Category Archives: Drones/Unmanned

Drones/Unmanned

The Arsenal of Autonomy: Why Taiwan Must Learn from Ukraine’s Drone Defense Before It’s Too Late

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By Joseph Hanacek and Josh Richards

Building the Airborne Asymmetry

In the predawn hours of June 1, 2025, a revolution in warfighting unfolded across Russia’s western airfields. Nearly 3,000 miles from the Ukrainian frontlines, Kyiv launched Operation Spiderweb, a coordinated strike of hundreds of weaponized drones aimed at five Russian air bases.1 The machines were rudimentary: off-the-shelf frames, improvised explosives, and batteries scavenged from consumer supply chains. But their impact was profound. In a single night, Russia lost more than a third of its nuclear-capable bomber fleet and was forced to reassess its employment of aircraft and air defenses. The cost equation was stunning: a few hundred dollars per drone against losses in the hundreds of millions.2

But beyond economics and impact, the operation revealed something deeper: a new standard of warfare. Airpower is no longer the exclusive preserve of modern combat jets and expensive precision-guided munitions. Cheap, expendable drones can now achieve strategic effects once possible only with state-of-the-art weapons and delivery platforms.3

This lesson is not theoretical for Taiwan. Facing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) overwhelming numerical, technological, and financial superiority, Taipei must ensure that future conflict will not be decided by who has more missiles, aircraft carriers, or advanced fighter squadrons, but rather by who can field, sustain, and adapt vast numbers of unmanned systems. Taiwan has the geography, the talent, and the industrial base to win this race. Whether they can scale up quickly enough is going to depend on how decisively they can pivot to embracing drones as a core element of their national strategy.

Taiwan’s Awakening

Taiwan recognizes the stakes and, notionally, they are heading in the right direction. The government has pledged to procure almost 50,000 drones over the next three years and to scale up to 180,000 units annually by 2028.4 The ambition is bold, but reality lags. Taiwan currently produces only 8,000–10,000 drones annually, far short of its 2028 goal.5 Moreover, there are important distinctions to be made with regards to the type, size and capacity of the drones being built, and the intended roles in which Taiwan plans to employ them. Whether those drones serve predominantly as supporting tools to more conventional weapons, or more directly as weapons themselves, presents a critical question.

Retired General Lee Hsi-ming, former Chief of the General Staff, has been a persistent critic of this imbalance, saying, “We are still spending too much money on conventional projects,” he told Politico. “What Taiwan needs is a large quantity of low-cost attack drones. If you have enough of them, it would be a big headache to China.”6

Legislator Kuan-ting Chen, who heads Taiwan’s Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship Association, has voiced a similar sentiment: “Spending wisely, like Ukraine has done with cheaper drones to counter the first line of attack, is a lesson Taiwan can learn. We are trying to reverse the situation, that they [China] have the quantity we don’t.”7

Both men capture the essence of Taiwan’s dilemma: the island has the technological sophistication and political awareness to recognize the importance of drones, but its defense establishment remains tethered to legacy platforms and procurement habits that undercut speed, scale, and flexibility.

In order to get drone production on track, Taiwan must establish a drone production industry designed around its unique defensive requirements, drawing on hard-learned lessons from the war in Ukraine and strengthened through partnerships with trusted international partners. To succeed, this effort cannot remain a niche initiative—it must be embraced as a pillar of Taiwan’s national strategy and identity, woven into both its defense doctrine and its broader sense of collective resilience.

Why Drones Matter for Taiwan’s Defense

Taiwan lies in the constant shadow of China’s expansionist ambitions. China’s key advantage is in scale. Its navy is the largest in the world, its missile arsenal vast, and its air force is modernizing at speed. Taiwan cannot match the PLA platform for platform, but drones invert the logic of numbers.8

Imagine a PLA amphibious fleet attempting to cross the Strait. Taiwanese sea drones prowl the shallows, striking troop transports. FPV drones dive onto armored vehicles at staging points. Loitering munitions suppress radars, blinding air defenses. Each system is expendable, but together they impose prohibitive costs and slow momentum. Every day gained allows U.S. and allied forces more time to respond.

This is the essence of asymmetric defense: not parity, but denial. Taiwan cannot outbuild the PRC’s navy, but it can make the Strait a drone battlefield, where every ship, runway, and depot is vulnerable to swarming attacks.9

While China is certainly not unaware of the capacity drones have to thwart their military aims, they are potentially quite limited in their ability to negate them. Electromagnetic and Cyber Warfare offer good opportunities to counter drone employment, but those attack vectors can be mitigated by creative system design and operational employment.

And while China is itself capable of fielding enormous numbers of drones, the tyranny of distance and the nature of offensive and amphibious operations work to its disadvantage. To carry a 10-pound payload across the 100+ mile Taiwan strait would generally require a more expensive gas-powered drone of several hundred pounds, and it would be tasked with finding hidden targets while confronted with a fuel constrained timeline and while. exposed to adversary defenses. Meanwhile, a 10-pound payload launched from a hidden position on Taiwan could be carried by a lightweight lithium battery powered drone, and the target it seeks to find will be in the open and likely ill-equipped to target small, agile drones.

Ukraine’s Lessons: The Drone as Ammunition

Ukraine’s experience provides both inspiration and warning. On the positive side, the war has shown that drones can radically shift the battlefield balance. Small FPV drones have struck tanks, artillery, and command posts far behind frontlines.10 Swarms of loitering munitions have overwhelmed air defenses. Civilian “maker” communities have become integral to military innovation, turning hobbyist know-how into combat capability.11

Two observations are critical.

First, losses in Ukraine of UAVs and loitering munitions are high. But so are the returns in terms of disruption. A $200 FPV drone destroyed dozens of times can still deliver asymmetrical impact against expensive infrastructure. Traditional platforms, by contrast, demand high maintenance, long lead times, and are easier to target once their intelligence and flight path are known.

Second, unmanned systems allow for actions in ambiguous zones: surveillance in peacetime or below war-threshold, small strikes, sabotage, counter-aircraft harassment. They erode distance and amplify risk to forward bases, ports, and airfields. For Taiwan, island geography, proximity, and the nature of cross-Strait clashes mean that drones (air, surface, and underwater) promise a force multiplier in deterrence and defense alike.

Electronic warfare has also proven decisive. Russian jamming and GPS spoofing forced Ukraine to innovate rapidly, developing AI-enabled drones capable of navigating and targeting autonomously.12 Taiwan must assume the PLA will employ similar tactics from the outset of any conflict. Its drones must be hardened against interference, with redundant navigation systems, encrypted communications, and fallback autonomy.

Important as well is the demonstrated psychological power of drones. Soldiers under constant drone surveillance, aware that an FPV strike could arrive at any moment, lose morale.13 This effect is asymmetric: a cheap drone imposes not just physical loss, but causes psychological costs far greater than its price tag.

Perhaps most important to Taiwan however, are the lessons Ukraine has revealed about the costs of delay. The staggering loss rates of thousands of drones each month means drones must be treated less like weapons platforms and more like ammunition.14 Stockpiles, not prototypes, win wars. Procurement must resemble shell production, with drones flowing off assembly lines in industrial quantities.

