Tag Archives: Sea Control

The CIMSEC Holiday Reading List 2022

By the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast Team

Happy holidays Shipmates! We’ve have put our heads together for our third annual Holiday Reading List. Below you’ll find a selection of books that we’ve read and enjoyed over the last year and some that we plan on enjoying in the future (and that we think you might enjoy, too). And of course, it should come as no surprise that we’ve interviewed more than a few of the authors we have recommended. Enjoy, and happy holidays from the CIMSEC team to all our readers and listeners!

Joshua Groover
Sea Control Associate Producer

Freaks of a Feather by Kacy Tellessen

The book that started it all, Freaks of a Feather led me down a rabbit hole of memoirs written by Marines. Tellessen, a Marine Corps machine gunner and the alleged only Marine to ever carry a .50-cal receiver the full 20 kilometers during the final hike at the School of Infantry, tells the story of his time in the Marine Corps. He was deployed twice to Iraq and saw significant combat during his first deployment. Tellessen’s relaxed tone and honesty make for an interesting read that grapples with the trials of combat, and its long-term impacts on the individual.

Guns Up! by Johnnie M. Clark

My favorite read this year, Guns Up! follows Johnnie Clark, a Marine Corps machine gunner in the famed 5th Marine Regiment, through the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The book is a gripping testament to the courage, dedication, and grit displayed by Clark and his fellow Marines during the Tet Offensive – I could hardly put it down when I was reading it!

With The Old Breed by E.B. Sledge

A Marine Corps and American Classic, With The Old Breed puts you in the shoes of E.B. Sledge aka “Sledgehammer” through his time in the Pacific during the Second World War. Sledgehammer served as a mortarman in the 5th Marine regiment. He chronicles the heroism, bravery, and sacrifice shown by Marines fighting in the Pacific, and the horrors and ravaging effects of war through his experiences at Peleliu and Okinawa.

19 Stars by Edgar F. Puryear Jr.

If you are looking for a book on leadership in the military, look no further. 19 Stars documents the “military character and leadership” of generals George S. Patton, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George C. Marshall. The book is informative and provides the reader with excellent templates on how to lead themselves.

To Be Read:

The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman

Very excited to read this book given how recent the US withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred. Ackerman is a retired Marine and former CIA paramilitary officer who spent considerable time deployed to Afghanistan. He also played a significant role in the evacuation of Afghan nationals who helped the Coalition in Afghanistan. In the book, Ackerman documents this and other events that occurred in the week leading up to the U.S. withdrawal. The first part of the book sucked me right in – can’t wait to read the rest! Ackerman talked to us for Sea Control 247 about his recent book War in 2034.

Anna McNeil
Sea Control Co-Host

Best Cutters of the Best Coast Guard by The Claw of Knowledge

This much-anticipated Kickstarter project is the author’s second book. Written to honor the crews of the Coast Guard’s most famous ships by connecting their efforts in a long blue line, this effort reflects on just how significant (and often overlooked) an impact each ship can have over the span of their operational service. Illustrated with the plucky sort of self-effacing humor that has endeared the author to Coasties everywhere, this book is nonetheless an extensively researched and smartly assembled account of relatable events given historical context. You won’t want to miss it, and we simply must have the author on the podcast once he or she is ready for a book tour!

Maritime Cybersecurity by Dr. Gary Kessler and Dr. Steven Shepard 

This 2022 refresh to the highly regarded original has been well0received by maritime security professionals everywhere. Chock full of case studies and practical content, this is an excellent reference written by experts in their craft. Check out CIMSEC Sea Control Episode 293 to hear from Dr. Kessler and Dr. Diane Zorri on cyber threats and chokepoints.

This is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race by Nicole Perlroth

Recommended to me by an academic well-versed in both engineering and legal disciplines, this New York Times Best-Seller is a journalist’s account of how a single conversation overheard by chance led her down a winding path of intrigue and strategic competition. This book promises to be an interesting read, and to give context to how we have arrived in an era of modern ‘bug bounty’ programs. 

The Phoenix Project by Gene Kim, Kevin Behr and George Spafford

This book is a fictional account an Information Technology employee at a big business. You might not think this is for you at first blush, but it was recommended to me when asked IT professionals for a case study on successful ‘steering the boat’ of an enterprise’s security architecture to head in a new direction. If you’d like a pragmatic solution which gives you hope for your own organization’s security architecture challenges, you might want to read this book. Not to be confused with The Phoenix Program.

Red Famine by Anne Applebaum 

Recommended to me by a geopolitical analyst as “the best book for understanding Russia’s history of punishing Ukraine, and why Ukraine is fighting so hard to push them back.” An Economist best book of the year.

Walker Mills
Sea Control Co-Host
CIMSEC Senior Editor

Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific by Robert Kaplan

After starting with Kaplan’s book Monsoon about the Indian Ocean before a trip to Sri Lanka, I have become a huge fan of Kaplan’s style and read several more of his books. Kaplan’s blend of travel writing and geopolitical analysis make his work easy reading but leave the reader with lasting impressions of foreign lands. Asia’s Cauldron (2014) is just old enough to be prescient and a great place to start for anyone interested in learning more about the complex South China Sea region.

The End of the World Is Just Beginning by Peter Zeihan

Zeihan is a self-professed geopolitical strategist and bestselling author. He writes in an easy-to-read bordering on flippant style that mask a barrage of data that will challenge your preconceptions on economics, geography, security and great power competition. While I didn’t love the style or agree with all of Zeihan’s conclusions, I have spent more time thinking about this book than any other I have read in the past year.

Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat by Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg

After having reread this book for a class at the Naval Postgraduate School, I am again recommending it to everyone I can. Originally written in the 1980s, it is not ground breaking historical research (Adam Tooze’s magisterial Wages of Destruction would be a better bet for that), but it makes abundantly clear the importance of energy, particularly oil, to military operations. Russian logistical incompetence during the initial stage of their invasion of Ukraine make clear how relevant Oil & War remains, and a reprint from Marine Corps University means you can download it for free.

Magdalena: River of Dreams, a Story of Colombia by Wade Davis

After spending the last three years living and working in Colombia, this is one of the best books about the country that I have read. It comes from an unusual source, Wade Davis is a Canadian who fell in love with the country as a student, but sometimes it takes an outside to truly understand and convey the essence of a place. The book is really an explanation of modern Colombia with the narrative following the Magdalena River from its source in Central Colombia to the Caribbean – passing not only through the stunning landscape of Colombia and it’s rich history, but also all of the strife, conflict, and tragedy that have shaped the country over the last 500 years.

