By Meng Kit Tang

Markets Close Before Missiles Fire

Tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf fell from 138 transits to fewer than eight within days of insurers withdrawing war-risk coverage in 2026. No ships were seized nor missiles were fired. Rather, the market closed the water before any navy could. That episode clarifies the problem in the Taiwan Strait more starkly than any fleet comparison. A quarantine there need not begin with interdiction. It can begin with paperwork of how a change in risk is priced and who is willing to bear it.

The strategic implication is precise. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not need to win command of the sea to interrupt Taiwan’s trade. It needs to make insurers hesitate. Once coverage is restricted or withdrawn, charter parties and loan covenants do the rest. Ships divert on their own.

The same mechanism that emptied the Gulf offers Beijing a fast, low-visibility path to sever Taiwan’s maritime lifelines. It also points to where deterrence must be constructed, not in missile silos or carrier decks alone, but in the ledgers and liability clauses that determine whether merchant vessels are willing to sail at all.

The Insurance Trigger: Commercial Lawfare and the Risk Cascade

A quarantine of Taiwan need not begin with gunfire. Instead, it begins with patrol patterns and the careful cultivation of doubt. The model Beijing has rehearsed relies on the appearance of lawful control rather than the application of overt force.

China Coast Guard cutters conduct “routine” inspections. Maritime militia vessels loiter in numbers that feel less like presence than occupation. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) remains just over the horizon, visible enough to anchor the scene but distant enough to preserve deniability. Legal ambiguity does the work that coercion would otherwise require.

From that posture, the mechanism unfolds with quiet efficiency. An inspection regime is announced under the language of safety or customs enforcement. The Joint War Committee in London, attuned to risk rather than intent, considers the Strait a Listed Area. After which, protection and indemnity clubs begin to narrow coverage, first with higher premiums, then with exclusions that matter. Charter parties and mortgage covenants, written to avoid precisely this kind of exposure, take over. Shipowners do not need to be ordered away. They withdraw because their contracts demand it, their insurers insist on it, and their lenders will not tolerate the alternative.

Traffic thins before any vessel is seized. The decisive fact is not damage sustained at sea, but risk reclassified on paper. This sequence does not require unanimity among insurers to take hold. Partial restrictions are enough. As such, a handful of major clubs tightening terms can reprice the entire route.

Shipping is a conservative business with narrow margins and strict compliance cultures. Faced with ambiguity in coverage, operators choose certainty elsewhere. Diversion becomes the rational default, not the exceptional case. The cascade is therefore less a switch than a ratchet, with each incremental tightening reinforces the next. The market reacts and moves as if a line has been crossed even when no single decision appears decisive.

Taiwan’s exposure to this dynamic is acute. Its energy system depends on a steady rhythm of liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries, with storage measured in days rather than months. A simple interruption to this rhythm and the problem is not only scarcity but unpredictability. Grid operators cannot plan around shipments that may or may not arrive. Industrial output and household consumption compete for a shrinking and unreliable supply. The waters around the island simultaneously carry approximately $2.45 trillion in annual commerce through surrounding sea lanes.

When confidence falters, the consequences propagate outward as quickly as they accumulate at home. Wargames suggest commercial diversion accelerates within seventy-two hours of a notional crisis, with merchant losses rising sharply before major combat and power generation falling to a fraction of normal capacity as fuel deliveries slip out of sequence.

The pattern mirrors what Chinese exercises have rehearsed without concealment. During the “Justice Mission” drills, coast guard and militia elements practiced the administrative choreography of control by issuing notices, establishing inspection routines, and shaping the legal narrative that would accompany any future operation. The rehearsal was less about fighting than about governing the terms under which others decide whether to sail.

That window between the moment risk is redefined on paper and the moment ships stop sailing is where the contest will be decided, and where preparation must already be in place.

Hormuz and Taiwan: Lessons and Limits

The record from the Iran-Iraq Tanker War offers the clearest precedent for what sovereign commitment can accomplish when insurance markets retreat. Under Operation Earnest Will, the United States did more than escort tankers. It absorbed the upper layers of risk through reflagging and sovereign backing.

By some accounts, war-risk premiums fell by more than half, and traffic returned even as Iranian attacks continued. The lesson was not about warships alone. It lay in Washington’s willingness to stand behind commercial exposure when private insurers stepped back. That willingness allowed underwriters to recalculate rather than retreat, and ships to sail that would otherwise have stayed in port.

However, tactical success at sea did not automatically restore confidence. The United States damaged Iranian assets and secured individual transits, yet broader commerce recovered only when financial risk became manageable.

The gap between naval action and commercial effect proved stubborn. This is a warning that any Taiwan scenario relying on convoy operations without addressing the insurance dimension risks repeating that failure, with escorts protecting ships that no longer wish to sail.

It should be noted that the analogy begins to fray once geography and actors come into view. The Strait of Hormuz narrows to roughly thirty-three kilometers, it is a confinement that amplifies mines, fast craft, and shore-based weapons. The Taiwan Strait spans closer to one hundred thirty kilometers at its narrowest point. That distance dilutes the immediacy of physical harassment without diluting the speed with which perceived risk propagates through insurance markets.