Production Bottlenecks: Supply Chain and Assembly

The manufacturing supply chain is Taiwan’s most pressing vulnerability endangering their required levels of drone production. While the island dominates global semiconductor manufacturing, it is less self-sufficient in the lower-margin but equally vital components. Thermal imaging units, GPS modules, secure communications chips, and high-performance magnets are often imported; some are still assembled in mainland China, undermining Taipei’s policy of “China-free” systems.15

Defense Minister Wellington Koo has promised stricter controls, but when Taiwan finds alternatives from trusted partners, costs rise sharply and export controls from Washington add friction.16 While critical to ensuring quality in higher end drones, those stricter controls create certification bottlenecks. Each drone must be verified as compliant with “China-free” requirements, a process that is expensive and slow.17 The problem is expounded by export controls of the United States and its allies which, though aimed at denying advanced technologies to Beijing, sometimes ensnare Taiwan as well, complicating Taiwan’s efforts to acquire subsystems or export finished drones.18

If Taipei can solve the supply chain headaches, the next bottleneck comes in the form of scaling production from 10,000 to 180,000 annually, which will require a massive industrial mobilization. Taiwan’s drone industry is fragmented among small firms, many innovative but undercapitalized. Companies like Thunder Tiger and GEOSAT produce capable systems. Yet without major investment in automation and workforce training, scaling will be impossible.19 New factories must be built, automation introduced, and a workforce trained at scale. The government has allocated $125 million to seed this effort, but the magnitude of the challenge far exceeds the initial outlay.20

Breaking the Supply Bottleneck: Selectivity and Innovative Partnerships

Getting the right components into the hands of Taiwan’s workers will require narrowing production to the most critical drone types and forging innovative partnerships. The first step in overcoming supply bottlenecks is ensuring that the parts being sourced are those most urgently needed. While Taiwan is currently investing in a wide array of drone systems to prepare for near-term conflict, not all of these platforms will deliver equal value on the battlefield. Larger UAVs with longer flight times and greater payload capacity are helpful in peacetime, during grey-zone operations, and in earliest stages of conflict, but their larger logistical and operating footprints make them unlikely to survive against Chinese air force and rocket force attacks. Meanwhile, FPV drones and other similar smaller platforms that Ukraine has been using to great effect for the past several years are far more survivable and materials to build them can be far more easily resourced.

By focusing on producing innovative FPV and other small and easily dispersible drones, Taiwan can reduce the administrative and logistical challenges currently hampering drone production while also ensuring that their main efforts are spent building the drones that will make the largest difference in a fight and thus carry the highest deterrent value against future conflict.

This focused effort also opens the door to closer partnerships with two critical countries. First, the United States, which is already heavily invested in Taiwan’s security and whose credibility in Asia depends on helping partners defend themselves affordably, not just through the deployment of billion-dollar jets and destroyers.21 The United States, which through its Replicator program is in the process of scaling up its own ability to produce large numbers of a wide variety of drones, should focus on partnering with Taiwan in three areas:

Investment and Co-Production. U.S. firms should invest directly in Taiwanese factories, ensuring secure “China-free” supply chains.

Technology Transfer and Training. Sharing software, swarm algorithms, and secure comms protocols.

Procurement Integration. Allowing Taiwan’s drone makers to access U.S. defense supply chains, driving down unit costs through volume.

These areas each constitute a massive degree of coordination, and to achieve it across the entire spectrum of drone system development is nearly impossible. Partnerships focused on micro drones and other niche drone platforms best suited for the defense of Taiwan presents an opportunity to focus U.S. collaboration on where it is most needed. The process of establishing this relationship will then set the groundwork for future collaboration on larger drones more optimized for gray zone operations.

The next key partnership for Taiwan is with Ukraine. Ukraine’s military has pioneered FPV tactics, swarm operations, and decentralized production under fire. Taiwan, by contrast, brings industrial sophistication and financial resources. Together, they could define the next generation of drone warfare.22

A formal partnership, including joint training, doctrinal exchanges, co-development projects, and establishing redundant common supply chains, would accelerate Taiwan’s learning curve while strengthening its political alignment with Europe’s frontline state.23 Symbolically, it would link two democracies facing existential threats from authoritarian giants. Practically, it would provide Taiwan with battle-tested innovations before they are needed.24

Breaking the Capacity Bottleneck: The Cultural Challenge

Scaling up production requires a whole-of-society approach. Taiwan must mobilize its formidable electronics sector, its universities, its active duty and reserve military forces, and even its maker communities. It must treat drones not as boutique projects for ambitious tech startups, but as national industrial essentials every bit as critical as semiconductors.

The most difficult transformation may not be industrial but cultural. Taiwan’s military establishment remains attached to legacy platforms: frigates, submarines, and fighter jets.25 These are not irrelevant, but they are not survivable in a full-fledged war against China and cannot substitute for drones’ deterrent value.

As General Lee insists, Taiwan must rebalance procurement: a small number of advanced drones, complemented by massed, low-cost strike systems. This will require political courage to redirect budgets, military openness to doctrinal change, and societal engagement to harness private innovation.

Taiwanese Active Duty and Reserve forces should be put to work learning to build, program, deploy, and operate new drone systems. Such employment would pay dividends to ensure not only production targets are met, but also that the military forces are familiar with maintaining and employing their equipment in the event they are called up to use it. It would also help ensure that new weapons being developed are compatible with the way that operational units intended to use them.

Civil society should be mobilized, just as it has been in Ukraine. Taiwan’s universities, tech firms, and maker communities can contribute to prototyping, piloting, cottage industry production, and maintenance. Doing so would embed resilience across society, ensuring that even if factories are struck, innovation and production continue. More importantly, success in scaling up via a whole of society approach would send a clear message to China and the world that Taiwan is willing and able to make the sacrifices necessary to defend their freedom.

Conclusion: The Clock Is Ticking

Operation Spiderweb should haunt Taiwan’s strategic imagination. It demonstrated that cheap, expendable drones can neutralize assets once considered untouchable. For Taipei, the message is urgent: the future battlespace will be saturated by unmanned systems, and deterrence will depend on numbers, resilience, and adaptability.

But ambition without follow-through is a liability. Taiwan must move from speeches and declarations toward mass production, component autonomy, doctrinal change, and tightly integrated partnerships, especially with the United States and with Ukraine.

As Defense Ministry spokesman Sun Li-fang put it: “Responding to the present enemy threat … the defense ministry is speeding up research and development and production of various drones. ”26  The question is whether Taiwan can move fast enough, before it is too late.

Joseph Hanacek is a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He serves as a Warfare Tactics Instructor at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School detachment of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in San Diego, CA. The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or its components.

Josh Richards is the Chief Commercial Officer of Pacific Peering. He serves on UN’s Joint Task Force on SMART Cables as a member of the Steering Committee, and chairs the Business Development Committee. He is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, a Tech Policy Fellow with the Aspen Institute, and a Senior Fellow with AI2030.