To Be Read:

Adriatic: A Concert of Civilizations at the End of the Modern Age by Robert Kaplan

Adriatic is Kaplan’s most recent book (2022) and it is part travelogue and part memoir, with a healthy dose of Kaplan’s reminisces about the region. After enjoying several of his other books like Balkan Ghosts, Asia’s Cauldron, and Monsoon, I can’t wait to tear into his newest work and I’m stoked that it’s centered around a body of water.

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II by Paul Kennedy

Victory at Sea is one of those books that I’ve heard so much about but have not been able to read yet. I just picked up a copy and I’ve already take some time to look at the beautiful illustrations by Ian Marshall. If you want a teaser or a recap, we did a great episode with Dr. Kennedy about his book for Sea Control 378.

Jared Samuelson
Sea Control Executive Producer

Adrift: The Curious Tale of LEGO Lost at Sea by Tracey Williams

My wife started laughing the instant I took this book out of its packaging: “This is literally all of your interests in a single book.” She was correct and you can listen to the podcast we did with Tracey, Sea Control 340, is great. It’s as much a scrapbook as it is a book, including beautiful maritime art, pictures of Tracey’s own finds, and poetry. There are also informative sections on the long-term impact of plastic on our oceans. 

On Wide Seas by Claude Berube

Dr. Berube is one of the most vocal CIMSEC supporters and a phenomenal Sea Control guest, but that’s not why his book is here. He’s used the book to produce a study of the U.S. Navy in the 1830s, a period overshadowed by the War of 1812 and American Civil War. There’s a particular focus on Andrew Jackson’s relationship with the Navy, technical developments and the intellectual growth of the Navy’s officer corps.

Underwriters of the United States: How Insurance Shaped the American Founding by Hannah Farber

“I went looking for adventure, and instead I found insurance,” was how Dr. Hannah Farber explained her research for this book when she joined us on Sea Control 380. The extent to which marine insurance impacts international trade and economic relationships has become more obvious as a result of the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent negotiations over Black Sea grain, but before that it played a critical role in the birth of the United States.

Cats in the Navy by Scot Christenson

You’re going to approach this book expecting a lot of pictures of cats on ships, and you won’t be disappointed. But amongst all the stills of cats lounging in adorable hammocks, there’s a lot of information packed in: the reason cats started going to sea, cats as a recruiting tool, superstitions, and more. Coming to a Sea Control episode near you!

Working Boats – An Inside Look at Ten Amazing Watercraft by Tom Crestodina

A spectacular addition to any children’s book collection. Incredible detailed artwork by the author and great explanations for all sorts of shipboard gear. If you’ve ever struggled to explain to a younger relative what it’s like to go to sea, this book will help start a conversation with some immersive visual aids. 

To Be Read:

Forging Wargamers: A Framework for Professional Military Education Edited by Sebastian Bae

Sebastian is going to read this and shoot me a note written with the tone a disappointed grandfather would use when addressing his grandson who broke a garage window. I will get to it and it looks excellent! One other great benefit to this book: because it’s published by Marine Corps University Press, it’s free! Click that hyperlink. The whole thing is there! Sebastian has been a repeat guest on the Sea Control podcast.

Marie Williams
Sea Control Associate Producer

The Constitution of Knowledge by Jonathan Rauch

This book is about the epistemic crisis in our public life. “How we know what we know.” How our shared social knowledge matters. And how our institutions matter. Writing in clear, easy prose, Rauch makes a strong case for both defending democracy and not losing touch with reality (it never works out well, he writes). I came away feeling armed, at least in my mind, for modern information warfare. 

Dmitry Filipoff
Director of Online Content

Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front by Michael Hunzeker

Wartime learning and adaptation is a convoluted but necessary business. Militaries need to do their absolute best to properly understand and adapt to future war in peacetime, but many concepts and capabilities will break in the naturally unforeseen chaos of conflict. Institutions must be well-designed to translate combat lessons into rapid military reform in the midst of pressing combat operations. Michael Hunzeker’s Dying to Learn is a gripping analysis of wartime learning in WWI and lays out how the various powers on the Western Front adapted their doctrine and their institutions during the course of great power war. Hunzeker assesses the fundamental building blocks of effective force development, including centralized training, decentralized experimentation, and how leaders properly manage these functions. All modern militaries can benefit greatly from these insights and mitigate the extent to which their warfighting methods will collapse in future combat crucibles. Read CIMSEC’s interview with Hunzeker on Dying to Learn here.

The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War by Mara Karlin

There are plenty of books on the Global War on Terror, yet few if any have systematically attempted to capture the comprehensive impact these conflicts have had on the U.S. military. After having served in civilian national security roles for five different Secretaries of Defense, Mara Karlin is well-positioned to understand how the military has been deeply affected by the Global War on Terror. Karlin interviewed more than 100 individuals for this book, most of whom served as senior general and flag officers during the Global War on Terror. They offered their candid and deeply personal perspectives on the legacies of this conflict. But The Inheritance reveals much more than the personal psychological scars of these wars, which have considerable policy implications. It highlights the fault lines that have emerged between American society and its military, and the military and its civilian masters, which may pose significant consequences for how America will go to war in the future.

Collin Fox
CIMSEC Senior Editor

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II by Paul Kennedy

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost by Cathal J. Nolan 

Victory at Sea is a brilliant and beautifully illustrated capstone on Kennedy’s classic, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It traces the rise of the U.S. Navy through the Second World War to unrivaled dominance in the post-war era. The Allure of Battle is a millennium-spanning survey of mostly land wars. Despite their differing scope and focus, both books converge toward a similar compelling thesis: The outcome of war is usually decided by the latent strength and endurance of the belligerents. Novel technologies, innovative tactics, brilliant commanders, and pitched battles are interesting and often exciting, but both books argue persuasively that these factors rarely decide the final outcome of a war. Factors of national power and geography are presented as far more predictive of victory and defeat. Also be sure to check out Sea Control 378 with Dr. Kennedy.

A Holidays 2020 Reading List

By the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast Hosts

Aloha Shipmates! We at the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast have put our heads together to come up with a “Holidays 2020 Reading List” or perhaps more appropriately named  “What We Were Able to Read This Year…” reading list. We’ve each chosen a few books that we read and loved this year and are at least tangentially related to international maritime security. We’ve also included a few that either we didn’t get to in 2020 or we’re looking forward to in 2021.

