By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC published submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles on whether U.S. Navy surface warfare officers should specialize.

Authors offered a variety of viewpoints on this long-running debate. These included arguments for different forms of specialization, making changes within the current generalist system, and other perspectives. As the global threat environment intensifies, the U.S. Navy’s SWO community may continue to reexamine its professional structure to stay effective.

The lineup is below, and we thank these authors for their excellent contributions.

“The Commanding Officer Must Be a Fighting Engineer — Surface Warfare and Generalism,” by Rob Watts

“Authors advocating each approach have employed personal experience and beliefs, historical analysis, and comparisons with other navies to make their cases. Data has had little role in this debate. To add data to this discussion, this author collected and analyzed information about the careers of current (as of December 1, 2025) destroyer commanding officers and executive officers encompassing 148 people across 74 ships.”

“SWO Specialization: Specialize by Platform Groups to Win the High-End Fight, Pt. 1,” by JR Dinglasan

“Perhaps the most hotly debated reform to improve warfighting skill is the specialization of the SWO community – proposed in the wake of the 2017 collisions but not implemented. Of myriad proposals, SWO specialization is the single most effective structural change the community can undertake to substantially increase the surface force’s tactical proficiency in the long term.”

“The Merchant Marine Specialized 100 years ago. The Navy should have then, and needs to now,” by Jeff Jaeger

“The time was a century ago for the SWO officer corps to accept that the future had arrived, and it is past high time for them to do so now. The U.S. Navy surface warfare community must adapt accordingly, as their Merchant Marine brethren have to great effect, for their benefit as professional mariners.”

“Preparing for the Future Fight: A Blended Career Path for Surface Warfare Officers,” by Scott Mobley

“It is useful to explore these questions from a historical perspective, connect the Navy’s past experience to the present-day SWO debate, and ultimately propose a blended career path, incorporating the best aspects of technical specialization and generalist command.”

“No Time to Specialize,” by Chris Rielage

“SWO specialization was a compelling idea for a peacetime navy – and if we can stabilize the short-term threat to Taiwan, we should return to sharpen the fleet’s long-term competitiveness. Time is just too short for it to be the right answer today. In 2026, the only path forward is to roll up our sleeves – at every level of seniority – and drive the existing framework of the SWO community to be more ready for war.”

“Specialization vs. Warfighting: Balancing Technology and the Human Element in War,” by Gerry Roncolato

“Specialization is attractive to bureaucratic organizations. It promises to solve the problems of building individual system knowledge in the face of extraordinary technological advancement. It works well in commercial applications, but its efficacy in military organizations that fight wars, suffer casualties, and adapt to unforeseen and highly dangerous events is at best unproven. The U.S. Navy is already heavily specialized, and today’s calls are for even more.”

“The Surface Warfare Officer Career Path – An Egalitarian Construct in need of some Improvement,” by Mike Fierro

“With this specialty structure, these navies do not share a unified identity as a force. Rather, each identifies with their own specialty and wear different insignia. Often, rather than unity, there is friction.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 28, 2025) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee (DDG 123) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) steam alongside the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Official U.S. Navy photo)

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC is publishing submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles on whether U.S. Navy surface warfare officers should specialize.

The long-running debate between specialized and generalist career tracks for SWOs has regained more relevance in light of growing great power threats. Authors will present well-argued and competing viewpoints in this series.

The lineup is below, and will be updated with further submissions in the coming days.

“The Commanding Officer Must Be a Fighting Engineer — Surface Warfare and Generalism,” by Rob Watts
“SWO Specialization: Specialize by Platform Groups to Win the High-End Fight, Pt. 1,” by JR Dinglasan
“The Merchant Marine Specialized 100 years ago. The Navy should have then, and needs to now,” by Jeff Jaeger
“Preparing for the Future Fight: A Blended Career Path for Surface Warfare Officers,” by Scott Mobley
“No Time to Specialize,” by Chris Rielage
“Specialization vs. Warfighting: Balancing Technology and the Human Element in War,” by Gerry Roncolato
“The Surface Warfare Officer Career Path – An Egalitarian Construct in need of some Improvement,” by Mike Fierro

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (May 10, 2022) Ensign Krystal Francis, from Augusta, Georgia, holds her Surface Warfare pin prior to being pinned as a Surface Warfare Officer aboard Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Samantha Oblander)

By Dmitry Filipoff

In the past year, numerous authors wrote for CIMSEC to offer useful insights and analysis on a broad range of maritime security topics and naval affairs. We are grateful to our readers and authors for contributing to the conversation on our pages. Our top ten most-viewed articles from 2025 are listed below, and we look forward to an exciting year in 2026!

