An increasingly accessible Arctic raises questions about U.S. responsibilities in the region. There are two core challenges. First, Russia’s (re)militarization of its Arctic coastline, coupled with growing Chinese activity—often enabled by Moscow—signals rising geopolitical competition in the region. Second, the United States has an interest in preserving a rules-based order in the Arctic, including freedom of navigation, credible deterrence, and the peaceful resolution of territorial and resource claims.
These challenges spur debate. Not everyone agrees that Arctic threats merit significant attention. Others believe the region represents a new frontier of U.S. national security. What is clear, however, is that no single service—including the U.S. Coast Guard, which bears primary operational responsibility in the region—can manage the Arctic’s growing demands alone. Securing the Arctic requires more than additional icebreakers. It requires an integrated, whole-of-government approach that combines the Coast Guard’s operational experience with law enforcement, intelligence, domain awareness, logistics. It also requires allied coordination across vast distances and unforgiving conditions.
The solution may be a joint interagency task force—a Coast Guard-led structure that establishes command and control procedures for the pressing needs in the Arctic like greater maritime domain awareness, emergency response, and credible deterrence.
Fortunately, the Coast Guard doesn’t have to start from scratch. There are important lessons to be learned from farther south, where the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), a Coast Guard-led effort to disrupt drugs smuggling, has become a textbook example of effective coordination across U.S. agencies and foreign partners.
The need for coordination in the Arctic
Receding sea ice is opening new shipping routes and exposing reserves of oil, gas, and minerals, driving geopolitical competition among Arctic and non-Arctic nations alike. This competition has increased militarization in the region, evidenced by recent Russian investments in nascent Arctic facilities and by more frequent naval exercises to assert control over strategic waterways and resources. At the same time, lack of clear governance frameworks—and mixed compliance with those frameworks—further complicates efforts to manage disputes, raising the risk of conflict over territorial claims and access rights.
The U.S. may not have the same equities in the region as Canada, Norway, or Russia. It also doesn’t have the same raw capabilities as some Arctic nations, with Russia’s icebreaker numbers towering over other countries. But taking a backseat to safeguarding the region would be a strategic mistake given U.S. interests. Outside of principled concerns over great power competition, there are several practical considerations. First, maintaining sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly around Alaska, is vital to ensuring freedom of navigation for commercial shipping and military logistics. Second, as a NATO member, the U.S. shares responsibility for protecting critical undersea infrastructure, including energy pipelines and communications cables, which have been the target of increased attacks in recent years. Third, a busier Arctic increases on the burden placed on the Coast Guard in terms of search and rescue operations, law enforcement efforts, and a wide variety of emergency response duties.
The Coast Guard cannot go it alone. Even with recent funding commitments, and investments in new ships, the service cannot meet the scale or complexity to confront tomorrow’s Arctic challenges. Coordination among U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community is required to effectively address emerging military and civil threats. Looming challenges also require robust international cooperation to prevent escalation and ensure the Arctic remains safe and secure.
The Coast Guard has already taken important steps by establishing an internal Task Force-Arctic in late 2023 to assist with command and control across its two major regional commands and their nine districts. But Task Force-Arctic’s roles and responsibilities remain subject to debate, and there have been calls to transition to an “up-and-out” model aimed at coordination among U.S. government entities as well as partner nations.
Questions remain as to what, exactly, a task force’s mission ought to be and, related, which entities must be involved. What is clear, however, is that coordination and collaboration are needed. Outside of search and rescue operations, where there are formal protocols for emergency response, many of the threats emerging in the Arctic stress operational capabilities and experience. This created command and control headaches within the USCG—and it means coordination across the U.S. government and foreign partners is often ad hoc. A more formal, institutionalized set of contingency plans, communication lines, and coordination protocols can speed up crisis response and assist with allocating scarce resources across the region.
The U.S. has similar efforts in other domains, including the recently stood up JIATF-401 for counter-drone operations and JIATF-CC and JIATF-S for counter-narcotics operations. JIATF-S in particular has been a much-lauded example of how this kind of coordination can work.
JIATF-S as a blueprint for interagency fusion
Established in 1994 to fight transnational drug trafficking, JIATF-S integrates a wide range of US government stakeholders, including the Department of State, U.S. Navy, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and partner nations. The task force functions as a centralized intelligence fusion and coordination center, synthesizing information and personnel from disparate agencies into a cohesive operational structure. It also integrates foreign countries, drawing on the capabilities of foreign liaison officers from 20 partner countries spanning Latin America and Europe.
JIATF-S plays a central role in coordinating maritime patrols, aerial surveillance, and logistical support to enable effective counternarcotics operations across the Caribbean, Eastern Pacific, and Latin America. Its effectiveness derives in part from its capacity to rapidly disseminate time-sensitive intelligence and assign the most appropriate operational asset to specific operations.
Commentators point to several reasons for this success. First, the JIATF-S has a clearly defined mission—combat the drug trade—which keeps daily tasking focused on core objectives while also promoting buy-in across U.S. agencies and foreign partners. Second, the task force’s structure, procedures, and operating methods have evolved over several decades in response to first-hand experiences. JIATF-S has become more efficient over time due to built-in knowledge sharing and the accumulation of trust among operating partners, even as drug traffickers have adapted to maintain effective networks. Third, the task force has reportedly become a desirable career stop for personnel. Staff performance is assessed primarily on contributions to the task force’s core mission, rather than on their home agency. This has been said to boost morale while fostering a cooperative, team-oriented culture. Fourth, participation by foreign partners increases the resources and the geographic reach of the task force. Moreover, these partners have a long history of shared strategic interests and demonstrated interoperability, further strengthening collaborative operations.
While not an exhaustive list, these factors highlight why JIATF-S is widely regarded as a model of interagency coordination, multinational cooperation, and centralized operational effectiveness. Duplicating that success elsewhere, however, is not straightforward and may not be possible in the Arctic due to a number of structural reasons.
JIATF-S is a “coalition of the willing,” relying heavily on voluntary contributions from participating agencies and foreign partners and lacking the standard military authorities of a command. This structure demands relative alignment of interests among partners, both to provide resources and to collaborate in operations. Effective interagency and multinational coordination requires overcoming barriers to burden sharing, communication, and the integration of diverse operational cultures. These issues would likely be relevant for any interagency task force. However, unique challenges in the Arctic make a simple “copy and paste” of the JIAFT-S framework impossible. The most critical is the lack of a clear organizing mission of common concern around which an Arctic task force could organize.
Is the JIATF-S model transferable to the Arctic?
There are several factors to consider in a region so vast and complex. Each of these presents strategic, operational, and tactical challenges to US entities and their partners.
Mission Diversity. JIATF-S seeks to accomplish a narrowly defined (albeit difficult) mission: countering narcotics trafficking through detection, monitoring, and interdiction efforts. The operational tempo, while inherently demanding, is directed toward that singular priority. In contrast, evolving threats in the Arctic are more diverse. These threats include illegal fishing, freedom of navigation interruptions, and increased militarization. Addressing this wide range of issues would require more combined resources and authorities, making interagency coordination significantly more complex than in the JIATF-S environment. For example, a JIATF-Arctic may be compelled to reconcile national security imperatives with civil support requirements. That means the task force’s mandate would have to be broader than that currently held by JIATF-S.
The potential breadth of the mandate has operational implications. The diffusion of missions—e.g., covering both emergency response and threat detection—would likely complicate the initial buy-in from both interagency and international stakeholders, perhaps critically.
Geography and Climate. The Arctic region’s remoteness, ice-covered waters, and extreme weather conditions demand specialized capabilities. The USCG has the most relevant experience within the U.S. government operating in these extreme weather conditions, including navigating ice. As a result, the USCG would likely bear the heaviest burden in coordinating C2 and in executing operational threat response. And yet many other agencies have roles to play in the region. Intelligence community assets contribute to maritime domain awareness, including monitoring vessel traffic. Likewise, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have law enforcement and investigatory responsibilities.
Yet those entities have fewer resources and less operational experience in the region. In fact, even including USCG assets, the Arctic is generally characterized by minimal infrastructure, high costs, and a pervasive absence of fixed Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. As a result, unlike JIATF-S’s relatively narrower geographic focus, the Arctic’s size and harsh conditions strain resources and capabilities. On the one hand, the challenging conditions are precisely why interagency and international coordination are important. One the other hand, those conditions place limited on who has the experience and capability to participate in joint efforts.
Geopolitical Dynamics. JIATF-S activities have at least nominal buy-in from governments across the area of responsibility. In the Arctic, however, there are more pressing geopolitical tensions, implying that Arctic nations are less aligned in their interests and willingness to cooperate with one another. Russia’s military buildup and China’s self-declared status as a “near-Arctic state” complicate consensus. Militarization concerns, particularly related to air and missile defense assets, engender significant disagreements. Even among U.S. allies and Arctic Council members, interests are not always aligned. As a result, building and sustaining a coalition of foreign partners in an Arctic task force setting will be more fraught politically, with less overlap in shared goals, interests, and missions.
