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Asia-Pacific

Charting a Course: Addressing Chinese Maritime Coercion Around Taiwan

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By Anthony Marco and Nils Peterson

On September 13th, 2025, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel entered the restricted waters around the Republic of China’s (ROC) Dongsha Atoll, also known as the Pratas Island, located approximately 400 kilometers southwest of the ROC’s main island of Taiwan. The CCG intrusion prompted a swift response from the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), which consisted of a CGA vessel chasing the CCG intruder from the area. Over the next four days, the CCG mounted four separate incursions into the restricted waters around Dongsha, a worsening symptom of a wider Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maritime gray zone campaign against the ROC in which the CCG has a prominent tool of coercion.

This article employs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) definition of gray zone coercion, the “deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.”

The ongoing coercion by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) aims to erode the ROC’s sovereignty by sending a message to the international community that the CCP has both the capability and the will to exert control over the waters near Taiwan, but this activity also threatens the United States’ national security interests. It is in America’s interest that the ROC remains a political entity distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for two primary reasons. First, at the operational level, Taiwan is a key maritime terrain in the First Island Chain or FIC, forming the foundation of American strategy in East Asia to counter the CCP’s territorial revisionist ambitions from a geographic standpoint. Second, at the strategic level, a CCP takeover of Taiwan would severely undermine the confidence of key regional and treaty allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, in the United States’ ability to defend them against further CCP aggression.

In the immediate term, CCG gray zone activity also displays the potential to endanger hard US economic interests by threatening major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that enter the Taiwanese main island’s major ports at Kaohsiung, Keelung, Mailao, Taichung, and Taipei. Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced semiconductor chips and is the seventh-largest merchandise trading partner of the United States, underscoring the importance of SLOCs entering Taiwan for American economic welfare.

If the PRC expands its gray zone maritime activity in a manner that threatens SLOCs, potentially leading to a maritime quarantine of Taiwan, this presents the US and its Pacific partners with the decision of whether to employ a military response. Recognizing, at a minimum, the economic damage and escalatory risks tied to potential CCP attempts at threatening the vitality of SLOCs, it behooves American policymakers to take steps to deter the expansion of this CCG-spearheaded maritime gray zone campaign.

The Nature of the CCG Threat

Over the past two years, the CCP has taken substantial steps to intensify its maritime gray zone campaign in ROC waters. In February 2024, a Chinese motorboat violated Kinmen’s restricted waters, prompting a CGA-mounted chase, which resulted in the deaths of two Chinese nationals when their boat capsized. The PRC has since used the incident to justify mounting a concerted effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty over the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands–located four miles and six miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China, respectively–by routinely dispatching CCG vessels that violate the islands’ restricted waters: CCG activity reached a total of 85 violations around Kinmen in September 2025.

While Kinmen and Matsu lie just a short boat ride away from the PRC mainland, the CCP’s effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty has more recently extended to Dongsha. According to the CGA, an “unprecedented” flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, numbering six “mother ships” and 29 “smaller boats,” entered restricted ROC waters around Dongsha on February 15th, 2025, prompting a swift response from local CGA vessels.

During this incident, a CCG vessel violated Dongsha’s restricted waters by attempting to intervene in the CGA’s law enforcement response. Since this incident, the CCG has sought to normalize this activity with consistent intrusions into the waters around Donghsa. Although Dongsha, like Kinmen and Matsu, lies on the ROC periphery, its recent targeting by the CCG is demonstrative of a graduated coercive campaign.

The CCG has also recently demonstrated its capacity to perform in a role that is specifically more dangerous to US interests. In a noticeable departure from past practice, the CCG, in what appears to be a PRC attempt to hybridize a potential blockade, debuted in PLA live-fire exercises around Taiwan during Joint Sword 2024-A in May 2024. This was followed up by Joint Sword 2024-B in October 2024, featuring approximately seventeen CCG vessels circumnavigating the Taiwanese main island as part of coordinated blockading drills with the PLAN.

During Joint Sword 2025-B, this year’s inaugural exercises in February, the CCG played a higher profile role that included carrying out mock vessel boardings and inspections–suggestive of potential actions that would interdict commercial shipping, a cardinal feature during a blockade or gray zone “quarantine”–in addition to violating, for the first time, the Taiwanese main island’s 24 nautical mile contiguous area.

