By Crispinus Lee and Joe Schwartzstein

Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States in the Pacific region. The Congressional Research Service notes that Guam is closer to Beijing than Hawaii, making it vital to the United States’ national defense for air and naval operations in the Indo-Pacific region.¹ The Port of Guam is designated as one of eighteen National Port Readiness Network commercial seaports. Military and civilian logistical experts believe that Guam will be a critical logistical hub for any conflict in the Asia-Pacific.² Despite the geographic importance of the island, Guam’s logistical capacity is far below the needs of the United States in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

Peacetime Capacity

The island’s only deep-water port, the Port of Guam, handles almost 90 percent of all the island’s imports and serves over 500,000 residents of Guam and Micronesia. The port moves approximately 85,000 containers annually and maintains 40.5 acres for storage. There are three 40-year-old rail-mounted gantry cranes with a spreader of 120-foot reach and a maximum reach height of 85 feet, seven top lifters, two 20-ton heavy-lift forklifts, and 32 tractors.

Berthing consists of four piers with a 2,700-foot linear wharf space dredged to between 28 and 35 feet and 40.5 acres of storage. Fishing vessels and tenants utilize pier F-3; container ships general cargo, and cruise ships utilize piers F-4 through F-6.  The port also has 858 chassis-mounted container stalls and 124 refrigerated container stalls. The port plans to develop a new F-7 pier, adding 900 feet of additional space.³

Cargo Capacity in Wartime Conditions

Would this be enough to support military operations? For comparison, the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom provide insight into the scale of logistical movement that would have to occur during a conventional war. To combat Iraq, the United States had to move 400,000 tons of ammunition for conventional fires, 117,000 wheeled vehicles, and 12,000 tanks and armored vehicles to ports in Saudi Arabia where its forces were deployed.⁴ To move these materials, the United States employed 385 vessels (foreign-flagged vessels carried 22.6 percent of all dry cargo), averaging 4,200 tons of cargo daily.

While the Gulf War ended in a victory for the U.S. led coalition, this military success overshadowed logistics being strained in a primarily land-based war. Foreign-flagged ships made 17 shiploads of ammunition delivery, an amount equal to the deliveries by the ready reserve force and three times more than that made by US-flagged shipping.⁵ Then Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) General Johnson stated, “Our ability to lift more than ten million tons of material by sea in seven months of operations to the Persian Gulf region has … depended heavily on the contributions of organic, allied, and friendly shippers. In the future, however, we may find ourselves in a contingency that may require us to accomplish a deployment by relying on a mix of U.S. sealift resources. One of our greatest concerns, then, is the state of the U.S. maritime industry.”⁶

Almost a decade later, the United States initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). From 2002 to 2011, vessels enrolled in the maritime security program moved an astronomical 18,540,965 containers over 9 years. This was done to combat a primarily land-based foe whose capacity for war was largely destroyed within the first year of conflict. In both cases, Iraq had virtually no control over its air and sea lanes of communication. With an average 1,545,080 containers moved a year during the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the wartime need for a deployed American force during that conflict alone dwarfs Guam’s average annual capacity. Even if the Port of Guam modified its activity to handle more cargo volume by tenfold, it would not be able to handle what the United States moved in a year during the two wars in Iraq. ⁷

In a contested maritime environment, logistics face the additional challenge of protecting isolated sea lines of communication that span vast distances. While the wars against Iraq had multiple developed allied ports on the European mainland, the Pacific is a vast stretch of ocean with a scattering of small islands.

The Falklands War provides more insight into this particular challenge. Argentina, with a formidable Air Force and Navy, faced a significantly diminished Royal Navy. The United Kingdom was forced to tackle an 8,000-nautical mile supply chain.  During the conflict, the British utilized 50 merchant marine ships to support 30,000 marines, sailors, airmen, and mariners. Ascension Island, sitting 4,000 nautical miles from Britain, served as the only possible forward support base. With no port except for a small jetty and an anchorage, Ascension Island served as a key hub for strategic airlift. The British military conducted 10,600 helicopter flights and 2,500 fixed-wing flights, airlifting more than 7,000 tons of ammunition, vehicles, and other cargo. In addition, the island base flew over 6,500 personnel.⁸ During that time, the British military moved one million ration packs, 12 million meals, 10,000 tons of ammunition, 1,260 tons of fuel, 3,880 tons of ordnance, and more than 38,000 tons of equipment.⁹ The loss of one ship, the MV Atlantic Conveyor, severely impacted British logistical efforts. On board were six Wessex helicopters, three CH47 helicopters, and equipment for 10,000 service members – only a single CH47 helicopter survived.¹⁰ The British successfully fought a war over 8,000 nautical miles from home, supporting over 30,000 service members, but the war required a significant logistical footprint.

Guam’s Shortfalls

 A war in the Pacific would far outstrip the British experience, with Taiwan playing the role of the Falklands and Guam the role of the Ascension Islands. The difference is that Chinese conventional and nuclear missiles are capable of striking both Taiwan and Guam, among several other facilities across the Pacific. The distance from one friendly port to another, such as San Diego to Honolulu, is 2,607 miles, and another 3,800 miles from there to Guam. This eye-watering distance would be strung together by a fleet of 44 ready reserve vessels, assuming prospective allies or friendly states during this contest would be willing to risk their assets.¹¹

It is essential to understand the Port of Guam’s supply chain limitations compared to recent military logistical operations requirements. In 2023, the Port of Guam handled 86,000 containers, 215,000 tons of non-containerized/breakbulk cargo, and 6,821 roll-on/roll-off cargo.¹² These cargo figures may seem impressive in a vacuum, but they must be compared to recent annual military logistical operations. U.S. Central Command handled 1,124,612 tons of breakbulk and Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) and 2,428,616 tons of containerized cargo in 2011.¹³ Now, imagine a war in the Indo-Pacific region requiring full military mobilization. During the Gulf War, U.S. sealift moved 945,000 pieces of equipment, totaling almost 32.7 million square feet, covering the equivalent of 681 football fields or 898 acres.¹⁴ Finally, utilizing the Port of Guam  for wartime operations would effectively shut down all civilian operations, leaving the population without the necessary supplies, food, and items for daily living. If it was not painfully evident yet, to say that the Port of Guam is incapable of meeting Indo-Pacific sealift logistical requirements is an understatement.