References

1. Kateryna Bondar, “How Ukraine’s Operation ‘Spider’s Web’ Redefines Asymmetric Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 202 https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare

2. The War Zone, Thomas Newdick, “What Ukraine’s Unprecedented Drone Attack Means For Russia’s Bomber Force,” June 2, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/what-ukraines-unprecedented-drone-attack-means-for-russian-bomber-force

3. Al Jazeera, “In China’s shadow, Taiwan is building a drone army to repel an invasion,” July 31, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/31/in-chinas-shadow-taiwan-is-building-a-drone-army-to-repel-an-invasion

4. Justin Ling, “Taiwan Is Rushing to Make Its Own Drones Before It’s Too Late,” Wired, June 23, 2025, https://www.wired.com/story/taiwans-rush-to-make-its-own-drones-before-its-too-late/

5. “Drones for Democracy: U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation in Building a Resilient and China-Free UAV Supply Chain,” Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), 2025, https://dset.tw/en/publication-en/36416/

6. Jonathan Eyal and Mark Thompson, interview with Gen. Lee Hsi-ming, Politico, 2025; see also “Taiwan is too slow learning from Ukraine war, ex-top commander says,” Politico Europe, June 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/taiwan-ukraine-china-leehsi-ming-ex-top-commander-says/

7. Kuan-ting Chen, public remarks at Taiwan-Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship events, 2025; coverage in Euronews and local Taiwan press. See: “Why lessons from drone warfare in Ukraine could be key to defending Taiwan against China,” Euronews, June 2025, https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/06/06/why-lessons-from-drone-warfare-in-ukraine-could-be-key-to-defending-taiwan-against-china

8. On sea drones and littoral denial, see: Marcus Weisgerber, “Unmanned Surface Vessels and Littoral Warfare,” Defense One, 2024–25; and RSIS analyses on Taiwan’s littoral approaches.

9. Policy speeches and parliamentary testimony by Kuan-ting Chen, 2025 public record; see local press coverage: Focus Taiwan, Taipei Times.

10. Stijn Mitzer and Jakub Janovsky, “FPV and Loitering Munitions in Ukraine: Tactics and Effects,” The Soufan Center / IntelBrief, June 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-11/

11. Kateryna Bondar, “How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology,” CSIS, January 13, 2025 https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology

12. Colin Demarest, “Electronic Warfare in Ukraine Has Lessons for US Weapons, Navigation,” C4ISRNET, May 6, 2024 https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2024/05/06/electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-has-lessons-for-us-weapons-navigation/

13. The Economist, “The economic lessons from Ukraine’s spectacular drone success,” June 2025. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/06/12/the-economic-lessons-from-ukraines-spectacular-drone-success

14. South China Morning Post, “Treat drones like bullets: Taiwan seeks 50,000 UAVs over two years,” 2025 reporting on procurement plans, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3322406/treat-drones-bullets-taiwan-seeks-50000-new-uavs-over-two-years-boost-defences

15. Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, “Taiwan and U.S. Work to Counter China’s Drone Dominance,” New York Times, September 25, 2024 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/25/world/asia/us-taiwan-drones-china.html

16. Congressional Research Service, “AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress,” June 20, 2023 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R47599.html

17. Soumaya Keynes and Chris Miller, “Transcript: Who Is Winning the Chip Wars? With Chris Miller,” Financial Times, August 26, 2024 https://www.ft.com/content/42bde830-ad35-4b3a-b13b-03390aceee25?syn-25a6b1a6=1

18. Justin Ling, “Taiwan Is Rushing to Make Its Own Drones Before It’s Too Late,” Wired, June 23, 2025 https://www.wired.com/story/taiwans-rush-to-make-its-own-drones-before-its-too-late/

19. Peter Dickinson, “Outgunned Ukraine Bets on Drones as Russian Invasion Enters Third Year,” Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/outgunned-ukraine-bets-on-drones-as-russian-invasion-enters-third-year/

20. DSET, “Drones for Democracy: U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation in Building a Resilient and China-Free UAV Supply Chain,” June 16, 2025 https://dset.tw/en/research/drones-for-democracy-the-strategic-imperative-for-u-s-taiwan-uav-cooperation/

21. James M. Acton, “Optimal Deterrence,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 17, 2025 https://www.cfr.org/reports/optimal-deterrence

22. Congressional Research Service, “AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress,” June 20, 2023 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R47599.html

23. DSET source: “Drones for Democracy,” June 16, 2025 https://dset.tw/en/research/drones-for-democracy-the-strategic-imperative-for-u-s-taiwan-uav-cooperation/

24. Kevin Pollpeter, Tsun-Kai Tsai, and April Herlevi, “Taiwan Lessons Learned from the Russia-Ukraine War,” CNA, November 2024 https://www.cna.org/reports/2024/12/Taiwan-Lessons-Learned-from-the-Russia-Ukraine-War.pdf

25. Budgetary discussions and constraints: Taiwan’s defense budget reporting, Ministry of Finance and MOFA releases, 2024–25.

26. Taiwan to Accelerate Military Drone Development, Taking Into Account Lessons from Ukraine War.” The Japan Times, February 7, 2023 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/02/07/asia-pacific/taiwan-drone-development-ukraine-war/

Featured image: A display at the Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA) in Taichung on 9 June 2026. (Wikimedia Commons)

Drones/Unmanned

An Unmanned Hellscape Needs a 21st Century Hephaestus

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By Scott Humr

Introduction

To understand the future, it is helpful to consider the past. Greek mythology can offer rich parallels to modern military technologies and concepts. Recent conceptions about the defense of Taiwan from a Chinese invasion through a “hellscape” of unmanned systems harkens to the mythical robot Talos to protect the island of Crete. Talos, a giant bronze robot, was commissioned by Zeus and built by the Greek god of invention and blacksmithing, Hephaestus. This lone Talos robot is said to have marched around Crete thrice daily and hurled boulders at invading enemy vessels.

While a single Talos was able to accomplish such mythical feats, the defense of Taiwan is envisioned to require “tens of thousands” of unmanned robotic systems. However, wishful thinking is not the bridge that will let us cross from myth to reality. Yet, “[w]ishful thinking” are the words of a retired Peoples Liberation Army Navy officer used to describe Admiral Paparo’s strategy for an “unmanned hellscape” if China were to conduct a cross straits invasion of Taiwan. While such an invasion of Taiwan and subsequent armed conflict would likely not benefit China, the fact remains that employing unmanned systems in the quantities envisioned by the United States would require its military to further develop both capacity and know-how to oversee such a complex endeavor.

If an unmanned hellscape is to move from fantasy to credible threat in the eyes of an adversary, the U.S. Navy, as part of the Joint Force, must take concrete steps to address weaknesses in its current conceptualizations of unmanned future warfare. To overcome these obstacles, the U.S. Navy can lead the way by appointing a robotics and autonomous systems czar to interface and invigorate industry, develop forward deployed naval robotics formations, and oversee a deeper investment in the forces needed to operate these systems.