In the Taiwan case, diversion is likely to hinge even more purely on financial calculation than on proximity to danger, making the insurance mechanism the primary instrument, not a secondary effect.

The actors differ as well. Iranian forces and their proxies operated with limited conventional reach. The China Coast Guard functions within a system backed by a nuclear-armed state and supported by the world’s largest navy in hull count. Legal claims, domestic statutes, and coordinated messaging accompany every operational move. The stakes are categorically higher and the room for misinterpretation narrower.

The Gulf experience confirms that insurance can close a sea lane and sovereign guarantees reopen it. It does not offer a template for sailing convoys under the shadow of a major power. Any application in the Taiwan context demands more deliberate legal framing and more restrained operational posture. The mirror reflects the mechanism clearly. It distorts the setting in which that mechanism must be managed.

Taiwan’s Role: Pre-Crisis Coordination

Taiwan’s role in this problem is neither symbolic nor auxiliary. A sovereign backstop offered by Washington carries greater political weight if Taiwan is seen to bear part of the burden of keeping its own sea lanes open. That visibility need not take the form of public declarations or new institutions. Commercial shipping does not wait for governments to clarify their positions. Within days of perceived risk, vessels divert, contracts are voided, and schedules unravel. If coverage is to hold, the groundwork must already exist before the first announcement is made.

What Taiwan can do is practical and, if handled carefully, conducted without public announcement.

The first task is cultivating understandings with the insurance market itself. Discussions with Lloyd’s syndicates and the major protection and indemnity clubs can establish thresholds at which coverage tightens and the conditions under which it can be sustained. These need not be formal agreements, but a shared expectation about triggers and tolerances can slow the reflex toward withdrawal.

Alongside this, port authorities can maintain standing open-port declarations that are legally sound and routinely exercised. Shipping firms take their cues from clarity. If access conditions are known and stable, the argument that waters are unsafe becomes harder to sustain.

Closer to shore, Taiwan’s Coast Guard carries a distinct responsibility. Final-approach escorts into port can be handled by a civilian maritime service as it signals control without inviting the confrontation associated with naval deployments. This reduces the exposure of foreign naval forces in confined waters while preserving visible protection for inbound traffic.

Beyond Taiwan’s immediate approaches, pre-arranged diversion protocols with ports in Japan and the Philippines would give shipping companies alternatives that are more than theoretical. These include contracts, berth rights, and customs procedures settled in advance, when time is still available to resolve them carefully.

Taiwan cannot openly designate war-risk zones or advertise convoy frameworks without risking a response that accelerates the scenario it seeks to avoid. It is not to abandon sufficient preparation but to conduct it carefully in a register that does not provoke. Agreements can be specific, rehearsed, and ready to activate  yet remain outside public view until the moment they are needed.

Beijing’s Escalation Calculus

Beijing’s approach to a Taiwan quarantine is best understood through two escalation thresholds that define both its options and its constraints.

The first sits below the threshold of force. Public moves would draw a response that is legal, diplomatic, and informational rather than kinetic. Chinese authorities would issue counter-declarations, challenge the measures under UNCLOS, and frame them as external interference in a domestic matter. State media would amplify that framing while diplomats pressed insurers and flag registries to distance themselves. The Coast Guard would likely increase patrol tempo to signal resolve without direct confrontation.

Pre-announced sovereign guarantees are, perhaps unexpectedly, less provocative than reactive interventions during a crisis. They set clear expectations, signaling to the markets that political risk has already been accounted for and absorbed, thus eliminating the ambiguity that Beijing might seek to exploit.

The second threshold is crossed when naval escorts begin to transit the Strait, at which point Beijing’s stance becomes more rigid. Escort operations, under Chinese domestic law, can be framed as violations of sovereignty, even in international waters. The PLAN shifts from passive observation to active shadowing, probing for weaknesses while avoiding direct engagement. The Coast Guard takes on a more prominent role, with boarding attempts against escorted vessels serving as a means to test rules of engagement without escalating to a confrontation between major surface combatants.

Each encounter becomes a contest of both legal and operational authority. When a vessel halts and submits to a Coast Guard inspection under duress, it may not technically be seized, but it still challenges the integrity of the convoy framework. Doctrine must address this scenario directly, as what escorts do when a merchant captain complies under pressure is just as operationally significant as their response when force is employed.

Across both thresholds, legal warfare provides the connective tissue. The doctrine of the three warfares: legal, media, and psychological ensures operational actions are paired with arguments and sustained pressure campaigns. Beijing would contest the legitimacy of sovereign guarantees, question their compatibility with maritime law, and seek to isolate participating insurers through diplomatic channels.

The contest extends beyond the seas, unfolding in international maritime legal forums and through the flag state administrations. Washington and Taipei must therefore prepare their legal arguments in advance, grounded in the precedents of Earnest Will and the Red Sea convoy, and communicate them to governments whose neutrality will influence insurer behavior before PRC counter-narratives can take hold.

