By Alex Crosby

The 1778 French entry into the American War for Independence imposed several strategic conundrums for the British that fatally impaired chances of victory. First, French entry initiated a pattern of European opportunism to challenge British global hegemony, specifically with the cooperative involvement of France and Spain. Second, peripheral theaters in the West Indies, India, and Europe diffused British naval forces and strained limited manpower, devastating the British capability to conduct land warfare successfully. Finally, French entry bolstered American international legitimacy and domestic determination, which prevented Britain from regaining the strategic initiative. Ultimately, these combined challenges had adverse effects that made any remaining chance of British victory impossible.

European Opportunism

In the years leading up to its entry into the war, France aligned strategic resources to capitalize on opportunities that challenged British hegemony, particularly in the maritime domain. The French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Vergennes, spearheaded ambitions to restore France to its perceived rightful dominant place in Europe by attacking British influence abroad instead of the historical strategy of targeting Britain itself.¹ Additionally, both the French Director-General of Finance and Secretary of State for the Navy, Jacques Necker and Gabriel de Sartine, respectively, established policy decisions from 1774-1780 that supported France’s ability to pay for domestic war support, including the robust reformation of its naval forces.² This preparation allowed France to be generally well suited to confront British naval forces, a physical representation of British hegemony, and directly contributed to British defeats in the maritime domain.

Following the commencement of the war, France identified the unique opportunity this far-off conflict presented for restoring order and balance to European power dynamics, which would also weaken British military successes. Specifically, the strained state that British forces were in following the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns provided the ideal timing for the French to enter the war. While Britain was considering negotiations to cease hostilities after these two campaign failures, France sought to prolong the war for its own benefit.³ France had long desired a revengeful opportunity to damage Britain in a manner that would increase maritime and political superiority in France’s favor.⁴ The tyranny of distance associated with European conflict in North America was capitalized on by France and continued to be a monumental struggle for Britain.

France’s entry into the war placed it in the unique position of being able to leverage American Revolutionary aims for independence as the catalyst for its grand strategy to challenge British hegemony and defeat it when opportunities presented themselves. Although France had expressed genuine interest in the American colonies seeking independence, this disturbance ultimately served France as a lever to restore global colonial balance and French influence.⁵ France embodied its role as a catalyst for challenging British hegemony and, in doing so, spurred Spain and Holland into later cooperation to ensure British victory in the American War for Independence would be impossible.

Motivated by decades of simmering retaliation and individual self-identification as the rightful European hegemon, France’s entry into the war forced Britain into a defensive maritime fight that prevented victory after 1778. Since 1763, the French-led House of Bourbon had been conducting robust shipbuilding efforts with the anticipation of likely conflict with Britain’s notoriously strong naval fleet. Unburdened by any land warfare entanglements in Europe, the House of Bourbon majorly oriented its resources towards increasing its combined maritime power.⁶ By 1775, France and Spain’s relative combined naval power exceeded Britain by approximately 25 percent and continued to grow throughout the remainder of the war.⁷ This prioritization of the maritime domain forced Britain into a strategic defensive posture, with alternating concerns between the North American land campaigns and countering Bourbon maritime threats across the globe.⁸

Peripheral Theaters

French entry into the American War for Independence created pervasive and politically deadly dilemmas for British control of its far-flung naval bases and ports across the globe.⁹ Except for the Spanish-controlled naval shipbuilding port of Havana, overseas locations for European countries were typically resource deficient and required significant garrison forces to maintain order.¹⁰ The vast distances and garrison requirements complicated British efforts to counter French attempts at harassment, isolation, or invasion. Due to French threats to British colonial garrison forces and the maritime sea lines of communication between them, Britain reoriented its forces and resources towards France and decreased allocations to combating the American colonialists.¹¹ Britain eventually further ensured its strategic defeat with its declaration of hostilities on Holland. France capitalized on the resulting Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and gained a critical extension of control into the Indian Ocean and West Indies.¹² This unification of European powers, led by France, signaled a shift in global British control and turned the weight of Britain’s colonial possessions won during the Seven Year’s War in 1763 into an overwhelmingly taxing drain that prevented the British from bringing its full combat potential to bear at the locations of its choosing.¹³

France’s entry also led to the defense of Britain becoming the primary strategic objective when threats of attack from the House of Bourbon culminated between 1778-1780.¹⁴ In particular, the British Admiralty tended to be riveted by fears of potential invasion and over-insured home waters with British naval forces that could have proved decisive elsewhere.¹⁵ This fear was further flamed as Britain entered hostilities without any continental allies.¹⁶ Despite focusing maritime forces in its home waters, the British navy would have had no legitimate chance against a combined Franco-Spanish naval fleet if they had pursued a determined invasion of Britain. Britain’s shift from offensive operations in the American colonies, King George’s original strategic objective, to defensive operations displayed the genuinely destructive nature of French entry into the war.