Naval Robotics and Autonomous Systems Czar

The appointment of a naval robotics and autonomous systems czar or Razar [pronounced: “razor”] can provide the authority within a single individual to generate the momentum needed to overcome the challenges to making any vision of a credible robotics force a reality. However, reporting suggests that rising demand for weaponized drones could strain existing U.S. industrial base capacity. Specifically, when it comes to scale, history provides a poignant example of how a leader with a singular focus can move mountains.

With the commencement of hostilities near the end of the 1930s, U.S. leaders concluded that they needed to get the country on a wartime footing by scaling production quickly. The U.S. was able to bring about a massive change at a scale never before seen and not yet repeated up to this point. The appointment of William Knudsen as Chairman of the Office of Production Management with an eventual commission as a Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army helped rapidly expand the defense industrial base by fostering both innovation and production at scale. Along with others such as Henry Kaiser and “Cast-Iron Charlie” Sorensen, Knudsen helped organize and rally the American industrial base like no other in history to achieve unprecedented levels of production needed by the Allied powers, a 20th century Hephaestus. Knudsen’s efforts were only possible because of the authority vested in him by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his own hard-won upbringing for understanding mass production like few others. Arguably, the U.S. Navy can do the same today.

While the U.S. Navy leads the Joint Force in operationalizing autonomous systems, it still needs a Razar to help lead and synchronize its efforts to ensure autonomous systems integrate with other platforms and capabilities. The Razar can lead the service’s efforts to help drive industry and cross-coordinate with the Joint Force for the development of common protocols and common control for autonomous systems technologies. Furthermore, the Razar can be the single office for Fleets and Type commands, who are responsible for readiness, training, and equipping of specific categories of naval capabilities, to interface with for the development of standards, open architecture approaches, testing, and assimilation of autonomous systems across the U.S. Navy. Without a Razar, the likelihood of a plethora of systems taking hold without a single integrator to help coordinate how these platforms will operate within current and projected naval concepts is bleak, particularly in the new age of “precise mass.”

A disjointed effort by the U.S. Navy will result in a greater number of incompatible systems, standards, and communications devices, which squanders precious time and limited resources. Rather, to succeed in this space, the U.S. Navy must appoint a Razar who is trilingual in technology, military operations, and acquisitions and has the authority, interpersonal skills, and enterprise knowledge to not only cut through bureaucratic red tape but is able to build bridges with industry. The Razar can also act as the lead sled dog of the Joint Force for helping implement Senator Roger Wicker’s Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense Act. To this end, the Razar’s efforts should become the Type command for future robotics formations.

Robotics Formations in the Fight

For the U.S. Navy to compete effectively with autonomous systems, robotics formations continuously operating forward should be its bid for success. The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated the utility of dedicated robotics force. While it can make sense to integrate some autonomous systems into existing formations, high-end capabilities will require additional technical acumen, safety considerations, and advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by a dedicated core of personnel. A Razar can oversee the professional development of dedicated units that understand the complexity and nuance needed to employ autonomous systems effectively while ensuring seamless integration into other naval formations.

A dedicated robotics force will require a host of new qualifications, training standards, and readiness considerations. Large scale integration of such systems into current formations would add a tremendous amount of additional requirements on top of an already overburdened sailor’s list of current qualifications. Attempting to maintain additional qualifications for robotics or autonomous systems on top of existing requirements, will result in watered down proficiency, or worse, only a superficial understanding of autonomous systems capabilities. This projection is backed by a recent Government Accountability Office report which found “the Navy does not fill all required ship positions, and that sailors assigned to a ship are sometimes unavailable for duty (for example, temporarily assigned to another ship) or may have inadequate training or preparation for their positions.” Combined with already higher stress levels the force is experiencing, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to make its already overworked sailors do more.

Rather, cohesive units of robotics systems operators who can train and learn together are a superior proposition. When brought in early for planning naval operations, such personnel can provide unmatched expertise to support the operational commander and properly integrate into planning staffs. The Navy’s Robotics Warfare rating is a great start and their continued professionalization as a vital component to the naval service. It is also critical that robotics professionals are prepared to do without the contract support many units have become accustomed to expect in warfare.

Warfare, for the U.S., is an inherently governmental function. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that a bevy of contracted support or field service representatives were necessary to employ a variety of technologies and provide in-country repair services. While the expansive forward operating bases of Iraq and Afghanistan provided a relatively safe area for contractors to operate, future battlefields in and around the First Island Chain will not provide the same level of sanctuary.

Placing robotics formations in the First Island Chain is also necessary for gathering the data necessary to train and improve machine learning algorithms for target recognition and autonomy before conflict erupts. This will allow robotics operators to improve their craft, especially in emissions control conditions where contacting distant support is not only unavailable, but dangerous. Operating forward in competition will allow robotics professionals to continuously perform operational test and evaluation, which is impractical if performed in its traditional manner. For these reasons, forward deploying dedicated robotics formations becomes an imperative to demonstrating a credible robotics force against Chinese aggression, improving autonomous systems tradecraft, while also demonstrating a strong commitment to our allies and partners.

Invest in Humans

The Razar can also act as the lead advocate for the development of robotics personnel, which are anticipated to increase. There are already reports from the war in Ukraine that make clear the necessity and importance of fielding large numbers of drone operators. These operators also provide critical oversight and expertise for employing autonomous systems capabilities to ensure both their legitimate, ethical, and effective use. Naval robotics personnel would provide the necessary legal and ethical oversight of autonomous weapon systems and assurances for helping overcome their complex employment. Because war is fundamentally a human endeavor, having human oversight over autonomous systems are key to demonstrating U.S. commitment to International Humanitarian Law and applying appropriate levels of human judgment required in Department of Defense Directive 3000.09. However, the Navy’s lowering of recruitment standards coupled with an already difficult recruiting environment may prove detrimental for inculcating the technically proficient human capital necessary to sustain such an envisioned robotics force that hellscape requires.

Key for adherence to these and other ethical principles is not only having educated, and well-trained personnel at all levels of command who understand the implications of employing autonomous systems, but professionalized units who specialize in autonomous systems. A key pillar of the Navy’s unmanned campaign framework is the investment in warfighter education. To accomplish this with personnel responsible for leading autonomous systems implementation, the U.S. Navy needs to expand its education at Carnegie Mellon University and the Naval Postgraduate School while furthering opportunities to include other schools for incorporating additional courses on the ethical employment of autonomous systems. Incorporation of more human factors and human-machine interaction training including the use of a detailed case study method will go a long way in developing greater understanding needed for autonomous systems operators and leaders alike. Accordingly, the realization of human-machine teaming with autonomous systems will only come about through a comprehensive appreciation in the development of the human side of the autonomous systems equation. To be sure, complexity does not stop there either.

Robotics and autonomous systems also operate within a system of other complex systems. When such systems are linked together in various kill webs or chains of diverse technologies, complexity increases nonlinearly. The combination and integration of different waveforms, assorted protocols, numerous encryption schemes, and variability of track formats makes complexity rise where mistakes can eventually compound. Robotics operators and their leaders need to become familiar with the myriad challenges associated with technologies within which autonomous systems are integrated. Having highly trained individuals will support easier integration of newer autonomous systems and associated technologies into operational plans. Fittingly, well-trained robotics personnel generate greater rapport for their organizations by establishing trust and confidence to commands and allies they support.

