Antarctic, Arctic

Polar Primer: Arctic and Antarctic Governance

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By Jake Brantley

As great power competition expands into new domains and climate change alters global geography, the Arctic and Antarctica have become central pieces of the national security conversation. However, the conversation around these strategic regions often lacks a nuanced understanding of the distinct governance frameworks that regulate each polar region. There is a frequent, yet flawed, tendency to view “the poles” as a single, uniform operational environment.

While both the Arctic and Antarctic regions are remote, extreme, and unforgiving maritime environments characterized by a history of cooperative scientific exploration, their legal, political, and geographic structures are fundamentally different. Navigating these regions requires more than just icebreakers and cold-weather gear; it requires a clear understanding of rules-based order that governs them.

This article provides a comprehensive yet concise overview of the primary governing mechanisms for both the Arctic and Antarctica, aiming to equip national security practitioners with the foundational knowledge necessary to operate within and strategize for these regions. For a deeper understanding, readers are encouraged to dig into the authoritative legal documents governing the Arctic, Antarctic and global maritime trade.

Why Governance Matters

Before analyzing the specific legal mechanisms, it is important to understand why these frameworks matter to the modern national security expert. Both polar regions are transitioning from peripheral zones of scientific curiosity to central arenas of geopolitical competition.

In the North, receding sea ice is opening new trans-polar shipping routes—such as the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage — that drastically reduce transit times between Asia and Europe. Simultaneously, the region is rich in untapped hydrocarbons, critical minerals, and migrating fish stocks. Commercial shipping, resource extraction, and emerging military opportunities will shape the future Arctic geo-strategic environment. These factors have already prompted renewed militarization by Russia and the assertion of “Near-Arctic State” status by China, as both countries seek to secure economic and strategic advantages.

In the South, Antarctica remains a demilitarized global commons, but it is not immune to strategic competition. The proliferation of scientific research stations has raised concerns regarding “dual-use” technologies, where scientific infrastructure—such as satellite tracking facilities—may be leveraged for military intelligence and space operations. Furthermore, the increasing demand for marine resources has tested the limits of Antarctic fisheries management. Understanding how to counter malign behavior in Antarctica requires a firm grasp of the legal architecture that defines norms and acceptable state behavior.

Adding to complexity, revisionist state pressure to undermine the rules-based order is increasing while region-specific enforcement options remain geopolitically limiting. Physically, extreme weather, logistics, and remote geography limit access and response time for nations to protect their interests in both regions. Legally, the Arctic affords relatively broad enforcement choices rooted in sovereign maritime jurisdiction. Conversely, Antarctica’s strict demilitarization restricts enforcement options primarily to diplomatic means—deviations from which risk validating Russian and Chinese “salami-slicing” tactics. To effectively project presence and achieve strategic priorities, security practitioners must account for the tyranny of distance, global narrative control, and legal nuance.

The Arctic

Geographically, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by the sovereign landmasses of eight nations (the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland). Consequently, it is governed primarily by national sovereignty and a multi-layered framework of maritime law and executive agreements.

Given the region’s fundamental nature as a maritime domain, Arctic governance is dominated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS dictates territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, and the rules for defining the extended continental shelf (Article 76)—the mechanism by which many Arctic states lay claim to the seabed and its resources. While the United States has not formally ratified UNCLOS, it recognizes its navigational and maritime zone provisions as customary international law. Alongside UNCLOS, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)—including the specialized IMO Polar Code—are critical to regulating maritime traffic and safety.

At the policy level, the Arctic Council serves as the preeminent high-level intergovernmental forum. It promotes cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the eight Arctic states, six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), and 38 non-Arctic observers. Notably, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that established the Council explicitly excludes matters related to military security. Although the Council does not discuss military matters, there are no legally binding agreements to prohibit military activity. While the Council is highly influential in drafting policy and fostering diplomacy, it is not a regulatory body and does not supersede the authority of sovereign states or legally binding agreements.

The tangible governance of the Arctic is heavily reliant on three principal executive agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council:

1. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic (2011): This 20-article agreement represents the first legally binding instrument negotiated among all eight Arctic states. The vast tyranny of distance and lack of infrastructure in the high north make SAR a daunting operational challenge. Key provisions establish specific regions of SAR responsibility, mandate the development of national capabilities and coordination centers, and provide vital guidelines for joint operations, information sharing, and cross-border assistance during mass-casualty events.

2. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013): As maritime traffic increases, so does the risk of environmental disaster. This 22-article agreement strengthens mutual assistance for oil spill preparedness and response. It requires parties to maintain a robust national response system, proactively notify other nations of pollution incidents, and provides operational guidance for joint response efforts, including the cross-border movement of cleanup assets.

3.  Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017): This agreement aims to facilitate the movement of researchers and equipment across borders. It protects intellectual property, ensures access to research infrastructure and data, and promotes the integration of traditional and local knowledge into scientific endeavors, ensuring that indigenous populations have a voice in the region’s future.

Antarctica

In contrast to the Arctic, Antarctica is a massive continent surrounded by the Southern Ocean. It is a global commons, governed by a single, comprehensive legal regime known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

Originally signed in 1959 at the height of the Cold War by twelve nations (including the US and the Soviet Union), the Antarctic Treaty was a masterclass in diplomatic pragmatism. Today, adhered to by 56 parties, the treaty establishes the legal framework for the entire continent. It is built upon three foundational principles:

1. The use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.

2. The absolute freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation.

3. The mandatory free exchange and availability of scientific observations and results.

The treaty consists of 14 articles. For the national security practitioner, the most consequential are:

Article 1: Explicitly prohibits any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. (Note: It does allow for the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose, which is how militaries operate logistics in the region today).

Article 4: Freezes all historical territorial claims (asserted by seven nations) and prohibits the assertion of new ones while the treaty is in force.

Article 5: Prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Article 7: Establishes a rigorous system of observation. It grants designated observers’ complete freedom of access to all areas, stations, installations, and equipment in Antarctica, as well as to all ships and aircraft discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel, ensuring compliance with the treaty’s demilitarization provisions.

The broader ATS includes subsequent additions that carry immense strategic weight. Most notable is the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (The Madrid Protocol), which designates Antarctica as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science” and outright bans all commercial mining and mineral resource activity. Furthermore, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources governs the region’s fisheries, attempting to balance conservation with the growing global demand for marine resources, such as krill.