Experience. JIATF-S is the product of decades of trial, error, and adjustment. It started as a heavily siloed set of independent task force efforts that was combined and refined since the late 1980s into the well-oiled machine operating today. Similar efforts in the Arctic may be able to borrow some of that experience. However, the unique challenges, including geographic, geopolitical, and mission complexities imply that achieving similar effectiveness would likely require significant time, sustained investment, and persistent trust-building among partners. The deficiency of established, routine combined operations in the High North signifies that the foundational trust required for interagency personnel to execute rapid, mission-critical decisions is currently absent.
Moving Forward
These challenges do not necessarily preclude the establishment of a JIATF-S-like organization in the Arctic. Rather, they highlight some of the inherent difficulties replicating this model from one region to another with fundamentally different mission sets, geography, infrastructure, and operating conditions. Overcoming these challenges would require two foundational features.
First, an Arctic task force must be given a clear mandate from Washington that defines its mission set, assigns dedicated resources, and clarifies the boundaries of the command’s authority across U.S. agencies and allied partners. We’ve stressed here that, at a minimum, a JIATF-Arctic must facilitate coordination and cooperation across—and outside—U.S. entities with roles and responsibilities in the region. This means ensuring that intelligence-sharing and communications channels are formalized rather than ad hoc. It also means developing defined protocols for tomorrow’s contingencies.
However, the mission set remains an open question. One thing the U.S. must consider is which foreign partners to include. If the U.S. goal is balancing adversary influence in the region, then the mission set—and membership—of the task force may focus on allied interests. But there’s also a different approach, one that includes Russia (and potentially China) to institutionalize cooperation around shared vulnerabilities in the region. That model would better approximate the Arctic Council’s structure, but could go beyond the Council’s core initiatives, which focus largely on environmental concerns.
Second, it should adopt decision-making and organizational structures that promote learning, flexibility, and adaptation, much as JIATF-S did through decades of trial and error. This would require fostering an organizational culture that incentivizes cross-agency collaboration and implements the use of embedded rotational staff to cultivate long-term personal and institutional trust. Together, these two features, when fully actualized, would provide the foundational elements for an effective joint interagency C2 model in the Arctic—enabling coordination among U.S. agencies and multinational partners, even amid the region’s extreme conditions and complex security dynamics.
Looking forward, such a task force could complement existing Arctic security structures like the Arctic Council, NORAD, and NATO, by providing a persistent, integrated U.S.-led framework for managing emerging threats, sharing intelligence, and synchronizing interagency and multinational C2 across air, land, and maritime domains. Ultimately, the question is not whether an Arctic task force could work, but whether the United States can afford to approach the region without one.
Jeffrey Kucik, Ph.D., is a Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Global Fellow at the Wahba Initiative for Strategic Competition at New York University.
Veronica De Allende, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses.
The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of CNA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, or the U.S. government.
Featured Image: The Coast Guard Cutter Stratton from Alameda, Calif., steams near an ice floe in the Arctic Ocean during Operation Arctic Shield 2014 Sept. 14, 2014. (Coast Guard photo courtesy of Cutter Statton)
Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.
This article will outline the reasons proponents feel the high north has increased value, examine the actual strategic value of each, and show that none is sufficient to divert scarce resources from higher value theaters. Strategy should serve as an appetite suppressant to keep the nation from committing to peripheral missions at the expense of critical ones.1
The 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy was justifiably “prudent and measured,” limiting DOD actions to enhancing domain awareness, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It planned to work with Allies and partners to uphold deterrence and homeland defense.2 The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy did not mention the Arctic.3 In contrast, proponents agitate for the United States to dedicate increased defense assets to maintain access to its vast natural resources, exploit the increased economic and shipping opportunities, and provide for national defense.
Unfortunately, the Joint Force is already overtasked in trying to meet its global and domestic missions while rebuilding the force. It is therefore prudent to examine the actual value of the far north before committing scarce resources to what is, at best, a strategic distraction.
A potential new trade route
The most exaggerated claim concerns the value of the Arctic as shortened and hence cheaper shipping routes between Asia and Europe. Many stories tout the speed and value of the shorter route for Asia to Europe shipping.4
While factual, these stories exaggerate both the volume and the value of shipping using the northern routes. To evaluate the real value of these routes, it is essential to understand their current usage and the limits that geography and oceanography impose. Figure 1, below, illustrates both routes.
“The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the ‘Northeast Passage’), along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in length…Most transits through the NSR are associated with the carriage of LNG from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula…The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands…potentially applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America, but it is less commercially viable than the NSR.”5
While this description sounds promising, it is important to understand the current and potential flow of shipping, the nature of containerized shipping, and the impact of oceanography on its future growth.
Almost all of the Northwest Passage lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Russia also claims that key straits on the route lie within its internal waters.6 See Figure 2, below.
Thus, almost all transits must pass through straits Russia claims as internal waters. Russia has assigned responsibility for managing the NSR to Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear power monopoly, which complicates obtaining the required permission for internal passage. In 2022, Russia also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, a subsea mountain range, as part of its continental shelf. This pushes its claimed EEZ boundaries to the edge of those areas claimed by Greenland and Canada. See Figure 3, below.
Figure 3: Arctic Nations Territorial Claims. (Photo source: Ian Birdwell, “Rival Claims to a Changing Arctic,” Maritime Executive, August 15, 2016.)
The percentage increase in shipping along these routes may sound very impressive, but only because the baseline was miniscule. Actual shipping remains minimal. The Centre for High North Logistics recorded only 97 voyages on the NSR during 2024.7 See Figure 4, below.
Despite continued official Chinese and Russian efforts to promote the route, as of August 31, 2025, only 52 vessels had transited the NSR. Container freight represented only 20 percent of the total. See Figure 5, below.
Further restricting traffic growth, in October 2025, four of the world’s five biggest container shipping companies — MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA CGM SA and Hapag-Lloyd AG — stated they will not use the NSR due to environmental, safe navigation, and transit issues. The fifth company, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese company, has not made a statement.8
The Northwest Passage supports even less shipping than the NSR. As the 2024 shipping season concluded only 18 ships completed the full journey – eight cruise ships, nine cargo ships and one tanker.9
Factors restricting the value of shipping via NSR or NWP
Several major and enduring factors – draft restrictions, unpredictable sea ice, the requirement for ice breakers, and higher cost per container–reduce the economic viability of these routes.
Draft restrictions
Arctic hydrography is particularly restrictive for commercial shipping. The NSR has a controlling draft of 12.5 meters and the NWP is limited to 10 meters. This means the Panamax-class (5,500 TEU maximum) is the largest that can use the NSR but they draw too much water for the NWP. In addition, ships may not have a beam of more than the ice breaker escorting them, or about 30 meters maximum.10
In August 2025, the NEWNEW company proudly announced it had increased its NSR traffic from 7 voyages in 2024 to 13 voyages in 2025. In those 13 trips, it carried a total of around 20,000 TEUs.11 For comparison, the Inira-class carries over 24,000 TEUs on a single voyage. From January 2022 to April 2024, over 800 ships per week transited the Cape of Good Hope and Suez Canal,12 for a yearly total of over 41,000 transits. More ships pass the Cape every 11 hours than use the NSR in a year and many are much larger than the Panamax-class.
Unpredictable Sea Ice
While Arctic Sea ice is steadily receding, this does not mean passages are necessarily or predictably clear. Sea ice moves with prevailing currents with thicker multi-year ice moving into areas where one year ice has melted. As such, moving multi-year ice often stacks up in restricted waters. The NASA image (Figure 6 below) shows how the melting ice on the NWP flows east and closes the route despite major reductions in total ice coverage. It led NASA to conclude:
“Despite overall declines in the thickness and extent of Arctic sea ice, shipping routes along the northern coast of North America have become less navigable in recent years.”13
The fact that the sea ice floats means it is very difficult to predict exactly where the passage will be blocked. This problem is not limited to the NWP. As late as September 2025, “a non ice-class Suezmax oil tanker has been forced to wait several days due to ice conditions before proceeding along Russia’s Northern Sea Route…at very slow speeds in close proximity to the shoreline to find a route through the ice.”14 Even ice rated ships are often delayed, the Buran, an Arc4 rated Liquid Natural Gas tanker “reached the Northern Sea Route north of the Bering Strait on October 29 and for the past three days has been struggling to find a path through early winter sea ice.”15
Compounding the problem of drifting ice, the routes have notoriously shallow water. The channels are not well marked and still surprise mariners. On September 7, 2025, the Thamesborg, a Dutch bulk freighter, ran aground in the remote Franklin Strait of the NWP. It required three salvage ships to refloat the Thamesborg.16 The vessel was not unloaded and refloated until October 9 – a delay of 33 days. Canadian Coast Guard inspections also revealed damaged ballast tanks.17
In addition to ice, Arctic weather ranging from storms to heavy fog often slows transiting ships. While delays are not a significant problem for bulk shipping, they have major impacts on the timeliness required for container freight.
