By Benjamin Massengale

Introduction

Much has been written over the last two decades about how cost-effective naval mine warfare can be for the U.S. Navy in great power war. Mines have demonstrated their utility in the Ukraine conflict by both deterring Russia from executing amphibious landings and interfering with Ukrainian grain exports. China has repeatedly cited it as the “assassin’s mace” and followed through with significant resources to deploy them via traditional means.¹ However, the current focus for American offensive naval minelaying is done either as a prelude to open hostilities, or when the U.S. has uncontested air and/or undersea superiority of the battlespace, an unreasonable assumption to maintain against a peer adversary. The U.S. Navy needs a realistic means to quickly deploy naval mines against a peer adversary in a contested environment.

Current U.S. capabilities to deploy mines are limited. B-52s and F/A-18 aircraft can deploy the Quickstrike mine by air and require suppression of enemy air defenses or uncontested airspace to enable minelaying. Undersea deployment via fast attack submarine or ORCA Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) is constrained by a limited number of proficient units available to conduct the mission, restricted abilities when operating in shallow depths, and comparatively slow time to establish the minefield. At the same time, platform survivability is dependent on not being detected, which is a major assumption against adversaries with modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Regaining the ability to deploy mines over the side from surface ships like was done during WWII will be unsuitable against a peer competitor in the missile age unless the vessel has effective protection from attack, is somehow undetected deep in the battlespace, or is deploying them in an area where adversary forces cannot respond in time (essentially an uncontested environment). Helicopter delivery does not offer a better option than already certified air platforms.

Naval mines need a new kind of delivery platform, specifically by either rocket or missile. Mine missiles will be used here to describe this delivery method and differentiate it from rocket-propelled naval mines activated after deployment, like the Chinese EM-52/T-1.

Mine Missile Advantages

Deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method. Interpolating from a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) paper, the fastest means to deploy 40 mines is using two or more B-52 platforms, but it would take over twenty hours to complete (working only at night and accounting for transit time).²

Alternatively, Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped platforms (surface, submarine, or land-based) already forward in the region could deploy the same number of mines in less than an hour, significantly minimizing the window for counterattack or detection while restoring more operational flexibility. Just as planners will rely on Tomahawk and other cruise missiles to eliminate the hardest fixed air defenses to lower the risk of losing attack aircraft, the same argument should apply to offensive mining. Missiles are significantly harder to engage than other mining platforms if detected, and the window to stop them before the delivery of their payload is narrow. By making mining more survivable and shifting the delivery mechanism to penetrating missiles, minefields could be laid in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to traditional delivery platforms.

Possibly the easiest conversion option for a mine-delivered missile would be from existing Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC). The current U.S. ASROC system is capable of carrying a 600-pound payload (based on the weight of Mark 54 Torpedo which would put it on par with the MK 62 Quickstrike mine.^3,4 Other nations have ASROC systems with greater throw weight, like the Japanese Type 07 vertical-launch ASROC, which can carry a 700-pound payload (based on the weight of the Type 12 torpedo) to either carry a larger mine or extend the range of mine deployment.⁵

While these may be the easiest to convert, they suffer from significant range limitations compared to other missile systems and were designed to engage individual contacts rather than work as a salvo for minefield placement. Converting ASROC-like mine missile could still be useful for coastal batteries, where defensive minefields can be deployed within territorial waters, negating the need for extended ranges.

A better option against a peer adversary would be a long-range missile system like the existing Tomahawk system. While it has the capability of carrying a 1000-pound payload (equivalent to the MK 63 Quickstrike mine), we should conservatively assume a smaller mine to account for the modifications needed to ensure safe separation from the missile and landing in the water. It still has significant benefits over an ASROC system in that its range is measured in the hundreds of miles, is designed to operate in contested airspace, and the existing strike planning systems could be more easily modified to support minefield planning. Additional value could be gained from a new system if it were possible to develop a missile and mine combination capable of delivering two or more mines per launch. For Tomahawk, this may require not just modifications to the missile but a new mine design with a better form factor to support at least two mines per missile.

Mine missiles would allow any U.S. Navy ship or submarine with VLS capabilities to lay mines, eliminating the need for a dedicated minelaying vessel and greatly expanding the options for delivery platforms. Developing a capability to deliver naval mines via missiles allows more platforms and joint partners to deploy naval mines, including Army and Marine units. Because delivery would be much faster, deploying craft could quickly shift to other tasking or more effectively evade retaliation. Additionally, by expanding mine delivery to VLS, submarines could execute any mining mission both further away from enemy patrols and in deeper waters while making it harder for invading forces to intercept them.