Hellscape’s Holdups?

The appointment of a Razar to oversee all robotics and autonomous systems also has drawbacks. It will centralize a number of aspects that may slow some units down for adopting and integrating autonomous systems in the short term. Moreover, an argument could be made that the U.S. Navy should let a thousand flowers bloom for robotics technologies and promote decentralized innovation. While the appointment of a Razar should not inherently slow down the development of robotics systems and their adoption by other units, a bias toward incorporation at the highest levels is still necessary. Instead, a Razar can take many of the best-of-breed innovations and systems to ensure they support naval forces in a unified way. The Razar can act as the key linkage to other Type or functional commanders in a way lower-level units may struggle to see adopted at scale. Moreover, the Razar is needed to advocate for the significant number of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy considerations to account for future programming of resources to ensure autonomous systems do not become an ephemeral capability.

Another potential drawback is not integrating them at scale within a carrier or expeditionary strike group (C/ESG). While this may be true at a certain level, it cannot be looked at as a shortcoming. Rather, through the use of liaison officers, pre-deployment workup opportunities, and envisioning such units as lethal eyes and ears of the C/ESG, forward deployed autonomous systems placement more than makes up for any apparent non-assimilation. Additionally, paired with forward deployed Marine Corps Stand-In Forces provides a more robust landward component of the Navy that will help keep the door open for the Joint Force, to include allies and partners. Predictably, the Joint Force could one day see the addition of a Combined Force Robotics Component Commander as part of a Joint Task Force in the very near future.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy, and the Joint Force, in general, face an impending crisis for supporting the defense of Taiwan against any number of potential Chinese actions to bring Taiwan under its control. However, the ability to create a hellscape will require a U.S. Navy intimately familiar with the capabilities and limitations of numerous robotics systems. Furthermore, burdening current units with large quantities of autonomous systems is equally unlikely to result in increased lethality and effective integration but instead weaken current capabilities due to the additional training placed on already overtasked personnel. Such an approach is a recipe for disaster and disuse of robotic systems. Instead, the future is professionalized naval units specializing in human-machine integration with the ability to seamlessly incorporate them into any number of naval formations. This will, however, require the U.S. Navy to have standing forces of these teams if it is to truly benefit from these advanced systems.

Unlike Talos, today’s robotic systems require significant human oversight and additional capabilities to orchestrate a credible capability. Yet, in similar fashion to Talos, robotic systems today can suffer from a number of singular flaws. The Razar should oversee mitigations through continuous development, training, and employment that will address these shortcomings. The ichor that powered Talos in Greek mythology is analogous to the data and connectivity necessary to operate a vast network of robotics and autonomous systems to create a hellscape. A ‘Hell-Razar,’ therefore, must address these potential points of failure.

The myth of Talos provides interesting parallels to the protection of an island by a robotic force. To address this future state, the U.S. Navy can lead the way by assigning a Razar to both coordinate better integration while bolstering defense business, develop forward deployed autonomous systems formations, while also expanding and investing heavily in its robotics personnel. This is what is needed to get “more players on the field” quickly to make our adversary’s think twice while also demonstrating a credible and employable capability to the Joint Force, allies, and partners.

Scott Humr, PhD, is an active duty lieutenant colonel in the United States Marine Corps. He currently serves as the deputy director for the Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems office under the Capabilities Development Directorate in Quantico, Virginia.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: A Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) at a Technology Readiness Experimentation event in San Diego in March. (Photo by Johns Hopkins APL/Steve Yeager)

Drones/Unmanned

Do USVs Have a Future in Latin American and Caribbean Navies?

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By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The column discusses regional navies’ challenges, including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) are sailing full steam ahead, as evidenced by their (deadly) efficiency in attacks by the Ukrainian armed forces against Russian targets across the Black Sea. Though the security landscape in Europe is dramatically different from that of the Western Hemisphere, new technologies are always of interest to any armed service and USVs should be no exception. Whether USVs have a future in Latin America and the Caribbean merits deeper exploration.

Recent Developments

It is beyond the scope of this commentary to list or analyze all USV developments, but it is important to note that new platforms continue to be built and utilized worldwide. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has continued to use its deadly Sea Baby USVs. Several governments and industries want to develop USVs to add to their fleets. In the United States, the Navy’s “newest Overlord Unmanned Surface Vessel Vanguard (OUSV3), was recently launched from Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Alabama,” the service reported in January. Also, the Louisiana-based shipyard Metal Shark is developing the USV Prowler and the micro USV Frenzy. As for future platforms, in Europe, the Netherlands announced its first domestic design for a USV to be used by the Dutch Navy. And in Asia, Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and the US software company Palantir Technologies signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 14 April to also co-develop a USV. USV development is flourishing around the globe.

In the Western Hemisphere, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has become a testing ground for USV technology. In late 2023, ten Saildrone Voyager USVs were launched from Naval Air Station Key West’s Mole Pier and Truman Harbor to help improve domain awareness during US Fourth Fleet’s Operation Windward Stack. According to SOUTHCOM, “Windward Stack is part of 4th Fleet’s unmanned integration campaign, which provides the Navy a region to experiment with and operate unmanned systems in a permissive environment … all designed to move the Navy to the hybrid fleet.” The command aims to use its Area of Responsibility (AOR) as an innovation hub for the US military, partners and allies, and the defense industry.

(Sept. 13, 2023) – Commercial operators deploy Saildrone Voyager Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) out to sea in the initial steps of U.S. 4th Fleet’s Operation Windward Stack during a launch from Naval Air Station Key West’s Mole Pier and Truman Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Danette Baso Silvers/Released)

Regarding the late-2023 test, SOUTHCOM’s 2024 Posture Statement explains, “U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet held its Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, hosting 47 Department of Defense Commands, 10 foreign partners, and 18 industry partners to foster innovation and experimentation to inform the Unmanned Campaign and Hybrid Fleet.” This experimentation has included advanced kill chains, contested operations, survivability, and sustainment at sea.

Under General Laura Richardson’s command, SOUTHCOM aims to “integrate tomorrow’s technology into our operations and exercises today” by investing in robotics, cyber technology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to “overmatch our adversaries and assist the region’s democracies.” Expanding SOUTHCOM’s missions to include testing new technologies, including USVs, is another tactic to expand the command’s importance within the US military.

Latin American-made USVs are also on the horizon. In early 2024, the Brazilian shipyard Emgepron announced a partnership with the local start-up Tidewise to manufacture the USV Suppressor. A company press release states that the Suppressor is the first platform developed in the Brazilian or Latin American defense market. Two variants of the Suppressor will be built: the seven-meter Suppress or seven and the 11-meter Suppressor 11. While regional navies have robots for underwater operations like search and rescue, USVs are not yet operated across the region.

A concept image of the Suppressor USV. (Emgepron image)

Do USVs have a future in Latin America and the Caribbean?

While the possibility of inter-state warfare across Latin America and the Caribbean is minimal (Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s belligerent statements notwithstanding), there are several non-combat maritime missions in which USVs could be helpful. Dr. Andrea Resende, professor at Brazil’s University of Belo Horizonte (Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte: UNIBH) and Una Betim University (Centro Universitário Una Betim: UNA), and Christian Ehrlich, director of the Institute for Strategy and Defense Research and a recent graduate from Coventry University with a focus on maritime security, have both made this argument.

