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The Looming Armageddon of The U.S. Military’s New Anti-Beard Policy

By Dr. John P. Cordle, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Introduction

There is an episode of Star Trek (S1:E2) that has always chilled me to the bone, called “Armageddon”. The premise is that wars are too costly, so they are gamed out using a computer simulation. Predicted deaths are calculated, then assigned to the general population by lottery. If your number comes up, you report to a central location and are executed. Everyone accepts it as the cost of doing business.

In the military today, a quiet Armageddon is about to occur as we watch the potential separation of up to 5% of the force for a condition known as Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB).

If you are in the military and can’t pronounce it, you need to learn it, because PFB is about to change your life whether you are directly affected or not. At the direction of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, this condition, which has been waiverable for four decades, is now a disqualifying condition for continued service in the armed forces. Depending on the military service, separations will begin as early as now (Air Force), nine months (USMC) or 11 months (Army and Navy). (1)

As a veteran with 30 years service, and a Human Factors Engineer who has researched this topic extensively in collaboration with military dermatologists, I would like to ask Mr. Hegseth to reverse his position against facial hair in the military, specifically for religious and medical reasons. It would be a win-win situation for him and the military.

The Secretary’s often-articulated core values of merit and warrior ethos would seem to lend support rather than opposition to beards, at least for those with religious or medical waivers. In June he stated, as justification for rescinding the requirement for flu vaccinations, that, “We will not force you [to get a flu shot) because your body, your faith and your convictions are not negotiable.” (2)  That is exactly the argument that he could use to support beards; the reasons for beard waivers are also related to individual body characteristics (the medical condition PFB) or religious convictions. If he truly believes in these values, he is missing a huge opportunity when it comes to facial hair.

Despite the sudden prevalence of this issue, many military members and national security members lack familiarity with PFB. A quick primer follows:

PFB is a chronic skin condition primarily associated with the curved shape of the hair follicle and tightly curled hair structure but can be associated with a genetic predisposition. It is triggered by shaving.(3)

There is no “treatment plan” that allows a person with PFB to “return to normal shaving.”  Shaving itself, combined with genetics, is the cause of PFB.

Discussions regarding the separation of service members who cannot shave revolve around force protection and risk-to-mission in contaminated or smoke-filled environments where protective masks must be worn.  However, considerable research demonstrates that there is minimal impact on forced air mask effectiveness for individuals with 1/8” to 1/4” facial hair; they achieved a satisfactory seal to OSHA standards in the vast majority of cases. (3)

While the effect of facial hair is more pronounced for gas masks in a CBRD environment, the setting of MOPP levels can easily incorporate shaving as additional step when gas masks are issued in the event of a real world threat, as I did in command. Effectiveness can be validated by a periodic fit test. Yes, there is risk, but it can be mitigated.

Figure 1. Representation of the impact of the U.S. Navy’s new PFB policy. (Mr. Michael Johansson)
Figure 1. Representation of the impact of the U.S. Navy’s new PFB policy. (Mr. Michael Johansson)

This shows an exceedingly small risk, and one that we have accepted for decades with no recorded injuries due to mask leakage during fires. I spoke with several military members affected by this policy. They, and their families, are under immense stress – especially those deployed and unable to access medical care. Here are a few of their stories:

Vignette 1

“I am a black Naval officer with PFB. I am fairly senior and have dealt with it for my entire career. Up until last week I felt like I was upwardly mobile in my community, but it appears that those days are over – a selection board will take one look at my photo and vote “Zero” regardless of my accomplishments. I’m still trying to wrap my head around the fact that I was able to serve honorably in a multitude of operational assignments for over 29 years with a beard, and suddenly it appears to be disqualifying.  I have made peace with this, and I’m ready to move on. But the impact doesn’t stop there. I have two teenage sons. One of them had decided long ago the Navy was not for him based on watching my career and the things that I had to work through. The second was on the fence, but the new policy essentially shuts the door on him since he has PFB. For me this policy is generational in its impact.”

Vignette 2

“I’m a junior enlisted person who has been in the Navy for six years. I joined the Navy to build a better life. Since joining I have become a naturalized citizen, earned a Bachelor’s and a Master’s degree while working full time on Active Duty. I have PFB and have tried everything but the only thing that works is not shaving. I have applied for a Commissioning program and felt I have a good chance, but the new policy seems to remove that opportunity. I am getting used to the idea that I may have to give up my career because of my PFB, despite having no impact on my performance or ability to do my job. I find the entire process confusing and frustrating. All I want is to do my job and serve my country.”

Vignette 3

“I recently graduated from the United States Naval Academy. Before that I attended NAPS (Naval academy prep school) and that’s when I was originally diagnosed with PFB. They were better with it there, I also wasn’t growing the same amount of facial hair so that could have played a part. They were a lot more understanding at NAPS than what I later experienced at USNA.

“My preparation actually came before plebe summer because I was led to believe that the only reason I had PFB was because I was shaving wrong. (No one ever taught me how to shave) So I tried everything: single and multi-bladed razors, magic shave, heated towels and steam. Using the techniques I figured a way to make my shaving better, but it still didn’t get rid of the PFB or the discomfort that came with shaving.

“So, when Plebe summer came around with completing time hacks, I was unable to properly shave not to mention being told to dry shave in front of everyone on the bulkhead if there was any stubble. I tried to toughen it out for a while because I didn’t want to seem different from my peers it wasn’t until an upperclassman from another company saw my neck and face that I was instructed to go to the doctor and get a chit. At this time when you received a chit you couldn’t line your beard up at all. I thought my facial hair was getting out of control and I didn’t think I was presentable or professional so I decided to line my beard up.

“This was a mistake. When my supervisors saw this, they made me shave immediately and then once again there was stubble so I had to dry shave in the hallway. The discomfort with all the training evolutions or just being outside having the sun and my own sweat run across my razor scrapped neck and face was horrible. I was very self-conscious about my face and neck while at the academy the way people stared at it makes you feel unhuman. Then the irritation and pain cause you to focus on your neck when you could be focusing on much more important things like school.

“When you look at PFB it’s usually minorities that have it. I understand that racism is not the intention of the current rules and policies but when usually only one race has PFB and we are told to be in the back while marching or are hidden at certain events it starts to get your mind racing. It just sucks to be singled out because of a medical condition that for some reason has a negative stigma. After a while you understand “it is what it is” and you may not be able to get certain jobs as a flag aide or things of that nature I realized this at the Academy that because of me not being able to shave I will probably miss out on a lot of opportunities in the Navy. Now it appears I may be separated before my career has really begun.”

Vignette 4

“I’m scheduled to promote to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) on September 1. I’ve served for 19 years, enlisting in 2007. Throughout my career I’ve had intermittent medical shaving waivers for pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB). At no point has this condition affected my ability to perform my duties, deploy, qualify, or lead Sailors.