Due to this refocusing towards Europe, Britain overly fixated on French naval dockyards in their misguided pursuit of a decisive naval engagement.¹⁷ The First Lord of the Admiralty, John Montagu, preferred concentration of the British naval fleet in Europe to force the House of Bourbon alliance to reallocate their respective naval forces from North America and the West Indies. However, the British navy lacked proper military intelligence on the intentions of enemy fleet movements.¹⁸ This intelligence gap resulted in the British fleet predominately failing to locate and engage the House of Bourbon naval forces. Additionally, France exploited its geographical position to facilitate an increasing operation focusing on guerre de course to harass British shipping.¹⁹ This missed opportunity of British naval forces countering France at sea allowed the French to operate with general freedom of action and inflict terminally damaging economic and military costs on Britain.

Bolstered Americanism

American Revolution leaders had framed their political narrative as a legitimate protest movement with traditional values grounded in English law and classical political philosophy to protect against British accusations and attract powerful European political and intellectual elites’ support.²⁰ This political narrative would result in an increasing European acknowledgment of American Revolution legitimacy in the international system, albeit initially limited. Additionally, the radical changes in principles, opinion, sentiments, and affections of people from the republican ideals in the Declaration of Independence improved American legitimacy and furthered domestic determination. The American Revolution leadership hoped that a potential French recognition of an established United States of America would pave the way for other European nations to join the war and understand the long-term economic benefits of a British defeat.²¹ By incorporating principles of English society into their cause, the American revolutionaries had created a brilliant situation where British resentment fueled a growing fire of emboldened Americanism. Having been satisfactorily impressed by the intricate efforts of the American Revolution leadership like Benjamin Franklin, France became the spark that lit the eternal fire of American determination to defeat Britain.²²

American leadership had long depended on France’s entry into the war and recognized the significance it would have on inhibiting Britain’s chance of victory. Even in the darkest moments after conflict initiation, George Washington remained faithfully committed that a French entry would inevitably occur. Specifically, Washington understood that the strategic complication of Britain fighting a land battle in the American colonies and contending with French naval forces across the globe would ensure a British defeat.²³ American leadership hoped that the British failure during the Saratoga Campaign would be a turning point for French war support, which proved valid with France’s entry shortly afterward.²⁴ Further hopes of a more meaningful alliance and a long-awaited desire to decisively defeat the British would come to fruition in August 1781 at the Battle of Yorktown with a sixteen thousand man-strong combined force of French and American troops.²⁵

France’s entry also brought tangible aid to the American colonists that ensured war efforts could continue and drain Britain’s overseas land combat potential. French military leaders identified that the American colonists organically possessed relatively proficient skills with handling weapons and that they maintained the ability to fight in the near-limitless space across the American colonies. Additionally, France perceived the American colonists as being fearless of losing cities as they had no legitimate political, moral, or industrial foundation for military efforts, unlike the cities of Europe.²⁶ This unique degree of American colonial resolve to reach war termination in their favor spurred on French, Spanish, and Dutch military aid in the forms of gunpowder, loans, and various equipment.²⁷ Specific to the French, the first shipment crossed the Atlantic Ocean just after conflict initiation in 1776 clandestinely through a fabricated commercial entity and continued until war termination.²⁸ The tangible aid that came with French entry, combined with the character of American warfighting, sapped British land forces of necessary combat potential.

In addition to tangible military aid, France provided a maritime-based capability to project power shore and inflict military costs on the British. While the American colonists focused almost exclusively on land warfare to drain British military resources, France focused its military efforts at sea.²⁹ This French naval strategy ideally supported land operations and had been doctrinally implemented with the anticipation of a potential war with Britain in the American colonies.³⁰ The September 1779 French fleet bombardment of Savannah displayed this ability against British land targets, and although limited in tactical success, contributed to furthering American determination against Britain.³¹ Following French entry, British naval and land combat potential in North America would never recover to 1776 levels.³²

Although traditional American naval action was limited during the American War for Independence, French entry bolstered American privateering against British shipping and the land pressuring of naval bases, providing morale boosts that kept American colonial determination strong. Before there was a French naval presence on the Atlantic Coast, British sea control was locally uncontested and prevented consistent privateering near the coastal waters.³³ American privateering increased and challenged British maritime security efforts once French naval forces provided limited sea control.³⁴ The presence of Comte d’Estaing’s ships forced Britain to abandon blockade efforts, which dramatically increased opportunities for privateering and the flow of European goods shipments.³⁵ This privateering went practically uncontested by the British for the remainder of the war and highlighted the general decrease in British maritime superiority upon French war entry.³⁶ Additionally, French entry spurred American determination to put pressure on and control the naval hubs of Boston, Narraganset Bay, and New York.³⁷ The threat of privateering and loss of strategically important naval bases in North America, enabled by the French, directly contributed to overall British defeat in the American War for Independence.

