Category Archives: Drones/Unmanned

The Role of Airborne Early Warning & Control Platforms in One-Way-Attack Drone Defense

By Olli Pekka Suorsa

The most recent conflict in the Middle East highlighted the growing significance of one-way attack drones (OWAD) in contemporary conflicts. The scale and affordability of large OWAD attacks—or mixed drone and missile offensives—posed a significant defensive problem to the United States, its partners in the Gulf, and Israel. This article draws on observations from the Iran War and highlights the role of airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) platforms as critical enablers in OWAD defense. It also identifies lessons for the United States and allied forces in the Pacific.

Observations From the Iran War

Operation Epic Fury, the 2026 U.S. air campaign against Iran, and subsequent periodic exchanges of attacks served as a master class in using overwhelming air power and delivering precise mass effects. However, despite the incredible tempo of American and Israeli air strikes against military forces and critical infrastructure, Iran has retained residual capability to retaliate against U.S. forces around the Arabian Gulf and in Jordan, and against Israel by launching waves of Shahed-136 one-way-attack drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.¹

Iran has effectively denied the U.S. military its sanctuaries in the region, putting U.S. forward-deployed forces at significant risk. In Iran’s campaign to blind U.S. forces and degrade air and missile defenses’ early-warning capacity, Iranian missiles and drones have targeted and successfully damaged or destroyed many key ground-based early-warning radars.² In the first step, Iran struck the powerful AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar. It then targeted U.S. partners’ anti-ballistic missile defense radars, focusing on the AN/TPY-2 early-warning and tracking radar, associated with the THAAD system. Especially pivotal was the Iranian mixed missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on March 27, which led to the destruction of a high-value U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft.³

Critically, Iranian OWAD and ballistic missile attacks have managed to overwhelm Israeli and U.S. ground-based air defenses on multiple occasions, leading to damage or destruction of hundreds of military facilities and dozens of aircraft.4 After repeated Iranian attacks against U.S. military bastions in Qatar, the U.A.E., Bahrain, and Jordan, U.S. regional allies have been forced to re-evaluate their basic assumptions regarding the American ability to protect these bastions and the long-held belief that U.S. and coalition forces can continue to operate from safe sanctuaries.5 The success of Iran’s strikes should serve as an important wake-up call to U.S. and allied forces worldwide.

Despite the Department of War’s claim on March 5th that it had successfully reduced the number of drones launched by 83% since the first day of the conflict, OWAD launches continued at a steady pace, albeit at significantly reduced intensity.6 Iran launched an estimated 4,400 Shahed-family OWADs against Israel and U.S. military installations in the region between February 28th and early April.7 The U.A.E. alone was targeted with 2,210 OWAD during the period.8

One-Way-Attack Drones are Integral to Contemporary Conflict

One-way-attack drones are not unique to the Iran conflict but have become an essential element of modern warfare. Both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the utility of low-cost, long-range mass precision fires by launching 6,000-8,000 OWADs per month and maintaining near-constant pressure on the adversary’s critical military and civilian infrastructure and political will.9 In June, Ukraine launched a staggering 11,500 OWADs.10 Daily attacks have in some cases included approximately 1,000 OWADs, with concentrated salvos containing between 200 and 300 drones.11 In May, during a single 24-hour period, Russia targeted Ukraine with almost 1,500 OWADs.12

Studies show that Russia can build up to 3,000 jet-powered Geran OWADs per month and aims to increase the capacity further to sustain the high tempo and scale of attacks.13 Iran was estimated to have built a stockpile of approximately 10,000 Shahed-type OWADs before the war, with capacity to produce more than 10,000 drones per month.14

These observations underscore the advantage of the offense over defense, largely thanks to long-range mass precision fires in the form of affordable OWAD. The U.S. military and its allies will have to seriously consider the survivability of their bases and other installations, critical civilian infrastructure, early-warning architecture, and other key capabilities. All of these can be subjected to sustained grinding air assault with aim to impose unfavorable cost-asymmetries for the defense, deplete adversary’s limited interceptor stocks, and overwhelm defenses.

To defend against Iranian Shahed OWADs, Israel, the U.S., and the Gulf countries employed whatever ground-based air defense systems (GBAD) were available, ranging from the high-end Patriot systems to air defense artillery, and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, what has received less attention has been the critical enablers in the theater, including the various airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft like the U.S. Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye II, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail, and the U.A.E. Air Force’s Saab GlobalEye.

The emergence of small drones caused headaches for ground-based surveillance and engagement radars due to drones’ relatively small radar cross-section and low and slow flight trajectory.15 Terrestrial radars struggle to pick up OWAD attacks against dense clutter backgrounds like hills, buildings, wind farms, telecommunications masts, or moving objects like cars.16 An OWAD can appear an awful lot like a flock of birds on a radar screen.

The Value of Bringing Airborne Sensors to the Fight

These challenges can be largely ameliorated by raising the radar into the air. An airborne radar that looks down to search for targets uses the well-known physics principle of doppler shift.17 In simple terms, doppler shift measures relative motion. For the purposes of a look-down radar, doppler-shift picks out objects in motion with relative velocity greater than the non-moving background. Modern radars employ advanced frequency and waveform modulation along with filters to accurately pick out targets of interest, even in high-clutter environments.

The U.S. Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye II, which operated from the three aircraft carriers in the theater of operations during Operation Epic Fury, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), was among the most capable AEW&C assets in the region.18 With at least 15 Hawkeye IIs deployed on the three carriers, the type overshadowed the USAF’s fleet of six geriatric E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft deployed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.19 The brunt of the joint force’s airborne battle management fell on the E-2D fleet’s shoulders. Operating from moving carriers became an advantage in the face of Iranian missile and drone attacks against high-value aircraft like AWACS at large air bases.

These platforms greatly assisted in creating a unified air picture and providing early warning against incoming OWADs and cruise missile assaults.20 They also provided air battle management in the congested airspace as large numbers cycled towards Iran and back across the Gulf.

The E-2D is also a true force multiplier in the Counter-OWAD role. This “new” mission is essentially a form of defensive counter-air, a role that is at the very center of any AEW&C aircraft’s purpose. The Advanced Hawkeye is built around the powerful AN/APY-9 UHF-band active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.21 The E-2D can monitor large swaths of airspace, from the stratosphere to the surface, detecting fast-movers like combat aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and slow-moving helicopters and terrain-hugging cruise missiles.

The pulse-doppler radar is optimized to detect many low-observable, slow, and low-flying objects like OWAD in high-clutter environments. It allows for near-simultaneous tracking of thousands of targets, including low-altitude sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles.22 Moreover, the E-2D is a critical node in the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability network, which enables seamless dissemination of target information with surface vessels and aircraft in the same network. In this role, the E-2D acts as a crucial air battle management center, providing early warning of incoming attacks, coordinating offensive and defensive counter air packages, and threat interception, while helping to deconflict different parties.

Designed to pick out terrain- or wave-top-hugging cruise missiles against ground or sea clutter, modern Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars can also detect low- and slow-flying OWAD at a significant distance beyond what would be possible with a similar terrestrial system.23 Airborne radar can look down into valleys and past hilltops, and other terrain, reducing the effectiveness of terrain-masking, or the use of natural or man-made terrain features to conceal a weapon’s ingress towards a target.

A jet-propelled OWAD resembles a small cruise missile on a radar screen. As Russia and Iran transition away from the older piston-engined Shahed-136 and Geran-2-family OWADs and increasingly employ the faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5, radars’ task of distinguishing a jet-powered OWAD from cars or birds will become substantially easier.24 This could make Counter-OWAD a little more manageable.

Operationally, Russia has adopted medium-altitude (3-6 km) ingress towards targets to avoid, in some places, diverse and dense very-short and short-range ground-based air defense systems.25  This fact again simplifies threat detection and identification for both the terrestrial and airborne radars to pick them up at a greater range.