“Early in my career, having a shaving waiver as a white Sailor came with a lot of ridicule. I was routinely told by senior leaders, “You’re not Black. Shave your f****** face.” Wanting to fit in and avoid the attention, I often shaved anyway despite the medical consequences. As I gained experience and advanced in rank, I became more confident advocating for my own health and refused to accept that kind of toxic leadership.

“I made Chief Petty Officer in 2015 and was commissioned as a Limited Duty Officer in 2017.  Across my career I’ve completed 13 operational submarine deployments. During every deployment, once we were underway, no-shave morale chits were standard practice. Neither I nor my teammates were required to shave, and it was never treated as an operational safety concern. Throughout all of those deployments, our ability to accomplish the mission was never questioned because of PFB or facial hair. I have earned numerous personal, campaign and unit awards. I also completed a Bachelor of Science while enlisted and a Master of Arts after commissioning, accomplishing both while serving on active duty and between deployments.

“I share that background because I want to make one point: PFB has never prevented me from deploying, qualifying, leading Sailors, or successfully completing any operational assignment I have been given. My record demonstrates that. When the new policy was announced, I immediately went to Navy Medical to understand my options. Based on the guidance I received, if I continue requesting recurring 90-day shaving waivers, after one year I could be processed for administrative separation. If I accept my promotion to LCDR on September 1, I will incur a three-year service obligation. Yet, based on the guidance I received, I could still face administrative separation before reaching retirement eligibility, despite nearly two decades of honorable service. That leaves me with an incredibly difficult decision. I can accept promotion and resume shaving, knowing it will aggravate a documented medical condition, or I can decline promotion and retire instead.

“For me, this isn’t about wanting to wear a beard. It’s about facing the possibility that a medically documented condition—not my performance, conduct, leadership, or ability to serve—could force me to choose between my health and the career I’ve spent nearly 20 years building.

“I understand the Navy has the authority to establish grooming standards, and I have lived under those standards for my entire career. I am not asking for special treatment. I am simply asking that decades of demonstrated readiness, operational performance, and documented medical evidence be given appropriate weight when determining whether a Sailor remains fit to serve. My concern is that this policy appears to place successful, deployable Sailors with documented medical conditions in an impossible position. I hope my story helps illustrate the very real impact these changes may have on experienced Sailors, their families, and ultimately the retention of proven leaders the Navy has spent years developing.”

These are real people, with real families. There are over 6000 of them in the Navy alone, and potentially quadruple that across the entire military. They feel betrayed, abandoned, and forgotten by the Navy they have loved and served. How do I know? They told me.

Contradictions

Finally, beards are historically aligned with the warrior ethos that the Secretary of War wants for the military. Navy SEALS  are routinely authorized to have beards, and they are truly amazing warriors. He also once said, “If you want to grow a beard, join the special forces.” He has already associated beards with an elite fighting unit, and expressed willingness to abandon grooming standards if the service-member is of a certain military skillset. This reveals either a lack of consistency or a contradiction in this new policy.

Beards are aligned with warrior ethos, independent of merit, and a historical symbol of strength and religious conviction, which puts them in perfect alignment with his values. Remember, this is not a case where a policy change was recommended by the services and approved by the Secretary; it came from him. But his actions contradict his words; what this policy is saying is, “We will force you (to shave) because your body, your faith and your convictions are negotiable.” This stance is contrary to Secretary of War’s previously stated values regarding bodily autonomy and religious conviction.

Further, many of our NATO Allies,such as Great Britain and Germany, allow beards with no operational or safety impact. Compared to navies around the world, our clean-shaven force is an outlier. 

Figure 2: Representation of the impact of Navy PFB on potential Black Recruits (Mr. Michael Johansson)
Figure 2: Representation of the impact of Navy PFB on potential Black Recruits (Mr. Michael Johansson)

The Cost to the Service

Most importantly, if the services  follow through with the Secretary’s  plan to separate those service members with PFB, we will be ruining lives and careers, as well as creating gaps in critical skill areas – many more than those separated during the pandemic for refusing the COVID vaccine. Let’s look at the numbers. I’ll focus on the Navy, and the readers can extrapolate the numbers for each service. 

Since the majority of those with PFB are Black, this policy has a disproportionate, if coincidental, racial outcome. This may not be the intent, but it is clearly the impact. Just within the Navy, the new policy will discharge between 6,000 and 12,000 Sailors in the next two years. Demographically that represents between 3-5% of all Sailors, but could exceed 20-25% of Black Sailors, who represent 65-85% of those with waivers. (4)  That is the equivalent of an entire Carrier Strike Group, at a time when our warships are engaged in combat operations and extended deployments with over 10,000 gaps at sea.

The new Navy policy goes a step further, buried in a small sub paragraph in the policy, applying the PFB restriction to new recruits as well. This will effectively shut the door to Navy service for 50% of Black Americans and ultimately change the face of the Navy. It will certainly turn back the clock by undoing the progressive policies of CNO Elmo Zumwalt in the removal of barriers for minorities. But the Secretary can change that by allowing those with PFB to continue to serve on a waiver. 

Talk to Your Experts and Your Sailors

I encourage the Secretary of War to meet with a Dermatologist to discuss the true nature of PFB; then meet with a group of “bearded warriors”, those with approved waivers – over a cup of coffee. Listen to their stories. Look past the beard at the person behind it; they are proud professionals who just want to serve their country, and exactly the type of people we want leading in tomorrow’s wars.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy surface warfare officer (nuclear). He commanded the destroyer USS Oscar Austin and the cruiser USS San Jacinto during his 30-year military career and was recognized with the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

References

1. NAVADMIN 162/26, “Navy Grooming Standards, “(https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/
Portals/55/Messages/NAVADMIN/FACT_SHEETS/Fact_Sheet_NAV_162_26.pdf).

2. “US military service members will no longer be required to get annual flu shot,” The Guardian, 21 April 2026 (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/21/military-flu-shot-
requirement-pete-hegseth).

3. “Review of Treatments for Pseudofolliculitis Barbae,” National Institute of Health, (https://
pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36840647/).

4. Influence of Facial Hair Length, Coarseness, and Areal Density on Seal Leakage of a Tight-
Fitting half-face Respirator, Floyd et al, University of Oklahoma College of Public Health.

5. Transcript of SECDEF Speech to Flag and General Officers, 30 September 2025, (https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/article/4318689/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-
addresses-general-and-flag-officers-at-quantico-v/).