Contrarian Viewpoint

Some might argue that the House of Bourbon alliance was fragmented between drastically different political objectives, leading to opportunities for Britain’s exploitation and regaining the initiative towards achieving favorable war termination. This fragmentation is supported by French awareness of the necessity for Spain to provide resources for a combined naval force to place the British naval fleet at risk. Likewise, Spain was exceptionally aware that France depended on their involvement and actively leveraged this to steer the House of Bourbon alliance to achieve its land seizure objectives. Spain had specific war objectives of seizing Minorca, Gibraltar, and Jamaica from British control but was generally less committed to holistically orienting strategic resources towards successful operational execution.³⁸ Additionally, Spain contrasted France in that it had no intentions of supporting the Americans or recognizing their moves towards independence.³⁹ Finally, Spanish political resolve for conflict was limited and nearly led to withdrawal from the war following Spanish failure at Gibraltar.⁴⁰ This vulnerable situation required France to direct resources to maintain a particular strategic objective of preventing Spanish capitulation from hindering French benefit or enabling a British victory.⁴¹

Despite these contrary views, these opposing objectives were overcome by an overall common unity to challenge British hegemony and cause culminating burdens. Neither France nor Spain were aggressively opposed to each other’s objectives and successfully found compromise to leverage each other’s military advantages. In particular, Spanish renewed efforts to pressure Britain in the West Indies allowed France to increase maritime and power projection operations in North America.⁴² France and Spain were deeply bound by desires for reprisal against British actions several decades prior and held sentiments of European rightfulness to supersede British hegemony.⁴³

Additionally, others might argue that British naval forces were doctrinally and capability superior to their French equivalents, which could have led to a British victory. In general, British naval forces were able to maintain a degree of local sea control around their sea lines of communication, thus ensuring the strategic sustainment of its North American land forces. Likewise, the British were confident in their naval superiority and assessed that one or two decisive maritime engagements would have terminally altered the threat of the Franco-Spanish naval fleet and regained the complete strategic initiative in British favor.⁴⁴

While this perspective holds some merit, British strategic decisions like those made by George Germaine, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, had severely limited British maritime strategy.⁴⁵ British fears of upsetting France and British taxpayers that response to the American rebellion was a prelude to invading the French West Indies led to limited naval mobilization in 1775. These limitations were also coupled with broad navy funding cuts and rules of engagement additions that dictated there be no interception of French ships carrying munitions and supplies to the American colonies. These measures ultimately negated any possibility of a successful blockade on the Atlantic Coast being effectively implemented.⁴⁶

Additionally, the French recognized the immense risks of becoming involved in a decisive naval battle with the British and instead focused efforts on attacking seaborne trade, launching land assaults against colonial possessions, enhancing French overseas control, and escorting French trade.⁴⁷ Compounding the problem of France not being a cooperative target set, the British failed to internally coordinate intelligence of French and Spanish naval dockyards, which led to the House of Bourbon operating with near impunity across the Atlantic Ocean.⁴⁸ With French entry pressing Britain into an overly defensive posture, British naval forces became too burdened by global mission tasking to guarantee local sea control of its Atlantic Ocean sea lines of communications.⁴⁹

Finally, the British would have ultimately had to prioritize the North American theater over its other colonies to mitigate the risk posed by the combined French-Spanish naval forces. This prioritization would have suicidally sacrificed British economic priorities in other colonies, such as the West Indies, which had become a focal point of French maritime operations.⁵⁰ Likewise, British naval focus on protecting the homeland was predicated on poor strategic assumptions that France intended to conduct an amphibious landing. Although there were discussions within the House of Bourbon to conduct such an invasion, this strategy was smartly abandoned for a more appropriate increase in maritime trade interdiction that would place Britain at greater strategic risk. Additionally, the British land forces in North America contended with unparalleled exterior lines of communication that measured more than three thousand miles across the Atlantic Ocean.⁵¹ This vast distance required overseas locations, with corresponding garrison forces, that Britain could not maintain after French entry.⁵² Ultimately, French entry into the American War for Independence in 1778 negated any possibility of Britain achieving victory. 

Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, an active duty naval intelligence officer, began his career as a surface warfare officer. His assignments have included the USS Lassen (DDG-82), USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, with multiple deployments supporting naval expeditionary and special warfare commands. He is a Maritime Advanced Warfighting School–qualified maritime operational planner and an intelligence operations warfare tactics instructor. He holds master’s degrees from the American Military University and the Naval War College.

Endnotes

[1] Pritchard, James. “French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal.” Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 86-87.

[2] Ibid., 85.

[3] Ferling, John. Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015: 207.

[4] Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890: 510-513

[5] “French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal.” 88.

[6] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 505.

[7] O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013: 343.

[8] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 508.

[9] Ibid., 511.

[10] Ibid., 520.

[11] Ibid., 520.

[12] Ibid., 521.

[13] Jasanoff, Maya. Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. New York: Knopf, 2011: 24.

[14] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[15] Mackesy, Piers. “British Strategy in the War of American Independence.” Yale Review, vol. 52 (1963): 555.

[16] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 334.

[17] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 526.

[18] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 333-334.