Conclusion

Effective planning requires a clear understanding of the operating environment. Without a foundational knowledge of polar legal governance, defense professionals will be unable to develop acceptable and fully informed strategies.

The Arctic is a sovereign maritime domain bordered by the territory of eight nations. It is governed by a multi-layered framework of international maritime law and targeted executive agreements. Security and sovereignty are paramount, and the region is an active theater for great power competition. In contrast, Antarctica is a vast, unpopulated landmass governed by a single, comprehensive treaty system that explicitly prohibits military activity, freezes territorial claims, and bans resource extraction.

This distinction dictates operational legality, the rules of engagement, and informs the strategic approaches required to protect U.S. and Allied polar interests. Both regions demand highly specialized assets to project presence, conduct scientific research, and ensure safety of life at sea. However, presence alone is not enough.

You cannot secure a domain you do not fully understand. As the strategic environment evolves, a working understanding of these complex legal and political landscapes is no longer an academic luxury, but an operational prerequisite for the modern national security professional.

CDR Jake Brantley currently serves as Deputy Chief – Coast Guard Office of Future Plans and Operations (CG-35) at CG Headquarters where he develops CG solutions to global maritime missions. Prior to staff, he served as a CG rescue pilot, civil engineer, and ships officer throughout North America.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the the U.S. Coast Guard or any other organization or official with which the author is affiliated.

Featured image: The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Storis transits to Johns Hopkins Glacier in Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve.(U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Ashly Murphy)

Human Capital

Toward a Navy Fatigue Management Program

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By Dr. John P. Cordle, Captain, USN (Ret).

The first week of June 2026 marked a seminal event in the history of sleep and fatigue in the military. The Department of War (DOW) Fatigue Related Management Working Group hosted the first ever Sleep and Fatigue Summit with over 130 experts in the field from all military services, providing a huge burst of momentum in the area of fatigue management as an operational imperative for our warfighters. For the first time in years, there is hope that the military, and especially the Navy, is finally turning a corner in this critical arena.  But there remains much work to be done. 

My relationship with fatigue is a long and storied one. I joined the Navy in 1984 and grew up as a Surface Warfare Officer at a time when fatigue was seen as a badge of honor. Later serving as a Human Factors Engineer, I studied its impact on individual readiness as well as mental health and advocated for changes to Navy policy. As a veteran, I live with the effects of a lifetime of sleep deprivation and non-circadian watch rotations, hooking up to my Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine every evening and dealing with obstructive sleep apnea and the onset of heart disease caused by atrial fibrillation (AFib). This is all tied to a Navy lifestyle and culture that ignored the known effects of fatigue, to the detriment of its sailors. 

I am gratified that there has been solid progress in the understanding and application of fatigue mitigation policies in various parts of the Navy. However, despite both DOD direction and concrete recommendations from many authoritative bodies, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Department of War (DoW), the Navy has still failed to implement an overarching fatigue management program to include education, research, and policy. 

One of the last projects that I worked on as a Government Service (GS) Human Factors Engineer  prior to retirement last year was trying to define the Navy’s Fatigue Management program in a single document. As with any large organization, a change like this is likely to meet bureaucratic obstacles, obfuscation, and outright obstruction… and it did. The main challenge to this effort was that no one in the Navy felt compelled to step up and say “I own this problem,” an obstacle that has now been overcome with the designation of the Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) as the process owner. It would be a shame to unlearn the lessons of the ship collisions of the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald, both of which occurred in 2017. The investigations for these separate incidents identified fatigue as a significant factor in the death of 17 Sailors.

Unfortunately, this was not the last collision for which sleep was a contributing factor. In 2025 the USS Harry S. Truman suffered a collision during her deployment to the Middle East. The investigation results cited fatigue as a major factor in the collision. While no one was killed, several sailors came within inches and seconds of losing their lives.  The below figures from the Navy investigation tell the story:

Figure 1. The Risk Management Brief specifically identified fatigue as a risk factor for senior leadership. They would not have been allowed to fly a plane in this condition but can drive a ship. The second figure shows the result.  Source: Navy Investigation of USS Harry S. Truman Collision.

Eerily, (Admiral) Whalen’s investigation stated that, “… fatigue as a human factor in the collision and cited department heads who described a ‘just get it done’ atmosphere aboard the carrier. Both sailors’ lack of sleep and pressure to perform tasks regardless of risk were crucial themes in the 2017 collisions.” The similarities with the 2017 collisions are impossible to miss. And yet, eight years later, little has changed within the U.S. Navy. 

 To be fair, there are policies in place in most of the major warfare areas, and the last two Carrier Strike Groups deployed with sleep monitoring devices on most sailors and a program to provide sleep data to inform individual Sailors, shipboard leaders, and Navy research efforts. Specifically, the Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW) program shows huge promise in collecting sleep and other biometric data and providing feedback to individuals and leadership to inform operational decision making.  There is ongoing research to design more comfortable mattresses that meet material condition and fire safety requirements on board ships. My former colleagues continue to push hard for improvement in this area, but it is still largely a “bottom up” effort – they deserve full policy and financial support. 

To that end, I offer here the below document as a proposed road map, including the key references and directives that should drive two significant outcomes: 

First, the designation of a single entity, responsible for fatigue management in the Navy, to include resource sponsorship (funding) for research and technology. Of note, since the drafting of this article,  this recommendation has occurred. The Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) has been designated to do just this.

Second, a formal policy for fatigue management, which includes research, education, and operational guidance for commanders.

I present the below draft document  for consideration by the U.S. Navy to address this critical problem. It was the result of over one year’s collaborative effort between the Navy Sleep expert team, many of whom have moved on or retired without replacement, leaving many key billets that support sleep research and policy unfilled.

The below document represents an 80 percent solution and would provide a starting point. It is ready to download, print, and sign. But who will take that important step? I hope it does not take another deadly collision, with fatigue as a major factor, for someone in Navy leadership to stand up and say, “I will!”

OPNAVINST XXXX

Subj: United States Navy Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management Program 

Ref: (a) Department of Defense Instruction 1010.10, Health Promotion and Disease Prevention (Apr. 28, 2014) (incorporating change 3, effective May 16, 2022). 

(b) Department of Defense, Report to Congressional Armed Services Committees, Study on Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Readiness of Members of the Armed Forces, March 2021

(c) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Next Steps on Suicide Prevention in the Military, March 2023

(d) GAO 24-105917 Military Readiness: Comprehensive Measures needed to Address Service Member Fatigue and Related Efforts. 