Although the CCP has not yet made a serious effort to dispute SLOCs to Taiwan, its multi-pronged gray zone activities suggest an intensifying trend that makes this a growing concern for the future. One potential route entails mounting infrequent CCG patrols of SLOCs that evolve into routine patrols, activities the CCP has attempted to normalize in other places through consistent effort, justified under the auspices of a contrived or provoked maritime incident. Patrols could evolve into the boarding and inspection of international commercial vessels, setting the conditions for a partial or full and temporary or indefinite maritime quarantine of the main island.

From a US standpoint, whether such gray zone maritime activity forms a deliberate, calibrated irregular warfare strategy to achieve unification non-kinetically or broadly aims to isolate Taiwan economically and politically, wherever and whenever the PRC can, any attempt to threaten SLOCs in this manner jeopardizes hard US and partner-nation interests. Thus, taking preventive measures to preserve SLOCs prior to PRC efforts to sever them is necessary, especially since attempting to roll back the latter’s efforts after the fact is more difficult and could risk a more dangerous escalation.

Policy Recommendations

The US Government (USG) should pursue a nested set of policy goals to address the CCG threat to American interests. At the operational level in the immediate term, the objective should be to deter CCG activity that would threaten American SLOCs. At the political level in the immediate term, the USG should accept the unpleasant reality that the existing CCG activity erodes ROC sovereignty, as it lacks the capacity to substantially roll back CCG presence. At the operational and political levels in the future, the objective should be to have a coalition prepared to deter a PRC maritime quarantine of Taiwan.

These policy goals rest on three key assumptions; if any of these is invalidated, the recommendations would no longer hold. First, the CCP does not deploy CCG assets in such numbers that they overwhelm our capacity to defend key SLOCs. Second, the CCP continues its salami-slicing strategy to degrade the operational environment around Taiwan, which involves minimizing direct confrontation between the PLA and foreign coast guard assets in waters that the party views as its own. Third, the CCP leadership thinks it still has time to achieve its political objective to gain control of Taiwan and therefore decides it does not now need to launch a maritime quarantine, blockade, or invasion.

The ROC, on its own, will likely struggle to preserve SLOCs. During a 2024 House Subcommittee Hearing on Transportation and Maritime Security, Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, Captain Eric M. Cooper, USCG (Ret.), estimated that there are a total of 700 CCG vessels operating in the Indo-Pacific. The entirety of the CCG’s complement is not dedicated to gray zone activity against Taiwan, but it has a growing presence deep in the South China and East China Seas. The CGA, on the other hand, maintains a smaller, but not insignificant force of approximately 250 vessels. Since 2018, the CGA has implemented a ten year indigenous shipbuilding program, with a target goal of 141 newly constructed vessels, but it remains and will remain overmatched by the sheer quantitative advantage retained by the CCG. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect the CGA to adequately deter potential CCG activity that jeopardizes SLOCs.

Recognizing the vulnerability of SLOCs, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to preserve them. Already, throughout the Indo-Pacific, the USG maintains a series of bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements (MLEA) that authorize the USCG to carry out activities such as conducting legally protected patrols to help safeguard a partner country’s maritime security.

Traditionally, bilateral MLEAs stipulate that the USCG dispatch personnel and or vessels to assist in maritime law enforcement within a partner country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles), and EEZs (200 nautical miles). For example, as provisioned under a bilateral MLEA, the USCG boarded six vessels illegally fishing within the Cook Islands’ EEZ this past June. The USCG also conducts maritime law enforcement exercises with regional partner countries.

In June 2024, the USCG trained alongside the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the South China Sea to buttress the latter’s law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities. The USCG has also scaled up exercises in the Indo-Pacific region into trilateral events: in June 2025, the USCG, PCG, and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) participated in drills outside Japan’s territorial waters for the first time. According to the senior participating USCG officer, Captain Brian Krautler, “By operating together, we strengthen our collective forces, ensuring readiness against threats to maritime safety and security.”

