Articles Due: January 18, 2027
Series Dates: February 15-19, 2027 Article Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words Submit to: Content@cimsec.org
By Brian Kerg
The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the maritime domain and naval warfighting. From automated target recognition systems enabling autonomous swarm attacks in the Black Sea and the Red Sea, to predictive maintenance models keeping aging surface combatants mission-ready, artificial intelligence is expanding across naval operations.
Yet, as AI transitions into a core instrument of naval power, it introduces structural vulnerabilities and escalation risks that military leaders and policymakers are only beginning to grapple with.
These vulnerabilities have drawn sharp attention on Capitol Hill. In debates over recent defense legislation, U.S. congressional leaders and defense committees expressed rising alarm regarding the unvetted deployment of military AI. Lawmakers warn that rushing unverified algorithms onto the digital high seas could result in unintended escalation, catastrophic system failures, or friendly-fire events. These risks have led Congress to demand strict AI assessment frameworks, mandatory cyber-governance rules, and sandboxed testing environments before systems are fielded.
Whether considering opportunities or risks, the operational integration of AI offers profound implications for naval operations and doctrine. Given the many promises and dangers of AI to naval warfare, how should leaders respond?
How should the Navy balance the operational demand for rapid fielding of AI with the rigorous testing and sandboxed environments necessary for safe deployment as mandated by Congress? How should adversary AI deployments and escalations affect our own escalation calculus and rules of engagement? How do we reform the training of our warfighters to prevent a dangerous gap between rapid AI adoption and actual warfighter understanding, ensuring operators at the tactical edge have the readiness to effectively trust, override, or troubleshoot autonomous actions in combat circumstances?
Authors are invited to consider these topics and more as they explore the benefits and dangers of naval AI. Authors can cover matters of technology, strategy, ethics, policy, or any other related area. Authors should strive to go beyond solely identifying risks and propose thought-provoking, concrete solutions to the issues they raise.
Nearly a century ago, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, U.S.N., wrote in the foreword to Arthur M. Shepard’s seminal work, Sea Power in Ancient History, that “Readers of this work cannot but be impressed by the similarity between the problems of sea power in ancient times and problems of sea power which are engaging the attention of maritime nations today.”1 Practitioners of naval power have long looked to the past for warnings, lessons, and insights that might inform the challenges of the present and future. This post follows in that tradition by considering what antiquity might offer for understanding one of the most enduring applications of naval power, the blockade.
The British naval theorist Julian Corbett distinguished between commercial blockade, intended to restrict an enemy’s maritime trade, and naval blockade, directed against an enemy’s fleet. The latter could itself serve different purposes, either keeping an enemy fleet confined to port or watching it closely while encouraging it to put to sea, where it could be brought to battle.2 Although Corbett developed these categories from the experience of more recent naval warfare, their basic purposes would have been readily recognizable in antiquity. Ancient fleets likewise sought to restrict maritime commerce and supplies, contain hostile naval forces, or compel an adversary’s fleet to come out and fight.
The relevance of these forms of blockade is hardly confined to the past. At the time of writing, the United States is enforcing a blockade against Iran, restricting maritime traffic to and from Iranian ports as part of the ongoing conflict.3 At the same time, across the Indo-Pacific, the possibility of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan remains a central concern in discussions of a potential cross-Strait conflict. Chinese military planning considers blockade operations as one means of isolating and coercing Taiwan, alongside the considerably more demanding possibility of an amphibious invasion.4 Despite enormous differences in political circumstances, technologies, and scale, these situations underscore a common problem. Establishing control of the sea is one thing, but maintaining that control long enough to achieve a political or military objective is another.
There are, of course, many examples of naval blockade in the ancient Mediterranean, but four cases highlight particularly well the different challenges such operations presented: Samos in 440–439 BCE, Syracuse in 413 BCE, Rhodes in 305–304 BCE, and Roman operations around Lilybaeum and Drepana in 250–249 BCE. Each exposes a different problem associated with blockade, including maintaining forces on station, preserving or contesting command of the sea, restricting or sustaining access to supplies, and protecting the forces involved.
Samos, 440–439 BCE: The Challenge of Maintaining a Blockade
The Athenian campaign against Samos in 440–439 BCE provides a clear example of both the effectiveness and fragility of naval blockade. After an earlier Athenian intervention on the island, a group of Samian exiles returned, overthrew the Athenian-backed government, and revolted.5 Athens responded by sending sixty ships under the command of Pericles and other generals. After defeating a Samian fleet of seventy vessels near Tragia and receiving additional ships from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, the Athenians landed troops and surrounded Samos with three walls while simultaneously blockading the city “from the sea at the same time” (ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα).6
The blockade quickly revealed a problem that remains fundamental to such operations, as forces maintaining a blockade may also be required to respond to threats elsewhere. Reports reached Pericles that a Phoenician fleet was approaching to assist the Samians. He therefore took sixty ships from the force stationed around Samos and sailed toward Caunus and Caria to meet the anticipated threat.7 His departure weakened the blockade at precisely the moment the defenders needed.
