By Josh Richards and Joseph Hanacek

A Cause Worth Losing For

Foreign policy debates are often framed around a single question: what causes are worth fighting for? Far less often do strategists ask the more uncomfortable but ultimately more revealing question, what causes are worth losing for? In the case of Taiwan, that distinction matters profoundly.

A war over Taiwan would carry the potential for catastrophic military losses, a severe global economic shock, and escalatory dynamics that could touch the nuclear threshold. Senior U.S. defense officials, allied governments, and independent analysts increasingly agree on one point: the only certainty in a direct U.S.–China conflict is that win or lose, the repercussions would be drastic and global in scope.¹

But focusing only on the dangers of war obscures the larger strategic reality. Taiwan is not simply another flashpoint in an increasingly crowded Indo-Pacific. It is a structural pillar of the modern international system, technological, economic, and military, on which U.S. power rests. Allowing Beijing to force Taiwan under its control would not merely alter the cross-Strait balance; it would reshape the global distribution of power in ways that are both durable and deeply unfavorable to the United States and its allies.

At the heart of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan are factors that will influence the rest of the twenty-first century: access to advanced computing hardware, the US diplomatic credibility and real power projection, and the strategic positioning that will drive the next generations of technological breakthroughs.  Abandoning Taiwan would impose costs across all three simultaneously, and once incurred, those costs would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.²

The strategic situation, in other words, is not that the United States might defend Taiwan and suffer severe consequences. It is that choosing not to defend Taiwan would impose even greater long-term costs on American power. The preferred outcome remains a peaceful resolution that maintains preservation of Taiwan’s democratic autonomy and the cross-Strait status quo. But a peaceful appeasement that effectively abandons Taiwan to coercive unification would be cataclysmic for America and the entirety of the western world.

Reframing the Question: The Strategic Costs of Appeasement

Reframed properly, the Taiwan question is less about the risks of action than the consequences of inaction. If the United States were to abandon Taiwan in the face of Chinese coercion or force, three losses stand out as both credible and, once triggered, largely irreversible.

The first is the erosion, and likely collapse, of U.S. leadership in advanced computing, including the race toward artificial general intelligence (AGI) and the broader ecosystem of high-performance and consumer computing hardware. Taiwan is not merely a major supplier within global semiconductor markets; it is the central node of the world’s most advanced fabrication capacity. Control over that capacity confers leverage not only over supply chains, but over the pace and direction of technological progress itself.³ Should Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem fall to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China would gain an unparalleled advantage in the production of the hardware that underpins artificial intelligence, advanced weapons systems, and the digital economy writ large.⁴

The second cost of appeasement would be a profound loss of U.S. diplomatic credibility around the world, particularly with regards to its power projection capability across Asia. Taiwan is the keystone of the first island chain and a focal point for how allies and partners assess American resolve. A failure to defend Taiwan would not be interpreted in isolation; it would be read as a signal about U.S. willingness to absorb risk on behalf of its security commitments more broadly. In more concrete terms, it would result in the creation of an incredibly influential strategic salient for China, providing them geostrategic leverage throughout the entire first island chain. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and others would be forced to reconsider long-standing assumptions about American staying power, basing access, intelligence sharing, and strategic alignment.⁵ History suggests that when fear eclipses confidence in a patron’s resolve, alliances erode quickly, and are rarely reconstituted on the same terms.⁶

The third cost is more subtle, but no less consequential: the loss of the United States’ ability to break out ahead in the next generation of foundational industries. Advanced computing is not an end in itself; it is the enabling substrate for future dominance in quantum technologies, automated manufacturing, robotics, advanced materials, and scalable energy systems. The United States currently enjoys a powerful advantage in these domains not only because of capital or policy, but because it remains the world’s most attractive ecosystem for top scientific and engineering talent.⁷ A collapse in technological leadership, paired with a visible retreat from global commitments, would redirect those talent flows, and the breakthroughs they enable toward alternative centers of gravity.

Taken together, these three losses describe more than a regional setback. They outline a pathway by which the United States would relinquish its position at the center of the global technological and security order. Once the process began, reversing it would demand resources, time, and political cohesion on a scale that great powers historically struggle to mobilize once strategic momentum turns against them.

The first cost of appeasement: Taiwan and the Foundations of American Technological Power

Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States is often summarized in shorthand: semiconductors. But that simplification understates the depth of the relationship and obscures why Taiwan’s role is so difficult to replace. Taiwan is not merely a large producer within global chip markets; it is the central node of the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Its firms are the world’s only producers capable of manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductor nodes, combining leading-edge logic fabrication, advanced process integration, and the tacit manufacturing knowledge required. Despite massive state-backed investments by the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union, no competitor has successfully replicated Taiwan’s frontier manufacturing capabilities at any scale.⁸

Advanced semiconductors now underpin nearly every domain of modern state power, including artificial intelligence, advanced weapons systems, secure communications, space and cyber capabilities, and industrial productivity. The United States retains world-class strength in chip design, electronic design automation, and systems integration, but those advantages are inseparable from Taiwan’s ability to manufacture at the cutting edge.⁹ Without access to that manufacturing base, the U.S. technology stack becomes brittle, slower to innovate, and more vulnerable to disruption.

Much has been made of U.S. efforts to reshore or “friend-shore” semiconductor production through initiatives such as the CHIPS and Science Act. These efforts are strategically necessary, but they should not be confused with strategic sufficiency. Building a handful of fabrication plants does not recreate the dense industrial ecosystem Taiwan has spent decades refining, an ecosystem that includes specialized suppliers, an experienced workforce, rapid iteration cycles, and institutional memory that cannot be legislated into existence on a political timeline.¹⁰ Even optimistic projections suggest that U.S.-based fabs will take years to reach maturity, and longer still to approach the yield, flexibility, and cost structures that Taiwanese firms currently achieve.¹¹

From a strategic perspective, Taiwan’s value lies not only in output volume, but in the continuity and reliability of frontier computing supply. That supply underwrites what can be described as frontier computing, the high-performance chips used in advanced AI research, military systems, and scientific discovery, as well as consumer computing, the mass-market hardware that sustains global digital ecosystems.

In this sense, Taiwan functions as critical infrastructure for the modern world. Its fabs are not interchangeable assets that can be relocated or duplicated without consequence. They are strategic choke points whose fate will shape the balance of technological power between democratic and authoritarian systems for decades to come.¹²

The Computing Arms Race: Bad Cases, Worst Cases, and Irreversible Outcomes

At a high level, two plausible futures stand out, both damaging, but one far more destabilizing than the other.