UUVs have been seen as the future of offensive mining, given the reported success of Ukraine’s SeaBaby system in delivering mines against Russian forces.⁶ But UUVs have limits and restrictions that traditional platforms or mine missiles do not have. Small to midsize UUVs are more susceptible to electronic and cyber warfare attacks that can disable them compared to traditional minelayers. Additionally, in the Ukrainian conflict, 60-70 percent of Ukrainian naval drone attacks were self-assessed to be defeated while fewer missile and rocket attacks were intercepted by Russian air defense systems, making a mine missile a more reliable means to reach the target area, especially as empty coastlines or channels are unlikely to be covered by point defenses.⁷

A missile-delivered minefield can be an expensive option to deliver a field, given how the cost of the missile is added to the mine. Using the previously cited NPS paper, using two B-52s to deploy 40 mines will cost about $11.6 million, assuming $88,000 per flight hour.⁸ Considering a single Tomahawk missile costs about $3.8 million (including payload), seeding the same 40 mines would cost $152 million.⁹ Alternatively, using a cheaper missile like the older RUR-5 ASROC at $1.85 million each (after adjusting for inflation) or $74 million for the field would cost less, though it has other operational drawbacks like reduced range.¹⁰ Either option is still cheaper than losing a single aircraft or submarine and related crew if an opponent detects and successfully engages the platform during a mine-laying operation in a contested environment. The loss of an ORCA XLUUV (at an adjusted $124.4 million each) might be more fiscally palatable compared to high-end missiles, however, the limited number of ORCAs expected to join the fleet, the time it takes to bring a new ORCA on station, and the uncertain production plan for replacement units could make their destruction as undesirable as any other platform.¹¹

Concepts of Operation

Developing the mines via missiles allows allied nation coastal batteries under threat of amphibious attack to rapidly reseed an area previously thought cleared. Mines could also be launched against an adversary’s ports to delay the deployment of an invasion fleet without involving other naval units. For added deterrence, coastal mine missile batteries could also be positioned to launch on warning and sow preplanned minefields while causing the enemy to waste ordnance on launchers that have already delivered their payloads, similar to how some nations operationalize nuclear deterrence. These would provide better deterrence against amphibious landings than standard coastal batteries, which could be destroyed by asymmetric platforms before they have the opportunity to engage a target.

The defense of Tawain scenario is an example where mine missiles could be used effectively. As soon as the defenders have indications of PRC attacks, pre-planned minefields are immediately deployed by coastal batteries (ideally by transport-erector-launchers, TELs) either against opposing ports (mustering amphibious forces) or defensively against projected landing locations before the launchers can be destroyed. Any surviving TELs can reposition and reseed the minefields as required.

A possible alternative to the mine missile is conducting missile strikes directly on ships and facilities. However, one of the primary objectives of a minefield is to shape the battlefield and influence enemy psychology, not just eliminate the enemy force. With the proper employment, a limited number of mines properly deployed can redirect forces and remove resupply/repair ports from consideration, or hazard enemy ships more effectively than if those vessels or ports were attacked directly. In WWII, one bomber in October 1943, between two sorties, dropped only six mines, which resulted in two ships destroyed, redirected a convey (allowing it to be mostly destroyed), and closed that port for the rest of the war.¹² In May 1972, 32 mines were dropped into the North Vietnam harbor of Haiphong, a significant shipping hub, under complete observation and anti-aircraft fire. As a result, all shipping through that port was stopped for 300 days.¹³

Both cases show that a modest number of mines were more cost-effective in suppressing enemy operations than a conventional assault because of the deep uncertainty they inflict on the commander’s mind. This effect could be further amplified if a mix of mine missiles and land attack cruise missiles strike a harbor where the adversary is unsure if it shot down a land attack missile or just missed stopping a missile from dropping a mine. Forcing this unknown variable on the enemy commander’s calculations should adequately justify the higher cost to quickly and assuredly deliver the mines in limited quantities.