Implications for the Pacific Theater

Applying observations of E-2D performance in the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific theater poses its own challenges. Unlike in the Middle East, where AEW&C aircraft could operate in a permissive environment, facing little to no threat from Iranian combat air or long-range air defenses, China’s air power poses an entirely different level of threat to the platform’s survivability.

The PLA Rocket Forces possess unparallelled and highly advanced ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that can hold any U.S. or allied military base at considerable risk throughout the first and second island chains.26 In addition, by virtue of its sheer industrial output and control of critical component supply chains, China could rapidly scale production of OWADs to unprecedented levels.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates by far the largest air force in the Asia-Pacific, second overall only to the U.S. Air Force in terms of its actual combat aircraft fleet.27 The PLAAF has become a modern and highly capable force with a rapidly growing number of low-observable fighters, very long-range air-to-air missiles, and supporting electronic warfare aircraft. Operating within the first island chain, the PLAAF poses a significant threat to the U.S. and allied air assets.

High value AEW&C platforms are especially vulnerable and the PLAAF would likely attempt to ambush these aircraft in the air or destroy them on the ground.28 The PLAAF could use long-range, low-observable platforms like the J-20A and advanced long-range air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-15, PL-16 or the extreme long-range PL-17 to shoot down American and allied AEW&C aircraft.29 Due to the sheer velocity and range performance of these missiles, it is very difficult for the slower AEW&C aircraft to evade and escape.

Nevertheless, conflicts in Europe and the Middle East show that an effective early-warning system and a layered sensor and interceptor network are critical to successful defense against the OWAD threat. Ground-based radars alone do not provide sufficient early warning, leaving a limited time window for threat interception. This is especially true in the Pacific where local terrain is often characterized by dense urban environments or mountains, further reducing terrestrial radar’s detection range. Moreover, ground-based radars are often static and would be vulnerable to Chinese air and missile attacks at the outset of a conflict in the Pacific.

Airborne radar offers a more survivable and flexible platform for the role. AEW&C assets provide early warning over distances and terrains that inhibit ground-based radars. Moreover, airborne counter-OWAD creates important defense-in-depth, allowing combat aircraft to engage and thin out incoming drone salvos well before they reach ground-based point defense systems.30

In addition, the aircraft’s air battle management role is central to the Counter-OWAD mission. AEW&C platforms help coordinate among air, ground, and surface air defense assets, and direct those capabilities to intercept incoming threats. The advantage of employing a flying air battle management asset over surface-based alternatives is its ability to act as an effective C2 relay platform, especially in dense electronic jamming environments in the Pacific theater.

China’s offensive counter-air and surface attack doctrine calls for a concentrated use of stand-off jamming, which could significantly degrade ground- and surface-based radars’ ability to detect and track oncoming OWADs.31 AEW&C can provide early warning and disseminate target information to ground-based and surface units, reducing the impact of stand-off jamming.

In the Pacific, the threat of Chinese missiles and drones to air bases in the first island chain is significant. The conflict in the Middle East has clearly demonstrated the difficulty of defeating large-scale mixed missile and drone salvos, even with the help of advanced American or Israeli missile and air defense systems. Moreover, AEW&C and aerial refueling aircraft become lucrative high-impact targets.

To improve the survivability of AEW&C assets in the First Island Chain, the USAF’s concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) or effective dispersion of aircraft from a few large air bases to a larger number of smaller operating locations, could help reduce the risk.32 Moreover, thanks to its short takeoff and landing capability, the USN and Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces’ E-2D aircraft can operate from shorter runways, utilizing smaller local airports, and increasing the number of potential operating locations substantially.33 This may ultimately make them more useful than AEW&C platforms such as the E-7 Wedgetail and Saab GlobalEye, even though these larger aircraft may be more survivable due to their higher operating altitudes and longer endurance.

Importantly, for the counter-OWAD role, AEW&C assets should be primarily bound to land bases. The flexibility to use a more diverse set of operating locations on land increases the type’s survivability, cuts the transit time to operating areas, and reduces the burden on aerial refueling aircraft. For example, Japanese E-2s and reserve, non-carrier air wing-attached USN Hawkeyes could operate out of numerous outlaying islands and smaller local airfields using the ACE principles.

Future Considerations

To improve detection of OWAD-type targets, the U.S. and allied air forces should invest in upgraded or new airborne radars that utilize GaN (Gallium Nitride) semiconductor technology. The GaN allows much higher power per transmit-receive module (TRM) and per element than what is possible with legacy radars employing Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) technology.34 With very high-power output, GaN offers a significant increase in radar efficiency, range, and resolution. The increase in power output and greater frequency and waveform flexibility help GaN radars to detect low-observable targets and targets against ground clutter more easily and at a greater distance, with significant impact on OWAD defense.

Human-machine teaming integrating crewed and uncrewed AEW platforms could futher improve AEW&C platform survivability in the heavily contested Asia-Pacific theater. Uncrewed AEW aircraft like the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation WZ-9 Divine Eagle or the GA-ASI MQ-9B Loyal Eye can loiter for 25-35 hours, offering three to four times longer time-on-station than their crewed counterparts.35 Albeit expensive, a loss of an uncrewed platform is acceptable compared to the risk of losing an aircraft with personnel onboard.

Future crewed-uncrewed teaming (CUC-T) solutions combining E-2D or similar platforms with several uncrewed AEW aircraft will enable a whole new airborne surveillance and air battle management doctrine.  In this case, the legacy AEW platform would act as a command and control (the ‘C’ in the AEW&C) hub that assigns patrol areas for uncrewed AEW aircraft and fuses a unified air picture from these different sources, which can then be disseminated to all users. The CUC-T would create a more persistent AEW system, significantly increasing the area of airspace monitored at any given time while keeping the crewed platform at a safe distance from potential threats.36

Operation Epic Fury clearly demonstrated the importance of airborne radar in extending the range at which incoming OWAD salvos can be detected, especially at lower altitudes. Airborne radars provide the necessary early warning and intercept coordination for fighters and GBAD systems to respond to the threat. These observations apply to the Asia-Pacific theater as well, where the U.S. and allies could face similar threats at larger scale thanks to China’s unrivaled manufacturing capacity.  AEW&C assets like the E-2D offer a critical capability for the warfighter with the ability to operate from smaller and more austere airfields found in the many islands and local airports of the Pacific theater, increasing their survivability while enabling the fight inside China’s menacing missile and drone threat rings.

Olli Pekka Suorsa is a YCAPS Senior Research Fellow for Air Power and an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates. Before his academic career, Olli worked in defense and aerospace industry in Finland.

References

1. Sabbagh, D. “Iran proves it can still inflict damage despite waves of US attacks”, The Guardian, 17 July 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/17/iran-inflict-damage-us-attacks. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

2. Marzbanmehr, A. “Blinding US Eyes in the Middle East”, Al Jazeera, 10 March 2026. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/blinding-us-eyes-middle-east. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

3. Gordon, C., & Losey, S. “Key E-3 AWACS damaged in Iranian attacks on Saudi air base”, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 28 March 2026. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/key-e-3-awacs-aircraft-damaged-iranian-attack-saudi-air-base/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

4. Glenn, M. “Iran hit hundreds of buildings, dozens of aircraft as war drains U.S. munitions, IG says”, Washington Times, 15 September 2026. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/sep/15/iran-hit-hundreds-buildings-dozens-aircraft-mideast-war-drains-us/?srsltid=AU7gw4WBZbdAljhmndoYlH_WDnD08vQmnS1QP1R2nkxJQqjYBIV2qvZH. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

5. Kwon, B., R. “When refusal doesn’t matter: Operation Epic Fury and erosion of host nation consent”, War on the Rocks, 19 May 2026. https://warontherocks.com/when-refusal-doesnt-matter-operation-epic-fury-and-the-erosion-of-host-nation-consent/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