The first is what might be termed the bad case. In this scenario, a Taiwan crisis, through blockade, quarantine, or limited conflict, causes Taiwanese semiconductor production to halt or sharply contract. Advanced chip supply would collapse, driving up costs, freezing portions of AI research and deployment, and triggering a sharp economic downturn. Analysts estimate that a major Taiwan disruption could cost the global economy trillions of dollars in lost output within the first year alone.¹³

In this bad case, both the United States and China would scramble to fill the void. The Western world retains access to much of the underlying intellectual property, design expertise, and niche manufacturing equipment required to rebuild capacity, but it moves slowly in constructing facilities, training labor forces, and scaling production. China, by contrast, possesses formidable advantages in industrial mobilization: the ability to build quickly, direct capital at scale, compel workforce participation, and absorb inefficiencies through state subsidy.¹⁴ At the same time, Beijing would continue to face constraints imposed by export controls, sanctions, and limited access to the most advanced lithography and design tools. The result would be a grinding, costly computing arms race in which neither side emerges unscathed.

The second scenario, the worst case, is qualitatively different. In this outcome, Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem does not merely shut down; it falls under effective PRC control, either through occupation, coerced integration, or a perceived abandonment by the United States that precipitates a rapid political and industrial merger. In such a case, the single most important variable is not physical plant damage, but the fate of Taiwan’s workforce, intellectual property, and specialized equipment. Should those assets be absorbed intact into China’s industrial base, Beijing would almost certainly surge ahead in both frontier and consumer computing.¹⁵

This outcome would have consequences far beyond short-term supply shocks. China would become the dominant producer of advanced hardware across nearly every category of modern computing, from data center accelerators and AI training chips to smartphones, electric vehicles, avionics, and missile guidance systems. The competitive balance in artificial intelligence would tilt decisively, not because of superior algorithms alone, but because of privileged access to the hardware that makes large-scale experimentation and deployment possible.¹⁶ Whether one believes artificial general intelligence is imminent or distant, beneficial or dangerous, its development under the exclusive control of an authoritarian state and great power rival would represent one of the most destabilizing and consequential shifts in the global balance of power in modern history.

Even in the bad case, the world would begin to fracture into competing technological blocs as states seek reliable access to computing resources. In the worst case, that fracture would harden rapidly, locking in Chinese advantages and forcing others to adapt to standards, platforms, and dependencies set in Beijing rather than Washington. Once that transition occurred, reversing it would require not just policy change, but the reconstruction of entire industrial and research ecosystems, a task that history suggests few great powers successfully accomplish after a major strategic reversal.

From this perspective, the central danger of abandoning Taiwan is not disruption, but capture. Preventing the seamless transfer of Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem into PRC hands is therefore not a secondary concern or contingency plan; it is one of the core strategic imperatives shaping the U.S. response to China’s aggression.

Pax Silica Ends: Two Tech Stacks and a Fractured Global Economy

If Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem is disrupted, or worse, captured, the consequences will not be confined to chip shortages or temporary market dislocations. The more enduring effect would be the collapse of what might be called pax silica: a global technological order in which advanced computing supply chains, standards, and research networks remain broadly interoperable across political systems.

That order is already under strain. U.S. export controls, Chinese industrial policy, and intensifying strategic competition over technology flows have begun to fragment the global technology landscape. A decisive break over Taiwan would accelerate this process dramatically, pushing the world toward two competing and increasingly incompatible technology stacks, one centered on the United States and its allies, the other organized around the People’s Republic of China.¹⁷

On the surface, this bifurcation might appear to concern consumer-facing choices: whose smartphones dominate emerging markets, which AI platforms are most widely adopted, or which digital standards govern next-generation networks. In reality, the fault lines would run much deeper. Competing tech stacks would structure access to rare earth minerals, advanced materials and chemicals, energy inputs, cloud infrastructure, financial services, and the research ecosystems that underpin long-term innovation.¹⁸ Countries would be pressured, implicitly or explicitly, to align their regulatory regimes, supply chains, and security partnerships with one bloc or the other.

In such a world, Taiwan’s fate becomes determinative. If Taiwan remains outside PRC control, the United States and its partners retain a credible foundation for a high-end technology ecosystem that can sustain innovation and resilience, even under stress. If Taiwan falls into Beijing’s orbit, the balance shifts decisively. China would not only command a dominant share of advanced hardware production; it would be positioned to shape standards, dictate terms of access, and leverage dependencies across a wide swath of the global economy.¹⁹

This would be particularly destabilizing for middle powers and developing states, many of which rely simultaneously on Western security guarantees and Chinese economic engagement. Over time, such pressures would erode the openness that has characterized the post–Cold War global economy, replacing it with a more rigid, bipolar system defined by technological allegiance rather than market efficiency.²⁰

For the United States, the end of pax silica would represent more than a loss of convenience or profitability. It would mark a structural shift in how power is accumulated and exercised internationally. Technological leadership has long allowed Washington to amplify its influence without constant coercion, embedding U.S. preferences in standards, platforms, and institutions that others voluntarily adopt. A world split between rival tech stacks, especially one in which China controls the most critical hardware inputs, would sharply curtail that advantage.

Appeasement and the Erosion of US Influence Abroad

Technology alone, however, does not determine strategic outcomes. Taiwan’s importance is magnified by its role in the military and political geography of the Indo-Pacific, where perceptions of U.S. resolve are as consequential as force posture itself.

Taiwan sits at the center of the first island chain, anchoring a network of alliances and partnerships that constrain the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to project power into the Western Pacific. Its continued autonomy complicates Chinese military planning, preserves U.S. freedom of maneuver, and reassures regional partners that American commitments remain credible.²¹ Conversely, Taiwan’s loss would create a cascading crisis of confidence that no amount of declaratory policy could easily repair.

