lives of two senior officers to promote his own ambition, and now he approved a night of vandalism and destruction that turned world opinion against Germany. Two days after Kristallnacht, the New York Times ran this front-page headline: “Nazis Smash, Loot and Burn Jewish Shops and Temples.” No one knew exactly what Hitler might do next, but Canaris decided that he could no longer allow himself to support Adolf Hitler.

But the admiral did not resign his position as head of the Abwehr to protest Kristallnacht. Instead, he used his rank and authority to smuggle hundreds of refugees out of the Third Reich by disguising them as Abwehr intelligence agents. In 1941, he smuggled 500 Jews out of Nazi-occupied Holland to neutral Spain and Portugal and across the Atlantic Ocean to South America, Mexico, Panama, and other countries. According to some accounts, Canaris’ refugees also entered the United States. All of these evacuees were disguised as Abwehr agents. Some were taught simple codes to make their cover stories more convincing. All passports and other documents were signed by Admiral Canaris himself. The admiral was also responsible for saving the lives of many other Jews and “undesirables” by arranging their escape from Nazi-occupied territory.

What role did Canaris play in the various plots to assassinate Hitler, particularly the July 20th Plot?

Admiral Canaris was well aware of most of the assassination plots against Hitler, but no evidence exists to show that he was directly involved with any of them. At least eight assassination attempts were made since the war began. The first took place on the night of November 8, 1939, at the Bürgerbraükeller in Munich. Hitler was scheduled to make a speech at the beer hall that night, and a bomb was placed behind the speaker’s rostrum by a former inmate of Dachau. Everyone expected Hitler to make one of his usual long-winded speeches, which usually lasted more than an hour but, to the surprise of the audience, he left the building much sooner than expected.  When the time bomb exploded at about 9.30 pm, Hitler had already finished speaking and had left the premises.

Hitler managed to escape all the other assassination attempts, as well, mostly because of what one writer called “the devil’s luck.” In June, 1940, a group of conspirators planned to shoot Hitler while he was attending a victory parade in Paris, but the plan came to nothing when the parade was canceled. A year later, another group of conspirators attempted to kill Hitler during a parade, yet once again, the parade was called off. In March 1943, a bomb was placed aboard Hitler’s airplane while he was traveling through Russia. The bomb featured an acid detonator, which had always proved to be very effective and efficient in the past. But the pilot was forced to climb to a higher altitude than planned to avoid turbulence, and the acid froze in the frigid upper atmosphere. The bomb failed to explode.

Hitler also managed to escape other bomb plots because of luck. One attempt failed when the bomb exploded prematurely. Another effort collapsed when Hitler left an exhibition after staying only a few minutes; he sensed that something was wrong and cut his visit short. Admiral Canaris did not have much faith in these schemes and “did not want to be too much in the picture,” according to one source. His plan for ending Hitler’s dictatorship was to do everything in his power to help make the impending Allied invasion a success. As far as he was concerned, everything else, including bomb plots and assassination attempts, was a complete waste of time and effort.

There were those in London and Washington who shared the admiral’s opinion. Many feared that killing Hitler would only turn him into a martyr, and would encourage right-wing militarists to begin preaching that Germany would have won the war if the Führer had not been murdered by traitors. If Hitler were assassinated, this line of thinking went, his followers would establish a new military dictatorship in 20 or 25 years, a Fourth Reich, and would start another war. This was exactly what Admiral Canaris did not want to happen. Losing the war, and dealing with Hitler and the Nazis after they had been overpowered by the Allied armies, was the only practical way of restoring a German government based on international law, according to Canaris’ point of view.

Canaris (right) confers with top Nazi party officials Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler (left) and Chancellor Joseph Goebbels. 

Canaris had a complex relationship with foreign intelligence services. How did he interact with British intelligence, and what impact did these interactions have on the war?

During the months leading up to D-Day, Admiral Canaris’ activities can be best described as hazy and mysterious. He managed to keep Allied intelligence well informed of reports concerning German defenses in Normandy. No one is exactly sure how he stayed in touch with his contacts in London, but it was probably through acquaintances in Spain. No matter how he accomplished it, the admiral sent a good many reports across to England, priceless information involving the German defense build-up on the coast of Normandy.

An American colonel attached to General Eisenhower’s intelligence staff found out exactly how valuable Admiral Canaris had become to the Allied war effort. The officer in question was Colonel James O. Curtis, who was the only American intelligence evaluator on Eisenhower’s staff. The other three officers were British. The main job of an intelligence evaluator was to read and evaluate each and every report that was received – thousands of reports and pieces of intelligence arrived in London during the period leading up to D-Day – and to determine which were genuine and which were unreliable. Colonel Curtis was on very friendly terms with his British colleagues, but he had the feeling that they were not telling him everything – including details about the sources of the information.

Allied intelligence had its own system of grading information, a system that judged each report based on its credibility. The highest quality reports were graded A-1; the lowest were F-6. Colonel Curtis noticed that a surprising number of reports were being graded A-1. A great deal of A-1 material seemed too accurate and detailed to be true, at least to colonel Curtis’ way of thinking. He refused to believe that all the reports were as accurate as his British associates seemed to think. The three British officers were reluctant to divulge the source of the information until Colonel Curtis insisted. He refused to pass the reports along to American planners at Eisenhower’s headquarters until he knew something about their source.

The head of the department, Colonel E.J. Foord, finally decided to let the American in on their secret. He told Colonel Curtis that the source was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, and went on to say that this disclosure was to be considered Top Secret: “The only reason that I am telling you this is that we want you to regard this information as being priceless and copper-bottomed.” Colonel Foord explained that only a very select few high-ranking individuals – President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, General Eisenhower – knew anything about Admiral Canaris’ activities. Colonel Curtis was taken completely by surprise by this revelation. “I was, at first, afraid to go to sleep in case I talked in my sleep,” he said.

