Category Archives: Strategy

The Maritime Doctrine Of Pakistan – Setting The Record Straight

This article is an authorized republication from the Center for International Strategic Studies. It can be read in its original form here.

By Muhammad Azam Khan

It is essential to know how a military doctrine differs from a maritime doctrine. The former embodies hard military power with defined set of principles for its application. The latter denotes sum total of sea power, the physical, demographic, geographic and military resources derived from or related to the sea. The sea power of a nation involves but is not limited to, mercantile marine (commercial shipping), marine or civil maritime industries, ports, harbors, shipyards, maritime zones (EEZ) with marine resources therein, seabed minerals, navies, coastguards, and where relevant includes contribution of land and air forces of a country. It further implies power both, at and from the sea. To sum up, a maritime doctrine is a combination of soft as well as hard power or the aggregate of a nation’s ability, inclusive of policy apparatus, to ensure control and safeguard of its maritime zones and other maritime interests during peace and war.

Put another way, while a military doctrine involves application of kinetic power alone, a maritime doctrine by contrast encompasses all elements of sea power including economic dimension (soft power) besides maritime military (combat) power (vested in navies, coast guard, coastal police etc.). A maritime doctrine must allude to national maritime interests’ preservation and protection of which both, at home and abroad is entrusted to a navy. Unlike an army or air force with combat operations restricted broadly within the geographical limits of a country, a navy largely operates in international waters just outside 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast and could carry a nation’s flag to farthest reaches of the planet. For the record, there is also a huge body of international maritime law that governs maritime operations which must also be complied with.

Founded on historical experiences and changes occurring in strategic environment, a doctrine serves as benchmark in policy making. A defense policy issued by the government dictates and drives the two elements of a military (land, air and naval) strategy i.e. developmental and employment strategies. In most countries while the title “maritime doctrine” has been retained, more often than not it is the respective navies that have lead and composed such a document. Therefore, Australian, British and Indian maritime doctrines have been devised by navies in each country.

A doctrine widely differs from Fleet orders, Compendiums, Temporary Memoranda, etc. In the Pakistan Navy, these are defined in Navy Regulations (NR) of 1988 as:

“Orders and instructions of the Chief of the Naval Staff on day to day administrative matters in the Navy. These are in addition to various books of regulations, PBRs, Navy Instructions and Joint Services Instructions. Government letters may also be reproduced in Fleet Orders.” 

The first edition of Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) was unveiled in 2018 by Mr. Arif Alvi, the President of Pakistan. The ceremony was held at Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), the premier seat of learning in Pakistan Navy. The ownership of the Maritime Doctrine was and still continues to rest with Pakistan Navy War College. It was at this institute that over a period of some six years several drafts were constructed, extensively studied and deliberated by a range of accomplished practitioners, scholars as well as reputed international maritime experts before the first edition was formally authorized for release. The issue of ‘jointness’ with other services was widely contemplated as well. In Pakistan the joint (tri) services operations is nevertheless a progressing phenomenon. The first edition of MDP consequently restricts itself to brief discourse on peacetime and wartime operations by Pakistan navy.

The role of Pakistan navy during 1971 war is worth recalling here. It was PN submarine Ghazi which kept the bulk of Indian navy’s eastern fleet confined to fringes of Bay of Bengal until its own sinking. Another PN submarine Hangor meanwhile turned the strategic tide in favour of Pakistan in North Arabian Sea after it sank an Indian frigate Khukri. All this meant pushing the Indian navy to a defensive posture. These are classical cases in history which aided in improving overall freedom of action to the benefit of Pakistan’s military.

Given the cold war dynamics and a colonial legacy of so called martial races joining the armed forces, Pakistan has perennially suffered from what is called “maritime blindness” (also sea blindness). It is an affliction in which large segments of general population and governments remain ignorant of maritime future and matters related to oceans. It is not specific to any one country. Many advance countries too suffer from this disorder.

There was a widely held belief in the Pakistan Navy that despite its enormous contributions both, during war as well as in peace, the service is not well understood even at the inter-services level let alone in country’s north. The inextricable link between import driven national economy underpinned by sea based commerce particularly, critically important fossil fuels (oil, LNG, and coal) was never understood in major parts of the country. As a measure, at an average 2.5 ships disembarked energy related cargo at Pakistani ports on daily basis in 2020, according to credible statistics. In a crisis, without such fuel reshipments, the strategic reserves could deplete rapidly. In the event, no military tank, fighter aircraft, or other combatant will be able to mobilize.

Major shifts in strategic environment following events of September 2001 reinforced the belief that Pakistan navy must come up with a document which quintessentially serves dual purpose: educational cum informational as well as an introductory doctrinal source. The “purpose” of first edition of MDP is accordingly defined at the onset: to provide understanding to all stakeholders on the distinctive attributes of national maritime sector and the role of Pakistan navy in national security (pg. 3).

The first edition of MDP was formulated as part of maritime and naval outreach initiative by Pakistan navy. It provides introductory narrative for in-country and overseas readership. The elementary knowledge on the national maritime sector and variety of naval features is meant for academia, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy besides others. It is predominantly an “informative” endeavor to “educate” stakeholders and interested parties. As such MDP had little to demonstrate classical military doctrinal approach and embarked upon a course to be more “informational” and less “doctrinal”. The first five chapters in the MDP educate a reader with essentials like military instruments of sea power, distinctive characteristics of maritime environment, brief history of developments in Indian Ocean, various dimensions of maritime environment besides Pakistan’s maritime interests and myriad non-traditional threats and challenges like piracy, trafficking etc. which infest the maritime commons. This is of course beyond the pale of hard-core military threats that endure.