Icebreaker requirements
Paradoxically, as the arctic ice cap is melting, the demand for icebreakers is surging. Russia has 47 in service with 15 under construction. Canada is funding two dozen new ones. Both nations require numerous ice breakers to support domestic industries in their EEZs.
In contrast, the United States currently has two icebreakers with one of those used primarily as a research vessel. The U.S. Coast Guard has also purchased a used icebreaker and hopes to have it in operation by 2026.18 Although the Coast Guard analysis indicated it would only need three heavy and three medium icebreakers, on October 10, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security announced the United States and Finland have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a Finnish company to produce four icebreakers with the next seven being produced in U.S. shipyards.19Given only 18 NWP passages in 2024, it is unclear why the United States needs to increase its icebreaker fleet from two to 11.
Cost
Proponents of Arctic shipping routes note that shorter northern routes will mean lower costs. Unfortunately, several factors mean the cost of shipping individual containers will often be higher. Draft restrictions, lack of ports enroute, slow emergency response, stricter construction requirements, specialized crew training, ice breaker escorts, and insurance costs all contribute to higher cost per container. While the cost of an individual ship’s voyage may be less on a shorter route, the Thamesborg and Lynx show a shorter route does not necessarily mean it is cheaper or even faster.
Bulk cargo is usually shipped point to point so can benefit from a shorter route. Obviously, it makes sense to ship coal, LNG, and oil that is produced in northern Russia to China or India via the NSR. However, due to economies of scale, bulk cargo originating elsewhere may be cheaper to ship via the much larger ships that can transit southern routes. Not only are Arctic-capable ships much smaller, but they must also meet strict construction, outfitting, and crew training requirements which make them more expensive to purchase and operate. Due to the route hazards, insurance rates are also higher. Further inflating the cost per voyage is the requirement for ice breaker escorts. Both Canada and Russia charge each vessel for icebreaking services.20
For its part, container shipping has different cost factors. The most important metric is the cost per container rather than the cost of the voyage for an individual ship. Thus, scale is an important factor.
A second critical metric for container freight is timeliness. Unlike either northern route, southern routes can be part of a shipping network. This is critical for on-time delivery and economy of scale. The desired standard for on-time delivery for containerized freight is 99%. To achieve this goal, container ships operate in networks with “strings” or routes of many ports serviced by multiple ships on a steady schedule. For example, a US east coast to Southwest Asia route taking 42 days round trip serviced by six ships means regular weekly service out of the ports serviced on that route.21
The network described limits delays to a week. Today, much of the global economy consists of subcomponents built in one country, shipped to a second for final assembly of the subcomponents, and then on to another country for inclusion in the final product. Such supply chains are based on just-in-time delivery. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, failure to deliver on time means production lines must be idled, making reliable delivery time critical. As noted, the unpredictable sea ice, infrequent sailings, and often brutal weather on the northern routes reduce reliability. Given the northern routes cover 2,500 miles with minimal infrastructure or support services, weeks-long delays are not unusual.
Access to natural resources
Minerals, particularly those yielding rare earth metals, are often touted as the primary resources of interest in the north. In fact, the Geological Survey of Norway estimated the value of rare earth minerals in the Arctic alone is $1.5-2 trillion.22 However, most of the minerals lie within the Exclusive Economic Zones of the six nations bordering the Arctic — Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the United States, and Iceland. Any exploitation will be done by those nations, and so there is no special urgency to secure them against competitors. Figure 3 shows how only a small slice of the Arctic Ocean lies outside national EEZs. A paper from the Institute for Security & Development Policy also noted:
“Overall, the High North’s … resources have long attracted global interest, but their exploitation is technologically difficult and capital-intensive, and often faces local resistance due to risks to nature-based livelihoods and cultural heritage. … In short, the Arctic’s mineral wealth is both enormous and yet largely untapped…”23
Just as important, rare earths are not rare. The High North is estimated to hold only 15 percent of the world’s supply.24 In fact, in the last year major deposits have been found in Wyoming and Arkansas; these deposits have the obvious advantage of easier access. The issue is not the ore but the refining process. Currently most rare earth minerals are shipped to China for refinement into rare earth metals. If the United States continues to invest in refining facilities, supplies of rare earths will not be an issue.
Oil is another driver of interest. According to the U. S. Geological Service “roughly 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable fossil fuel resources in the world” may remain in the Arctic with 84 percent of it outside the Exclusive Economic Zones of Arctic nations.25
However, the high production cost of High North oil meant the United States government received no bids in the January 2025 Alaska Wildlife Refuge lease sale.26 Apparently, oil firms have decided it makes no economic sense to invest in very high-cost production when there is still oil in fields with much lower production costs. Russian firms are the obvious exceptions. As state-controlled firms, they must continue to invest onshore in the north of the country. Oil revenues are essential to the Russian economy and government budget.
National Security
Two threads emerge from the discussion of the need for U.S. defense of the High North. The first is the need for surveillance to detect any Russian attack coming over the pole. The second concern is the security of Greenland, Svalbard, and the protection of shipping routes.
During the Cold War, the United States and Canada operated the Defense Early Warning (DEW) radars from 1957 to 1985 to provide warning of Soviet bomber and missile attacks over the pole. From 1985 to 1988, DEW transitioned to the North Warning System (NWS). The NWS provides surveillance for the atmospheric defense of North America. Today, the United States and Canada are working to improve the surveillance element of missile defense. Re-establishing the radar system in the High North will be an extremely difficult, very expensive, and time-consuming project.27 A potential alternative is space surveillance. The Pentagon is already exploring deploying space-based sensors as part of the Golden Dome. If this very expensive project continues, it will provide the surveillance aspect of the DOD tasks.
The sudden concern that the United States must field and deploy forces to physically defend Greenland, Svalbard, and the new shipping routes is a bit puzzling. By holding the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, NATO credibly defended the western exit from the High North throughout the Cold War against a highly capable Soviet Navy. Even with global warming, the Gap will remain Russia’s best exit to the west. In the east, the Bering Strait is about 50 miles wide with two islands in the middle.
In fact, the most significant change since the Cold War has been the steady decline of the Russian forces in the region. “Decades of attrition, neglect, and resource depletion have left Russia’s Arctic capabilities outdated and functionally broken.”28 Against the degraded Russian air and sea forces, land-based missiles and drones can provide an affordable option. There is no requirement for U.S. or allied forces to penetrate the NSR. Containerized land-based missiles, drones, radar, command and control systems integrated with space-based surveillance can allow U.S. and allied forces to engage surface ships and aircraft transiting the Arctic. In short, the United States and its allies can control traffic that attempts to leave the Arctic. These systems can also support the most challenging mission – tracking and, if needed, engaging Russian submarines.
Conclusion
Strategy should provide discipline to guide the investment of limited defense resources. Proponents of investing in capabilities focused on the High North point to defending Greenland and Svalbard; balancing the increased Chinese and Russian interests in the region; maintaining access to its vast natural resources; and taking advantage of the shortened shipping via the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Yet, the vastly increased range of land-based missiles supported by pervasive surveillance means it is easier and cheaper to defend the chokepoints at the exits to the Arctic Ocean than during the Cold War. And they will do so against vastly reduced Russian forces. The vast natural resources lie within the EEZs of the Arctic nations, so access requires diplomacy and businesses willing to make arrangements for western firms to exploit them. Military resources will not improve access. Finally, the shipping routes will, even with massive growth, never amount to more than a minor fraction of global trade. So, while there is some value in investing in High North capabilities, those resources will have to be taken from already under-resourced theaters with much higher strategic value. Strategy requires allotting scarce assets to priority missions – the High North is not one of them.
While there is essentially no need for major military investment in the High North, the United States should continue to engage concerning environmental issues and apply sanctions against violators. It should also reduce its icebreaker contract to the maximum of six suggested by the Coast Guard. While the current two icebreakers may be insufficient, the proposed buy is much too large. It will take shipbuilding resources away from the Navy at a time when the fleet is understrength and has no path to sufficient numbers of ships. The U.S. can continue to maintain a defense of the High North using the same terrain and maritime chokepoints used during the Cold War. The investments in new generations of cruise missiles and long-range drones necessary to support the priority theaters will also provide a flexible force to defend the north if needed. Lastly, it should not allocate limited DOD assets to the region because high-priority theaters like Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are already under-resourced. These measures can effectively manage Arctic interests within the appropriate context of focused national strategy.
T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He served 30 years in the U.S. Marine Corps.
Endnotes
1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategy as an Appetite Suppressant,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/strategy-as-appetite-suppressant/.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, “2024 Arctic Strategy,” https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF.
3. Donald J. Trump, “United States National Security Strategy, November 2025,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
4. “Arctic Shipping Update: 37% Increase in Ships in the Arctic Over 10 Years,” Arctic Council, January 31, 2024, https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/ and Malte Humpbert, “Chinese Containership ‘Istanbul Bridge’ Reaches UK via Arctic Route in Record 20 Days,” gCaptain, October 13, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-containership-istanbul-bridge-reaches-uk-via-arctic-route-in-record-20-days/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-5ee6139183-381157581&mc_cid=5ee6139183&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
5. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Updated July 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41153.