Time compresses all these choices. China’s own dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors and the exposure of regional supply chains limits how long a quarantine can be sustained before incurring costs at home. That constraint favors a rapid shock to commercial confidence rather than a drawn-out campaign. If sovereign guarantees are in place before a crisis, the mechanism Beijing seeks to exploit may never take hold.

The Sovereign Guarantee Framework

The architecture of sovereign guarantees in the Taiwan Strait is designed to preserve commercial confidence and deter coercion. Central to this system is the integration of doctrine, escort strategies, and allied logistics, ensuring that the framework operates effectively under pressure.

Doctrine: Institutionalizing Insurance-Backed Deterrence

Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait hinges on maintaining commercial confidence under pressure, making insurance a core element of operational strategy. At the heart of the system is a U.S.-led reinsurance mechanism, which pre-negotiates war-risk coverage for vessels operating under American guarantees. Commercial insurers continue to provide standard coverage, while the sovereign layer activates only when risk surpasses the private market’s capacity, preserving the current system without triggering collapse.

Vessels operating under the guarantee are publicly designated and sail within energy and humanitarian corridors, allowing insurers to reassess exposure and commanders to clarify rules of engagement. These corridors signal a deterrent by reducing perceived risks, providing legal clarity, and affirming U.S. credibility in maintaining commercial flow.

For effective deployment, this structure must be embedded in doctrine. The U.S. Seventh Fleet would establish standing procedures for insurance-backed convoy operations, including activation protocols and coordination with Lloyd’s and P&I clubs. Annual tabletop exercises at Fleet Activities Yokosuka would ensure synchronized timelines between insurance activation and operational decision-making, closing the gap between tactical escort actions and commercial confidence.

Escorts: Calibrated Presence and the Problem of Coerced Compliance

At sea, escort operations must strike a balance between visibility and restraint. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer would provide command and defense capabilities, signaling commitment, while unmanned systems would ensure surveillance and documentation without escalating tensions. These assets shadow Coast Guard vessels, recording interactions without unnecessarily heightening the stakes.

Rules of engagement must be graduated: initial contact prompts bridge-to-bridge communication and warnings, followed by interposition and unmanned asset deployment if boarding is attempted, and defensive measures only in response to overt force.

More complex cases require equal consideration: a merchant captain who submits to a CCG boarding request under implicit pressure rather than explicit force. No shots are fired, and no legal seizure takes place, yet the integrity of the convoy is quietly and completely undermined.

This situation lies outside the scope of current rules of engagement, which address the use of force but not voluntary compliance. Doctrine must clarify the authority of escorts to intervene before compliance occurs and define the legal justification for such intervention within the corridor designation framework.

A captain who yields to subtle intimidation rather than overt coercion presents a challenge that cannot be addressed by warships or written rules of engagement alone. Failing to address this gap leaves the most critical flaw in the structure unaddressed.

Equally, de-escalation triggers matter as much as escalation authorities. A commander who knows precisely when to hold course and when to yield tactical ground without conceding strategic credibility is as operationally valuable as one who knows when to act.

Allied Integration: Logistics, Access, and Shared Credibility

Allied logistics provide the depth that makes the system credible over time. Japan offers the backbone through pre-negotiated port access and substantial throughput capacity, enabling rerouting if direct Strait transit falters. The Philippines extends reach into the southern approaches with forward sites for replenishment and support.

Shared tracking and communication protocols across U.S., Japanese, and Philippine forces reduce friction during compressed decision timelines. Taiwan’s coast guard manages final approach into port, maintaining presence without raising the profile of foreign naval forces in sensitive inner waters.

Limits of the Sovereign Guarantee Architecture

While sovereign guarantees stabilize markets, they do not eliminate the coercive capabilities of Chinese maritime forces, and pressure from these forces will persist. The value of the system lies in deterrence rather than resolution. By denying China its fastest, least costly options, the framework forces Beijing to resort to more overt measures, where costs increase, ambiguity narrows, and interference becomes harder to disguise as routine enforcement. This recalculates the escalation burden, shifting it onto the side that can least afford to bear it publicly.

Pre-Empting the Insurance Weapon

A PRC quarantine of Taiwan would not require forceful military action through the Strait to succeed. The decisive impact would come earlier, through contracts, premiums, and the subtle recalibration of risk. Once insurers withdraw, shipping follows, and the island loses access without a single exchange of fire at sea. In this scenario, the key factor is not naval vessels or missiles but confidence in coverage. This shift in focus makes the threat hard to deter through traditional naval presence alone.

The sovereign guarantee architecture directly addresses this. By absorbing risk upstream, it prevents hesitation from turning into withdrawal. Once credible backstops are in place, the insurance trigger loses its power, as the expected economic disruption no longer materializes. The mechanism fails before it activates, and Beijing’s window for rapid, decisive commercial disruption never opens.