6. New Navy Policy Limits Medical Shaving Waivers to One Year, USNI, July 9, 2026.

Featured image: Fleet Master Chief Petty Officer Raymond D. Kemp, fleet master chief for U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, waits to receive the American flag during the reading of “Old Glory” at his retirement ceremony on Naval Support Activity Naples, Italy, June 4, 2019. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Damon Grosvenor/Released) 

The Armyfication of the Navy

By Eric Lies

The United States Navy has set a course that will see it morph into an army on the sea. The differentiating factors between the sea services and its landbound compatriots are fast eroding, diminishing the value of the fleet as its capabilities are more constrained. Traditionally, the utility and strength of the U.S. Navy revolved around the supreme maneuverability of the fleet and its ability to pass without a trace, skills the U.S. Army could only dream of. Now, however, fleets have never been more visible or more movement constrained, exposing them to the same strategic limitations an army on campaign faces. Adding to these challenges is the development of a set-piece mentality within the force over the previous decades as the U.S. Navy acted as mobile strike assets for ground wars. Redressing this army-fication, however, will be key to ensuring the continued success of the sea services and ultimately the safety of the United States.

This article will unfortunately be short on answers but long on questions and identifying the fundamental problems the Navy and Marine Corps team faces. Correctly identifying these issues now will save immense amounts of misplaced effort and, more importantly, lives should war break out. Therefore, this piece is written more as an opening statement in the discussion as opposed to a neat, simple solution, if such a thing can even exist in this instance.

Hiding in a Fishbowl

Armies are traditionally easier to track than navies. They operate in the same domain that people live in and the opportunities to observe their movements are frequent. This is the case even when their direct movements aren’t recorded by opposing forces. Civilians may watch and then talk carelessly, spreading the information. Physical evidence such as disturbed fields or damaged roads are also left behind for the keen observer. The pieces are there to pick up.

In ages past, once a fleet left harbor there was practically no way of knowing where it was operating. Barring a lucky sighting or maintaining a visual track, difficult in the best of circumstances, the surest way of locating a fleet was to correctly identify where it was going and lie in wait. The ability to disappear upon setting sail largely holds when there’s a large capability gap, such as when the combatants are the United States and minor powers or terrorist organizations. This would not be the case if the United States were to engage a peer or near peer competitor.

Much like how armies leave behind evidence when travelling, modern navies do too. The combination of long-range radar/sonar, satellite surveillance, drones, and signals intelligence gives modern commanders unprecedented ability to locate and track fleets. Permanent sensors, such as fixed array sonar systems, provide real time monitoring of vital transit lanes and vast swaths of the ocean without sending out ships or aircraft. Current radar technology routinely allows for identification and tracking of vessels hundreds of kilometers away, a range that will only increase as AI and algorithmic improvements are made. With a dense enough satellite constellation, consistent satellite imagery will also make fleet transits readily trackable via image analysis. This says nothing of accidental leaks of position by sailors using various apps or devices.

The development of autonomous systems allows for the surveillance and identification zones to be pushed out even further. With low to no risk to manned assets, forces can deploy additional sensors that loiter nearly indefinitely, turning on only when needed, acting as relays for each other, and casting a wide detection net. These technologies will only become more readily available and cheaper with time, exacerbating commander’s struggle to operate unobserved.

Highways on the Seas

This is not to say that there are no countermeasures to being observed, but competent captains and admirals must operate under the assumption that it’s not a question of if they’re found at sea, but when. While the risk of detection is relatively low while out on the high seas, the chances of detection increase exponentially the closer the fleet comes to shore.  This vastly narrows the geographic scope of operations that are readily hidden or obfuscated. Layering the various detection methods and their ranges on a map and then adding weapon engagement ranges creates a vastly different operating picture than fleets have encountered in the past.

A reading of the major military thinkers quickly impresses upon students of war the importance of geography and the field of battle. Sun Tzu’s work dedicates 30 percent entirely to the topic and is identified as a core pillar of strategy. Clausewitz, while he doesn’t examine geography or the terrain in discrete chapters, does lace it throughout his writing and thinking, identifying it as one of the key “modifiers” a strategist must consider. Corbett even identifies the difference between an army and a navy, discussing how armies must follow roads or traversable terrain while “the sea knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation.”

The maps of today, and especially tomorrow, resemble “roads” and “safe passages” around and through identification and engagement zones that fleets will have to navigate within. Leaving these bounds exposes them to swift identification and possibly an engagement with shore-based forces or unmanned vessels. These constraints on fleet movements complicate attempts at maintaining a true “fleet in being” that is at once both dispersed as well as ready to combine and pounce on weak or isolated elements of an enemy’s forces. As seen within the land domain, the massing of forces exposes attackers to extreme risk when mass and near real time surveillance are combined.

Modern technology allows a capable force to restrict where opposing fleets are likely to operate and therefore prepare the battlefield in ways unprecedented for naval warfare. This can create opportunities to more consistently develop kill boxes, ambushes, and direct the fighting to areas of strength for the forces operating near their shorelines, and thus within range of supporting missile and drone units.

The Anchored Fleet

Naval strategy revolves around the concepts of isolation and convergence. The isolated elements of a fleet can be converged upon and destroyed, leading to the ultimate destruction of the fleet and its fighting strength. At the core of this concept is the understanding that a fleet is never stationary but shifts and flows where it can best be utilized. Balancing the freedom of movement underpinning fleet operations is the fact that a fleet could simply be “removed from the board” by pulling into port under the protective watch of shore-based batteries. The force could defend itself via movement or via fortifications that forced attackers to risk their fighting force against shore troops that neutralize the advantages of mobility.

This concept faded from prominence with the close of the Cold War and the U.S. Navy’s dominance of the maritime domain. Modern navy doctrine then shifted to force projection as the ultimate raison d’etre, a natural metamorphosis in support of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders began utilizing “op-boxes” and deliberately restricted maneuvering schemes to minimize risk while supporting the ground fight. The maximum ranges and on-station times of airframes began dictating where a carrier could steam and, naturally, where the escort ships must station to provide cover or support. It didn’t matter that a fleet could show up anywhere along the coast, it mattered that the fleet was as close to the specific coast that allowed safe and direct flights inland.

This prioritization, combined with forward operating bases that are now within range of shore-based fires, creates a situation akin to army forts staring across a field at the enemy lines. Complicating matters, unlike in the past, pulling a fleet into port doesn’t ensure the safety of the ships, but could unintentionally increase the risk to the force. Ports are well imaged and mapped via satellite imagery, and as such represent easily precleared and evaluated targets. There is a growing push to harden bases and to disperse forces throughout potential operational areas, thereby increasing resilience and survivability. This doesn’t change the fact that this only increases the number of potential targets, even if it does decrease the payoff for successful strikes.