Diplomatic credibility is not an abstract concept. It is built through repeated demonstrations that commitments will be honored even when doing so entails risk. A failure to defend Taiwan would be interpreted throughout Asia not as a narrow exception, but as a signal that the United States is unwilling or unable to absorb the costs required to maintain its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. Japan would be forced to reconsider the viability of extended deterrence and the security of its southwestern islands. South Korea would face renewed pressure to pursue independent nuclear capabilities. Southeast Asian states would accelerate hedging strategies, recalibrating basing access, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic alignment in anticipation of a diminished U.S. role.²²

The logic underlying these reactions is well captured by Thucydides’ enduring insight that fear, honor, and interest drive state behavior. Alliances endure not because partners are altruistic, but because they believe their interests and honor are safer within a collective framework than outside it. When fear of abandonment outweighs confidence in a patron’s resolve, alignment gives way to accommodation. History offers few examples of alliances that survived such a reversal intact.²³

Importantly, this dynamic cuts both ways. A credible U.S. effort to defend Taiwan, even under adverse conditions, would reinforce deterrence well beyond the immediate theater. It would signal that when Washington draws a line in the sand, crossing it has repercussions. In a world where diplomacy is increasingly being made on the basis of realpolitik rather than ideological framework, demonstrating a willingness to partake in brinksmanship with PRC is the only way to assure allies and partners that it is in their own best interest to share burdens, accept risk, and align their long-term strategies with U.S. leadership regardless of the shifting political winds attendant with democratic nations. As several analysts have noted, credibility is often less about winning clean victories than about demonstrating a willingness to stand firm when outcomes are uncertain.²⁴

Taiwan thus functions as a strategic litmus test. The question facing U.S. policymakers is not whether defending Taiwan guarantees stability, but whether abandoning it would all but ensure the unraveling of the alliance system that has underwritten American influence in Asia for more than half a century.

Geography Still Matters: Taiwan as the Modern Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier

Long before semiconductors or artificial intelligence entered the strategic lexicon, Taiwan’s importance was rooted in geography. General Douglas MacArthur famously described the island as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” a forward position from which the United States could project power and constrain adversaries across maritime Asia. While the technologies of warfare have changed dramatically since MacArthur’s era, the underlying logic has not; if anything, it has intensified.²⁵

An autonomous and U.S. aligned Taiwan shapes deterrence dynamics throughout the region. As things stand today, any Chinese attempt to project power seaward must contend with layered defenses, allied coordination, and the prospect of early escalation under unfavorable conditions. Remove Taiwan from that equation, and the PLA’s operating environment becomes markedly more permissive. Deterrence weakens not because U.S. capabilities vanish overnight, but because the balance of risk and opportunity shifts decisively in Beijing’s favor.²⁶

A PRC controlled Taiwan presents a stark contrast from a geostrategic perspective. As Taiwan sits astride the most critical maritime and air corridors linking Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and the broader Pacific, control of the island would allow the PLA to break through the first island chain, extending Chinese power projection deep into the Philippine Sea and undermining the defensive geometry that has long favored the United States and its allies.²⁷ From Taiwan, China could more effectively contest U.S. naval operations, threaten key bases in Japan, and exert sustained pressure on sea lines of communication that carry a significant share of global trade.²⁸

Equally important are the second-order effects. A PRC-controlled Taiwan would significantly tighten Beijing’s grip over waters within the entire first island chain, from Japan to Singapore. In the event that China wanted to exert pressure on any nation attempting to conduct commerce inside that arc, a PRC bastion in Taiwan would alter risk calculations for commercial shipping, energy flows, and undersea infrastructure, driving up insurance costs and increasing the vulnerability of global trade to political pressure.²⁹ For an international system heavily dependent on maritime commerce, such a shift would reverberate far beyond the Indo-Pacific.

Seen through this lens, MacArthur’s aphorism is not an anachronism. Taiwan remains an unsinkable aircraft carrier, not in the narrow sense of hosting runways, but as a fixed geographic asset that anchors regional stability. Surrendering that asset would impose enduring military disadvantages that no amount of distant force projection could easily offset.

Losing the Next Industrial Breakout

The strategic consequences of abandoning Taiwan would not end with today’s technologies or force postures. A third, often under-appreciated cost lies in the loss of opportunity to lead the next wave of industrial and scientific breakthroughs, those that will define economic and military power in the decades ahead.

Advanced computing is the enabling substrate for progress across a wide range of emerging sectors, including quantum information science, automated and additive manufacturing, robotics, advanced materials, and scalable low-cost energy systems. In each of these fields, the pace of discovery and commercialization is increasingly shaped by access to high-performance computing, large datasets, and AI-driven experimentation. States that command these inputs gain a compounding advantage, accelerating innovation while widening the gap with competitors.³⁰

The United States currently occupies a strong position in this landscape not because of deterministic superiority, but because it hosts a uniquely attractive ecosystem for global talent. Its universities, research institutions, venture capital networks, and open scientific culture continue to draw many of the world’s most capable engineers and scientists.³¹

Abandoning Taiwan would place this ecosystem at risk. A visible collapse in U.S. technological leadership, paired with a retreat from global security commitments, would redirect talent flows and investment decisions toward alternative hubs perceived as ascendant or more stable. China, already investing heavily in strategic technologies through state-directed programs, would be well positioned to capitalize on such a shift, particularly if it also secured dominant access to advanced compute through control of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.³² Losing ground in these areas would not simply slow U.S. growth; it would constrain strategic choice, forcing policymakers to operate within narrower margins of technological advantage.³³

History suggests that technological leadership, once ceded, is extraordinarily difficult to reclaim. It depends not only on investment and policy, but on intangible factors, prestige, confidence, and the belief among innovators that they are building the future rather than catching up to it. By allowing Taiwan to fall into Beijing’s hands, the United States would risk forfeiting precisely those intangibles at a moment when they matter most.

In this sense, the defense of Taiwan is not merely about preserving the status quo. It is about protecting the conditions under which the United States can continue to shape the frontier of American strategic advantage. Appeasement would not buy stability; it would mortgage the future.

Conclusion: Fear, Honor, and Interest in the Twenty-First Century

More than two millennia ago, Thucydides observed that fear, honor, and interest drive the decisions of states. That framework remains instructive today, not as a relic of classical realism, but as a reminder that power, credibility, and perception are inseparable in international politics.

In the case of Taiwan, all three align. The fear is evident: a world in which China controls the most critical nodes of advanced computing, dominates the military geography of the Western Pacific, and sets the terms of technological and economic participation for others. The interest is unmistakable: preserving the foundations of American technological leadership, alliance credibility, and freedom of maneuver in a system that has underwritten U.S. prosperity and security for decades. And honor, often misunderstood, lies not in abstract notions of pride, but in the trust that allies and partners place in American commitments, and in the reputational capital that makes leadership possible.³⁴

Much has been written about whether Taiwan is a cause worth fighting for. That question, while important, is incomplete. The more consequential question is whether the United States is prepared to live with the world that would follow from choosing not to. The evidence suggests that such a world would be poorer, more coercive, and less stable, defined by fractured technology systems, weakened alliances, and a strategic environment in which force and dependency replace rules and consent.