Walker Mills

Missionaries, by Phil Klay, Penguin Press, 2020. 

Missionaries is veteran author Phil Klay’s second work, coming after his award-winning collection of short stories Redeployment (2014). Well-received by U.S. and Colombian critics, Missionaries is a wrenching story about several characters coming together in Colombia as the government was finishing a peace agreement with the FARC in 2015-2016. Klay uses his characters and their lives to explore violence at the human, community, and system levels and its impact on the human soul. 

Feeding Victory: Innovative Logistics from Lake George to Khe Sanh, by Jobie Turner, Kansas University Press, 2020. 

Feeding Victory is an eminently readable book about logistics in war. Jobie Turner, an Air Force colonel, breaks down five different case studies in logistics – all unique in their own way. The history is mixed with analysis and takeaways for the contemporary practitioner. Perhaps most interesting to CIMSEC readers will be the Guadalcanal case study where Turner compares and contrasts Japanese and American expeditionary logistics in the months-long struggle for the island. 

Cod: A Biography of the Fish the Changed the World, by Mark Kurlansky, Penguin Books, 1997.

Though over twenty years old, Cod is still a riveting introduction into the world of commercial fishing through a deep dive into the history of a single fish: Atlantic Cod. Fishing is more relevant than ever – in 2020 the United States Coast Guard released an Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing Strategic Outlook,” massive Chinese fishing fleets off the Galapagos attracted international attention, and the United Kingdom has threatened to use naval vessels to protect its fisheries in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Kurlansky’s book is a quick read and each chapter includes a recipe for cod to help deal with the inevitable craving. Listeners can check out Sea Control 206 about the “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the UK or Sea Control 219 to catch a conversation with USCG Commandant Karl Schultz about the IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook. 

To-be-read:

The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare by Christian Brose, Hachette Books, 2020.

Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, by David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Oxford University Press, 2020.

Both of these are books came highly reviewed and despite the fact that I pre-ordered them I still have not managed to read them yet. But I’ve followed the authors’ work at War on the Rocks and intently listen to their podcasting. I’m sure these books won’t disappoint.

2034: A Novel of the Next War, by Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis, Penguin Press, 2021.

Can’t overstate how excited I am for this one. Ackerman is a former Marine who has written several very good books, including the award-winning Dark at the Crossing, and Stavridis has written several previous books about leadership (including another book on this list) and his extensive Navy experience including serving as former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO.

Jared Samuelson

Learning War, by Trent Hone, Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Selling Seapower: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941, by Ryan D. Wadle, University of Oklahoma Press, 2019.

These books are paired because they address the question “how did we get here?” for two different communities in the Navy. If you are a surface warfare officer, you have undoubtedly spent hours in the darkened cold of your ship’s Combat Information Center. How did that space come to be, why is it designed the way it is, and what problems was the Navy trying to solve? Learning War addresses all those questions and, if that weren’t enough, you get a graduate-level discussion of the evolution of the officer corps and some early 1900s ship design. Listen to Sea Control 209 with author Trent Hone to learn more. I thought Selling Seapower did much the same for today’s public affairs community, from its birth in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the development of the collateral duty Public Affairs Officer, and the Navy’s relationship with mass media (spanning early radio to film). 

The Alice Network: A Novel, by Kate Quinn, William Morrow Paperbacks, 2017.

The best possible endorsement I can give this book is that I read it in less than 48 hours while co-parenting an infant and doing my day job. It was that good. The pace is incredible and the historical setting will have you picking up your phone to Google “did X really happen” multiple times. The author’s follow-up, The Huntress, is sitting on my to-be-read pile.

The Riddle of the Sands, by Erskine Childers, Modern Library, 2002.

Originally printed in 1903, The Riddle of the Sands was a recommendation from an old friend and former CO that took me completely by surprise. The book is the story of two friends ostensibly on a late summer sailing expedition in the Baltic and North Seas who stumble onto a sinister plot whilst being pursued by German agents. No less than Winston Churchill cited the novel as a reason the British ultimately established multiple naval bases on the North Sea prior to World War I.

To-be-read:

Grey Dawn: A Tale of Abolition and Union, Balance of Seven, 2020, by Sea Control 163 guest and now host of her own podcast, Friday Night History, Dr. Nyri Bakkalian. 

How the Few Became the Proud, Naval Institute Press, 2019 by Sea Control 184 guest Dr. Heather Venable. I have a literal signed copy just waiting to be cracked open. Massive personal failure on my part.

Wargaming Experiences: Soldiers, Scientists and Civilians, by Natalie Wojtowics, J10 Gaming, 2020.

Battle in the Baltic: The Royal Navy and the Fight to Save Latvia & Estonia, 1918-1920, by Steve R. Dunn, Naval Institute Press, 2020.

This book seemed like a logical successor after reading Michael B. Barrett’s Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands in preparation for Sea Control 168. Cautiously optimistic the author will be coming to a podcast near you in 2021!

Anna McNeil

Can’t Hurt Me: Master Your Mind and Defy the Odds, by David Goggins, Lioncrest Publishing, 2018.

If talks about resilience and hope are ringing empty in your ears this holiday, or you feel depression and disempowering thoughts setting in, this is the book I suggest you begin with. Cultivate the knowledge that you can and will get through to a brighter future. Then, move forward with intention for the new year ahead.

Honor Harrington series, by David Weber, 2002-2017.

Science Fiction. Space Navy. Military-Industrial complex. Vast sprawling strategic positioning and tactical level skirmishes. Personal assistant on the Commander’s shoulder and in her ear. A female protagonist who lives up to the name Honor. The first of this series, On Basilisk Station, was given to me by my grandfather, a retired U.S. Navy Electronics Technician. It was a large part of the reason I considered joining the Navy. The best fiction is that through which we can more clearly imagine possibilities for ourselves in the real world. Fiction lovers can check out the wrap-up of CIMSEC’s Fiction Week in Sea Control 216 with an interview of the winning authors Mike Burke and Nick Nethery. 

The Good Shepherd, by C.S. Forester, reissue by Penguin Books, 2018.

Yes, Hollywood made a movie of this already, but the discussion on social media about the proper use of helm commands doesn’t even scratch the surface of how much justice is done to the seagoing service. Read the first ten pages and you’ll see why I was suddenly inspired to write Steering Casualty and Tactical Signals drill cards.