All this is compounded by the fact that the Port of Guam is in range of Chinese strike assets. Facilities may be damaged by missile and drone attacks, aerial bombardment, and sabotage. There will be degradation to the Port of Guam’s expected operational capabilities.

Currently, the federal government plans to expand the port to accommodate four Ultra Large Container Vessels (ULCVs), at least four ROROs, and 3 product tankers simultaneously. This would involve a 500-acre expansion for ROROs and 250 acres for container storage to meet the minimum for sealift operations. Additionally, sufficient petroleum storage is available to handle military operations. To support large-scale operations, the port will require sufficient capacity for both military and commercial operations, as well as large-scale storage and robust infrastructure to meet national security requirements.

Prepositioning Stocks in Guam

The abysmal port capacity is even more concerning when considering the use of Guam as a base to use for prepositioning forces. The Department of Defense maintains prepositioned military essential stocks around the globe for rapid deployment for national contingencies. These prepositioned stocks provide enough equipment and supplies to allow the DOD to quickly deploy forces around the globe, rather than waiting the weeks necessary to ship supplies and equipment to the theater. This essential policy enhances U.S. global military readiness of any combatant commander to meet any national security challenge.  Could Guam support a force that may require deployment for 30 days? The answer is a resounding no.

The Department of Defense, in its report to Congress, noted that Guam requires significant investment to upgrade its deteriorating infrastructure to support future military expansion and meet U.S. national strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁶ Prepositioning stocks require significant infrastructural support for both the equipment and personnel.

Leghorn Army Depot in Livorno, Italy, is a typical example of a base that maintains prepositioned supplies.  It consists of “60 maintenance bays in 16 warehouses with over 749,000 square feet of humidity-controlled storage.”¹⁷ Guam falls short yet again in almost every category. Currently, the U.S. military utilizes about 20 percent of the island’s electrical power. Guam’s Power Authority concluded that the island faces challenges in “keeping its aging, owned plants reliable and in good working condition.”¹⁸ Any adhoc expansion could cause rolling blackouts on the island. Prepositioned stocks also require a significant investment in personnel to manage and monitor stock readiness, which in turn requires major reworks to water treatment and wastewater removal. Guam Waterworks Authority (GWA) recently settled with the EPA over violations of the Clean Water Act, which included untreated sewage, and its poor condition sanitary sewer system.  Even something as basic as roads are lacking. The DOD report highlighted several issues, including inadequate bridges, road flooding, tight corners, and poor roads.¹⁹ The military would face significant challenges in moving equipment, supplies, personnel, and associated waste without infrastructure improvements.

Finally, returning to the Port of Guam itself, afloat prepositioning stocks require either pier space or anchorages. The Port of Guam does not have the pier space to berth prepositioning ships. Apra Harbor would need to be enlarged and deepened to accommodate afloat prepositioning ships. Commercial ships require access to the port’s anchorage that prepositioning ships would take up. Further, the port would require the construction of piers and dredging.  Naval Base Guam supports over 30 tenant commands in support of Pacific Command. Prepositioning ships would take up vital pier space or anchorages required for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. Unfortunately, Guam would not be able to host DOD prepositioning stocks, either shoreside or shipboard, without a significant financial and physical investment.

Why Prioritize Guam?

While it would be advantageous for the military to rely on non-U.S. ports for logistic support, assuming that these ports would be available for U.S. use during an Indo-Pacific conflict could prove disastrous. China holds considerable economic and military influence in the Asia-Pacific region that can be leveraged to exclude the United States from ports and supply chain hubs. Aside from the fact that most major ports in the Indo-Pacific lie closer in range to Chinese military assets, most Asian Pacific ports operate at capacity to supply some of the largest import-oriented economies in the world. This configuration would force the DOD to compete for port access, berthing, cargo operations, storage, and transportation of containers, rolling stock, and break-bulk materials.

Further complicating the supply chain is the spread of the DOD’s logistical footprint across multiple ports. Diversifying across multiple ports complicates the DOD’s logistical footprint and supply chain, making the military’s supply chain vulnerable to disruptions. There is no guarantee that a port can meet TRANSCOM’s sealift requirements.

Port cybersecurity vulnerabilities are another area to contend with in ports in the Pacific theater. China’s dominance in port infrastructure across the Pacific region places cybersecurity at the top of defense concerns.

There is also concern about Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) vulnerabilities at allied and non-allied ports. Asian-Pacific ports are vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks, submarines, and subsea cable infrastructure attacks. It is unlikely that the United States would be able to prevent attacks on foreign ports by an adversary seeking to disrupt U.S. sealift, particularly for the number of U.S. assets over the largest maritime theater on Earth.

Guam serves as Maritime Prepositioning Stock Squadron 3’s center. This makes it the center of America’s military Pacific posture for sustainment and a vital intermodal conduit for U.S. forces. As such, the Port of Guam must be the priority for upgrades to support U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. This requires extensive infrastructure upgrades and the acquisition of land for container and RORO stockyards aligning with most continental U.S. strategic seaports.