For naval commanders and policymakers, this means preparation must start before the legal and financial framework of a quarantine becomes visible, not after commercial shipping has already made its calculations. In the Taiwan Strait, control over movement may depend less on patrol patterns than on who first convinces underwriters that uncertainty has already been priced and contained. That is the real contest… and it has already begun.

Tang Meng Kit is a Singaporean freelance analyst and commentator who works as an aerospace engineer. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025.

Featured image: Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen reviews Taiwan Coast Guardsmen, September 2021. (Wikimedia Commons)

By David Scott

Operation Highmast, running from April to November 2025, took a UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG), led by HMS Prince of Wales, over 40,000 nautical miles to the Sea of Japan and back. The CSG consisted of five UK vessels, with eight others joining the CSG at various stages from other navies. Three strategic considerations underpinned this deployment as per Prime Minister Keir Starmer: successfully operating a two-carrier navy (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), sending a “clear message of strength to our adversaries,” and “a message of unity and purpose to…allies.”

Operating a Two-Carrier Navy

Operation Highmast was announced in May 2023 by Conservative Party Prime Minister Rishi Sunak at the signing of the Hiroshima Accord, which was a landmark agreement focusing on “an enhanced UK-Japan global strategic partnership” and included “the future deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific.” The deployment was carried out by the Labour Party administration after it came to power in July 2024, and it proceeded despite some calls to “mothball” of one of the carriers after the exchange of power between parties.

Another strategic decision illuminated by Operation Highmast was that despite growing concerns over Russian aggression in Europe, the Royal Navy maintained an Indo-Pacific commitment, albeit modified. The March 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy announcement of an “Indo-Pacific tilt” underpinned the Queen Elizabeth CSG deployment in that year’s Operation Fortis. Four years later, the June 2025 Strategic Defence Review mantra of “NATO first does not mean NATO only” guided the Prince of Wales CSG deployment in Operation Highmast.

Strategically, the UK’s punch increased as both its Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, are the largest vessels ever constructed for the Royal Navy (80,000 ton displacement). This is almost four times the displacement of the three Invincible-class aircraft carriers (22,000 ton displacement) they replaced. Additionally, the Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) for the Wildcat helicopter Sea Venom anti-ship missile, carried on the Prince of Wales, was announced at the start of October. The Royal Navy considered this “a step-change in [its] combat power.”

After deciding to build the aircraft carriers, the UK government chose to embark F-35B fighters, considerably more advanced than the retired Harriers used on the previous Invincible-class. Strategically, the F-35B decision would enhance interoperability with the US, Italian, and Japanese navies. Eighteen UK F-35Bs embarked at the start of the Prince of Wales deployment and were joined by six more in October for a total of 24. Unfortunately, these jets had embarrassing engine malfunctions including one that was temporarily grounded in India as well as another in Japan. Nevertheless, Full Operational Capacity (FOC) was declared in November, signifying that the two carriers, the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales, could operate with purely UK F-35B complements.

Working with Allies and Partners

The Royal Navy’s ability to work with others was illustrated in cooperation with various European navies as well as in operations with India, Australia, Japan, and the United States—denoting a tacit balancing against China.

Operation Highmast represented a European rotation of CSGs, under the European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (ECGII), which has been guiding defense movements since 2008. The 2023 UK-France Summit had agreed on “the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific.” In this vein, the Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024, led by ITS Cavour, was followed by the French CSG deployment in the first third of 2025, led by FNS Charles de Gaulle, and then by the UK CSG deployment, led by HMS Prince of Wales, in the following months of 2025.

Operation Highmast had other European nations embedding their ships within the UK CSG. The Norwegian frigate HNoMS Roald Amundsen was in support throughout the CSG deployment. This reflects the Joint Statement on Enhanced Defence Cooperation between Norway and the United Kingdom signed in February 2025. Portugal’s frigate NRP Bartolomeu Dias joined the CSG from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. Spain’s frigate ESPS Mendez Nunez joined from the Atlantic to the Philippines, and Italy’s ITS Luigi Rizzo joined the CSG in the Mediterranean.

Close UK-Italy ties were on show as Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper and Defense Secretary John Healey hosted their Italian counterparts on board the Prince of Wales in November at the conclusion of the Falcon Strike exercise, which was the NATO exercise at the end of Operation Highmast of the coast of Naples, Italy. Their Joint Statement noted:

The presence of the F-35-equipped UK Carrier Strike Group in Naples underlines deep British-Italian defense ties. Complex joint exercises during the deployment have further enhanced the interoperability of our Armed Forces.

The dual carrier exercises with Italy’s ITS Cavour in the Med Strike exercise in May as well as the Neptune Strike exercise in November represented a European willingness to carry the burden in the Mediterranean, enabling US carrier strength to be deployed elsewhere.