To-be-read:

Navigating the Seven Seas of Leadership: Leadership Lessons of the First African-American Father and Son to Serve at the Top in the US Navy, by MSCM (ret) Melvin G. Williams Sr., and VADM (ret) Melvin G. Williams, Naval Institute Press, 2011.

Wisdom direct from the experiences of one very special military family, written down and offered to the benefit of anyone willing to read it. This book was written with such generosity and goodwill toward all mankind that it simply must be on my holiday reading list.

The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations, by Christopher P. Twomey, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2010.  

I suppose this could be considered a book about peace on Earth. Or rather, understanding how to use the military to lead options other than shooting wars.

Icebound: Shipwrecked at the Edge of the World, by Andrea Pitzer, Scribner, 2021.

Get ready to be transported out of your own struggles into the tale of the famous polar explorer William Barentz’s year-long fight for survival in the Arctic. Out in January 2021! 

Jonathon Frerichs

Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition, by Wayne Hughes and Robert Girrier, Naval Institute Press, 2018.

 A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R. Holmes, Naval Institute Press, 2019.

During a month-long temporary duty assignment to Naples, Italy, I recognized that I utterly lacked an understanding of how the Navy operates (despite having deployed on three different Marine Expeditionary Units, or MEUs). Seeking answers, I picked up Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations from the Navy Exchange on base. With nothing else to do in the evenings but eat Napoli pizza, I quickly devoured the book and found it immediately valuable in expanding my knowledge of naval operations. Upon completion, however, I found myself thirsting for a better understanding of how naval forces have contributed to obtaining national strategic objectives. 

Enter A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy – a perfect complement. This short, digestible book is power packed with historical examples and an easy-to-apply framework through which to look at the application of naval forces from competition to crisis to conflict. For either the military historian or the naval practitioner, this book is guaranteed to be a great read and valuable resource. 

The Art of War: A New Translation by Michael Nylan, Sun Tzu, W. W. Norton and Company, 2020. 

I have digested bits and pieces of various translations of The Art of War over my career, but never sat down and read it cover to cover. When I saw @teaandtactics recommend the book, I decided I would bite and resolve my academic shortfall. Combining a depth of Chinese history and a nuanced fluency of the Chinese language, Nylan has created a translation that is easy to read, cover-to-cover. Additionally, in her introduction she provides an opportunity to apply the ideas of strategy and conflict to life outside of war. 

To-be-read:

To Rule Eurasia’s Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea, by Geoffrey Gresh, Yale University Press, 2020.

Just received my copy of this book. Upon a quick scan, I am excited to digest the multinational look at great power competition in the maritime domain. Many recent books have focused on looking at great power competition through a bipolar lens (Russia/United States or China/United States) but this book appears to take a much more expansive and systemic look at how great powers compete in the maritime domain. If you’re interested in To Rule Eurasia’s Waves, be on the lookout for a future Sea Control episode. 

The Pacific War trilogy, by Ian Toll, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011-2020.

I continue to see these recommended from military history scholars and servicemembers alike.

Andrea Howard

If 2020 did not provide enough existential fodder for society, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World  Basic Books, 2018, by Pedro Domingos serves as one of the best introductions on how machine learning – and the prospective development of a unifying master algorithm – will forever alter the world. Unsupervised learning algorithms can structure and illuminate meaning from raw data, and the naval-oriented mind will see the innumerable applications from fire control systems to underwater mapping. 

Shifting over to a work that explicitly discusses the impact of cyber developments in the warfare domain, I recommend Cyber Security and Cyberware: What Everyone Needs to Know by P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Oxford University Press, 2014. While exploring the ramifications of the Stuxnet virus and cyber units within the American and Chinese military structures, the authors outline how future conflicts will touch every individual via cybercrime in the financial realm and attacks on infrastructure. 

To round out the two above choices, the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ top choice for 2020 is a strategic must-read. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare by Christian Brose, Hachette Books, 2020 explores the emerging technologies that present disturbing threats to American military superiority, but he also advocates for the development of a battle network of systems (a “kill chain”) to uphold deterrence and ultimately prevent war. 

To-be-read:

For my upcoming deployment, I’m intending to bring along The Leader’s Bookshelf by Admiral James Stavridis and R. Manning Ancell, Naval Institute Press, 2017 to consume the lessons learned from the active and retired four-star military officers’ habits and favorite books. The promised efficiency will be necessary for the small bits of time afforded before hitting the rack and awaking for watch.

Readers and listeners can get to know the podcast team better by listening to Sea Control  214 “Meet the Team!” or finding us on Twitter at @jwsc03@AndreaR_Howard, @WDMills1992, @2BAtSea, and @hoplitemarine

Featured Image: Book collection, photo via the U.S. Naval War College.

There Are No Strategic Chokepoints

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Captain Jamie McGrath, USN (ret.)

Keys to the World

Naval theorist Milan Vego opens a chapter on chokepoint control with a quote from British Admiral Sir John Fisher, who stated that there are “five keys to the world. The Strait of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope. And every one one of these keys we hold.”1 Fisher spoke from an Anglo-centric view, but his point is evident that control of key chokepoints equated to control of national strategic interests. But a century later, with the technological advances in weapons and sensors, and the interconnectedness of the global economy, can such a claim be made today?

There are over 100 straits where international interest in the free flow of trade transcends the interests of the nearby littoral states. Not all of these maritime chokepoints are of equal importance. Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?

Perhaps the strategic value of any given chokepoint is overstated because the ability to truly “control” these chokepoints is significantly degraded in the current maritime threat environment. The focus should instead be placed on strategic seas, and not the connectors between them.

Strategic Versus Operational Significance

Before scuttling the idea of strategic straits, there should be a common understanding of the difference between the strategic and operational importance of maritime geography. Maritime strategy is the science and art of using all naval and non-naval sources of power at sea in support of the national military strategy, with military strategy being “the art and science of using or threatening to use military power to accomplish the political interests of a nation…”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy calls for:

“A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force posture, alliance, and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.”3

The focus on lethality, resilience, and lethality within an alliance and partnership architecture, combined with “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment,”4 and “a global strategic environment [which] demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action,”5 indicate that fixed geographic positions like chokepoints have reduced strategic relevance in U.S. strategy.

Naval operations are defined as the “theory and practice of planning, preparing, and executing major naval operations aimed at accomplishing operational objectives.”6 While operational objectives are chosen to achieve strategic ends, there often are multiple operational options to a support strategy. The operational value of a chokepoint tends to be temporal and depends on the other operational factors of time, space, and force of the particular operation. A chokepoint with high operational value may have limited or no strategic value if other options exist to achieve the national political objectives.