This paper has argued that Taiwan’s significance lies not in symbolism, but in structure. Taiwan anchors the technological supply chains, alliance networks, and military geography that sustain the current international order. Its loss would not be a discrete regional setback, but a systemic shock whose effects would reverberate across innovation, security, and global governance for generations.

For that reason, this paper serves as a foundation rather than a conclusion. The defense of Taiwan cannot be understood, or executed, through military posture alone. It depends on a wider set of enabling conditions: the ability to sustain asymmetric defense at scale, to endure economic and energy coercion, to secure critical materials, and to preserve the physical and digital infrastructure that connects Taiwan to its allies. Each of these domains merits focused analysis in its own right.

Defending Taiwan does not promise easy victories or risk-free outcomes. But abandoning it would represent a strategic self-inflicted wound, one that would shape the next century of American power far more decisively than the costs of deterrence ever could. In that sense, Taiwan is not merely a test of resolve. It is the fulcrum on which the future balance of the international system may well turn.

Josh Richards is the Chief Commercial Officer of Pacific Peering. He serves on the UN’s Joint Task Force on SMART Cables as a member of the Steering Committee, and chairs the Business Development Committee. He is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, a Tech Policy Fellow with the Aspen Institute, and a Senior Fellow with AI2030.

Joseph Hanacek is a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He serves as a Warfare Tactics Instructor at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School detachment of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in San Diego, CA. The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or its components.

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34. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Thomas Hobbes (London: 1629), https://archive.org/details/eightbookesofpel00thucuoft/page/n5/mode/2up; see also Kori Schake, “Deterrence,” Hoover Institution, May 2022, https://www.hoover.org/research/deterrence

Featured image: Taipei skyline at night. (Wikimedia Commons)

By Lawrence J Kaiser

In late 2025, Turkey conducted a successful test of an air-to-air missile launched from an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).  At first glance, the event appeared to be a narrow technical milestone – another incremental advance in the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Yet in strategic terms, the test reveals something far more consequential:  a structural shift in Turkey’s strategic posture as a middle power, a shift that increasingly tests, reshapes, and exploits alliance boundaries rather than choosing sides within them.

However, for U.S. and NATO planners, the significance of the test lies elsewhere.  Turkey’s air-to-air UCAV capability alters the escalation calculus of the alliance itself while remaining formally inside NATO’s institutional framework.  The episode signals less about alliance defection than an emerging pattern of alliance stress-testing – one that exploits gray-zone ambiguity from within.

The Event and the Misreading

Turkey’s successful air-to-air missile launch from a UCAV, reportedly conducted using Bayraktar’s Kizilelma platform, was widely reported as evidence of Ankara’s growing defense-industrial sophistication.  Commentators emphasized technical details:  sensor fusion, indigenous missile development, and the potential export market for Turkish drones.  While accurate, this framing misses the strategic significance of the test.

Air-to-air capability is qualitatively different from the ground-attack roles that have defined drone warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and the Middle East.  Ground-attack UCAV’s typically operate against fixed or surface targets in permissive or degraded air-defense environments where escalation remains geographically bounded and politically intelligible. However, air-to-air systems directly contest air sovereignty and interact with the manned aircraft of other states. They enter, then, a domain historically governed by tightly managed rules of engagement and alliance de-confliction arrangements. As a result, their use moves these weapons from supporting roles in peripheral conflicts, to potential instruments of direct interstate belligerence within contested airspace. In doing so, Turkey is not merely adding a new weapon, it is redefining the political and strategic meaning of unmanned force.

Why Air-to-Air Matters for a Middle Power

For a middle power like Turkey, air-to-air UCAVs offer three distinct advantages. First, they reduce political risk. The absence of a pilot lowers the domestic and alliance costs of escalation, enabling assertive signaling without immediate reputational or human consequences. Second, they enhance ambiguity in the escalation environment. Unmanned aircraft do not hold a distinct legal status under the U.N. Charter, the Law of Armed Conflict, or U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement. The destruction of such a platform remains a use of force. Yet the absence of a pilot materially alters the political and psychological dynamics of confrontation. Without the risk of killed or captured personnel, incidents involving unmanned systems generate lower immediate domestic or alliance pressures to retaliate. As a result, leaders are able to frame them as limited coercive signals – or even technical miscalculation – rather than as acts demanding a reciprocal military response. Third, they strengthen bargaining leverage. Indigenous air combat capability signals autonomy from alliance supply chains and constraints.

These advantages are not merely theoretical. Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for tools that expand its room for maneuver, while preserving plausible deniability. From drone operations in Syria and Libya to naval posturing in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara has favored capabilities that allow it to probe limits without triggering decisive retaliation. Air-to-air UCAVs fit squarely within this pattern.

Supply Chains, Material Sourcing, and Strategic Autonomy

Turkey’s progress in unmanned air combat cannot be understood solely in terms of platforms or doctrine. Its deeper significance lies in the supply chains and material sourcing strategies that underpin Turkey’s drone ecosystem. These industrial foundations are what allow Ankara to sustain operational tempo, absorb potential political friction, and maneuver within alliance constraints without triggering formal rupture.

Unlike many NATO allies, Turkey has pursued defense-industrial depth rather than specialization. Over the past decade, Ankara invested heavily in a more vertically integrated production model across a host of sectors: airframes, avionics, sensors, and – perhaps most critically – munitions. Firms like Baykar operate within a broader ecosystem of domestic subcontractors that, in turn, reduce reliance on single foreign suppliers. This matters because air-to-air UCAVs are not one-off prestige systems. They require reliable access to not only propulsion components and guidance systems, but missile inventories and data links that can be replenished under conditions of political stress.

Supply chain autonomy has already proven decisive in earlier phases of Turkey’s drone deployment. Western export controls on engines, optics, and precision components following operations in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh forced rapid substitution and indigenous development. Rather than halting progress, these constraints accelerated Turkey’s efforts to diversify its sourcing and indigenize critical subsystems. While the result is not complete autarky, it is a fairly resilient hybrid model that limits the coercive leverage of any single supplier or alliance partner.

In the air-to-air domain, this resilience takes on heightened strategic importance. Unlike ground attack drones, the use of air-to-air UCAVs implicate alliance airspace management, rules of engagement, and escalation control. Capability that exists only on paper – or even depends on fragile supply chains – would offer only limited leverage.  In contrast, a system backed by secure production lines and scalable munitions supply enables Turkey to signal persistence rather than experimentation.  It tells allies and adversaries alike that these platforms are not exceptions, but part of a durable force structure.