Colonel Curtis wrote about Admiral Canaris’ accomplishments: “His most important service was to give us substantially the complete order of battle plans for the German Army, together with the plans they had worked out for coping with the invasion.” Receiving the Wehrmacht’s listing of divisions and regiments was an enormous asset for Allied intelligence. Piecing together that much information would have taken a great deal of time and effort, if the task could have been managed at all. Instead, intelligence agents were able to put that energy to work on other projects. Delivering the order of battle was one of Admiral Canaris’ major achievements. It gave Allied intelligence priceless information on enemy defenses in Normandy, and proved to be a major contribution toward helping Allied forces win the war.

What were the key reasons for Canaris’s eventual downfall, and how was he discovered to be working against the Nazi regime?

The failed assassination plot of July 20, 1944 made Hitler almost obsessively determined to round up everyone who had any connection at all with the plot, no matter how slight. The Gestapo carried out Hitler’s orders with brutal efficiency. Hundreds of German officers were arrested for complicity in the assassination attempt. About 20 percent of them were executed; many were tortured beforehand.

Admiral Canaris was not involved in the plot, but one of the officers taken into Gestapo custody named Canaris as one of the conspirators. Under the stress of Gestapo questioning, this officer, Colonel Georg Hansen, not only implicated the admiral as a member of the July 20 plot, but also identified him as one of the leaders of the anti-Nazi opposition. Colonel Hansen also said that Canaris was directly responsible for smuggling Jews and other “undesirables” out of German-occupied territory, a disclosure that took his interrogators completely by surprise. On the day after this interrogation, Admiral Canaris was arrested by the Gestapo.

Senior Nazi officials, including Martin Bormann, Hermann Göring, and Bruno Loerzer survey the damaged conference room of the July 20 assassination attempt. (Photo via German National Archives)

While under arrest, Canaris was regularly questioned by Gestapo agents. Most of these interrogators were specialists in either tricking or intimidating their prisoners into telling them what they wanted to know. But the admiral always managed to avoid answering their questions. He sometimes pretended to be a stupid old man, acting as though he did not understand what the agents were asking him. Sometimes he just sidestepped the questions, or replied with an answer that did not make sense. For months, he frustrated the Gestapo with one ruse after another. But the interrogators never gave up. They always had more questions, and kept coming back.

Not all of the prisoners were as resourceful, or as devious, as Admiral Canaris. One of the suspected conspirators told the Gestapo about some files that were being kept in the town of Zossen, about 20 miles south of Berlin, files that were said to contain valuable information about the anti-Hitler movement. The Gestapo immediately went to Zossen, where they discovered several binders in a safe at the Wehrmacht headquarters building. The binders contained several diaries that recorded – in great detail, and in Admiral Canaris’ handwriting – the activities of the anti-Nazi movement since the 1930s. These diaries supplied the Gestapo with all the evidence they needed to hang Admiral Canaris.

No one knows exactly why Canaris kept such a detailed account for so many years. He gave names, dates, and particulars of just about all the activities of the anti-Hitler conspirators. Possibly it may have been to record events for future historians; maybe it was to keep an official record of the corruption of Hitler and the Nazis for a post-war tribunal. Whatever the reason, the diaries have been one of the great mysteries of Admiral Canaris’ enigmatic life.

Sometime during early April, probably April 4, the diaries were handed over to Adolf Hitler. After reading Admiral Canaris’ comments and observations, Hitler ordered the admiral to be given a quick trial and then hanged. Admiral Canaris had been moved to Flossenbürg concentration camp, about a mile from the Czech border, at the beginning of February. Arranging for a quick trial and execution at Flossenbürg was a routine matter.

American soldiers stand at the gates of the Dachau concentration camp after its liberation. (Photo via 42nd “Rainbow” Infantry Division)

What were Canaris’s personal relationships like with his family and close friends during the height of his double life? How did they perceive his actions?

During the war, Admiral Canaris’ closest friends and associates were members of the anti-Hitler movement. Colonel Hans Oster turned against Hitler in 1934, and was involved in Operation Agular. He would be hanged on the same day as Canaris. Hans von Dohnanyi was also disturbed and angered by the Blomberg-Fritsch incident, and took part in Operation Seven. Ulrich von Hassell had been the German ambassador to Italy; he shared Canaris’ thoughts regarding the persecution of Jews and other outcasts. He unsuccessfully attempted to involve the British government in a plot to overthrow Hitler. General Walter Schellenberg remained on friendly terms with the admiral even though he was a high-ranking officer in German intelligence. The two often went horseback riding together. Admiral Canaris’ relationship with friends can best be described as “cautions.” Every one of his friends and acquaintances realized that one misplaced word regarding the admiral might very well result in the arrest of Canaris and very possibly themselves. Not very much is known about the existence of Canaris’ wife and two daughters. They were apparently not involved in any of the admiral’s anti-Hitler activities and remained in the background of Wilhelm Canaris’ life throughout the war. Both daughters, as well as Canaris’ wife, lived for many years after the war ended.

Can you describe the circumstances of Canaris’s arrest, trial, and execution? What was his legacy following his death?

After Admiral Canaris’ diaries were discovered at the beginning of April 1945, which furnished unquestionable proof that he had been a leader in the anti-Nazi resistance for years, his execution followed very quickly. Adolf Hitler issued the order on April 5. By April 8, Canaris was tried, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death. Following his trial, the admiral was given a brutal interrogation by his SS guards. The guards beat him with their fists, which left him badly bruised and with a broken nose, and returned him to his cell barely able to walk.

On the following morning, Admiral Canaris was hanged. According to another prisoner at Flossenbürg, he died slowly and horribly. He was actually hanged twice – once with an iron collar around his neck, with the noose placed over the collar. After several minutes, he was taken down while still alive. The iron collar was then removed and he was hanged again. This time, he was left hanging until he was dead. Four other prisoners were also hanged that day. The bodies of all five prisoners were burned on a huge bonfire. The wind blew the cremated remains of Admiral Canaris and the others through the bars of the nearby cell windows.