Traditional Methods of Sea Control

The control of chokepoints has long been a primary way to control access to a given body of water. Revisiting Fisher’s assertion that there were five keys to the world, control of key straits meant control of the flow of global maritime traffic and, therefore, the strategic interest of most maritime nations. Warships and merchantmen during the age of sail depended on the prevailing winds for reliable propulsion and shore bases for routine resupply. These trade winds and shore bases funneled ships through specific shipping lanes, many of which transited the key chokepoints Fisher identified. Since transit of these chokepoints was essential, controlling them guaranteed control of merchant shipping and warship movement.

The emergence of steam propulsion removed reliance on the trade winds, but increased dependence on the shore bases that had been established in the age of sail, which were starting to serve as coaling stations. Thus, in Admiral Fisher’s time, his assertion was correct. But since World War II, dependence on shore basing for resupply has diminished. The U.S. Navy perfected at-sea replenishment during World War II, and merchantmen have significantly increased their unrefueled range, both of which reduced the reliance on shore stations and subsequent dependence on specific shipping lanes.

Chokepoints simplify several operational and tactical aspects of naval warfare by concentrating forces. This, in turn, limits the challenges of scouting and screening, because less sea space must be scouted and screened. The avenues of approach to the chokepoint are limited, so the party that controls the chokepoint can concentrate forces or make better use of limited forces available.

Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō’s defeat of Russia’s Second Pacific Squadron at the Tsushima Strait demonstrates how chokepoints simplify scouting. Togo did not know when the Russian fleet would arrive, nor did he wish to search for it in the open ocean. But he did know that the Russian fleet had to pass through the Tsushima Strait to reach its base at Vladivostok. This allowed Togo to concentrate his scouting force of cruisers in the strait and consolidate his battle line inside the Sea of Japan. But what if the Russians had entered the Sea of Japan through the La Pérouse Strait, Tsugaru Strait, or Strait of Tartary? In the 1890s, the limitations of coal-fired steam plants meant that traveling the extra 1000 or more miles without a coaling station made the Tsushima Strait the only choice. Today, however, at-sea logistics provide naval forces greater flexibility in entering strategic seas.

Changing Military Value of Chokepoints

Historically, chokepoints held strategic military value partly because they forced ships to transit within range of the weapons and sensors posted there, and made movements more predictable. Into the second decade of the twentieth century, optical sensors and coastal guns limited that range to or just beyond the horizon. Technological advances over the intervening century expanded that range immensely. First, aircraft extended scouting range, then, as aircraft improved, expanded the striking range of weapons well beyond the chokepoint’s horizon. The introduction of radar further enhanced scouting and early-warning capabilities, and space-based surveillance now allows for the searching of vast ocean areas independent of geographic chokepoints. The missile age added over-the-horizon, ship-killing weapons, with anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) marking the ultimate long-range strike capability.

Holding a chokepoint serves two fundamental purposes, one rooted in sea control and the other in sea denial. The sea denial case, often a strategy of the weaker navy, holds that by controlling the chokepoint, an adversary cannot access the seas on its opposite side. As Vego points out, this is often part of a larger, major defensive joint/combined operation and maybe one of several elements of a national defensive strategy to either bottle up an opponent’s naval force in its own narrow seas, or prevent an opponent’s naval force from entering a narrow sea where it could threaten the defending nation’s territory.7 In the sea control case, control of the chokepoint theoretically allows one to use their naval forces at the time and manner of their choosing within the chokepoint and in the seas controlled by the strait. That is to say, if a nation controls a chokepoint, naval forces and maritime trade can pass through that chokepoint freely at the discretion of the nation that controls it.8

In the current maritime threat environment, controlling the land and water in the vicinity of the chokepoint no longer represents the exclusive manner to control it. The focus on strategic chokepoints may have held when the range of weapons was barely over the horizon, but today an adversary no longer has to control the geographic entrance to strategically important seas to deny their use. Space-based sensors and long-range missile firepower allow an adversary to effectively close, or at least threaten closure of, geographic chokepoints without the traditional need to hold the immediate surrounding land or seas. “Holding” a geographic chokepoint no longer guarantees the use of the seas on either side, nor does it ensure safe passage through the chokepoint itself. Therefore, the U.S. Navy would be better served to focus more broadly on its ability to control or deny strategic seas than the strategic chokepoints of ages past.

Changing Economic Value of Chokepoints

Another element that gives a chokepoint strategic value is the volume of trade transiting the strait. Traditionally, blockades and maritime trade warfare have used control of chokepoints to great strategic effect. Britain’s control of the Dover Straits, combined with the North Sea Mine Barrage, closed all maritime trade to Germany during World War I and contributed to the fall of the Kaiser’s government in 1918. During World War II, the failure of the Axis powers to seize the Suez allowed Great Britain to continue using the canal for resupply of its empire. Would such action have the same strategic effects today?

Vertical and horizontal charts showing locations and densities of mine fields of the North Sea Mine barrage, issued in November and December 1918, after the fields were completed. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

Today, high trade volume certainly gives a strait economic value because these chokepoints often represent the shortest route from manufacturer to market and thus the cheapest transportation cost. But is controlling trade through a strait a viable strategic goal? Chris McMahon argues that maritime trade warfare is ineffective in today’s global economy. Among the many reasons he presents, he notes that the closing of chokepoints has no real impact on global trade.9 One of the most-often mentioned strategic chokepoints is the Strait of Malacca because it handles so much of the world’s maritime traffic. But how would closing the Strait of Malacca affect global trade? It would impact Singapore’s role in the global shipping market, certainly. But would the global shipping network be severely burdened by having to transit the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait? Would there be a cost increase, yes, but once the market adjusts for the increased cost, shipping will find a way to make it work. 

Consider the wave of piracy off the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s, an area often discussed as a strategic chokepoint because of the volume of trade passing through the Arabian Sea. Shipping companies dealt with the insecurity of that maritime region in one of three ways – accept the risk and charge accordingly, arm themselves against pirates, or re-route ships around the Cape of Good Hope at increased cost and charge accordingly. In each case, maritime trade continued. Lord Fisher mentioned the Suez Canal as one of the keys to the world, but it has been closed on five occasions since it opened in 1869, including for eight years between 1967 and 1975. During that most recent closure, the cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope was markedly higher than the Suez route but presented no serious economic hardship to global consumers. Rerouting Pacific trade for a closed Strait of Malacca would have a similar minimal effect on the cost of global trade.10

Chokepoints Can Be Superseded

The demise of the strategic value of chokepoints is revealed by looking at some traditional strategic chokepoints of the past. One of Fisher’s keys to the world, British control of the Straits of Dover, seemingly kept Hilter’s Kriegsmarine bottled-up in the North Sea, much as it had the Kaiserliche Marine three decades before. But Germany negated the British advantage by conquering France and establishing bases in Brittany, unfettered by the Straits of Dover. To be sure, the straits still impeded access to merchant shipping and warship transit to the German homeland, but control of the strategic strait did not mean control of the German U-boats. Chokepoints can be bypassed.