6. Cornell Overfield, “Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation,” Lawfare, October 17, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wrangling-warships-russias-proposed-law-northern-sea-route-navigation.
7. ”Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024, https://chnl.no/news/main-results-of-nsr-transit-navigation-in-2024/.
8. Brendan Murray and Danielle Bochove, “China Turns to Arctic Shortcut While Major Carriers Steer Clear,” gCaptain, October 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/china-turns-to-arctic-shortcut-while-major-carriers-steer-clear/.
9. “International Voyages on the Northwest Passage in 2024,” Aker Arctic, November 13, 2024, https://akerarctic.fi/news/international-voyages-on-the-northwest-passage-in-2024/.
10. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.
11. Malte Humpert, ”Chinese Companies Dispatch Multiple Container Ships Along Arctic Route for Faster European Trade,” High North News, August 4, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-companies-dispatch-multiple-container-ships-along-arctic-route-for-faster-europe-trade/.
12. ”Ship crossings through global maritime passage: January 2022 to April 2024,” Office of National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/bulletins/shipcrossingsthroughglobalmaritimepassages/january2022toapril2024.
13. ”Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024, https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/images/153166/sea-ice-chokes-the-northwest-passage.
14. Malte Humpert, “Sanctioned Suezmax Oil Tanker Without Ice Protection Stuck for Days on Russia’s Arctic Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, September 15, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/sanctioned-suezmax-oil-tanker-without-ice-protection-stuck-for-days-on-russias-arctic-northern-sea-route/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-245bcea0f7-381157581&mc_cid=245bcea0f7.
15. Malte Humpbert, ” Russia Pushes ‘Shadow Fleet’ to Limit as LNG Carrier Struggles Through Early Arctic Ice on Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, November 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/russia-pushes-shadow-fleet-to-limit-as-lng-carrier-struggles-through-early-arctic-ice-on-northern-sea-route/.
16. Malte Humpbert, ”Two Salvage Vessels Arrive in Canadian Arctic to Begin Refloating of Grounded ‘Thamesborg’,” gCaptain, September 23, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/two-salvage-vessels-arrive-in-canadian-arctic-to-begin-refloating-of-grounded-thamesborg/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-a458a9f7c7-381157581&mc_cid=a458a9f7c7&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
17. Malte Humpbert, ” Arctic Cargo Ship ‘Thamesborg’ Refloated AIS Data Show, Awaiting Company Confirmation,” gCaptain, October 9, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/arctic-cargo-ship-thamesborg-refloated-ais-data-show-awaiting-company-confirmation/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-400f2f7a4e-381157581&mc_cid=400f2f7a4e&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.
18. Stew Magnusen, ” The Icebreaker Numbers Game,” National Defense, January 13, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/1/13/the-icebreaker-numbers-game.
19. ”DHS Celebrates Purchase of New Coast Guard Icebreakers as President Trump Signs Deal with Finland,” Department of Homeland Security, October 10, 2025, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/10/10/dhs-celebrates-purchase-new-coast-guard-icebreakers-president-trump-signs-deal.
20. Nouman Ali, “The Cost of Icebreaking Services,” SeaRates, Jun 11, 2020, https://www.searates.com/blog/post/the-cost-of-icebreaking-services.
21. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.
22. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.
23. Mia Landauer, Niklas Swanström, and Michael E. Goodsite, ”Mineral Resources in the Arctic: Sino-Russian Cooperation and the Disruption of Western Supply Chains,” Niklas Swanström & Filip Borges Månsson, editors, The “New” Frontier: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and its Geopolitical Implications, September 2025, Institute for Security and Development Policy, https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SP-Arctic-Sep-2025-final.pdf.
24. Ibid, p.109.
25. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.
26. ”Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program,” Congressional Research Service, updated July 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12006#:~:text=On%20January%208%2C%202025%2C%20DOI,the%20lease%20sale%20discouraged%20participation.
27. Sune Engel Rasmussen, ” Inside the West’s Race to Defend the Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/inside-the-wests-race-to-defend-the-arctic-0f04ca7a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAi4UrfELbN8TNIpkiANQ9qkJ409UcY7ybn1KHm71Es8FzKPdjCv2Sk3_6eJxEI%3D&gaa_ts=68efa5d0&gaa_sig=X9bLexZswY1r8pD8-BgF7-BUcPWUSkNZB5DFNXcqGswh-PVRHJkHIZ_O-GK6LEEDyK8b2uDpyvgFayIxLxTHnA%3D%3D.
28. Michael S. Brown, ”Rethinking the Arctic Threat Landscape,” Proceedings, November 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/november/rethinking-arctic-threat-landscape?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PWNov6-25&utm_id=PWNov625&utm_source=U.S.+Naval+Institute&utm_campaign=f01c9a3224-Proceedings_This_Week_2025_6_November&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_adee2c2162-f01c9a3224-223022301&mc_cid=f01c9a3224&mc_eid=e0ac270dd4.
Featured Image: The icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB 20) keeps station while conducting crane operations alongside a multi-year ice floe for a science evolution in the Beaufort Sea, Aug. 9, 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Briana Carter)
The United States’ foundations as a global great power rest in no small part on its status as a regional hegemon. No single country in the Western Hemisphere can make a serious bid to balance Washington’s economic and military might, to say nothing of competing with the close but often-overlooked bonds of trade, culture, and family which constitute vital elements of U.S. strength in the region. Because they are so easily forgotten however, the United States has shown an alarming willingness to take its position in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for granted. The 2022 National Security Strategy proudly proclaims that “No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere,” but the U.S. defense posture in LAC is at risk of being outflanked by extra-hemispheric competitors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first among them.
While the PRC has led with economic engagement in its approach to LAC countries, military considerations have not been far behind. China has funded dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, most notably ports and satellite ground stations throughout the region. Today, Chinese-owned or operated ports dot the coastlines of LAC countries, secretive satellite ground stations collect signals intelligence in Argentina, and potentially Cuba, and PRC-supplied weapons have made their way into the hands of dictatorial regimes like Venezuela. In the event of a Pacific War, these capabilities and more would likely be leveraged by China to collect intelligence on and disrupt U.S. operations within the Western Hemisphere, as well as leverage its soft power within the region to court influence and keep LAC governments neutral or even sway some towards overt support of Beijing’s position in the conflict. While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.
Fortunately, the next three years present a number of opportunities for the United States to meaningfully strengthen its southern flank. Specifically, the United States should prioritize better coordination between its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and strengthen ties with regional allies such as Colombia and Argentina. Finally, any strategy aimed at countering China’s expansion in LAC must incorporate a resource-backed counteroffer to PRC investment in strategic sectors like ports, telecommunications, and power generation.
Why LAC Matters to the PRC
China’s relations within its own “near abroad” understandably figure heavily in mostanalyses of potential Indo-Pacific conflicts and their outcomes. To a lesser extent, scholars have also looked to Africa and the Middle East as regions that would be critical to secure China’s energy imports during a conflict. Even less understood, however, is the importance that the Western Hemisphere holds for the PRC and its ability to wage war from an ocean away. This is a major blind spot, as LAC has emerged over the past two decades as a keystone region for China’s economy and industry, exemplified by Brazil’s longtime status as the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment.
LAC, and particularly South America, is a vital source of natural resources to China. While the Middle East is crucial for China’s energy supply, the Americas are a linchpin of China’s food and mineral imports. In 2022, Brazil alone accounted for nearly 23 percent of China’s food imports, and nearly 60 percent of its soybean imports in particular. Maintaining access to LAC’s rich agricultural industry will be critical for China to continue to feed its 1.4 billion inhabitants in the event of a major conflagration.
LAC is also a key supplier of critical minerals to China, especially copper and lithium. Chile and Peru together accounted for half of China’s copper imports in 2022, while as of May 2024 Chile and Argentina provided a staggering 97.7 percent of China’s lithium carbonate. These minerals are essential for China’s economy as a whole, but also its defense sector as they are instrumental in everything from high-capacity batteries used to sustain fleets of autonomous systems, to the wiring and interconnects needed for basic vehicles and communications systems. More high-end capabilities depend on a staggering variety of rare minerals and metals, such as niobium, a critical component in advanced aeronautics and hypersonic missiles. Brazil sits roughly 94 percent of global niobium reserves, leading the PRC to assiduously cultivate an ownership stake over roughly a quarter of Brazilian niobium production.
Finally, China, like Russia, has almost certainly realized the benefits that a presence within the Western Hemisphere can accrue in terms of capacity for horizontal escalation. Moscow, under the so-called Primakov Doctrine has practiced this frequently, pursuing military maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere as a tit-for-tat escalation in response to U.S. support for Ukraine. In July 2024 for instance, Russia dispatched two naval flotillas to Cuba and Venezuela in direct response to U.S. easing of restrictions on long-range strikes by Ukraine into Russian territory. For China, the cultivation of dual-use infrastructure, combined with support for anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, would surely prove an asset in the event of war in the Indo-Pacific.