Material sourcing also shapes Turkey’s export behavior which reciprocally feeds back into its posture within the alliance. Because Turkish drones are not fully captive to U.S. or European components, Ankara can sell them to partners that Western suppliers would exclude or delay. This export flexibility strengthens Turkey’s diplomatic reach, while reinforcing domestic production volumes and, thereby, further insulating its supply chains from external pressure. In effect, Turkish exports subsidize Turkish autonomy.

For NATO, this presents a subtle but consequential challenge. Alliance influence has traditionally flowed through shared logistics, interoperability standards, and supplier dependence. Turkey’s drone supply chain strategy erodes that leverage without violating formal commitments. Ankara remains interoperable where it chooses, while retaining the option to diverge when alliance consensus constrains Turkish interests.

This pattern is not unique to Turkey. Arms-transfer data from the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI) suggest that other middle powers, including India and South Korea, also have long pursued analogous diversification and domestic production strategies in order to reduce supplier leverage, while remaining formally aligned with U.S.-led security frameworks.

Viewed in this light, Turkey’s air-to-air UCAV capability is not merely a technological leap. It reflects the mindset of a deeper industrial strategy that converts supply chain resilience into strategic optionality. This material foundation is what allows Turkey to stress-test NATO from within, while remaining confident that any resulting political friction will not translate into immediate operational vulnerability.

Alliance Stress-Testing Rather Than Alliance Exit

Much of the commentary on Turkey’s defense trajectory assumes a binary choice: either Ankara is drifting away from NATO or it remains a difficult but ultimately loyal ally. This framing obscures a third possibility: Turkey is deliberately stress-testing the alliance to extract concessions, redefine roles, and maximize its autonomy.

The UCAV air-to-air test exemplifies this approach. By developing capabilities that NATO itself is still debating conceptually and doctrinally, Turkey positions itself as both indispensable and disruptive. It contributes innovations while simultaneously complicating alliance planning. This duality is not accidental. It allows Ankara to argue for greater voice and flexibility within NATO, while retaining the option to act independently when alliance consensus falters.

Importantly, this is not equivalent to the logic behind Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system. Whereas the S-400 represented a clear breach of alliance norms, indigenous UCAV development does not violate formal commitments. Instead, it creates informal pressure, thereby forcing allies to adapt to Turkish capabilities rather than constrain them.

For NATO, while alliance commitments remain unchanged, incidents involving unmanned platforms may unfold at a tempo that tests NATO’s consultation processes, thereby increasing the risk that political coordination lags behind rapid escalation dynamics.

Escalation Optionality and the Compression of Thresholds

One of the most significant implications of the air-to-air UCAVs is their effect on escalation dynamics. Traditional air combat involves high thresholds: the deployment of manned fighters, formal rules of engagement, and alliance consultation mechanisms. In regions such as the Aegean and the Black Sea, where air encounters are frequent and politically sensitive, this ambiguity creates new risks of miscalculation that are difficult to manage through existing alliance procedures. For example, a Turkish unmanned interceptor operating near contested airspace in the Aegean could shadow a Greek aircraft or conduct a radar lock without immediately triggering the political shock associated with a manned confrontation. If the unmanned platform was damaged or downed in such an encounter, the absence of a captured or killed crew would reduce the immediate domestic and alliance pressures that typically accompany the loss of a pilot, even though the legal characterization of the incident would remain unchanged. The legal threshold would be the same, but the political demand for swift retaliation would be lower. Unmanned air-to-air platforms alter escalation tempo without altering legal thresholds.

For Turkey, the effect is not the creation of new legal authorities but the expansion of escalation flexibility. Manned fighters are equally capable of conducting warning intercepts or employing force in self-defense, and neither NATO policy nor the UN Charter establishes a distinct approval regime for unmanned systems. The distinction lies in the consequences attached to the loss of personnel. When a crewed aircraft is damaged or downed, the presence of killed or captured aircrew generates immediate domestic and alliance pressures that narrow response options and accelerate consultation demands. Incidents involving unmanned platforms, while still constitute a serious use of force, do not carry the same immediate human stakes, thereby allowing greater room for graduated signaling and a controlled response. In contested environments such as the Aegean, northern Syria, and the Black Sea, that marginal difference can matter.

From a strategic perspective, Turkey is acquiring not just a weapon, but a spectrum of options that blur the line between peace and conflict. This is a hallmark of contemporary middle power strategy under conditions of multipolarity and institutional strain.

Turkey as Systems Integrator, Not Mere Spoiler

A common caricature portrays Turkey as a spoiler within NATO: unpredictable, transactional, and disruptive. The UCAV test suggests a more nuanced reality. Turkey is increasingly acting as a systems integrator, combining indigenous platforms, tailored doctrines, and selective alliance participation into a coherent strategic posture. But this integrative posture also introduces alliance friction. A Turkey able to conduct limited unmanned air operations in contested airspaces – such as an intercept or retaliatory strike in the Aegean or northern Syria – without incurring immediate personnel loss may act more rapidly than NATO’s consultation processes can accommodate. While such an action might fall below the threshold of collective defense, it could nevertheless trigger countermeasures from a third party, thereby placing the alliance in the position of managing escalation dynamics it did not collectively authorize.  Allies may diverge over what constitutes a proportional response, levels of risk tolerance, or the necessity of consultation, exposing internal fractures and complicating deterrence signaling. The issue, then, is not alliance collapse, but the strain placed on cohesion and decision-making under compressed timelines. 

This posture does not reject the West, nor does it align fully with revisionist powers like Russia or Iran. Instead, it seeks leverage against all sides by creating capabilities that others must account for. In this sense, Turkey resembles other middle powers that pursue strategic autonomy without formal non-alignment (e.g. India or Brazil), albeit within a more militarized and volatile regional context.

Forward Indicators: What to Watch

If the UCAV test is a signal, what does it signify? Several indicators merit close attention. First, integration with naval aviation, particularly Turkey’s ambitions for carrier-based drone operations, would further enhance its independent power projection. Second, export behavior – whether Turkey restricts or proliferates air-to-air drone capabilities – will reveal how Ankara balances profit, influence, and restraint. Third, NATO doctrinal debates on unmanned air combat will indicate whether the alliance adapts to Turkey or attempts to constrain it.  Finally, shifts in Turkish strategic rhetoric will signal how Ankara seeks to justify its posture diplomatically.