[19] Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Introductory” and “Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.” In Mahan on Naval Strategy. John B. Hattendorf, ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015: 33

[20] Genest, Marc. “The Message Heard ‘Round the World.” In Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates about War and Revolution. Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, S.C.M. Paine, eds. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019: 10.

[21] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[22] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 114.

[23] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[24] Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. 40.

[25] Ibid., 52.

[26] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 541.

[27] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[28] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[29] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 508.

[30] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 91.

[31] Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. 44.

[32] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[33] Ibid., 333-334.

[34] Ibid., 343.

[35] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 93.

[36] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 209.

[37] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 520.

[38] Ibid., 510.

[39] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 87.

[40] Ibid., 94.

[41] Ibid., 96-97.

[42] Ibid., 99.

[43] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 509.

[44] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 554.

[45] Ibid., 548.

[46] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 13-14.

[47] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 92.

[48] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 346-347.

[49] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 541.

[50] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 513.

[51] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 543.

[52] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 515.

Featured Image: Battle of the Virginia Capes, 5 September 1781. Oil on canvas by v. Zveg, 1962, depicting the French fleet (at left), commanded by Vice Admiral the Comte de Grasse, engaging the British fleet (at right) under Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Graves off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. (Courtesy of the U.S. Navy Art Collection, U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph)

By James Wirtz

As great power competition becomes an increasingly grim reality, senior officers are coming to terms with the end of a globally permissive, power projection environment. Strategists and planners can no longer assume that limited naval forces in theater can transit to some crisis epicenter and influence events by threatening or projecting power ashore with little interference.¹ While this operational reality has been in the works for some time, its impact is only now reverberating across various Navy communities, raising the specter of profound disruption of long-standing procedures and the obsolescence of familiar capabilities.

Several emerging warfighting concepts also shape today’s Navy operations, adding further complexity. The quest to develop distributed maritime operations – that is, to disperse long-range fires, sensors, communications, and command and control nodes across platforms separated by significant distances – is an ongoing project intended to defeat opposing anti-access and area denial capabilities.² The “One Atlantic” initiative, by contrast, is intended to transcend the command and control seams that exist between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command to increase de facto availability of maritime assets for European contingencies.³ In the Pacific, non-traditional sea denial capabilities, so-called “hellscape” swarms of autonomous platforms, have become a centerpiece of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s plan to defeat a cross-strait assault on the Island of Taiwan.⁴

This operational churn is a healthy reaction to the waves of techno-strategic change confronting the Navy. Nevertheless, it complicates efforts for Navy leaders to describe the maritime force’s outsized contribution to the Joint Force and today’s Joint Warfighting Concept. These competing operational initiatives and maritime concepts, however, are primarily internal Navy matters – the Joint Force is more concerned with the operational effects and strategic impact the Navy provides rather than the specific processes behind them. Additionally, since these operational concepts focus on warfighting, they fail to address the movement of U.S. defense strategy towards a more robust deterrent posture.

Eventually, the Navy will develop a more pervasive operational concept that reflects emergent techno-strategic realities. Until then, it needs to identify how the Navy of today and tomorrow will help deter great power war. The Navy needs to explain to a broader audience what it is trying to do – not how it is trying to do it. The Navy must identify its contribution to the emerging U.S. deterrent strategy. Synchronization of competing warfighting concepts can then follow in strategy’s wake.

The Navy’s Contribution to Deterrence Today

How does the Navy contribute to the U.S. deterrence posture from both a regional and global standpoint? Although the Biden administration introduced the notion of “integrated deterrence” into the strategic lexicon in 2022, Navy officials, academics, and defense observers have been relatively silent about the Navy’s contribution to deterrence in today’s techno-strategic setting.⁵ The integrated deterrence concept is simple enough: “In a world of multiple adversaries, emerging technologies, new domains of warfare, and globalized economic ties, deterrence requires a broader approach than traditional military methods alone.”

The new concept addresses these developments by calling for a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance strategy that utilizes both non-kinetic and kinetic deterrent threats and capabilities. Integrated deterrence is ambitious; there is no formula to integrate the way these domains, agencies, and allies contribute to deterrence.⁶ Although the policy and academic response to the notion of integrated deterrence has been modest, virtually no one participating in this discussion has deemed it necessary to describe the Navy’s contribution to national security as strategic, or the role the Navy would play in an integrated deterrence strategy. This last observation should disturb naval strategists.

The Navy can make two key contributions to deterrence that signal to friend and foe alike the U.S. capability and willingness to make good on its diplomatic and military commitments. These contributions to deterrence take the form of a bi-modal deterrent strategy and concept of operations that draws a distinction between sea control and sea denial forces.