The UK CSG interaction with India reflected the February 2025 Defense Partnership-India (DP-1) as well as the UK decision in 2022 to co-lead India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI). The CSG exercised in the Arabian Sea with India twice on its way to and from Japan. In June 2025, the CSG exercised with INS Tabar, a P-8I Neptune plane, and an Indian submarine. The October Konkan exercise was particularly powerful. It involved dual carrier operations with the INS Vikrant CSG for the first time, which included seven ships in the Indian CSG and six ships in the UK CSG. Port calls to Mumbai and Goa coincided with Keir Starmer’s visit to Mumbai. Not surprisingly, the India-UK Joint Statement on October 9 declared: “Prime Minister Modi welcomed the port call of UK’s Carrier Strike Group and the Royal Navy’s exercise Konkan with the Indian Navy.” An implementing agreement on electric-powered engines, currently in development by Rolls Royce for India’s next generation navy, was on show with the Prince of Wales’s and HMS Richmond’s Full Electric Propulsion System.

Australian involvement with the CSG was noticeable. Having just carried out freedom of navigation activity around the Spratley Islands with HMS Spey in June, Australia’s HMAS Sydney joined the UK CSG in July on their way to Australia for Exercise Talisman Sabre. The Sydney participated in the CSG exercises in the Timor Sea with the USS George Washington CSG, representing a trilateral Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) format. On July 27, the third day of the Australia-UK Ministerial (AUKMIN) talks were held in Darwin, Australia on the Prince of Wales under Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). These talks involved Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Defense Secretary John Healey, and their Australian counterparts. The AUKMIN Joint Statement welcomed that “the [CSG] deployment demonstrates the UK’s ongoing commitment to increase interoperability with Australia in the Indo-Pacific.” HMAS Brisbane joined the CSG in August in the Philippine Sea as part of the trilateral Japan-UK-US CSG and again in the bilateral UK-Japan carrier drills southwest of Japan in September.

UK convening power was on display as—for the first time—the Prince of Wales led the Bersama Lima exercise in September, off the Malaysian coast, under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). This involved other naval units from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia (HMAS Ballarat) and New Zealand (HMNZS Aotearoa). New Zealand’s HMNZS Te Kaha had earlier joined the CSG from April to July across the Indian Ocean from the Arabian Sea to the Timor Sea, while Canada’s HMCS Ville de Québec joined the CSG from April (Devonport) to August (North Philippine Sea).

UK cooperation with Japan was further strengthened by Operation Highmast. When the Prince of Wales moored in Tokyo Bay on August 28, UK Defense Secretary John Healey, First Sea Lord General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, and Japan Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani were present to welcome the carrier and participate in the Pacific Future Forum onboard. At the Forum, Healey stressed UK-Japan defense cooperation: “[T]his carrier strike route deployment is the operational demonstration of this truth,” and “that is why the presence of the Prince of Wales here in Tokyo is not just symbolic — it’s strategic.”

Naval cooperation with Japan was on show with the trilateral carrier exercises involving JS Kaga in the North Philippine Sea in August, the F-35B bilateral exercises in the Sea of Japan on September 6, and the bilateral carrier exercise off south-west Japan, which again involved JS Kaga as well as JS Akebono, on September 9. It was particularly helpful to provide proof of concept when UK jets landed on JS Kaga as it was converted from a helicopter carrier to a fixed-wing F-35B-capable aircraft carrier. It was also noticeable that JS Akebono stayed with the UK CSG on its way back across the Indian Ocean.

The trilateral carrier exercise in the North Philippine Sea was a particularly striking visual moment, involving as it did four flat-top F-35B carrying battle groups, involving the USS George Washington, the USS America, Japan’s JS Kaga, and the UK’s Prince of Wales. This trilateral naval format reflects the Japan-UK-US agreement signed by naval chiefs in October 2016, that “as Chiefs of three highly capable and like-minded Services, [the nations] share a common vision of enhancing the operational effectiveness of… maritime forces through increased cooperation.” This was furthered in their Joint Statement in November 2019 about maintaining a “routine forward presence“ for cooperating over “the security of the Indo-Pacific region.” In the case of operational effectiveness, the common F-35B choices made by all three navies aids inter-operability, which was very much on show with the crossdeck activities carried out in Operation Highmast between these various carriers.

Last but not least, cooperation with the US was present throughout. The UK CSG was led through the Bab-el-Mandeb by USS Truxtun. Twice the USS George Washington CSG exercised with the UK CSG: once bilaterally in the East Timor Sea and another time trilaterally with Japan in the Philippine Sea. In another first, the USNS Wally Schirra, alongside RFA Tidespring, carried out a simultaneous Replenishment at Sea (RAS) with the Prince of Wales. The USS Higgins accompanied HMS Richmond on its transit of the Taiwan Strait in September before briefly joining the main UK CSG group as it sailed across the South China Sea. When the CSG transited into Red Sea in October, anti-drone and missile cover was provided by USS Forrest Sherman.

Deterring Adversaries?

On the eve of departure, the UK Defense Secretary John Healey had been upbeat in April, commenting, “[The] Royal Navy is once again demonstrating its formidable capability while protecting British values and sending a powerful message of deterrence to any adversary.”