The Samians exploited the opportunity. They attacked the inadequately protected Athenian naval station, destroyed the guard ships, and defeated the vessels sent against them. For fourteen days they “controlled the sea in their area” (τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν) and, as Thucydides puts it, “brought in and carried out whatever they wished” (ἐσεκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἃ ἐβούλοντο).8 When Pericles returned, however, the Athenians reestablished the blockade by land and sea. Further reinforcements arrived from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, and after a nine-month siege the Samians surrendered, demolished their walls, surrendered their fleet and hostages, and agreed to repay the costs of the war.9
For fourteen days, the diversion of part of the Athenian fleet was enough to reopen Samian access to the sea, demonstrating the importance of persistence in maintaining a blockade. For those under blockade, even a temporary weakening of the forces on station could provide an opportunity to restore maritime access.
Syracuse, 413 BCE: The Reversal of a Blockade
When the Athenians arrived at Syracuse in 415 BCE, seeking to conquer the city and extend their power into Sicily, their overwhelming superiority at sea was one of the expedition’s greatest advantages. Over the course of the campaign, however, they gradually lost that advantage and ultimately found themselves trapped in the Great Harbor.10 By 414 BCE, the campaign had developed into an effort to isolate Syracuse by land and sea. The Athenians occupied Plemmyrium at the entrance to the Great Harbor, using it to protect their ships and store equipment, while their army attempted to complete a wall of circumvallation around the city. Thucydides emphasizes how far the Athenian works had progressed by the time Spartan support for Syracuse arrived under the command of Gylippus. Much of the wall toward the Great Harbor was already complete, while materials had been prepared to extend the line toward the opposite coast.11
Gylippus’ intervention changed the strategic situation. Syracusan counter-walls prevented completion of the Athenian circumvallation, while the capture of Plemmyrium deprived the expedition of its principal position at the mouth of the Great Harbor and cost it substantial stores and naval equipment.12 The Syracusans also refused to remain blockaded within the Great Harbor, continuing to contest Athenian control of its waters. In 413 BCE, they modified their triremes for its confined waters, strengthening and shortening their prows for direct, head-on, prow-to-prow attacks (ἀντιπρῴροις), rather than the maneuvering attacks (ἐκ περίπλου) for which the more lightly constructed Athenian prows were designed.13
After defeating the Athenians at sea, the Syracusans closed the mouth of the Great Harbor with merchant vessels, warships, and other crafts moored across the entrance. The fleet that had arrived with overwhelming maritime superiority now had to fight its way out of the harbor it had once helped control. In the final naval battle, the Athenians attempted to break the Syracusan blockade, attacking the barrier across the harbor entrance, but the Syracusan and allied fleet prevented their escape.14 The surviving Athenians abandoned their ships and attempted to retreat overland, ending in the destruction of the expedition.
Syracuse demonstrates that a blockade depends on continued control of the surrounding maritime space. As Athenian control weakened through setbacks ashore, the loss of key positions, Syracusan tactical adaptation, and defeat at sea, the Athenians went from attempting to cut off Syracuse to being trapped themselves. For a force under blockade, contesting control rather than simply accepting isolation can fundamentally alter the strategic situation.
Rhodes, 305–304 BCE: The Limits of a Blockade
Few commanders in antiquity possessed a reputation for naval siege warfare comparable to Demetrius Poliorcetes, yet his enormous effort against Rhodes in 305–304 BCE failed to isolate the city completely. Maritime commerce was fundamental to Rhodian wealth and strategic power. Diodorus Siculus describes Rhodes as possessing considerable naval strength (ἰσχύουσα ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι) and notes its particularly close economic relationship with Ptolemy I of Egypt.15 When Antigonus and Demetrius attempted to force Rhodes away from its relationship with Ptolemy, separating the city from outside support became a central part of the campaign.
Demetrius arrived with a formidable fleet. He attacked the Rhodian harbor defenses from the sea, deployed ship-mounted artillery and siege machinery, and later shifted much of his effort ashore.16 Yet his fleet could not make the waters around Rhodes impermeable. Rhodian warships continued to operate, and outside powers repeatedly sent assistance. Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus supplied the city, with Diodorus describing major shipments of grain and other provisions.17 Their importance was reflected in the honors Rhodes later granted its benefactors.
Every successful entry weakened the coercive purpose of Demetrius’ effort to isolate the city. So long as Rhodes retained sufficient maritime access to receive supplies and outside assistance, time did not necessarily favor the attacker. After roughly a year of fighting, Demetrius accepted a settlement. Rhodes preserved its autonomy and its relationship with Ptolemy, while agreeing to support Antigonus except in conflicts against Ptolemy.18
Rhodes illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a fully effective blockade. A blockade does not need to stop all traffic to exert pressure, nor does every successful passage render it ineffective. Its effectiveness ultimately depends on whether enough traffic is restricted to achieve its strategic purpose, while even limited access may be sufficient for the defender to sustain resistance.
Lilybaeum and Drepana, 250–249 BCE: The Costs of Maintaining a Blockade
By 250 BCE, during the First Punic War, Roman successes in Sicily had narrowed the Carthaginian position to a handful of strongholds in the west, but the effort to blockade Lilybaeum exposed the Roman fleet to risks that would ultimately threaten the operation itself. Polybius notes that the Romans believed its capture would open the way for attacks against North Africa, while Carthage resolved to hold it at virtually any cost.19 The Romans therefore invested Lilybaeum by land and sea.
The harbor proved exceptionally difficult to blockade effectively. Carthage exploited local knowledge, favorable winds, and skilled seamanship to penetrate the Roman blockade. A force under Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, carried approximately 10,000 troops and supplies into Lilybaeum despite the Roman presence.20 Hannibal “the Rhodian” later repeatedly sailed between Carthaginian territory and Lilybaeum, running the Roman blockade until the Romans captured a sufficiently fast Carthaginian vessel to intercept him.21 These episodes demonstrated the difficulty of transforming naval superiority into complete control of a contested area.