On the issue of ‘doctrinal and strategic’ ambiguity, readers may note that Pakistan’s overall strategic posture is one that remains ambiguous and indistinct for well-known reasons. Pakistan has not formally published any strategic doctrine either. The available material is only through formal statements of top officials rendered in national, international foras including local and overseas think tanks of repute. Weapons development is meanwhile an ongoing process in strategic posturing. Also, at the time of publication of first edition, strategic developments like AUKUS, Quad, BECA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and MSRA had not occurred. The geopolitical landscape too was quite different. The end of war in Yemen and Somali piracy, emergence of Israel as a player in the Indian Ocean, withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, INS Arihant, the Indian navy SSBN completing first deterrent patrol etc. are subsequent developments. Though apportionment of share in defense budget has undoubtedly been a concern for Pakistan navy, it is nowhere central to MDP. Given the innate dynamic attributes of strategic environment, MDP was envisaged to be reviewed only after five years.

The second edition of MDP currently under process is intended to build on the inaugural edition. It will dilate on the roles of Pakistan navy; what it does at and from the sea in much more eloquent manner and greater depth. It will also provide stakeholders with an extensive insight into military strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and its influence upon Pakistan’s maritime interests. The new edition will expound blue economy and its relationship with maritime security. It will explain Gwadar port under CPEC and prospective regional connectivity that it importantly offers. The benchmark for new edition will be National Security Policy of 2022-2026.

The narrative appearing in some recent papers examining MDP and carried by prominent publications is more or less regurgitation of worn out clichés without any breakthrough or noteworthy research critique. If access to a primary source is available and is not availed, in this case (PNWC), it unquestionably runs counter to the spirit of research ethics.

Muhammad Azam Khan is a retired naval officer with over 47 years of experience as practitioner in the field of maritime security and nuclear research studies. He can be reached at mazamkhan54@gmail.com.

Note: The views expressed in the article are those of the author and not necessarily that of Pakistan Navy or Pakistan Navy War College. The article aims to clarify some of the views expressed in, “Major power competition in the Indian Ocean and doctrinal development in Pakistan,published in Comparative Strategy, Volume 42-Issue 4, authored by Dr. Khurram Iqbal & Muneeb Salman and, Advocating by Doctrine: The Pakistan Navy’s Experience,” published by CIMSEC, October 16, 2023.

Featured Image: Pakistan navy frigate F-22P Zulfiquar visit to Port Klang, Malaysia. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Strategic Military Public Affairs: Safeguarding U.S. Naval Supremacy through Narrative Control

By Richard Rodgers

In an era marked by the complexities of global politics and evolving information landscapes, the role of military public affairs becomes increasingly significant in shaping and safeguarding a nation’s strategic interests. The United States, with its longstanding commitment to naval supremacy, recognizes the importance of effectively controlling the narrative surrounding its military actions. The concept of military public affairs, particularly in the context of U.S. naval supremacy, is the public facing image that controls the warfighter narrative, that holds both allies and adversaries accountable where the lines between truth and misinformation become blurred or even completely eroded. The ability to hold both adversaries and allies accountable is a crucial factor in maintaining U.S. naval dominance. The symbiotic relationship between military public affairs and naval power projection is imperative to generate a narrative control that can serve as a strategic tool for U.S. national security interests.

At its core, military public affairs disseminates information, manages perceptions, and the shapes narratives about military activities both domestic and international audiences. The U.S. Navy, as a key component of the country’s military apparatus, relies on effective public affairs strategies to not only inform the public but also to project strength and maintain influence on the global stage.

Naval supremacy, characterized by the ability to project power across oceans and dominate maritime spaces, requires more than just technological superiority: it necessitates the construction of narratives that underscore the importance and legitimacy of U.S. naval activities. These narratives not only serve to rally public support at home but also influence how foreign nations perceive and respond to U.S. naval operations. The intersection of military public affairs and naval supremacy is grounded in the recognition that perception and information can be as powerful as the hardware itself to maintain maritime dominance.

In the contemporary information landscape, the challenge of navigating competing narratives, especially when allies and competitors may not prioritize objective truth, poses a significant hurdle to effective military public affairs. While transparency and truthfulness remain ideals, strategic interests often necessitate molding narratives that may not always align with objective reality. In cases where the U.S. and its allies may have divergent interests, a unified narrative that serves U.S. strategic goals becomes paramount.

It is crucial to acknowledge that the deliberate manipulation or distortion of information can erode trust, both domestically and internationally. The ethical dimensions of military public affairs must be carefully balanced against the imperative of protecting national security interests and the objective reality and transparency deserved by the public both at home and abroad. This calls for a nuanced approach that requires a balance between narrative control and maintaining credibility.

Narrative control, despite its ethical complexities, provides the U.S. with a strategic instrument to maintain naval supremacy amidst divergent interests. Through skillful public affairs management, the U.S. Navy can shape perceptions of its capabilities, intentions, and achievements, which in turn influence allies and potential adversaries alike.

Effective military public affairs can contribute to deterrence by signaling resolve and capability. Through carefully curated narratives, the U.S. Navy can underscore its preparedness to defend its interests and respond decisively to any threat. Such narratives serve as a deterrent against potential adversaries and discourage hostile actions through conveyance of the perception of as the preeminent naval force.

In an era of information abundance, credibility is a sacred asset that cannot be sacrificed. Misinformation or deliberate manipulation, especially when uncovered, damages both public trust and international partnerships. To avoid erosion of credibility, military public affairs strategies should be underpinned by a commitment to accurate and responsible communication. The challenge of maintaining narrative control becomes particularly pronounced during times of crisis. While the impulse to shape narratives in favor of national interests remains strong, crises demand a degree of transparency to manage public perceptions effectively. To illustrate the complexities of military public affairs in the context of U.S. naval supremacy, two case studies can provide valuable insights: the First Gulf War during the early 1990s and the current disputes in the South China Sea.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. military engaged in comprehensive public affairs campaigns to shape the narrative surrounding its intervention in Kuwait. The portrayal of U.S. actions as a response to aggression and a defense of international norms served instrumental in building a coalition of international support. Public affairs carefully constructed a narrative to garner global backing, efforts to maintain credibility were challenged by controversies such as the reporting of “baby incubator” incidents, which were later debunked. This highlights the delicate dance between narrative control and ethical communication during conflict.