6. Olay, M. “Hegseth says there’s no shortage of American will, resources in Operation Epic Fury”, Pentagon News (U.S. Department of War), 05 March 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4424786/hegseth-says-theres-no-shortage-of-american-will-resources-in-operation-epic-fu/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

7. Nadimi, F. “Iran’s drone strategy (Part 1): Wartime performance and adaptations”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy”, 22 May 2026. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-drone-strategy-part-1-wartime-performance-and-adaptations. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

8. Ibid.

9. Combat Aircraft Journal, “Ukraine’s long-range attack drones analyzed”, November 2026. https://www.key.aero/article/ukraines-long-range-attack-drones-analysed. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

10. Ibid.

11. Gozzi, L. & Lukiv, J. “Russia launched 948 drones at Ukraine in largest attack over 24-hour period”, BBC, 24 March 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz90gpyw90wo. Accessed on November 09, 2026; Anokhin, I. “Monthly analysis of Russian Shahed-136 deployment against Ukraine – Updated”, Institute for Science and International Security, 13 October 2026. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/monthly-analysis-of-russian-shahed-136-deployment-against-ukraine-updated. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

12. Kyiv Post, “Russia hits Ukraine with record 1,400+ drones amid renewed peace push”, 14 May 2026. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/76104. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

13. Thomas, D. “Russia builds 3,000 jet drones monthly to counter Ukrainian interceptors, HUR says”, Euromaidan Press, 12 August 2026. https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/08/12/russia-geran-drones-production/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

14. Grieco, K. “Don’t count launches: Misreading Iran’s drone capacity”, War on the Rocks, 16 March 2026. https://warontherocks.com/dont-count-launches-misreading-irans-drone-capacity/. Accessed on November 09, 2026; Hirtenstein, A., Mills, A., Saul, J. “Iran could disrupt the Strait of Hormuz with drones for months”, Reuters, 04 March 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-could-disrupt-strait-hormuz-with-drones-months-2026-03-04/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

15. Hunter, J. “How drone detection is evolving to counter smaller, faster, and swarm threats”, The War Zone, 03 September 2026. https://www.twz.com/sponsored-content/how-drone-detection-is-evolving-to-counter-smaller-faster-and-swarm-threats. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

16. Rahman, H. Fundamental Principles of Radar, June 2019.

17. Stimson, G., W., Griffiths, H., D., Baker, C., J., and Adamy, D. Stimson’s Introduction to Airborne Radar (3rd Ed.), May 2014.

18. Trevithick, J. & Rogoway, T. “NavyE-2D Hawkeyes appear to be rushing to the Middle East”, The War Zone, 17 March 2026. https://www.twz.com/air/navy-e-2d-hawkeye-radar-planes-appear-to-be-rushing-to-the-middle-east. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

19. Sheers, P. “Iran shows emerging crisis of the US airborne battle management fleet”, Breaking Defense, 30 March 2026. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/03/iran-shows-the-enduring-need-and-emerging-crisis-of-the-us-airborne-battle-management-fleet/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

20. Trevithick, J. & Rogoway, T. 17 March 2026.

21. Lockheed Martin, “AN/APY-9 radar”. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/an-apy-9-radar.html. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

22. Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye”. https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/aircraft/e-2d-advanced-hawkeye. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

23. Stimson, G., W., Griffiths, et al. May 2014.

24. Garman, B. & Murphy, M. “Russia’s new jet powered drones outpacing Ukraine’s air defenses with daily launches”, BBC, 10 September 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c804d9lyj2jo. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

25. Miron, M. & Thornton, R. “Commentary: Russia’s new jet-powered drones mark latest evolution in air war above Ukraine”, Channel News Asia, 03 October 2026. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/russia-ukraine-air-war-drone-6426651. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

26. U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual report to Congress: Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2025”. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

27. Kazianis, H., J. “The 5 biggest air forces on Earth: China wins every other raw count, but America flies nearly a quarter of the world’s military aircraft”, 19Forty Five, 02 July 2026. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/07/the-5-biggest-air-forces-on-earth-china-wins-every-other-raw-count-but-america-flies-nearly-a-quarter-of-the-worlds-military-aircraft/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

28. Rogoway, T. & Trevithick, J. “E-2 Hawkeye replaces USAF E-3 Sentry, E-7 cancelled in new budget”, The War Zone, 11 June 2026. https://www.twz.com/air/e-2-hawkeye-replaces-usaf-e-3-sentry-e-7-cancelled-in-new-budget. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

29. Barrie, D. “Air-launched missiles: A low-observable numbers game”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 24 April 2020. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2020/04/air-launched-missiles-china-plaaf-j-20-fighter/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

30. Suorsa, O., P. “Understanding airborne defence against one-way attack drones”, RSDI Insights, 05 October 2026. https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/understanding-airborne-defence-against-one-way-attack-drones. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

31. Engstrom, J. “Systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare”, RAND Corporation, 01 February 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

32. USAF, “Agile Combat Employment”, AFDN 1-21, 23 August 2022. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

33. Rogoway, T. & Trevithick, J. 11 June 2026.

34. Brown, A., D. Active Electronically Scanned Arrays: Fundamentals and application, Wiley & Sons Inc. November 2021.

35. Trevithick, J. & Rogoway, T. “China’s massive WZ-9 Divine Eagle drone now operating from South China Sea base”, The War Zone, 25 February 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/chinas-massive-wz-9-divine-eagle-drone-emerges-now-operating-from-south-china-sea-air-base. Accessed on November 09, 2026; General Atomics Aeronautical, “GA-ASI completes first flight of MQ-9B with AEW pods”, 21 May 2026. https://www.ga-asi.com/ga-asi-completes-first-flight-of-mq-9b-with-aew-pods. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

36. Osborne, T. “Saab sees demand for GlobalEye-LoyalEye combination”, Aviation Week, 23 August 2026. https://aviationweek.com/defense/sensors-electronic-warfare/saab-sees-demand-globaleye-loyaleye-combination. Accessed on November 09, 2026.

Featured Image: An E-2D Hawkeye, attached to Airborne Command & Control Squadron (VAW) 117, flies over Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

The Arsenal of Autonomy: Why Taiwan Must Learn from Ukraine’s Drone Defense Before It’s Too Late

By Joseph Hanacek and Josh Richards

Building the Airborne Asymmetry

In the predawn hours of June 1, 2025, a revolution in warfighting unfolded across Russia’s western airfields. Nearly 3,000 miles from the Ukrainian frontlines, Kyiv launched Operation Spiderweb, a coordinated strike of hundreds of weaponized drones aimed at five Russian air bases.1 The machines were rudimentary: off-the-shelf frames, improvised explosives, and batteries scavenged from consumer supply chains. But their impact was profound. In a single night, Russia lost more than a third of its nuclear-capable bomber fleet and was forced to reassess its employment of aircraft and air defenses. The cost equation was stunning: a few hundred dollars per drone against losses in the hundreds of millions.2

But beyond economics and impact, the operation revealed something deeper: a new standard of warfare. Airpower is no longer the exclusive preserve of modern combat jets and expensive precision-guided munitions. Cheap, expendable drones can now achieve strategic effects once possible only with state-of-the-art weapons and delivery platforms.3

This lesson is not theoretical for Taiwan. Facing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) overwhelming numerical, technological, and financial superiority, Taipei must ensure that future conflict will not be decided by who has more missiles, aircraft carriers, or advanced fighter squadrons, but rather by who can field, sustain, and adapt vast numbers of unmanned systems. Taiwan has the geography, the talent, and the industrial base to win this race. Whether they can scale up quickly enough is going to depend on how decisively they can pivot to embracing drones as a core element of their national strategy.

