All posts by Dmitry Filipoff

Iran War Series Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

In the last two weeks, CIMSEC featured writing submitted to our Call for Articles on maritime conflict with Iran. 

Authors covered a wide range of topics, including strategic differences between allies, new paradigms in warfare, and underappreciated yet decisive dimensions of the conflict. The maritime domain has prominently featured in this conflict and exerted a major influence over the terms of war termination. The broader impacts of the war still remain to be seen, but could include a wider degradation of freedom of the seas and lesser readiness for great power conflicts. This war deserves the most careful examination from navies and maritime forces to better understand how the changing character of warfare and global connectivity is evolving the security maritime domain.

Below are the articles and authors that featured in the series. We thank them for their contributions.

The Price of Doubt: Sea Control in the Strait of Hormuz,” by James Jackson

“The strait was open when the bombs fell. On March 4, Iran closed the strait in response to the strikes. What had been a campaign against Iranian military power became, by consequence, a campaign to reopen a waterway the United States had helped shut.”

Hormuz and the Era of Asymmetry: Sea Mines, Unmanned Systems, and the Redefinition of Naval Power,” by Admiral Massimo Vianello (Ret.) and Master Chief Petty Officer Giovanni Giorguli (Ret.)

These threats, once categorized as one-off tactics employed in isolation, are now weighted by indigenous industrial capacities and employed at scale by Iran and its proxy networks. They are systematically integrated with cyber operations and strategic disinformation campaigns designed to destabilize financial markets, energy security, and global communication architectures.”

The Insurance Chokepoint: War-Risk Pricing as an Instrument of Maritime Coercion,” by Bruce Randolph Tizes

Most analysis of the U.S.-Iran maritime war will focus on carrier strike group positioning, IRGC small-boat tactics, Marine Corps Stand-in Forces, and the operational lessons of contested chokepoints. Those analyses are necessary. They also miss a dimension Iran has built as deliberately as its mine and drone programs, one that will outlast any ceasefire: the commercial and insurance layer through which maritime trade is priced and governed.”

The Hormuz Closure and the Limits of Sanctions: How Russia Benefited from Iran’s Chokepoint Weapon,” by Rustam Taghizade

When the Trump administration granted India a 30-day waiver on March 5 to purchase Russian oil, the formal justification was straightforward: stabilize global energy markets after Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. Yet beneath the surface, a deeper story unfolded. The waiver revealed a tension between two pillars of contemporary U.S. strategy—the use of maritime power to secure global chokepoints and the use of economic sanctions to punish adversaries.”

Asymmetric Alliance Strategy: An Israeli Maritime Perspective on the Iran War,” by Ehud Eiran

For the United States, however, the restoration of maritime order gradually became an objective in its own right. This did not produce an open alliance dispute, but it did create different hierarchies of priorities. Israel viewed the sea primarily as another theater through which Iran could be weakened. The United States viewed the sea as both a theater of war and a strategic system whose disruption could undermine wider political and economic interests.”

Chokepoint Hormuz: Epic Fury and Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy,” by Rear Adm. Roberto Domini (Ret.)

The closure of Hormuz must be read through this framework — not as a regional crisis to be observed from a safe distance, but as a challenge that ‘cannot be delegated to others.’ This analysis traces the evolution of the conflict, assesses its geopolitical and operational consequences, and highlights Italy’s maritime vulnerabilities, which if left unaddressed, could lead to the loss of its relevance in the Mediterranean.”

The Iran War Highlights New Realities and Changing Paradigms,” by Paul Viscovich

To effectively impact Iran’s ability to launch similar attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. would have to seize and hold the coastline from where these strikes originate. If the landings are successful, occupation of these coastal regions would force Iran to move its drone and ASCM launch sites further inland, increasing the reaction time for forces to target and engage, while exposing Iranian weapons to ground fire enroute to their targets at sea. However, this carries significant risks of its own.”

The Hormuz Strait Crisis Confirms Nodal Control Will Dominate Maritime Geopolitics,” by Ludvico Domini

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis exposes the inadequacy of some classical geopolitical frameworks. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power, centered on blue-water naval supremacy, and Halford Mackinder’s land power, which focuses on Eurasian continental hegemony, are framed in a dualistic tension with one another. This framing proves insufficient in an era of advanced globalization and asymmetric warfare.”