During the Cold War, the water between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK Gap – was a strategic chokepoint because Soviet ballistic-missile submarines had to pass through that gap to threaten the United States. The later development of longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles meant the submarines could remain in the Arctic to launch these weapons, thus limiting the strategic value of the GIUK Gap as a chokepoint. Chokepoints can be outranged.

The GIUK gap and major regional military bases. (Heritage Foundation)

Today, a resurgent China lays claim to the South China Sea (SCS) as its own internal waters. As discussed above, the Strait of Malacca has traditionally been a key to control of the SCS and, therefore, strategically important for trade between Europe and Asia. But the Strait of Malacca is not the only access route to the SCS, which can also be accessed through the much larger Luzon Strait and numerous passages through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. The PRC recognizes this and has adopted control mechanisms that do not depend on control of the chokepoints, but instead focuses on long-range anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and redundant fortified islands within the SCS.11

China’s A2/AD strategy in the SCS is important for two reasons. First, the assumption that physical control of a chokepoint guarantees use of the chokepoint is invalid in the face of PRC A2/AD weapons and sensors. Although the United States and its partner states may possess the land on either side of the Strait of Malacca, and have sufficient naval forces to patrol the strait, the PRC could nonetheless prevent free transit of the Strait of Malacca using ASBM and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Furthermore, these long-range weapons based on the Chinese mainland or in the central SCS can contest the other straits leading into the SCS. Conversely, the reduced reliance of predictable trade routes for maritime traffic – both merchant and military – means they can easily bypass the Strait of Malacca if it were to be “controlled” by an opposing power.12 Chokepoints can be replaced.

Conclusion

The question then should not be “what are today’s strategic chokepoints?” but instead, “what are today’s strategic seas?” Control of chokepoints is only one of the ways to control a sea. Vego writes that there are two primary arenas of naval conflict: open ocean and narrow seas. While many characteristics differentiate the open ocean from the narrow sea, the predominant one is proximity to land.13 In narrow seas, the land influences many aspects of naval warfare, from the ability of naval vessels to maneuver to the threat from land-based weapons. As one moves further out to sea, maneuver space opens up and land-based threats dissipate, or so it would stand to reason.

The ability of naval forces to operate freely on the open ocean outside the threat of land-based weapons, whether missiles or aircraft, is greatly diminishing in the current threat environment. This, in turn, means an expansion of the areas previously considered narrow seas – even if not in all aspects. If the narrow seas have now broadened to cover a much higher portion of the world’s oceans, then the restrictive chokepoints once seen as strategic lose much of their relevance. 

There may be operationally compelling reasons to control a chokepoint, but their strategic value is greatly diminished in an era of space-based sensors and proliferating long-range missiles. Control of a chokepoint no longer means the “keys to the world” as it did in Admiral Fisher’s day. Expending the time and force to control a chokepoint will likely not result in the strategic advantage sought, and worse, could fix forces to a geographic location when mobility is operationally necessary. The U.S. would be better served exercising more agile and dynamic mechanisms of strategic sea control and sea denial rather than focusing on the obsolete idea of strategic chokepoints.

Captain Jamie McGrath (ret.), retired from the U.S. Navy after 29 years as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer. He now serves as a Deputy Commandant of Cadets at Virginia Tech and as an adjunct professor in the U.S. Naval War College’s College of Distance Education. Passionate about using history to inform today, his area of focus is U.S. naval history, 1919 to 1945, with emphasis on the interwar period. He holds a Bachelor’s in History from Virginia Tech, a Master’s in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a Master’s in Military History from Norwich University.

References

1. Quoted in Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 188.

2. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 2.

3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Military Strategy of the United States of America (US Department of Defense: Washington, DC, 2018), 1.

4. Ibid., 7.

5. Ibid.

6. Milan Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2017), 1.

7. Vego, Sea Denial, 301.

8. Vego, Sea Control, 188-9.

9. Christopher J. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 70: No. 3 (Summer 2017), 29-34.

10. Ibid., 29-30.

11. Naval War College Professor James Holmes argues that considering PRC sea power, their entire military must be considered and not just the PLAN, see James Holmes, “Visualize Chinese Sea Power,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (June 2018). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/visualize-chinese-sea-power

12. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” 29-30.

13. Vego, Sea Control, 18-20.

Featured Image: August 6, 1988, Egypt: An aerial port bow view of the aircraft carrier USS FORRESTAL (CV 59) transiting the Suez canal. A formation of crewmen spells out”108″on the bow to signify that the ship has been at sea for 108 consecutive days. (Photo by PH2 Buckner, USN/U.S. National Archives)

Sea Control Through The Eyes of the Person Who Does It, Pt. 2

The following article originally appeared in The Naval War College Review and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. It will be republished in three parts, read Part One here

By Christofer Waldenström 

The Field of Sensors

To determine whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the minimum safety zone, the commander must be able to observe the objects present in the naval battlefield. Today, the naval battlefield comprises more than just the surface of the sea. Threats of all sorts can come from either beneath the surface or above it. The driver of a car determines from the pertinent visual field whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the minimum stopping zone.22 For a commander, however, it is not possible to perceive directly the elements of the operations area—the naval battlefields are far too vast. Instead, as noted above, the objects present have to be inferred, on the basis of sensor data.23

Thus, there exists a “field of sensors” that the commander uses to establish whether the field of safe travel approaches the edge of the minimum safety zone. The field of sensors is an objective spatial field the boundaries of which are determined by the union of the coverage of all sensors that provide data to the commander. The importance of the sensor field is also emphasized in one theory of perception-based tactics that has been advanced (though without discussion of its spatial dimensions).24 As the sensors that build up the field have different capabilities to detect and classify objects, the field of sensors will consequently consist of regions in which objects can be, variously, detected and classified with varying reliability. (These regions could be seen as fields in their own right, but for now we will leave them as is.) Nevertheless, to establish the boundary of the field of safe travel and determine whether it is receding toward the minimum safety zone, the commander must organize the field of sensors in such way that it is possible both to detect contacts and to classify them as nonhostile before they get inside the minimum safety zone.