(e) USFF Comprehensive Review of Surface Incidents, October 2019. 

Encl. (1) Tables of Requirements and Recommendations 

1. This instruction establishes overarching guidance IAW references (a) through (e) for the implementation of Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management practices to improve warfighting effectiveness across the Navy operational domain. It is intended as a framework based on scientific and operational principles to be tailored by instruction for individual communities based on specific needs of their operators.

2. Background. As described in reference (a) and (b), sleep is considered a protective factor against combat operational stress, and sleep restriction is considered a risk factor for symptoms of combat operational stress. The DOD requires that all commanders consider circadian rhythm—the body’s internal resting or wakefulness schedule over the course of a day—when creating policy related to sleep. For example, watchbills are schedules for when Sailors stand watch for fixed periods of time. Circadian rhythm watchbills are designed so that Sailors stand watch and sleep at the same time each day, allowing the body to follow its natural biological processes on a 24-hour cycle. The Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (ref c) also made recommendations related to sleep. For example, it recommended that duty schedules allow for eight hours of sleep and minimize the frequency of shift changes, and that the department provide education in healthy sleep habits during training and unit formations. The report clearly shows the connection between sleep deprivation and fatigue as contributing factors to stress, anxiety, and even suicidal thoughts and actions. 

3. Extensive research over the past decade has shown the importance of crew endurance and fatigue management to individual readiness and war fighting capability. Research has shown that cognitive ability degrades at a consistent rate as sleep deprivation progresses, with a major impact on decision making, which can prove fatal in battle. Performance starts to degrade after as little as 18 hours of wakefulness, and 24 hours without sleep can have similar impacts on performance to a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent. While operational commitments and manning shortages may challenge leaders to provide their crew with sufficient sleep, every effort must be made through planning, education, and risk management to plan for, account for, and mitigate excessive fatigue in the fleet. This policy supports Operation Total Force and is foundational to Warrior Toughness, Operational Stress Control, and other Culture of Excellence initiatives.

4. Enclosure (1) Tables 1-3 provide a summary of DOD requirements and recommendations.  They were used to produce the required actions in this instruction and are provided here for easy reference.

5. Action. This instruction does not dictate a particular watchbill or schedule but is designed to provide a set of guiding principles upon which to build a policy and tailored instruction at the Echelon III level. Collaboration is encouraged. While primarily applicable to ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines, the basic tenets apply to other teams such as staffs, guard forces and watch floors. The following precepts will be incorporation into each Type Commander’s instructions:

a. Focus on alert watch standers.

b. Implement a circadian watchbill based on a 24-hour schedule (i.e., watch, work and sleep periods occur at the same time each day).

c. Promote a sleep environment that considers complete darkness, good ventilation, ambient temperature control, and low noise levels.

d. Adjust working hours, meal hours, and daily routines to support watch standers and maintenance personnel at sea and ashore.

e. Establish periods of protected sleep to equal at least eight hours in every 24.

f. Consider individual fatigue as a risk factor for all evolutions, including go/no-go criteria for both operations and maintenance.

g. Allow additional sleep during ramp up to mission and recovery times following periods of extreme sleep deprivation or during period of high operational tempo.

h. Establish metrics and measures to track implementation of this policy at the unit level. Wearable technology is encouraged to support this effort.

i. Establish go/no-go criteria to stop or delay evolutions when fatigue poses an unacceptable risk.

j. Implement sleep and crew endurance education and training in all levels of officer and enlisted pipeline training for each community.

k. Assign one individual per unit as a sleep expert for training and support of sleep-related policies. 

l. Promote good nutrition and moderation in caffeine and energy drinks into programs like Warrior Toughness, Basic Training, and command training programs.

m. Establish policies and procedures to incorporate wearable sleep monitoring technology, data collection, analysis and display commensurate with security requirements.

n. Develop guidelines for training programs which may include periods of intentional sleep deprivation to prevent inflicting harm on personnel in a training environment.

o. Develop and maintain an online repository of sleep related research and best practices. 

p. One size does not fit all – Commanders should obtain analysis of watch rotations and schedules from experts such as the Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Health Research Laboratory.

6. Nothing in this instruction precludes a Commander from executing the mission assigned. Conflict with a peer competitor may be characterized by a long duration of high stress operations; the ability of Sailors and Marines to continue to operate at peak performance over long periods is critical. It is imperative that everyone from the Commanding Officer to the most junior watch stander be capable of sustaining peak performance, and sleep is a necessary prerequisite for that requirement.

Enclosure (1) Tables of DOD Requirements and Recommendations 

Table 1. Military Service Responsibilities set forth in ref (a), DOD Instruction 1010.10 Table 2. Recommendations from Reference (b), DOD Study of Fatigue in the Military.

Table 3. Sleep Policy Recommendations from the DOD Suicide Prevention and Response Review Committee Report (2022).

The recommendations in the above instruction are grounded in existing documents; they are clear, actionable, and they will save lives. Most can be implemented with minimal cost. All it needs is a signature. But whose? 

We now have an answer. The Office of Warfighting Advantage has been designated as the process owner for Fatigue Management in the Navy. They can now take ownership of the process from policy, instructions (like the above) to research and (importantly) as a budget priority. The current CNO and VCNO have well-established records of advocacy for Sailor Wellness and of recognizing the importance of sleep to mental health, physical fitness, and warfighter readiness. CNO Caudle even added Dr. Matthew Walker’s excellent book Why We Sleep to his 2026 Reading List! This is a perfect opportunity for the CNO to put his “stamp” on this service-wide safety and performance issue by demanding action – and accountability – across the force with a formal policy; maybe even a “CNOte” titled “Sleep as a Weapon!”