Sea Control

Across the conflict spectrum, the Navy’s sea control capability signals that the United States is ready to uphold its deterrence policies and to assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their defense. Come what may, the U.S. Navy will maintain global communications with allies and partners, preventing the isolation of key friends, countering coercion, and facilitating the movement of forces and materials to conflict regions. James H. Bergeron, for instance, describes how sea control plays an important role in bolstering NATO’s deterrent posture:

“The maritime dimension of NATO is a spectrum and continuum; a strategic unity that links the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS) across the Atlantic, the North Atlantic and GIUK Gap, the Norwegian Sea, the Arctic passages to the Pole, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. But also, beyond that, to the global seas and oceans that feed our trade and commerce . . .. the seas matter tactically due to the potential threat of sea-based missile attack on Allied ships or indeed land targets. It matters operationally in the ability of an adversary to disrupt SLOCs between North America and Europe and within the NATO Area of Responsibility. And it matters politically and strategically as the symbol of our essential connectedness as an Alliance.”⁷

America has global deterrent commitments, and its friends and allies are near great powers that are increasingly capable and belligerent. Sea control demonstrates that the United States will always be able to influence worldwide events and that opponents will not succeed in efforts to isolate allies and partners. Sea control is the glue that binds America’s alliances together.

Sea Denial

The Navy’s sea denial capability, which exists both in a day-alert and, if necessary, a generated-alert status, signals to all concerned that the United States is unwilling to cede the opening move in a nascent conflict or fait accompli to its adversary. Put simply, the U.S. Navy will always be prepared to disrupt hostile actions, and that the Navy’s response will be geared to the warning time available (whether that is hours, days, or weeks). A ready sea denial capability bolsters deterrence by compelling the adversary to anticipate active resistance, and to assess continuously evolving sea denial capabilities. The ongoing improvement of the sea denial force injects doubts into the opponent’s planning process – one can never be sure if some exquisite operation planned against a specific capability has accounted for the latest innovation. A ready sea denial capability reduces the attractiveness of attempting a fait accompli, which by definition would shift the onus of escalation onto Washington. Sea denial suggests that war will commence when aggression begins, not weeks or months later in the form of a long attritional campaign to return to the status quo ante bellum.

Sea denial deters aggression by complicating opponents’ planning, by placing the onus for initiating a significant conflict on the opponent, and by holding the line until the full weight of the Joint Force can be brought to bear in battle. A ready sea denial capability reduces the likelihood that an opponent might come to believe that U.S. officials might choose not to respond to some fait accompli – sea denial suggests to the opponent that there is no way to sidestep an active opponent, achieve limited objectives, and plan for the best.

A Bi-modal Maritime Deterrent

The concept of a bi-modal deterrent strategy not only aligns maritime strategy with today’s political demands, it also suggests a way to organize the operational and tactical churn within the Navy. When placed within the context of a maritime deterrent strategy, the Navy’s operational concepts no longer appear to be competitive but more complementary. The Hellscape initiative contributes to deterrence by providing sea denial, while the One Atlantic initiative bolsters the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deterrence in Europe by increasing Atlantic sea control and even force projection onto the continent of Europe. 

Distributed maritime operations (DMO) could be seen as increasing both sea denial and sea control capabilities by harnessing the offensive capability of far-flung forces, while minimizing their vulnerability to hostile action. Most importantly, a maritime deterrent strategy that emphasizes bi-modal operations gives renewed emphasis to the Navy’s contribution to strategic deterrence and the role of the Joint Force in deterring aggression. This is the primary techno-strategic change that is unsettling Navy planners today, that is, the shift from globally permissive, power projection environment that emphasized warfighting to a world where deterrence dominates U.S. defense policy. 

Conclusion

The bi-modal, sea denial and sea control concept is not new. Wayne Hughes described the idea in a seminal article published in the Naval War College Review in 2007.⁸ Today, a bi-modal fleet is being advanced as an operational concept that would allow the Navy to use new technologies to deal with the proliferation of anti-access and area denial threats, while putting the existing Fleet to good use to achieve sea control.⁹ A maritime deterrent strategy, particularly one suited to today’s great power competition, can leverage the bi-modal concept to synchronize the many ideas and capabilities that are emerging in response to the changing techno-strategic environment. The proliferation of these innovations is a positive sign. It demonstrates that strategists, planners, and developers are searching for new ways to incorporate new capabilities and ideas to deal with increasingly significant threats. Nevertheless, this burst of creativity requires an overarching strategy to identify objectives and how new and existing capabilities might be used to obtain them. A Maritime Deterrent Strategy that adapts a bi-modal operational concept of operations would serve as a useful blueprint to synchronize the Navy’s response to today’s security setting.¹⁰

James J. Wirtz is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

References

[1] James J. Wirtz, Jeffrey E. Kline, and James A. Russell, “A Maritime Conversation with America,” Orbis, Vol. 66, Iss. 2, 2022, pp. 166-183.