Since he had become head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris managed to smuggle several hundred Jews and other outcasts out of Nazi-occupied territory, right past the Gestapo. He also sent valuable information to the Allies and did everything possible to prevent Adolf Hitler from winning the war. And with a great deal of cunning and an equal amount of good luck, he managed to avoid being discovered. But his luck ran out on July 20, 1944, when he was implicated in the failed Hitler assassination plot. Although he managed to get away with all of his anti-Nazi activities for many years, he was hanged because of a conspiracy in which he played no active part.

Exactly two weeks after Admiral Canaris was hanged, members of the 358th and 359th US infantry regiments arrived at Flossenbürg and liberated the camp. A week after Flossenbürg was liberated, and three weeks after the admiral was executed, Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin chancellery. He shot himself on April 30; his bride, Eva Braun, swallowed poison. Seven days later, during the early hours of May 7, Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allied powers and the Third Reich ceased to exist. The end came too late to save thousands of inmates who died in the concentration camps, but the mass murders had finally ended. Admiral Canaris could be well satisfied that he had done his part in saving many political and religious prisoners from places like Flossenbürg.

Memorial at Flossenbürg concentration camp to the German resistance members executed on 9 April 1945. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

David Alan Johnson is the author of fourteen books, including The Last Weeks of Abraham Lincoln and Decided on the Battlefield: Grant, Sherman, Lincoln, and the Election of 1864.

Commander Christopher Nelson, USN, is a career naval intelligence officer and a frequent contributor to CIMSEC. The questions and comments here are his own and not necessarily those endorsed by the Department of the Defense or the United States Navy.

Featured Image: Adolf Hitler and his entourage visiting the Eiffel Tower in Paris on June 23, 1940, following the occupation of France by the Nazis. (Photo via German Federal Archives)

DMO and the Firepower Revolution: Evolving the Carrier and Surface Force Relationship

By Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.)

Introduction

39 years ago, in the October 1985 issue of USNI Proceedings, then-LCDR Joe Benkert and I questioned how the Navy structured the relationship between the carrier force and the surface fleet:

“Do non-carrier surface warships have any strategic significance? To listen to discussions of maritime strategy and naval force structure in the public arena, one would think that the only general-purpose naval forces with strategic significance in their own right are carrier-launched aircraft and nuclear-powered attack submarines, and that surface combatants are simply integral parts of larger, carrier-dominated structures. Reminiscent of Peggy Lee’s song, ‘Is that all there is?” Are surface combatants simply supporting players, or do they have a larger strategic role?”…the Maritime strategy suggests that naval forces would move forward as early as possible to take decisive, offensive action to neutralize the Soviet Navy and pressure the Soviet flanks. This strategy envi­sions the Soviet fleet being neutralized mostly by attack submarines and carrier-based aviation. The principal role for surface combatants in this task lies in providing de­fense for aircraft carriers.”

Is that still all there is? Fast forward to 2024 where we may be witnessing a role reversal. Are we reaching a point in which the surface fleet, with the long-range Maritime Strike Tomahawk missile, will become the preferred platform-weapon combination for U.S. anti-ship warfare? Could this subsequently shift the role of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to being the supporting platforms rather than the supported?

The looming introduction of VLS-capable anti-ship missiles across a wide range of untapped force structure within the Navy and the joint force deserves to trigger a rethink of the fleet’s combined arms doctrine, especially between the surface fleet and the carriers. The U.S. Navy is about to experience a historic firepower revolution, and it needs to think deeply about the implications.

Making Sense of the Firepower Revolution

CDR Jeff Vandenengel argues in his recently published book, Questioning the Carrier: Opportunities in Fleet Design for the U.S. Navy, that aircraft carriers are too vulnerable in certain threat environments to take on the strike warfare role, and that the surface fleet’s offensive potential has been hamstrung by traditional doctrinal roles that relegated it to supporting the carrier defensively. Vandenengel and others have argued that the age of the carrier has been surpassed by the age of the missile, which has become the principally dominant weapon in modern naval warfare. The question is whether the combined arms doctrine that integrates the various naval communities into a fleet has adapted to make the most of the principal weapon of the era.

The lethality of the anti-ship missile has greatly exacerbated the intense attrition that has long characterized naval combat and set it apart from other warfare domains. As Captain Wayne Hughes argued,

“It is demonstrable both by history and theory that not only has a small net advantage in force often been decisive in naval battles, but the slightly inferior force tends to lose with very little to show… every strategist must know the relative fighting value of his navy – so carefully nurtured and expensive to build and maintain in peacetime. When committed in battle, the heart of a fleet can be cut out in an afternoon.”

In war at sea, a slight tactical disadvantage in striking power can quickly snowball into major losses, strongly encouraging navies to make the absolute most of the dominant weapons of their era. As Dmitry Filipoff has argued:

“…no other service needs to be more invested in tactical superiority and solid warfighting doctrine than navies. If a carrier strike group falls prey to a single missile salvo, that’s about seven thousand lives and $20 billion dollars that is lost in a matter of minutes. By comparison, those numbers would get you about 2,000 tanks, but there is no plausible combat scenario where two thousand tanks are destroyed in a couple minutes. Modern naval warfare is an absolutely brutal form of combat, and because of that, nobody stands to lose so much so quicky from their tactical shortfalls than navies. In naval warfare especially, tactical shortfalls can rapidly escalate into strategic liabilities…”1

Accordingly, the Navy’s warfighting concept of DMO should be developing a better understanding of how fleet warfare is evolving with respect to the wide proliferation of long-range anti-ship firepower across both the force structure of the U.S. military and its rivals. Lying at the core of this transformation is the point that the Maritime Strike Tomahawk possesses a combination of traits that are especially suited for mass anti-ship fires – long range, broad platform compatibility, and eventually steep inventory depth. While several other new anti-ship missiles are also joining the joint force, including SM-6 and the Naval Strike Missile, no other anti-ship missile in the U.S. inventory fields this specific combination of mass firing traits to the same degree as MST. And arguably no other community will field this decisive weapon to the same extent as the surface fleet. This historic evolution in the U.S. Navy’s striking power should have major effects on the roles and missions of the aircraft carrier, its air wing, and the fleet as a whole.