Dr. Resende notes that USVs could be used by the Brazilian Navy and other regional navies as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) vehicles to locate suspicious vessels. For example, USVs could locate vessels engaged in the trafficking of illicit narcotics, the famous narco-boats or narco-subs. Moreover, USVs could locate illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels. There is a tendency to think that distant water fishing fleets (DFW) are the primary perpetrators of IUU fishing in the Western Hemisphere, particularly from China. But, in reality, DWF fleets primarily operate in the South Atlantic and South Pacific, while local artisanal fishing vessels work illegally across Latin America and the Caribbean. USVs would help locate smaller IUU fishing vessels, which are more challenging to locate than a vast fleet of hundreds of ships.

In other words, USVs offer over-the-horizon capabilities for regional navies and coast guards to locate different types of vessels. Imagine an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) deploying a helicopter, a rigid inflatable boat, and a USV; quickly becoming a small fleet with vast surveillance and interception capabilities.

Moreover, USVs have practical applications for other non-combat and non-security operations, like search and rescue missions and scientific operations. Ehrlich noted that USVs can also be helpful for offshore infrastructure, “particularly to protect offshore oil platforms.” The platforms can also be used for near-shore operations, like port security.

POV video captured by Saildrone Explorer SD 1045’s onboard camera showing large waves and heavy weather conditions inside Hurricane Sam in the Atlantic Ocean at 1414UTC, Sept 30, 2021.

USVs vs UAVs and UGVs

Will USVs eventually be a component of Latin American and Caribbean fleets? The short answer is yes, but when exactly this will occur is debatable as acquisition programs vary depending on each service and, unsurprisingly, budgetary issues.

A parallel can be made with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have become quite popular with regional militaries. Virtually every service across the region operates UAVs. In May alone, the United States donated six Aerovironment UAV systems to El Salvador’s military for border patrol operations. Meanwhile, the Brazilian UAV company Xmobots announced the training of 21 Brazilian Army personnel to operate the company’s Nauru 100C UAV. There is a clear proliferation of UAVs across Latin America and the Caribbean.

A ScanEagle UAV on display in a launcher, during the 106th anniversary celebration of Naval Aviation, at the Brazilian Navy São Pedro da Aldeia Naval Air Base, Rio de Janeiro, August 26, 2022. (Brazilian Navy photo)

On the other hand, as this analyst wrote in Breaking Defense, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have not found much interest in Latin America. The Brazilian Army is reportedly interested in European-made UGVs; however, UGVs have yet to become popular among Latin American armies compared to the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.

Will USVs become the next UAV or the next UGV? So far, there are not enough data points for a proper prediction. Emgepron’s Suppressor project suggests that at least one company is willing to test the water, so to speak, to see if there is regional interest. If successful, Emgepron could quickly corner the Brazilian defense market with its homegrown USV.

In his comments to CIMSEC, Ehrlich brought up an important issue: long-term vision. For the maritime security expert, “the culture of regional navies” is the major obstacle to acquiring (or attempting to develop locally) USVs. Regional ministries of defense and navies continue to be focused on “operating traditional systems due to a doctrine that does not foment innovation.” Ehrlich mentioned that only the Brazilian Navy is interested in acquiring or developing USVs, including for potential combat missions.

Meanwhile, Dr. Resende explained that a critical factor is the budget of regional armed forces, which tend to suffer “cyclical crises” for various reasons. “Hence, the budgets for investing in the acquisition and training to utilize USVs may be limited.” Moreover, for Dr. Resende, the future of USV technology is part of a broader discussion of the present and future missions of armed forces since they face “greater restrictions as compared to the armed forces in the Global North.”

Ehrlich’s comments about vision and institutional ambition to develop new capacities are a useful lens for gauging these developments. Unsurprisingly, a Brazilian company, Emgepron, is the first in the region to attempt to develop a USV, given the Brazilian Navy’s strong interest in developing the defense industry. Several other South American shipyards are engaged in ambitious projects, including constructing frigates, offshore patrol vessels, transport vessels, and even an icebreaker; however, the Brazilian defense industry still leads the way. Perhaps if the Brazilian Navy positively reviews the Suppressor USV, other regional navies may also be interested in acquiring it.

Finally, there are obvious physical and technical requirements for a ship to transport and operate a USV, which means some basic adaptations will be needed for any ship to utilize this new technology. Navies with older vessels or a surface fleet composed of small vessels will be less likely to acquire USVs, though they could be utilized for port security and other near-shore operations, so they do not have to voyage far from a naval base.

As the war in Ukraine continues, a revolution regarding military technology is underway, and the word “Unmanned” has become very popular. Latin American and Caribbean militaries have quickly adopted UAV technology; however, UGVs have yet to be widely utilized. Likewise, regional naval forces have yet to show major interest in unmanned surface vessels beyond Brazil, and budgetary, doctrinal & technical issues are still obstacles to greater adoption. While USVs could help Latin American and Caribbean naval forces achieve their missions, not all services are in a position to acquire them. More research is necessary to understand which navies, and ministries of defense, have the long-term vision and interest in this technology. In Latin America and the Caribbean, USVs are on the horizon, but they are not yet ready to dock.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: RNMB Harrier USV. (Royal Navy photo)

Drones/Unmanned

A Concept of Operations for the U.S. Navy’s Hybrid Fleet

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By Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (ret.)

Generational Change for the U.S. Navy

In an address at a military-industry conference, then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, revealed the Navy’s goal to reach 500 ships by adding approximately 150 unmanned maritime vehicles to the Navy’s inventory. This concept added additional granularity to the Navy’s UNMANNED Campaign Framework and culminated in the issuance of the Chief of Naval Operations NAVPLAN and Force Design 2045, both of which call for 350 manned ships and 150 large unmanned maritime vehicles. 

Most recently, at the annual U.S. Naval Institute/Armed Forces and Communications and Electronic Association “West” Symposium, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, reaffirmed the U.S. Navy’s commitment to a future force of 350 manned ships and 150 large unmanned maritime vehicles as an important initiative in the face of a rapidly growing Chinese Navy.1

While the composition of the future U.S. Navy crewed vessels is relatively well understood—based on ships being built and being planned—what those unmanned maritime vehicles will look like, let alone what they will do—remains opaque to most observers. This uncertainty slows progress on the aspirations detailed in the UNMANNED Campaign Framework.

Additionally, Congress demonstrated increasing reluctance to authorize the Navy’s planned investment of billions of dollars on unmanned surface vessels (USVs) until the Naval Service develops a concept-of-operations (CONOPS) for use. Fairly, Congress has a point. The Navy announced plans to procure large numbers of unmanned systems, especially large and medium unmanned surface vehicles without a CONOPS. Until the Navy can develop such a CONOPS, it is unlikely that a 500-ship fleet populated by 150 unmanned surface vehicles will reach fruition.