Taiwan’s Awakening

Taiwan recognizes the stakes and, notionally, they are heading in the right direction. The government has pledged to procure almost 50,000 drones over the next three years and to scale up to 180,000 units annually by 2028.4 The ambition is bold, but reality lags. Taiwan currently produces only 8,000–10,000 drones annually, far short of its 2028 goal.5 Moreover, there are important distinctions to be made with regards to the type, size and capacity of the drones being built, and the intended roles in which Taiwan plans to employ them. Whether those drones serve predominantly as supporting tools to more conventional weapons, or more directly as weapons themselves, presents a critical question.

Retired General Lee Hsi-ming, former Chief of the General Staff, has been a persistent critic of this imbalance, saying, “We are still spending too much money on conventional projects,” he told Politico. “What Taiwan needs is a large quantity of low-cost attack drones. If you have enough of them, it would be a big headache to China.”6

Legislator Kuan-ting Chen, who heads Taiwan’s Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship Association, has voiced a similar sentiment: “Spending wisely, like Ukraine has done with cheaper drones to counter the first line of attack, is a lesson Taiwan can learn. We are trying to reverse the situation, that they [China] have the quantity we don’t.”7

Both men capture the essence of Taiwan’s dilemma: the island has the technological sophistication and political awareness to recognize the importance of drones, but its defense establishment remains tethered to legacy platforms and procurement habits that undercut speed, scale, and flexibility.

In order to get drone production on track, Taiwan must establish a drone production industry designed around its unique defensive requirements, drawing on hard-learned lessons from the war in Ukraine and strengthened through partnerships with trusted international partners. To succeed, this effort cannot remain a niche initiative—it must be embraced as a pillar of Taiwan’s national strategy and identity, woven into both its defense doctrine and its broader sense of collective resilience.

Why Drones Matter for Taiwan’s Defense

Taiwan lies in the constant shadow of China’s expansionist ambitions. China’s key advantage is in scale. Its navy is the largest in the world, its missile arsenal vast, and its air force is modernizing at speed. Taiwan cannot match the PLA platform for platform, but drones invert the logic of numbers.8

Imagine a PLA amphibious fleet attempting to cross the Strait. Taiwanese sea drones prowl the shallows, striking troop transports. FPV drones dive onto armored vehicles at staging points. Loitering munitions suppress radars, blinding air defenses. Each system is expendable, but together they impose prohibitive costs and slow momentum. Every day gained allows U.S. and allied forces more time to respond.

This is the essence of asymmetric defense: not parity, but denial. Taiwan cannot outbuild the PRC’s navy, but it can make the Strait a drone battlefield, where every ship, runway, and depot is vulnerable to swarming attacks.9

While China is certainly not unaware of the capacity drones have to thwart their military aims, they are potentially quite limited in their ability to negate them. Electromagnetic and Cyber Warfare offer good opportunities to counter drone employment, but those attack vectors can be mitigated by creative system design and operational employment.

And while China is itself capable of fielding enormous numbers of drones, the tyranny of distance and the nature of offensive and amphibious operations work to its disadvantage. To carry a 10-pound payload across the 100+ mile Taiwan strait would generally require a more expensive gas-powered drone of several hundred pounds, and it would be tasked with finding hidden targets while confronted with a fuel constrained timeline and while. exposed to adversary defenses. Meanwhile, a 10-pound payload launched from a hidden position on Taiwan could be carried by a lightweight lithium battery powered drone, and the target it seeks to find will be in the open and likely ill-equipped to target small, agile drones.

Ukraine’s Lessons: The Drone as Ammunition

Ukraine’s experience provides both inspiration and warning. On the positive side, the war has shown that drones can radically shift the battlefield balance. Small FPV drones have struck tanks, artillery, and command posts far behind frontlines.10 Swarms of loitering munitions have overwhelmed air defenses. Civilian “maker” communities have become integral to military innovation, turning hobbyist know-how into combat capability.11

Two observations are critical.

First, losses in Ukraine of UAVs and loitering munitions are high. But so are the returns in terms of disruption. A $200 FPV drone destroyed dozens of times can still deliver asymmetrical impact against expensive infrastructure. Traditional platforms, by contrast, demand high maintenance, long lead times, and are easier to target once their intelligence and flight path are known.

Second, unmanned systems allow for actions in ambiguous zones: surveillance in peacetime or below war-threshold, small strikes, sabotage, counter-aircraft harassment. They erode distance and amplify risk to forward bases, ports, and airfields. For Taiwan, island geography, proximity, and the nature of cross-Strait clashes mean that drones (air, surface, and underwater) promise a force multiplier in deterrence and defense alike.

Electronic warfare has also proven decisive. Russian jamming and GPS spoofing forced Ukraine to innovate rapidly, developing AI-enabled drones capable of navigating and targeting autonomously.12 Taiwan must assume the PLA will employ similar tactics from the outset of any conflict. Its drones must be hardened against interference, with redundant navigation systems, encrypted communications, and fallback autonomy.

Important as well is the demonstrated psychological power of drones. Soldiers under constant drone surveillance, aware that an FPV strike could arrive at any moment, lose morale.13 This effect is asymmetric: a cheap drone imposes not just physical loss, but causes psychological costs far greater than its price tag.

Perhaps most important to Taiwan however, are the lessons Ukraine has revealed about the costs of delay. The staggering loss rates of thousands of drones each month means drones must be treated less like weapons platforms and more like ammunition.14 Stockpiles, not prototypes, win wars. Procurement must resemble shell production, with drones flowing off assembly lines in industrial quantities.

Production Bottlenecks: Supply Chain and Assembly

The manufacturing supply chain is Taiwan’s most pressing vulnerability endangering their required levels of drone production. While the island dominates global semiconductor manufacturing, it is less self-sufficient in the lower-margin but equally vital components. Thermal imaging units, GPS modules, secure communications chips, and high-performance magnets are often imported; some are still assembled in mainland China, undermining Taipei’s policy of “China-free” systems.15

Defense Minister Wellington Koo has promised stricter controls, but when Taiwan finds alternatives from trusted partners, costs rise sharply and export controls from Washington add friction.16 While critical to ensuring quality in higher end drones, those stricter controls create certification bottlenecks. Each drone must be verified as compliant with “China-free” requirements, a process that is expensive and slow.17 The problem is expounded by export controls of the United States and its allies which, though aimed at denying advanced technologies to Beijing, sometimes ensnare Taiwan as well, complicating Taiwan’s efforts to acquire subsystems or export finished drones.18

If Taipei can solve the supply chain headaches, the next bottleneck comes in the form of scaling production from 10,000 to 180,000 annually, which will require a massive industrial mobilization. Taiwan’s drone industry is fragmented among small firms, many innovative but undercapitalized. Companies like Thunder Tiger and GEOSAT produce capable systems. Yet without major investment in automation and workforce training, scaling will be impossible.19 New factories must be built, automation introduced, and a workforce trained at scale. The government has allocated $125 million to seed this effort, but the magnitude of the challenge far exceeds the initial outlay.20

Breaking the Supply Bottleneck: Selectivity and Innovative Partnerships

Getting the right components into the hands of Taiwan’s workers will require narrowing production to the most critical drone types and forging innovative partnerships. The first step in overcoming supply bottlenecks is ensuring that the parts being sourced are those most urgently needed. While Taiwan is currently investing in a wide array of drone systems to prepare for near-term conflict, not all of these platforms will deliver equal value on the battlefield. Larger UAVs with longer flight times and greater payload capacity are helpful in peacetime, during grey-zone operations, and in earliest stages of conflict, but their larger logistical and operating footprints make them unlikely to survive against Chinese air force and rocket force attacks. Meanwhile, FPV drones and other similar smaller platforms that Ukraine has been using to great effect for the past several years are far more survivable and materials to build them can be far more easily resourced.