The blockade also imposed costs on the Romans. Combat, siege operations, and disease depleted the fleet’s manpower, requiring 10,000 replacement sailors.22 In 249 BCE, the Roman consul Publius Claudius Pulcher used the reconstituted fleet to strike the nearby Carthaginian naval base at Drepana, apparently hoping to surprise the Carthaginian commander Adherbal and eliminate the threat to Roman blockade operations around Lilybaeum.23 Instead, Adherbal brought his ships into open water. The Romans, caught close to the coast with less maneuverable ships and inexperienced replacement crews, suffered a devastating defeat. Polybius reports that ninety-three Roman vessels were captured while Claudius escaped with about thirty.24 Carthaginian forces subsequently returned to the vicinity of Lilybaeum and attacked Roman ships there.25
Lilybaeum and Drepana reveal the sustained costs of blockade. Maintaining pressure exposes the forces involved to attrition, crew exhaustion, enemy action, and competing operational demands. As these pressures accumulate, they can create opportunities for the opposing force to challenge the blockade and reshape the balance at sea.
Ancient Blockades and the Problem of Sea Power
Ancient and modern blockades operate with radically different technologies. Samos, Syracuse, Rhodes, and Lilybaeum offer no tactical prescriptions for fleets operating with submarines, aircraft, missiles, satellites, or unmanned systems. Their relevance lies instead in the strategic problems they expose.
Taken together, the four cases suggest that blockade should be understood as a continuing contest rather than a condition established simply by achieving maritime superiority. Samos demonstrates the demands of persistence, as even the temporary removal of part of the blockading force created an opportunity to reopen access to the sea. Syracuse shows how control can be reversed, as the Athenians went from attempting to isolate the city to being trapped within the Great Harbor themselves. Rhodes demonstrates that a blockade need not be broken completely to fail; sufficient access may allow a defender to continue resisting. Lilybaeum and Drepana show how the accumulating costs and vulnerabilities of maintaining a blockade can create opportunities for it to be challenged.
These cases raise several enduring strategic questions about blockades. How difficult is a blockade to impose, sustain, resist, or break? How much force does it require, and for how long? How complete must it be to achieve its political or military objectives? How much traffic can continue to pass through before its effectiveness is undermined? What outside powers might intervene or provide support? And what forces, bases, or geographic features might strengthen, weaken, or threaten a blockade?
The central question is therefore not simply whether a blockade can be imposed, but whether it can be maintained long enough to achieve its purpose in the face of resistance, changing circumstances, and the costs of sustaining it.
That broader lesson returns us to Moffett’s observation nearly a century ago. The instruments of sea power have changed beyond anything an ancient commander could have imagined. The underlying strategic problem has not changed. Control of the sea is only valuable insofar as it can be translated into lasting political or military results.
Dr. Stephen DeCasien is the Henry A. Kissinger Visiting Scholar Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. His research integrates archaeological and historical evidence to examine ancient warships, naval warfare, and the exercise of maritime power. He is currently co-editing, with William M. Murray, “The Naval Rams from the Battle of the Egadi (Aegates) Islands in 241 BCE”, a volume presenting archaeological evidence from the first securely identified ancient naval battlefield and examining Roman and Carthaginian naval warfare, technology, and logistics.
Notes
1. Moffett, William A., foreword to Arthur M. Shepard, Sea Power in Ancient History: The Story of the Navies of Classic Greece and Rome. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1924, p. vii.
2. Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, pp. 183–85.
3. U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Forces to Resume Naval Blockade Against Iran,” July 13, 2026.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2025), pp. 38–40.
5. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.115.3–5.
6. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.116.1–2.
7. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.116.3.
8. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.117.1.
9. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.117.2–3.
10. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.43–44.
11. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.2.3–4.
12. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.22–24.
13. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.36–40, especially 7.36.2–5; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 13.10.2–3.
14. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.59.2–3; 7.70–71.
15. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 20.81.2–4.
16. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 20.82.1–4.
17. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 20.96.1–3.
18. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 20.99.1–3.
19. Polybius, Histories, 1.41.4–6.
20. Polybius, Histories, 1.44.1–10; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 24.1.
21. Polybius, Histories, 1.46.4–47.10.
22. Polybius, Histories, 1.49.1–2.
23. Polybius, Histories, 1.49.3–7.
24. Polybius, Histories, 1.49–51, especially 1.51.10–12.
25. Polybius, Histories, 1.52–53; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 24.1–4.
Featured image: The Naval Battle in the Harbor of Syracuse, 1890 (Artist unknown).
The evolution of maritime warfare has largely moved in expanding the form of conflict and the direction of it. Originating from largely surface conflict and eventually amphibious assaults, maritime conflict shifted to expanded domains, attacks from below by submarines and above by aircraft carriers. However, in the continued evolution of maritime conflict since World War II, various new technologies and strategies have shifted the way war is conducted, as well as preparations for war. This is reflected most clearly in the case of China and Chinese maritime expansion. Although it began and evolved by replicating traditional naval strategy, adopted from Soviet Union systems and adapted for Chinese needs and limitations, it has since evolved dramatically to employ a vast array of unconventional methods.