Convert Merchants into Unmanned Ships to Manage Risk in the Strait of Hormuz,” by Alexander Lott, Kristjan Tabri, and Angela Sooba

Would it be possible for ships to undertake the passage through danger zones, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, autonomously via shore-based control centers? Could crew members disembark for the inbound transit and then board the outbound ships in the ports far from the theater of war? Such a method could substantially change the risk calculus affecting commercial shipping and the safety of navigation in dangerous waters.”

American Naval Mines Can Be Decisive Against Iran,” by Ronald Stewart and Scott Truver

The conventional bombs carried by the Navy’s aircraft carriers could easily be converted to unconventional ‘Quickstrike’ naval mines to be planted in water as well as on dry land for offensive and defensive requirements, generating strategic, operational, and tactical implications.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: March 12, 2025 – Naval vessels take part in a joint Iranian-Russian-Chinese military drill in the Gulf of Oman. (Iranian Army photo)

Iran War Series Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the next two weeks, CIMSEC will be featuring writing submitted to our Call for Articles on maritime conflict with Iran. 

The maritime domain has featured prominently in the Iran War and heavily shaped negotiations over the post-war future. The world economy has been strongly affected, with the military contest over the Strait of Hormuz reverberating across markets. 

Below are the articles and authors being featured, and will be updated with further submissions as the series unfolds.

The Price of Doubt: Sea Control in the Strait of Hormuz,” by James Jackson
Hormuz and the Era of Asymmetry: Sea Mines, Unmanned Systems, and the Redefinition of Naval Power,” by Admiral Massimo Vianello (Ret.) and Master Chief Petty Officer Giovanni Giorguli (Ret.)
The Insurance Chokepoint: War-Risk Pricing as an Instrument of Maritime Coercion,” by Bruce Randolph Tizes
The Hormuz Closure and the Limits of Sanctions: How Russia Benefited from Iran’s Chokepoint Weapon,” by Rustam Taghizade
Asymmetric Alliance Strategy: An Israeli Maritime Perspective on the Iran War,” by Ehud Eiran
Chokepoint Hormuz: Epic Fury and Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy,” by Rear Adm. Roberto Domini (Ret.)
The Iran War Highlights New Realities and Changing Paradigms,” by Paul Viscovich
The Hormuz Strait Crisis Confirms Nodal Control Will Dominate Maritime Geopolitics,” by Ludvico Domini
Convert Merchants into Unmanned Ships to Manage Risk in the Strait of Hormuz,” by Alexander Lott, Kristjan Tabri, and Angela Sooba
American Naval Mines Can Be Decisive Against Iran,” by Ronald Stewart and Scott Truver

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Aircraft is staged for flight operations on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in support of Operation Epic Fury, Mar. 3, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

RDML T.J. Zerr on Strengthening Surface Force Lethality

By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC recently engaged with the commander of the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), RDML T.J. Zerr, to discuss the latest developments and priorities of the command. RDML Zerr discusses multiple topics in this interview, including how SMWDC is processing lessons from Red Sea combat, informing the development of unmanned systems, and generating new solutions through the Surface Requirements Group. 

SMWDC has been at the forefront of developing adaptations based on Red Sea combat experience. What are some key lessons from that experience and how is SMWDC embedding them in the surface force?

Some key lessons from recent Red Sea operations include the importance of continuous learning and advancing each TAO’s qualification—the people are the most important factor. Programs like the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) track tactical watchstander currency and proficiency throughout their career. Aegis TAOs are the first group of tactical watchstanders being tracked, with plans to incorporate Aegis warfare coordinators, SSDS, and LCS by the end of calendar 2026. Aegis TAOs run one of four Surface Combat Systems Training Command (SCSTC)-developed Red Sea virtual scenarios, which allows them to simultaneously satisfy SWCTC proficiency and currency requirements while executing Red Sea reps and sets based on lessons learned. 

Another key lesson is the need for rapid information processing, ensuring that our systems are tactically optimized. Our ability to quickly analyze the combat systems’ data and make updates to our tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a rapid and time relevant manner is critical to remaining ahead of the enemy’s threat development timeline. Finally, it is about taking that information and implementing it in the next round of advanced tactical training. It is a continuous cycle.

SMWDC WTIs were the primary briefers for HASC/SASC congressional briefs for Red Sea engagements updates. Our team in Dahlgren has taken the data from these real-world cases and ensured that insights are rapidly translated into actionable TTPs for the fleet. The result is a Surface Force that learns, adapts, and maintains overmatch in complex, contested environments.

SMWDC’s role is to ensure the Surface Force learns quickly and effectively from real-world operations. These experiences reinforced the importance of integration across warfare areas and rigorous decision-making at the individual watchstander level.