1. “Exposed Undersea: PLA Navy Officer Reflections on China’s Not-So-Silent Service,” by Ryan Martinson

“Writing in the November 2023 issue of Military Art (军事学术), a prestigious journal published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science, three PLAN officers revealed that the peacetime operations of Chinese submarines are highly vulnerable to the U.S. Navy’s undersea surveillance system, raising serious questions about their strategic and operational utility.”

2. “Neither Fish nor Fowl: China’s Development of a Nuclear Battery AIP Submarine,” by Dr. Sarah Kirchberger and CAPT Christopher P. Carlson, USN (Ret)

“Given the rapid modernization of China’s military, and particularly its navy, it seems advisable to keep an eye on the likelihood that the Type 041 submarine could be sporting a novel, auxiliary nuclear powerplant in place of the Stirling engine previously employed in its AIP propulsion system.”

3. “If the U.S. Navy can’t Repair Ships in Peacetime, how will it do so in War?” by Michael Hogan

“If the Navy is to meet the demands of a major conflict, it must prioritize not only shipbuilding but also ship repair and salvage capabilities. The lessons of the past are clear—effective battle damage repair and salvage can mean the difference between victory and defeat.”

4. “Navy Force Planning with a Pertinacious Marine Corps,” by Bruce Stubbs

“The United States Marine Corps has an outsized effect on Navy force planning. While the Navy and the Marines exhibit a sincere and genuine single team spirit conducting global naval operations, they are a fierce team of rivals when determining the requirements for amphibious ships, which the Navy funds for their construction and operation.”

5. “Small Craft, Big Impact: Ukraine’s Naval War and the Rise of New-Tech Warships,” by David Kirichenko

“Over the past few years, Ukraine’s growing use of naval drones has pushed both sides to rapidly adapt, accelerating the race for countermeasures and maritime innovation. NATO would do well to study Ukraine’s approach as it prepares for the future of warfare at sea.”

6. “Break China’s Grip on Shipping with the Multilateral Maritime Alliance,” by Blaine Worthingon

“While there have been some nods to bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding, the United States has not made a concerted effort toward a robust, multilateral counter-China maritime strategy. That needs to change. A coordinated, multinational approach is required to counter Chinese shipping dominance.”

7. “Bringing Command and Accountability Back to Surface Fleet Maintenance,” by Capt. John Cordle, USN (ret.) and Capt. Holman Agard, USN

“Radical change, with incremental and careful execution, is urgently needed within the US Navy’s Surface Ship Repair Maintenance enterprise to rectify the shortcomings of two decades of well-intentioned initiatives that rendered a majority of Surface ships neglected and ill-equipped for combat.”

8. “China’s Coming Small Wars,” by Michael Hanson

“The crucible of real combat must test PLA leadership, units, and operational methods before attempting an invasion of Taiwan. China’s adversaries should remain attuned to China’s engagement in small wars as means to advance political objectives and test its forces in preparation for a Taiwan invasion.”

9. “Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America,” by CDR Paul Viscovich, USN (Ret.)

“Whether the U.S. outright withdraws from the Alliance or simply reneges on its obligations, the Europeans and Canada must accept full responsibility for their own defense and embrace the challenges this will demand. One of these responsibilities is developing a NATO naval and maritime strategy that is independent of American participation and priorities.”

10. “Bring Out the Knives: A Programmatic Night Court for the Surface Navy,” by Chris Rielage

“If sailors are already fully occupied and their schedules are overflowing, it hardly matters how good the new simulators or WTIs are. The present system of time allocation in the surface fleet is not a deliberate product of a warfighting-centric focus, but rather an unchecked process of creeping administrative overload. When new tacticians and training tools hit the fleet, they are eclipsed and diluted by a vast array of miscellaneous requirements. The leaders of the surface force must launch an effort to systematically protect time for tactics by aggressively pruning other requirements, or else these new efforts will fall short.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PLA Navy Aircraft carriers Shandong (Hull 17) and Fujian (Hull 18) moored in a wharf at night. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn and by Mu Ruilin)

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