Evolving Firepower, Evolving Roles

The air wing has a range of limits, including the range of its aircraft, the range of its anti-ship missiles, the wide scope of missions the air wing may have to perform simultaneously, the time it takes to arm and launch sizeable strike packages, and of course the risk that can be reasonably tolerated by putting carriers within reach of certain high-end targets. Long-range anti-ship missiles based on the surface force offer a useful alternative for circumventing some of these limits and risks, and providing a much more expansive array of options for fighting enemy fleets.

But the carrier will still be needed to leverage this wide scope of new firepower. An alternative combined arms relationship is offered in Filipoff’s “Fighting DMO” series. The carrier air wing can serve as a force multiplier to this potent mass firing capability by fulfilling the information demands required to take full advantage of the long range of these weapons and their broad scope of distribution across a theater. Carrier aircraft such as the F-35 can take the lead in penetrating the contested battlespace and facilitating the striking power of entire fleets. As Filipoff has argued: “aircraft are going to be very critical for managing the breadth of the offensive kill chain. This can go from scouting for targets, cueing fires against them, maneuvering those fires, and assessing those fires’ effectiveness.” As carrier aircraft call in anti-ship fires from across the joint force, they can be postured to provide crucial retargeting updates to in-flight salvos based on the dynamic awareness offered by sensor fusion, and allow aircraft to shepherd anti-ship missiles into cohesive volumes of fire against enemy fleets.

Sailors taxi an F-35C Lightning II, assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), on Jan. 22, 2022. (US Navy Photo)

The ability of the carrier air wing to provide offensive information support for the maritime fires killchain is significantly enhanced by the sensor fusion and networking capabilities possessed by 5th generation F-35 aircraft. F-35 fighters possess multiple datalink options to share data with dissimilar platforms, such as F/A-18s and E-2Ds. These datalinks could also be used to dynamically command anti-ship missiles to fly various waypoints, flying formations, and sensor postures to maximize effectiveness in a complex battlespace. The P-8 community can also provide valuable command and control functions for the maritime fires process, and offer aerial C2 options that are not tethered to the location or risk profile of a carrier.

Aircraft can be empowered with the command-and-control of significant amounts of anti-ship firepower in the moments that could decide fleet battles. It is through these roles that the carrier can still very much serve as a decisive capital ship by focusing on the critical currency of modern warfare – information advantage.

Conclusion

Given the range advantage of surface fleet-based missiles, the range limitations of the carrier air wing, and the vulnerability of the carrier in certain threat environments, the role of the carrier and its air wing should evolve in tandem with the U.S. Navy’s changing firepower. The carrier and its air wing should serve as the force quarterback that scouts wide spaces, cues surface ship fires against targets, and provides crucial in-flight retargeting support to those salvos on their way through a contested battlespace. In this method, the air wing can be empowered to deliver much more than the force of the carrier – it can deliver the force of entire fleets.

This is only one possible concept of operations for harnessing the new possibilities that are on the horizon. The fundamental issue at hand is whether the Navy will truly recognize it is in the midst of one of the most sweeping transformations in offensive anti-ship firepower in its history, and whether it will give serious consideration to shifting the combined arms doctrine that has long defined how the fleet intends to fight. The U.S. Navy’s warfighting concepts, including DMO, should be the driving force behind experimenting with these alternatives and eventually articulating what these new combined arms roles should be. The firepower revolution and the DMO concept are also happening in the context of the Navy’s growing emphasis on fleet-level warfare and Maritime Operations Centers. All of these elements must be thoughtfully integrated, especially with respect to reforming combined arms relations to maximize the fleet’s overall striking power. That is the ultimate end, not elevating one platform’s primacy or another’s.

Captain R. Robinson “Robby” Harris commanded USS Conolly (DD-979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. Ashore he served as Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel. He was a CNO Fellow in CNO Strategic Studies Group XII.

References

1. This quote is from a presentation delivered by Filipoff to the Strategy Discussion Group (SDG) and used here with permission.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (June 13, 2021) Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105), front, and Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transit the Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Olympia O. McCoy)

The Maritime Doctrine Of Pakistan – Setting The Record Straight

This article is an authorized republication from the Center for International Strategic Studies. It can be read in its original form here.

By Muhammad Azam Khan

It is essential to know how a military doctrine differs from a maritime doctrine. The former embodies hard military power with defined set of principles for its application. The latter denotes sum total of sea power, the physical, demographic, geographic and military resources derived from or related to the sea. The sea power of a nation involves but is not limited to, mercantile marine (commercial shipping), marine or civil maritime industries, ports, harbors, shipyards, maritime zones (EEZ) with marine resources therein, seabed minerals, navies, coastguards, and where relevant includes contribution of land and air forces of a country. It further implies power both, at and from the sea. To sum up, a maritime doctrine is a combination of soft as well as hard power or the aggregate of a nation’s ability, inclusive of policy apparatus, to ensure control and safeguard of its maritime zones and other maritime interests during peace and war.

Put another way, while a military doctrine involves application of kinetic power alone, a maritime doctrine by contrast encompasses all elements of sea power including economic dimension (soft power) besides maritime military (combat) power (vested in navies, coast guard, coastal police etc.). A maritime doctrine must allude to national maritime interests’ preservation and protection of which both, at home and abroad is entrusted to a navy. Unlike an army or air force with combat operations restricted broadly within the geographical limits of a country, a navy largely operates in international waters just outside 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast and could carry a nation’s flag to farthest reaches of the planet. For the record, there is also a huge body of international maritime law that governs maritime operations which must also be complied with.