To these ends, the container berths require massive expansions and upgrades. At a minimum, the Port of Guam should be able to handle four ULCVs with four to six cranes capable of working each ship. The berths must be dredged to a depth of forty-five feet. The container yard should be expanded to accommodate marshaling and storage of wartime logistical needs, with a minimum of 250-300 acres and sufficient Rubber-Tired Gantry Cranes (RTGs) to facilitate container movements.

The Port of Guam should also have sufficient RORO berthing to handle four ROROs dredged to a depth of thirty-seven feet. TRANSCOM RORO marshaling and storage footprint will require between 500 and almost 900 acres. In comparison, during the Gulf War, TRANSCOM moved enough equipment and supplies to cover 680 football fields, about 897.6 acres.²⁰ 

Further, the Port must have sufficient tanker berthing and storage to perform cargo operations on at least two to four tankers at any time, dredged to thirty-seven feet,  and storage capacity for one week to handle DOD’s requirements of 12.6 million gallons of fuel per day.²¹ The Port of Guam will require sufficient break-bulk berthing to accommodate two to four ships dredged to a depth of forty-one feet. Ports require tugs to facilitate vessel movements. Assisting in the ships in the port requires enough tugs to handle multiple ship moves per day. An average U.S. port could have between six to eight tractor tugs in the range of 60 to 80 bollard tons. The Department of Defense should also consider six azimuth stern drive (ASD) tugs for port operations.

Finally, to ensure the vessel movement in the Port, the DOD must provide familiarization training to all members of the U.S. Navy Reserve’s Strategic Sealift Officer Force Harbor Pilot Detachment, a group of highly trained and skilled civilian harbor pilots whose sole responsibility would be to facilitate the movement of sealift vessels within the port.

The Port of Guam serves as the key strategic sealift port in the Indo-Pacific region and, with the proper investment, can fulfill its potential as the critical supply chain strong point for the department.

Crispinus “Cris” Lee is a Surface Warfare Officer and Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He works as a Program Management Specialist for Booze Allen Hamilton. Prior to this, he served as an Assistant Operations Officer onboard USS Cole and as Weapons Officer aboard USS Gladiator. 

Joe Schwartzstein is a Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve Strategic Sealift Officer Force and serves as a Maryland State Pilot. A dual-licensed graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, he holds master’s degrees from the California State University Maritime Academy and the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. Commander Schwartzstein is also a U.S. Coast Guard licensed First-Class Pilot, Master of Oceans, Unlimited Tonnage, and First Assistant Engineer of Steam, Motor, and Gas Turbine Vessels.

Notes

1. Andres Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” published August 3, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47643, 2.

2. Clara Fong and Diana Roy, “Guam’s Strategic Importance in the Indo-Pacific,” published September 6, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/articles/guams-strategic-importance-indo-pacific.

3. Port of Guam. “Equipment, Berthing, and Facilities,” accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.portofguam.com/about-us/maritime-operation/facilities-and-services/equipment-berthing-and-facilities.

4. William G. Pagonis and Michael D. Krause, No. 13, Land Warfare Papers (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare 1992), 11-13;  Keith M. Wilkinson, “The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War: A Snowball in the Desert,” June 18, paper prepared for  Naval War College, Newport, RI [DTIC AD-A264 145], https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA264145.pdf. 15.

5. James K. Matthews, and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1996), 115.

6. Wilkinson, The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War, 12.

7. Albert Joseph Herberger, Kenneth C. Gaulden, and Rolf Marshall, Global Reach: Revolutionizing the Use of Commercial Vessels and Intermodal Systems for Military Sealift, 1990-2012 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 417.

8. Peter Dye, “Logistics in the Falklands Campaign,” Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 54, (2003): 96

9. Kenneth L. Privratsky and Julian Thompson, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2019), 37.

10. Ibid. 127.

11. MARAD, The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-defense-reserve-fleet/ndrf/maritime-administration%E2%80%99s-ready-reserve-force#:~:text=The%20Ready%20Reserve%20Force%20(RRF)%20is%20a%20subset%20of%20vessels,deployment%20of%20U.S.%20military%20forces.

12. Port Authority of Guam, Financial Statements, Required Supplementary Information, and Supplementary and Other Information, Tamuning, Guam, 2023, 11-13.

13. Vice Admiral A.J. Herberger, U.S.N. (ret), Kenneth C. Gaulden, Commander Rolf Marshall, U.S.N. (ret). Global Reach, Revolutionizing the Use of Commercial Vessels and Intermodal Systems for Military Sealift, 1900-2012, (Annapolis MD, 2015) 437-439.

14. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 112.

15. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Hudak, “Lengthening the Tether of Fuel in Afghanistan,” Army Sustainment Magazine March-April 2013, https://www.army.mil/article/97879/lengthening_the_tether_of_fuel_in_afghanistan.

16. Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” 30.

17. U.S. Army Europe and Africa Public Affairs Office, “Fact Sheet: Army Prepositioned Stocks,” June 27, 2024,  APS_Fact_Sheet_27062024.pdfhttps://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/APS_Fact_Sheet_27062024.pdf.

18. Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” 23.

19. Guam and CNMI Military Relocation, Volume 6: Related Actions – Utilities and Roadway Projects (Guam) Final EIS (July 2010), I-5,

20. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast,  115.

21. Colonel Gregory J. Lengyel, USAF, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air War College, April 2007, 14, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA476848.pdf.

Featured image: The Port of Guam as seen from the air in June 2021. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

By Morgan Bazilian and Jahara Matisek

Just as oil fueled the mechanized warfare of the 20^th century, electricity is becoming the foundational resource for militaries of the 21^st century. Echoing First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill’s historic decision to switch the Royal Navy from domestic coal to imported oil, today’s energy transition means the ability to generate, store, and deliver electricity will increasingly dictate national power. In order to meet this urgent challenge, the United States government and military must treat grid expansion as a national security priority by creating “Defense Energy Security Zones” to expedite federal permitting, intentionally and aggressively leveraging the Defense Production Act (DPA) to secure critical grid components, and integrating power resilience into how the Pentagon chooses to fund firms that produce munitions and weapon systems.