Conclusion

Turkey’s successful air-to-air missile launch from a UCAV should be understood as a strategic signal rather than a technical curiosity. It reflects an emerging middle power logic that prioritizes escalation optionality, alliance stress-testing, and indigenous capability development. Far from signaling a simple drift away from NATO, the test underscores Ankara’s efforts to redefine its role within (and occasionally beyond) the alliance.

For analysts and policymakers, the lesson is not that Turkey is drifting away from NATO, but that an alliance may increasingly face stress from within as members acquire tools that compress escalation thresholds without breaking formal rules. Turkey’s air-to-air UCAV highlights how military innovation can outpace alliance governance, turning institutional ambiguity into leverage. Understanding this dynamic is essential not only for managing Ankara’s trajectory, but for adapting alliance strategy to an era in which escalation control is no longer monopolized by manned platforms.

Dr. Lawrence Kaiser is a geopolitical strategist focused on alliance politics, middle-power hedging, and escalation dynamics. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and an ALM in international relations from Harvard University.

Featured Image: Turkey’s KIZILELMA UCAV: A next-generation unmanned combat aerial vehicle designed for precision strikes, with supersonic speed, 1.5-ton payload capacity, and advanced autonomous flight capabilities. (Picture source Ugur Ozkan via X)

By Phil Bozzelli and Paul Giarra

The Duke of Wellington’s aphorism “The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton,” has been widely accepted as a validation of sports and their greater relevance to warfighting and victory. We take that statement at face value but go further.

Using the renewed emphasis upon warfighting within the defense and naval establishments, we propose that sports at our service academies, especially the U.S. Naval Academy, do more than provide venues for exercise or competition. Rather, those activities and their participants should be an integral part of the warfighting curriculum of those institutions just as everything else there should be.

This theme leverages the basic relationships between sports and warfighting. In the former one needs to know and understand himself, his teammates and his opponents. It is no different in warfare, where the stakes are higher and therefore the knowing and understanding of one’s self, allies and enemies is of even greater importance for success. Warfare thinking and action are focused upon the international environment.

The global population has embraced sports as a way to improve understanding and relations between nations. The Olympics are the most obvious manifestation of this reality. We have all witnessed how this venue has become, over the decades, a demonstration of either national pride, wealth, political ideology, or a combination of all as well as other positives and negatives. These gatherings have, as a minimum, permitted an up-close and extended engagement by and among the individual athletes themselves.

America does bring foreign officers to the U.S. for training and education exchange programs. Some exchanges involve officers at the more senior levels whose thinking has already been largely shaped and is done in a generally formal classroom environment. This schooling process includes little participation of America’s less friendly counterparts and for the most part it takes place on American soil.

USNA has 33 varsity sports at the national competition level and 25 intramural and club sports for those not competing at the varsity level. America’s other service academies operate similar programs (e.g. West Point offers 25 varsity sports and 28 intramural and club teams). All midshipmen (and cadets) are engaged in one or more sports or athletic activities, but essentially all on the domestic scene.

This sporting, intramural, and club scene is dynamic not only in content but in venue and physicality. The digital age has introduced E-Sports, gaming and wargaming as competitive processes that fill stadiums and require superb hand-eye coordination analogous to that of professional basketball players but while seated at a computer screen. The games have transitioned from general games to those that mimic live sports as well and they too have transitioned to international levels of competition monitored by its version of the NCAA (Global Esports Federation – GEF). Similarly, the military-focused wargaming genre has joined this digital competitive environment.

The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ) manages to field 37 sports at various levels (even including traditional American sports like football, basketball, etc.). USNA (and USMA) have about the same number of students as at the NDAC with the major difference being that the NDAJ offers a three-year education to future officers of all services before they go on to separate one-year schools for their individual militaries.

To varying degrees, militaries have officer-based sporting teams at different levels of skill within and without the primary service school. The Indian Navy has the largest naval academy in Asia and offers at least nine sporting teams. The Royal Navy, in addition to sports teams at its Naval School, fields a vast variety of teams throughout its naval establishment. China’s PLAN sporting focus, as can be determined from afar, appears to be more of a utilitarian team building type, although it does field a seriously respected rugby team. Interestingly, the PLA has not lagged in joining the digital age of competition, with E-Sports and wargaming popular among its military and civilian schools.

The various USNA teams should engage internationally with their friendly and not-so-friendly international military equivalents. The numbers of USNA teams provides significant engagement opportunities at varying appropriate skill levels dispersed over the entire calendar year. An environment exists where competition can be fair and appropriate as well as useful to help produce the warfighting leadership of the future. This proposed international engagement via sports far exceeds that international experience available to midshipmen from any other current program. It is on the international fields and seas where these officers will engage in war and peace.

We do not wish to engage here in a debate regarding how strong the warfighting focus has been of the USNA in recent years. However, it is clear that “warfighting” is currently being emphasized. The newly installed Secretary of Defense has made clear his focus and emphasis is upon warfighting and war readiness. This echoes the previous Chief of Naval Operations in her 2024 Navigation Plan for its “Warfighting Navy” headline and focus.

There is a renewed awareness and focus upon warfighting ability and readiness as the primary, if not singular, mechanism for maintaining peace. As one of the nation’s commissioning sources of naval officers the burden is upon USNA not only to support but to lead in this warfighting mission via its classrooms, dormitories and playing fields.

We are not starting from ground zero. The USNA offshore sailing team recently competed and won at the Ecole Navale International Sailing Week Competition, and in May 2024 the USNA had part of its men and women rugby teams participate in a State Department sponsored Rugby 7 tour of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. We are proposing an organized expansion of these efforts not just for the sport but for the inherent benefit it brings to America’s national security via the education of its future Naval leaders in meeting the USNA mission that the naval officer “must be a great deal more.”

Our interest in this subject came about when we became involved on the periphery of an invitation from the NDAJ’s four-star level civilian head to the USNA rugby team, via its coach, for the team to join in a rugby tournament at the NDAJ that would include teams from the NDAJ, the UK (Royal Naval College) and France (Ecole Navale). USNA’s Rugby team’s schedule and other factors (e.g., financing, event timing, NCAA rules etc.) precluded USNA participation.

We must first call attention to and highlight the significance of this NDAJ rugby initiative given the historical political and societal factors operating in that nation. We see sports related thinking as a “big deal.” The NDAJ rugby initiative not only reinforces the transnational utility of sports but offers a focused interpersonal engagement vehicle for military forces – friendly and not – which the U.S. and U.S. Navy should leap upon and expand. The more important aspect is the engagement with non-friendly nations.