Factors Limiting Detection

Several factors limit the detection of enemy units. First, terrain features can provide cover. Units that hide close to islands are difficult to detect with radar. In a similar way, a submarine that lies quietly on the bottom is difficult to distinguish from a rock formation with sonar. The weather is another factor: high waves make small targets difficult to detect; fog and rain reduce visibility for several sensors, such as visual, infrared, and radar; and temperature differences between layers in the atmosphere and in the water column influence how far sensors can see or hear. Yet another factor is stealth, or camouflage, whereby units are purposely designed to be difficult to detect with sensors. Sharp edges on a ship’s hull reflect radar waves in such ways that they do not return to the transmitting radar in detectable strength. Units are painted to blend into the background, propulsion systems are made silent, ships’ magnetic fields are neutralized, and exhaust gases are cooled—all to reduce the risk of detection. Being aware of these factors makes it possible for commanders to use them to advantage. Units might be positioned close to islands while protecting the field of safe travel, or the high-value units might select a route that will force the enemy units to move out at sea, thus making themselves possible to detect.

Factors Limiting Classification

To avoid being classified, the basic rule is to not emit signals that allow the enemy to distinguish a unit from other contacts around it. Often naval operations are conducted in areas where neutral or civilian vessels are present, and this makes it difficult to tell which contacts are hostile. To complicate matters, the enemy can take advantage of this. For example, an enemy unit can move in radar silence in normal shipping lanes and mimic the behavior of merchants, so as to be difficult to detect using radar and electronic support measures. Suppressing emissions, however, only works until the unit comes inside the range where the force commander would expect electronic support measures to classify its radar—no merchant ever travels radar silent. To detect potential threats the commander establishes a “picture” of the normal activities in the operations area. Behavior that deviates from the normal picture is suspect and will be monitored more closely. Thus, contacts that behave as other contacts do will be more difficult to classify.

The Field of Weapons

As mentioned above, the commander has three choices for handling a detected threat: move the high-value units away from the threat, take action to eliminate the threat, or receive the attack and defend. In the two latter cases the threat can be eliminated either by disabling it or by forcing it to retreat. Either way, the commander must have a weapon that can reach the target with the capability to harm it sufficiently. It is immaterial what type of weapon it is or from where it is launched, as long as it reaches the target and harms it sufficiently. Thus, the weapons carried by the commander’s subordinate units, or any other unit from which the commander can request fire support, create a “field of weapons” in which targets can be engaged. Like the field of sensors, the field of weapons is a spatial field, bounded by the union of the maximum weapon ranges carried by all units at the commander’s disposal. The field of weapons is further built up by the variety of weapons, which means that the field consists of different regions capable of handling different targets. For example, there will be regions capable of engaging large surface ships, regions capable of destroying antiship missiles, and other regions capable of handling submarines. Nevertheless, to prevent the high-value units from being sunk, the field of weapons must be organized in such way that it is possible to take action against hostile units and missiles before they get inside their corresponding minimum safety zones. For example, the threat posed by air-to-surface missiles can be dealt with by protecting two minimum safety zones. The commander can take out the enemy aircraft before they get a chance to launch the missile—that is, shoot down the aircraft before they enter the minimum safety zone created by the range of the missile they carry. If this fails the commander can take down the missiles before they hit the high-value units—that is, shoot down the missiles before they get inside the minimum safety zone created by the distance at which the missile can do damage to the high-value units.

It is now possible to specify how the fields of sensors and weapons work together: the field of sensors and the field of weapons must be organized in such a way that for each field of safe travel hostile units can be detected, classified, and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone. One scholar of naval tactics and scouting touches on what can serve as an illustration. Closest to the ships that should be protected is a zone of control where all enemies must be destroyed; outside the zone of control is a zone of influence or competition, something like a no-man’s-land.25 Outside the zone of influence is a zone of interest where one must be prepared against a detected enemy. Scouting in the first region seeks to target; in the second, to track; and in the third, to detect. Important to notice is that the field of sensors and the field of weapons are carried by, tied to, the commander’s units, which simultaneously bring the fields to bear with respect to all pairs of fields of safe travel and minimum safety zones. This complicates matters for the commander. As the fields of safe travel and minimum safety zones are stacked, actions taken to tackle a threat to one minimum safety zone may create problems for another. The competition of units between the pairs of minimum safety zones and fields of safe travel may lead to a situation where a managed air-warfare problem creates a subsurface problem. This bedevilment is not unknown to the naval warfare community: “The tactical commander is not playing three games of simultaneous chess; he is playing one game on three boards with pieces that may jump from one board to another.”26

To illustrate the problem, suppose that the situations in figure 3 occur simultaneously; there is both a surface and a subsurface threat to the high-value unit. In this case the field of sensors has to be organized so that contacts can be detected and classified in a circular field with a radius of a hundred kilometers (for the antiship missile, figure 3a) and also within a smaller and elliptical field (figure 3b, in the torpedo case). For example, radars and electronic support measures have to be deployed to detect and identify surface contacts, while sonar and magneticanomaly detection have to be used to secure the subsurface field. Accordingly, the field of weapons has to be organized so that contacts can be engaged before entering the respective minimum safety zones—antisubmarine weapons for subsurface threats and antiship weapons for surface threats.

Not only weapons can be used to shape the field of safe travel; another means to influence it is deception. Deception takes advantage of the inertia inherent in naval warfare. First, there is the physical inertia whereby a successful deception draws enemy forces away from an area, giving an opportunity to act in that area before the enemy can move back. Second, there is the cognitive inertia of the enemy commander. It takes some time before the deception is detected, which gives further time. Deception can, thus, be seen as a deliberate action within the enemy’s field of sensors to shape the field of safe travel to one’s own advantage. For successful deception it is necessary that commanders understand how their own actions will be picked up by the enemy’s field of sensors and that they be aware of both the enemy’s cognitive and physical inertia. The commander has to “play up” a plausible scenario in the enemy’s field of sensors and then give the enemy commander time to decide that action is needed to counter that scenario (cognitive inertia) and then further time to allow the enemy units to move in the wrong direction (physical inertia). The central role of inertia will be further discussed later.