Certainly there are obstacles to implementing such an instruction, such as manning shortages and excessive OPTEMPO. But like rust, fatigue doesn’t care how important or busy you are; it eats away at the foundation of readiness and, if unchecked, will eventually lead to failure. The instruction above must be accompanied by strong institutional resolve; it must come with education, funding, and a culture of learning to address the “get ‘er done” and excessive “can do” attitude that contributed to both the 2017 and 2024 collisions. This instruction must be more than “checking a block”; it needs to come with a strong commitment to drive real change.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy surface warfare officer (nuclear). He commanded the destroyer USS Oscar Austin and the cruiser USS San Jacinto during his 30-year military career and was recognized with the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

References

1. Captain John Cordle, U.S. Navy and Dr. Nita Shattuck, “A Sea Change in Standing Watch,” USNI Proceedings, January 2013, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/sea-change-standing-watch

2. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Fatigue is the Navy’s Black Lung Disease,” USNI Proceedings, January 2020,  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/fatigue-navys-black-lung-disease

3. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Go Circadian Now!”, USNI Blog, September 2017,  https://blog.usni.org/posts/2017/09/22/go-circadian-now

4. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Improve Sleep-Disorder Treatment for Service Members and Veterans,” USNI Proceedings, September 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/improve-sleep-disorder-treatment-service-members-and-veterans

5. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Make Crew Endurance an Operational Warfighting Imperative,” CIMSEC, 23 September 2019,  https://cimsec.org/make-crew-endurance-an-operational-warfighting-imperative/

Featured image: Red lights glow from the primary flight control room aboard the USS Ronald Reagan during a darken ship period. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ryan McFarlane)

Infrastructure

Guam’s Logistics Capacity Must Be Increased

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By Crispinus Lee and Joe Schwartzstein

Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States in the Pacific region. The Congressional Research Service notes that Guam is closer to Beijing than Hawaii, making it vital to the United States’ national defense for air and naval operations in the Indo-Pacific region.1 The Port of Guam is designated as one of eighteen National Port Readiness Network commercial seaports. Military and civilian logistical experts believe that Guam will be a critical logistical hub for any conflict in the Asia-Pacific.2 Despite the geographic importance of the island, Guam’s logistical capacity is far below the needs of the United States in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

Peacetime Capacity

The island’s only deep-water port, the Port of Guam, handles almost 90 percent of all the island’s imports and serves over 500,000 residents of Guam and Micronesia. The port moves approximately 85,000 containers annually and maintains 40.5 acres for storage. There are three 40-year-old rail-mounted gantry cranes with a spreader of 120-foot reach and a maximum reach height of 85 feet, seven top lifters, two 20-ton heavy-lift forklifts, and 32 tractors.

Berthing consists of four piers with a 2,700-foot linear wharf space dredged to between 28 and 35 feet and 40.5 acres of storage. Fishing vessels and tenants utilize pier F-3; container ships general cargo, and cruise ships utilize piers F-4 through F-6.  The port also has 858 chassis-mounted container stalls and 124 refrigerated container stalls. The port plans to develop a new F-7 pier, adding 900 feet of additional space.3

Cargo Capacity in Wartime Conditions

Would this be enough to support military operations? For comparison, the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom provide insight into the scale of logistical movement that would have to occur during a conventional war. To combat Iraq, the United States had to move 400,000 tons of ammunition for conventional fires, 117,000 wheeled vehicles, and 12,000 tanks and armored vehicles to ports in Saudi Arabia where its forces were deployed.4 To move these materials, the United States employed 385 vessels (foreign-flagged vessels carried 22.6 percent of all dry cargo), averaging 4,200 tons of cargo daily.

While the Gulf War ended in a victory for the U.S. led coalition, this military success overshadowed logistics being strained in a primarily land-based war. Foreign-flagged ships made 17 shiploads of ammunition delivery, an amount equal to the deliveries by the ready reserve force and three times more than that made by US-flagged shipping.5 Then Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) General Johnson stated, “Our ability to lift more than ten million tons of material by sea in seven months of operations to the Persian Gulf region has … depended heavily on the contributions of organic, allied, and friendly shippers. In the future, however, we may find ourselves in a contingency that may require us to accomplish a deployment by relying on a mix of U.S. sealift resources. One of our greatest concerns, then, is the state of the U.S. maritime industry.”6

Almost a decade later, the United States initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). From 2002 to 2011, vessels enrolled in the maritime security program moved an astronomical 18,540,965 containers over 9 years. This was done to combat a primarily land-based foe whose capacity for war was largely destroyed within the first year of conflict. In both cases, Iraq had virtually no control over its air and sea lanes of communication. With an average 1,545,080 containers moved a year during the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the wartime need for a deployed American force during that conflict alone dwarfs Guam’s average annual capacity. Even if the Port of Guam modified its activity to handle more cargo volume by tenfold, it would not be able to handle what the United States moved in a year during the two wars in Iraq. 7

In a contested maritime environment, logistics face the additional challenge of protecting isolated sea lines of communication that span vast distances. While the wars against Iraq had multiple developed allied ports on the European mainland, the Pacific is a vast stretch of ocean with a scattering of small islands.

The Falklands War provides more insight into this particular challenge. Argentina, with a formidable Air Force and Navy, faced a significantly diminished Royal Navy. The United Kingdom was forced to tackle an 8,000-nautical mile supply chain.  During the conflict, the British utilized 50 merchant marine ships to support 30,000 marines, sailors, airmen, and mariners. Ascension Island, sitting 4,000 nautical miles from Britain, served as the only possible forward support base. With no port except for a small jetty and an anchorage, Ascension Island served as a key hub for strategic airlift. The British military conducted 10,600 helicopter flights and 2,500 fixed-wing flights, airlifting more than 7,000 tons of ammunition, vehicles, and other cargo. In addition, the island base flew over 6,500 personnel.8 During that time, the British military moved one million ration packs, 12 million meals, 10,000 tons of ammunition, 1,260 tons of fuel, 3,880 tons of ordnance, and more than 38,000 tons of equipment.9 The loss of one ship, the MV Atlantic Conveyor, severely impacted British logistical efforts. On board were six Wessex helicopters, three CH47 helicopters, and equipment for 10,000 service members – only a single CH47 helicopter survived.10 The British successfully fought a war over 8,000 nautical miles from home, supporting over 30,000 service members, but the war required a significant logistical footprint.

Guam’s Shortfalls

 A war in the Pacific would far outstrip the British experience, with Taiwan playing the role of the Falklands and Guam the role of the Ascension Islands. The difference is that Chinese conventional and nuclear missiles are capable of striking both Taiwan and Guam, among several other facilities across the Pacific. The distance from one friendly port to another, such as San Diego to Honolulu, is 2,607 miles, and another 3,800 miles from there to Guam. This eye-watering distance would be strung together by a fleet of 44 ready reserve vessels, assuming prospective allies or friendly states during this contest would be willing to risk their assets.11

It is essential to understand the Port of Guam’s supply chain limitations compared to recent military logistical operations requirements. In 2023, the Port of Guam handled 86,000 containers, 215,000 tons of non-containerized/breakbulk cargo, and 6,821 roll-on/roll-off cargo.12 These cargo figures may seem impressive in a vacuum, but they must be compared to recent annual military logistical operations. U.S. Central Command handled 1,124,612 tons of breakbulk and Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) and 2,428,616 tons of containerized cargo in 2011.13 Now, imagine a war in the Indo-Pacific region requiring full military mobilization. During the Gulf War, U.S. sealift moved 945,000 pieces of equipment, totaling almost 32.7 million square feet, covering the equivalent of 681 football fields or 898 acres.14 Finally, utilizing the Port of Guam  for wartime operations would effectively shut down all civilian operations, leaving the population without the necessary supplies, food, and items for daily living. If it was not painfully evident yet, to say that the Port of Guam is incapable of meeting Indo-Pacific sealift logistical requirements is an understatement.