Iran is already moving in this direction for mine warfare with the Fajr-5 rocket system, demonstrating the ability to deliver naval mines from a coastal launcher in January 2025.¹⁴ Little is known about the type, number, or size of the naval mines that were deployed, though they appear to be floating mines based on an Iranian state video.¹⁵ The Fajr-5 rocket system has a maximum range of approximately 65 nm, which is useful for standoff deployment in territorial seas and confined waters, but is limited to a 198-pound payload.¹⁶ While light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines, they are still heavier than diver -delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field. Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area. While distressing for nations relying on free transit through the Strait of Hormuz, it does provide an operational example that Taiwan could use in a defensive contingency.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy does not have a strong mining strategy for operating in a contested environment today against a peer adversary. Current air platforms are too vulnerable against modern air defense systems and require enabling capabilities and operations to reach minelaying areas. Submarines might be capable depending on the circumstances, but the consequences of them being sunk in a contested area would discourage all but the most vital mining operations. UUVs might be a viable strategy eventually, but require a radically different procurement plan to develop them cheap and in mass that has not been observed in the ORCA XLUUV. Iran, an adversary best known for asymmetric power projection, is demonstrating interest in this concept and how it could be done cost effectively. It is time for America and like-minded countries to usher naval mines into the missile age.

Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and was the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Center. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

These opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not intended to reflect official views or policies of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.

References

1. Erickson, Andrew S, William S Murray, and Lyle J Goldstein. 2009. Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability. Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7/.

2. Holder, John T., IV, Adrew M Murray, Jason P Pinnow, Grant Rodgers, and Samantha Sperry. 2023. ASSET SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE MINING OPERATIONS. Systems Engineering Capstone Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 77. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72545.

3. Lockheed Martin. 2019. “Baseline VLA Product Card.” Lockheed Martin. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/Baseline_VLA_Product_Card_8.5x11_042219.pdf.

4. U.S. Navy. 2023. MK 54 – Lightweight Torpedo. November 15. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167937/mk-54-lightweight-torpedo/.

5. The Type 12 Torpedo – Japan’s Latest Submarine Killer. May 12. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://therandomjapan.com/type12-torpedo/.

6. Marson, James. 2024. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. June 25. https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?st=rreeu9omyfcpc68.

7. Rennolds, Nathan. 2023. Ukraine’s hi-tech naval attack drones have paralyzed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, spy chief says. Augest 26. Accessed March 13, 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-sea-drones-paralyzed-russia-black-sea-fleet-spy-chief-2023-8.

8. Mizokami, Kyle. 2022. “How Much it Actually Costs to Fly U.S. Military Aircraft.” Popular Mechanics, November 16. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41956551/cost-per-hour-to-fly-us-military-aircraft/.

9. USD Chief Financial Officer. 2024. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request. Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf.

10. Global Security. 2017. RUR-5 ASROC. June 12. Accessed March 11, 2025. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/vla.htm.

11. United States Government Accountability Office. 2022. EXTRA LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE Navy Needs to Employ Better Management Practices to Ensure Swift Delivery to the Fleet. Report to Congress, Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 25. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105974.pdf.

12. Greer, William L, and Bartholomew C James. 1982. Psychological Aspects of Mine Warfare. Professional Paper 365, Naval Studies Group, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 15.

13. Ibid.

14. The Maritime Executive. 2025. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t. January 26. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t.

15. News Military. 2025. Iran Demonstrates Fajr-5 Rocket Launcher for Sea. Febuary 22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGlQe1sRZNY.

16. Army Recognition Group. 2025. Fajr-5 Fadjr-5 333mm MLRS. Febuary 3. https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/artillery-vehicles-and-weapons/multiple-launch-rocket-systems/fadjr-5-333mm-iran-uk.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG-89) launches an RUM-139 VL-ASROC anti-submarine rocket during a live-fire exercise off Guam. (U.S. Navy photo)

This article originally featured on the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Max Schreiber

America’s military vessels brave contested waters, hurricanes, tropical storms, and other chaos—so why is the presence of U.S. Navy ships in the Arctic so limited? The Arctic, after all, is no longer just vast icebergs floating around like sentinels of death, surrounded by silence more oppressive than its cold—it is now a major geopolitical prize in the Great Power Competition between the United States, China, and Russia. 