With the specific intent of maintaining SLOCs entering Taiwan, the USCG should seek to replicate similar activity with the CGA as would be provisioned in a bilateral MLEA. The USCG already has a pre-existing cooperative relationship with the CGA that is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in March 2021. Under this MOU, the USCG and CGA formed a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG) to establish a common understanding of maritime security priorities and advance cooperation between the USCG and CGA. In addition to the dialogues within the CGWG, instances of security cooperation have occurred. For example, in 2024, the USCG dispatched an International Port Security (IPS) Program team to Taiwan to exchange knowledge with CGA officials regarding how to enhance maritime cybersecurity and general port security.

Despite these positive developments, current USCG and CGA cooperation is inadequate, with it being limited to informal bilateral talks, workshops, and occasional practice sharing. Thus, the MOU should be updated to deepen security cooperation or an unofficial agreement, akin to a bilateral MLEA, established that extends USCG authorities in ROC waters, specifically granting the USCG the ability to conduct patrols along SLOCs, sending a clear message to the CCP that the US will protect its interests.

In line with past practice, whenever the US deepens security cooperation with the ROC, the CCP will likely vehemently protest such a move; however, given the recognizable and public economic interests at stake in preserving SLOCs, the USG should frame USCG presence patrols in Taiwanese waters within the context of that specific end rather than communicating an intent to buttress ROC claims to sovereignty, although this would be an undeniably favorable byproduct.

It must be acknowledged that, compared to the CCG, the current and near-term potential force posture of the USCG in the region is problematic. Presently, the USCG has eight vessels forward deployed in the region and possesses another 79 vessels capable of serving in the region, but this would practically amount to the USCG’s entire inventory of high seas vessels. Despite this modest vessel count, the USCG could afford to apportion a couple of cutters and a handful of smaller craft, based on existing deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, communicating the USG’s resolve concerning the preservation of SLOCs.

A comprehensive analysis is warranted to assess the impact this deployment would have on other USCG priorities in the theater. Still, such deployments would communicate the USG’s resolve to preserve SLOCs. This is especially the case due to the escalatory risks the CCP would incur by contemplating a confrontation with a USCG vessel performing its duties. The USG could also establish a shiprider agreement, a type of MLEA, with the CGA, permitting USCG personnel to board CGA vessels: the USG maintains twelve such agreements with regional partners such as Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Vanuatu. Although typically partner force personnel board USCG vessels, USCG personnel have boarded Royal Navy vessels under a shiprider arrangement, which can be replicated with the CGA.

Moreover, the USG should seek ways to internationalize any USCG efforts to preserve SLOCs entering Taiwan. USCG Captain (Ret.) Eric Cooper has made compelling arguments for the establishment of a multilateral maritime law enforcement task force in the form of the US-led Bahrain Combined Maritime Force (CMF). Headquartered in Bahrain and consisting of 46 participating countries, the CMF maintains maritime security in major waterways around the Middle East. Organizing a task force akin to a CMF with the aim of preserving Taiwan’s SLOCs could include countries like Japan and the Philippines, especially when considering these two countries’ significant economic interests linked to these SLOCs and their recent combined participation in USCG-led exercises.

If these recommendations are implemented, the following would be benchmarks to measure success: In the immediate future, the continued absence of CCG vessels in key SLOCs. In the longer term, a stable rotational presence of up to three USCG cutters and between five and ten smaller craft regularly operating in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in areas proximate to Taiwan, in conjunction with a CMF-style task force.

The deteriorating security situation around Taiwan due to the CCP-initiated gray zone coercion shows no signs of improvement in the near future. In addition, the United States no longer enjoys being the unrivalled seafaring power in East Asia. In this security environment, the creative employment of USCG assets and personnel in combination with regional partner countries becomes an important policy pathway toward achieving American national interests.

Anthony Marco is a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and holds a BS from the United States Military Academy at West Point and an MA from Reichman University as an Anna Sobol Levy Scholar. He also serves as a special advisor on the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Proxies and Partners Special Project.

Nils Peterson is a Marshall Scholar studying for an MA in Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies and holds a BA in History and Chinese from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He previously led the China Team at the Institute for the Study of War as a War Studies Fellow.

The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or the Army. Appearance of, or reference to, any commercial products or services does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of those products or services. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of the linked websites, or the information, products or services therein.