Founded on historical experiences and changes occurring in strategic environment, a doctrine serves as benchmark in policy making. A defense policy issued by the government dictates and drives the two elements of a military (land, air and naval) strategy i.e. developmental and employment strategies. In most countries while the title “maritime doctrine” has been retained, more often than not it is the respective navies that have lead and composed such a document. Therefore, Australian, British and Indian maritime doctrines have been devised by navies in each country.

A doctrine widely differs from Fleet orders, Compendiums, Temporary Memoranda, etc. In the Pakistan Navy, these are defined in Navy Regulations (NR) of 1988 as:

“Orders and instructions of the Chief of the Naval Staff on day to day administrative matters in the Navy. These are in addition to various books of regulations, PBRs, Navy Instructions and Joint Services Instructions. Government letters may also be reproduced in Fleet Orders.” 

The first edition of Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) was unveiled in 2018 by Mr. Arif Alvi, the President of Pakistan. The ceremony was held at Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), the premier seat of learning in Pakistan Navy. The ownership of the Maritime Doctrine was and still continues to rest with Pakistan Navy War College. It was at this institute that over a period of some six years several drafts were constructed, extensively studied and deliberated by a range of accomplished practitioners, scholars as well as reputed international maritime experts before the first edition was formally authorized for release. The issue of ‘jointness’ with other services was widely contemplated as well. In Pakistan the joint (tri) services operations is nevertheless a progressing phenomenon. The first edition of MDP consequently restricts itself to brief discourse on peacetime and wartime operations by Pakistan navy.

The role of Pakistan navy during 1971 war is worth recalling here. It was PN submarine Ghazi which kept the bulk of Indian navy’s eastern fleet confined to fringes of Bay of Bengal until its own sinking. Another PN submarine Hangor meanwhile turned the strategic tide in favour of Pakistan in North Arabian Sea after it sank an Indian frigate Khukri. All this meant pushing the Indian navy to a defensive posture. These are classical cases in history which aided in improving overall freedom of action to the benefit of Pakistan’s military.

Given the cold war dynamics and a colonial legacy of so called martial races joining the armed forces, Pakistan has perennially suffered from what is called “maritime blindness” (also sea blindness). It is an affliction in which large segments of general population and governments remain ignorant of maritime future and matters related to oceans. It is not specific to any one country. Many advance countries too suffer from this disorder.

There was a widely held belief in the Pakistan Navy that despite its enormous contributions both, during war as well as in peace, the service is not well understood even at the inter-services level let alone in country’s north. The inextricable link between import driven national economy underpinned by sea based commerce particularly, critically important fossil fuels (oil, LNG, and coal) was never understood in major parts of the country. As a measure, at an average 2.5 ships disembarked energy related cargo at Pakistani ports on daily basis in 2020, according to credible statistics. In a crisis, without such fuel reshipments, the strategic reserves could deplete rapidly. In the event, no military tank, fighter aircraft, or other combatant will be able to mobilize.

Major shifts in strategic environment following events of September 2001 reinforced the belief that Pakistan navy must come up with a document which quintessentially serves dual purpose: educational cum informational as well as an introductory doctrinal source. The “purpose” of first edition of MDP is accordingly defined at the onset: to provide understanding to all stakeholders on the distinctive attributes of national maritime sector and the role of Pakistan navy in national security (pg. 3).

The first edition of MDP was formulated as part of maritime and naval outreach initiative by Pakistan navy. It provides introductory narrative for in-country and overseas readership. The elementary knowledge on the national maritime sector and variety of naval features is meant for academia, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy besides others. It is predominantly an “informative” endeavor to “educate” stakeholders and interested parties. As such MDP had little to demonstrate classical military doctrinal approach and embarked upon a course to be more “informational” and less “doctrinal”. The first five chapters in the MDP educate a reader with essentials like military instruments of sea power, distinctive characteristics of maritime environment, brief history of developments in Indian Ocean, various dimensions of maritime environment besides Pakistan’s maritime interests and myriad non-traditional threats and challenges like piracy, trafficking etc. which infest the maritime commons. This is of course beyond the pale of hard-core military threats that endure.

On the issue of ‘doctrinal and strategic’ ambiguity, readers may note that Pakistan’s overall strategic posture is one that remains ambiguous and indistinct for well-known reasons. Pakistan has not formally published any strategic doctrine either. The available material is only through formal statements of top officials rendered in national, international foras including local and overseas think tanks of repute. Weapons development is meanwhile an ongoing process in strategic posturing. Also, at the time of publication of first edition, strategic developments like AUKUS, Quad, BECA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and MSRA had not occurred. The geopolitical landscape too was quite different. The end of war in Yemen and Somali piracy, emergence of Israel as a player in the Indian Ocean, withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, INS Arihant, the Indian navy SSBN completing first deterrent patrol etc. are subsequent developments. Though apportionment of share in defense budget has undoubtedly been a concern for Pakistan navy, it is nowhere central to MDP. Given the innate dynamic attributes of strategic environment, MDP was envisaged to be reviewed only after five years.

The second edition of MDP currently under process is intended to build on the inaugural edition. It will dilate on the roles of Pakistan navy; what it does at and from the sea in much more eloquent manner and greater depth. It will also provide stakeholders with an extensive insight into military strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and its influence upon Pakistan’s maritime interests. The new edition will expound blue economy and its relationship with maritime security. It will explain Gwadar port under CPEC and prospective regional connectivity that it importantly offers. The benchmark for new edition will be National Security Policy of 2022-2026.

The narrative appearing in some recent papers examining MDP and carried by prominent publications is more or less regurgitation of worn out clichés without any breakthrough or noteworthy research critique. If access to a primary source is available and is not availed, in this case (PNWC), it unquestionably runs counter to the spirit of research ethics.