This article will analyze these unconventional methods, focusing centrally on China’s evolving systems and strategies, while also drawing parallels to other unconventional strategies of other nations. That said, this article is centrally focused on Chinese maritime strategy evolution and its ramifications. These tools, by examining an undercurrent of strategy applied to different facets of the undersea domain, establish an argument on Beijing’s military-civil infrastructure, through research vessels, cargo fleets, fishing boats, and autonomous drones. In such a way, this infrastructure operates without acting as a clear and present threat or exigency for war; rather, it functions simply as an inconvenience or mild concern, one which becomes increasingly threatening, despite not acting as an obviously military entity. The article is in turn divided into key sections, focused on military-civil fusion, submarine strategies, the role of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and anchor dragging.
The underwater domain has seen a disproportionate advancement in large part due to its modern nature. Submarines are highly technical weapons of war, and as a result, see the most significant growth and unconventional adaptations. China’s newest submarine, the Type 095, is also referred to as a sail-less submarinebecause of its unique proportions, designed to be swifter and stealthier. These are, in fact, two separate hulls under parallel development rather than a single design: satellite imagery placed the Type 095 fitting out at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao in February 2026, sporting a conventional sail and a distinctive X-form rudder, while a separate, still-unnamed vessel of roughly 120 meters surfaced independently at Jiangnan Shipyard near Shanghai that June, evidence Beijing is now running simultaneous next-generation attack-submarine programs across at least two yards. By reducing noise, it is able to better avoid acoustic detection systems, such as those employed by the U.S. and Japan’s ‘Fish Hook’ detection system, specifically surrounding the First Island Chain.
This development has followed a striking increase in Chinese submarine production, including a 2+1 production of nuclear attack submarines per year. The undersea domain is not limited to submarines specifically; however, for example, the mapping and data collection of the ocean floor work to enable submarine piloting. His data has been gathered throughout the Indo-Pacific region as well as the Arctic, through military-civil fusion doctrine, established by Xi Jinping as a national strategy, and has seen systematic incorporation. UUVs in particular have been deployed by Chinese vessels to map the seafloor, under the International Seabed Authority’s designation; however, these UUVs were found to spend only about 6% of their time in these designated zones. Additionally, a majority of these vessels were found to be tied to state companies and were reported to have conducted suspicious activity. Such activity includes mapping undersea cable networks, potentially for sabotage purposes, as well as UUV data collection near the U.S. Pacific Submarine Fleet’s homeport in Guam.
This data collected under a scientific and civil guise has been reported to have been communicated with Chinese state systems such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Such data gathering under a civilian guise has been reflected in other reports, such as Chinese shipping systems, as recently as September 2026, wherein COSCO was accused of surveillance while transporting cargo. While the COSCO case has been denied publicly, the expansion of Chinese trade in the Arctic draws attention to such possibilities of espionage undertaken through trade, the very same trade which is expanding uniquely and without competition into the Arctic. These Arctic expeditions were preceded by years of icebreaker data recording. Such icebreakers are utilized with the technology required to map the saefloor and collect data to enable submarine piloting in the region. Buoys have been deployed with recording infrastructure to collect data in the Arctic, which has raised concern among Canadian officials.
Anchor dragging serves as a form of deep-sea sabotage unique to Russia and China, corresponding with seabed mapping. The maps of the seafloor enable a surgical strike specifically on undersea communications cables, such as those conducted in the Baltic and Taiwan. Anchor dragging and GUGI operations are unique because they specifically create kinetic conflict between nations with plausible deniability, and thereby not sparking any wars, while still acting in offensive operations.
There is also the case of shadow fleets to skirt sanctions, trade route chokepoints, Chinese sponsorship of pirates, fisherman harassment, the Batanes issues, so forth. The tools utilized by China rest not within traditional means of war but instead flow into a system of gray-zone maritime strategy adopted by Russia and China alike, to avoid open war. Through habituation, the subtle encroachment of Chinese vessels in waters around Taiwan, the Batans, and Alaska has slowly become accepted; Chinese actions, while never outright tolerated, have become increasingly accepted.
Russia’s shadow fleet illustrates such a case: after sanctions barred Russia’s traditional shipping fleets, the nation utilized other commercial ships for strategic ends. The assembled fleet is roughly 400 to 600 aging tankers, a range CSIS has independently tracked, which continue to transport the majority of Russia’s seaborne crude outside the reach of Western price caps, insurance regimes, and, of course, sanctions. These vessels sail under the guise of different nations, through shell-company ownership, and often without identification transponders- something paralleled in China’s expansion in the Arctic. China has also employed vessels without “functioning” transponders to deliver goods to the Arctic LNG 2, and reiterates the notion of commercial shipping as strategy.
The Shadow Fleet, as it’s come to be known, serves as an economic lifeline for the Kremlin as well as a weapon of war with no clear national association. The Eagle S. is a tanker flagged under the Cook Islands and linked to the shadow fleet; however, it was seized by Finnish authorities after dragging its anchor for 66 miles across the Gulf of Finland in December of 2024. This anchor dragging severed the Estlink 2 power cable as well as a number of telecommunications cables; another merchant vessel under the Hong Kong flag served the Baltic connector gas pipeline in October 2023. The Chinese-owned Yi Peng 3 also severed cables between Sweden and Lithuania in November 2024, dragging an anchor for nearly 300 kilometers. CBS News’s 60 Minutes has documented this Eagle S-Balticconnector-Yi Peng 3 sequence in detail, tracing each vessel’s anchor-drag track via satellite data. Russia retains a Main Directorate of Underwater Research, an operational force tied to a variety of undersea sabotage operations and missions, such as anchor dragging. Known by the Russian acronym GUGI, the directorate answers directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, as opposed to participating in the Navy chain of command, as well as operating a vessel, the Yantar, equipped with submersibles capable of reaching the depths of undersea cables.