Featured Image: The Wanshan Vessel formation conduct towing exercises in waters off Huangyan Dao in South China Sea in July, 2024. (China Coast Guard photo)

Interviews

RDML T.J. Zerr on Strengthening Surface Force Lethality

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC recently engaged with the commander of the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), RDML T.J. Zerr, to discuss the latest developments and priorities of the command. RDML Zerr discusses multiple topics in this interview, including how SMWDC is processing lessons from Red Sea combat, informing the development of unmanned systems, and generating new solutions through the Surface Requirements Group. 

SMWDC has been at the forefront of developing adaptations based on Red Sea combat experience. What are some key lessons from that experience and how is SMWDC embedding them in the surface force?

Some key lessons from recent Red Sea operations include the importance of continuous learning and advancing each TAO’s qualification—the people are the most important factor. Programs like the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) track tactical watchstander currency and proficiency throughout their career. Aegis TAOs are the first group of tactical watchstanders being tracked, with plans to incorporate Aegis warfare coordinators, SSDS, and LCS by the end of calendar 2026. Aegis TAOs run one of four Surface Combat Systems Training Command (SCSTC)-developed Red Sea virtual scenarios, which allows them to simultaneously satisfy SWCTC proficiency and currency requirements while executing Red Sea reps and sets based on lessons learned. 

Another key lesson is the need for rapid information processing, ensuring that our systems are tactically optimized. Our ability to quickly analyze the combat systems’ data and make updates to our tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a rapid and time relevant manner is critical to remaining ahead of the enemy’s threat development timeline. Finally, it is about taking that information and implementing it in the next round of advanced tactical training. It is a continuous cycle.

SMWDC WTIs were the primary briefers for HASC/SASC congressional briefs for Red Sea engagements updates. Our team in Dahlgren has taken the data from these real-world cases and ensured that insights are rapidly translated into actionable TTPs for the fleet. The result is a Surface Force that learns, adapts, and maintains overmatch in complex, contested environments.

SMWDC’s role is to ensure the Surface Force learns quickly and effectively from real-world operations. These experiences reinforced the importance of integration across warfare areas and rigorous decision-making at the individual watchstander level.

How are SWATT exercises growing more sophisticated and challenging? How are SWATTs informing the Combat Surge Ready (CSR) standard?

SWATT exercises are becoming more sophisticated and challenging by increasing the integration of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training utilizing a new SMWDC LVC Battle Lab located at Tactical Training Group Pacific (TTGP). This allows Sailors, ships, and staffs to train against complex, realistic threats that closely mirror what they could face in operations. We are continuously learning from every interaction the fleet is experiencing, and each of these interactions inform how we design advanced tactical training to challenge every watch team during the advanced phase of the cycle. Last year, we completed six SWATTs across the force, which were more sophisticated than previous events, including injects based on lessons from the most recent kinetic operations.

The Combat Surge Ready (CSR) standard has not changed; ships continue to progress through their workup cycle. What SWATT provides is additional insight into tactical proficiency and readiness, allowing commanders to validate that crews are prepared to surge at a moment’s notice while maintaining confidence in their ability to operate across multiple warfare areas.

SMWDC is launching the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) as a method to measure warfighting proficiency. How is the rollout of SWCTC progressing, and how will SWCTC scores have a real impact on SWO assignments?

The rollout of SWCTC is progressing steadily across the Surface Force. All cruisers and destroyers (CRUDES) TAOs are executing SWCTC with plans to expand to CRUDES warfare coordinators Q1 CY26, then SSDS (excluding CVNs) and both LCS variants by end of CY26. The SWCTC Level of Knowledge (LOK) test bank expanded from Surface Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, and Air Missile Defense to now include Amphibious Warfare, Ballistic Missile Defense, Mine Warfare, and Electronic Warfare. SWCTC scores provide commanders with objective data reflecting the cumulative tactical (maritime warfare) proficiency scores of individuals at the unit level to help inform unit employment and tactical decisions.

How do superior levels of tactical skill and contributions to warfighting development get rewarded in career progression for WTIs and SWOs more generally?

From a career perspective, becoming a Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) is a clear force multiplier. It begins with a 16-week, high-intensity course of instruction that provides a level of technical depth and tactical mastery that simply is not realized anywhere else in the Surface Navy. In 2025, we produced 158 WTIs, which represents a direct and immediate increase in the lethality of the Fleet.