The Navy’s Commitment to Unmanned Surface Vehicles: A Bridge to the Navy-After-Next

Many, to include U.S. Congress, encouraged the Navy to increase the number of ships it fields but with little to no increase in funding to do so. This is further exacerbated by the increasing cost to build ships, the cost to man these vessels, and the high operational tempo of ship deployments. This issues compound into a sustainability crunch where the Navy is literally wearing these ships out more rapidly than planned to meet the increasing demands of U.S. Combatant Commanders. From the resultant vector of these issues, it is easy to see why the Navy has difficulty growing the number of manned surface vessels.2

However, the rapid growth of the technologies that make unmanned surface vehicles increasingly capable and affordable provide the Navy with a way forward to put more hulls in the water. This led to the Navy’s commitment to field a force comprised of 150 large and medium unmanned surface vehicles.3 That said, some have noted that the Navy’s UNMANNED Campaign Framework is high on aspiration but low on specifics.4 Said another way, this vision is good as far as it goes, but the Navy has endured withering criticism from a skeptical Congress that is not warm to the Service spending billions of dollars on USVs until the Navy can come up with a concept-of-operations for using them.

Congressional Concerns over the Navy’s Plans for Unmanned Surface Vehicles

Few Navy procurement initiatives have been the subject of as much scrutiny—from Congress as well as defense analysts—as the Service’s plans for unmanned surface vehicles. A Jane’s Defense report noted: “U.S. lawmakers have balked at the service’s efforts to shift money from legacy ship programs toward proposed unmanned ones—in part because the USN has yet to develop a track record in the development of unmanned systems.5

Another article in a defense publication reported Congressional concerns that stated, “The Navy has yet to produce a concept of operations or even a coherent public strategy to back up the investments they want to make. Further, Congress is wary of appropriating money for platforms that rely on technologies that haven’t been fully developed yet.”6

As the Navy looks to allay Congressional concerns and accelerate the fielding of unmanned maritime systems, the emphasis should be on no longer thinking of each unmanned maritime system as a “one-of,” but rather, to package these together as multiple-sized and function vehicles designed for specific missions.7

A Concept of Operations for Getting Unmanned Surface Vessels to the Fight

The concept of operations proposed is to marry various size unmanned surface, subsurface and aerial unmanned vehicles to perform missions that the U.S. Navy has—and will continue to have—as the Navy-After-Next evolves. Simply put, the Navy can use the evolving large, unmanned surface vehicle as a “truck” to move smaller USVs, UUVs and UAVs into the battle space in the contested littoral and expeditionary environment.

While there is a plethora of important Navy missions, the proposed integrated unmanned solution combination of unmanned platforms focuses on two aspects: intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and mine countermeasures (MCM). There are many large, medium, small, and ultra-small unmanned systems ready to be adopted for these missions.

Rather than speaking in hypotheticals as to how unmanned vehicles might be employed for these two missions, this article will offer concrete examples, using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) unmanned systems that have been employed in recent Navy and Marine Corps events. In each case, these systems not only demonstrated mission accomplishment, but also the hull, mechanical and electrical (HME) attributes and maturity that Congress demands.

While there are a wide range of medium unmanned surface vehicles (MUSVs) that can potentially meet the U.S. Navy’s needs, there are three unmanned surface vehicles that appear to be furthest along in the development cycle and that have been featured in numerous Navy and Marine Corps exercises, experiments and demonstrations.8 These MUSVs cover a wide range of sizes, hull types and capabilities:

  • The Textron Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), now used by the Navy as the MCM-USV, features a single hull coupled with a modular and open architecture design.
  • The Maritime Tactical Systems Inc. (MARTAC), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) include the MANTAS T12 and the Devil Ray T18, T24 and T38 craft are catamarans that feature two hulls on both sides of the vessel. These USVs feature a modular and open architecture design.
  • The Leidos Sea Hunter, and its sister ship, Sea Hawk, are the largest of the three. The Sea Hunter is a 132-foot-long trimaran that features a central hull with two outriggers.

All three are viable candidates to be part of an integrated unmanned solution CONOPS. The MANTAS and Devil Ray craft are viable candidates for this CONOPS for several reasons. First, these vessels come in varied sizes with the same HME and command and control attributes. Second, Sea Hunter is too large to fit into the LUSVs the Navy is considering. Third, the CUSV is the MUSV of choice for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine-Countermeasures Mission Package, and all CUSVs scheduled to be procured are committed to this program.

The MANTAS and Devil Ray are COTS MUSVs that the Navy has wrung out in exercises, experiments, and demonstrations over the past several years, including operations with Navy Task Force 59.9 These have been married together to show Congress and others that the Navy does, indeed, have an effective way to use these platforms operationally.10

Most recently, and directly supporting the Navy’s “Hybrid Fleet” vision, Task Force 59 created a subordinate command, Task Group 59.1, focused specifically on manned-unmanned teaming operations. The Navy indicated that this means it will focus on the operational deployment of unmanned systems teamed with manned platforms to bolster maritime security across the Middle East region.11 Task Force 59 Commodore, Captain Colin Corridan, explained that in recent months Task Force 59 and Task Group 59.1 have been breaking new ground by evaluating unmanned vehicles for offensive operations. He noted the successful test firing of a Miniature Aerial Missile System weapons off an unmanned MARTAC T38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicle with direct hits against a training target each time.12

Kinetic use of USVs like the T38 Devil Ray are gaining traction but are likely some years away from becoming part of the arsenal of worldwide fleets. What is evolving today is the urgent need to shift the burden of performing the ISR and MCM missions from expensive and overdeployed manned platforms to plentiful and attritable unmanned vehicles. Part of an evolving operational concept for employing unmanned surface vehicles involves placing them in the environment where they can perform their missions of ISR and MCM.

If the U.S. Navy wants to sustain its manned capital ships in the lead up to war, the Navy needs to surge unmanned maritime vehicles into the contested battlespace. This paradigm shift ensures risk worthy vessels operate within the range of adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) platforms, systems, sensors, and weapons. Small and medium USVs, UAVs and UUVs need a “truck” to deliver them near or even in the battlespace.13 The Navy envisions that truck to be the LUSV. LUSVs will be 200 feet to 300 feet in length and have full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons.14

Depending on the size that is ultimately procured, the LUSV can carry several T38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicles and deliver them, largely covertly, to a point near the intended area of operations. The T38 can then be sent independently to perform the ISR mission, or alternatively, can launch one or more T12 MANTAS USVs to perform the ISR mission. Building on work conducted by the Navy laboratory community and sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, the T38 or T12 will have the ability to launch unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct overhead ISR.15

A T38 Devil Ray operating alongside a U.S. Coast Guard vessel. (Photo via Dave Meron)

For the MCM mission, the LUSV can deliver several T38s equipped with mine-hunting and mine-clearing systems (all of which are COTS platforms tested extensively in Navy exercises). These vessels can then undertake the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work previously conducted by Sailors who had to operate in the minefield. Given the large mine inventory of peer and near-peer adversaries, this methodology may well be the only way to clear mines safely.