In terms of operations, the CSG was able to twice deploy through the troubled Red Sea. When transiting in late May/early June, the CSG had been put on “defense station” in the light of continuing Houthi activities in the Red Sea. The context was that the UK had carried out strikes on Houthi drone facilities on April 29, joining the US in Operation Rough Rider. However, despite Houthi outrage, all was calm a month later for the CSG. Upon the CSG’s return in September, a diversionary tactic was employed. A fake Bahr Guardian sea exercise was announced for the Arabian Sea, with an accompanying press blackout, leaving the CSG free to instead slip though the Bab-el-Mandeb and up the Red Sea. It is unclear as to whether this move was an indication of the UK’s cunning  or a fear that a publicly announced transit was still too dangerous.

China remained the elephant in the room as the UK refused to acknowledge the deployment was China-motivated. Though China did not use official public channels to announce its displeasure, its state media, namely the Global Times, was ready to express China’s negative opinions. Back in 2023, when the deployment was first announced, a Global Times editorial on December 17, titled “The UK’s sunset fleet should just stay surfacing the internet,” warned that the UK was “closer to becoming a laughing stock.” The article derided UK collaboration with Japan as a vain attempt to restrain China. These protestations more likely revealed a sensitive subject for Beijing over UK-Japan security collaboration.

During the 2025 CSG deployment, the Chinese state media was ready to comment again. Starmer’s announcement about meeting threats was immediately denounced in the Global Times on April 24 with a piece titled “Can the UK aircraft carrier’s ‘return to the Indo-Pacific’ deter anyone?” Global Times journalists, Liu Xuanzun and Liang Rui, scoffed over UK problems with the F-35B jets in their August 10 article titled: “UK carrier-based F-35B reportedly makes emergency landing in Japan; Chinese expert says incidents highlight Britain’s struggling with aircraft complexity.”

There had been advance speculation whether the UK would be deterred from freedom of navigation activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. It was significant that both were carried out. The CSG detached HMS Richmond for a transit of the Taiwan Strait alongside USS Higgins on September 12, which was immediately denounced as “provocative” by the PLA Eastern Theater Command. Some Chinese harassment had taken place. “Constructive kills,” or in layman’s terms tactical drills run with no missiles fired, were carried out around HMS Richmond with Chinese jets following the path they would take if they were launching an attack. Immediately after, the CSG transited the South China Sea, during which RFA Tidespring and HNoMS Roald Amundsen carried out specific freedom of navigation activities around the Spratleys in mid-September. The CSG was followed by several Chinese ships broadcasting messages for the CSG to stay away. However, the details on this only came to light in a Times report on September 29 followed by the Royal Navy briefing on 30 September, by which time the UK ships had long left these waters.

Unsurprisingly, the UK exercising with other China-concerned actors attracted further criticisms from China. On July 14, Zhang Changyue and Guo Yuandan denounced the Talisman Sabre exercise in their piece titled: “US-Australia largest ever war drill underway, hyping it may draw ‘Chinese observation’ to boost attention.” The subsequent trilateral exercising drew more Chinese fire with Liu Xuanzun and Liang Rui’s piece on August 6 titled: “US, UK, Japan, others hold drill in Pacific; move undermining regional peace.” One can surmise that such Chinese criticisms would not appear unless the UK deployment was having an impact regarding freedom of navigation issues and a tacit balancing of China.

Looking forward

Five strategic questions remain to be answered for the future concerning the operation of a two-carrier Navy:

1. With two carriers scheduled for active service until 2029, should the UK maintain a two-carrier navy and resist any further calls for ”mothballing?”
2. What is the right balance between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific CSG deployments? If Indo-Pacific deployments continue regularly should the four-year gap between Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales missions become the norm, or should it be shortened or lengthened?
3. How far should carriers operate as “crewed aircraft” carriers. The Strategic Defence Review recommends that:

Much more rapid progress is needed in its evolution into ‘hybrid’ carrier airwings, whereby crewed combat aircraft (F-35B) are complemented by autonomous collaborative platforms in the air, and expendable, single-use drones. Plans for the hybrid carrier airwings should also include long-range precision missiles capable of being fired from the carrier deck.

It can be noted that in a “historic first,” the Prince of Wales used drones to transfer supplies between ships as opposed to traditional helicopters.

4. How will the Royal Navy manage its fleet’s numbers to support its strategic goals? The structural problems of being hollowed out, in terms of other naval assets, remain acute. The continuing challenge of numbers expected to decline before eventual increase in numbers as eight Type-26 and five Type-31 replacements for the nine current Type-23 frigates are completed.
5. How will the Royal Navy manage its new F-35Bs moving forward? Questions and choices still remain surrounding the numbers and capabilities of the F-35B planes. At present, the UK currently has 34 F-35Bs with initial plans to acquire 48 and potentially 138 in the more distant future. F-35B capabilities await the replacement of their Paveway-series guided bombs by more advanced Spear-3 cruise missiles. These were originally slated for delivery and use on F-35Bs by 2025 but face delays due to software configuration problems at Lockheed Martin and US export control regulations.