The Arctic has relevance to every facet of this struggle. Energy? The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that one-eighth of the world’s untapped oil reserves and one-third of its natural gas reserves lie in the Arctic. Trade? The Arctic’s three trade routes—the Northwest Passage (above Canada), the Northern Sea Route (above Russia), and the Central Arctic Route (between Iceland and the Bering Strait, through the North Pole)—will soon subsume a substantial share of shipping, by some accounts five percent of global maritime traffic in 2030 and with no sign of slowing down. Political-military risk? The Russian Navy’s elite Northern Fleet recently expanded its area-of-responsibility specifically to secure the Northern Sea Route, and China proclaimed itself a “near Arctic” state as it begins to establish a “Polar Silk Road” of influence and commerce in the region (“near” does a lot of work there). In fact, China and Russia are cooperating in the Arctic, as evidenced by their joint naval patrol near the U.S. Aleutian Islands in 2023.

The Great Powers in the Arctic

The Great Power Competition in the Arctic will be won with icebreakers—highly specialized naval vessels capable of slicing directly through polar ice that would crush traditional ships and withstanding “storms that can ice over superstructures until ships become so top-heavy they capsize.” Currently, complete exploration, shipping, and patrol of the Arctic is impossible without them. Yet, there is a stark imbalance among the Great Powers in their icebreaking capabilities. China, located 800 miles away from the Arctic at its closest point, operates two existing icebreakers (with a third on the way) and is developing nuclear-powered technology for these vessels. Russia has a fleet of forty-six icebreakers, including three nuclear-powered ships for extended Arctic patrols, and has recently launched a new “class of combat icebreakers with high-speed guns and launchers for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.” Both Russia and China have centralized their icebreaker programs under their navies, underscoring their view of these ships as military assets.

In contrast, America’s icebreaker program is in disarray. The U.S. government has only two operational icebreakers—the decades-old Polar Star and the Healy—and neither of them are capable of year-round operations. Plans to build a new fleet of six to nine icebreakers, through the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, are faltering. This joint venture between the Navy and Coast Guard is vastly over budget and behind schedule, already exceeding procurement cost by 39 percent, with the first delivery expected in 2029—four years late. Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. has no serious plan to equip its developing icebreakers with nuclear power. Moreover, while the Navy has some involvement in procurement and construction of the icebreakers, the Coast Guard alone is responsible for their operations. This is important because the Navy is the U.S. military’s forward-deployed, combat-oriented force, while the Coast Guard is structured primarily for homeland defense. This organizational divide means that the purpose, posture, and operational reach of America’s icebreakers are dangerously mismatched with those of its primary adversaries in the Arctic.

The Need for a U.S. Navy Icebreaker Program

Accordingly, the U.S. Congress and the President must enact legislation requiring the Navy to build and operate its own combat-oriented icebreaker program to secure our national interests in the Arctic. The Navy is unlikely to take on this role voluntarily. In 2023, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, underscored this reluctance when he deflected questions about icebreaker procurement to the Coast Guard, making it clear that he did not view the program as the Navy’s responsibility. Currently, the Coast Guard is the only branch of the U.S. military legally tasked with “develop[ing], establish[ing], maintain[ing], and operat[ing] icebreaking facilities.” Without a mandate, the Navy has shown no intention to expand its footprint into the icebreaking business. Notably, Gilday’s 2022 Navigation Plan, which outlines the Navy’s strategic goals through 2045, does not even acknowledge the Arctic as a major global maritime shipping route, nor does it identify potential geographic choke points in the region. In 2020, then-Secretary of the Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite, acknowledged the importance of icebreakers in front of Congress, but stated that “it is not a mission that is central to the United States Navy” and is one it “rel[ies] on the Coast Guard to provide.” However, leaving this critical program solely with the Coast Guard—a service with less than 10 percent the Navy’s size and budget—neglects U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic.

U.S. presence in the Arctic requires a robust naval combat capability which the Coast Guard cannot provide alone. In his 2001 commentary on the differences between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, Professor Colin Gray of the Naval War College identified three unique characteristics of the Navy, all of which are implicated by the icebreaker program. 

First, the Navy “takes its tune … from control (even command) of the high seas.” This means the first duty of “the premier navy, is to control sea lines of communication—to allow or deny access to the sea, thence across it, and finally to the land, where humankind lives.” However, without an active icebreaker presence in the Arctic, the Navy is voluntarily denying itself full access to the Arctic leaving gaps for its adversaries—namely Russia and China, to aggressively expand and militarize their icebreaker presence. 

Second, the Navy’s commitment to “boldly go … where great navies have feared to sail” is undermined by its repudiation of icebreaking operations. Failing to establish a surface presence in the Arctic with icebreakers could yield an “asymmetric [] equalizer” for adversaries, a risk that becomes more imminent as polar ice melts and access to the Arctic increases. 