After two decades of flat demand, U.S. consumption is projected to rise 20% by 2030, driven by a boom in data centers and advanced manufacturing. Yet the physical grid cannot keep up. Transmission projects often take a decade to permit and build. New generation projects face grid interconnection queues lasting around five years, with over 2.6 terawatts of proposed capacity – that’s more than double the existing power fleet – just waiting for a connection. And now, political issues are compounding these technical bottlenecks. From Virginia to Arizona, local communities are increasingly pushing back against the construction of new data centers and the gas-fired power plants required to run them, citing concerns over noise, land use, tax breaks, and environmental impact. The result is $64 billion worth of data center projects being blocked and delayed. The entire digital age system is under strain from every direction.

Growing electrical bottlenecks also challenge American military power. For the Iran war, the Pentagon utilized Anthropic’s tool Claude and Palantir products like Maven, which used AI to process vast amounts of sensor data for multi-domain awareness and to identify targets. Successful AI targeting use, however, was predicated on an enormous, and largely invisible, expenditure of electrical power in the data centers that trained and ran the models.

This reveals a new reality: the military’s power dependencies operate on very different time scales. At the tactical level, the hour-by-hour management of peak load dictates whether radar networks, command centers, and various weapon systems can function without rolling brownouts. At the strategic level, precision munitions, advanced materials, and microelectronics all depend on electricity-intensive sites that take years to plan and build. Worse, their production of these cannot be surged during a crisis without a reliable baseload of power.

The technologies driving the modern civilian economy (e.g., AI, advanced computing, semiconductors, etc.) also enable warfighting advantages. This constraint is not just domestic. The power grid in Guam is falling critically short, putting U.S. bases there at risk and undermining military readiness in the Pacific.

Herein lies the central paradox of digital-age military power: America’s relentless pursuit of technological overmatch has created a profound and overlooked vulnerability. The military is becoming highly dependent on the very energy-intensive technologies, such as AI-enabled military systems, that are straining the national grid to its breaking point. The data center boom in Virginia and Arizona is now in direct competition for power with the industrial base needed to build weapons, maintain air defense, and collect real-time multi-domain awareness. America’s economic might and military power are both being constrained by an infrastructure that cannot meet the demands of the present, let alone the future.

Strategy is Outrunning Infrastructure

Historically, achieving military advantage depended on technological sophistication and industrial production. More recently, this has translated into developing stealthy aircraft and faster missiles, alongside trying to mass produce drones, with energy infrastructure being treated as a background concern. That hierarchy is reversing. Modern military power is an energy-intensive ecosystem, and three systemic shifts explain this transition.

First, computational power has become a foundational military resource. AI is not a niche capability, but is being embedded across everything from logistics to targeting. While training a single frontier AI model requires tens of megawatt-months of electricity (mainly due to dual-use commercial applications), the military challenge is trying to deploy these models. Running continuous AI inference across thousands of distributed battlefield nodes for Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) creates a persistent, high-volume electrical demand on local grids. Because military operations are increasingly dependent on processing substantial amounts of data in real-time, warfighting capability is now directly constrained by grid capacity at the tactical and operational levels.

Second, modern weapons production is electricity-intensive. From the advanced metallurgy needed for hypersonic weapon systems to the high-temperature processing for ‘old’ artillery shells, manufacturing at every level relies on continuous, high-reliability power. Recent experience demonstrates this defense industrial base link. During Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel, U.S. Navy destroyers fired substantial numbers of advanced interceptors to defend against ballistic missiles. This single engagement consumed a significant number of missiles from a limited stockpile, while annual production rates for these complex systems remain low. The munitions shortfall has only worsened since the 2026 Iran war, where 5 weeks of munitions expended may take up to 5 years to replace. The expenditure-refill gap reflects the physical limits of specialized, energy-bound production lines. Surge capacity is thus a function of power availability, not just funding and minerals.

Third, this energy demand is creating fierce competition for foundational materials across the entire military-industrial complex. No material illustrates this challenge better than copper. The entire energy transition, from grid expansion and electric vehicles to the data centers powering AI, all runs on copper, where the gap between supply and demand is rapidly widening. Estimates show that global demand for copper is set to double by 2035, creating a massive supply gap – and an obstacle to future economic growth. Yet this demand surge is colliding with a rigid supply chain. New copper mines take an average of 18 years to develop globally and nearly 30 years in the United States. The refined copper needed for the electronics in a missile or a fighter jet is the same copper sought for a new data center.

These shifts mean military effectiveness depends on an integrated supply chain: from mineral extraction to electrical generation, to industrial processing, and finally to operational power. If any link in that chain is constrained (i.e., lack of copper or congested grid) the entire system slows. The decisive question is no longer simply who invents the most advanced technology, but who can secure the materials and power to manufacture and operate that technology at scale.

America’s Structural Power Vulnerability

The United States enters this new era of energy competition with an electrical grid designed for a different century. The energy landscape is changing rapidly. After two decades of flat demand, U.S. consumption will rise 20% by 2030, driven by major growth in data centers, electrified industry, and advanced manufacturing. Forecasts show data centers alone consuming 9% of total U.S. electricity demand by 2030 – roughly 75% of Texas’ power generation. Now, with demand skyrocketing, the grid is being asked to accelerate after years of standing still.