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve varying narratives from different nations involved, including U.S., its allies, partners, and competitors. The U.S. Navy conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region to challenge excessive maritime claims, maintaining a consistent narrative is crucial to strengthen alliances to uphold adherence to the norms set forth by the United Nations Conventions Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which helps counterbalance Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence. However, divergent interests among allies can complicate efforts to maintain a unified narrative, underscoring the challenge of narrative control in a multilateral context.

The realm of military public affairs is a multifaceted landscape where the necessity of narrative control intersects with the ethical imperative of truthfulness. In the pursuit of maintaining U.S. naval supremacy, the ability to shape narratives that align with strategic interests becomes an indispensable tool for projecting power, deterring adversaries, and building alliances. Yet, this must be tempered by a commitment to credibility and transparency, recognizing that the erosion of trust results in dire consequences. As the information landscape continues to evolve and geopolitical dynamics shift, the role of military public affairs in safeguarding U.S. naval dominance will remain crucial. The lessons from historical case studies underscore the need for careful calibration of narrative control and ethical communication. In an age where perception and information are as influential as military might, mastering the art of military public affairs will be a key to unlock U.S. naval supremacy in the 21st century.

Richard Rodgers previously served as a noncommissioned officer in U.S. Navy Public Affairs. He worked at the Creative Director for Navy Public Affairs Support Element East, the Navy’s premiere expeditionary public affairs command, Communications Director for Carrier Strike Group 10 Public Affairs, and a content developer at Defense Media Activity. He currently studies at Harvard University and works as a writer. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the position of any institution.

Featured Image: (Feb. 15, 2023) – Ships and aircraft from Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (NIMCSG) and Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (MKI ARG), with embarked 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), operate in formation in the South China Sea.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kenneth Lagadi)

Asymmetric Naval Strategies: Overcoming Power Imbalances to Contest Sea Control

By Alex Crosby

According to Julian Corbett, “[T]he object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”1 However, naval warfare innately favors stronger naval powers in their pursuit of command of the sea. This institutional bias can drive weaker naval powers to act in less traditional manners, with the effects bordering on dangerously destabilizing to the involved security environment. Likewise, weaker naval powers can become increasingly receptive to the establishment of innovative and unique options to achieve the relative parity necessary for contesting command of the sea.

First, weaker naval powers can use asymmetric naval warfare in the form of devastating technologies and surprise shifts in strategy. Second, weaker naval powers can leverage coalitions to increase relative combat power and threaten secondary theaters to diffuse the adversary’s combat power. Finally, weaker naval powers can inflict cumulative attrition along distant sea lines of communication. These options, singularly or together, can enable a weaker naval power to contest command of the sea against a stronger naval power.

Asymmetric Naval Warfare

A weaker naval power can use asymmetric naval warfare to contest the command of the sea through the integration of devastating technologies. For example, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese leveraged two unique warfighting capabilities to undermine relative Russian naval superiority. First, the Japanese Navy used naval mines to offensively damage or destroy Russian ships attempting to leave Port Arthur.2, 3 Additionally, the placement of mines provided a means of sea denial, allowing Japanese ships to contest and control the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula with limited demand for direct naval engagements.

Second, the Japanese Navy used destroyers armed with torpedoes in close-proximity attacks on the Russian battleships of Port Arthur.4 This asymmetric employment of small naval assets with lethal firepower proved to be a devastating surprise against Russian ships expecting significant force-on-force engagements. This technology combination, mines and torpedo-equipped destroyers, is an example of how a relatively weaker naval force can contest command of the sea, especially in littoral waters.

Another means of asymmetric warfare that a weaker naval power can leverage for contesting command of the sea is a surprise shift in strategy. An example of this is the strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare focused on commerce targets that the German Navy used during the early stages of the Second World War. Early in the conflict, Germany identified the sea lines of communication crossing the Atlantic Ocean from the United States as critical for continued Allied efforts in the European and North African theaters.5 Germany concentrated its well-trained and disciplined submarine force and associated combat power into wolf packs to target this vulnerability. The primary objective of these wolf packs was to attrit as much tonnage of Allied shipping as possible, with the desired effect of exceeding the rate at which the Allies could replace their respective shipping fleets.6, 7 Germany was able to have significant successes during the early stages of the war, particularly by focusing these wolf packs off the east coast of the United States. This placement and intensity of submarine forces instilled a corresponding fear into the American populace and directly contested command of the sea.8, 9

In the early period of the war, the German strategy was definitively effective against the desired target set. Thus, a strategy such as unrestricted submarine warfare can be particularly useful in contesting command of the sea when the adversary is unsensitized to that type of warfare and remains slow in implementing tactics or technology necessary for countering.10 Asymmetric naval warfare, either through the employment of devastating technologies or the employment of surprise strategies, has the potential to be a force multiplier for weaker naval powers in contesting command of the sea.