Third, and most importantly, “the navy of a superpower that aspires to protect commerce and international order globally has no responsible choice other than to pursue excellence virtually wherever military science takes it, however serendipitously.” Russia and China are actively moving the Great Power Competition to the Arctic: Russia is arming its icebreakers with anti-ship weapons and cruise missiles, both nations are regularly patrolling the Arctic seas with icebreakers, and heavily investing in nuclear technology for these vessels. While icebreakers are certainly necessary for the Coast Guard’s missions—including search and rescue, navigation, environmental protection, interdiction, and ice operations—Russia and China have embraced icebreakers as dual-use assets that squarely address the Navy’s purpose. Moreover, the Navy and Air Force’s existing submarine and aircraft presence in the Arctic is inadequate for the Great Power Competition. Submarines and aircraft alone cannot “clear a path for critical shipping, respond to oil spills, or conduct maritime safety and security boardings in the U.S. Arctic”—let alone accomplish more strategic goals of sea control and power projection in the region.

Separately from the mission, Congress and the President should also require an independent Navy icebreaker program due to the Coast Guard’s ongoing struggles in procuring and constructing the vessels. This summer, the United States recently signed the ICE Pact with Finland and Canada to build seventy to ninety new icebreakers over the next decade. While this agreement will help expand America’s icebreaker fleet, it relies on Finland—which can build a polar-class vessel in two years at just 25 percent of the cost of in America—to handle construction. This outsourcing is, frankly, an embarrassment. The poor outcomes in the PSC program may stem in part from its joint structure: since the Coast Guard operates the icebreakers, the PSC program lacks the Navy’s full commitment. The Navy hasn’t fully leveraged its size, money, expertise and influence to drive efficiency or accelerate progress of the program, while the Coast Guard remains constrained by the Navy’s budget authority. Furthermore, each service can deflect blame onto the other in congressional oversight hearings, complicating accountability for the program’s setbacks.

In some ways, the PSC Program inverts the issues between space operators and Air Force leadership that precipitated the United States Space Force. There, space operators’ lack of independence in the DAF—which is traditionally led by pilots—meant space operations and acquisition were deprioritized. With icebreakers however, the lack of substantial direct involvement by the Navy—especially in operations—may be depriving the military of considerable influence that could expedite and improve the development of these critical vessels.

Conclusion

The Arctic is poised to become a critical arena in the Great Power Competition. Thus, to ensure the U.S. is strategically postured in this region, incoming-President Donald J. Trump should work with Congress to enact legislation mandating that the Navy build its own combat-oriented icebreaker fleet—which, upon completion, can sustain a U.S. surface warfare presence in the Arctic.

By Bakhtiyar Askaruly

Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country, relying heavily on a resource-exporting economy, with the main route to international markets going through Russian territory.¹ For many years, Kazakhstan did not experience any interruptions while exporting its resources, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s economic and security stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station in the Black Sea port to draw Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring different routes for its resource exports. The Caspian Sea offers a promising option but will require sea lines of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being” to protect its lines of communication, guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea.²

80 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gas exports.³ 90 percent of those oil exports go to European markets through Russian territory via pipelines.⁴ Kazakhstan’s reliance on energy exports places the country in a vulnerable position that is now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation several times in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen foreign policy. On March 20, 2022, high seas in the Black Sea allegedly damaged the oil pumping station, but under nefarious circumstances. During the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan lost up to 300 million dollars in revenues.⁵ Before this event, reports surfaced that Kazakhstan chose not to send troops to Ukraine to fight alongside Russian forces.⁶ On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station in the Black Sea a second time due to discovered malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.⁷ The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian local court halted exports under the guise of an oil spill.⁸

In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the development of alternative routes for oil export. He directed a study to examine the construction of an underwater pipeline and the use of an oil tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea.⁹ Similar proposals for an underwater pipeline took place in the 1990s but remained blueprints and mockups. In the 1990’s U.S. companies undertook the Transcaspian gas pipeline project, which was aimed to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a new position in the State Department for Caspian gas and oil projects. In turn, Russia appointed two high-level government representatives to address the Caspian issues. Moscow also agreed with Iran for strategic energy cooperation in the region, meant to block any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not under Russia’s control or influence.¹⁰ Both countries used the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea to impede any further development of energy transfer options.