Unfortunately, this demand crashes against a highly balkanized system. The U.S. electrical grid is heavily fragmented into regional interconnects (like ERCOT in Texas or PJM in the Mid-Atlantic) that struggle to share power across state lines. Because power cannot easily flow from regions with a surplus to regions facing brownouts, the physical location of defense manufacturing facilities becomes a critical vulnerability. An ammunition plant in a power-constrained region cannot surge production, regardless of national security needs.

While permitting delays and interconnection queues are well-known problems, the physical expansion of the grid is also hampered by critical hardware shortages driven by booming global demand for power. For example, in the Global South, electricity demand is rising due to growing basic electrification and air conditioning, not AI usage. Worse, the market for high-voltage transformers is straining the ability of countries to build new power plants. The procurement lead time for these essential components has ballooned from months to several years. This not only delays new generation projects but also creates a severe national security risk, as it limits the ability to recover from major storms or a physical attack on the grid.

This challenge is magnified when contrasted with China. While the U.S. grid struggles with fragmentation and inertia, China is executing a centrally planned, state-funded strategy to dominate the energy landscape. Beijing has built a network of over 30,000 kilometers of Ultra-High-Voltage transmission lines to move massive amounts of power from its energy-rich interior to its coastal industrial hubs.

This is not just an energy policy; it is a geopolitical strategy designed to underwrite industrial and military power. This “tale of two grids” creates a grim picture: China is building the electrical foundation for 21^st century capabilities for advanced tech and manufacturing for mass, while America remains mired in regulatory and physical gridlock. The result is a dangerous structural mismatch: U.S. strategic ambition is outrunning the very infrastructure required to sustain it.

Conclusion: Power is the new bottleneck for the Economy and Military

The defining strategic constraint is now electrical capacity, not technological innovation. Economic growth, industrial output, and military readiness now depend on America’s ability to build, permit, and deploy the physical systems that generate and move power. Without that expansion, economic ambition and military strategy outrun infrastructure. Allowing any further grid stagnation is essentially a “geopolitical tax” that directly undermines American national security.

Military power faces this constraint immediately. Joint all-domain operations (JADO) need an unbroken chain of energy-intensive data fusion, satellite networks, AI-driven targeting, precision manufacturing, and advanced chips. JADO is what the Pentagon is betting on to ensure warfighters can out-fight near-peer threats, an approach paired heavily with AI during the 2026 Iran war. A resilient and capable electrical grid is needed for JADO and AI to function properly. To win the global AI race, the United States must first harden its grid. Electricity now sets the speed, reach, and endurance of the U.S. military.

To prevent domestic infrastructure from undermining military effectiveness, the United States government must proactively intervene with policies that treat grid expansion as a national security imperative. While the April 2025 White House executive order on grid security and the Department of Energy’s commitments in 2026 are steps in the right direction, they need more ‘industrial teeth’ to be effective in the era of great power competition.

First, Congress must move beyond half-measures. While the House Energy and Commerce Committee holds hearings and debates grid reliability bills, industry experts are right to call out that permitting reform is not a ‘silver bullet’. Market structures must be reformed to properly value and compensate firm, dispatchable power that can survive crises, ensuring a resilient grid that is valued like a strategic asset rather than letting it be dictated by the whims of the free market. Furthermore, the Pentagon should be granted statutory authority to designate specific manufacturing hubs as “Defense Energy Security Zones,” granting them expedited federal permitting under the FAST-41 framework to override local gridlock.

Second, the administration must aggressively leverage the Defense Production Act (DPA) to secure the domestic supply chain for critical grid components. Relying on state-level energy emergency policies to manage shortages is a reactive, losing strategy. Growing lead times for high-voltage transformers are a national security crisis. Utilizing the DPA to incentivize domestic manufacturing and stockpiling of grid parts is a crucial ‘insurance plan’ to ensure the United States can surge when needed and rapidly recover from an attack against the grid.

Third, the Pentagon must integrate power availability into its acquisition approach. The Pentagon cannot award massive contracts to defense firms that host AI data centers or make munitions and weapon systems without assessing whether their facilities (and their suppliers) are connected to a regional grid that is capable enough to sustain surge periods. Power resilience must become an important metric to consider for future defense procurement programs.

The arsenal of the future is becoming increasingly dependent on electricity. If the United States fails to treat grid expansion as a national security priority on par with funding the next submarine or fighter jet, it risks an era where military capability is decided by domestic infrastructure failures rather than adversary action. If America cannot generate and deliver that power at scale, it will lose the next war before the first shot is fired.

Morgan D. Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy and professor at the Colorado School of Mines, with over thirty years of experience in global energy policy and investment. A former World Bank lead energy specialist and senior diplomat at the UN, he has held roles in the Irish government and advisory positions with the World Economic Forum and the International Energy Agency. A Fulbright fellow, he has published widely on energy security and international affairs.

Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek (PhD) is a U.S. Air Force command pilot, senior fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. He is the most published active-duty officer currently serving, with 2 books and over 200 articles on the defense industrial base, strategy, and warfare. Views are his own and not those of the U.S. Air Force, Department of War, or the U.S. Government.