[2] “Report to Congress on Navy Distributed Maritime Operations,” Congressional Research Service, 3 July 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/download/IF/IF12599/IF12599.pdf/

[3] Meagan Eckstein, “Fleet forces chief wants to make a smaller Navy more lethal,” Defense News, 3 May 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/05/03/fleet-forces-chief-wants-to-make-a-smaller-navy-more-lethal/

[4] John Grady, “’Hellscape’ Swarms Could be a Cost-Effective Taiwan Defense, Report Says,” USNI News, 1 July 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/07/01/hellscape-swarms-could-be-as-cost-effective-taiwan-defense-says-report

[5] See The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington: 12 October 2022), 8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf (whitehouse.gov); and 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, Annex 1 to 2022 US National Defense Strategy (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 27 October 2022), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1183514.pdf, 

[6] James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Wanted: A Strategy to Integrate Deterrence,” Defense and Security Analysis, pp. 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943

[7] James H. Bergeron, “Reflecting on One Year of War: A Transformational Year in Maritime NATO,” Center for Maritime Strategy, February 17, 2023. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/reflecting-on-one-year-of-war-a-transformational-year-in-maritime-nato/

[8] Wayne P. Hughes, “A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60: No. 2, Article 5, 2007. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/5

[9] James J. Wirtz, Jeffrey E. Kline and James A. Russell, The U.S. Navy and the Rise of Great Power Competition: Looking Beyond the Western Pacific (London: Routledge, 2024), pp. 129-143.

[10] The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect the position of any government, government agency, commercial firm, or other organization.

Featured Image: SASEBO, JAPAN (Sept. 19, 2024) Amphibious transport dock ship USS San Diego (LPD 22) arrives pierside at Commander Fleet Activities Sasebo as part of a scheduled home port shift to Sasebo, Japan. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Darian Lord)

This article is an authorized republication from the Center for International Strategic Studies. It can be read in its original form here.

By Muhammad Azam Khan

It is essential to know how a military doctrine differs from a maritime doctrine. The former embodies hard military power with defined set of principles for its application. The latter denotes sum total of sea power, the physical, demographic, geographic and military resources derived from or related to the sea. The sea power of a nation involves but is not limited to, mercantile marine (commercial shipping), marine or civil maritime industries, ports, harbors, shipyards, maritime zones (EEZ) with marine resources therein, seabed minerals, navies, coastguards, and where relevant includes contribution of land and air forces of a country. It further implies power both, at and from the sea. To sum up, a maritime doctrine is a combination of soft as well as hard power or the aggregate of a nation’s ability, inclusive of policy apparatus, to ensure control and safeguard of its maritime zones and other maritime interests during peace and war.

Put another way, while a military doctrine involves application of kinetic power alone, a maritime doctrine by contrast encompasses all elements of sea power including economic dimension (soft power) besides maritime military (combat) power (vested in navies, coast guard, coastal police etc.). A maritime doctrine must allude to national maritime interests’ preservation and protection of which both, at home and abroad is entrusted to a navy. Unlike an army or air force with combat operations restricted broadly within the geographical limits of a country, a navy largely operates in international waters just outside 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast and could carry a nation’s flag to farthest reaches of the planet. For the record, there is also a huge body of international maritime law that governs maritime operations which must also be complied with.

Founded on historical experiences and changes occurring in strategic environment, a doctrine serves as benchmark in policy making. A defense policy issued by the government dictates and drives the two elements of a military (land, air and naval) strategy i.e. developmental and employment strategies. In most countries while the title “maritime doctrine” has been retained, more often than not it is the respective navies that have lead and composed such a document. Therefore, Australian, British and Indian maritime doctrines have been devised by navies in each country.

A doctrine widely differs from Fleet orders, Compendiums, Temporary Memoranda, etc. In the Pakistan Navy, these are defined in Navy Regulations (NR) of 1988 as:

“Orders and instructions of the Chief of the Naval Staff on day to day administrative matters in the Navy. These are in addition to various books of regulations, PBRs, Navy Instructions and Joint Services Instructions. Government letters may also be reproduced in Fleet Orders.” 

The first edition of Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) was unveiled in 2018 by Mr. Arif Alvi, the President of Pakistan. The ceremony was held at Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), the premier seat of learning in Pakistan Navy. The ownership of the Maritime Doctrine was and still continues to rest with Pakistan Navy War College. It was at this institute that over a period of some six years several drafts were constructed, extensively studied and deliberated by a range of accomplished practitioners, scholars as well as reputed international maritime experts before the first edition was formally authorized for release. The issue of ‘jointness’ with other services was widely contemplated as well. In Pakistan the joint (tri) services operations is nevertheless a progressing phenomenon. The first edition of MDP consequently restricts itself to brief discourse on peacetime and wartime operations by Pakistan navy.

The role of Pakistan navy during 1971 war is worth recalling here. It was PN submarine Ghazi which kept the bulk of Indian navy’s eastern fleet confined to fringes of Bay of Bengal until its own sinking. Another PN submarine Hangor meanwhile turned the strategic tide in favour of Pakistan in North Arabian Sea after it sank an Indian frigate Khukri. All this meant pushing the Indian navy to a defensive posture. These are classical cases in history which aided in improving overall freedom of action to the benefit of Pakistan’s military.