Modern commanders are thus stuck with a dilemma. To effectively employ the weapons and doctrine developed over the last three and a half decades they cannot freely move their ships. In order to replenish and repair, they must return to easily targeted ports. They therefore cannot leverage the fundamental strength of a fleet: its ability to change the location of its operations, to disperse itself and to converge when enemy forces are isolated. “Stay in the op-box,” “This is our circuit for flight ops, we can’t change it.” Phrases such as these make fleet operations sound more and more analogous to ground operations where forces need to “Take the hill” or “secure this rail depot.” It is this decades-long doctrinal development that could represent the biggest risk to mitigating the increased visibility and expanded engagement zones.

Charting the Course

Resolving the current transformation of the sea services will require bold thinking and innovative synthesis of emerging technologies and revised doctrine. While not exhaustive, the following few ideas can serve as a launch point for further discussion and to begin charting the course for a renewed and revitalized fleet.

First, developing a better understanding of how peer competitors are thinking of possible engagements, such as how the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is deployed and the doctrine they adhere to, will be vital to gleaning lessons learned and offsetting their advantages. The days where the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps could make nearly unilateral decisions about force structure, armaments, and employment is far gone. Any peer or near peer has an equal say in what kind of conflict they will engage in, and it is foolish not to study their thinking as much, if not more, than current U.S. doctrine.

Second, the Navy should consider fleet composition and organization. This has naturally occurred in tandem with developments in naval and military technology, but taking a deliberate and methodical approach that seriously evaluates how fleets are structured and operate will help mitigate unnecessary losses. Some fits and starts have been made on this front, normally under the guise of “lethality,” such as the hunter killer surface action groups or  modular lethality. The current approach of clamoring for more of the same ships and submarines fails to address the issue at hand in a viable manner, while redesigning the fleet could make a substantial difference.

Third, examining how joint operations in the littoral and just into blue water are conducted could bear fruit in the shorter term. It naturally takes some time to redesign fleets and to construct the newly required vessels. Finding avenues to better leverage current inventories of weapons and vessels across the military services can help offset the time delay that such a redesign and build out requires. The emphasis should be on novel combinations and employment of existing kit, better cross service planning and coordination, and seamless operational control that counters the strengthened position of shores-based fires.

 It is worth noting that some of the work on each of these topics has already been done. Notably, in 2016, a trio of Navy future fleet architecture reviews were conducted, and responded to, that sought to rigorously identify how the Navy should structure its forces to fight and win in 2030. Across all three reviews, the need to shift from the assumption of sea control, and even dominance, to a contested maritime domain while engaged in high intensity fighting with a peer/near peer was central. The CSBA report, for example, outlined a fleet structure organized around region/threat specific deterrent forces supported by maneuver forces, addressing elements of the first two suggestions made above. MITRE identified the need for better integration of air-based assets into missile defense structures.  The Navy team discussed distributed fleets and the use of non-kinetic offensive and defensive weaponry as being integral to modern warfare. Aspects from all three are visible in the current force, and the sea services were strengthened from their adoption. Where these reviews fell short was in their limited scope and their failure to address critical assumptions underpinning their analysis, however. The process of evaluation and adapting to new technology and adversary developments is never ending, and the gaps identified in this article must be addressed if the Navy and Marine Corps are to remain a viable fighting force.

The army is worthy of emulation in many respects, but to have the Navy and Marine Corps become nothing more than an army at sea would be an unmitigated disaster. The challenges facing the sea services are great even without factoring in the challenges within the defense industrial complex supporting them. No amount of enhanced lethality or iterative innovation can save a force sailing in the wrong direction. But there is still time to shift the rudder and steady on a course of relevance and enhanced capabilities. This piece merely begins the conversation by diagnosing the primary impediments to an effective naval force and outlining briefly a few initial steps to move in the right direction. The army-fication of the Navy can and must be reversed.

Eric Lies is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Alliance Futures Initiative and an expert in alliance systems, security strategy, and military affairs.

Featured image: Albert Bierstadt, Beached Ship, 1859. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Human Element of Sea Power: Ports, People, and Presence in the South China Sea

By Eleanor Gaudion and Michael Posey

American maritime strategy in the South China Sea often starts by counting ships. Planners must keep enough hulls forward to contest Beijing’s constant pressure and its excessive maritime claims. The number of ships matters because a Navy that is too small, too strained, or too delayed in maintenance cannot meet the demands of a global maritime power. Still, ship counts, or a fleet’s volume of tonnage, can pull the conversation in the wrong direction. In 2005, Admiral Michael Mullen, then the Chief of Naval Operations, argued for a 1,000-ship navy. However, the basis of his call was not “more hulls.” Instead, he envisioned a multinational “fleet-in-being” that leveraged international cooperation to achieve maritime domain awareness, mobility, and access.

Strategists often reduce Alfred Thayer Mahan to the apostle of fleets, commerce, bases, and command of the sea. His framework also emphasized the human element. In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan lists six principal conditions affecting sea power. The list includes geographical position, coastline accessibility, extent of territory, and population size, as well as the “character of the people” and the “character of the government.” Sea power cannot be pigeonholed as simply hulls and military strength afloat. It also depends on national habits, political will, maritime culture, institutions, and the human systems that allow ships to achieve strategic effects.

Mahan’s principles remain relevant in the South China Sea. The number of ships the United States has must be considered alongside where those ships can go, how long they can remain forward, and whether partners want them there. Access drives that problem. Access constitutes a range of possibilities, from overflight rights to permanent garrisons. It also includes the permissions and practical support that allow forces to enter, operate, replenish, repair, and work with partners. While basing gives a navy staying power, access enables presence.

The U.S. Navy does not need to match the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s local presence ship for ship in the South China Sea. Instead, the U.S. Navy needs access that links lawful operations at sea to port visits, exercises, repair arrangements, and partner relationships ashore. The human element of sea power, built on trust, access, and routine cooperation, turns ship presence into influence. The decisive factor in the South China Sea is not ship numbers or capabilities alone, but the human infrastructure of access, repair, and partner trust that allows ships to operate with purpose and endurance.

Port visits, recurring exercises, maintenance agreements, professional exchanges, or staff talks at a partner-nation headquarters may seem modest compared with carrier strike group operations or a shipbuilding plan. Yet routine interactions hold quiet, practical meaning, such as helping port authorities learn what a U.S. ship needs, helping commanders from different navies understand one another, and making a partner government more comfortable agreeing to future American requests. Though day-to-day formalities may seem insignificant, they can shape possibilities in the South China Sea in crisis or in conflict.

Naval campaigning blends hard and soft power, but the better frame for the South China Sea is the human element of sea power. Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment. Smart power, an integrated strategy and toolkit that draws on both hard and soft power, aids planners in framing naval campaigning most effectively. While the concept helps, it should not distract from the practical maritime point: naval power works best when ships, ports, repair facilities, embassy teams, and partner navies reinforce one another through cultivated and sustained relationships.