This scenario and CONOPS is built around an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) that is underway in the Western Pacific. This ESG includes three LUSVs under supervisory control from a large amphibious ship. The then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, suggested this CONOPS in 2022 when he noted that he: “Wants to begin to deploy large and medium-sized unmanned vessels as part of carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups in 2027 or 2028, and earlier if I can.”16

Vignette for an Integrated Unmanned Solution Mission:

The ESG in the Western Pacific is on routine patrol five hundred nautical miles from the nearest landfall. An incident occurs in their operating area and the ESG is requested to: (1) obtain reconnaissance of a near-shore littoral area, associated bays and river accesses and (2) determine if the entrance to a specific bay has been mined to prevent ingress. The littoral coastline covers two hundred nautical miles. This area must be reconnoitered within twenty-four hours without the use of air assets.

Command staff dispatches three LUSVs for the request mission. Two LUSVs are each configured with four T38-ISR craft and the third LUSV is configured with four T38-MCM vessels. The three LUSV depart the strike group steaming together in a preset autonomous pattern to a waypoint that is central to the ISR scan area. At this waypoint, the LUSV will stop and dispatch the smaller T38 craft and then wait at this location for their return.

Two T38-ISR craft are launched from each of the two LUSVs carrying the ISR craft. The autonomous mission previously downloaded specifies a waypoint location along the coast for each of the four craft. Each of the four T38 craft will have a geographically confined ISR mission to cover.

Two T38-MCM craft are launched from the third LUSV. The autonomous mission previously downloaded has them transit independently along different routes to two independent waypoints just offshore of the suspected mine presence area where they will commence mine-like object detection operations. In this manner, each of the six craft will be transiting independently and autonomously to their next waypoint which will be the mission execution start point.

The objective is for each of the T38-ISR craft to complete their ISR scan and for the two T38-MCM craft to jointly scan the bottom and the water column for the presence of mine-like objects.

Even with the Expeditionary Strike Group well outside of littoral waters, the ESG Commander will have the results of the ISR and MCM scan of the shoreline littoral area after dispatching the LUSVs. The LUSVs then return to the ESG, ready for the next mission. 

Moving Forward with Effective Unmanned Surface Vehicle Deployment

As noted earlier, the Navy envisions large and medium unmanned vessels as part of carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups later this decade. The goal is to take an evolutionary approach and to scale up unmanned surface vessels in order to have large numbers of USVs available to commanders.17 This nested doll approach can accelerate this effort.

This is not a platform-specific solution, but rather a concept. When fleet operators see a capability with different size unmanned COTS platforms in the water working together and successfully performing the missions presented in this article, they will likely press industry to produce even more-capable platforms to perform these missions.

While evolutionary in nature, this disruptive capability delivered using emerging technologies can provide the U.S. Navy with near-term solutions to vexing operational challenges, while demonstrating to a skeptical Congress that the Navy does have a concept-of-operations to employ the unmanned systems it wants to procure.

Captain George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator and national security professional. His 30-year career as a naval aviator culminated in 14 years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. He enjoys writing, especially speculative fiction about the future of warfare. He is the author of 18 books, including four consecutive New York Times bestsellers. His latest book, published by the U.S. Naval Institute, is Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars.

References

1. Patrick Tucker and Lauren Williams, “Navy Robot Ships on a 15-year Path to Operating At Speed and Scale,” CNO says,” Defense One, February 13, 2024.

2. Megan Eckstein, “Navy Adds ‘Wholeness Balance Reviews’ to Budget Process to Consider Total Ownership Costs,” USNI News, January 18, 2018.

3. See, for example, Chief of Naval Operations NAVPLAN 2022 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, July 2022), Sam Lagrone and Mallory Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: ‘We Need a Naval Force of Over 500 Ships’” USNI News, February 18, 2022, and Sam Lagrone, “Navy’s Force Design 2045 Plans for 373 Ship Fleet, 150 Unmanned Vessels,” USNI News, July 26, 2022.

4. Department of the Navy UNMANNED Campaign Framework (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, March 2021). See, David Larter, “U.S. Navy’s New Unmanned Plan Has ‘Buzzwords and Platitudes’ But Few Answers,” Defense News, March 17, 2021.

5. Michael Fabey, “Unmanned market: U.S. Navy Looks to Tap Existing Technology to Jump Start Autonomous Fleet Plans,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2021.

6. David Larter, “The Pentagon Wants to Forge Ahead with Robot Warships, But Congress Wants To Slow The Train,” Defense News, June 19, 2020.

7. Tim Galladuet, “Three Ways the Navy Can Surge Its Unmanned Surface Force,” Real Clear Defense, February 26, 2022. The author, the former Deputy Administrator of NOAA, emphasizes the importance of multiple vehicle integration, a key attribute behind this concept of operations.

8. Megan Eckstein, “U.S. Navy More Certain of Role for Medium Surface Drones Following Tests,” Defense News, January 12, 2023.

9. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “US Navy Highlights TF 59 Contributions to Fleet’s Unmanned Vision,” Naval News, January 23, 2023

10. U.H. “Jack” Rowley, “Integrating Unmanned Surface Vehicles into the Surface Fleet: The Case for a “Nesting Dolls” Approach,” Paper presented at the American Society of Naval Engineers 2021 Virtual Technology, Systems and Ships Symposium, January 26-28, 2021.

11. Agnes Helou, “Commander: Navy’s new Task Group 59.1 to Usher Unmanned Systems into Operational Realm,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2024.

12. Rich Abott, “5th Fleet Unmanned Unit Starts New Hybrid Task Group,” Defense Daily, January 13, 2024.

13. Some of the Congressional criticism of the Navy’s plans for is unmanned surface vehicles is the fact that the Navy has (honestly) admitted that initially its large unmanned surface vehicles will actually be manned, albeit with a small crew. See, for example, Sam Lagrone, “Navy: Large USV Will Require Small Crews for the Next Several Years,” USNI News, August 3, 2021. Operating large unmanned surface vehicles as part of a carrier or expeditionary strike group could obviate the need for this crew, as sailors could be flown from CSG or ESG ships to the LUSV to perform needed functions, especially emergent repairs, and then return to their parent ship(s).

14. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress – CRS Report 45757.

15. See Vladimir Djapic et al, “Heterogeneous Autonomous Mobile Maritime Expeditionary Robots and Maritime Information Dominance,” Naval Engineers Journal, December 2014 for a description of how an unmanned surface vehicle can launch unmanned underwater vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles. 

16. Bradley Peniston, “Navy Chief Sees Robot Ships Alongside Aircraft Carriers Within Five Years,” Defense One, February 16, 2022. See also, Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday Taking a More ‘Realistic’ Approach to Unmanned Systems in the Fleet,” USNI News, February 16, 2022.

17. Justin Katz, “From 7 Classified ‘Spirals’ to Coming Robotic Ships: Gilday on Navy’s Unmanned Task Force,” Breaking Defense, February 17, 2022. See also, Megan Eckstein, “Unmanned or Minimally Manned Vessels Could Deploy Alongside Strike Groups as Soon as 2027,” Defense News, February 17, 2022.

Featured Image: A T38 Devil Ray unmanned system. (Photo via Dave Meron)