All this is compounded by the fact that the Port of Guam is in range of Chinese strike assets. Facilities may be damaged by missile and drone attacks, aerial bombardment, and sabotage. There will be degradation to the Port of Guam’s expected operational capabilities.

Currently, the federal government plans to expand the port to accommodate four Ultra Large Container Vessels (ULCVs), at least four ROROs, and 3 product tankers simultaneously. This would involve a 500-acre expansion for ROROs and 250 acres for container storage to meet the minimum for sealift operations. Additionally, sufficient petroleum storage is available to handle military operations. To support large-scale operations, the port will require sufficient capacity for both military and commercial operations, as well as large-scale storage and robust infrastructure to meet national security requirements.

Prepositioning Stocks in Guam

The abysmal port capacity is even more concerning when considering the use of Guam as a base to use for prepositioning forces. The Department of Defense maintains prepositioned military essential stocks around the globe for rapid deployment for national contingencies. These prepositioned stocks provide enough equipment and supplies to allow the DOD to quickly deploy forces around the globe, rather than waiting the weeks necessary to ship supplies and equipment to the theater. This essential policy enhances U.S. global military readiness of any combatant commander to meet any national security challenge.  Could Guam support a force that may require deployment for 30 days? The answer is a resounding no.

The Department of Defense, in its report to Congress, noted that Guam requires significant investment to upgrade its deteriorating infrastructure to support future military expansion and meet U.S. national strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.16 Prepositioning stocks require significant infrastructural support for both the equipment and personnel.

Leghorn Army Depot in Livorno, Italy, is a typical example of a base that maintains prepositioned supplies.  It consists of “60 maintenance bays in 16 warehouses with over 749,000 square feet of humidity-controlled storage.”17 Guam falls short yet again in almost every category. Currently, the U.S. military utilizes about 20 percent of the island’s electrical power. Guam’s Power Authority concluded that the island faces challenges in “keeping its aging, owned plants reliable and in good working condition.”18 Any adhoc expansion could cause rolling blackouts on the island. Prepositioned stocks also require a significant investment in personnel to manage and monitor stock readiness, which in turn requires major reworks to water treatment and wastewater removal. Guam Waterworks Authority (GWA) recently settled with the EPA over violations of the Clean Water Act, which included untreated sewage, and its poor condition sanitary sewer system.  Even something as basic as roads are lacking. The DOD report highlighted several issues, including inadequate bridges, road flooding, tight corners, and poor roads.19 The military would face significant challenges in moving equipment, supplies, personnel, and associated waste without infrastructure improvements.

Finally, returning to the Port of Guam itself, afloat prepositioning stocks require either pier space or anchorages. The Port of Guam does not have the pier space to berth prepositioning ships. Apra Harbor would need to be enlarged and deepened to accommodate afloat prepositioning ships. Commercial ships require access to the port’s anchorage that prepositioning ships would take up. Further, the port would require the construction of piers and dredging.  Naval Base Guam supports over 30 tenant commands in support of Pacific Command. Prepositioning ships would take up vital pier space or anchorages required for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. Unfortunately, Guam would not be able to host DOD prepositioning stocks, either shoreside or shipboard, without a significant financial and physical investment.

Why Prioritize Guam?

While it would be advantageous for the military to rely on non-U.S. ports for logistic support, assuming that these ports would be available for U.S. use during an Indo-Pacific conflict could prove disastrous. China holds considerable economic and military influence in the Asia-Pacific region that can be leveraged to exclude the United States from ports and supply chain hubs. Aside from the fact that most major ports in the Indo-Pacific lie closer in range to Chinese military assets, most Asian Pacific ports operate at capacity to supply some of the largest import-oriented economies in the world. This configuration would force the DOD to compete for port access, berthing, cargo operations, storage, and transportation of containers, rolling stock, and break-bulk materials.

Further complicating the supply chain is the spread of the DOD’s logistical footprint across multiple ports. Diversifying across multiple ports complicates the DOD’s logistical footprint and supply chain, making the military’s supply chain vulnerable to disruptions. There is no guarantee that a port can meet TRANSCOM’s sealift requirements.

Port cybersecurity vulnerabilities are another area to contend with in ports in the Pacific theater. China’s dominance in port infrastructure across the Pacific region places cybersecurity at the top of defense concerns.

There is also concern about Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) vulnerabilities at allied and non-allied ports. Asian-Pacific ports are vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks, submarines, and subsea cable infrastructure attacks. It is unlikely that the United States would be able to prevent attacks on foreign ports by an adversary seeking to disrupt U.S. sealift, particularly for the number of U.S. assets over the largest maritime theater on Earth.

Guam serves as Maritime Prepositioning Stock Squadron 3’s center. This makes it the center of America’s military Pacific posture for sustainment and a vital intermodal conduit for U.S. forces. As such, the Port of Guam must be the priority for upgrades to support U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. This requires extensive infrastructure upgrades and the acquisition of land for container and RORO stockyards aligning with most continental U.S. strategic seaports.

To these ends, the container berths require massive expansions and upgrades. At a minimum, the Port of Guam should be able to handle four ULCVs with four to six cranes capable of working each ship. The berths must be dredged to a depth of forty-five feet. The container yard should be expanded to accommodate marshaling and storage of wartime logistical needs, with a minimum of 250-300 acres and sufficient Rubber-Tired Gantry Cranes (RTGs) to facilitate container movements.