Having defined the fundamental fields it is now possible to formulate what is required from commanders to establish sea control. The skill of securing control at sea consists largely in organizing a requisite set of pairs of correctly bounded minimum safety zones and corresponding fields of safe travel shaped to counter actual and potential threats, and in organizing the field of sensors and field of weapons in such way that that for each field of safe travel, hostile contacts can be detected, classified, and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone.

Factors Limiting the Field of Safe Travel

So far it has been said that it is the enemy that limits and shapes the field of safe travel. This is, however, not the whole truth. The field of safe travel is also shaped by other physical and psychological factors.

Terrain Features That Reduce Capability to Detect and Engage Targets

To be able to sink the high-value unit the enemy must detect, classify, and fire a weapon against it. All this must happen in rapid succession, or the high-value unit may slip out of the weapon’s kill zone. This means that to fire a weapon against the high-value unit the enemy must organize its field of sensors and its field of weapons so that they overlap the high-value unit at the time of weapon release. In this way the field of safe travel is built up by all the paths that take the high-value unit outside the intersection of the enemy’s field of sensors and the enemy’s field of weapons. This further means that the boundaries of the field of safe travel are determined in part by terrain regions where high-value units can go but enemy weapons cannot engage them—for example, an archipelago that provides protection against radar-guided missiles. The boundaries are also determined by the enemy’s capability to detect the high-value units, and thus terrain features can also delimit the field of safe travel in that they protect the high-value units from detection. For example, the archipelago mentioned above also provides protection against detection by helicopter-borne radar, as long as the ships move slowly. (If they start to move quickly, however, they will stand out from the clutter of islands.) It is also important to notice that a minimum safety zone is resized in the same way as the corresponding field of safe travel—if the enemy cannot see the high-value unit or has no weapon that can engage it, the enemy unit can be allowed closer in.

Terrain Regions Where Enemy Units Can Hide

Like enemy units, potential threats also throw out lines of clearance. One such potential threat is a terrain feature where the enemy might have concealed units and from which attacks can be launched (see figure 4a). Such regions—for example, islands where enemy units can hide close to land—contain potential threats. There may or may not be actual threats there, the objective field of safe travel may or may not be clear, but since commanders can only react to their subjective fields, the latter are properly shaped and limited by these barriers.

Terrain features that serve as good attack points for the enemy also radiate lines of clearance, and they shape the field of safe travel (a); enemy units may or may not be present. In (b) the field of safe travel is impinged by the potential location of enemy units. When an enemy unit slips out of the field of sensors, it creates an area of potential threat that grows as time passes. These potential threat areas also determine the boundaries of the commander’s subjective field, although here the enemy never encroached on the objective field and is now well clear of it.

Enemy Units That Are Spotted and Then Lost

Another potential threat that will radiate clearance lines arises from the movement of enemy units. It is possible for a contact that has been detected and classified to slip out of the field of sensors —for instance, by turning off its radar after being tracked by electronic support measures. The potential movement of such a unit shapes the field of safe travel. Suppose an enemy unit was detected at position p at time t (see figure 4b). As the enemy is outside the field of safe travel, it does not pose a threat to the commander at this time. Now, the contact slips out of the field of sensors, and contact with it is lost. As time passes and the commander fails to reestablish contact, the region where the unit can be is a circle that grows proportionally to the maximum speed of the enemy unit. Eventually the region grows to such a size that it is not possible for the force to pass without the minimum safety zone intersecting with it. In figure 4b the subjective field of safe travel is correctly shaped by the potential threat, but the objective field of safe travel is clear—the enemy unit has turned around and is heading away.

Legal Obstacles and Taboos

 The field of safe travel is also limited by international law. One such legal obstacle is the sea territory of neutral states. A neutral state has declared itself outside the conflict the commander is involved in, and this prohibits the parties of the conflict from using its sea territory for purposes of warfare. Such regions delimit the fields of safe travel and thus restrict where the commander’s units can move. On the other hand, they do not pose a threat to the high-value units and can safely be allowed to encroach on the minimum safety zone.

Neutral Units in the Operations Area

Today, as noted, naval operations take place in areas where neutral shipping is present. Like the sea territory of neutral states, neutral shipping is protected by international law. A consequence of this is that neutral shipping in the area also influences the shape of the field of safe travel. The commander is of course prohibited from attacking neutral merchants. This is not a problem in itself—if a certain contact is classified as neutral, we cannot engage it. Nevertheless, it has implications for where high-value units are allowed to move. As neutral shipping cannot be engaged, we are forbidden to use it for cover—for instance, to move so close to a merchant vessel as to make it difficult for the opponent to engage without risk of sinking the merchant. This means that neutral shipping creates “holes” in the field, where combatants are not allowed to move. If the commander does not track the merchant vessels continuously, these holes grow proportionally to the merchants’ maximum speed, as they do for enemy units spotted and then lost.

Mines

Mines shape the field in the same way that ships do. They can be seen as stationary ships with limited weapon ranges; the minimum safety zone for a mine would be the range at which a ship could pass it without being damaged if the mine detonated. Laying mines shapes the commander’s field, and the commander must react, either by taking another route or by actively reshaping the field—that is, by clearing the mines. Clearing mines has the same effect as taking out enemy ships; the field of safe travel expands into the area that has been cleared. Of course, the enemy can use this for purposes of deception, pretending to lay mines, sending a unit zigzagging through a strait, and making sure that the commander’s field of sensors picks this up. If the deception is successful, the commander’s subjective field is shaped incorrectly.

Dr. Waldenström works at the Institution of War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. He is an officer in the Swedish Navy and holds an MSc in computer science and a PhD in computer and systems sciences. His dissertation focused on human factors in command and control and investigated a support system for naval warfare tasks. Currently he is working as lead scientist at the school’s war-gaming section, and his research focuses on learning aspects of war games.

References

22. Gibson and Crooks, “Theoretical FieldAnalysis of Automobile-Driving,” p. 457.

23. Intelligence reports from higher command are also included when constructing this operational view of the battlefield. This operational view of the battlefield is compiled by exchanging and merging sensor data, a partly manual and partly automatic process well known in all navies. The result is usually displayed as a map of the operations area overlaid with symbols representing the objects present in varying stages of classification— detected, classified, or identified.

24. T. Taylor, “A Basis for Tactical Thought,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1982).

25. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat.

26. Ibid., p. 196.

Featured Image: MEDITERRANEAN SEA (July 25, 2012) A plane captain signals to the pilot of an F/A-18C Hornet assigned to the Blue Blasters of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 34 on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joshua E. Walters/Released)