Leveraging Coalitions

A weaker naval power can further contest command of the sea by leveraging coalitions, mainly through the increase of combat power parity to surpass that of an adversary’s superior naval strength. During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta represented a predominantly land-centric power compared to the naval-centric Athens in a conflict dominated by the maritime domain. Assessing its accurate position as the weaker naval power, Sparta sought allies that possessed naval strength to increase the combined power of the Peloponnesian League to contest Athens’s claim on command of the sea.11 Additionally, Sparta leveraged the Persian willingness to export naval capabilities in exchange for economic and diplomatic trades further to increase the naval strength of the Peloponnesian League.12 The Spartan increase in maritime power through a combination of direct and indirect coalitions had the additional effect of instilling strategic paranoia in Athenian leadership. This fear of Sparta, and more specifically the fear of Sicilian states joining the Peloponnesian League, caused Athens to overextend its naval power for a resource-draining expedition.13 The alignment of combined naval strength against the Delian League ultimately proved decisive for turning the tide of the Peloponnesian War in favor of the Spartan-led coalition.

A weaker naval power can also leverage coalitions, and the increase in combined naval power, to threaten a stronger adversary in secondary theaters and diffuse their combat power to more manageable levels. The American Revolution is an example of this situation, where the American colonies gained the critical maritime support of France. This coalition represented relative combined naval power that exceeded that of the British Navy and continued to increase throughout the remainder of the war.14, 15 Additionally, the France’s colonial garrison forces and associated sea lines of communication in proximity to British global equities diffused British naval power to relatively weaker concentrations.16 This reduction in the British Navy’s ability to mass combat power was further compounded with France’s entry into the conflict. The threat posed by France spurred Britain to allocate significant naval power for the defense of the British Isles from invasion, altering the primary strategic objective of the entire war.17, 18 The combined effort of France and the Thirteen Colonies displayed the importance of several weaker naval powers forming a coalition against a stronger naval power and the strategic dilemma it can manifest for an overextended adversary.

Inflicting Cumulative Attrition Along Distant Sea Lines of Communication

Finally, a weaker naval power can contest command of the sea by inflicting cumulative attrition along distant sea lines of communication. During the Second World War, the Japanese Navy identified the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean as a critical operation factor that presented several advantages to achieving command of the sea. The tyranny of distance associated with any sea lines of communication required by a transiting American force would be vulnerable to Japanese exploitation. Specifically, Japan planned for the expected significant quantities of merchant shipping to be a central target set of its strategy for degrading American naval power to more manageable levels.19 Additionally, the extreme distances of the Pacific Ocean would, at least in the initial stages of the conflict, prevent the American Pacific Fleet from massing to its maximum combat potential. Based on the detriments the distances would inflict on American naval operations, the Japanese aimed to inflict cumulative attrition with a defined strategy.

The Japanese Navy implemented a wait-and-react strategy, which was planned to involve a series of naval engagements far from Japanese centers of gravity to attrite the American Pacific Fleet.20 In addition to these minor naval engagements, the wait-and-react strategy relied upon the garrisoning of island strongholds. These strongholds would allow the concentration of air and naval offensive combat power to attrite a westward-moving American naval force further. The projection of Japanese combat power would have directly threatened the massing of American naval strength, both of warships and the associated merchant shipping.21 Through this added attrition of sea lines of communication, the American naval power was intended to have been decreased to matching or weaker status than the Japanese Navy. This risk reduction would then have enabled a decisive fleet-on-fleet engagement, allowing Japan to gain command of the sea.22 Despite the distances of the Pacific Ocean and its status as a relatively weaker naval power, the Japanese Navy formulated a strategy with the potential to inflict enough cumulative attrition for decisive effects.

An Argument For Joint Force Integration

Some might argue that a better option for a weaker naval power to contest command of the sea would be the integration of the joint force against the threats posed by a stronger naval power. Julian Corbett in particular proclaimed the value of joint integration to achieve maritime objectives such as contesting command of the sea.23 The coordination of joint firepower is critical to mass enough effects to contend with a stronger naval power, which is especially pertinent with the introduction of modern technology.24

Additionally, the influence of devastating offensive firepower, including over the horizon targeting capabilities, validates the insufficiency of mono-domain action from the sea. The combination of a multi-domain aggregation of firepower is a near necessity for a weaker naval power to have any legitimate chance at contesting command of the sea.25

Conclusion

Joint operations, while important in a general sense, and critical for first rate navies, are not the best option for weaker powers to contest command of the sea. Joint operations are resource-intensive and could prove more burdensome than helpful for a weaker naval power. Additionally, joint interoperability would likely be nonetheless reliant on the previous factors of asymmetric naval warfare, coalition leveraging, and attrition of distance sea lines of communication in order to be effective. Conversely, joint interoperability is not a prerequisite for those different factors. Asymmetric naval warfare can be conducted regardless of a joint force in a variety of ways, especially when possessing devastating technologies and employing surprise shifts in strategy that undermine an adversary’s understanding of the maritime environment.

Coalitions can be leveraged to increase relative combat power and threaten an adversary’s secondary theaters without the demand of a joint force. Distant sea lines of communication can be harassed and attacked to inflict cumulative attrition absent a joint force. Even a small, unique advantage has the benefiting possibility of supporting the instillment of innovation and growth towards multilateralism, all caused by existential concerns with the maritime domain.

Ultimately, a weaker naval power has a multitude of options when it comes to contesting command of the sea against a stronger naval power without needed to rely on joint operations. 

Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, an active duty naval intelligence officer, began his career as a surface warfare officer. His assignments have included the USS Lassen (DDG-82), USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, with multiple deployments supporting naval expeditionary and special warfare commands. He is a Maritime Advanced Warfighting School graduate and an Intelligence Operations Warfare Tactics Instructor. He has masters’ degrees from the American Military University and the Naval War College.

References

1. Corbett, Julian S. “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.” London: Longman, Green, 1911. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1988. 62.

2. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia.” In Naval Administration and Warfare. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918. 147 

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. “Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941”, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 101.

4. Corbett, “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” 149.

5. Matloff, Maurice. “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 679.

6. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 236.

7. Baer, George W. “One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990”. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 192.