Given the cold war dynamics and a colonial legacy of so called martial races joining the armed forces, Pakistan has perennially suffered from what is called “maritime blindness” (also sea blindness). It is an affliction in which large segments of general population and governments remain ignorant of maritime future and matters related to oceans. It is not specific to any one country. Many advance countries too suffer from this disorder.

There was a widely held belief in the Pakistan Navy that despite its enormous contributions both, during war as well as in peace, the service is not well understood even at the inter-services level let alone in country’s north. The inextricable link between import driven national economy underpinned by sea based commerce particularly, critically important fossil fuels (oil, LNG, and coal) was never understood in major parts of the country. As a measure, at an average 2.5 ships disembarked energy related cargo at Pakistani ports on daily basis in 2020, according to credible statistics. In a crisis, without such fuel reshipments, the strategic reserves could deplete rapidly. In the event, no military tank, fighter aircraft, or other combatant will be able to mobilize.

Major shifts in strategic environment following events of September 2001 reinforced the belief that Pakistan navy must come up with a document which quintessentially serves dual purpose: educational cum informational as well as an introductory doctrinal source. The “purpose” of first edition of MDP is accordingly defined at the onset: “to provide understanding to all stakeholders on the distinctive attributes of national maritime sector and the role of Pakistan navy in national security” (pg. 3).

The first edition of MDP was formulated as part of maritime and naval outreach initiative by Pakistan navy. It provides introductory narrative for in-country and overseas readership. The elementary knowledge on the national maritime sector and variety of naval features is meant for academia, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy besides others. It is predominantly an “informative” endeavor to “educate” stakeholders and interested parties. As such MDP had little to demonstrate classical military doctrinal approach and embarked upon a course to be more “informational” and less “doctrinal”. The first five chapters in the MDP educate a reader with essentials like military instruments of sea power, distinctive characteristics of maritime environment, brief history of developments in Indian Ocean, various dimensions of maritime environment besides Pakistan’s maritime interests and myriad non-traditional threats and challenges like piracy, trafficking etc. which infest the maritime commons. This is of course beyond the pale of hard-core military threats that endure.

On the issue of ‘doctrinal and strategic’ ambiguity, readers may note that Pakistan’s overall strategic posture is one that remains ambiguous and indistinct for well-known reasons. Pakistan has not formally published any strategic doctrine either. The available material is only through formal statements of top officials rendered in national, international foras including local and overseas think tanks of repute. Weapons development is meanwhile an ongoing process in strategic posturing. Also, at the time of publication of first edition, strategic developments like AUKUS, Quad, BECA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and MSRA had not occurred. The geopolitical landscape too was quite different. The end of war in Yemen and Somali piracy, emergence of Israel as a player in the Indian Ocean, withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, INS Arihant, the Indian navy SSBN completing first deterrent patrol etc. are subsequent developments. Though apportionment of share in defense budget has undoubtedly been a concern for Pakistan navy, it is nowhere central to MDP. Given the innate dynamic attributes of strategic environment, MDP was envisaged to be reviewed only after five years.

The second edition of MDP currently under process is intended to build on the inaugural edition. It will dilate on the roles of Pakistan navy; what it does at and from the sea in much more eloquent manner and greater depth. It will also provide stakeholders with an extensive insight into military strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and its influence upon Pakistan’s maritime interests. The new edition will expound blue economy and its relationship with maritime security. It will explain Gwadar port under CPEC and prospective regional connectivity that it importantly offers. The benchmark for new edition will be National Security Policy of 2022-2026.

The narrative appearing in some recent papers examining MDP and carried by prominent publications is more or less regurgitation of worn out clichés without any breakthrough or noteworthy research critique. If access to a primary source is available and is not availed, in this case (PNWC), it unquestionably runs counter to the spirit of research ethics.

Muhammad Azam Khan is a retired naval officer with over 47 years of experience as practitioner in the field of maritime security and nuclear research studies. He can be reached at [email protected].

Note: The views expressed in the article are those of the author and not necessarily that of Pakistan Navy or Pakistan Navy War College. The article aims to clarify some of the views expressed in, “Major power competition in the Indian Ocean and doctrinal development in Pakistan,” published in Comparative Strategy, Volume 42-Issue 4, authored by Dr. Khurram Iqbal & Muneeb Salman and, “Advocating by Doctrine: The Pakistan Navy’s Experience,” published by CIMSEC, October 16, 2023.

Featured Image: Pakistan navy frigate F-22P Zulfiquar visit to Port Klang, Malaysia. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

By Richard Rodgers

In an era marked by the complexities of global politics and evolving information landscapes, the role of military public affairs becomes increasingly significant in shaping and safeguarding a nation’s strategic interests. The United States, with its longstanding commitment to naval supremacy, recognizes the importance of effectively controlling the narrative surrounding its military actions. The concept of military public affairs, particularly in the context of U.S. naval supremacy, is the public facing image that controls the warfighter narrative, that holds both allies and adversaries accountable where the lines between truth and misinformation become blurred or even completely eroded. The ability to hold both adversaries and allies accountable is a crucial factor in maintaining U.S. naval dominance. The symbiotic relationship between military public affairs and naval power projection is imperative to generate a narrative control that can serve as a strategic tool for U.S. national security interests.