By focusing on producing innovative FPV and other small and easily dispersible drones, Taiwan can reduce the administrative and logistical challenges currently hampering drone production while also ensuring that their main efforts are spent building the drones that will make the largest difference in a fight and thus carry the highest deterrent value against future conflict.

This focused effort also opens the door to closer partnerships with two critical countries. First, the United States, which is already heavily invested in Taiwan’s security and whose credibility in Asia depends on helping partners defend themselves affordably, not just through the deployment of billion-dollar jets and destroyers.21 The United States, which through its Replicator program is in the process of scaling up its own ability to produce large numbers of a wide variety of drones, should focus on partnering with Taiwan in three areas:

Investment and Co-Production. U.S. firms should invest directly in Taiwanese factories, ensuring secure “China-free” supply chains.

Technology Transfer and Training. Sharing software, swarm algorithms, and secure comms protocols.

Procurement Integration. Allowing Taiwan’s drone makers to access U.S. defense supply chains, driving down unit costs through volume.

These areas each constitute a massive degree of coordination, and to achieve it across the entire spectrum of drone system development is nearly impossible. Partnerships focused on micro drones and other niche drone platforms best suited for the defense of Taiwan presents an opportunity to focus U.S. collaboration on where it is most needed. The process of establishing this relationship will then set the groundwork for future collaboration on larger drones more optimized for gray zone operations.

The next key partnership for Taiwan is with Ukraine. Ukraine’s military has pioneered FPV tactics, swarm operations, and decentralized production under fire. Taiwan, by contrast, brings industrial sophistication and financial resources. Together, they could define the next generation of drone warfare.22

A formal partnership, including joint training, doctrinal exchanges, co-development projects, and establishing redundant common supply chains, would accelerate Taiwan’s learning curve while strengthening its political alignment with Europe’s frontline state.23 Symbolically, it would link two democracies facing existential threats from authoritarian giants. Practically, it would provide Taiwan with battle-tested innovations before they are needed.24

Breaking the Capacity Bottleneck: The Cultural Challenge

Scaling up production requires a whole-of-society approach. Taiwan must mobilize its formidable electronics sector, its universities, its active duty and reserve military forces, and even its maker communities. It must treat drones not as boutique projects for ambitious tech startups, but as national industrial essentials every bit as critical as semiconductors.

The most difficult transformation may not be industrial but cultural. Taiwan’s military establishment remains attached to legacy platforms: frigates, submarines, and fighter jets.25 These are not irrelevant, but they are not survivable in a full-fledged war against China and cannot substitute for drones’ deterrent value.

As General Lee insists, Taiwan must rebalance procurement: a small number of advanced drones, complemented by massed, low-cost strike systems. This will require political courage to redirect budgets, military openness to doctrinal change, and societal engagement to harness private innovation.

Taiwanese Active Duty and Reserve forces should be put to work learning to build, program, deploy, and operate new drone systems. Such employment would pay dividends to ensure not only production targets are met, but also that the military forces are familiar with maintaining and employing their equipment in the event they are called up to use it. It would also help ensure that new weapons being developed are compatible with the way that operational units intended to use them.

Civil society should be mobilized, just as it has been in Ukraine. Taiwan’s universities, tech firms, and maker communities can contribute to prototyping, piloting, cottage industry production, and maintenance. Doing so would embed resilience across society, ensuring that even if factories are struck, innovation and production continue. More importantly, success in scaling up via a whole of society approach would send a clear message to China and the world that Taiwan is willing and able to make the sacrifices necessary to defend their freedom.

Conclusion: The Clock Is Ticking

Operation Spiderweb should haunt Taiwan’s strategic imagination. It demonstrated that cheap, expendable drones can neutralize assets once considered untouchable. For Taipei, the message is urgent: the future battlespace will be saturated by unmanned systems, and deterrence will depend on numbers, resilience, and adaptability.

But ambition without follow-through is a liability. Taiwan must move from speeches and declarations toward mass production, component autonomy, doctrinal change, and tightly integrated partnerships, especially with the United States and with Ukraine.

As Defense Ministry spokesman Sun Li-fang put it: “Responding to the present enemy threat … the defense ministry is speeding up research and development and production of various drones. ”26  The question is whether Taiwan can move fast enough, before it is too late.

Joseph Hanacek is a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He serves as a Warfare Tactics Instructor at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School detachment of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in San Diego, CA. The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or its components.

Josh Richards is the Chief Commercial Officer of Pacific Peering. He serves on UN’s Joint Task Force on SMART Cables as a member of the Steering Committee, and chairs the Business Development Committee. He is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, a Tech Policy Fellow with the Aspen Institute, and a Senior Fellow with AI2030.

References

1. Kateryna Bondar, “How Ukraine’s Operation ‘Spider’s Web’ Redefines Asymmetric Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 202 https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare

2. The War Zone, Thomas Newdick, “What Ukraine’s Unprecedented Drone Attack Means For Russia’s Bomber Force,” June 2, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/what-ukraines-unprecedented-drone-attack-means-for-russian-bomber-force

3. Al Jazeera, “In China’s shadow, Taiwan is building a drone army to repel an invasion,” July 31, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/31/in-chinas-shadow-taiwan-is-building-a-drone-army-to-repel-an-invasion

4. Justin Ling, “Taiwan Is Rushing to Make Its Own Drones Before It’s Too Late,” Wired, June 23, 2025, https://www.wired.com/story/taiwans-rush-to-make-its-own-drones-before-its-too-late/

5. “Drones for Democracy: U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation in Building a Resilient and China-Free UAV Supply Chain,” Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), 2025, https://dset.tw/en/publication-en/36416/

6. Jonathan Eyal and Mark Thompson, interview with Gen. Lee Hsi-ming, Politico, 2025; see also “Taiwan is too slow learning from Ukraine war, ex-top commander says,” Politico Europe, June 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/taiwan-ukraine-china-leehsi-ming-ex-top-commander-says/

7. Kuan-ting Chen, public remarks at Taiwan-Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship events, 2025; coverage in Euronews and local Taiwan press. See: “Why lessons from drone warfare in Ukraine could be key to defending Taiwan against China,” Euronews, June 2025, https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/06/06/why-lessons-from-drone-warfare-in-ukraine-could-be-key-to-defending-taiwan-against-china

8. On sea drones and littoral denial, see: Marcus Weisgerber, “Unmanned Surface Vessels and Littoral Warfare,” Defense One, 2024–25; and RSIS analyses on Taiwan’s littoral approaches.

9. Policy speeches and parliamentary testimony by Kuan-ting Chen, 2025 public record; see local press coverage: Focus Taiwan, Taipei Times.

10. Stijn Mitzer and Jakub Janovsky, “FPV and Loitering Munitions in Ukraine: Tactics and Effects,” The Soufan Center / IntelBrief, June 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-11/

11. Kateryna Bondar, “How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology,” CSIS, January 13, 2025 https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology

12. Colin Demarest, “Electronic Warfare in Ukraine Has Lessons for US Weapons, Navigation,” C4ISRNET, May 6, 2024 https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2024/05/06/electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-has-lessons-for-us-weapons-navigation/

13. The Economist, “The economic lessons from Ukraine’s spectacular drone success,” June 2025. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/06/12/the-economic-lessons-from-ukraines-spectacular-drone-success

14. South China Morning Post, “Treat drones like bullets: Taiwan seeks 50,000 UAVs over two years,” 2025 reporting on procurement plans, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3322406/treat-drones-bullets-taiwan-seeks-50000-new-uavs-over-two-years-boost-defences

15. Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, “Taiwan and U.S. Work to Counter China’s Drone Dominance,” New York Times, September 25, 2024 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/25/world/asia/us-taiwan-drones-china.html

16. Congressional Research Service, “AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress,” June 20, 2023 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R47599.html