In 2018, the Caspian Convention regional countries signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.¹¹ This new legal status for the Caspian Sea allows Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit options. This project’s completion remains uncertain due to Russia’s opposition. Another option for Kazakhstan is to build a tanker fleet and expand port capabilities. In the future, a Caspian oil tanker fleet could move up to 30 percent of oil exports through the Caspian Sea.¹² However, oil tankers in the Caspian remain vulnerable to adversaries’ provocations without appropriate protection offered by the Corbettian concept of a “Fleet in Being,” providing security to a friendly fleet, and defending against unwarranted attacks.

The military balance of power in the Caspian Sea is shared between five countries: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “local command” of the Caspian Sea with its relatively significant fleet for this isolated body of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, including two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, four patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six landing craft, and a gunboat.¹³ Iran’s fleet comprises one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, four submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet comprises two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.

Kazakhstan’s present naval fleet remains inferior compared to the top threat. Russian and Iranian cooperation further compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious position. Kazakhstan’s fleet only patrols the littorals and provides security for offshore oil extraction.

In the face of new challenges, namely developing new export routes through the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in Being” to ensure the denial of adversaries. The main task of Kazakhstan’s fleet should be focused on quick reaction to any provocation on its SLOCs, which are approximately 300 kilometers in length. This could be resolved by three to five corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with effective firepower, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. More significantly however, a naval buildup might stimulate further militarization and an arms race in the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these risks surface ships numbers should be enough to present a credible threat, but appear defensive.

To ensure that any adversary’s action in the sea would be defeated, Kazakhstan might acquire ISR systems and loitering munitions. This capability combination proved effective in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War.¹⁴ ISR systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would be able to provide locations of ships and targeting information, while loitering munitions could deliver precision strikes, similar to current operations in Ukraine. The main requirements for such platforms can include UAVs that are able to operate beyond an adversary’s effective range while being able to relay the target’s location. Loitering munitions should feature enough explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. For instance, the Harop drone could be used as a loitering munition designed to locate and strike with 23 kg of high explosive. It also can be safely landed and relaunched.¹⁵

The combination of UAVs and loitering munitions can avoid an unnecessary arms race in the Caspian Sea. It is also cheaper to acquire and maintain them. Another advantage of this combination is that they can be used in other tasks in different locations. Loitering munitions can be operated in low altitudes above the sea surface, making them highly survivable. They can an effective range of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.¹⁶ Units that operate this system could train in any location in the vast steppe of Kazakhstan. In concert with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they can also provide a credible deterrent.

Conclusion

In the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports through the Caspian Sea. However, the country’s naval power might not be able to provide secure lines of communication since it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil production, more like the functions of a coast guard. To ensure SLOC security, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being.” That capability could consist of additional corvettes armed with cruise missiles, as well as ISR systems and loitering munitions. This combination promises to be an effective deterrent while not provoking an arms race in the Caspian Sea.

Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a military officer of a Central Asian nation.

References

1. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-transport-and-logistics (accessed 4-30-2023)/

2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is meant by this term, a force than can “dispute” command of the sea.

3. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz#:~:text=Yearly%20Trade,-%23permalink%20to%20section&text=The%20most%20recent%20exports%20are,and%20Germany%20(%243.82B) (accessed 4-30-2023)…

4. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/07/23/russia-could-stop-the-transit-of-kazakh-oil-to-europe/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

5. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/uscherb-ot-avarii-na-ktk-nazval-ministr-finansov-466764/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

6. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1289976/ncrd1289985#liveBlogCards (accessed 4-30-2023.

7. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-russia-frictions-over-ukraine-war-go-public (accessed 4-30-2023).

8. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-court-suspends-oil-flows-through-caspian-pipeline-2022-07-06/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

9. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstan-needs-diversify-oil-supply-routes-tokayev-says-2022-07-07/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.

11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Commission, Energy Security Program Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO association of Canada).

12. https://astanatimes.com/2023/03/kazakhstan-on-its-way-to-oil-supply-diversification/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

13. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/caspian-flotilla-russias-offensive-reinvention

14. John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die, (Oxford, UK: Casemate Publisher, 2022).

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

Featured Image: A Russian Navy Caspian Flotilla warship fires a Kalibr-NK cruise missile during naval drills. (Photo via Russian Ministry of Defense)