The real transformation, however, happens during the 18-to-24-month production tour. During this time, these officers are not just maintaining their skills—they are defining the edge. They are the ones leading SWATT exercises, driving tactical experiments, and authoring the very tactics, techniques, and procedures our forward-deployed warfighters rely on. During this production tour, WTIs really become and practice the WTI core attributes of warrior, thinker, teacher.

By the time a WTI reaches career milestones like Department Head or Command, their tactical proficiency is significantly higher than non-WTI peers. That edge shows in their performance and their continued career progression. Today, we have 250 WTIs serving at sea, synchronizing our functional areas and ensuring that when our Surface Navy fights, we do so with lethal tactics.

There are many unmanned systems currently in development, which can offer new capabilities and pose new threats to the U.S. surface fleet. How is SMWDC informing the development of unmanned capabilities, while also better preparing the fleet to guard against these threats?

SMWDC informs the development of unmanned systems and prepares the fleet to counter emerging threats by identifying tactical gaps and testing solutions in realistic scenarios. Through the Surface Force Readiness Group (SURFRG) cycle, our Warfare Tactics Instructors analyze current fleet capabilities, evaluate new concepts, and develop actionable recommendations. In 2025, our talented team identified 28 critical tactical gaps and produced 46 proposed solutions, which are prioritized by the Surface Force Commander for investment by the resource sponsor and then vetted through experimentation before integration into doctrine.

This approach allows us to shape the development of unmanned capabilities while simultaneously ensuring that Sailors and ships are trained and equipped to counter potential threats. By integrating lessons learned into advanced tactical training and ongoing operations, SMWDC ensures the Surface Force remains adaptable, lethal, and ready to operate against both manned and unmanned threats in complex environments.

SMWDC has also worked with PERS 41 to ensure WTIs are part of the Surface Development Group (SURFDEVGRU), as well as the newly formed Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadrons (USVRONs) to work on the advancement of these capabilities and concepts of operation and employment. 

What are the lessons from the recent Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG) cycle and how are WTIs shaping the capability requirements process?

Lessons from the recent Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG) cycle emphasize accelerating the delivery of warfighting capability to the Fleet and continuing to amplify the Surface Fleet’s voice on tactical priorities. To achieve this, the process has been adapted by shortening the gap-definition phase for a faster transition to solutions, and by integrating the Naval Rapid Capabilities Office (NRCO) to assess promising technologies intra-cycle. This agile forum prioritizes solutions that incorporate robotic, autonomous, and AI-enabled systems, directly supporting the Department of War’s acquisition reforms by fostering collaboration between warfighters, industry, and the acquisition community, while keeping the fleet’s voice central to the process. WTIs continue to gather direct feedback from forward-deployed Sailors and engage senior leadership to refine tactical priorities.

Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTIs) are fundamental to this evolution, shaping the requirements process at every stage. Within SURFRG, WTIs lead the Tactical Gaps Working Group, analyze operational data to identify critical warfighting gaps, and then evaluate the tactical relevance of proposed solutions. This direct involvement ensures new capabilities are not just technologically advanced, but are also grounded in real-world fleet needs.

Rear Adm. T. J. Zerr is Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center. Zerr’s sea tours include USS Princeton (CG 59), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and USS Kidd (DDG 100). He later served as Deputy Commander and Commander of Destroyer Squadron 21. Ashore, he served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy of Naval Reactors at the Washington Navy Yard; Director of Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council at the White House; Branch Head for Policy, Doctrine, and Advanced Concepts (N5) at Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) Headquarters; Commander’s Action Group Director for Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Deputy Commander of SMWDC; and Chief of Staff, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 17, 2020) Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) fires its MK 45 5-inch gun during a live fire exercise during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Deirdre Marsac)

Warfighting Development

Cosmetics versus Combat: Inspect for Warfighting Over Rust

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By Spike Dearing

From the moment we leave our homeports, the ships of 7th Fleet live under the shadow of Chinese weapons and in the ever-present gaze of their ISR network. We are far from home, and very near to those who may wish us harm. This reality is embodied in the phrase “Tip of the Spear.” We expect to be the first to fight, the first to deliver and sustain damage, and the first to die. As such, the priority of the surface force in 7th Fleet ought to be in line with the Secretary’s hardcore focus on warfighting, of keeping the spear sharp. But it has dulled. Our priorities instead have pivoted to preservation. Rust and paint have taken precedence over combat readiness at exactly the moment when our time could not be more valuable.