17. Soumaya Keynes and Chris Miller, “Transcript: Who Is Winning the Chip Wars? With Chris Miller,” Financial Times, August 26, 2024 https://www.ft.com/content/42bde830-ad35-4b3a-b13b-03390aceee25?syn-25a6b1a6=1

18. Justin Ling, “Taiwan Is Rushing to Make Its Own Drones Before It’s Too Late,” Wired, June 23, 2025 https://www.wired.com/story/taiwans-rush-to-make-its-own-drones-before-its-too-late/

19. Peter Dickinson, “Outgunned Ukraine Bets on Drones as Russian Invasion Enters Third Year,” Atlantic Council, February 21, 2024 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/outgunned-ukraine-bets-on-drones-as-russian-invasion-enters-third-year/

20. DSET, “Drones for Democracy: U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation in Building a Resilient and China-Free UAV Supply Chain,” June 16, 2025 https://dset.tw/en/research/drones-for-democracy-the-strategic-imperative-for-u-s-taiwan-uav-cooperation/

21. James M. Acton, “Optimal Deterrence,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 17, 2025 https://www.cfr.org/reports/optimal-deterrence

22. Congressional Research Service, “AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress,” June 20, 2023 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R47599.html

23. DSET source: “Drones for Democracy,” June 16, 2025 https://dset.tw/en/research/drones-for-democracy-the-strategic-imperative-for-u-s-taiwan-uav-cooperation/

24. Kevin Pollpeter, Tsun-Kai Tsai, and April Herlevi, “Taiwan Lessons Learned from the Russia-Ukraine War,” CNA, November 2024 https://www.cna.org/reports/2024/12/Taiwan-Lessons-Learned-from-the-Russia-Ukraine-War.pdf

25. Budgetary discussions and constraints: Taiwan’s defense budget reporting, Ministry of Finance and MOFA releases, 2024–25.

26. Taiwan to Accelerate Military Drone Development, Taking Into Account Lessons from Ukraine War.” The Japan Times, February 7, 2023 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/02/07/asia-pacific/taiwan-drone-development-ukraine-war/

Featured image: A display at the Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA) in Taichung on 9 June 2026. (Wikimedia Commons)

An Unmanned Hellscape Needs a 21st Century Hephaestus

By Scott Humr

Introduction

To understand the future, it is helpful to consider the past. Greek mythology can offer rich parallels to modern military technologies and concepts. Recent conceptions about the defense of Taiwan from a Chinese invasion through a “hellscape” of unmanned systems harkens to the mythical robot Talos to protect the island of Crete. Talos, a giant bronze robot, was commissioned by Zeus and built by the Greek god of invention and blacksmithing, Hephaestus. This lone Talos robot is said to have marched around Crete thrice daily and hurled boulders at invading enemy vessels.

While a single Talos was able to accomplish such mythical feats, the defense of Taiwan is envisioned to require “tens of thousands” of unmanned robotic systems. However, wishful thinking is not the bridge that will let us cross from myth to reality. Yet, “[w]ishful thinking” are the words of a retired Peoples Liberation Army Navy officer used to describe Admiral Paparo’s strategy for an “unmanned hellscape” if China were to conduct a cross straits invasion of Taiwan. While such an invasion of Taiwan and subsequent armed conflict would likely not benefit China, the fact remains that employing unmanned systems in the quantities envisioned by the United States would require its military to further develop both capacity and know-how to oversee such a complex endeavor.

If an unmanned hellscape is to move from fantasy to credible threat in the eyes of an adversary, the U.S. Navy, as part of the Joint Force, must take concrete steps to address weaknesses in its current conceptualizations of unmanned future warfare. To overcome these obstacles, the U.S. Navy can lead the way by appointing a robotics and autonomous systems czar to interface and invigorate industry, develop forward deployed naval robotics formations, and oversee a deeper investment in the forces needed to operate these systems.

Naval Robotics and Autonomous Systems Czar

The appointment of a naval robotics and autonomous systems czar or Razar [pronounced: “razor”] can provide the authority within a single individual to generate the momentum needed to overcome the challenges to making any vision of a credible robotics force a reality. However, reporting suggests that rising demand for weaponized drones could strain existing U.S. industrial base capacity. Specifically, when it comes to scale, history provides a poignant example of how a leader with a singular focus can move mountains.

With the commencement of hostilities near the end of the 1930s, U.S. leaders concluded that they needed to get the country on a wartime footing by scaling production quickly. The U.S. was able to bring about a massive change at a scale never before seen and not yet repeated up to this point. The appointment of William Knudsen as Chairman of the Office of Production Management with an eventual commission as a Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army helped rapidly expand the defense industrial base by fostering both innovation and production at scale. Along with others such as Henry Kaiser and “Cast-Iron Charlie” Sorensen, Knudsen helped organize and rally the American industrial base like no other in history to achieve unprecedented levels of production needed by the Allied powers, a 20th century Hephaestus. Knudsen’s efforts were only possible because of the authority vested in him by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his own hard-won upbringing for understanding mass production like few others. Arguably, the U.S. Navy can do the same today.

While the U.S. Navy leads the Joint Force in operationalizing autonomous systems, it still needs a Razar to help lead and synchronize its efforts to ensure autonomous systems integrate with other platforms and capabilities. The Razar can lead the service’s efforts to help drive industry and cross-coordinate with the Joint Force for the development of common protocols and common control for autonomous systems technologies. Furthermore, the Razar can be the single office for Fleets and Type commands, who are responsible for readiness, training, and equipping of specific categories of naval capabilities, to interface with for the development of standards, open architecture approaches, testing, and assimilation of autonomous systems across the U.S. Navy. Without a Razar, the likelihood of a plethora of systems taking hold without a single integrator to help coordinate how these platforms will operate within current and projected naval concepts is bleak, particularly in the new age of “precise mass.”

A disjointed effort by the U.S. Navy will result in a greater number of incompatible systems, standards, and communications devices, which squanders precious time and limited resources. Rather, to succeed in this space, the U.S. Navy must appoint a Razar who is trilingual in technology, military operations, and acquisitions and has the authority, interpersonal skills, and enterprise knowledge to not only cut through bureaucratic red tape but is able to build bridges with industry. The Razar can also act as the lead sled dog of the Joint Force for helping implement Senator Roger Wicker’s Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense Act. To this end, the Razar’s efforts should become the Type command for future robotics formations.

Robotics Formations in the Fight

For the U.S. Navy to compete effectively with autonomous systems, robotics formations continuously operating forward should be its bid for success. The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated the utility of dedicated robotics force. While it can make sense to integrate some autonomous systems into existing formations, high-end capabilities will require additional technical acumen, safety considerations, and advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by a dedicated core of personnel. A Razar can oversee the professional development of dedicated units that understand the complexity and nuance needed to employ autonomous systems effectively while ensuring seamless integration into other naval formations.

A dedicated robotics force will require a host of new qualifications, training standards, and readiness considerations. Large scale integration of such systems into current formations would add a tremendous amount of additional requirements on top of an already overburdened sailor’s list of current qualifications. Attempting to maintain additional qualifications for robotics or autonomous systems on top of existing requirements, will result in watered down proficiency, or worse, only a superficial understanding of autonomous systems capabilities. This projection is backed by a recent Government Accountability Office report which found “the Navy does not fill all required ship positions, and that sailors assigned to a ship are sometimes unavailable for duty (for example, temporarily assigned to another ship) or may have inadequate training or preparation for their positions.” Combined with already higher stress levels the force is experiencing, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to make its already overworked sailors do more.

Rather, cohesive units of robotics systems operators who can train and learn together are a superior proposition. When brought in early for planning naval operations, such personnel can provide unmatched expertise to support the operational commander and properly integrate into planning staffs. The Navy’s Robotics Warfare rating is a great start and their continued professionalization as a vital component to the naval service. It is also critical that robotics professionals are prepared to do without the contract support many units have become accustomed to expect in warfare.