At its core, military public affairs disseminates information, manages perceptions, and the shapes narratives about military activities both domestic and international audiences. The U.S. Navy, as a key component of the country’s military apparatus, relies on effective public affairs strategies to not only inform the public but also to project strength and maintain influence on the global stage.

Naval supremacy, characterized by the ability to project power across oceans and dominate maritime spaces, requires more than just technological superiority: it necessitates the construction of narratives that underscore the importance and legitimacy of U.S. naval activities. These narratives not only serve to rally public support at home but also influence how foreign nations perceive and respond to U.S. naval operations. The intersection of military public affairs and naval supremacy is grounded in the recognition that perception and information can be as powerful as the hardware itself to maintain maritime dominance.

In the contemporary information landscape, the challenge of navigating competing narratives, especially when allies and competitors may not prioritize objective truth, poses a significant hurdle to effective military public affairs. While transparency and truthfulness remain ideals, strategic interests often necessitate molding narratives that may not always align with objective reality. In cases where the U.S. and its allies may have divergent interests, a unified narrative that serves U.S. strategic goals becomes paramount.

It is crucial to acknowledge that the deliberate manipulation or distortion of information can erode trust, both domestically and internationally. The ethical dimensions of military public affairs must be carefully balanced against the imperative of protecting national security interests and the objective reality and transparency deserved by the public both at home and abroad. This calls for a nuanced approach that requires a balance between narrative control and maintaining credibility.

Narrative control, despite its ethical complexities, provides the U.S. with a strategic instrument to maintain naval supremacy amidst divergent interests. Through skillful public affairs management, the U.S. Navy can shape perceptions of its capabilities, intentions, and achievements, which in turn influence allies and potential adversaries alike.

Effective military public affairs can contribute to deterrence by signaling resolve and capability. Through carefully curated narratives, the U.S. Navy can underscore its preparedness to defend its interests and respond decisively to any threat. Such narratives serve as a deterrent against potential adversaries and discourage hostile actions through conveyance of the perception of as the preeminent naval force.

In an era of information abundance, credibility is a sacred asset that cannot be sacrificed. Misinformation or deliberate manipulation, especially when uncovered, damages both public trust and international partnerships. To avoid erosion of credibility, military public affairs strategies should be underpinned by a commitment to accurate and responsible communication. The challenge of maintaining narrative control becomes particularly pronounced during times of crisis. While the impulse to shape narratives in favor of national interests remains strong, crises demand a degree of transparency to manage public perceptions effectively. To illustrate the complexities of military public affairs in the context of U.S. naval supremacy, two case studies can provide valuable insights: the First Gulf War during the early 1990s and the current disputes in the South China Sea.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. military engaged in comprehensive public affairs campaigns to shape the narrative surrounding its intervention in Kuwait. The portrayal of U.S. actions as a response to aggression and a defense of international norms served instrumental in building a coalition of international support. Public affairs carefully constructed a narrative to garner global backing, efforts to maintain credibility were challenged by controversies such as the reporting of “baby incubator” incidents, which were later debunked. This highlights the delicate dance between narrative control and ethical communication during conflict.

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve varying narratives from different nations involved, including U.S., its allies, partners, and competitors. The U.S. Navy conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region to challenge excessive maritime claims, maintaining a consistent narrative is crucial to strengthen alliances to uphold adherence to the norms set forth by the United Nations Conventions Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which helps counterbalance Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence. However, divergent interests among allies can complicate efforts to maintain a unified narrative, underscoring the challenge of narrative control in a multilateral context.

The realm of military public affairs is a multifaceted landscape where the necessity of narrative control intersects with the ethical imperative of truthfulness. In the pursuit of maintaining U.S. naval supremacy, the ability to shape narratives that align with strategic interests becomes an indispensable tool for projecting power, deterring adversaries, and building alliances. Yet, this must be tempered by a commitment to credibility and transparency, recognizing that the erosion of trust results in dire consequences. As the information landscape continues to evolve and geopolitical dynamics shift, the role of military public affairs in safeguarding U.S. naval dominance will remain crucial. The lessons from historical case studies underscore the need for careful calibration of narrative control and ethical communication. In an age where perception and information are as influential as military might, mastering the art of military public affairs will be a key to unlock U.S. naval supremacy in the 21st century.

Richard Rodgers previously served as a noncommissioned officer in U.S. Navy Public Affairs. He worked at the Creative Director for Navy Public Affairs Support Element East, the Navy’s premiere expeditionary public affairs command, Communications Director for Carrier Strike Group 10 Public Affairs, and a content developer at Defense Media Activity. He currently studies at Harvard University and works as a writer. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the position of any institution.

Featured Image: (Feb. 15, 2023) – Ships and aircraft from Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (NIMCSG) and Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (MKI ARG), with embarked 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), operate in formation in the South China Sea.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kenneth Lagadi)