Western defense officials have tracked the Yantar loitering over transatlantic cable junctions from Ireland to the Baltic, per UK Ministry of Defence and Royal Navy monitoring reports, noting that the submersible remote-controlled vehicles are explicitly capable of tapping cables for intelligence, as well as laying explosives upon them for future sabotage. GUGI’s vessels deliberately survey and manipulate the seabed without an incident of any deliberate attack, under the guise of research and science, thus insulating any actions from sparking conflict. In other words, Russia’s strategy of a shadow fleet and research vessels conducting operations is an adoption of an existing Chinese strategy of military-civil fusion.
China’s undersea cable incidents work in tandem with the Russian operations- in 2025, a Togo-flagged vessel, the Hong Tai 58, crewed by Chinese personnel, loitered near the Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 cable, before releasing its anchor and serving the aforementioned cable. Taiwanese authorities detained the vessel and its captain in the aftermath of the incident. January of the same year saw a Cameroon-marked vessel, the Shunxin39, cut a cable near Keelung after loitering nearby, which Taiwan’s coast guard confirmed to be Chinese-owned despite its flag of convenience. Operations that rest just below the threshold to spark conflict, but work to erode and sabotage Western systems, degrading Western influence, power and regional capability.
China has employed commercial ships for espionage operations as well, with a Reuters 2026 report claiming that COSCO, the state-owned Chinese shipping conglomerate, has operated signals-intelligence equipment aboard its vessels, and thus collected military communications around the U.S., Europe, and throughout Asia, which U.S. officials confirmed to Reuters on the condition of anonymity. Correspondingly, the Pentagon had previously added COSCO to a list of companies linked to the Chinese military in January of 2025, per the Department of Defense’s Section 1260H designation,- the same year a U.S. Naval War College report concluded the PLA was utilizing China’s commercial fleets for intelligence. The Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute detailed the fishing fleet’s intelligence role specifically, identifying trained specialists embedded within militia crews. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law (Article 7, per China Law Translate’s official English translation) obliges Chinese state firms to assist state intelligence work when asked, in part fueling military-civil fusion doctrine, and providing Beijing with endless strategic assets for use across the world.
China’s maritime militia operates in the South China Sea to project state power through civilian forces; it is power projection through influence that is present, if in a non-evidently violently. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia act as civilian operators under governmental action, and utilize civilian boats, based primarily out of Hainan, which harass rival claimants and foreign naval vessels. As such, Beijing is not acting as a provocative, aggressive nation, but rather a nation that utilizes proxy forces, without sparking conflict.
Philippine officials have documented repeated incidents in which Chinese Coast Guard vessels, side by side with maritime militia boats, weaponized water cannons against Filipino fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal in December of 2025. The Philippines’ Batanes Islands have also seen increased Chinese aggression through diplomatic actions, as well as the Armed Forces of the Philippines has tracked a persistent presence of Chinese research vessels working around the Bashi Channel, akin to the Chinese UUV operations near Guam. UUVs, are alone, outside of their data collection, act as novel weapons of war- seen through AUVs and remote-controlled UUVs, or gliders. These systems include the AJX002, an extra-large UUV or XLUUV, which was synthesized for the strategic purposes of minelaying, particularly in and around the First Island Chain. The undersea drones that were functioning primarily for surveillance have been designed for military and destructive purposes. The AJX002 has been paired with the HSU100, a reconnaissance variant of an XLUUV fitted with retractable masts, to turn the vessel into a glider design from an AUV, for long-range intelligence-gathering expeditions. Beijing has also experimented with at least five XLUUV designs; several are capable of ferrying torpedoes and mines across the ocean. These play a kinetic role in the prior wall of intelligence that detected submarines and underwater actions through the Underwater Great Wall, a network of seabed sensors, now utilizing long-range gliders, autonomous UUVs, and newly defended by military UUVs. The civilian seabed-mapping campaign using UUVs aforementioned only strengthens this notion of military-civil fusion, particularly utilized by UUVs and enabled by AI technology.
Additionally, this minelaying strategy, if deployed by a “research” expedition around Taiwan, would lead to a critical blockade crucial to overtaking the island nation. Should these mines be planted weeks or months in advance around chokepoints or ports, or planted subtly by UUVs, China would hold a keen advantage in the waters around the strait and island. While the captains of vessels can be detained and prosecuted, uncrewed drones, if unflagged or operating under a guise, such legal action cannot be successfully prosecuted.
Overall, the strategies of submarines, anchor-dragging, sanctions-evading, maritime militias, and autonomous underwater drones create an overarching image of Chinese unconventional means of warfare. While each act and method is uniquely deniable and non-escalatory by design, the culmination of each method of power projection creates a strong Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions, without a single warship present. Tankers with drag anchors across critical cables fly under false flags, while research vessels operate with designated permits, and a system of undersea infrastructure designed for submarine enabling and detection alike. Each development in this system of maritime power projection builds upon a structure that has already, evidently, been established. In such a way, the slow and subtle habituation to Chinese operations in the world’s oceans, through a civilian cover with military means, establishes a status quo wherein Chinese operations are capable from the Baltic to the Bashi Channel.