Featured Image: The new 350 kilowatt-hour solar array located near the Hill Aerospace Museum at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. (U.S. Air Force photo by Cynthia Griggs)

By Ryan C. Walker

Popular history and historians in public service have encouraged the public to view the production capacity of the United States during as World War II (WWII) as a “miracle.”¹ The production was recognized by the Allies as pivotal to victory and the first studies appear to have sought to understand the process behind the miracle. Academic interest in the subject dates at least to 1956, when Francis Walton wrote the book that likely coined the term, Miracle of World War II: How American Industry Made Victory Possible.² Research did not end there, however, as Alan L. Gropman wrote a McNair Report in 1996, Mobilizing US Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality, which sought to dispel notions of a spontaneous miracle and identify how this process occurred. Gropman believed the importance of dispelling the “halo” surrounding the production was identifying the constituent causes as:

“…there were enormous governmental, supervisory, labor-management relations and domestic political frictions that hampered the effort—and there is no reason to think that these problems would not handicap future mobilization efforts. With enormous threats looming in the mid 1930s and increasing as Europe exploded into war at the end of the decade, the United States was in no way unified in its perception of the hazards, nor was there any unity in government or business about what to do about it.”³

Gropman identified one of his primary influences as Gary E. Weir.⁴ Weir has been one of the primary influences in identifying these processes specifically for shipyards and submarine production, with his focus on 1940-61.⁵ Weir argues the “wartime blend of naval, industrial, and scientific resources,” would eventually coalesce into what he termed the “naval-industrial complex,” which was a result of “[t]he wartime blend of naval, industrial, and scientific resources,” that constituted modern submarine construction.⁶ The previous focus of these studies has been macro-observations, centering primarily on the larger players, but the problems of today seem to match closely to the problems facing the USN in the 1930s, potentially offering insight into solutions of the present context.

The current production of ships, particularly submarines, has become a subject of interest as geopolitical circumstances become increasingly uncertain. Solutions to increase shipyard productivity, which include building new facilities in Lorain County, Ohio, are primarily long-term solutions that seek to reverse the post-Cold War atrophy of the defense industrial base and are hindered by the necessity of building supply chains for new Naval-Capital Towns.⁷ As investment has maintained a smaller industrial base since 1991, for the foreseeable future, the shipyards that are producing and repairing today are all that can be reasonably depended on in the short-term (3-5 years). The United States can do well by recognizing this fact and looking at alternative methods to increase production in existing areas, such as returning to shift work seven days a week on a modified Dupont schedule used in facilities requiring 24-hour support. The modification would be the shift work time availability and switching to a gold-blue crew working two 10-hour first and second shifts, on a four day on/four day off schedule, henceforth referred to as an 8-4-2-10 schedule (eight-day work week, four days per crew, two primary shifts working ten-hour days).

The Challenges to Navigate and Consider

A shipyard, particularly for submarines that fall under SUBSAFE requirements, is one of the most complex production environments. The shipyard worker is employed in a dynamic environment including challenges such as limited spaces; ventilation; exposure to the elements; or the heat and cold associated with an interior of a ship that does not have services to control atmosphere. Further, maritime industries are a relatively unknown niche that only directly or indirectly employed 393,390 people in the United States during 2020, of which 83.1 percent of the directly employed were concentrated in ten states.⁸ Due to the declining significance and lack of prestige associated with blue-collar work, shipyards that need workers such as General Dynamics Electric Boat have resorted to hiring on the spot and creating elaborate advertisement outreach campaigns. Thus, compounding the shipyard shortage is a shortage of laborers willing to work on a shipyard in any capacity (directly onsite or supporting).⁹

Creating any solution must be palatable to a variety of stakeholders, Federal, State and Local governments, business and organizational interests, and labor interests. For any radical departure from the status quo outlined in this work, concessions must be made to all stakeholders. For government and naval officials, this proposal would assume a higher expenditure for funds that are already tightly spread amongst the Department of the Navy. For business interests, the schedule will interrupt long-standing processes and require a new business environment, the type of overhaul that necessitates organizational unrest. Similarly, labor interests will have to change their normal work schedule of eight hours, five days a week, with a rigid weekday and weekend divide (which has come under recent pressure anyway). Recognizing these challenges and then designing collaborative strategies that find true win-wins among the stakeholders is a major goal of this article and is meant to be thought-provoking rather than a delineation of true guidelines.

The Miracle of Production was fuelled in no small part by hard work and coordination at all levels of production, from the apprentice standing a Firewatch to the Admirals who oversaw the programs, getting an increase in production today will likely require a similar level of shiftwork, dedication, and expense seen in the previous era. There is a defense industrial base to build on today, and the USN, private shipyards, and policymakers would do well to seek to maximize the current output in addition to planning new facilities. The shift work this article seeks to create is similar to the nearly around the clock production seen in World War II. It also maintains a period of third shift where evolutions that require minimal personnel presence or would be too costly to be effective, and the 8-4-2-10 schedule could be implemented to offer a sustainable long-term solution. First, though, it is important to understand why this would be more desirable/efficient than the current status quo.

Shift Work as Practiced Today

In 1920, then Rear Admiral Joseph R. DeFrees was approached by Thomas Edison on the “best ways to expedite construction.”¹⁰ With Edison’s input, Defrees recommended uninterrupted construction programs, increased uniformity in construction, improved labor and facilities, as well as devoting more hours to production, improving labor relations to reduce strikes, and encouraging more efficient utilization of skilled workers who could not do shift work.¹¹ Similar issues, such as labor shortages, plagued submarine construction prior to WWII as well, but Weir notes the Commandant of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard adopted several of these recommendations, such as “employing shifts, permitting overtime, and hiring as many skilled workers as possible,” though the primary yards were stymied by a limited two-year construction program.¹²

While shift and weekend work is still practiced in many yards, the ability of the second and third shifts to match production is limited primarily by the structure of society emphasizing a five-day, 40-hour work week, primarily conducted between 0600-1700. The result of the slowdown in defense spending, the schedules have shifted to a ‘normal’ workweek that emphasizes much of the work is primarily done during first shift. Work conducted aboard a submarine is conducted in tight spaces, often falling prey to the Law of Diminishing Marginal Productivity, wherein adding labor units to a fixed space will increase productivity at a decreasing rate, until adding additional units becomes negative. Further, the difficulty of coordination in an environment with so many stakeholders means much of the time that could be spent for labor is often spent in meetings (which are important, but do represent an opportunity cost). Currently, shipyards are facing the issue of too much simultaneous work is conducted during first shift, increasing frustration for the work force.