8. Ibid., 194.

9. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. 61-62.

10. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 250-251.

11. Strassler, Robert B., ed. The Landmark Thucydides. New York: The Free Press, 1996. 1.121.2.

12. Nash, John. “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War.” Naval War College Review, vol. 71, no.1 (Winter 2018). 129.

13. Strassler, ed. “The Landmark Thucydides,” 6.11.

14. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 505.

15. O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. 343.

16. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 520.

17. O’Shaughnessy, “The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire,” 14.

18. Mackesy, Piers. “British Strategy in the War of American Independence.” Yale Review, vol. 52 (1963). 555.

19. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 717.

20. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 464.

21. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare. Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 84-85.

22. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, 464.

23. Corbett, “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” 15. 

24. Corbett, Julian S. “Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905”. Vol. 2. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. 382.

25. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, 484.

Featured Image: SOUTH CHINA SEA (April 22, 2023) – F/A-18F Super Hornets from the “Mighty Shrikes” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 94 fly in formation above the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (U.S. Navy photo)

Top Issues Facing the U.S. Navy: A Compendium from The Madison Sea Power Workshops

By Capt. Gerard D. Roncolato (ret.), Capt. Scott Mobley (ret.), and CDR Paul Giarra (ret.)

Introduction

This paper presents the collated opinions from participants in the Madison Sea Power Workshops, an informal gathering of navalists whose purpose is to explore key issues facing American sea power as we shift to an era of great power competition.

The challenges facing our Navy and its Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) are legion, stemming from the long post-Cold War era, a 20-plus year focus on terrorism, the wars in Southwest Asia, and perhaps more fundamentally, the lack of active naval combat against a peer competitor since 1945.

We intend these issues to serve as a springboard for developing specific, actionable recommendations that would help the Navy and the CNO put the rudder hard over to get the ship’s head moving, relying on the system to refine the course downstream.

We asked our members: “What are the top issues facing the U.S. Navy today?” In answering the question, members submitted their top five issues. We then binned their responses and ranked them in order of most feedback to least. This yielded the following rank-ordered discussion of the survey results.

Our membership includes longstanding navalists and non-navalists interested in national security and the U.S. Navy. It includes a diverse group of intellectual and academic backgrounds. 27 of the 58 members responded. The demographics include (some members fit into more than one category):

  • Serving/Served Navy: 19
  • Interservice and Interagency: 4
  • PhDs: 7
  • Academics and Analysts: 10
  • Retired Flag/Senior Officer/SES: 14
  • Active Duty: 5

In short, we feel this effort offers a fresh and diverse voice to the tough issues facing today’s Navy. Just as importantly, we note the order of the bins, with “Logistics” near the top and “Material” at the bottom. This is somewhat the inverse of what one might expect and reflects a unique result of this survey.

Though our original paper included recommendations and “issues,” the decision was made to separate the two into the issues themselves, how they were gathered, and how they broke out in the rankings, which are of value on their own. Next, we intend to provide an analytical document that focuses on recommendations. This separation of products allows us to report on the membership’s priorities and then analyze the recommendations in a logical sequence.

Survey Results: Top Issues for the U.S. Navy

As we reviewed the issues provided by our participants, we found that they naturally organized themselves into nine broad categories (i.e., “bins”). The bins are ranked in order from most feedback to least. It should be noted that the focus of the group fell largely into two categories: (1) issues deemed fundamental and (2) issues receiving less attention in the navalist community and the press.

1. Strategy

The need for a naval (or maritime) strategy that drives programmatic decisions, doctrine, and training is a frequent topic in academia, media, and navalist circles. Yet, despite years of debate, such a strategy remains elusive. The reasons underlying this situation are beyond the purview of this paper. However, Madison Sea Power Workshop participants provided numerous responses on this issue. The issues fall into several broad sub-categories, including deficient national and naval strategies, inadequate or missing strategic planning skills and processes, and incoherent and unbalanced force structures—including our Foreign Military Sales system. Some argued that the Navy has surrendered its strategic planning to other organizations like the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or combatant commanders. At the same time, there is general agreement that the Navy, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in particular, must articulate the importance and the nation’s need for sea power.

A common theme was the apparent absence of an explicit concept of what kind of competition and war could and should inform procurement and doctrinal decisions, including any concept of war termination or victory conditions. A recent article on unmanned systems asks: A fleet to do what?1 Related to these comments was the argument that such a gap in the Navy’s strategic framework hinders building a realistic operational context for judging and using technological developments. In the interwar period, War Plan Orange provided such a context. While its contents constantly shifted as conditions changed and as the Navy learned through education, wargames, and exercises, the solid presence of the plan served as a foundation for decisions.

Finally, it was noted that the lack of an overarching U.S. maritime strategy fosters a narrow focus on technology and, for lack of a better term, kill chains or webs. While the latter are a necessary element in preparing for a future war, they alone are insufficient. The overly narrow framework that drives current naval thinking and joint thinking also avoids hard issues that emerge when one considers the broader aspects of a great power war with a heavy maritime component. The defense of shipping, ports, logistics lines to forward-deployed forces, homeland infrastructure, and impeding Chinese trade or economic activity all fall outside the scope of kill chain logic.

It has been argued that sea power is all about movement: enabling ours while impeding that of the enemy.2 This is a radically different frame of reference from ground-centric or even air-centric strategic concepts. It is uniquely maritime and hence, uniquely naval in character. For this reason alone, the participants saw developing a broad yet focused maritime strategy as key, even foundational, in preparing for the next great power war.