“Quo Vadis?” indeed, for a two-carrier UK navy.

Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at davidscott366@outlook.com.

Featured Image The U.K. Queen Elizabeth-class (QEC) aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales (R09)’s participation in WESTLANT 23. (US Navy photo by Dane Wiedmann)

By Michael Hanson

The world took note of the meteoric growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), both in size and capability. Specifically, the PLA and PLAN’s amphibious capabilities development is impressive and alarming. According to many experts, the reason for this rapid development is the forceful reintegration of the island of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹ Analysts argue that a PLA cross-strait amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the largest amphibious assault in history, greater in scale and complexity than invasions of Normandy and Okinawa, the largest amphibious operations in each theater during World War II.²

A cross-strait operation would be a serious challenge for a world-class military. Though the Chinese military is quickly reaching peer status with the United States military in many areas, the PLA is not currently ready for a daunting amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The PLA remains untested. Chinese leaders will likely subject their prototype to a series of test runs before committing to such a fateful mission. History and current events show small wars and limited interventions serve as useful training grounds to develop the leadership, processes, and capabilities of military forces for larger designs. At present, North Korean troops are active participants in the war in Ukraine to presumably gain combat experience of their own.³ Likewise, before China embarks on a major war, it will likely hone its edge in small ones.

According to the renowned military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart, “A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.”⁴ To establish a lodgment, not only does the offensive force have to overcome a defending force, but significant geographic and climatic factors. Once successfully seizing a beachhead, the attacker must break out from it and begin a land campaign in which it can still meet defeat if it does not have adequate logistics to sustain its campaign. Even once ashore, the challenges of sustaining a campaign overseas are significantly greater than doing so overland. It is for these reasons that successful amphibious campaigns have been the domain of a relatively few militaries in modern history.

China seeks to join the small pantheon of militaries effective at amphibious operations. However, China’s military last combat experience occurred during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In that conflict Vietnamese militias stymied Chinese offensive thrusts while the bulk of Vietnam’s People’s Revolutionary Army was simultaneously engaged in Cambodia. Though the Chinese never officially acknowledged their casualty figures, independent estimates contend China suffered up to 25,000 killed in action and 37,000 wounded in the month-long war.⁵

The PLA made enormous strides in the 45 years since its last war. In 1979, China possessed a peasant army organized and equipped for what Mao Zedong called “Peoples’ War,” or guerrilla war.⁶ However, modern conflict changed China’s calculus. Following the American overwhelming triumph in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, China embarked on a massive military modernization.⁷ Chinese President Xi Jinping, recently charged the PLA to prepare for war, even uttering the words “dare to fight” during a visit to the Eastern Theater Command, the military district responsible for Taiwan.^8,9 Experts assert President Xi is referring to forceful reunification of Taiwan.¹⁰

Before undertaking such an enormous and consequential operation the PLA must demonstrate its proficiency. China has conducted numerous exercises and drills, but these displays of military might will not prove sufficient. ¹¹ The crucible of real combat must test PLA leadership, units, and operational methods before attempting an invasion of Taiwan. China’s adversaries should remain attuned to China’s engagement in small wars as means to advance political objectives and test its forces in preparation for a Taiwan invasion.

Contingency operations provide a wealth of knowledge and experience. For these reasons, these limited engagements serve as the most effective training operations. Indeed, throughout history countries have used active battlefields as schoolhouses for improving their combat capabilities, especially engaging in small wars to prepare for a larger one.

From 1937 to 1939, civil war raged in Spain and outside powers supplied troops and equipment to both sides. Though volunteers came to Spain from around the world, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided support with the express purpose of gaining knowledge and experience, and testing equipment and doctrinal methods with an eye on the future. Germany, rearming from the severe restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, exploited this opportunity to test its new tanks and airplanes, while employing new concepts.¹² Germany’s famed Condor Legion, a unit consisting of both air and ground elements, was the vessel that gave some 19,000 German soldiers and airmen experience in a warzone.¹³ This was to be an investment that would pay off handsomely in a few short years.

As German arms and ideas were subjected to experimentation in Spain, the Wehrmacht learned other valuable lessons during Adolf Hitler’s bloodless conquests. In Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, as well as its annexations of Austria, the Sudetenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia, and finally Klaipeda, the Wehrmacht gained valuable experience in these unopposed invasions. These campaigns without battles allowed the German military to execute planned movements to seize objectives and secure key terrain and critical infrastructure. The Germans employed tactical and operational methods to set conditions for mutual support when contested. Though the Germans faced little opposition, they experienced other friction and fog inherent in war. In the process of working through these challenges, the Germans profited enormously, specifically in the areas of mobilization, deployment, logistics, and command and control.¹⁴

The United States, in fact, has a long history of developing its military in small wars close to home, but perhaps the most notable are in the period between the world wars known as the Banana Wars. Many American senior commanders in World War II cut their teeth as junior officers in these Latin American interventions, from the soldiers who chased Pancho Villa on the Mexican Border just before World War I, to the Marines who fought bandits in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua during the interwar period. More notable than the personalities who served in these small wars are the lessons in warfighting they brought back with them, such as the Marine development of close air support to tactics in jungle fighting that the “Old Breed” passed to their new recruits in preparation for Guadalcanal.¹⁵

More recent small-scale interventions in America’s near abroad have had notable impacts on the American military as well. Early confusion in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada exposed gaps in intelligence, planning, and joint interoperability in execution that helped instigate the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act which dictate high level organizations and processes to this day.¹⁶ On the other hand, the rapid success of Operation Just Cause in Panama seemed to validate doctrinal planning and training methods.¹⁷ Both short and decisive operations did much to improve America’s military stature in the rough wake of the Vietnam War.