The South China Sea Problem and Freedom of Navigation Operations

The South China Sea links the Pacific and Indian Oceans through vital trade routes. Roughly one-third of global shipping passes through it. China uses excessive legal claims, coast guard operations, maritime militia pressure, and the militarization of South China Sea features to routinize its presence and justify its claims. Although the 2016 arbitral tribunal rejected China’s expansive maritime claims, Beijing continues to press its position, as reflected in the Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report and CSIS reporting on Chinese coercive tactics at Second Thomas Shoal.

In the South China Sea, the United States does not need to chase every Chinese patrol. It needs to appear often enough, with enough purpose and enough partners, to render Chinese coercion ineffective. Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) remain necessary. These operations challenge excessive maritime claims, preserve legal positions, demonstrate operational access, and reassure partners that the United States will not treat coercive claims as settled facts. FONOPs matter for strategy and alliance politics, as they are lawful and legitimate, resting on treaty law, customary international law, and long-standing U.S. legal positions.

A recent example shows how they support the narrative of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In August 2025, USS Higgins conducted a freedom of navigation operation near Scarborough Shoal. Beijing claimed it had expelled the destroyer; the U.S. 7th Fleet rejected that claim and said Higgins operated in accordance with international law before continuing normal operations. USNI News, Reuters, and the Associated Press captured the ambiguity: a U.S. warship asserted navigational rights, while China sought to recast the same event as a sovereignty narrative.

Freedom of navigation operations do not build partner capacity on their own. They cannot repair ships or make access automatic. They work best when they are not one-off events. A legal challenge at sea should connect to the next port visit, the next exercise, the next repair arrangement, and the next conversation with a partner navy. When port partnerships are grounded in the human element of sea power, the logistics, operations, and wartime readiness of both navies stand to benefit.

Port Visits Are Strategic Acts

When new sailors visit a port, their leaders remind them that they are ambassadors. Some may hear that as a warning to behave ashore. Most understand that port visits also build relationships and continue service in another form. With timeless ceremony, liberty, public affairs, and diplomatic theater, port visits remind hosts that U.S. naval power arrives with people, expectations, and presence, not only steel. A 1921 Proceedings article described foreign port visits and official calls as routine duties involving courtesy, ceremony, and relations with foreign officials. Likewise, a warship entering port by invitation shows that the host government has chosen to cooperate with the United States.

A port visit alone, even to a country with close ties to Beijing, will not deter China. Port visits, however, can make deterrence more politically sustainable. A ship in port gives visible proof that the United States is welcomed and able to operate with partners. Port visits also create human contact that a communique cannot replicate. Commanders meet their counterparts. Supply officers and port authorities learn requirements and test procedures. Defense relationships become personal.

Vietnam and Malaysia show how cautious partners can still create room for maritime cooperation. The USS Carl Vinson’s 2018 visit to Da Nang marked the first U.S. aircraft carrier visit to Vietnam in more than forty years, and the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group visited Vietnam in 2023. The USS Abraham Lincoln’s 2024 port call at Port Klang was the first U.S. carrier visit to Malaysia in 12 years. These visits did not transform Vietnam or Malaysia into U.S. allies. Their contribution is more modest, and more useful: they make cooperation visible and routine without forcing partners into a binary choice.

Port visits to the Philippines convey a different message. As a U.S. treaty ally directly exposed to Chinese pressure, the Philippines is increasingly vital to the U.S. posture in the South China Sea. The U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines describe the importance of alliance coordination, including access to agreed locations under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Even in the Philippines, U.S. Navy access depends on domestic politics, public trust, alliance management, and a shared sense that American presence contributes to Philippine security rather than simply serving American requirements.

The Philippines also illustrates why access must be handled carefully. After a port call and fuel stop in Subic, USS Guardian ran aground on Tubbataha Reef in 2013, damaging a protected site and forcing the Navy to dismantle the ship in place. The United States later paid the Philippines nearly $2 million for damage to the reef. Access is a privilege sustained by discipline, local awareness, and strategic empathy for the host nation.

Relationships Become Access

Access, basing, and overflight do not appear automatically when a crisis begins. They are built over time through trust, repeated contact, legal arrangements, mutual benefit, and political confidence. Security cooperation helps build trust conditions that contribute to access, basing, and overflight outcomes. Military access to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific could shape the outcome of a conflict, and lower-level peacetime access, such as overflight and logistics, can matter even if combat access remains politically sensitive.

In a crisis, governments rarely grant access to strangers. They are more likely to grant it to people and institutions they already know, and to forces they trust will act with discipline. That trust is built through exercises, exchanges, port calls, staff talks, coast guard engagements, logistics planning, and professional military relationships. The relationships built now shape which access decisions are politically possible in a time of crisis.

This is where the human element of sea power matters most. The United States should not treat naval operations, diplomacy, economic cooperation, and sustainment as work done in separate rooms by separate people. A port visit can open the door for a multinational or bilateral exercise. Exercises can reveal logistics requirements and test assumptions. A logistics agreement can facilitate future access for repairs. Repair cooperation can generate economic benefits. Political support can create access during a crisis.

The Indo-Pacific will not follow a NATO template anytime soon. Instead, each relationship must be nuanced and bilateral to deliver the best outcomes for both countries. Vietnam and Malaysia may offer political access and maritime diplomacy. The Philippines may provide operational access, geography, and alliance-enabled logistics. Meanwhile, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia are stronger candidates for maintenance, repair, replenishment, and industrial support. The United States must continue to work with each partner on what they can actually support.

Japan’s value to this network could extend even further. In a Foreign Affairs interview, Oriana Skylar Mastro argued that Japan fighting alongside the United States in a regional conflict from the start rather than shifting to a later supporting role could strengthen deterrence. Japan’s geographically forward-positioned ports enable a much shorter response timeline. The speed advantage would not be a function of hull numbers, but instead a function of years of exercises, staff talks, and routine interactions that have facilitated Japan’s response rather than requiring negotiation in a time of crisis. Routine human interaction leads to familiarity, which leads to fast, credible ally responses.

Maintenance Enables Maritime Influence

Presence breaks down when ships cannot be repaired, replenished, or politically sustained. A ship that can be repaired forward returns to operations faster. A ship that must transit long distances for maintenance pays a tax in time, fuel, and availability. A fleet tied to a few fixed facilities becomes easily targetable and narrows its own options. Delayed maintenance imposes real readiness costs.

The Navy already relies on forward repair in several places. Naval Sea Systems Command describes the Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance Center as keeping the Seventh Fleet mission-ready from Yokosuka and Sasebo. At the same time, its Singapore detachment supports repair work across the region. Australia is developing the Henderson Defense Precinct to support naval shipbuilding and sustainment. In South Korea, the Navy reported that USNS Wally Schirra completed major maintenance in 2025.

Forward sustainment already exists in pieces. The Navy already thinks in terms of refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive, and it already uses forward repair facilities, allied shipyards, and partner access. But the Western Pacific demands a more integrated approach to logistics, resupply, and sustainment than the current system provides.