Cutting corners in safety is not acceptable in the USA and is certainly not acceptable in a NAVSEA or NAVSEA-certified private facility producing SUBSAFE boats, reducing hours for any reason is likely not a tenable solution as each evolution has a purpose. If there has been a benefit in the slowdown in the past thirty years, it is that much of the waste associated with naval production has been identified and mitigated to the best of the respective facilities’ ability. In this case, the root cause is the reliance on one shift to do much of the current work in a limited space.

In the recommended 8-4-2-10 modified Dupont schedule, the two ten-hour shifts will be equally divided in terms of personnel and workload. Assuming the actual labor time per shift can be increased to seven hours per 20 hours of effective labor availability per day, with the average extended across all seven days, would mean an effective 140 hours of potential production per week. This compares to the current (1.5 full shift capability, for 12 hours of potential production, five days a week) for 60 hours, which can be extended two more full shifts during the weekend for a likely peak efficiency at 76 hours per week. These hours are illustrative and substantiated only by the author’s personal experience in the naval facilities; they may not be accurate or paint the full picture for every shipyard or even each department. For best results, the best insight would be garnered by surveying each department if the 8-4-2-10 schedule is best for their work as the answer may be different depending on the type of work conducted.

The greatest potential increase comes from increased weekend work, but in the current five-day workweek, working overtime or weekend work in addition to a normal workweek could cause burnout and cause prospective personnel to shy away from the shipyard due to a reputation of burnout. To prevent that, creating a two-crew system that allows laborers to have four days off will preserve their well-being while also ensuring production continues. Overtime opportunities will still be present: if a person is ill or on vacation during their scheduled shift, two workers could be present to offer their time in six consecutive days of labor, while also ensuring two days of rest occur. If a pandemic such as COVID-19 occurred once again and a person on one shift were sick, this could ensure the further division of the labor force to ensure around-the-clock production continues. This is an incredibly desirable practice, which guarantees labor force happiness even during the upheaval associated with a dramatic organizational restructuring. The generous time off practice would become a beacon for employees seeking a more favorable work environment with better benefits and prevent a union, group, or laborers to argue they are being taken advantage of.

Having two primary shifts, first and second, that extend to be ten-hour swathes as opposed to eight, will keep the third shift in a steward/setup role. Manning a third shift as an equal shift would be impracticable, as it is an undesirable shift for many, thus spreading two hours that are traditionally third shift to the other shifts would assist in week-to-week work. Further it creates new opportunities for deckplate leaders, who coordinate with managers that oversee the transition and ensure work continues as the shift changes. The 8-4-2-10 also prevents the Law of Diminishing Marginal Productivity while also preventing the shortage of parking from which most naval facilities suffer, a quality-of-life improvement many desire. Further, it would offer more opportunities to build the workforce to avoid future shipyard labor shortages or expansion to new facilities like the production of submarines in the Manitowoc Shipyard in Wisconsin during WWII. While this is a future envisioned for shipyards, if executed successfully it could be replicated in essential programs within the DOD.

Returning to the Manitowoc example, should a potential conflict erupt, the shifts also build the available pool of experienced labor to act as advisors for yards who need to be rapidly stood up. As Don Walsh recalled:

“In early 1940 the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company was asked to build the most complex of ships: the submarine. This was a radical, almost unimaginable, proposal for a company of shipbuilders, many of whom had never set eyes on a submarine…In September 1940, the Navy awarded a contract for the initial run of ten subs. Teams of experts from the Electric Boat Company came to Manitowoc under contract to the yard to help with the early stages of this program. Manitowoc personnel, in turn, visited Electric Boat and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to observe submarine construction that was under way at those sites. The first Manitowoc boat, the USS Peto (SS-265), was laid down in June 1941. She was launched in April 1942—228 days ahead of schedule—and went off to war just one year after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Early delivery of subs was to be a way of life for this fine shipyard. And as they got out into the Fleet, their crews even began to send back thank-you letters for the quality and strength of those boats. These satisfied ‘customers’ offered the best kind of praise for the Manitowoc employers, who earned Navy Department production “E” awards every year during the war.”¹³

The teams of Electric Boat advisors were pivotal to this rapid success, along with allowing the workers from those areas to observe production in existing sites. In an ideal world, the short-term solution would also be pursued simultaneously with longer-term solutions, each fueling the other’s success. As labor is at the center of each challenge, any solution that increases the available pool of labor should be considered.

Challenges Reconsidered

The ultimate question is whether or not the potential increase in production is worth it. Manning production around the clock will likely increase the cost of doing business in private or public yards. Are policy-makers and the USN willing to spend the money? Even if the plan received backing from leadership, where would that money come from? Would private and labor interests buy-in? Perhaps attempting this on a smaller scale, such as only shipyard trades or on a smaller project would be more palatable to start with. Once that is accomplished, larger projects can be attempted once actual production increases can be observed and measured as worth the expense. Further, there may be money to develop a new production site or to increase production; the former will likely be more efficient in the long-run and the latter for the short-run. Manitowoc was stood up, but experienced personnel from other yards helped the push, expanding the pool of experienced labor can only aid these long-term projects positively.

For naval officials, this program would likely cause questions of how to adequately supervise and maintain control over essential procedures, particularly those requiring approval and oversight. Changes to management structures to become a fulcrum between the two shifts, splitting their time equally between the two shifts, will be necessary. In some cases, stoppages are inevitable, but the goal in this schedule would be to resolve the issue discovered on one shift, before they return to work the next day, or at least make progress. Overall, the least amount of resistance is expected from naval officials, as this is a recognized and much discussed topic.