Other countries have learned from limited adventures abroad as well. The severe shortcomings of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia with its rusty leftover Soviet military served as a wake-up call to President Vladimir Putin. The poor performance of Russian leaders, personnel, units, equipment, and procedures led to massive overhaul of the Russian Army, with a modernization program to upgrade all of these areas of disappointment.¹⁸ After several years of development, President Putin utilized Syria as a testing ground for new Russian weapons as well as a stage to advertise their capabilities to the world.¹⁹ The results of this build-up, combined with Russia’s initial proxy war in Ukraine, served to convince the world of a daunting Russian military machine, an image that was only dashed when Putin squandered these reforms with his ill-advised and poorly planned conventional invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Yet while the Russian war machine is bogged down in cratered and shell-blasted Ukrainian landscapes reminiscent of the battlefields of World War I, China continues developing its own capabilities. Chinese military spending rose significantly in 2024 to $236 billion.²⁰ Recent Chinese developments include the 2022 launch of a Type-003 Fujian aircraft carrier, comparable to an American Nimitz class super carrier.²¹ In addition to this crown jewel of power projection, the PRC launched their fourth Type 075 Helicopter Landing Dock (LHD) ship, comparable to the American Tarawa and Wasp class amphibious ships, and other amphibious dock landing ships that complement this platform to round out the Amphibious Ready Group construct.²² Like the American Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), these acquisitions give China a suite of crisis response and power projection capabilities. They have even built several classes of at-sea replenishment ships to support their fleet far from home waters.²³

The question remains whether platforms similar to Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Tarawa/Wasp Class helicopter ships, and underway replenishment ships are necessary for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan when the island is already within range of airfields on the Chinese mainland. More likely these are intended for power projection in their near abroad. In other words, the world may witness a coming era of Chinese gunboat diplomacy and small war interventions similar to the Banana Wars during the period of rising American hegemony. With over $1 trillion invested since 2013 and as of 2023, 147 countries signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has lots of opportunities to intervene in overseas contingencies to defend its national interests.²⁴ In line with former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s call for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct “new historic missions,” the PLAN is already at work flexing its muscles abroad.²⁵

Since 2009 the PLAN has participated in international counter-piracy operations in areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Arabian Sea.²⁶ Since the start of the Israel-Gaza War, the PLAN dispatched naval forces to the region following Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the waters off of Yemen.²⁷ While the PLAN routinely operates from a military base in Djibouti, one expert warns this outpost will only be the first of many Chinese overseas military bases.^{28, 29} Yet Chinese involvement in multilateral military missions extend to the land as well.

In recent years, over 2,000 Chinese troops deployed to conflict zones in Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.³⁰ These deployments are not a recent developments. Since 1992, China has deployed over 50,000 troops to no less than 29 United Nations peacekeeping missions, losing 24 killed in these operations.³¹ Of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China contributes the most personnel to UN missions. President Xi Jinping offered to provide 8,000 troops to a United Nations standby force in 2015.³² As Chinese sailors, soldiers, and airmen gain experience in overseas contingencies, the Chinese military builds its capability to pursue larger missions, like an invasion of Taiwan.

Conclusion

The world has time before China could attempt to use force to bring Taiwan under its heel. However, every year that passes, they increase their readiness. Drills and training exercises certainly increase a military’s abilities. However, only so much can be learned in sterile, controlled training environments. China will likely test its military might in small wars before embarking on a larger one. The world should take note of China’s entry and actions during a small war. When the People’s Republic of China does engage in a small war, the world will know China is preparing for the forceful reunification of Taiwan.

Major Michael A. Hanson, USMC, is an Infantry Officer serving at The Basic School, where the Marine Corps trains its lieutenants and warrant officers in character, officership, and the skills required of a provisional rifle platoon commander. He is also a member of the Connecting File, a Substack newsletter that shares material on tactics, techniques, procedures, and leadership for Marines at the infantry battalion level and below.

References

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[2] Council on Foreign Relations. “Why China Would Struggle To Invade Taiwan.” https://www.cfr.org/article/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan. Accessed March 26, 2024.

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Featured Image: Rigged with combat loads, paratroopers assigned to a brigade under the Chinese PLA Army file into a Mi-171E transport helicopter during a parachute training exercise in September 2025. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn/by Hu Qiwu)