Understanding the Risks
China’s current position in the Western Hemisphere presents three key wartime risks for the United States: (1) control over ports and maritime choke points, (2) dual use of space infrastructure to degrade U.S. space capabilities and threaten the homeland, and (3) disinformation and diplomatic pressure towards U.S. allies and partners.
The first risk is potentially the most proximate and decisive in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese state-owned or based firms currently own or operate at least twelve ports across the LAC region. This includes the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on either side of the Panama Canal. The ports are leased and operated by Hutchison Ports, a Hong Kong-based private company which acquired the sites in 1997. While even at the time observers raised concerns over the potential for the Chinese government to exercise undue influence over Hutchison’s operations along this critical maritime artery, over the past decade the PRC’s steady erosion of Hong Kong’s independence only elevates this risk. Indeed, in 2017 a slew of laws, notably the National Intelligence Law, National Defense Mobilization Law, and National Defense Transportation Law, underscored that the Chinese government can enlist the services of any private company for the purpose of nebulously-defined national security interests. Two PRC state-owned companies, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), were also part of the winning bid to build the $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal, a major undertaking which (after serious delays) has at last begun to move forward.
The confluence of PRC infrastructure and China’s impressive soft power influence in Panama opens up a potential nightmare scenario for the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific war. In such a scenario, China could either directly, or through a proxy, sabotage port infrastructure on either side of the canal, disrupting or entirely preventing transit through the choke point for a period of time. Not only would this serious impact U.S. trade and shipping, it would cripple the United States’ ability to quickly shift forces between Atlantic and Pacific theaters. With current wargames suggesting the first phases of a naval clash would result in major losses, the added weeks it would take for reinforcements to transit around the Strait of Magellan rather than through the Canal Zone could prove decisive.
Maritime traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)
While loss of the Panama Canal is one of the most clear-cut risks presented by China’s power position in LAC ports, it is by no means the only way China could leverage maritime infrastructure to its advantage. Ports by their nature collect massive amounts of data on the shape and flow of international trade. The PRC’s planned port and special economic zone in Antigua, together with other PRC-controlled ports, may grant Beijing a one-of-a-kind window into commerce moving throughout the eastern Caribbean and the sea lines of communication which run through it. In the case of ports directly owned or operated by PRC-based firms, like the Brazilian port of Paranaguá or the planned Peruvian megaport of Chancay, this intelligence-gathering capacity could be turned into an operational capability by strategically delaying or seizing key shipments to snarl supply chains for key goods and apply economic pressure on the United States and allies. Finally, presence in regional ports may allow the PRC to carry out more sensitive sabotage operations targeting associated maritime infrastructure, particularly the undersea cables which comprise the backbone of global internet communications. While perhaps not decisive in their own right, China’s position in LAC ports could accord it a host of benefits that are currently underappreciated in planning around a potential Pacific conflict.
Ports are not the only dual-use infrastructure of note. In recent years, reports have highlighted a proliferation of PRC-operated space infrastructure stretching from the very tip of the Southern Cone through Venezuela, and potentially even into the Caribbean. Most notable among these is the Espacio Lejano Research Station operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and located in Neuquén, Argentina. Authorized in 2014 under the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the site has become notorious as a “black box” which even Argentine government authorities struggle to gain access to. To date, two inspections have been conducted of the facility, one in 2019 and another more recently under the Milei administration in April 2024 – indicating that serious political will is needed to gain access. In both cases, the Argentine delegation coordinated with the Chinese embassy prior to arrival, and the overall inspection process was relatively perfunctory, doing little to assuage U.S. or Argentine concerns about the facility’s potential for military use.
Neuquén was notably also the first ground station operated by the PRC outside Chinese territory and capable of providing telemetry tracking and control (TT&C) which enables the maneuver and operation of satellites and other orbital vehicles. The facility’s strategic location in the southern hemisphere was also particularly important to supply TT&C capabilities for China’s Chang’e 4 and 5 lunar probes. Neuquén, and similar ground stations in turn compliment China’s growing space presence in Antarctica where in 2023 the PRC announced plans to begin construction of a new dual-use satellite ground station at its Zhongshan research base. TT&C is not just important for satellites and other scientific craft, it is vital for the operation of hypersonic glide vehicles, which conduct complex maneuvers that depend on ground data links for guidance and to better evade missile defenses. China, which according the Congressional Research Service, has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic weapon tests as the United States, could use this network of ground stations in the event of a conflict to strike at the United States from the south, in doing so evading U.S. missile defenses which are primarily concentrated on northern approaches. Chinese space infrastructure in LAC could furthermore help the PRC collect key data on the orbits and locations of satellites in doing so enabling PRC anti-satellite warfare capabilities during a Pacific war scenario.
The final risk involves PRC use of diplomatic influence alongside dis- or mis-information campaigns to shape the political environment in LAC to its favor in the event of a war with the United States. Key targets in such a scenario would likely be the seven LAC countries which still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Beijing would undoubtedly seek to isolate and pressure these countries to shift their recognition prior to or even during a PRC invasion of the island. China could cooperate with other U.S. adversaries to magnify the effect of its disinformation campaigns. According to one report, in Argentina, Chinese and Russian media outlets work in concert with one another to produce “a virtuous cycle of disinformation.” Critically, these efforts would not need to actively sway countries into fully backing China’s campaign (with the exception of those regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua likely predisposed to do so already), but would instead merely need to convince governments to remain on the sidelines.
China could also use its economic heft as the number one or two trading partner for a majority of LAC countries to ensure neutrality, if not support from countries in the region. Again, the case of Russia proves instructive of how an authoritarian regime can deploy messaging and economic pressure to compel LAC governments. Shortly after his inauguration, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa proposed selling $200 million in legacy Russian and Soviet weaponry to the United States in exchange for new equipment (the United States would presumably pass the weapons it received along to Ukraine). Moscow retaliated by threatening phytosanitary restrictions on Ecuadorian banana imports, while launching a media push to claim that if the deal moved forward, Ecuador would make itself a belligerent on the side of Ukraine. The pressure worked, Noboa relented, and Ecuador’s banana exports continued apace. China, which carries significantly more economic weight in the region than Russia could prove a frightening prospect indeed for any government considering taking a vocal stance against the PRC in wartime.
Taken together, the PRC has quietly amassed a host of capabilities within the Western Hemisphere to give it both tactical and strategic advantages against the United States in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, for its part, has been slow to react to the scope of this threat and adjust priorities in LAC accordingly.
Bolstering Readiness in the United States’ Shared Neighborhood
There are a number of steps the United States can and should take between now and 2027 to gird itself and its regional allies in preparation for potential conflict with China.
Better Integrate SOUTHCOM in Pacific War Planning: A lack of integration across U.S. combatant commands risks cultivating a myopic view of Pacific war. Given the PRC and PLA’s global ambitions, any future conflict with China is unlikely to be restricted solely to one theater. As the above sections have illustrated, there are a number of areas where China could pursue a horizontal escalation strategy to gain an edge against the United States. Fostering greater exchange and intelligence sharing across combatant commands should be a priority to ensure the United States is ready to fight and win a war on multiple fronts. One early step could be to create a designated role for SOUTHCOM in key Pacific exercises like the Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare exercise. LAC militaries such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, already participate in this exercise. Carving out a greater role for SOUTHCOM could help bolster U.S. defense ties with regional militaries and build closer partnerships across combatant commands.
Another area for increased cooperation could be a cross-cutting effort across SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and partner governments to tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, a threat which plagues communities and ecosystems across the Pacific. While not directly applicable in a warfighting scenario, such an effort would serve to build greater partnership and information sharing between combatant commands, and build goodwill among partners throughout the Pacific domain.
Double Down on Defense Cooperation: While China has made headway in defense cooperation activities, the United States remains by far the preeminent security partner for the vast majority of LAC countries. However, more can be done to strengthen these ties and build partner capacity to respond to potential malign PRC activity in the hemisphere. One easy step would be to amend the Department of Defense’s Section 312 and 321 requirements that foreign military education training focus on “developing countries.” The Department of Defense’s current standards for designating a country as “developing” prevent partners like Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana, from benefiting from U.S. training programs. Amending these to include a more nuanced standard would open the door to a much wider array of military-to-military engagement.
Furthermore, the United States should seek to rise to the occasion in cases where LAC governments have already expressed interest in a closer security partnership. Ecuador, which is currently contemplating reversing a constitutional prohibition on foreign military basing to allow for a reopening of the former U.S. naval base at Manta could be a key ally in this effort. Argentina, which is currently pursuing an ambitious military modernization effort, and has expressed a desire to rise to NATO Global Partner status, could be another.
Harden Allies Against Chinese Economic Coercion: China’s investments in critical infrastructure throughout the region pose risks not only for the United States, but its LAC allies and partners as well. For instance, two PRC based companies, China Three Gorges Corporation and China Southern Power Grid International, now collectively control the entirety of Lima, Peru’s power supply. Combined with the forthcoming port of Chancay, China has a number of vectors through which it can apply pressure against a Peruvian government seeking to pursue a policy against Beijing’s interests. The State Department could lead a regionwide effort with allies and partners to map and evaluate risks posted by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. The findings of this review should also be passed along to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for review and to help prioritize investments aimed at reducing the amount of influence China can wield over LAC government through its infrastructure projects and trade links.