2. Logistics

Based on additional input following the September 20th, 2023, hybrid workshop session at the U.S. Naval Institute, the logistics bin received the second most responses. This is due in part to the broad definition of logistics used. It also suggests the deep concern many participants have with the neglect of the Navy’s logistics capabilities. Finally, members’ concerns underscore the need to rethink logistic concepts in the face of a future great power war in the western Pacific against a capable and determined adversary with superior industrial capacity. As used here, logistics covers the full spectrum, including factory assembly lines, naval supply depots, distribution systems, and ultimately our combat forces—the “last tactical mile.” There was significant concern over what was perceived as a deficient industrial base, particularly for shipbuilding and repair. This was complemented by perceptions of a shipbuilding plan overly focused on high-end combatants for confrontation with enemy fleets and power projection ashore at the expense of other missions like convoy escort, sea lines of communication defense, mine countermeasures, and logistic support.

Many respondents perceived that logistics networks are brittle and insufficient for sustaining a joint campaign in the western Pacific against China. This includes woefully inadequate merchant sealift. This capability and capacity gap is exacerbated by the vulnerabilities of air and sea lines of communication and their associated depots in a great power war.3

Several participants added concerns about the “last tactical mile” of logistics support. Specifically, the long-known inability to rearm vertical launch system (VLS) weapons at sea was seen as a critical shortcoming. Likewise, planning and capacity for logistics support of dispersed formations, whether Marine Corps or Navy, was seen as inadequate. In all cases, concern for capability gaps was amplified by a sense that there seems to be little urgency in effectively addressing those gaps.

A related concern expressed by a few of the Madison Sea Power Project participants is the seeming lack of questioning long-held logistics operational concepts. Specifically, there was concern that in the post-Cold War era, naval logistics had returned to the hub-based structure of the pre-World War II era. The concern is that reliance on in-theater logistics hubs introduces vulnerabilities and operational rigidities when employed in a great power conflict. World War II development of a mobile logistics force concept was necessary in sustaining combat operations against a very capable and mobile area denial enemy.4,5 The answer cannot be that such a situation would never happen when one asks, “What happens if our in-theater depots are compromised?”

Finally, there was concern that the abandonment of organic maintenance and repair (along with commensurate manning, onboard tools, and parts) had compromised ship self-sufficiency at exactly the time the Navy was placing increased emphasis on dispersed operations. It is noted that the Navy is changing course on this last issue, but greater urgency is recommended.

3. Training and Education

This bin covers accession, tactical/system training, and professional education. Key concerns from our members included deficient personnel recruitment, reliance on antiquated techniques for training, inadequate officer education on war, history, and warfighting, and insufficient wargaming at all levels as a tool for training and experimentation. There is continued concern with crew maintenance capability and capacity at the shipboard level. Specifically, design compromises that impair the ability of crews to effect emergency battle damage repairs intended to keep the ship in the fight or allow it to withdraw. For example, the shipboard 4160 VAC electrical distribution system requires depot-level repair that the ship’s crew cannot affect at sea.

Perhaps the most significant concern expressed by participants was the apparent neglect of building an officer corps capable of dealing with the inevitable surprises that combat in a great power war will bring. While related to the Culture bin discussed next, comments in this bin emphasized the role of training and education in building the desired skills. One participant made the case for an increased emphasis on command. Reflecting on the uncertainty surrounding combat and the incredible speed with which events can unfold, he noted:

“I think command—as a concept and a role—needs more emphasis. Training and education should be oriented to creating officers who can think independently, assess multiple factors quickly, and act strategically, even in tactical situations. That’s what the Naval War College did in the 1930s.”

Finally, several participants noted that tactical training in today’s Navy is inadequate. It is, they argue, focused largely on systems alignments and checklists. While these are important building blocks to tactics, they are not themselves tactics. Even in a highly technological service like the Navy, the human element in combat remains significant. In a great power war, the side that adapts effectively first will prevail. Many factors influence this capability, but true tactical education and training are seen as of primary importance.

4. Culture

Our members submitted a significant number of responses on the issue of service culture. In some cases, members argued that changing the culture is the first and most important step in addressing the issues facing the Navy today. On the other hand, some members argued for deleting the Culture bin since a changed culture is the product of other changes across the institution. In the context of this paper, the concept of Navy culture was of sufficient concern to our members that we include it here—primarily as a statement of issues facing the Navy. Subsequent products from Madison Sea Power Workshop will focus on recommended actions where the relationship between culture and change will be explored.

The overarching concern of the Madison Sea Power Project Workshop members was a perceived lack of focus on warfighting. This includes a lack of realistic tactical training, over-focus on inspections, which consume the majority of time for operational forces, and a perceived zero-defect culture. A warfighting culture, by contrast, focuses primarily on warfighting imperatives, placing the study and practice of tactics above other concerns, and recognizes the importance of ship and squadron ownership of their tactics. Finally, such a culture recognizes and acts upon the precept that combat is a chaotic human endeavor where surprise is ever-present and, consequently, where only the agile and most highly trained can prevail.

The perceived inability of the Navy to foster such a culture has many causes, per the responses. These include career paths that allow little deviation and even less time for personal study about war and tactics. Ship/squadron schedules afford little time for units to ponder and execute effective training for warfighting. Respondents see tactical training as overly focused on technical procedures and system alignments, neglecting the dynamics of actual wartime tactics. Also, a heavy focus on the material aspects of warfighting while neglecting the human elements. The heavy inspection culture has created an organizational dependency on outsiders to define ship and squadron success, fostering a persistent zero-defect culture focused on passing inspections rather than preparing for war. Several members commented on the need to enhance Navy leadership: rebuild “committed, engaged leadership (from work center to fleet command).” A final set of responses emphasized the challenges of our existing peacetime promotion and selection process that seems to value conformity and management over warfighting knowledge and proficiency.