The NDAJ and USNA catalog of sports is more typical than not of what exists at the world’s various service academies. Further, and more importantly, is the global shift in military attitudes exemplified by the Japanese government’s more visible foreign policy on the world’s stage to include this invitation to both the USN and its major seagoing allies via their officer producing schools.

Our contention is that it is all about warfighting to include having the necessary warfighting skills to achieve success without war. In the words of Wellington, “Not all naval battles are fought at sea!” Once one accepts this dictum, the tradeoffs required in terms of time and funding between these events and more traditional activities of Midshipmen (e.g. summer cruises) can be more equitably evaluated.

The “whys” for doing this are probably limited more by experience than imagination, so we list but a few of the more obvious. Whether one is a “globalist” or not, the reality is that America’s military has been involved globally since its founding and this is especially true of its sea services – the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard – whose officers are expected to function as diplomats in their international engagements, even at junior levels. Doing this well requires more international engagement sooner and over a longer period of service time.

The history of the world and certainly that of America from its beginning has made clear the need for supporters, friends, allies, partners regardless of whether the objective is military, political, economic or diplomatic. Whether that non-American shows up as a ship in our formation, a soldier in an adjacent fox hole, an article in some foreign media, a vote in some organizational chamber, some piece of needed foreign real estate or overflight, a trading partner or lender or simply an unpretentious “flag” among many – we all know and accept this need and the utility of someone to satisfy it. Perhaps, even more importantly, we appreciate that we must nurture these relationships if they are to be maintained or improved upon. For the military officer, this is not about “good will” or “friendships” it is about what is required in terms of knowledge about both allies and possible enemies.

For the naval officer this relationship between knowledge and warfighting is lifelong and consistent. It begins at USNA with its motto Ex Scientia Tridens (From Knowledge Sea Power), engraved on every USNA graduate’s class ring. It continues and is reinforced with the U.S. Naval War College motto of Viribus Mari Victoria (Victory through Sea Power); and these academic guidons become seagoing reality in the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Ready power for peace.

The authors’ experiences have been that there has been and remains a great deal of ignorance and misunderstanding of what transpires in the minds and cultures of others. This deficiency occurs at all institutional levels, public and private. Therefore, being able to make critical judgments regarding what others present becomes ever more important as the pace and sourcing of information is growing exponentially. While critical thinking ability is essential for the domestic environment as well, our focus is warfighting wherein both the opponents and allies will be foreign.

A major, if not the greatest, impediment to international success and a contributor to contentions has been ignorance or misunderstanding of the history, culture, motivations, beliefs, psychology of others. A deficiency compounded in this modern era where English is the new global lingua franca. Because American “culture” (e.g. Apple, pop music, entertainment) is dispersed to the furthest corners of the globe and all are joined together via the Internet and social media, we therefore assume, incorrectly, that others think and are motivated as we are.

Despite varying bloody, military conflicts since World War II’s VJ day, the vast majority of America’s military effort, and especially that of its Navy, has been on peaceful non-kinetic engagement with neutrals, friends, allies, opponents, competitors around the world. All of these actions are either directly or indirectly pointed to enhancing that warfighting prowess to be there when needed and be visible and accepted so as not to be needed.

Although the NDAJ and rugby were the impetus for this article, the opportunities are more extensive and the demand pressing enough that the U.S. and especially the U.S. Navy should take a leadership role in making this happen using the hype created by the Olympics, international athletic competition, and the ever-present forces necessitating “gray zone” engagement. As demonstrated repeatedly, sports allow engagements where otherwise precluded by politics.

This puts the NDAJ invitation in a different light, not just as a friendly school-to-school athletic challenge, but as an opportunity for international exposure, country-to-country understanding, and bonding with friends and allies. And to emphasize the earlier points, this is not just about Japan or Rugby but the broader opportunities across all sports and all nations for a deliberate military to military engagement program in a different sort of classroom and “battlefield.”

Clearly, there are requirements that would have to be met, such as funding, carving out time in already packed academic and sports schedules, and meeting NCAA restrictions. Held against the international opportunities for building personal and professional relationships and improving understanding among all parties, these are not obstacles, but simply the cost of doing business. It is probably not an exaggeration to state that all that takes place in the lives of Midshipmen is geared to turning them into competent naval officers, citizens, and leaders. Consequently, the time allocated to these various endeavors is justified and valid as is the funding, regardless of its source (e.g. government budgets, donations, alumni funding, sports revenue etc.)

These are all costs that need to be sourced. However heavy the financing thumb is on the scale, it should be balanced by potential gains, financial and otherwise. Depending upon where and how these contests are conducted there is the opportunity for revenue such as from advertising, broadcasting and tours. Neither USNA nor the U.S. government itself are novices in this category. On that same counterweight side of the scale are the intangible benefits of image, recruiting across the board, good will, cultural understanding and messaging all done via the more acceptable and less intrusive vehicle of sport.

Although this proposal is directed at the junior levels of the military, our experience has been that a shared background of military service provides a degree of basic rapport that often does not exist between the military and civilian of even the same nation. This is especially true for the sea services where the impartiality of the seas, winds and skies allows one ship’s captain to readily baseline himself with another regardless of nationality. Similarly, competitive athletes at all ages have this shared understanding among their international colleagues. A boxer or wrestler or oarsman or whatever knows, appreciates and has a common foundation with his fellow competitor regardless of nationality because the common vigor of the shared sport transcends borders. Thus, there is an important starting framework from which to go forward – shared naval schooling background combined with common sporting experience.

Basically, getting to “Yes” will include understanding by U.S. leaders that this is both an internal and external political – military issue of great significance. We recommend the following:

1. Begin with “Of course we will participate” and find a way.

2. Start early, quickly and small – focus upon a successful beginning.

3. As with the launching of ships, it is important to “grease the skids” at all stakeholder levels, from coaches to national governments to funders to help ensure success

4. Following on to the NDAJ receptivity and initiative regarding Rugby, Rugby may be the logical beginning; however, pursuing this as the first step may violate the above idea of “early, quickly and small.”

5. The U.S., U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Naval Academy have so many options in terms of sports, timing, venues (domestic and international), and opponents that it is difficult to see an obstacle to an early success once the decision is made to participate.

6. There are several way to fund this program: Academy supporters, athletic and team supporters, patrons, corporations, U.S. DOD and non-DOD funds.

7. Planning around academic year class schedules is difficult, but not impossible. Summer cruises can be designed around team participation as is done now for major sports; venue selection can facilitate the time required for the event. Therefore, we see this as a year-round activity.