The Port of Guam should also have sufficient RORO berthing to handle four ROROs dredged to a depth of thirty-seven feet. TRANSCOM RORO marshaling and storage footprint will require between 500 and almost 900 acres. In comparison, during the Gulf War, TRANSCOM moved enough equipment and supplies to cover 680 football fields, about 897.6 acres.20 

Further, the Port must have sufficient tanker berthing and storage to perform cargo operations on at least two to four tankers at any time, dredged to thirty-seven feet,  and storage capacity for one week to handle DOD’s requirements of 12.6 million gallons of fuel per day.21 The Port of Guam will require sufficient break-bulk berthing to accommodate two to four ships dredged to a depth of forty-one feet. Ports require tugs to facilitate vessel movements. Assisting in the ships in the port requires enough tugs to handle multiple ship moves per day. An average U.S. port could have between six to eight tractor tugs in the range of 60 to 80 bollard tons. The Department of Defense should also consider six azimuth stern drive (ASD) tugs for port operations.

Finally, to ensure the vessel movement in the Port, the DOD must provide familiarization training to all members of the U.S. Navy Reserve’s Strategic Sealift Officer Force Harbor Pilot Detachment, a group of highly trained and skilled civilian harbor pilots whose sole responsibility would be to facilitate the movement of sealift vessels within the port.

The Port of Guam serves as the key strategic sealift port in the Indo-Pacific region and, with the proper investment, can fulfill its potential as the critical supply chain strong point for the department.

Crispinus “Cris” Lee is a Surface Warfare Officer and Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He works as a Program Management Specialist for Booze Allen Hamilton. Prior to this, he served as an Assistant Operations Officer onboard USS Cole and as Weapons Officer aboard USS Gladiator. 

Joe Schwartzstein is a Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve Strategic Sealift Officer Force and serves as a Maryland State Pilot. A dual-licensed graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, he holds master’s degrees from the California State University Maritime Academy and the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. Commander Schwartzstein is also a U.S. Coast Guard licensed First-Class Pilot, Master of Oceans, Unlimited Tonnage, and First Assistant Engineer of Steam, Motor, and Gas Turbine Vessels.

Notes

1. Andres Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” published August 3, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47643, 2.

2. Clara Fong and Diana Roy, “Guam’s Strategic Importance in the Indo-Pacific,” published September 6, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/articles/guams-strategic-importance-indo-pacific.

3. Port of Guam. “Equipment, Berthing, and Facilities,” accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.portofguam.com/about-us/maritime-operation/facilities-and-services/equipment-berthing-and-facilities.

4. William G. Pagonis and Michael D. Krause, No. 13, Land Warfare Papers (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare 1992), 11-13;  Keith M. Wilkinson, “The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War: A Snowball in the Desert,” June 18, paper prepared for  Naval War College, Newport, RI [DTIC AD-A264 145], https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA264145.pdf. 15.

5. James K. Matthews, and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1996), 115.

6. Wilkinson, The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War, 12.

7. Albert Joseph Herberger, Kenneth C. Gaulden, and Rolf Marshall, Global Reach: Revolutionizing the Use of Commercial Vessels and Intermodal Systems for Military Sealift, 1990-2012 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 417.

8. Peter Dye, “Logistics in the Falklands Campaign,” Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 54, (2003): 96

9. Kenneth L. Privratsky and Julian Thompson, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2019), 37.

10. Ibid. 127.

11. MARAD, The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-defense-reserve-fleet/ndrf/maritime-administration%E2%80%99s-ready-reserve-force#:~:text=The%20Ready%20Reserve%20Force%20(RRF)%20is%20a%20subset%20of%20vessels,deployment%20of%20U.S.%20military%20forces.

12. Port Authority of Guam, Financial Statements, Required Supplementary Information, and Supplementary and Other Information, Tamuning, Guam, 2023, 11-13.

13. Vice Admiral A.J. Herberger, U.S.N. (ret), Kenneth C. Gaulden, Commander Rolf Marshall, U.S.N. (ret). Global Reach, Revolutionizing the Use of Commercial Vessels and Intermodal Systems for Military Sealift, 1900-2012, (Annapolis MD, 2015) 437-439.

14. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 112.

15. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Hudak, “Lengthening the Tether of Fuel in Afghanistan,” Army Sustainment Magazine March-April 2013, https://www.army.mil/article/97879/lengthening_the_tether_of_fuel_in_afghanistan.

16. Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” 30.

17. U.S. Army Europe and Africa Public Affairs Office, “Fact Sheet: Army Prepositioned Stocks,” June 27, 2024,  APS_Fact_Sheet_27062024.pdfhttps://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/APS_Fact_Sheet_27062024.pdf.

18. Tilghman, “Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness,” 23.

19. Guam and CNMI Military Relocation, Volume 6: Related Actions – Utilities and Roadway Projects (Guam) Final EIS (July 2010), I-5,

20. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast,  115.

21. Colonel Gregory J. Lengyel, USAF, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air War College, April 2007, 14, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA476848.pdf.

Featured image: The Port of Guam as seen from the air in June 2021. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

Indo-Pacific, Industrial Base, Infrastructure

Performance Is Not Endurance: Sustaining Combat Power in Contested Operations

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By Captains Al Collins and Kevin Eyer

Now…and Then

Recent naval operations in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated that the United States Navy remains extraordinarily capable in combat. Precision strike operations, integrated air and missile defense, continuous maritime presence, and sophisticated joint operations have reinforced the credibility of American naval power. By nearly any operational measure, the force has performed at a very high level under demanding conditions.

That success should not be mistaken for proof of how the Navy would perform in prolonged conflict against a peer adversary. The true benchmark in high-end warfare against a peer is whether naval power can be sustained over the course of a prolonged Pacific conflict. Therefore, it is important to establish a framework for examining the details that will determine success in protracted conflict. The framework suggests that success hinges on distributed forward-based logistics, renewed emphasis on neglected warfare competencies, and sufficient operational depth in munitions, ships, and manpower.

The China Challenge

Combat operations against regional opponents, such as the Houthis or Iran, demonstrate current operational proficiency under narrow conditions. They do not answer the more difficult question of whether the Navy could sustain that performance against China in a conflict defined by distance, attrition, and the degradation or destruction of the systems that support combat power.

The distinction matters because a hypothetical Pacific war tests far more than tactical effectiveness. It would likely be protracted and fought across an immense theater while adversary attacks target deployed forces and the networks and infrastructure that sustain them. The opening phase might last days or weeks, but the decisive question is whether combat power could be sustained across months or even years.

The United States continues to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan. Washington deliberately avoids stating explicitly whether it would intervene militarily in the event of Chinese action against the island nation. The policy is intended to deter both Beijing and Taipei from destabilizing behavior while preserving flexibility for American decision-makers.1

Regardless of whether the U.S. would or would not intervene to defend Taiwan, China is now the central organizing challenge for U.S. defense planning. The Department of Defense identifies China as the pacing challenge shaping force design, modernization priorities, and operational concepts.2 The Pacific has become the primary theater for long-term strategic competition.