How are SWATT exercises growing more sophisticated and challenging? How are SWATTs informing the Combat Surge Ready (CSR) standard?

SWATT exercises are becoming more sophisticated and challenging by increasing the integration of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training utilizing a new SMWDC LVC Battle Lab located at Tactical Training Group Pacific (TTGP). This allows Sailors, ships, and staffs to train against complex, realistic threats that closely mirror what they could face in operations. We are continuously learning from every interaction the fleet is experiencing, and each of these interactions inform how we design advanced tactical training to challenge every watch team during the advanced phase of the cycle. Last year, we completed six SWATTs across the force, which were more sophisticated than previous events, including injects based on lessons from the most recent kinetic operations.

The Combat Surge Ready (CSR) standard has not changed; ships continue to progress through their workup cycle. What SWATT provides is additional insight into tactical proficiency and readiness, allowing commanders to validate that crews are prepared to surge at a moment’s notice while maintaining confidence in their ability to operate across multiple warfare areas.

SMWDC is launching the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) as a method to measure warfighting proficiency. How is the rollout of SWCTC progressing, and how will SWCTC scores have a real impact on SWO assignments?

The rollout of SWCTC is progressing steadily across the Surface Force. All cruisers and destroyers (CRUDES) TAOs are executing SWCTC with plans to expand to CRUDES warfare coordinators Q1 CY26, then SSDS (excluding CVNs) and both LCS variants by end of CY26. The SWCTC Level of Knowledge (LOK) test bank expanded from Surface Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, and Air Missile Defense to now include Amphibious Warfare, Ballistic Missile Defense, Mine Warfare, and Electronic Warfare. SWCTC scores provide commanders with objective data reflecting the cumulative tactical (maritime warfare) proficiency scores of individuals at the unit level to help inform unit employment and tactical decisions.

How do superior levels of tactical skill and contributions to warfighting development get rewarded in career progression for WTIs and SWOs more generally?

From a career perspective, becoming a Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) is a clear force multiplier. It begins with a 16-week, high-intensity course of instruction that provides a level of technical depth and tactical mastery that simply is not realized anywhere else in the Surface Navy. In 2025, we produced 158 WTIs, which represents a direct and immediate increase in the lethality of the Fleet.

The real transformation, however, happens during the 18-to-24-month production tour. During this time, these officers are not just maintaining their skills—they are defining the edge. They are the ones leading SWATT exercises, driving tactical experiments, and authoring the very tactics, techniques, and procedures our forward-deployed warfighters rely on. During this production tour, WTIs really become and practice the WTI core attributes of warrior, thinker, teacher.

By the time a WTI reaches career milestones like Department Head or Command, their tactical proficiency is significantly higher than non-WTI peers. That edge shows in their performance and their continued career progression. Today, we have 250 WTIs serving at sea, synchronizing our functional areas and ensuring that when our Surface Navy fights, we do so with lethal tactics.

There are many unmanned systems currently in development, which can offer new capabilities and pose new threats to the U.S. surface fleet. How is SMWDC informing the development of unmanned capabilities, while also better preparing the fleet to guard against these threats?

SMWDC informs the development of unmanned systems and prepares the fleet to counter emerging threats by identifying tactical gaps and testing solutions in realistic scenarios. Through the Surface Force Readiness Group (SURFRG) cycle, our Warfare Tactics Instructors analyze current fleet capabilities, evaluate new concepts, and develop actionable recommendations. In 2025, our talented team identified 28 critical tactical gaps and produced 46 proposed solutions, which are prioritized by the Surface Force Commander for investment by the resource sponsor and then vetted through experimentation before integration into doctrine.

This approach allows us to shape the development of unmanned capabilities while simultaneously ensuring that Sailors and ships are trained and equipped to counter potential threats. By integrating lessons learned into advanced tactical training and ongoing operations, SMWDC ensures the Surface Force remains adaptable, lethal, and ready to operate against both manned and unmanned threats in complex environments.

SMWDC has also worked with PERS 41 to ensure WTIs are part of the Surface Development Group (SURFDEVGRU), as well as the newly formed Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadrons (USVRONs) to work on the advancement of these capabilities and concepts of operation and employment. 

What are the lessons from the recent Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG) cycle and how are WTIs shaping the capability requirements process?