Conclusion
Future conflicts will not be constrained to a single geographic region. In the event of a Pacific war between the PRC and United States, LAC will almost undoubtedly find itself a zone of contention, whether it wishes it or not. Failure to incorporate this understanding into U.S. contingency planning for such a conflict therefore creates risks not just for the United States itself, but also its regional allies and partners who may find themselves in the crosshairs of PRC coercive efforts. There is still time to patch key vulnerabilities in the region, but a recognition LAC’s important role in future global crises cannot come soon enough.
Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on great power competition, transnational organized crime, as well as security and defense in the Western Hemisphere. His writing and commentary have been featured in CSIS, War on the Rocks, the Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal.
Featured Image: The Panama Canal. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)
In a recent article titled “Is the Moskva-Class Helicopter Cruiser the Best Naval Design for the Drone Era?” author Przemysław Ziemacki proposed that the Moskva-class cruiser would be a useful model for future surface combatants. He writes, “A ship design inspired by this cruiser would have both enough space for stand-off weapons and for an air wing composed of vertical lift drones and helicopters.”1 These ships would have a large battery of universal Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) to carry long range anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles. The anti-ship missiles would replace fixed-wing manned aircraft for strike and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), while surface-to-air missiles would provide air defense. Early warning would be provided by radar equipped helicopters or tilt-rotor aircraft, while vertical take-off UAVs would provide target acquisition for the long range missiles. A self-sufficient platform such as “a vessel inspired by the Moskva-class helicopter carrier and upgraded with stealth lines seems to be a ready solution for distributed lethality and stand-off tactics.” The article concludes that inclusion of this type of vessel in the US Navy would make “the whole fleet architecture both less vulnerable and more diversified.”
The article’s foundation rests on three principles: aircraft carriers are, or will soon be, too vulnerable for certain roles; manned naval aviation will be replaced by shipboard stand-off weapons; and drones have fundamentally changed warfare. From these principles the article proposes a more self-sufficient aviation cruiser would be less vulnerable in enemy Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zones and able to effect “sea denial” over a large area of ocean, becoming an agile and survivable tool of distributed lethality, rather than “a valuable sitting duck.”2 Both the foundational principles and the resulting proposal are flawed.
The article names itself after the Moskva-class. They were the largest helicopter cruisers, but like all helicopter cruisers, were a failure. They were single-purpose ships with inflexible weapons, too small an air group, too small a flight deck, and awful seakeeping that magnified the other problems. Their planned role of hunting American ballistic missile submarines before they could launch was made obsolete before Moskva was commissioned: There were simply too many American submarines hiding in too large an area of ocean to hunt them down successfully.
The article’s ‘Modern Moskva’ proposal avoids the design’s technical failures but does not address the fundamental flaws that doomed all helicopter cruisers. Surface combatants such as cruisers, destroyers and frigates need deck space for missiles, radars, and guns. Aviation ships need deck space for aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft are more efficient than rotary-wing, and conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) – particularly with catapults and arresting gear – more efficient than vertical take-off and landing (VTOL). Trying to make one hull be both an aviation vessel and a surface combatant results in a ship that is larger and more expensive than a surface combatant, but wholly worse at operating aircraft than a carrier.
Consequently, helicopter cruisers were a rare and fleeting type of surface combatant around the world. Only six of these ungainly hybrids were ever commissioned: France built one, Italy three, the Soviet Union two. The Japanese built four smaller helicopter destroyers (DDH).3 In every case the follow-on designs to these helicopter ships were dedicated aircraft carriers: the Soviet Kiev-class, Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi-class*, and Japanese Hyuga-class. France’s Marine Nationale chose not to replace Jeanne d’Arc after her 2010 retirement.
Moskva-class, Mikhail Kukhtarev, 07/28/1970 (the pennant number 846 implies this is Moskva in 1974, the photo may be misdated)
The Moskva-class was a striking symbol of Soviet Naval Power. These vessels epitomize the aesthetic of mid-Cold War warship with a panoply of twin arm launchers, multiple-barrel anti-submarine rocket-mortars and a forest of antennae sprouting from every surface save the huge flight deck aft. They are also poorly understood in the West. The Soviets were never satisfied with the design, cancelling production after the first two ships in favor of dedicated separate aircraft carriers and anti-submarine cruisers, the 6 Kiev and Tblisi-class carriers and 17 Kara and Kresta-II-class ASW cruisers in particular.4
The Moskva-class, known to the Soviets as the Проект 1123 “Кондор” Противолодочная Крейсера [Пр.1123 ПКР], (Project 1123 “Condor” Anti-Submarine Cruiser/Pr.1123 PKR) was conceived in the late 1950s. Two ships, Moskva and Leningrad, were laid down between 1962 and 1965, entering service in late 1967 and mid 1969 respectively. The Moskva-class was conceived as anti-submarine cruisers, designed to hunt down enemy SSBN and SSN as part of offensive anti-submarine groups at long ranges from the USSR.5 The primary mission of these groups was to sink American ballistic missile submarines, the 41 for Freedom, before they could launch.6
USS George Washington (SSBN-598), lead boat of the 41 For Freedom (Photo via Naval History and Heritage Command)
The requirements were set at 14 helicopters to enable 24/7 ASW helicopter coverage, and a large number of surface to air missiles for self-protection. The resulting ships were armed with (from bow to stern):7
2x 12 barrel RBU-6000 213mm ASW rocket-mortars
96 Depth Bombs total, 48 per mount
1x Twin Arm SUW-N-1 (RPK-1) Rocket-Thrown Nuclear Depth Bomb system
8 FRAS-1 (Free Rocket Anti Submarine) carried
2x twin-arm launchers for SA-N-3 GOBLET (M-11 Shtorm)
48 SAM per mount, 96 total
2x twin 57mm gun mounts, en echelon
2x 140mm ECM/Decoy launchers (mounted en echelon opposite the 57mm guns)
2x quintuple 533mm torpedo mounts amidships
One per side, 10 weapons carried total
Primary organic weapons of the Moskva-class warship Leningrad. Click to expand. (Image from airbase.ru, modified by author.)
This concept and armament made sense in 1958, when submarine-launched ballistic missiles had short ranges and SSBNs would have to approach the Soviet coast.8 In 1964 the USN introduced the new Polaris A-3 missile, which extended ranges to almost 3,000 miles.9 By the commissioning of Moskva in December 1967, all 41 for Freedom boats were in commission, with 23 of those boats carrying the Polaris A-3.10 The increased range of Polaris A-3 meant that US SSBNs could hit targets as deep in the USSR as Volgograd from patrol areas west of the British Isles, far beyond the reach of Soviet ASW forces.11 The Project 1123 was obsolete in its designed mission before the ships took to sea, as they could never find and destroy so many submarines spread over such a large area before the SSBNs could launch their far-ranging missiles.
Leningrad sensor fit. Click to expand. (Attribution on image, edited by author)
The defining feature of the Moskva-class was the compliment of 14 helicopters kept in two hangars, one at deck level for two Ka-25 (NATO codename: HORMONE) and a larger one below the flight deck for 12 more of the Kamovs. The greatest limitation of this hangar and flight deck arrangement was the relative inefficiency compared to a traditional full-deck carrier. There was only space on the flight deck to launch or recover four aircraft at any one time. This was sufficient for the design requirements, which were based around maintaining a smaller number of aircraft round-the-clock. However, the limited space prevents efficient surging of the air group, and the low freeboard forced central elevators, rather than more efficient deck edge designs. The Soviet Navy found the aviation facilities of the Moskva-class limited and insufficient for its role.12 The third ship in the class was to be built to a differing specification, Project 1123.3, 2000 tons heavier, 12m longer and focused on improving the ship’s air defenses and aviation facilities.13 Project 1123.3 was cancelled before being laid down and focus shifted to the more promising Project 1143, the four ship Kiev-class aircraft carriers.
Leningrad showing her typical seakeeping in 1969. (forums.airbase.ru)
Among the chief reasons for the cancellation of all further development of the Moskva-class was the design’s terrible seakeeping. The very fine bow pounded in rough seas, shipping an enormous amount of water over the bow.14 On sea trials in 1970, Moskva went through a storm with a sea state of 6, meaning 4-6m (13-20ft) wave height calm-to-crest. For the duration of the storm the navigation bridge 23m (75 ft) above the waterline was constantly flooded.15
A Moskva in drydock awaiting scrapping, showing the rounded lines aft. (forums.airbase.ru)
The Moskva-class also had a broad, shallow, round-sided cross-section aft. This caused issues with roll stability in all but moderate seas. This meant that flight operations could be conducted only up to a sea-state of 5, or 2.5-4m (8-13 ft) waves, especially when combined with the excessive pounding in waves.16 In addition, the class shipped so much water over the bow that the weapons suite was inoperable in heavy seas and prone to damage at sea state 6.17 The Moskva-class failed to meet the requirements for seakeeping set by the Soviet Navy.18 It could not effectively fight in bad weather, a fatal flaw for ships designed to hunt enemy submarines in the North Atlantic.