China’s military modernization has proceeded at extraordinary speed. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now numerically the largest navy in the world, with rapid expansion in destroyers, frigates, submarines, amphibious vessels, and carrier aviation.3 It is supported by a mature missile strike complex, advanced integrated air defenses, cyber warfare capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated space and counter-space systems.

Critically, China’s proximity to Taiwan provides a structural advantage. Its military objectives are comparatively close, allowing military forces to concentrate near home waters. China’s military is supported by dense land-based logistics, missile coverage, and industrial depth. By contrast, to fight China near Taiwan, the United States must project and sustain combat power across thousands of miles of ocean, and maintain it under contested conditions far from the factories and shipyards that produced it. This asymmetry is not decisive, but it shapes a fundamental problem: keeping combat power viable across vast distances, under fire, for as long as the conflict demands.

From Performance to Endurance

Ultimately, what matters is endurance. Endurance is not simply the ability to absorb losses. It is the capacity to sustain combat effectiveness over time despite attrition, disruption, and operational fatigue. In a Pacific war, endurance would determine whether initial success could be translated into a strategic and enduring advantage. For example, during World War II, the U.S. Army deployed floating maintenance and repair depots to keep regeneration high and its air force in the fight. Without these ships, damaged aircraft would have to return to distant shore-based facilities for repairs.4

U.S.S. Maj Gen Herbert A Dargue anchored off Saipan or Iwo Jima. She was one of the six Liberty ships converted into floating repair depots as part of Operation Ivory Soap. (Wikimedia Commons)

A force designed for a war defined by distance and attrition must be capable of delivering combat power at the outset of conflict and remaining operational over extended periods. This means possessing the ability to repair itself, keep crews combat-ready, replace losses, and regenerate capability under fire. That requires more than tactical proficiency.

Ships must continue operating despite logistical disruption. Supply networks must remain viable under attack, maintenance and repair must occur forward and under degraded conditions, and combat losses must be absorbed without interrupting operations. In other words, self-sufficiency despite attrition is a core requirement.

Recent operations demonstrated tactical and operational excellence, but they occurred under conditions that differ fundamentally from those expected in a Pacific war. Logistics networks were intact. Regional infrastructure remained accessible. Operational timelines were limited. Even intense engagements remained episodic rather than continuous. Those conditions bear no resemblance to the geography, distance, and unrelenting operational pressure a Pacific war imposes.

Observable indicators suggest that continuous operational demand produces cumulative effects that the force absorbs quietly. Maintenance schedules compress. Technical personnel are stretched across multiple demands. High-end platforms require increasingly careful management to maintain availability rates. Readiness is preserved, but often at the cost of operational depth and reach.5

The Navy adapts well and has always done so. Personnel surge forward to fill gaps, maintenance is reprioritized, and operational demands are met through extraordinary effort. In the short-term, this system works. Over time, however, the gap between consumption and regeneration widens. The system thins and becomes less resilient, even as it remains highly capable. That is the central risk: not systemic collapse, but steady erosion.

Read the Signs

Recent operations already provide warning signals, revealing stresses that a prolonged Pacific conflict would expose on a much larger scale. The employment of carrier strike groups under unrelenting global tasking illustrates the pressure placed on a limited number of high-value assets. Modern carriers are not simply ships, but complex floating airbases requiring continuous maintenance, logistics support, and a pipeline of trained personnel. Back-to-back surge deployment cycles reduce recovery time not only for platforms but for entire air wings and support ecosystems. As operational demand increases, maintenance windows compress, and manning shortfalls compound. Parts pipelines tighten, and personnel rotations accelerate.

A more visible strain is occurring in the consumption of precision munitions. Recent operations in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that even limited engagements can generate significant expenditure rates for advanced interceptors and strike weapons, including SM-series interceptors, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and other high-end systems whose production lines were streamlined for peacetime and not wartime consumption.6 A Pacific war would magnify this dynamic exponentially.

A third warning signal is less visible but equally consequential. Several foundational warfighting competencies required for conflict with China have atrophied during decades of focus on power projection ashore and limited regional contingencies. For example, anti-submarine warfare would be a daily operational requirement in a Pacific campaign, not a niche specialty. Mine countermeasures would determine whether ports and sea lanes remained usable. Taiwan’s limited number of deep-water ports presents an especially acute vulnerability to offensive mining. Both competencies have received less consistent emphasis than a peer conflict would require. Success in limited regional operations can create a false sense of confidence in preparedness for a sustained great-power war.

Unlike regional operations, a peer conflict in the Pacific would generate simultaneous demand across every warfare domain, consuming munitions and capabilities at a pace far beyond recent experience. Modern precision warfare creates a paradox: accuracy increases consumption. Each target may require fewer shots, but the number of targets and the complexity of the environment drive overall expenditure upward. The limiting factor is industrial throughput.

Move the Force Forward

In the Pacific, geography is the dominant operational variable. The transit from the U.S. West Coast to the Western Pacific requires roughly 15-18 days under peacetime conditions and significantly longer under contested ones. Distance compounds every element of operational warfare, including fuel consumption, maintenance delays, resupply cycles, and casualty evacuation timelines.7 In a contested environment, time becomes both a tactical and strategic constraint and demands a fundamentally different basing architecture.

The United States currently relies heavily on a limited number of forward hubs, principally Japan and Guam. These remain essential, but they are not sufficient for a war fought on a Pacific scale. They present concentration risk, logistical bottlenecks, and targeting vulnerabilities in an era of massed long-range precision strikes.

A more resilient posture requires sacrificing efficiency for a distributed basing network across the Indo-Pacific that expands access, disperses critical resources, and enables logistics and repair functions to continue under sustained attack. This is not merely a military requirement. It is also a strategic opportunity.

Many Indo-Pacific states increasingly recognize that their security and economic futures are tied to the regional balance of power. Infrastructure investments associated with defense cooperation can strengthen deterrence while also improving national resilience. Facilities that support military operations often provide broader economic and civil benefits, creating incentives for deeper regional partnerships.

Distributed basing also complicates adversary targeting. Concentrated infrastructure can be neutralized or degraded under missile attack. Distributed networks are inherently more resilient, even if individually more modest. In a theater defined by distance and denied access, where you start when the war begins largely determines whether you can fight at all.