8. Treat this program the same as Olympic team participation. There are clear precedents for scheduling and funding for military personnel.

9. Recommendation 1, above, to participate, is not enough: Lead!

Finding a way requires the collaboration of many parties. However, the leadership initiative rests with the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy who has authority for the human resources required for this program and whose staff includes an International Engagement Office, which may need expansion in both depth and breadth to develop and execute a successful program.

There will be various arguments as to why the above is either too difficult or unnecessary. We address three:

1: NCAA rules: important enough to USNA’s Division 1 status and all that goes with it to have a compliance officer on the USNA Athletic Association staff to ensure the coaches adhere to the rules. However, as any tourist to Annapolis will see on display in either a souvenir shop or on the back of a midshipman tee shirt the logo “USNA, not college”. Within and without the USNA, there needs to be a reminder that the service academies have a purpose that goes beyond and sometimes conflicts with that of just being a major educational institution. Further, there are NCAA rules, such as the transfer portal entry, that the USNA is not able to employ. If the USNA becomes serious about executing this proposal, working the NCAA rules process to satisfy all requirements is probably achievable.

2: USNA’s to-do list: that USNA’s superintendent has much to do and adding something else such as this to that work list is counterproductive. The US government and the US Navy furnishes the Superintendent with a significant sized staff to include an already existing International Engagement Officer. We acknowledge that there is no shortage of projects being thrust upon the USNA leadership; however, we think all these endeavors, whether new or traditional, first need to be evaluated and prioritized accordingly by the leadership, writ large, before being rejected. As addressed above, we see the USNA’s primary mission as being that of educating and training entry level naval officers in a manner consistent with the missions of the operating fleet and its other educational institutions. Under this logic every opportunity to educate midshipmen within the framework of warfighting makes sense as an element of the USNA mission.

3: Vehicles, such as CISM (International Military Sports Council) already exist to do such: therefore, use that mechanism rather than something new or different. For reasons best known to USNA, the institution has had no noticeable participation via CISM. Those reasons would certainly have included obstacles such as the NCAA rules, financial support, schedules etc.

While useful in part within that structure, the NDAJ rugby invitation and its acceptance by others sends the message that other vehicles exist, are used and are probably preferred. The recent USNA sailing competition in France and the USNA Rugby 7 tour of some of the South Pacific islands are but two examples. Perhaps most importantly are the objective and who leads.

The objective is to enhance warfighting prowess of America’s Naval Forces. Objectives of such institutions as CISM (“The ultimate goal is to contribute to world peace by uniting armed forces through sports. The motto under which we operate is “Friendship through Sport“) or even that motivating the USNA Rugby 7 tour of the South Pacific (“to enhancing our partnership with the Pacific Islands and the respective governments to achieve our shared vision for a resilient Pacific Islands region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity”) are all well and good but should not and cannot be the objectives of military forces. We say this with full appreciation that a competent warfighting military force can certainly help produce the environment for these other outcomes, as reflected in the US Seventh Fleet’s maxim “ready seapower for peace,” but the operative action is power – seapower and warfighting ability.

The ability of America’s military to perform its primary function – defense of the United States and its objectives – will, as always, depend upon the skills and willingness of its military leaders to lead – to lead internally and externally. Without denigrating the utility, value, importance of friends, allies and international cooperation, the reality – welcomed or not – is that the external world for the foreseeable future is looking to and expecting U.S. leadership. Therefore, we expect America and its naval leadership to lead here as well.

We close with this reminder – “Not all naval battles are fought at sea!”

Captain Phil Bozzelli, USN (Ret.) is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served as Defense Attache in Rome.

Commander Paul Giarra, USN (Ret.) served as a Navy pilot, attended the National War College-equivalent National Institute for Defence Studies in Tokyo, and was a varsity lightweight oarsman at Harvard.

Photo: Members of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard Men’s 7s Rugby teams contest for possession of the ball during a scrum, Aug. 22, 2025. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Theodore Lee)

By Jason Lancaster

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.¹

The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process. 

The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.²

Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.

Countering IUUF

The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty,³ the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance. 

Pacific Fusion Center

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.”⁴ The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.

Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels.⁵ The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.⁶ 

Improving Capacity

Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC.⁷ The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024.⁸ Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025.⁹ Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.¹⁰

The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.

PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.

The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.

The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.

To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.

Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.

Endnotes 

^1. Commander Jennifer Runion, “Fishing for Trouble: Chinese IUU Fishing and the Risk of Escalation,” Proceedings 149, no. 2 (February 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/february/fishing-trouble-chinese-iuu-fishing-and-risk-escalation. Geoffrey Till, “At War with the Lights Off,” Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/war-lights.

^2. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent: Implementation Plan 2023–2030*. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Mar. 2024, https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2050-Strategy-Implementation-Plan_2023-2030.pdf#:~:text=This%20first%20Implementation%20Plan%20for%20the%202050%20Strategy,and%20levels%20of%20ambition%20of%20the%202050%20Strategy. Accessed 5 Sept. 2025.

^3. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fishing in the Blue Pacific, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our-development-cooperation-partnerships-in-the-pacific/case-studies/fishing-in-the-blue-pacific.

^4. Pacific Fusion Centre, Home, Pacific Fusion Centre, n.d., accessed June 11, 2025, https://www.pacificfusioncentre.org/.

^5. Micah McCartney, “Argentina Deploys Military as PRC Leads Fishing Swarm Near Waters,” Newsweek, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/argentina-deploys-military-atlantic-fishing-swarm-PRC-spain-korea-taiwan-2035671.

^6. CDR Mike Holland, “Overview: Maritime Domain Awareness, Securing the Seas: 12 Global Tides and Currents of Maritime Domain Awareness,” The Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea 63, no. 3 (2006).

^7. Australian Defence Forces, Australian Defence Forces Pacific Maritime Security Program, n.d., https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/maritime-capability.

^8. Max Walden, “RFNS Timo Sustains Damage during Docking,” ABC News, December 22, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-23/fiji-navy-vessel-gifted-australia-sustains-damage-docking/104757584.

^9. Ana Madigibuli, “RFNS Timo Completes First Patrol,” Fiji Times, April 16, 2025, https://www.fijitimes.com.fj/rfns-timo-completes-first-patrol/.

^10. U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Sector Pacific Area, n.d., accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Cutters/.

Featured Image: Twelve Chinese fishing boats are banded together with ropes on December 21, 2010 to try to thwart an attempt by a South Korean coast guard ship to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea. (Photo by Park Young-Chul, Agence France-Press)