Western and allied responses have been primarily reactive, at the time of writing. NATO’s Baltic Sentry was launched in January 2025 to better patrol the undersea infrastructure in the Baltic, in large part a response to the Russian cable-cutting. However, there is no standing international posture to counter gray-zone maritime activity as a unified strategy, as it appears to be. Such an asymmetry of action- the limited responses of the West compared to wide options for Chinese engagement- is a critical design of the unconventional strategy. As Beijing’s own investment shifts from crewed research vessels toward uncrewed platforms like the AJX002, the political cost of coercion will only continue to fall, and the window for building deterrence around attribution, rather than around the presence of a detainable crew, is closing.
Jack Lindstrom is a graduate researcher from the University of California, San Diego, pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs. He is also a junior researcher for the Mackinder Forum, where he conducts research on great power strategy and historical shifts of international competition.
Featured image: The BRP Cabra of the Philippine Coast Guard and two vessels of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources approaches Chinese-flagged ships at Whitsun Reef (known as Julian Felipe Reef in the Philippines) during maritime patrol operations. (Wikimedia Commons)
The United States Navy seeks to prevail over a potential Chinese military threat before 2027 as the naval component of a joint force.1 Passing through the “Davidson Window” of China’s maximum military threat without China initiating a war could be interpreted as a victory of deterrence.2 The reality could be that the Navy focused on the expanding People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) instead of China’s actions to relentlessly expand its influence and control in the South China Sea through non-military means. To halt China’s subliminal war through use of non-military, civilian entities, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) should build the Mother of All Cutters (MOAC) based on a container ship with deck-mounted mission modules in standard shipping containers. MOAC will function as a very large cutter and power projection platform, adding joint, interagency, and allied and partner capabilities to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) for a full range of law enforcement missions.
This article will discuss China’s territorial claims and the problematic nature they pose; America’s objectives in the region; the nature of China’s subliminal war relying on the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the China Maritime Militia (CMM); military activities that have failed to halt China’s gradual advances; the risk of relying on military power to stop China; and how the USCG can use MOAC to contribute to PACOM plans and exercises in the non-military realm.
The South China Sea Tinderbox and China’s Dashed-Line Sparks
Source: CRS. Boundaries from U.S. Department of State. 3
America does not recognize China’s “dashed line” which is China’s claim of territorial ownership and encompasses most of the South China Sea.4 China uses its dashed line to justify its subliminal war to challenge the U.S. principles of freedom of the seas and settling territorial disputes between parties “without coercion and on the basis of international law.”5 America rejects excessive maritime territorial claims that are “unlawful and sweeping” or that advance “incoherent legal theories of maritime entitlement” undermining the rules-based international system.6
China distorts the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) provisions to justify treating the internationally recognized sea as an internal issue for China to define and resolve.7 Notably, China rejected a 2016 international tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines seeking relief under UNCLOS from China’s illegitimate territorial claims.8
China asserts core interests—so vital that they are “not subject to negotiations or compromise”—in the South China Sea, as well as for Taiwan and territory administered by Japan and India.9 Although the Philippines bears the brunt of China’s aggression, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam increasingly defy China by asserting their own South China Sea territorial claims.10
The National Security Strategy declares America’s commitment to “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” as “core, vital national interests”.11 The National Defense Strategy declares America’s commitment to “a decent peace in the Indo-Pacific, where trade flows openly and fairly.”12 On the ten-year anniversary of the international tribunal ruling, the Philippines was joined by the U.S., Japan, and 11 other countries to affirm the ruling as “final, legally binding, and definitive between China and the Philippines.”13
The South China Sea is “an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition.”14 Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, commander of PACOM, stated to Congress that “our strategy is clear: we must deny China the ability to achieve its objectives through military aggression while strengthening the network of alliances and partnerships that constitute our greatest asymmetric advantage.”15 Admiral John Aquilino, then commander of Indo-Pacific Command (now PACOM), told a U.S. House of Representatives committee that if China’s aggression “resulted in the death of a Philippine service member”—even with water cannons used by the CCG—the Philippines could trigger the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty.16 China warned America to keep out of the dispute and refrain from “stirring up trouble.”17
If China controls the South China Sea, America’s military deployments in the western Pacific will be constrained. American allies and partners might then “reexamine their own defense programs and foreign policies” that support the U.S. in ways that weaken America’s security network and accelerate China’s goal of regional hegemony.18
China’s Subliminal War: “Fishermen” Versus FONOPs
Admiral Paparo stated that his command embraces the need to address “a broad range of factors outside of the military realm” in its plans and exercises, including a “broader group of interagency partners.”19 Without addressing the perils of over-analyzing the useful shorthand term “DIME” (diplomatic, information, military, and economic),20 PACOM would benefit from other instruments to more effectively resist China’s subliminal war that relies on non-military means to methodically expand and entrench its unlawful South China Sea territorial claims.21