Taken together, these responses emphasize the importance of shifting Navy culture to one that extols frank feedback at all levels, emphasizes lower-level initiative, and, in general, evolves into a fast and agile organization well-versed in the profession of warfighting. Such an organization can absorb war’s inevitable surprises and quickly develop corrective measures. In short, the group sensed that developing a culture focused on warfighting would entail rebuilding an organization with critical thinking and adaptability at the forefront. This is the learning culture about which Trent Hone so effectively writes.6

5. Organization

The Navy’s organization and its place within the broader Department of Defense and governmental framework garnered a significant number of inputs, half of which were received in response to the initial draft of this paper. Comments were wide-ranging and focused on three principal areas: Internal Navy organization, the Navy’s relationship with the government, and the Navy’s engagement within and beyond the institution, including with the American people.

At its core, the Navy organization must align with a dramatically different geo-strategic environment. Members remarked upon outdated Navy roles and missions, the lack of an effective strategic planning arm of the Navy staff, and a long-range (30-40 years) planning office focused more narrowly on the Navy’s roles and requirements for a U.S.-Peoples Republic of China competition. Additionally, Madison Sea Power Workshop members were concerned with the bureaucratic inertia evident in Navy staff (as well as other government bureaucracies). This retards action, values deliberate (and thus slow) planning, distorts the value of the enterprise approach to decision-making, and tends to centralize decisions at high levels with a resultant dampening of lower-level initiatives and innovation.

The members’ greatest concern was the Navy’s external relationships. Decades of “small” land wars in Southwest Asia encouraged focus on ground-centric operations in a relatively benign environment. The Navy’s (and the Nation’s) long heritage as a maritime nation reliant on sea power for its security and prosperity faded into the background. In its place, a more homogenized concept of jointness emerged, particularly in the wake of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Members noted a perceived Army dominance in our joint doctrine, where service perspectives have been shoe-horned into a one-size-fits-all type of jointness. This is at odds with the Navy’s experience in the Pacific Campaign of World War II, where Admiral Nimitz developed a heterogeneous framework for joint campaigning that harnessed the unique perspectives of the various services to build a highly effective integrated force. As the Nation shifts focus toward what will largely be a maritime campaign versus China, such a heterogenous and agile doctrinal approach will become increasingly important.

This perspective applies as well to the U.S. military’s current combatant command structure. Several members noted that the regional combatant commands evolved to their current state during the post-Cold War era. It was noted that regional combatant commands may not be well suited to countering an increasingly global power, China, or a global coalition of disruptive powers—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. What is missing is a single military command or organization empowered to develop deterrence, warfighting strategies, and doctrine on a global level. A nuance of this command is developing a global maritime combatant command. This combatant command would be like existing ones, such as Space Command, Cyber Command, etc., charged with harnessing and employing US maritime forces around the great global commons.

Beyond the joint military arena, members were also concerned with our civilian leaders’ perceived lack of knowledge and understanding of military affairs. When combined with our political processes, this general lack of knowledge more often yields what one member called “policy mayhem.” This perspective naturally leads to a recognition of the Navy’s weakness in the public relations domain. Several members reiterated concerns over the Navy’s poor engagement with Congress and the American people. The perception is that the Navy tends to tell the people, through Congress and the press, that all is well and under control, but the details are classified.

This approach, akin to circling the wagons, will no longer work. The challenges faced by the Navy, internally as well as externally—are readily apparent to the attentive public. And not only are deep problems perceived, but a lack of progress over time is also apparent. Central to this issue, as reported by our members, is the lack of an effective maritime strategy that aligns internal Navy efforts and makes the case for American sea power to the public, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This links back to the earlier discussion of strategy above.

Viewed as a coherent whole, the issue of the Navy’s organization will play out within the context of a challenged U.S. civil-military relations framework. Increasingly discussed in the open press, civil-military relations must be strengthened and revamped to pave the way for effective whole-of-government solutions to the emerging crisis. This is a broad issue that the Chief of Naval Operations alone cannot fix but can drive into the agenda.7

6. Doctrine

This is another broad bin with a wide diversity of responses from Madison Sea Power Workshop members. Persistent interoperability challenges topped the concerns—interoperability within the Navy, in the joint force, and with allies and partners. Related to these concerns, members emphasized the need to look at the Pacific campaign through a joint lens. Several noted that while geography dictates that the fight will be maritime in nature, it will not be won by naval forces alone. Innovative approaches to the joint fight and its associated doctrine will be essential. There is a perceived lack of Army-Navy cooperation in developing a unified operational concept that maximizes and integrates the unique contribution of each service to the fight.

A significant part of the problem, as articulated by the members (and as mentioned in the Strategy section above), is the absence of a consensus on the character of a maritime war against China, how the U.S. will define victory in such a conflict, and what ways and means will be needed to accomplish that victory. The perception is that the military continues to prepare for a war with China through the lens of the past thirty years rather than accepting that such a war will be large, likely long, and that a peacetime military will be unable to win against the People’s Liberation Army. Members felt that the military had yet to fully align with new realities, specifically fighting against a determined and highly capable enemy thousands of miles from home in a contested maritime environment with an adversary that enjoys the home-court advantage. Moreover, the sense is that the current doctrine fails to account for the industrial advantage enjoyed by China and the challenges our military will face in replacing losses and sustaining high rates of weapons consumption.

Flowing from these issues is the broader one of what might be called a doctrinal echo chamber. The Navy and Marine Corps are developing doctrines such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) in response to current fiscal realities. Yet, the war they are being asked to fight presents demands far in excess of what the government is funding today. We face the potential of developing an eloquent doctrine based more on fiscal constraints and less on warfighting realities. The disconnect can prove disastrous.

Finally, the Navy’s doctrinal development suffers from self-imposed cultural and organizational challenges: cumbersome, unresponsive, centralized, and inadequately tested.