While the government will ultimately bear much of the cost, businesses will be required to spend more money on more laborers, particularly benefits for full-time employees. However, considering the potential “deal” laborers would receive, there likely would be no shortage and the production scheduling issues that have plagued them could be resolved without burning out the workforce. There is even the potential that reducing the amount spent on overtime labor will reduce costs and the shipyard itself would become increasingly resilient.

On the surface, one could look at this potential schedule and sense the laborers receive the greatest benefit and have no room to complain. This would ignore how fundamental the first shift, 40-hour work week has become for American society. Working 9 to 5 (or any other iteration of an eight-hour work day) is cherished by many and it would take a long time for towns to cater to the workers on different shifts. For a single person there is not much lost, but many who work have families. Adopting the 8-4-2-10 would be asking for a fundamental change in the work week, affecting availability for family events, dinners, sport events, and many other familial practices and commitments. A labor union, which many shipyards have, would have to sell that this is not only a good idea, but a benefit to the people they represent. The guarantee of four days off per 8-day work week and at least 15 days of paid time off (which seems to be the industry standard as is) would help sell this as a deal that cannot be refused: a win-win for all. Make no mistake, despite the benefits, the greatest burden will be carried by the labor force should this plan be enacted; and leaders should seek to empower and support their mission.

Conclusion

How to return to WWII production pace in an unsure geopolitical environment that requires ever more ships? The first step should not be asking where can we produce more and spending resources, but rather asking how can current facilities be operated at the maximum efficiency? This article forwards a proposal based on a return to around the clock production, modified to meet the needs of all stakeholders. The 8-2-4-10 modified Dupont schedule could increase shipyard productivity in the short-term to levels needed, once an adjustment period associated with an initial learning curve is overcome. The inspiration we should look for is not a “miracle,” but rather a slow progressive increase in production efficiency coupled with nurturing the labor force to ensure labor issues are also resolved. This is potentially a radical solution that may ultimately be unpalatable but should start the conversation in a direction that emphasizes reinforcing current production, rather than spending a generation waiting on another Miracle of Production.

Ryan C. Walker served in the United States Navy’s Submarine Force from 2014 to 2019, receiving an honorable discharge. He received his Bachelor of Arts in History from Southern New Hampshire University, he then received his Master of Arts in Naval History from the University of Portsmouth, receiving a Distinction. Walker has continued his studies at the University of Portsmouth as a PhD candidate, his current research interests are enlisted American submariners from 1915-40, British private men-of-war in the North Atlantic, and the development of American Naval-Capital-Towns. Walker has also held a variety of roles in the Defense Industry and is currently employed by General Dynamics Electric Boat as a Senior Test Engineer. The opinions and views expressed are those of the author alone and are presented in his private capacity.

Endnotes

¹ The National WWII Museum, “Out-Producing the Enemy:’ American Production During WWII,” accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/mv-education-package.pdf; David Vergun, “During WWII, Industries Transitioned From Peacetime to Wartime Production,” accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/2128446/during-wwii-industries-transitioned-from-peacetime-to-wartime-production/; National Parks Service, “World War II and the American Home Front,” accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.nps.gov/subjects/nationalhistoriclandmarks/upload/WWII_and_the_American_Home_Front-508.pdf. 

² Francis Walton, Miracle of World War II: How American Industry Made Victory Possible, (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

³ Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing US Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality. McNair Report No. 50, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, 2.

⁴ Gropman, Mobilizing US Industry, v.

⁵ Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval- Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction,(Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center Department of the Navy, 1993); Gary E. Weir, “The Search for an American Submarine Strategy and Design, 1916-1936.” Naval War College Review 44, no. 1 (1991): 34–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44637145.

⁶ Weir, Forged in War, 6.

⁷ Richard Payerchin, “Lorain: Submarines would Ride in Barges to get to Dry Dock,” accessed May 14, 2023, https://www.morningjournal.com/2022/02/14/lorain-submarines-would-ride-in-barges-to-get-to-dry-dock/; Megan Eckstein, Joe Gould and Bryant Harris, “How the US plans to Expand its Submarine Industrial Base for AUKUS,” accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/03/15/how-the-us-plans-to-expand-its-submarine-industrial-base-for-aukus/; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Estimates 5 More Years for Virginia Attack Sub Production to Hit 2 Boats a Year,” accessed May 5, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/03/31/navy-estimates-5-more-years-for-virginia-attack-sub-production-to-hit-2-boats-a-year; Sam LaGrone, “Submarine Supply Chain Largest Barrier to Improving Virginia Attack Sub Schedule, Says Boykin,” accessed May 14, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/05/08/submarine-supply-chain-largest-barrier-to-improving-virginia-attack-sub-schedule-says-boykin.

⁸ Maritime Administration (MARAD), The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, Report, March 30, 2021. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-06/Economic%20Contributions%20of%20U.S.%20Shipbuilding%20and%20Repairing%20Industry.pdf, 1, 8.

⁹ Dana Wilkie, “The Blue-Collar Drought: Why jobs that were once the backbone of the U.S. economy have grown increasingly hard to fill,” accessed May 14, 2023, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/the-blue-collar-drought.aspx; Brian Hallenbeck, “Electric Boat president can’t stress it enough: ‘We’re hiring!’” May 8, 2022, https://www.theday.com/local-news/20220121/electric-boat-president-cant-stress-it-enough-were-hiring/.

¹⁰ Weir, Forged in War, 14-15.

¹¹ Weir, Forged in War, 15.

¹² Weir, Forged in War, 15-16.

¹³ Walsh, “Those Stout Manitowoc Boats,” Website Reprint.

Featured Image: An October 2017 aerial view of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard located in Kittery on the southern boundary of Maine across from the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. (Photo via U.S. Library of Congress)