The United States will not fight alone. A sustained Pacific campaign would require not merely allied political support, but interoperable logistics, distributed basing access, industrial coordination, and intelligence integration. Those alliances are a source of endurance. Access, logistics support, industrial cooperation, and intelligence integration provided by partners throughout the Indo-Pacific are essential to sustaining combat power over time.

Build the Fleet That Keeps the Fight Alive

The deeper issue is structural. The Navy must ensure it has not only the power to strike, but the architecture to remain in the fight after the opening phase. Combat power at sea depends on afloat logistics. A Pacific war would place enormous demands on replenishment oilers, ammunition ships, sealift vessels, repair ships, hospital ships, and auxiliary platforms. Yet many of these capabilities remain limited in number, aging in composition, and dependent on civilian mariners and the Military Sealift Command.8

U.S.S. Cole in transit to a shipyard after the October 12th, 2000 terrorist attack in Yemen. (Wikimedia Commons)

This dependency introduces strategic uncertainty regarding manpower availability, survivability, and forward repair capacity under contested conditions. The future frigate program illustrates a broader challenge in force development: balancing industrial considerations with operational requirements. As currently conceived, the platform appears optimized for presence missions and sustaining shipbuilding capacity rather than high-end escort warfare. It lacks the systems and capacity necessary for robust area air defense of logistics formations, and its anti-submarine warfare capabilities remain uncertain following the cancellation of earlier mission module efforts.

Revitalizing the shipbuilding industrial base is both necessary and strategically prudent. The larger question is whether the resulting frigate platform provides the capabilities required to operate as an effective escort in a contested combat environment. If endurance depends on sustaining logistics under fire, escort forces must be designed foremost around that mission.

Meanwhile, the Navy will almost certainly commit its principal surface combatants, the Arleigh-Burke class destroyers, to offensive and defensive operations in the opening phases of a Pacific conflict. This limits their availability to escort logistics formations, raising a fundamental question the force has not yet fully answered. Does it possess sufficient protection capacity to keep the supply chain intact through months of contested operations?

Experts often suggest unmanned surface vessels as part of the solution. They may indeed become important force multipliers in sensing, targeting, and distributed operations. But their survivability, command-and-control requirements, and integration into contested maritime environments remain unresolved. Their contribution to keeping the force in the fight remains uncertain.9

Readiness and Regeneration

The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) was designed to stabilize deployment cycles and restore predictability in readiness after years of high operational tempo. It has improved maintenance discipline and force generation processes.10 But a key question remains unresolved. Does it regenerate forces capable of meeting the demands a great-power war would impose?

Much of the current readiness assessment remains tied to certification cycles and deployment schedules. These metrics are designed for peacetime force management rather than wartime survival. Harder questions remain. Can ships operate while isolated from shore infrastructure? Can crews maintain complex systems without contractor support? Can battle damage be repaired rapidly under contested conditions? Can logistics networks survive persistent attack? Most importantly, can the forces regenerate combat capability as fast as they consume it? That is the defining question of readiness in a great-power war, and the current status of the force suggests that the answer is “no.”

A more useful assessment framework would measure not certifications achieved, but organic capability preserved. Can crews diagnose and repair complex systems without contractor support, whether ships can remain on station without shore infrastructure, and whether battle damage can be addressed forward rather than returning to port. These are the conditions a Pacific conflict would impose from the first day. Readiness is rarely measured against these conditions in today’s framework.

The Industrial Base and Ordnance

The rapid consumption of precision weapons defines modern warfare. Recent conflicts demonstrated that even limited engagements can place significant stress on advanced munitions inventories. A Pacific war would simultaneously multiply this demand across all domains.11

Yet the U.S. defense industrial base remains structured for efficiency rather than surge production. Many systems rely on consolidated supply chains, specialized labor, and long production timelines. Scaling output rapidly under wartime conditions would be difficult without significant preexisting expansion.

The core challenge is therefore not stockpiles alone, but whether the nation’s production infrastructure can scale under wartime conditions. Can the force replenish what it expends before culmination and operational momentum falters? Defense manufacturing capacity, skilled labor, supply chain resilience, and access to critical materials determine how long the nation can fight.12

Conclusion

The Navy demonstrated extraordinary capability in recent operations. But those operations were fought close to intact logistics networks, against adversaries who could not threaten American industrial depth, and across timelines measured in weeks rather than years. A peer conflict in the Pacific presents none of those conditions. It would test the force against geography, vast distances, contested sea lanes, and China’s asymmetric industrial capacity.

A force can deliver brilliantly at the outset while exhausting the resources required to keep fighting. Tactical brilliance can create the illusion of long-term sustainability even when the ability to sustain large-scale fighting remains largely untested. That illusion is dangerous. By the time it is dispelled, the window for correction may already have closed.

The United States faces a requirement not only to preserve naval superiority but to strengthen the foundations that allow maritime power to endure. Logistics, basing, fleet architecture, readiness, and industrial capacity are often discussed as separate issues. In a Pacific war, they are inseparable. Each contributes to the same outcome: that combat power can be sustained long enough to achieve strategic objectives. Any strategic assessment of a naval conflict with China must acknowledge a fundamental rule. While performance wins engagements, endurance wins wars.

Captain Al Collins is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served on active duty for 39 years. He commanded a guided-missile destroyer, Destroyer Squadron One, and served as Chief of Staff for U.S. Fourth Fleet.

Captain Eyer is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served on active duty for 27 years. He deployed aboard seven guided-missile cruisers, serving in command positions aboard three of them.

References

1. U.S. Department of State, Taiwan relations policy framework on strategic ambiguity.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC (latest edition).

4. Operation Ivory Soap: A World War II U.S. military operation to provide depot-level maintenance at the point of need.

5. U.S. Navy and Congressional reporting on carrier strike group deployment tempo and readiness strain.

6. CSIS Missile Defense Project and defense press reporting on Red Sea munitions expenditure trends.

7. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command logistics posture discussions and naval operational planning references.

8. Military Sealift Command force structure and GAO reporting on sealift capacity and civilian mariner dependency.

9. Congressional Research Service, USV programs and Navy surface unmanned systems analysis.

10. U.S. Navy documentation on the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP).

11. CSIS and DoD analyses on precision munitions expenditure rates in recent conflicts.

12. GAO and CSIS reporting on U.S. defense industrial base capacity constraints and surge limitations.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer in a floating dry dock at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Virginia. (Wikimedia Commons)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.