Moskva in the North Atlantic. Pennant number indicates 1970 or 1978 (forums.airbase.ru)
Project 1123 stands among the worst ship classes put to sea during the Cold War. The Moskva-class had too few aircraft, too small a flight deck, poorly laid out weapons, shockingly bad seakeeping, and was generally unsuitable for operation in regions with rough seas or frequent storms, despite being designed for the North Atlantic. They were not significantly modernized while in service and were scrapped quickly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Many knew the Moskva-class cruisers were bad ships when they were in service. The Soviets cancelled not only further construction of the class, but further development of the design before the second ship of the class, Leningrad, had commissioned.19 In place of Project 1123 the Soviets built Project 1143, the Kiev-class, an eminently more sensible, seaworthy, and efficient ship with a full-length flight deck which saw serial production and extensive development.20
Part II: Whither the Helicopter Cruiser?
Having explored the development and history of the Moskva-class helicopter cruiser, let’s examine the proposed ‘Modern Moskva’. The goal of the ‘Modern Moskva’ is to have a self-contained ship with drones, helicopters, stand-off anti-ship and strike weapons, and robust air defenses.21 The original article calls this a helicopter cruiser (CGH), helicopter carrier (CVH), or helicopter destroyer (DDH). This article will describe it as an aviation surface combatant (ASC), which better reflects the variety of possible sizes and configurations of ship. The original article then explains that such a self-contained ship accompanied by a handful of small ASW frigates (FF) would be the ideal tool for expendable and survivable distributed lethality to carry out sea denial in the anti-access/area denial zones of America’s most plausible enemies.22 Both the design and operational use concept are flawed, and will be examined in sequence.
The argument made in favor of aviation surface combatants in the article rests on three fundamental principles: that the threat of anti-shipping weapons to carriers has increased, that naval aircraft will be supplanted by long-range missiles, and that unmanned and autonomous systems have fundamentally changed naval warfare. These foundational assertions are false.
The threat of anti-ship weapons has increased over time, in absolute terms. Missile ranges have increased, seekers have become more precise, and targeting systems have proliferated, but the threat to aircraft carriers has not increased in relative terms. As the threat to aircraft carriers has increased, shifting from conventional aircraft to both manned (Kamikaze) and unmanned anti-ship missiles, the carrier’s defenses have also become more powerful. The Aegis Combat System and NIFC-CA combine the sensors and weapons of an entire naval task force, including its aircraft, into one single coherent system. Modern navies are also transitioning towards fielding fully fire-and-forget missiles, such as RIM-174 ERAM, RIM-66 SM-2 Active, 9M96, 9M317M, Aster 15/30, and others. Navies are also moving towards quad-packed active homing missiles for point defense, such as RIM-162 E/F/G ESSM Block 2, CAMM and CAMM-ER, or 9M100. These two developments radically increase the density of naval air defenses, pushing the saturation limit of a naval task force’s air defenses higher than ever before.
USS Sullivans, Carney, Roosevelt, and Hue City conduct a coordinated launch of SM-2MR as part of a VANDALEX, 12/1/2003 (US Navy Photo)
The article is correct that anti-ship weapons have become more capable, but the defenses against such weapons have also benefited from technological advances. The aircraft carrier is no more threatened today than has been the case historically. That is not to say that aircraft carriers are not threatened in the modern era, but that they always have been threatened.
The article claims that naval fixed-wing aircraft will soon be supplanted in their roles as stand-off strike and attack roles by long range missiles. While it is true that modern missiles can strike targets at very long ranges, naval aircraft will always be able to strike farther. Naval aviation can do so by taking the same missiles as are found on ships and carrying them several hundred miles before launch. For example, an American aviation surface combatant as proposed in the article would carry 32 AGM-158C LRASM in VLS, and fire them to an estimated 500 nautical miles. A maritime strike package with 12 F-18E Super Hornets could carry 48 LRASM to 300 nautical miles, and then launch them to a target another 500 miles distant, delivering 150% of the weapons to 160% the distance.23 Unlike VLS-based fires, which must retreat to reload, carrier-based aircraft can re-arm and re-attack in short order. The mobility, capacity, and persistence of aircraft make it unlikely that naval aviation will be replaced by long range missiles.
AGM-158C LRASM flight test (NAVAIR photo)
Finally, the article claims that there is an ‘unmanned revolution’ which has fundamentally changed naval combat. This point has some merit, but is overstated. Unmanned systems typically increase the efficiency of assets, most often by making them more persistent or less expensive. However, this is not a revolution in naval warfare. There have been many technological developments in naval history that were called revolutionary. Other than strategic nuclear weapons the changes were, instead, evolutionary. Though they introduced new methods, new domains, or increased the mobility and tempo of naval warfare, these were evolutionary changes. Even with modern advanced technology, the strategy of naval warfare still largely resembles that of the age of sail. As Admiral Spruance said:
“I can see plenty of changes in weapons, methods, and procedures in naval warfare brought about by technical developments, but I can see no change in the future role of our Navy from what it has been for ages past for the Navy of a dominant sea power—to gain and exercise the control of the sea that its country requires to win the war, and to prevent its opponent from using the sea for its purposes. This will continue so long as geography makes the United States an insular power and so long as the surface of the sea remains the great highway connecting the nations of the world.”24
Control or command of the sea is the ability to regulate military and civilian transit of the sea.25 This is the object of sea services. Unmanned and autonomous systems enhance the capability of forces to command the sea, but they do not change the principles of naval strategy.
Sea Hunter USVs sortie for Unmanned Battle Problem 21 (UxS IBP-21) with USS Monsoor DDG-1001 astern. (Photo 210420-N-EA818-1177, April 20, 2021, MC2 Thomas Gooley via DVIDS/RELEASED)
Having examined the underlying assumptions of the article, we must now examine how these ships are proposed to be used. The concept is that task groups of “two of the proposed helicopter carriers and at least 3 ASW frigates… would be most effective… [in] the South-West Pacific Ocean and the triangle of the Norwegian Sea, the Greenland Sea and the Barents Sea.”26 These waters are said to be so covered by enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that “traditional air-sea battle tactics” are too dangerous, requiring these helicopter cruisers groups to change the risk calculus.
The article’s use case for the aviation surface combatant has three interlocking assertions. First is that China and Russia will use A2/AD. A2/AD refers to “approaches that seek to prevent US forces from gaining or using access to overseas bases or critical locations such as ports and airfields while denying US forces the ability to maneuver within striking distance of [the enemy’s] territory.”27 Next, that A2/AD represents a novel and greater threat to naval forces which prevents typical naval tactics and operations, therefore new tactics and platforms are needed. Finally, that aviation cruisers leading frigates into these A2/AD zones for various purposes are the novel tactic and platform to solve A2/AD.
The article is flawed on all three counts. Despite the popularity of A2/AD in Western literature, it does not actually correlate to Russian or Chinese concepts for naval warfare. Even if A2/AD did exist as is proposed, it does not represent a relatively greater threat to naval task forces than that historically posed by peer enemy forces in wartime. Finally, even if it did exist and was the threat it is alleged to be, the solution to the problem would not be helicopter cruiser groups.
Launch of SS-C-5 STOOGE (3K55 Bastion) coastal missile system. (Photo via Alexander Karpenko)
A2/AD is a term which evolved in the PLA watching community and has been applied to the Russians.28 Indeed, there is no originally Russian term for A2/AD because it does not fit within the Russian strategic concept.29 Russian thinking centers around overlapping and complimentary strategic operations designed “not to deny specific domains, but rather to destroy the adversary’s ability to function as a military system.”30 While there has been a spirited back-and-forth discussion of the capabilities of Russian A2/AD systems, these center around “whether Russian sticks are 4-feet long or 12-feet long and if they are as pointy as they look or somewhat blunter.”31 By ignoring the reality of how the Russian military plans to use their forces and equipment this narrative loses the forest for the trees.
The term A2/AD comes from PLA watching, perhaps it is more appropriate to the PLAN’s strategy? Not particularly. The Chinese concept is a strategy called Near Seas Defense, “a regional, defensive strategy concerned with ensuring China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”32 Defensive refers to the goals, not the methods used. The PLAN’s concept of operations stresses offensive and preemptive action to control war initiation.33 Near Seas Defense has been mixed with the complimentary Far Seas Protection to produce A2/AD.34 As with the Russian example, the actual strategy, operational art and tactics of the PLA have been subsumed into circles on a map.