Warfare, for the U.S., is an inherently governmental function. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that a bevy of contracted support or field service representatives were necessary to employ a variety of technologies and provide in-country repair services. While the expansive forward operating bases of Iraq and Afghanistan provided a relatively safe area for contractors to operate, future battlefields in and around the First Island Chain will not provide the same level of sanctuary.

Placing robotics formations in the First Island Chain is also necessary for gathering the data necessary to train and improve machine learning algorithms for target recognition and autonomy before conflict erupts. This will allow robotics operators to improve their craft, especially in emissions control conditions where contacting distant support is not only unavailable, but dangerous. Operating forward in competition will allow robotics professionals to continuously perform operational test and evaluation, which is impractical if performed in its traditional manner. For these reasons, forward deploying dedicated robotics formations becomes an imperative to demonstrating a credible robotics force against Chinese aggression, improving autonomous systems tradecraft, while also demonstrating a strong commitment to our allies and partners.

Invest in Humans

The Razar can also act as the lead advocate for the development of robotics personnel, which are anticipated to increase. There are already reports from the war in Ukraine that make clear the necessity and importance of fielding large numbers of drone operators. These operators also provide critical oversight and expertise for employing autonomous systems capabilities to ensure both their legitimate, ethical, and effective use. Naval robotics personnel would provide the necessary legal and ethical oversight of autonomous weapon systems and assurances for helping overcome their complex employment. Because war is fundamentally a human endeavor, having human oversight over autonomous systems are key to demonstrating U.S. commitment to International Humanitarian Law and applying appropriate levels of human judgment required in Department of Defense Directive 3000.09. However, the Navy’s lowering of recruitment standards coupled with an already difficult recruiting environment may prove detrimental for inculcating the technically proficient human capital necessary to sustain such an envisioned robotics force that hellscape requires.

Key for adherence to these and other ethical principles is not only having educated, and well-trained personnel at all levels of command who understand the implications of employing autonomous systems, but professionalized units who specialize in autonomous systems. A key pillar of the Navy’s unmanned campaign framework is the investment in warfighter education. To accomplish this with personnel responsible for leading autonomous systems implementation, the U.S. Navy needs to expand its education at Carnegie Mellon University and the Naval Postgraduate School while furthering opportunities to include other schools for incorporating additional courses on the ethical employment of autonomous systems. Incorporation of more human factors and human-machine interaction training including the use of a detailed case study method will go a long way in developing greater understanding needed for autonomous systems operators and leaders alike. Accordingly, the realization of human-machine teaming with autonomous systems will only come about through a comprehensive appreciation in the development of the human side of the autonomous systems equation. To be sure, complexity does not stop there either.

Robotics and autonomous systems also operate within a system of other complex systems. When such systems are linked together in various kill webs or chains of diverse technologies, complexity increases nonlinearly. The combination and integration of different waveforms, assorted protocols, numerous encryption schemes, and variability of track formats makes complexity rise where mistakes can eventually compound. Robotics operators and their leaders need to become familiar with the myriad challenges associated with technologies within which autonomous systems are integrated. Having highly trained individuals will support easier integration of newer autonomous systems and associated technologies into operational plans. Fittingly, well-trained robotics personnel generate greater rapport for their organizations by establishing trust and confidence to commands and allies they support.

Hellscape’s Holdups?

The appointment of a Razar to oversee all robotics and autonomous systems also has drawbacks. It will centralize a number of aspects that may slow some units down for adopting and integrating autonomous systems in the short term. Moreover, an argument could be made that the U.S. Navy should let a thousand flowers bloom for robotics technologies and promote decentralized innovation. While the appointment of a Razar should not inherently slow down the development of robotics systems and their adoption by other units, a bias toward incorporation at the highest levels is still necessary. Instead, a Razar can take many of the best-of-breed innovations and systems to ensure they support naval forces in a unified way. The Razar can act as the key linkage to other Type or functional commanders in a way lower-level units may struggle to see adopted at scale. Moreover, the Razar is needed to advocate for the significant number of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy considerations to account for future programming of resources to ensure autonomous systems do not become an ephemeral capability.

Another potential drawback is not integrating them at scale within a carrier or expeditionary strike group (C/ESG). While this may be true at a certain level, it cannot be looked at as a shortcoming. Rather, through the use of liaison officers, pre-deployment workup opportunities, and envisioning such units as lethal eyes and ears of the C/ESG, forward deployed autonomous systems placement more than makes up for any apparent non-assimilation. Additionally, paired with forward deployed Marine Corps Stand-In Forces provides a more robust landward component of the Navy that will help keep the door open for the Joint Force, to include allies and partners. Predictably, the Joint Force could one day see the addition of a Combined Force Robotics Component Commander as part of a Joint Task Force in the very near future.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy, and the Joint Force, in general, face an impending crisis for supporting the defense of Taiwan against any number of potential Chinese actions to bring Taiwan under its control. However, the ability to create a hellscape will require a U.S. Navy intimately familiar with the capabilities and limitations of numerous robotics systems. Furthermore, burdening current units with large quantities of autonomous systems is equally unlikely to result in increased lethality and effective integration but instead weaken current capabilities due to the additional training placed on already overtasked personnel. Such an approach is a recipe for disaster and disuse of robotic systems. Instead, the future is professionalized naval units specializing in human-machine integration with the ability to seamlessly incorporate them into any number of naval formations. This will, however, require the U.S. Navy to have standing forces of these teams if it is to truly benefit from these advanced systems.

Unlike Talos, today’s robotic systems require significant human oversight and additional capabilities to orchestrate a credible capability. Yet, in similar fashion to Talos, robotic systems today can suffer from a number of singular flaws. The Razar should oversee mitigations through continuous development, training, and employment that will address these shortcomings. The ichor that powered Talos in Greek mythology is analogous to the data and connectivity necessary to operate a vast network of robotics and autonomous systems to create a hellscape. A ‘Hell-Razar,’ therefore, must address these potential points of failure.

The myth of Talos provides interesting parallels to the protection of an island by a robotic force. To address this future state, the U.S. Navy can lead the way by assigning a Razar to both coordinate better integration while bolstering defense business, develop forward deployed autonomous systems formations, while also expanding and investing heavily in its robotics personnel. This is what is needed to get “more players on the field” quickly to make our adversary’s think twice while also demonstrating a credible and employable capability to the Joint Force, allies, and partners.

Scott Humr, PhD, is an active duty lieutenant colonel in the United States Marine Corps. He currently serves as the deputy director for the Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems office under the Capabilities Development Directorate in Quantico, Virginia.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: A Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) at a Technology Readiness Experimentation event in San Diego in March. (Photo by Johns Hopkins APL/Steve Yeager)

Do USVs Have a Future in Latin American and Caribbean Navies?

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The column discusses regional navies’ challenges, including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) are sailing full steam ahead, as evidenced by their (deadly) efficiency in attacks by the Ukrainian armed forces against Russian targets across the Black Sea. Though the security landscape in Europe is dramatically different from that of the Western Hemisphere, new technologies are always of interest to any armed service and USVs should be no exception. Whether USVs have a future in Latin America and the Caribbean merits deeper exploration.

Recent Developments

It is beyond the scope of this commentary to list or analyze all USV developments, but it is important to note that new platforms continue to be built and utilized worldwide. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has continued to use its deadly Sea Baby USVs. Several governments and industries want to develop USVs to add to their fleets. In the United States, the Navy’s “newest Overlord Unmanned Surface Vessel Vanguard (OUSV3), was recently launched from Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Alabama,” the service reported in January. Also, the Louisiana-based shipyard Metal Shark is developing the USV Prowler and the micro USV Frenzy. As for future platforms, in Europe, the Netherlands announced its first domestic design for a USV to be used by the Dutch Navy. And in Asia, Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and the US software company Palantir Technologies signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 14 April to also co-develop a USV. USV development is flourishing around the globe.