Muhammad Azam Khan is a retired naval officer with over 47 years of experience as practitioner in the field of maritime security and nuclear research studies. He can be reached at mazamkhan54@gmail.com.

Note: The views expressed in the article are those of the author and not necessarily that of Pakistan Navy or Pakistan Navy War College. The article aims to clarify some of the views expressed in, “Major power competition in the Indian Ocean and doctrinal development in Pakistan,published in Comparative Strategy, Volume 42-Issue 4, authored by Dr. Khurram Iqbal & Muneeb Salman and, Advocating by Doctrine: The Pakistan Navy’s Experience,” published by CIMSEC, October 16, 2023.

Featured Image: Pakistan navy frigate F-22P Zulfiquar visit to Port Klang, Malaysia. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Take the Conn! Steering a Course for Technical Talent in Modern Naval Warfare

By Scott A. Humr

Technical talent is critical to the Department of the Navy’s bid for technological overmatch in modern warfare. More emphatically, Vice Admiral Loren Selby stated in the Navy’s Naval STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) Strategic Plan, “Strong Naval STEM efforts are critical to America’s future, and are a matter of national security.”1 While technologies are crucial to enabling systems and processes such as Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), technical talent that informs the development and employment of algorithmic warfare systems is equally important.2

However, the naval services – the Navy and Marine Corps – lack an implementation plan for how they will cultivate STEM talent. To succeed in 21st century naval warfare, the naval services must take a holistic approach to recruiting, education, and retention if they are to effectively compete with today’s advanced threats and the multitude of adversaries. Without clear actions and the right personnel, the naval services’ efforts to improve warfare today will remain, at best, aspirational.

Improving the Foundation

The foundation of a 21st century naval warfare workforce begins with recruiting. Recruiting a technically competent workforce lays the keel of future success. However, the naval services will likely need to improve recruitment of STEM degrees from their largest accession pool for officers such as Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and other commissioning sources. For instance, the US Navy and the Marine Corps only obtain 19.9 percent and 15.89 of their officer accessions from the Service academies, respectively. Fortunately, all these officers graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree.3 Therefore, with majority of officer accessions deriving from non-military academy sources, the naval services need to do a great deal more for targeting their largest commissioning populations.

The demand for STEM degrees throughout the world is currently outstripping supply. The World Economic Forum reported that there is a global STEM crisis, causing many advanced countries to sound the alarm.4 In the US, a March 2024 brief published by National Science Board reported “We [the United States] are not producing STEM workers in either sufficient numbers or diversity to meet the workforce needs of the 21st century knowledge economy, especially if STEM talent demand grows as projected.”5 Joseph McGettigan, the Director of the United States Naval Academy STEM Center recently stated:

“In 2017 there were 2.4 million positions in the US workforce that went unfilled because there were not enough people with STEM degrees to fill them. It is expected that in 2027 that number will increase by ten percent.”6

Not surprisingly, the US National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) shows that engineering and related degrees, along with computer and information sciences and support services, only make up a small percentage of all the degrees conferred as shown in Figure 1.7 Hence, these statistics do not bode well for the naval services recruiting and diversity goals for STEM education to support modern warfare. With a growing shortage of STEM talent, the naval services will have to increasingly compete for a smaller portion of this skilled population. Still, the naval services can improve their ability to recruit in a number of different ways.

Figure 1 – Number of college degrees by discipline. Source: US National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
Figure 1 – Number of college degrees by discipline. Source: US National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).

One way the naval services can improve their recruiting efforts is to influence and increase the pool of eligible candidates sooner. Specifically, the naval services should vector more resources towards their Junior ROTC (JROTC) programs.

Established in 1916, JROTC programs were established to inculcate citizenship and leadership for secondary school students.8 Currently, the JROTC programs are not explicitly designed for military recruitment.9 However in the 2015 Armed Forces Appropriations Bill, Congress voiced its concerns about JROTC’s connections to recruitment by stating:

“The Committee is concerned about the shrinking number of American youth eligible for military service. For nearly 100 years, the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps [JROTC] has promoted citizenship and community service amongst America’s youth and has been an important means through which youth can learn about military service in the United States. But evidence suggests that some high school JROTC programs face closure due to funding tied to program enrollment levels, adversely impacting certain, particularly rural, populations.”10

While recruitment is not an explicit end-state of JROTC programs, it nonetheless has implications for recruitment.11 For these reasons, the naval services are missing out on an important source of potential recruitment and greater influence over the types of skills needed to support the naval services.

One way the naval services could improve the JROTC program is by making it a more attractive and viable place to grow the next generation of technical leaders. For instance, JROTC programs should place less emphasis on traditional programs of drill and ceremonial activities that the rising generation may consider anachronistic. Rather, JROTC units could structure their programs around more of an Ender’s Game approach:12 creating opportunities such as drone racing leagues, robot building, hackathon coding camps, and E-sports. A more modern conceptualization of JROTC could help shed the stodgy drill and ceremony competitions and create more interest in STEM fields. Such a change would make the military more appealing while also cultivating the skills needed in modern warfare. As a result, the naval services would benefit by increasing the potentially pool for recruitment of this talent.

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Oct. 30, 2018) Cmdr. Chris Swanson, officer in charge, Landing Signal Officer (LSO) School, participates in a final prototype demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) TechSolutions-sponsored Flight Deck Crew Refresher Training Expansion Packs (TEP). (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

If the Navy and Marine Corps are to recruit capable citizens to meet the demands of 2030 and beyond, the services need to also address their public-facing social media presence used for their JROTC recruitment. In fact, both Navy and Marine Corps recruitment platforms for their respective JROTC programs require a complete overhaul. The web presence found for these organizations are woefully uninspiring and uninformative. From webpages to social media, the NJROTC and Marine Corps ROTC (MCJROTC) media does not tell a compelling story of service to one’s country or anything remotely intriguing that would drive potential recruits to click, scroll, or swipe deeper into the content. For instance, the Navy’s own NJROTC webpage is a throwback to the way webpages were formatted in the mid-2000s with the content being almost completely text based. Furthermore, NJROTC content on such sites as YouTube is equally uninspiring along with no official Navy presence to speak of on Instagram or TikTok.