7. Operations

Responses on this issue focused on the mutually reinforcing problems of high operational-tempo demands, poor readiness in terms of manning, material, and training, a perception of too many priorities for too little time, and too little force structure. One member succinctly stated the thoughts of the group regarding operations in the context of other Navy issues: “Chronically being stretched thin, generalist mentality, poor staying power of numerous initiatives, no white space to truly think and go deeper.”

The upshot of this situation is that the Navy lacks the time and operational availability for extensive, rigorous, focused experimentation. Traditional means of doing this, such as the well-known Fleet Problems of the interwar era, are constrained by high operational tempo and the ease with which adversaries can monitor exercises. The Navy is making use of virtual reality simulations to experiment behind closed doors, but much more is needed. In addition to that need, the speed and effectiveness with which doctrinal lessons are being learned and fed back into new doctrine is too slow. This is part of an overall need for speed across the organization.

8. Acquisition

Acquisition reform has been a topic of discussion for decades across the defense community. Results have been minimal at best. Madison Sea Power Project members cited two major components of the problem. First, the process remains broken. Procurement takes too long, systems are over-complicated, and operator input seems sporadic, resulting in the delivery of platforms that take years, if not decades, to make useful to the operating forces. Second, compounding the inefficiency with which the Department of Defense spends its money is the continued paucity of resources. The nation is lurching toward great power competition, if not war, without the needed funding. The Navy’s influence on these issues is limited to a degree. But changing course is possible and will depend on the Navy’s ability to argue an effective case for both a streamlined and agile acquisition process and the funding needed to build and sustain the kind of Navy needed to project power into the western Pacific against a capable and determined adversary.

9. Material

Material issues are numerous and difficult. Members largely avoided these issues, aware they are the most talked about challenges in our military-industrial complex. However, they raised several issues: too few ships to meet a growing spectrum of necessary wartime missions and peacetime commitments, the large percentage of ships tied up in maintenance for extended periods, the chronic issue of too few missiles and other weapons with an inability to rearm underway in-theater, and the continued tendency of the procurement system to seek solutions in emerging technologies without adequate testing or doctrinal considerations. In particular, members are concerned with the leap into unmanned or optionally manned platforms without rigorous and honest examination of the technical risks, intended operational concepts, and sustainability issues. Regarding the latter, an excellent article examining the challenges of relying upon unmanned systems to make numbers was published in mid-October 2023 after member responses were recorded. The reader is urged to consider its points.8

Conclusion

This paper has presented the consolidated input of 27 Madison Sea Power Workshop members—civilian, active duty, and retired. The process yielded issues and their priority ranking that differ from the usual listing of concerns in navalist circles. Hopefully, this unique approach will be useful to the Navy’s leadership and informative to the American public and its leaders.

As noted in the introduction, the decision was made to first offer a summary of the issues Madison Sea Power Workshop members identified in their responses. No recommendations have been included above. The intent is to produce a separate document that takes this paper as a point of departure, conducts a rigorous analysis of the issues, and then offers concise recommendations for action.

Taken as a whole, the two papers will present a compelling and holistic recipe for the radical course change needed to shape and prepare the Navy for a wholly new strategic environment.

CAPT Gerard D. Roncolato, USN (Ret), is a retired surface warfare officer with extensive experience in policy and strategy work. He commanded the guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) and Destroyer Squadron 26 at sea.

CAPT Scott Mobley, USN (Ret)commanded USS Boone (FFG-28) and USS Camden (AOE-2) and served as Reactor Officer in USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75). After retiring from the Navy, he earned a Ph.D. in History and authored Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018). Dr. Mobley teaches international security and civil-military relations courses at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

CDR Paul Giarra, USN (Ret),is the president of Global Strategies & Transformation, a professional services firm and strategic planning consultancy. He was a P-3 pilot and served aboard two ships during his naval career. He was a designated naval strategic planner, a political-military strategic planner for Far East, South Asia, and Pacific issues, and he managed the U.S.–Japan alliance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Acknowledgments

The Madison Sea Power Workshop is an informal gathering of navalists to explore key issues facing American sea power during the shift to an era of great power competition. Members represent a spectrum of professions, some with naval service and others without. All members share a deep-seated belief that American sea power is of the greatest importance to the nation and the world, that American sea power is challenged in unprecedented ways, and that sustaining it requires the action and commitment of the American public. We are indebted to our members, without whom this paper would not have been possible. 

References

1. Jonathan Panter, “Unmanned Ships: A Fleet to do What?” Center for International Maritime Security, October 17th, 2023.

2. This was the answer that then-CNO William D. Leahy provided to the question from Congress in 1938: What did he need a bigger Navy for? See Phillips Payson O’Brien, The Second Most Powerful Man in the World, (New York: Dutton, 2019), p. 118.

3. David B. Larter. “’You’re on your own’: US sealift can’t count on Navy escorts in the next big war,” Defense News, October 10th, 2018.

4. Trent Hone. “From Mobile Fleet to Mobile Force: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Logistics in the Central Pacific During World War II,” Journal of Military History, 87:2 (April 2023), pp. 367-403.

5. Dr. Salvatore Mercogliano. “Six Oilers,” YouTube Media, April 20th, 2023.

6. Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2018), and, most recently, Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2022).

7. Eliot Cohen recently penned an important exploration of the challenges facing U.S. civil-military relations and the decline of the study, understanding, and acceptance of war as an enduring phenomenon in the country. “Beware the False Prophets of War: Why Have the Experts Been so Persistently Wrong?” The Atlantic, September 11th, 2023.

8. Jonathan Panter, “Unmanned Ships: A Fleet to do What?” Center for International Maritime Security, October 17th, 2023.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (June 12, 2023) An F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to the Royal Maces of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 27, launches from the flight deck aboard the U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), in the Philippine Sea, June 12, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eric Stanton)