History reinforces the point. Mahan is sometimes reduced to a “more ships” (or bigger fleet) thinker. Still, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History was also about commerce, bases, maritime infrastructure, and national systems that enable fleets to operate over long distances. World War II offers an even more practical example. In the early 1940s, Service Squadron Ten performed many functions of an advanced naval base in the Pacific, supporting voyage repairs and helping return ships to service without sending every damaged vessel back across the ocean. But that access did not appear by magic. At Ulithi, survey work, pontoon piers, repair ships, floating dry docks, tenders, welders, carpenters, electricians, shipfitters, and command and control arrangements turned a lagoon into a functioning forward base. Although the contemporary Indo-Pacific differs, the lesson still holds: maritime power depends on forward sustainment, and forward sustainment depends on relationships, access, skilled people, and political preparation.

Economic Cooperation Makes Presence Less Extractive

Partners cannot see themselves as being taken advantage of, as it neither serves them nor American interests. Ship repair, port infrastructure, workforce development, technical training, logistics contracts, maritime domain awareness support, and industrial partnerships can help partners build capacity while improving American endurance.

The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative supports partner maritime security and human capital development. In the Philippines, the U.S. Embassy’s transfer of mobile energy systems to Palawan demonstrates how partner-capacity efforts can connect infrastructure, resilience, and maritime access in a contested area. Allied participation in maintenance, repair, overhaul, and shipbuilding cooperation offers one path for strengthening endurance. Japanese shipyards could serve as forward maintenance hubs, improving readiness and creating stable demand for Japanese industry. These initiatives enable shared maritime endurance: more repair options for the United States, more work and capacity for partners, and fewer single points of failure for everyone.

The Human Infrastructure of Maritime Power

The United States should think of relationships as maritime infrastructure. Ports, drydocks, logistics hubs, legal agreements, and maintenance facilities matter. Behind each of them are people: port officials, shipyard workers, diplomats, logisticians, naval officers, coast guards, local political leaders, embassy teams, and sailors who have interacted with one another before a crisis. This kind of infrastructure is easy to miss because it does not appear to be a source of combat power and does not appear in fleet-size comparisons or shipbuilding plans. However, in a crisis, it may determine whether ships can enter port, whether repairs can be made, whether logistics can flow, whether partners accept political risk, and whether American presence is seen as legitimate.

Some of the great strategic thinkers can help us understand the importance of the human element of sea power. Clausewitz reminds us that military action remains connected to political intercourse, not divorced from it. Mahan reminds us that sea power depends on commerce, bases, national systems, and the ashore infrastructure that allows fleets to operate across distance. Corbett reminds us that maritime strategy is about communications and movement, not simply occupying ocean space. James Cable’s theory of naval diplomacy reminds us that navies are political instruments below the threshold of war, using limited naval power to secure advantage or avert loss. In sum, maritime presence is not created by hulls alone. It is created by relationships, permissions, habits, and support networks that allow hulls to have political effects.

China’s advantage in the South China Sea is proximity and persistence. The United States draws its advantage from a network of allies and partners, global mobility, operational experience, and legitimacy when it acts in defense of lawful maritime use. The U.S. advantage must be cultivated as the competition for the South China Sea remains a contest over whose presence is more legitimate, sustainable, and politically useful.

China understands the logic of employing the human element of sea power. In Cambodia, Beijing has financed the expansion of the Ream Naval Base, rotating Chinese ships through its pier, and framing the arrangement as a mutual-benefit partnership rather than a foreign outpost. This comparison is instructive rather than reassuring. Cambodia’s government insists that Ream remains open to any friendly navy, yet years of opacity about the terms of access open a door to Beijing and Phnom Penh familiarity that could prove impactful in wartime. That uncertainty, or strategic ambiguity, can be useful to China, yet also points to an opportunity for the U.S. While China’s version of relationship building runs through dependency and quiet leverage, the American version depends on a wider set of partners who retain the standing and political space to say no. The United States does not win the human element of the sea by default. It wins by ensuring its access is transparent, consensual, and reciprocal in ways that Beijing’s arrangements are not.

While these behaviors reflect diplomacy and logistics, they also constitute sea power. Ships cannot exercise influence where they cannot enter, repair, or remain. The U.S. Navy does not lack port visits, exercises, or repair arrangements, but sometimes these activities are treated as separate events rather than as parts of the same maritime campaign.

Implications for Maritime Planners

Navy and joint planners should plan port visits as campaign events rather than courtesy calls. The Navy sets a theater by increasing its access to key terrain, such as ports near a chokepoint. Therefore, a port visit should do more than put sailors ashore and generate photos. It should test access, build relationships, support public diplomacy, reveal logistics friction, and set conditions for the next engagement. It should create relationships across ranks and functions to encourage a port-wide familiarity that can be called upon in times of uncertainty.

Planners should also map access by function. Some locations may support port visits and replenishment. Others may support exercises, crew rest, voyage repair, emergent maintenance, drydock work, or contracted sustainment. Not every partner is a base. Not every port is a repair hub. Nevertheless, many can still contribute to the overall campaign.

Finally, planners should integrate operations, diplomacy, economics, and sustainment into a single maritime campaign. Freedom of navigation operations, exercises, port visits, repair agreements, senior-leader engagements, and partner-capacity efforts should build on one another rather than stand alone.

Conclusion: Ships Need People

The United States needs a ready fleet, a stronger maritime industrial base, and enough ships to meet global commitments. Shipbuilding, maintenance reform, and industrial revitalization still anchor U.S. maritime power, as the Department of Defense’s National Defense Industrial Strategy also makes clear. Ships alone, however, will not secure American influence in the South China Sea.

The future of U.S. maritime presence will depend on where ships can go, how long they can stay, whether partners welcome them, and whether they can be repaired and sustained forward. Those conditions are built through people. Port visits, exercises, maintenance cooperation, and professional exchanges may seem ordinary, but they build trust, test assumptions, and enable future operations.

Mahan’s “character of the people” was not a decorative phrase. It points to the habits, confidence, discipline, and political will that allow maritime power to endure. In the South China Sea, that character will not be measured only by the number of ships the United States builds. It will also be measured by whether the United States can build the trust and access that allow those ships to matter.

The United States cannot match China’s proximity-driven presence ship-for-ship in the South China Sea. It does not need to. The better task is to show up consistently, operate lawfully, sustain forward, and do so alongside partners who see American presence as legitimate and useful. The human element of sea power begins with a simple recognition: ships need ports, ports need trust, and trust begins with people.

Eleanor Gaudion is a graduate of the University of Virginia with a B.A. in Foreign Affairs with a focus in intelligence and military relations. She previously served as an intern at the U.S. Army War College, revising national security wargaming scenarios for students.