In the Western Hemisphere, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has become a testing ground for USV technology. In late 2023, ten Saildrone Voyager USVs were launched from Naval Air Station Key West’s Mole Pier and Truman Harbor to help improve domain awareness during US Fourth Fleet’s Operation Windward Stack. According to SOUTHCOM, “Windward Stack is part of 4th Fleet’s unmanned integration campaign, which provides the Navy a region to experiment with and operate unmanned systems in a permissive environment … all designed to move the Navy to the hybrid fleet.” The command aims to use its Area of Responsibility (AOR) as an innovation hub for the US military, partners and allies, and the defense industry.

(Sept. 13, 2023) – Commercial operators deploy Saildrone Voyager Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) out to sea in the initial steps of U.S. 4th Fleet’s Operation Windward Stack during a launch from Naval Air Station Key West’s Mole Pier and Truman Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Danette Baso Silvers/Released)

Regarding the late-2023 test, SOUTHCOM’s 2024 Posture Statement explains, “U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet held its Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, hosting 47 Department of Defense Commands, 10 foreign partners, and 18 industry partners to foster innovation and experimentation to inform the Unmanned Campaign and Hybrid Fleet.” This experimentation has included advanced kill chains, contested operations, survivability, and sustainment at sea.

Under General Laura Richardson’s command, SOUTHCOM aims to “integrate tomorrow’s technology into our operations and exercises today” by investing in robotics, cyber technology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to “overmatch our adversaries and assist the region’s democracies.” Expanding SOUTHCOM’s missions to include testing new technologies, including USVs, is another tactic to expand the command’s importance within the US military.

Latin American-made USVs are also on the horizon. In early 2024, the Brazilian shipyard Emgepron announced a partnership with the local start-up Tidewise to manufacture the USV Suppressor. A company press release states that the Suppressor is the first platform developed in the Brazilian or Latin American defense market. Two variants of the Suppressor will be built: the seven-meter Suppress or seven and the 11-meter Suppressor 11. While regional navies have robots for underwater operations like search and rescue, USVs are not yet operated across the region.

A concept image of the Suppressor USV. (Emgepron image)

Do USVs have a future in Latin America and the Caribbean?

While the possibility of inter-state warfare across Latin America and the Caribbean is minimal (Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s belligerent statements notwithstanding), there are several non-combat maritime missions in which USVs could be helpful. Dr. Andrea Resende, professor at Brazil’s University of Belo Horizonte (Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte: UNIBH) and Una Betim University (Centro Universitário Una Betim: UNA), and Christian Ehrlich, director of the Institute for Strategy and Defense Research and a recent graduate from Coventry University with a focus on maritime security, have both made this argument.

Dr. Resende notes that USVs could be used by the Brazilian Navy and other regional navies as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) vehicles to locate suspicious vessels. For example, USVs could locate vessels engaged in the trafficking of illicit narcotics, the famous narco-boats or narco-subs. Moreover, USVs could locate illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels. There is a tendency to think that distant water fishing fleets (DFW) are the primary perpetrators of IUU fishing in the Western Hemisphere, particularly from China. But, in reality, DWF fleets primarily operate in the South Atlantic and South Pacific, while local artisanal fishing vessels work illegally across Latin America and the Caribbean. USVs would help locate smaller IUU fishing vessels, which are more challenging to locate than a vast fleet of hundreds of ships.

In other words, USVs offer over-the-horizon capabilities for regional navies and coast guards to locate different types of vessels. Imagine an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) deploying a helicopter, a rigid inflatable boat, and a USV; quickly becoming a small fleet with vast surveillance and interception capabilities.

Moreover, USVs have practical applications for other non-combat and non-security operations, like search and rescue missions and scientific operations. Ehrlich noted that USVs can also be helpful for offshore infrastructure, “particularly to protect offshore oil platforms.” The platforms can also be used for near-shore operations, like port security.

POV video captured by Saildrone Explorer SD 1045’s onboard camera showing large waves and heavy weather conditions inside Hurricane Sam in the Atlantic Ocean at 1414UTC, Sept 30, 2021.

USVs vs UAVs and UGVs

Will USVs eventually be a component of Latin American and Caribbean fleets? The short answer is yes, but when exactly this will occur is debatable as acquisition programs vary depending on each service and, unsurprisingly, budgetary issues.

A parallel can be made with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have become quite popular with regional militaries. Virtually every service across the region operates UAVs. In May alone, the United States donated six Aerovironment UAV systems to El Salvador’s military for border patrol operations. Meanwhile, the Brazilian UAV company Xmobots announced the training of 21 Brazilian Army personnel to operate the company’s Nauru 100C UAV. There is a clear proliferation of UAVs across Latin America and the Caribbean.

A ScanEagle UAV on display in a launcher, during the 106th anniversary celebration of Naval Aviation, at the Brazilian Navy São Pedro da Aldeia Naval Air Base, Rio de Janeiro, August 26, 2022. (Brazilian Navy photo)

On the other hand, as this analyst wrote in Breaking Defense, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have not found much interest in Latin America. The Brazilian Army is reportedly interested in European-made UGVs; however, UGVs have yet to become popular among Latin American armies compared to the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.

Will USVs become the next UAV or the next UGV? So far, there are not enough data points for a proper prediction. Emgepron’s Suppressor project suggests that at least one company is willing to test the water, so to speak, to see if there is regional interest. If successful, Emgepron could quickly corner the Brazilian defense market with its homegrown USV.

In his comments to CIMSEC, Ehrlich brought up an important issue: long-term vision. For the maritime security expert, “the culture of regional navies” is the major obstacle to acquiring (or attempting to develop locally) USVs. Regional ministries of defense and navies continue to be focused on “operating traditional systems due to a doctrine that does not foment innovation.” Ehrlich mentioned that only the Brazilian Navy is interested in acquiring or developing USVs, including for potential combat missions.

Meanwhile, Dr. Resende explained that a critical factor is the budget of regional armed forces, which tend to suffer “cyclical crises” for various reasons. “Hence, the budgets for investing in the acquisition and training to utilize USVs may be limited.” Moreover, for Dr. Resende, the future of USV technology is part of a broader discussion of the present and future missions of armed forces since they face “greater restrictions as compared to the armed forces in the Global North.”

Ehrlich’s comments about vision and institutional ambition to develop new capacities are a useful lens for gauging these developments. Unsurprisingly, a Brazilian company, Emgepron, is the first in the region to attempt to develop a USV, given the Brazilian Navy’s strong interest in developing the defense industry. Several other South American shipyards are engaged in ambitious projects, including constructing frigates, offshore patrol vessels, transport vessels, and even an icebreaker; however, the Brazilian defense industry still leads the way. Perhaps if the Brazilian Navy positively reviews the Suppressor USV, other regional navies may also be interested in acquiring it.

Finally, there are obvious physical and technical requirements for a ship to transport and operate a USV, which means some basic adaptations will be needed for any ship to utilize this new technology. Navies with older vessels or a surface fleet composed of small vessels will be less likely to acquire USVs, though they could be utilized for port security and other near-shore operations, so they do not have to voyage far from a naval base.

As the war in Ukraine continues, a revolution regarding military technology is underway, and the word “Unmanned” has become very popular. Latin American and Caribbean militaries have quickly adopted UAV technology; however, UGVs have yet to be widely utilized. Likewise, regional naval forces have yet to show major interest in unmanned surface vessels beyond Brazil, and budgetary, doctrinal & technical issues are still obstacles to greater adoption. While USVs could help Latin American and Caribbean naval forces achieve their missions, not all services are in a position to acquire them. More research is necessary to understand which navies, and ministries of defense, have the long-term vision and interest in this technology. In Latin America and the Caribbean, USVs are on the horizon, but they are not yet ready to dock.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: RNMB Harrier USV. (Royal Navy photo)