To reinforce international norms the U.S. conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through international waters and air space that China unlawfully claims.22 These overt actions are part of information operations through military means within the current DIME strategy. China’s subliminal war continues despite more countries deploying military forces to signal their rejection of China’s claims.23 China typically advances South China Sea objectives by using its CCG to confront foreign vessels, purportedly for “law enforcement” while the PLAN provides overwatch, deterring foreign military escalation.24
China’s naval strength includes the PLAN, the CCG, and the CMM. China has expanded the PLAN massively in size and sophistication. It is the largest navy measured by numbers and deploys modern multi-mission ships.25 The non-PLAN component of China’s naval strength includes the CCG and CMM.26 The CCG is the largest coast guard and includes newer ships with better armament and longer endurance than most CCG ships, plus numerous regional patrol combatants and coastal patrol craft.27 The CMM standing force mobilizes civilian fishing vessels that can be massed for months-long deployments, and trains with and supports the PLAN and CCG. China may have 1,000 fishing vessels available in the South China Sea alone, in addition to the standing component of the CMM.28
China employs DIME means to assert control in the South China Sea.29 While its military supports the effort, China keeps its actions “below the threshold of open warfare” but beyond the “boundaries of normal diplomatic and economic interaction.”30 The most innovative line of attack has been creating islands in the South China Sea from sea features that do not confer territorial claims. China describes its island-building as “routine domestic governance.”31 Admiral Paparo stated that China “uses coercive behavior and overt aggression to exert its excessive claims, including harassing the Philippines, Japan, and other Southeast Asian partners.”32
The CCG and CMM exploit “China’s significant maritime force advantage” to intimidate its targets in territorial disputes.33 Using non-PLAN ships for overt aggression makes it difficult for targeted states to define effective rules of engagement without giving the appearance of escalation.34 Advancing slowly spreads out the harm in small doses, none of which seems worthy of escalation by targets.35 China’s framing of their actions as its internal affairs promotes a favorable narrative about any clashes.36 China has focused on the Philippines to erode their ability to exercise sovereignty in its South China Sea territory and EEZ. The CCG has a massive ship that overpowers what the Philippines can deploy.37 In a trend already evident with its “monster ships” with superior crew size, weapons, and fuel capacity that dwarf USCG cutters, China decided to build a CCG mothership that may carry aircraft or drones.38
America and its allies resist China’s subliminal war
Over the past few years, the U.S. and it’s allies have taken deliberate actions to counter the Chinese narrative and reaffirm the legal precedents. These include:
The Philippines launched a media information campaign using journalists aboard its vessels to document Chinese aggression.39
America conducts FONOPs that prevent unlawful claims “from becoming accepted customary international law.”40
Allies from outside the western Pacific participate in FONOPs.41
Military activities in the region continue, such as the United States, Japan, and Canada joining Philippine forces in anti-ship exercises to defend the Philippines against military attack.42
The Philippines and its allies and partners have reminded China for ten years that their territorial claims violate international law.
The USCG expanded its presence to supplement the Navy in the western Pacific.43 This includes the 2026 transfer of the USCG “expeditionary cutter squadron” of six 154-foot fast response cutters to operate out of the Philippines and Singapore.44
Yet China has not restrained its claims or behavior:
China is not deterred by the information campaign.45
Periodic American FONOPs and displays of military power have not blunted China’s drive to intimidate neighbors.46
FONOPs have not stopped China’s island-building.47
Allied FONOPs have not stopped China, as its aggressive response to a Dutch frigate’s operation made clear. A China Southern Theater Command spokesman justified its actions couched as lawful territorial defense, saying Chinese forces used “necessary measures” that were “in accordance with laws and regulations.”48
China rejects FONOPs that undermine what China characterizes as its sovereignty and security.49
The U.S., Japan, and the Philippines view China’s actions with concern.50 U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called China’s actions inconsistent with international law, accusing China of undermining regional peace and stability.51 The American and Philippines defense secretaries jointly reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Philippines alliance “for upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”52 Because even a victory through a traditional military war could be ruinously costly, PACOM’s focus has been deterring China’s growing military power in the western Pacific.53 In this environment, China’s subliminal war raises the risk of Great Power War.
The U.S. seeks to deter aggression and ensure that force or coercion are not used to settle territorial disputes. America needs to “draw a balance between doing nothing and doing too much.”54 America is seemingly trapped between risking war by using military power to directly confront China’s civilian-led advances or seeing U.S. alliances fray as China advances without overt military aggression. The U.S. clarified the broad extent of its defense pact with the Philippines, but noted it has options short of shooting under the treaty.55 The missing piece in PACOM’s DIME effort is strengthening the capacity of the Philippines and other targets of China’s subliminal offensive to exercise sovereignty over their territory with civilian regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Recent expansion of USCG presence begins to provide the means to accomplish that.
The USCG is “a more relevant model for partner nation maritime forces than any [Department of Defense] branch and more effective than them in executing a host of international missions.”56 The service has the appropriate power and authority to defy China’s efforts to expand de facto control of the South China Sea to match its unlawful claims. The USCG seeks to be “bold, innovative, collaborative, and willing to act in new ways” to overcome challenges.57 A USCG line in the South China Sea would give America more options below the Navy threshold. Just as the PLAN provides overwatch for the CCG and CMM, PACOM’s objective of denying China escalation options could keep PACOM’s DIME campaign in the sub-military realm. The USCG remains ready for evolving missions, recognizing that it may need to develop new assets.58 MOAC can be the critical force multiplier for USCG and allied civilian agencies to exercise administrative and law enforcement powers in their recognized South China Sea territory.