Michael Posey is an active-duty Naval Flight Officer. He holds business degrees from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Florida. He is a doctoral candidate in education at Pennsylvania State University. Currently, he serves as an assistant professor and the Admiral William F. Halsey Chair of Naval Studies at the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of War.

Featured image: Rear Adm. Eric Anduze, commander, Task Force 70 and Carrier Strike Group 5, shakes hands with a member of the Vietnamese military during Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington’s (CVN 73) regularly scheduled port visit in Da Nang, Vietnam, July 30, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Anthony Vilardi) 

Contesting the Littoral Terrain: The Iran War and the Military Solution to Chokepoint Warfare

By Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired), Indian Army

The U.S.-Iran war has provided an operational test of American maritime power. Despite assembling a formidable naval force, conducting extensive strike campaigns and achieving consistent tactical success, the United States failed to control the Strait of Hormuz or sustain freedom of movement in the Red Sea. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), employing distributed fast attack craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, maritime mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munitions, along with the Houthis, effectively contest both waterways. In addition to restricting operations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, commercial shipping remains disrupted, generating global economic consequences, energy price spikes, supply chain delays and domestic inflation that continues to accumulate political pressure on the American war effort disproportionate to the military situation.

The core failure leading to this dilemma was one of strategic understanding. The United States applied a conventional maritime power-projection model built for adversaries with limited cost-tolerance and permissive maritime approaches, against an adversary fighting what it understood to be an existential conflict in its own littoral territory. Iran did and does not not need to defeat the U.S. Navy. It needs only to make the contest so long and costly that the United States will eventually choose to quit. Compounding this, the attempt to suppress Iran’s denial capability at its source failed structurally; the absence of a genuine alliance architecture from the outset removed the mechanism by which American cost-tolerance could have been collectively sustained. Below, this article discusses the  central lessons of the war.

The Cost-Tolerance Asymmetry and Why Conventional Responses Failed

When the decisive variable in a maritime contest is not firepower but the relative willingness of each party to absorb cost, conventional military responses will underperform regardless of their tactical effectiveness. This is the Iran war’s foundational lesson. The IRGCN’s asymmetric instruments –  cheap, dispersed, and rapidly reconstituting – were effective because they were difficult to destroy individually and because the aggregate cost of contesting them exceeded what the system, simultaneously absorbing the economic blowback of a contested strait, was prepared to sustain indefinitely. Iran, fighting existentially, had no equivalent constraint. This cost-exchange compounded the problem. Every Standard Missile which intercepted a cheap Iranian drone represented an exchange ratio that, sustained over months of operations, depleted American precision munitions stockpiles faster than industrial production can replenish. Every manned strike sortie against a dispersed fast boat concentration costed orders of magnitude more than the target it neutralized. The mathematics of attrition in asymmetric chokepoint warfare are designed deliberately, to favour the defender over time. A military solution to contested chokepoint warfare cannot be built on this exchange model but must seek to invert it.

The most direct military response to a distributed denial force is to destroy it at the source by striking command nodes, logistics networks, manufacturing facilities and supply chains. The United States and Israel attempted this comprehensively but did not achieve desired outcomes. Iran had spent four decades dispersing, hardening and building redundancy into its critical military infrastructure in anticipation of exactly this campaign. This was not adequately appreciated. The mobile launcher problem that frustrated Scud-hunting in the Gulf War was applied at institutional scale by the IRGCN: dispersed, mobile, and rapidly reconstituting systems are structurally resistant to suppression by strike, regardless of the precision or volume of fires applied.

Alliance Architecture – a Military Necessity

The United States entered the maritime contest without the alliance architecture that sustained chokepoint operations require. By committing to conflict without prior consultation with the allies most affected by the Hormuz Strait’s disruption, the United States created economic grievances among the partners whose naval capacity, basing access and political support were essential to sustaining the campaign. The operational consequence was an American force bearing the overwhelming majority of cost. The naval forces of allies, properly integrated under combined command with shared rules of engagement and equitable distribution of operational cost, would have materially changed the cost-tolerance equation. Alliance-building is therefore a military precondition for sustained chokepoint operations.

The Military Solution: Neutralising the Terrain

If suppression of the source fails and conventional power projection into the contested space is cost-unsustainable, the military solution must operate on a different logic entirely. The answer the Iran war points toward is the active neutralization of the geographic and asymmetric advantages the adversary has built within the contested terrain – contesting the chokepoint itself with instruments that impose on the adversary the same cost-exchange problem it has imposed. Iran achieved its strategic effects by positioning distributed, low-signature denial forces within and adjacent to the strait, making every American attempt to operate there expensive. The military solution is to do the same thing in reverse: make the adversary’s use of the terrain as costly.

Inverting the Cost Exchange: Directed Energy and Attritable Systems

The current exchange model of combat fiscally favours the adversary over any prolonged contest. Two complementary capabilities invert this ratio. Directed energy weapons, shipborne and shore-based laser systems and high-powered microwave emitters intercept drones and fast boat concentrations at a marginal cost once fielded, with no magazine depth constraint. Against the high-volume, low-cost threat that characterized IRGCN operations, directed energy offers the first cost-exchange model that structurally favours the contesting force rather than the denial force. Though these systems are still fledgling, the Iran war provides the operational urgency to field these systems at scale across the fleet and at shore-based positions adjacent to contested waterways.

Attritable unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and UAVs, deployed in large numbers as the primary friction-absorbers within the threat envelope, complete the inversion. When the platforms absorbing adversary fires are unmanned and genuinely expendable, costing a fraction of a destroyer or a manned aircraft, the adversary’s cost-exchange advantage disappears. At sufficient scale and combined with allied production-sharing, this model exhausts adversary precision munitions inventories faster than they can be replenished, reversing the attrition dynamic that has run against the United States throughout the conflict.

The Undersea Domain: Where Geography Cannot Canalize

The undersea domain is the one environment in which the littoral defender’s geographic advantage is most effectively neutralized. Attack submarines operating in the strait and its approaches can conduct surveillance, deliver precision strike and lay minefields without presenting the surface signature that activates adversary anti-access systems. Iran used maritime mines as a cheap denial instrument that imposed uncertainty and economic disruption across the entire commercial shipping community. The United States can apply the same instrument at greater scale and sophistication through submarine-delivered minefields contesting Iranian naval approach routes, complicating IRGCN fast boat operations, and imposing on Iran the same cost of uncertainty it has imposed on others. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) extend this capability further, operating in the shallowest and most geographically confined sections of the strait where manned submarines cannot easily go.

The undersea domain should be the primary domain of sea control operations in contested chokepoint environments. This is because submarines and UUVs present no viable target to the asymmetric denial systems that have proven most effective, and because the cost of undersea operations does not replicate the devastating exchange ratios that surface and air operations produce. Expanding submarine production capacity is the most direct and durable military response to the chokepoint problem this war has posed. It is a response whose value compounds as adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems become more sophisticated.