If the naval services are going to battle other narratives that compete for attention and tell a compelling story, they must do battle on the same cyber terrain. Warfare knows no bounds and extends to the arena of recruiting the next generation of talent. If the Navy and Marine Corps do not recognize this, then they have already ceded the field of battle to other competing narratives, or worse, the enemy.

Educating for Decision-Making

To compete effectively with modern warfare technologies over the next decade, the naval services must educate and promote continuous learning for better decision-making. Decision-making at the pace of artificial intelligence (AI) is anticipated to be measured in seconds in future war. For instance, the US Army’s Project Convergence which is already testing many AI-enabled applications, advertised they were able to achieve target acquisition to target engagement within 20 seconds.13 Commenting on the challenges Navy destroyer captains face in the Red Sea against Iranian-back Houthis, Admiral Brad Cooper stated they only had nine to 15 seconds to make a decision in an intense environment.14 Therefore, reducing the amount of time to close the kill chains to seconds portends a significant increase in the pace of warfare in the foreseeable future, and by extension, the need for faster human judgments when humans are an integral part of the decision-making process.15 For these reasons, future leaders will not only need to have the best education but will require continuing education to ensure their skills are kept current and relevant to meet such demands.

The naval services must educate to adapt to the changing realities of the Cognitive Age,16 otherwise risk falling behind. However, educating personnel and not placing them in follow-on billets to use their skills and hone their education further through real-world application risks reducing the service’s return on investment in these critical skills. For instance, most US Navy personnel who graduate from the Naval Postgraduate School are not placed in billets that maximizes the use of their degree.17 This is problematic because it demonstrates that the Navy, as publicized in the comprehensive Education for Sea Power (E4S) report, does not have a rigorous selection process for assigning personnel to NPS.

This is clear from the E4S report that the Navy, in particular, is missing the mark on education in at least two ways. First, the E4S showed that the Navy has consistently selected personnel who were either already approved for retirement when entering school or retired from active duty immediately after graduation (p. 331). Figure 2, from the E4S, shows that in FY18 alone the Navy had 736 sailors who fit that description. Second, the E4S stated that, “The variances in training requirements/career progression/sea-shore rotation for each URL (Unrestricted Line) community do not support directly associating a career milestone with graduate education. Communities do not require post-graduation education at the same time within each respective career path” (p. 339). What’s worse is this practice was identified in a 1998 Center for Naval Analysis report, stating that only 37 percent of graduates were sent to utilization tours in relevant coded billets.18 Once again, this demonstrates that the Navy’s system of selection and employment of its most critical asset, its people, falls woefully short and requires an immediate course correction if it is to properly educate and subsequently employ its human talent.

Figure 2 – Number of Navy officers attended who were already approved for retirement when entering school or did retire from active duty immediately after graduation. From E4S report (p. 331).
Figure 2 – Number of Navy officers attended who were already approved for retirement when entering school or did retire from active duty immediately after graduation. From E4S report (p. 331).

To correct these shortcomings, the Navy should employ a more deliberate board process. For instance, they could adopt a similar approach to the Marine Corps’ graduate education board process.19 Next, both naval services need to identify all billets requiring Master’s-level education that are steppingstones to greater responsibility and promotability. For instance, the Marine Corps should zero-baseline its technical talent in order to realign billets to where they are needed the most.20 Under the Marine Corps’ current policy, units must identify three billets to compensate for a single technically educated service member.21 For this reason, periodically assessing where technical talent needs to reside is crucial for managing this critical talent.

Raising the educational bar and the prestige of such billets will pressurize the system to demand the education and performance necessary to place such billets on par with other career-enhancing positions. This is necessary to ensure only the best and brightest remain in critical leadership roles across all warfare communities.

Retention Requires an Idiosyncratic Approach

It’s no secret that retention is a major concern for the naval services. From the Marine Corps’ efforts to mature the force under Force Design 2030 to the Navy’s own efforts to keep top talent, the naval services will likely continue to struggle given the additional pressures operating under the current recruiting crisis.22 Therefore, all warfare communities should consider several measures that could help with retention. First, all communities should have a clear path to the admiral and general officer levels. For instance, it has been noted that the Navy fills top-level leadership posts in the information warfare communities with unrestricted line officers and not information warfare personnel.23 Such practices not only demonstrate that information warfare leaders may not get to command at the highest levels, but it also demoralizes the community as a whole because it signals technical competence and intimate community understanding are not required to excel.

Second, retention should become more appealing the longer one stays within their community while making meaningful contributions. For instance, bonuses could follow a more tiered system in which the longer one stays, the larger the bonus becomes. This approach can be further incentivized by structuring choices around loss aversion rather than simple lump sum bonuses. This would potentially increase the incentives for receiving a larger bonus the longer one stays.

SAN DIEGO (Sept. 17, 2019) U.S. Navy Information Systems Technicians assigned the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) provision more than 1,500 computer workstations for integration into their shipboard Consolidated Afloat Ships Network Enterprise Services (CANES) system in Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific’s Network Integration and Engineering Facility. (U.S. Navy photo by Rick Naystatt/Released).

While there are many additional incentives the services could offer to retain their technical talent, retention still remains idiosyncratic and inducements are not a one-size fits all. Rather, the services need to have the flexibility to provide a range of more bespoke incentives that can be aligned with individual interests. Combinations of geographic preference, additional leave, and bonuses should merit consideration. In short, retention is an important leadership issue that commanders are in a position to positively influence and help shape on a case-by-case basis. Anything short of this will not provide the flexibility needed to help retain the service’s technical talent.