Preservation in and of itself is not a bad thing and it certainly has a place in our list of priorities. Those who defend the primacy of preservation rely on two arguments. First, a well-preserved ship is indicative of a well-trained crew. The battle between steel and seawater is eternal, they do not play well together. Running rust can ruin a deck, and beyond the purely cosmetic, it can do damage to the hull and various systems exposed to the outside of the ship. It takes the dedicated efforts of many sailors to effectively keep it at bay. This first argument presupposes that if a ship is well-preserved, it is because the crew is working hard at it. And if they work hard at preservation, then they must be working hard at everything else too. Perhaps.

The second argument is that a well-preserved ship sends a message to friends and foes alike. To our friends it is a message of pride, fortitude, and reliability. For eight decades ships of the United States Navy have been patrolling the waters of the Indo-Pacific, safeguarding the peaceful flow of maritime traffic and commerce. That our ships are well maintained and present demonstrates to our friends that we will be there to carry on this legacy and can be trusted to preserve this system if challenged. To our foes the message is that we are still here, still committed, and still lethal. Our finely manicured exteriors are a sign that rather than a fleet in decline that is wanting for manpower and resources, we are still the preeminent naval force in the world.

I do not dispute the inherit truth in either of these arguments. That being said, should preservation of ships be such a high priority? Should it be more important than combat readiness? Should it consume a lot of a Commanding Officer’s attention and potentially ruin their careers? The press releases and official statements centered on the Navy are geared more towards preparing for war and ensuring the Fleet maintains its lethal advantages over potential adversaries. But when it comes to defining priorities however, words pale in comparison to how time and effort is actually being expended. In the 7th Fleet surface force today, much more time and focus has been allotted towards preservation rather than warfighting readiness. This will have an adverse effect on our wartime performance if not properly realigned.

Since returning to 7th Fleet nearly 14 months ago, I can recall four instances where senior officers (ranking O-6 and above) toured the waterline and inspected ships on “preservation tours.” These high-ranking officers would walk down the piers in Yokosuka or take a small-boat ride out to a ship at anchorage, scope out the warships, determine whether their level of rust was defensible, and then turn around. While such preservation spot-checks have become a common occurrence, these senior officers hardly – if at all – come aboard the “Tip of the Spear” ships and request that the Combat Information Center (CIC) be fully manned up and a combat scenario be run for their observation. I personally have not witnessed this ever taking place, which I find alarming.

What exactly is the current state of paint and rust going to reveal about a ship’s ability to actually fight and win a war at sea? Certainly not more than observing trained watchstanders execute simulated combat operations in a stressful environment and gauging their performance.

This is not a radical idea. After the burning and decommissioning of USS Bonhomme Richard (BHR) the Navy instituted a new process of no-notice fire safety inspections. Assessors would show up to ships, request the entire in-port emergency teams (ship version of firefighters) be mustered for accountability, and conduct safety walkthroughs. Ships responded to this shift by increasing training and vigilance amongst the crew. No captain wanted to get caught slacking by the fire safety inspectors. This action shifted a priority. While fires have still broken out on ships in the time since, none have suffered the same fate as BHR.

Instituting a similar practice for combat scenarios is necessary. Snap combat inspections are a time-honored practice of great power fleets preparing for war. Doing so would provide an honest look into how ships are preparing to execute their primary purpose – to intimidate and destroy the enemy. Commodores and Flag Officers should be interested in stopping by their ships to see how well they actually fight.

This is the ultimate test for ship COs and would absolutely re-focus their priorities if they have been drawn away from their tactical roots. The potential of the Commodore swooping by to spot-check a combat evolution would motivate commands to always have their teams well-trained and prepared for an unannounced visit – which extends to being more ready for an unannounced war. This is even more important for 7th Fleet ships who do not have the luxury of a long transit to a conflict to train themselves up.