MOAC, the Missing Piece of America’s Line in the Sea
The USCG must strengthen its primary lines of effort of “persistent presence, meaningful engagements, and maritime governance” in the Indo-Pacific.59 The USCG describes itself as America’s only multi-mission, military maritime service, bridging gaps between law enforcement, diplomacy, and defense capabilities. It provides a full spectrum of options in the gray zone world of China’s subliminal war.60 The USCG is the best service for employing non-shooting options in the broad spectrum between doing nothing and doing too much. In May 2026, the USCG cutter Midgett joined a maritime cooperative activity with the Philippine navy and coast guard. That joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal moved beyond mere presence or FONOP to active “law enforcement activities, including maritime interdiction of vessels and boarding actions.”61
Without sufficient USCG assets in the Western Pacific, instead of being a non-military force multiplier, the USCG could remain insignificant or even counter-productive if China’s subliminal war persists.62 A MOAC flagship would support formalizing persistent USCG deployments for law enforcement activities.63 Such a strengthened USCG would, as one analyst explained, “allow the U.S. to play on a broader spectrum” than the Navy can.64 By complementing fleeting FONOPs and military exercises, the USCG would establish itself as the “Global Coast Guard” it seeks to be.65
MOAC is modeled on the modularized auxiliary cruiser described in Military Review.66 Such a ship relies on a modified civilian container ship hull equipped with weapons and systems in standard shipping containers mounted on the deck. MOAC would require a flight deck for manned and unmanned operations. It would have flexibility in the design to allow capabilities to be added or removed as the mission and scenario dictates. MOAC would resupply and provide overwatch for smaller USCG patrol boats and cutters which have difficulty operating far from support infrastructure in America.67 Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) could be deployed and sustained from MOAC using containerized systems, building on Navy experience integrating a Medium USV into a Carrier Strike Group.68 Joint and interagency vessels and aircraft plus allied and partner law enforcement assets could be sustained and supported by MOAC.
MOAC’s very size will convey power to reassure allies and partners who routinely face “monster” CCG vessels, and could sail alongside allies and partners in the South China Sea to bolster the rules-based international order founded on freedom of the seas.69 The following missions will strengthen capacity to assert sovereign maritime governance while raising the price China would pay for escalating to force with the CCG and CMM:
Humanitarian first responders. When natural disaster strikes, MOAC could initiate relief operations using onboard supplies and UAVs providing intelligence on devastated areas. It would conduct rescue missions, deliver supplies, and evacuate the injured.
Safety of life at sea. MOAC would conduct rescues at sea with helicopters or forward-deployed USCG vessels. Onboard medical facilities could provide emergency care.
Environmental stewards. Surveillance would identify and record evidence of actors threatening the sea environment. MOAC personnel could intervene alongside regional allies and partners.
Protecting natural resources. MOAC would help regional states protect their EEZs from poaching or illegal resource extraction. One mission could be to support the Philippine Kadiwa initiative to escort and resupply their fishermen operating near the Scarborough and Salina shoals.70 Whether the offender is a state or non-state actor, MOAC could support prompt diplomatic, law enforcement, or armed responses.
Law enforcement. Piracy, other crimes, or state interference in international maritime trade and civil air traffic would be more difficult with a well-armed MOAC “cop on the beat” identifying threats. 71 Increasing the capabilities of other nations to police their own waters strengthens maritime governance.72 The USCG has established a precedent away from the South China Sea.73
Securing maritime borders. International law provides standards to define maritime boundaries. Powers like China can ignore them if unopposed. MOAC would work with regional states to protect allied and partner territorial integrity, including support for outpost resupply missions. One PACOM commander stated that escorting supply ships is “an entirely reasonable option” under the U.S.-Philippines defense treaty.74
Promoting rule of law. MOAC would exercise with allies and partners to build collective law enforcement capacity that promotes a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”75 Allied law enforcement agencies deployed on MOAC could conduct “visit, board, search, and seizure operations” against what could be deemed privateers doing China’s bidding behind a façade of civilian status.76
Preventing terrorism. Terrorists threatening life and property from the sea may be thwarted with a persistent USCG armed presence, including its planned special operation organization, Special Missions Command.77 MOAC could be bolstered by intelligence personnel, regional assets, and other American military forces, including Marine Corps and Special Operations Command detachments.
Enhancing cyber and critical infrastructure security. MOAC could host training that shares best practices with regional partners and allies to harden defenses and preempt malign actors in the maritime domain.
Military force. As an armed service, the USCG would be the first line of defense if a crisis escalates beyond water cannons. MOAC would act as a deterrent to all but the most deliberate armed escalation.
Intelligence gathering and sharing. The USCG is an intelligence partner with other American armed services and friendly nations. All of the missions would be assisted by and contribute to joint and international intelligence on regional threats to the rules-based order.
These missions—and more as the USCG evolves to meet new challenges—will strengthen alliances and partnerships to defend the principles of freedom of the seas and settling territorial disputes without use of force or coercion.
A White Hull Line in International Waters
The USCG’s value was validated with a nearly $25 billion “historic investment” that then-Acting Commandant, Admiral Kevin Lunday, said “marks a new era for the Coast Guard.”78 Defending a “white hull” line in the South China Sea will be a bold demonstration of the U.S.’s “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific” and will protect the U.S.’s “powerful ties of commerce, culture, technology, and defense.”79 To hold the line against and roll back China’s subliminal DIME war before United States Navy “gray hulls” must intervene, the United States Coast Guard must build and deploy to the South China Sea the Mother of All Cutters to embark on its new era in PACOM.80
Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and a MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired from his job as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has written articles for publications such as Proceedings, Army, Military Review, and Joint Force Quarterly, and writes about defense and national security issues on Substack in The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
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Featured image: The Normand Cutter, a Norwegian-flagged offshore construction and subsea support vessel. (Wikimedia Commons)