If A2/AD existed as more than a buzzword it would not necessarily pose a new or greater threat to aircraft carriers than existed historically. The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and the US Navy off Okinawa and the Japanese Home Islands during the Second World War experienced threats as dangerous as A2/AD. The constrained waters in the Mediterranean, especially around Malta, kept Royal Navy forces under threat of very persistent air attack at almost all times. At Okinawa and off the Home Islands, the Japanese could launch multi-hundred plane Kamikaze raids against exposed US forces thousands of miles from a friendly anchorage. These raids were the impetus for Operation Bumblebee, which became Talos, Tartar and Terrier and eventually the Standard Missiles and Aegis Combat System.35 The US Navy has been aware of and striving to meet this challenge for nearly a century, just under different names.
Since 1945, the defense has required:
Well-positioned early warning assets, such as radar picket ships or aircraft,
Effective fighter control,
Large numbers of carrier-based fighters relative to incoming launchers (shoot the archer) and weapons (shoot the arrow),
Heavily-layered air defenses on large numbers of escorts and the carriers themselves. In the Second World War, these included 5”/38, 40mm, and 20mm anti-aircraft guns. Today, these include SM-2ER/SM-6, SM-2MR, ESSM, RAM, Phalanx, Nulka and SRBOC.
Well-built ships with trained and motivated crews, skilled in fighting their ship and in damage control.
This methodology does not wholly prevent ships being lost or damaged: There is no such thing as a perfect defense. What it does do is optimize the air defenses of a task force for depth, mass, flexibility, and redundancy.
Aviation cruiser groups are not the appropriate solution to the A2/AD problem. The cruiser groups proposed have far less air defense than the US Navy’s Dual Carrier Strike Groups (DCSG), the current concept to push into “A2/AD” areas.36 The paper implies that these aviation surface combatants would be smaller targets and would not be attacked as much, but if they were attacked, they would be expendable. However, the enemy decides what targets are worth attacking with what strength, not one’s own side. If a carrier strike group with 48 strike fighters, 5 E-2D AEW&C aircraft to maintain 24/7 coverage, escorts with 500 VLS cells, and the better part of two dozen ASW helicopters is too vulnerable to enter the A2/AD Zone, why would two aviation cruisers and five ASW frigates with 200-350 VLS cells, some drones and 4 AEW helicopters be able to survive against a similar onslaught?37 If a carrier cannot survive the A2/AD area, deploying less capable aviation surface combatants would be wasting the lives of the sailors aboard. The rotary-wing AEW assets proposed are too limited in number and capability to provide anything approaching the constant and long-range coverage the USN feels is necessary.38 Even if A2/AD existed as the threat it is alleged to be, the proper response would not be to build helicopter cruisers and send them into harm’s way with a small ASW escort force. The appropriate response would be to build large numbers of competent escorts to reinforce the carrier task forces, such as the Flight 3 Burke-class or the forthcoming DDG(X).
Conclusion: Neither Fish Nor Fowl
The Moskva-class represented the largest and most obvious failure of the helicopter cruiser concept. Their weapons were inflexible and their air group too small, compounded by horrible seakeeping. Beyond the failings of the design itself, their doctrinal role was made obsolete before the first ship commissioned. While the proposed ‘Modern Moskva’ avoids these failings, the concept does not address the problems which doomed all helicopter cruisers. Efficiently operating large numbers of aircraft requires as much flight deck as possible. Surface combatants require deck space for weapons and sensors. Trying to combine the two requirements yields a ship that does neither well. A ‘Modern Moskva’ finds itself in a position of being larger and more expensive than a normal surface combatant, but wholly worse than a carrier at flight operations.
If the aircraft are necessary and supercarriers unavailable, then a light carrier (CVL) is a better solution. Specifically, this light carrier should be of conventional CATOBAR design with two catapults capable of operating two squadrons of strike fighters, an electronic attack squadron and an ASW helicopter squadron, plus detachments of MQ-25 and E-2D. In addition to the previously mentioned increased anti-shipping and land attack strike radius, the CVL’s fixed wing air group can fight the outer air battle, the modern descendant of the WWII-era “Big Blue Blanket,” and do so in excess of 550 nautical miles from the carrier.39 A task group with a single CVL and escorts could exercise command of the sea over a far greater area than a helicopter cruiser group, and do so with greater flexibility, persistence, survivability, and combat power. The range of carrier aircraft allows the carrier to stay outside of the purported A2/AD bubbles and launch full-capability combined arms Alpha strikes against targets from the relative safety of the Philippine or Norwegian Seas.
USS Midway, CV-41, with CVW-5 embarked, 1987. The modern CVL could approach Midway in displacement and deck area. (U.S. Navy Photo/Released)
The world is becoming less stable. Russia and China are both militarily aggressive and respectively revanchist and expansionist. They are skilled, intelligent and capable competitors who should not be underestimated as potential adversaries. American and Allied forces must be ready and willing to innovate both in the methods and tools of warfare. Rote memorization, mirror imaging and stereotyping the enemy lead to calamity, as at the Battle of Tassafaronga. It is important to remember that these potential enemies are just as determined, just as intelligent, and just as driven as Western naval professionals. These potential enemies will not behave in accordance with facile models and clever buzzwords, nor will they use their weapons per the expectations of Western analysts. They have developed their own strategies to win the wars they think are likely, and the tactics, equipment and operational art to carry out their concepts.
English speaking defense analysis tends to obsess over technology, but war is decided by strategy, and strategy is a historical field.40 We must not forget that “The good historian is like the giant of a fairy tale. He knows that wherever he catches the scent of human flesh, there his quarry lies.”41 Historical context focuses on the human element of warfare: the persistent question of how to use the weapons and forces available to achieve the political goals of the conflict. By removing history, and with it strategy, operational art, and tactics, proposals often drift toward past failed concepts mixed with the buzzword du jour. War has only become faster and more lethal over time. The stakes in a conflict with the probable enemy will be higher than any war the US has fought since the Second World War. Novelty and creativity are necessary and should be lauded, but they must be balanced with historical context, strategic vision, and a candid and realistic understanding of potential adversaries.
Benjamin Claremont is a Strategic Studies MLitt student at the University of St Andrews School of International Relations. His dissertation, Peeking at the Other Side of the Fence: Lessons Learned in Threat Analysis from the US Military’s Efforts to Understand the Soviet Military During the Cold War, explored the impact of changing sources, analytical methodologies, and distribution schemes on US Army and US Navy threat analysis of the Soviet Military, how this impacted policy and strategy, and what this can teach in a renewed era of great power competition. He received his MA (Honours) in Modern History from the University of St. Andrews. He is interested in Strategy, Operational Art, Naval Warfare, and Soviet/Russian Military Science.
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
*Correction: The Italian carrier was of the Giuseppe Garibaldi class, not the Vittorio Veneto class as originally stated.
2. Ziemacki, Moskva Class for the Drone Era. All quotations in this and the preceding paragraph are from Mr. Ziemacki’s article.
3. The French Jeanne d’Arc, the Italian Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Soviet Moskva and Leningrad, and the Japanese Haruna, Hiei, Shirane and Kurama.
4. Yuri Apalkov, Противолодочные Корабли, 2010, МОРКНИГА, p. 79, 98 The Tblisi class became the Kuznetsov class after 1991.
10. The first to be built with Polaris A-3 was USS Daniel Webster, SSBN-626. In addition, the 10 SSBN-627 boats and 12 SSBN-640 boats all carried 16 Polaris A-3 each for a total of over 350 missiles.
29. Kofman, It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD. The Russian term is a translation of the English
30. Kofman, It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD
31. Kofman, It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD
32. Rice, Jennifer and Robb, Erik, “China Maritime Report No. 13: The Origins of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection”” (2021). CMSI China Maritime Reports, p. 1
33. Rice and Robb, CMSI #13, p. 7
34. For more on the interactions between Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection see RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream, CNA, June 2016, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf
35. The technical advisor for Bumblebee, 3T, Typhon, and Aegis was the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, who also developed the VT fuse. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA229872.pdf
36. USS Theodore Roosevelt Public Affairs, Theodore Roosevelt, Nimitz Carrier Strike Groups conduct dual carrier operations, 2/8/2021, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130807
37. A nominal CSG has 1x CG-47 and 4x DDG-79; CGH group has 2x 96 Cell CGH and 5x ASW LCS or 5x FFG-62
38. This is due to the payload, fuel efficiency, speed and altitude limitations inherent to rotary wing or tilt-rotor aircraft compared to fixed wing turboprops.
39. Based on estimated combat radius of c. 500 nautical miles for the F-18E, plus 50 nautical miles for the AIM-120D.
40. Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy in the Twenty-First Century’, in Strachan, Hew, ed., The Changing Character of War, (Oxford, 2011) p. 503; A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History, (Boston, 1918) p. 7, 226-7; Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London, 1911) p. 9, Vigor, ‘The Function of Soviet Military History’, in AFD-101028-004 Transformation in Soviet and Russian Military History: Proceedings of the Twelfth Military History Symposium, 1986 p. 123-124; Andrian Danilevich, reviewing M. A. Gareev M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist, quoted in Chris Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, p. 200
41. Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, (New York, 1953), p. 26
Featured Image: April 1, 1990—A port beam view of the Soviet Moskva class helicopter cruiser Leningrad underway. (U.S. Navy photo by PH3 (Ac) Stephen L. Batiz)