The execution of such a program could be made simple. It is a reality that setting up a CIC for a scenario is time-intensive for sailors. A call to a ship’s CO from their immediate superior that a visit will be conducted the next day would provide an opportunity to have the system properly configured while not allowing so much time that the watchstanders could get away with not being adequately knowledgeable or trained. These snap combat inspections should also be genuinely stressing and not easily gamed. The senior officer could have a set of multiple scenarios sent over to the ship in advance and then select a scenario once they arrive to push the watchstanders to adapt and improvise. This would eliminate the possibility that the ship could practice a certain scenario multiple times and perform well due to their familiarity with the sequence of events. Snap combat inspections should guard against assessing heavily scripted drills that sailors can easily prepare for.

Regardless of the details of such an initiative, the central purpose should remain intact. It is not a given that warfighting readiness will get prioritized. It demands active and sustained attention from senior leaders to drive this focus into their commands. Perhaps Commodores and Admirals – by being more deliberate about what they choose to inspect – can bend the surface force towards victory.

LT Spike Dearing is a Surface Warfare Officer and Integrated Air and Missile Defense Warfare Tactics Instructor serving on USS JOHN FINN (DDG 113) as the Damage Control Assistant.

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government entity. 

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 1, 2024) Petty Officer 1st Class Nikolai Raab stands watch in the combat information center (CIC) aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin Monroe)

Announcements

SWO Specialization Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC published submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles on whether U.S. Navy surface warfare officers should specialize.

Authors offered a variety of viewpoints on this long-running debate. These included arguments for different forms of specialization, making changes within the current generalist system, and other perspectives. As the global threat environment intensifies, the U.S. Navy’s SWO community may continue to reexamine its professional structure to stay effective.

The lineup is below, and we thank these authors for their excellent contributions.

“The Commanding Officer Must Be a Fighting Engineer — Surface Warfare and Generalism,” by Rob Watts

“Authors advocating each approach have employed personal experience and beliefs, historical analysis, and comparisons with other navies to make their cases. Data has had little role in this debate. To add data to this discussion, this author collected and analyzed information about the careers of current (as of December 1, 2025) destroyer commanding officers and executive officers encompassing 148 people across 74 ships.”

“SWO Specialization: Specialize by Platform Groups to Win the High-End Fight, Pt. 1,” by JR Dinglasan

“Perhaps the most hotly debated reform to improve warfighting skill is the specialization of the SWO community – proposed in the wake of the 2017 collisions but not implemented. Of myriad proposals, SWO specialization is the single most effective structural change the community can undertake to substantially increase the surface force’s tactical proficiency in the long term.”

“The Merchant Marine Specialized 100 years ago. The Navy should have then, and needs to now,” by Jeff Jaeger

“The time was a century ago for the SWO officer corps to accept that the future had arrived, and it is past high time for them to do so now. The U.S. Navy surface warfare community must adapt accordingly, as their Merchant Marine brethren have to great effect, for their benefit as professional mariners.”

“Preparing for the Future Fight: A Blended Career Path for Surface Warfare Officers,” by Scott Mobley

“It is useful to explore these questions from a historical perspective, connect the Navy’s past experience to the present-day SWO debate, and ultimately propose a blended career path, incorporating the best aspects of technical specialization and generalist command.”

“No Time to Specialize,” by Chris Rielage

“SWO specialization was a compelling idea for a peacetime navy – and if we can stabilize the short-term threat to Taiwan, we should return to sharpen the fleet’s long-term competitiveness. Time is just too short for it to be the right answer today. In 2026, the only path forward is to roll up our sleeves – at every level of seniority – and drive the existing framework of the SWO community to be more ready for war.”

“Specialization vs. Warfighting: Balancing Technology and the Human Element in War,” by Gerry Roncolato

“Specialization is attractive to bureaucratic organizations. It promises to solve the problems of building individual system knowledge in the face of extraordinary technological advancement. It works well in commercial applications, but its efficacy in military organizations that fight wars, suffer casualties, and adapt to unforeseen and highly dangerous events is at best unproven. The U.S. Navy is already heavily specialized, and today’s calls are for even more.”

“The Surface Warfare Officer Career Path – An Egalitarian Construct in need of some Improvement,” by Mike Fierro

“With this specialty structure, these navies do not share a unified identity as a force. Rather, each identifies with their own specialty and wear different insignia. Often, rather than unity, there is friction.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 28, 2025) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee (DDG 123) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) steam alongside the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Official U.S. Navy photo)