Contesting the Terrain: Land-Based Positioned Forces

The most structurally important military solution is also the one most directly derived from Iran’s own operational example. The relevance of small, low-signature Marine and special operations forces, positioned on islands and coastal terrain within or adjacent to contested chokepoints armed with long-range anti-ship missiles, drone swarms, electronic warfare systems and coastal surveillance networks is evident. These will impose a persistent, reconstituting threat on the adversary that cannot be suppressed without costly operations. Such forces positioned ashore within range of Iranian naval routes would cause the IRGCN to expend resources on suppression rather than on denial operations. Drone swarms launched from coastal positions degrade adversary surveillance and force dispersal rather than concentration. Electronic warfare embedded in the terrain contaminates the targeting networks on which adversary precision fires depend.

This concept does not replicate Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS) as it is not about projecting power onto inland objectives from a permissive maritime approach. Nor is it the Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept in its original Indo-Pacific framing. It is terrain contestation using the same geographic logic that Iran has exploited so effectively –  presence within the chokepoint, short supply lines, distributed and reconstitutable positioning, but as an offensive denial tool rather than a defensive one. The adversary that has made maritime terrain a weapon must find that terrain has become a shared burden rather than a private advantage.

Together, these three elements constitute an integrated military approach to chokepoint warfare that does not depend on suppressing the source, does not require forward-deploying irreplaceable capital ships into the highest-threat zones, and generates a cost-exchange ratio that can sustain even against an adversary with existential stakes.

Force Structure Implications

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains the most capable maritime task force ever assembled and carrier aviation retains decisive value in permissive and semi-permissive environments. The Iran war does not invalidate that value but it clarifies its limits. In contested chokepoints, the CSG is the wrong primary instrument: too detectable, too valuable to risk and too dependent on approach conditions that asymmetric adversaries are specifically organized to prevent. The CSG should be held in depth, committed only after terrain-contesting and undersea forces have imposed sufficient cost on the adversary’s denial capability to open a corridor of reduced-threat access. CSG employment follows conditions; it does not create them.

Naval force structure for littoral or choke point combat should therefore be rebalanced accordingly around the three priorities brought out above, that this war has validated as operationally decisive. These three capabilities, operating in combination with genuinely integrated allied naval contributions, constitute a cost-exchange model that can be sustained. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) security mission that has organized American naval strategy for generations must be restructured around this model with a tiered approach that prioritizes SLOCs directly serving American economic interests, while building genuine allied burden-sharing for the broader global maritime commons whose security no single navy can now afford to guarantee alone.

The Taiwan Parallel: China’s Existential Calculus

The operational lessons of the Iran war carry their most consequential implications not in the Persian Gulf but in the Western Pacific. Beijing has observed this conflict with the same analytical intensity that military historians apply to transformative wars. The Taiwan question presents a structural parallel for China: a great power attempting maritime force projection against a regional adversary for whom the conflict is existential.

However, the reverse is also true. Taiwan is central to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s historical narrative, to the political identity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to the domestic political standing of the leadership in Beijing. A Chinese leadership that fails to act on Taiwan under sufficient provocation would face an internal political crisis of the first order. This means that in any serious confrontation over Taiwan, China’s cost-tolerance would be structurally elevated and the cost-exchange dynamics of the Iran war would repeat at enormously greater scale.

China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) architecture in the Western Pacific vastly exceeds the IRGCN’s capabilities in scale, sophistication and depth. The anti-ship ballistic missiles, with ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, hold CSGs at risk well beyond the first island chain. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) submarine force, land-based aviation massed on the Fujian coast, and an integrated maritime surveillance network combining space, cyber and undersea sensors, create a threat environment that makes the Strait of Hormuz look manageable by comparison. And crucially, as the Iran war has demonstrated, striking the source of this capability will not reliably degrade it. Chinese A2/AD infrastructure is distributed, hardened and redundant in ways that reflect decades of preparation for exactly the kind of suppression campaign would be attempted.

The strategic prescription that flows from the Iran war applies directly: the United States and its allies must prepare for a Taiwan contingency on the basis that CSG-forward operations inside the first island chain represent an unacceptable risk to irreplaceable assets. The only option that does not accept catastrophic risk but maintains credible deterrence requires the following elements: the distributed deterrence model with forward-positioned land-based anti-ship missiles with Japan, the Philippines and Australia; expanded undersea presence within the first island chain; attritable unmanned systems at scale; and Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial capability developed explicitly on the Iranian model.

Taiwan’s investment in land-based anti-ship missiles, coastal defense systems, sea mines and drone swarms – the precise instruments that gave Iran disproportionate leverage in the strait – raises China’s cost of coercion without requiring capital ships to enter the most prepared kill zones on Earth. The Iran war has demonstrated what a determined littoral defender with the right asymmetric instruments can impose on a conventionally superior adversary. The alliance architecture supporting Taiwan’s defense must be built before any confrontation begins, not assembled in its aftermath.

Conclusion: Reading the War Honestly

The Iran war was a failure of strategic understanding of the dynamics of asymmetric cost-tolerance in existential littoral conflict compounded by the absence of an alliance architecture that should have been the precondition for military action.

The military solution that emerges from honest analysis is specific and actionable. Directed energy and attritable unmanned systems invert the cost-exchange ratio that has run against the United States throughout the conflict. Submarine and UUV forces operating in the undersea domain can effectively contest the chokepoint as undersea geography provides no canalization advantage to the defender. Land-based positioned forces within the contested terrain flip the asymmetric logic, making the adversary’s geographic advantage a shared burden rather than a private weapon. And genuine alliance architecture, built before conflict rather than during it, distributes cost-tolerance across the coalition to a level that an existential adversary’s threshold cannot easily exceed.

These prescriptions apply with even greater urgency to the Taiwan contingency, where China’s nationalist cost-tolerance, vastly superior A2/AD architecture and decades of preparation for allied suppression campaigns create conditions that will replicate and exceed the Iran war’s dynamics. The time to build the distributed deterrence model, develop allied land-based strike networks, expand undersea capacity and ensure Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial is the time before the confrontation. The Iran war has provided the template, the warning and the operational data.The question now is its implementation.

Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired) is a decorated Indian Army officer with over 37 years of distinguished service. His operational experience included amphibious and littoral warfare in the subcontinent. He has held pivotal operational, strategic and advisory roles in India’s defense establishment and continues to shape discourse in homeland and international security. He is a graduate of premier military education institutions in India and abroad, including the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHDEDN) in Paris. Gen. Mann is a Ph.D. from Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, where he researched defense industrial policy, defense offsets and their role in national security.

Featured image: Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121) fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy Photo)