Conclusion

Warfare in the 21st century will demand new approaches for recruiting, education, and retention for the naval services to excel and prevail in battle. As more technologies incorporate AI, autonomy, and even quantum computing, leaders will need to hold the line on sustained investment in technical talent to reap the benefits of both a technologically competent and mature force. Furthermore, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence states that, “the human talent deficit is the government’s most conspicuous AI deficit and the single greatest inhibitor to buying, building, and fielding AI-enabled technologies for national security purposes.”24 Moreover, as the pace of warfare increases, technical talent will have to equally keep apace to ensure the domains they operate in are not ceded to the enemy.

Technically demanding fields require the resources and manpower to have a true force in readiness. Without a clear implementation strategy to address these issues, technical talent will likely exit their service for greener pastures.25 To maintain the United States’ competitive advantage throughout the spectrum of armed conflict, the naval services need to recognize that talent management is a continuous fight and that its people will remain the key driver for winning now and in the future.

Scott Humr, Ph.D. is an active-duty Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Marine Corps with more than 26 years of service. He has worked at every level of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and has multiple deployments spanning the spectrum of operations. He currently serves as the Deputy for the Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems office under the Capabilities Development Directorate in Quantico, VA. 

Endnotes

1. Department of the Navy, Naval STEM Strategic Plan, https://navalstem.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/C31_43-10535-22_Naval-STEM_Strategic-Plan_Final.pdf.

2. Allen, Gregory C. “Six Questions Every DOD AI and Autonomy Program Manager Needs to Be Prepared to Answer.” Washington, DC: 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-questions-every-dod-ai-and-autonomy-program-manager-needs-be-prepared-answer.

3. “Active Component Enlisted Accessions, Enlisted Force, Officer Accessions, and Officer Corps Tables.” Accessed November 25, 2023. https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/AP/poprep/2017/Appendix%20B%20-%20(Active%20Component).pdf.

4. Timo Lehne, What can employers do to combat STEM talent shortages?, World Economic Forum, May 21, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/05/what-can-employers-do-to-combat-stem-talent-shortages.

5. National Science Board, Talent is the treasure, March 2024, https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2024/2024_policy_brief.pdf.

6. Jennifer Bowman, Investing in Future Generations: SSP Receives Hands-On STEM Outreach Training at the US Naval Academy, December 6, 2023, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3609182/investing-in-future-generations-ssp-receives-hands-on-stem-outreach-training-at.

7. “Undergraduate Degree Fields.” Accessed November 25, 2023. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cta/undergrad-degree-fields.

8. Goldman, Charles A., Jonathan Schweig, Maya Buenaventura, and Cameron Wright, Geographic and Demographic Representativeness of the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1712.html, p.ix.

9. Ibid.

10. US Congress, S. Rept. 113-211 – Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015, 113th Congress (2013-2014), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-congress/senate-report/211.

11. Goldman, Charles A., Jonathan Schweig, Maya Buenaventura, and Cameron Wright, Geographic and Demographic Representativeness of the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1712.html, p.x.

12. Bryant, Susan F., and Andrew Harrison. Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the US Armed Forces. National Defense University Press, 2019.

13. Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. “Kill Chain In The Sky With Data: Army’s Project Convergence.” Breaking Defense (blog), September 14, 2020. https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/09/kill-chain-in-the-sky-with-data-armys-project-convergence.

14. Norah O’Donnell, Navy counters Houthi Red Sea attacks in its first major battle at sea of the 21st century, June 23, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/navy-counters-houthi-red-sea-attacks-in-its-first-major-battle-at-sea-of-21st-century-60-minutes-transcript.

15. “Autonomy In Weapon Systems.” https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.

16. Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, “Technological Leadership: Combining Research and Education for Advantage at Sea,” USNI Proceedings, accessed on March 22, 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/february/technological-leadership-combining-research-and-education.

17. “Education for Sea Power Report.” https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302021/-1/-1/1/E4SFINALREPORT.PDF.

18. Gates, William R., Maruyama, Xavier K., Powers, John P., Rosenthal, Richard E., and Cooper, Alfred W. M. “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools: The NFS Faculty Critique of CNA’s Report.” Monterey, 1998. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA358184.pdf#:~:text=there%20is%20a%20low%20utilization%20rate%20(approximately,highest%20per%2Dstudent%20expenditure%20relative%20to%20other%20%22.

19. “Marine Corps Graduate Education Program (MCGEP).” Accessed November 19, 2023. https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCO%201524.1.pdf?ver=2019-06-03-083458-743.

20. Scott Humr and Emily Hastings, Old Wine in New Wine Skins: Marine Corps technical talent requires a new approach, Marine Corps Gazette, June 2024.

21. “Total Force Structure Process.” https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/MCO%205311.1E%20z.pdf.

22. Novelly, Thomas, Beynon, Steve, Lawrence, Drew F., and Toropin, Konstantin.” Big Bonuses, Relaxed Policies, New Slogan: None of It Saved the Military from a Recruiting Crisis in 2023.” Accessed November 13, 2023. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/10/13/big-bonuses-relaxed-policies-new-slogan-none-of-it-saved-military-recruiting-crisis-2023.html.

23. Bray, Bill. “The Navy information warfare communities’ road to serfdom.” Accessed October 23, 2023. https://cimsec.org/navy-information-warfares-road-to-serfdom.

24. “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.” Washington, DC, 2021. https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf, p. 3.

25. Nissen, Mark E., Simona L. Tick, and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States. “Understanding and retaining talent in the Information Warfare Community.” Technical Report NPS-17-002. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (February 2017), 2017. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060196.pdf

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Dec. 13, 2021) An unmanned MQ-25 aircraft rests aboard the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brandon Roberson)