Lessons from the recent Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG) cycle emphasize accelerating the delivery of warfighting capability to the Fleet and continuing to amplify the Surface Fleet’s voice on tactical priorities. To achieve this, the process has been adapted by shortening the gap-definition phase for a faster transition to solutions, and by integrating the Naval Rapid Capabilities Office (NRCO) to assess promising technologies intra-cycle. This agile forum prioritizes solutions that incorporate robotic, autonomous, and AI-enabled systems, directly supporting the Department of War’s acquisition reforms by fostering collaboration between warfighters, industry, and the acquisition community, while keeping the fleet’s voice central to the process. WTIs continue to gather direct feedback from forward-deployed Sailors and engage senior leadership to refine tactical priorities.

Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTIs) are fundamental to this evolution, shaping the requirements process at every stage. Within SURFRG, WTIs lead the Tactical Gaps Working Group, analyze operational data to identify critical warfighting gaps, and then evaluate the tactical relevance of proposed solutions. This direct involvement ensures new capabilities are not just technologically advanced, but are also grounded in real-world fleet needs.

Rear Adm. T. J. Zerr is Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center. Zerr’s sea tours include USS Princeton (CG 59), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and USS Kidd (DDG 100). He later served as Deputy Commander and Commander of Destroyer Squadron 21. Ashore, he served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy of Naval Reactors at the Washington Navy Yard; Director of Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council at the White House; Branch Head for Policy, Doctrine, and Advanced Concepts (N5) at Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) Headquarters; Commander’s Action Group Director for Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Deputy Commander of SMWDC; and Chief of Staff, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 17, 2020) Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) fires its MK 45 5-inch gun during a live fire exercise during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Deirdre Marsac)

SWO Specialization Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC published submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles on whether U.S. Navy surface warfare officers should specialize.

Authors offered a variety of viewpoints on this long-running debate. These included arguments for different forms of specialization, making changes within the current generalist system, and other perspectives. As the global threat environment intensifies, the U.S. Navy’s SWO community may continue to reexamine its professional structure to stay effective.

The lineup is below, and we thank these authors for their excellent contributions.

The Commanding Officer Must Be a Fighting Engineer — Surface Warfare and Generalism,” by Rob Watts

Authors advocating each approach have employed personal experience and beliefs, historical analysis, and comparisons with other navies to make their cases. Data has had little role in this debate. To add data to this discussion, this author collected and analyzed information about the careers of current (as of December 1, 2025) destroyer commanding officers and executive officers encompassing 148 people across 74 ships.”

SWO Specialization: Specialize by Platform Groups to Win the High-End Fight, Pt. 1,” by JR Dinglasan

Perhaps the most hotly debated reform to improve warfighting skill is the specialization of the SWO community – proposed in the wake of the 2017 collisions but not implemented. Of myriad proposals, SWO specialization is the single most effective structural change the community can undertake to substantially increase the surface force’s tactical proficiency in the long term.”

The Merchant Marine Specialized 100 years ago. The Navy should have then, and needs to now,” by Jeff Jaeger

The time was a century ago for the SWO officer corps to accept that the future had arrived, and it is past high time for them to do so now. The U.S. Navy surface warfare community must adapt accordingly, as their Merchant Marine brethren have to great effect, for their benefit as professional mariners.”

Preparing for the Future Fight: A Blended Career Path for Surface Warfare Officers,” by Scott Mobley

It is useful to explore these questions from a historical perspective, connect the Navy’s past experience to the present-day SWO debate, and ultimately propose a blended career path, incorporating the best aspects of technical specialization and generalist command.”

No Time to Specialize,” by Chris Rielage

SWO specialization was a compelling idea for a peacetime navy – and if we can stabilize the short-term threat to Taiwan, we should return to sharpen the fleet’s long-term competitiveness. Time is just too short for it to be the right answer today. In 2026, the only path forward is to roll up our sleeves – at every level of seniority – and drive the existing framework of the SWO community to be more ready for war.”

Specialization vs. Warfighting: Balancing Technology and the Human Element in War,” by Gerry Roncolato

Specialization is attractive to bureaucratic organizations. It promises to solve the problems of building individual system knowledge in the face of extraordinary technological advancement. It works well in commercial applications, but its efficacy in military organizations that fight wars, suffer casualties, and adapt to unforeseen and highly dangerous events is at best unproven. The U.S. Navy is already heavily specialized, and today’s calls are for even more.”

The Surface Warfare Officer Career Path – An Egalitarian Construct in need of some Improvement,” by Mike Fierro

With this specialty structure, these navies do not share a unified identity as a force. Rather, each identifies with their own specialty and wear different insignia. Often, rather than unity, there is friction.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 28, 2025) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee (DDG 123) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) steam alongside the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Official U.S. Navy photo)