By Olli Pekka Suorsa
The most recent conflict in the Middle East highlighted the growing significance of one-way attack drones (OWAD) in contemporary conflicts. The scale and affordability of large OWAD attacks—or mixed drone and missile offensives—posed a significant defensive problem to the United States, its partners in the Gulf, and Israel. This article draws on observations from the Iran War and highlights the role of airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) platforms as critical enablers in OWAD defense. It also identifies lessons for the United States and allied forces in the Pacific.
Observations From the Iran War
Operation Epic Fury, the 2026 U.S. air campaign against Iran, and subsequent periodic exchanges of attacks served as a master class in using overwhelming air power and delivering precise mass effects. However, despite the incredible tempo of American and Israeli air strikes against military forces and critical infrastructure, Iran has retained residual capability to retaliate against U.S. forces around the Arabian Gulf and in Jordan, and against Israel by launching waves of Shahed-136 one-way-attack drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.¹
Iran has effectively denied the U.S. military its sanctuaries in the region, putting U.S. forward-deployed forces at significant risk. In Iran’s campaign to blind U.S. forces and degrade air and missile defenses’ early-warning capacity, Iranian missiles and drones have targeted and successfully damaged or destroyed many key ground-based early-warning radars.² In the first step, Iran struck the powerful AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar. It then targeted U.S. partners’ anti-ballistic missile defense radars, focusing on the AN/TPY-2 early-warning and tracking radar, associated with the THAAD system. Especially pivotal was the Iranian mixed missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on March 27, which led to the destruction of a high-value U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft.³
Critically, Iranian OWAD and ballistic missile attacks have managed to overwhelm Israeli and U.S. ground-based air defenses on multiple occasions, leading to damage or destruction of hundreds of military facilities and dozens of aircraft.4 After repeated Iranian attacks against U.S. military bastions in Qatar, the U.A.E., Bahrain, and Jordan, U.S. regional allies have been forced to re-evaluate their basic assumptions regarding the American ability to protect these bastions and the long-held belief that U.S. and coalition forces can continue to operate from safe sanctuaries.5 The success of Iran’s strikes should serve as an important wake-up call to U.S. and allied forces worldwide.
Despite the Department of War’s claim on March 5th that it had successfully reduced the number of drones launched by 83% since the first day of the conflict, OWAD launches continued at a steady pace, albeit at significantly reduced intensity.6 Iran launched an estimated 4,400 Shahed-family OWADs against Israel and U.S. military installations in the region between February 28th and early April.7 The U.A.E. alone was targeted with 2,210 OWAD during the period.8
One-Way-Attack Drones are Integral to Contemporary Conflict
One-way-attack drones are not unique to the Iran conflict but have become an essential element of modern warfare. Both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the utility of low-cost, long-range mass precision fires by launching 6,000-8,000 OWADs per month and maintaining near-constant pressure on the adversary’s critical military and civilian infrastructure and political will.9 In June, Ukraine launched a staggering 11,500 OWADs.10 Daily attacks have in some cases included approximately 1,000 OWADs, with concentrated salvos containing between 200 and 300 drones.11 In May, during a single 24-hour period, Russia targeted Ukraine with almost 1,500 OWADs.12
Studies show that Russia can build up to 3,000 jet-powered Geran OWADs per month and aims to increase the capacity further to sustain the high tempo and scale of attacks.13 Iran was estimated to have built a stockpile of approximately 10,000 Shahed-type OWADs before the war, with capacity to produce more than 10,000 drones per month.14
These observations underscore the advantage of the offense over defense, largely thanks to long-range mass precision fires in the form of affordable OWAD. The U.S. military and its allies will have to seriously consider the survivability of their bases and other installations, critical civilian infrastructure, early-warning architecture, and other key capabilities. All of these can be subjected to sustained grinding air assault with aim to impose unfavorable cost-asymmetries for the defense, deplete adversary’s limited interceptor stocks, and overwhelm defenses.
To defend against Iranian Shahed OWADs, Israel, the U.S., and the Gulf countries employed whatever ground-based air defense systems (GBAD) were available, ranging from the high-end Patriot systems to air defense artillery, and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, what has received less attention has been the critical enablers in the theater, including the various airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft like the U.S. Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye II, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail, and the U.A.E. Air Force’s Saab GlobalEye.
The emergence of small drones caused headaches for ground-based surveillance and engagement radars due to drones’ relatively small radar cross-section and low and slow flight trajectory.15 Terrestrial radars struggle to pick up OWAD attacks against dense clutter backgrounds like hills, buildings, wind farms, telecommunications masts, or moving objects like cars.16 An OWAD can appear an awful lot like a flock of birds on a radar screen.
The Value of Bringing Airborne Sensors to the Fight
These challenges can be largely ameliorated by raising the radar into the air. An airborne radar that looks down to search for targets uses the well-known physics principle of doppler shift.17 In simple terms, doppler shift measures relative motion. For the purposes of a look-down radar, doppler-shift picks out objects in motion with relative velocity greater than the non-moving background. Modern radars employ advanced frequency and waveform modulation along with filters to accurately pick out targets of interest, even in high-clutter environments.
The U.S. Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye II, which operated from the three aircraft carriers in the theater of operations during Operation Epic Fury, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), was among the most capable AEW&C assets in the region.18 With at least 15 Hawkeye IIs deployed on the three carriers, the type overshadowed the USAF’s fleet of six geriatric E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft deployed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.19 The brunt of the joint force’s airborne battle management fell on the E-2D fleet’s shoulders. Operating from moving carriers became an advantage in the face of Iranian missile and drone attacks against high-value aircraft like AWACS at large air bases.
These platforms greatly assisted in creating a unified air picture and providing early warning against incoming OWADs and cruise missile assaults.20 They also provided air battle management in the congested airspace as large numbers cycled towards Iran and back across the Gulf.
The E-2D is also a true force multiplier in the Counter-OWAD role. This “new” mission is essentially a form of defensive counter-air, a role that is at the very center of any AEW&C aircraft’s purpose. The Advanced Hawkeye is built around the powerful AN/APY-9 UHF-band active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.21 The E-2D can monitor large swaths of airspace, from the stratosphere to the surface, detecting fast-movers like combat aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and slow-moving helicopters and terrain-hugging cruise missiles.
The pulse-doppler radar is optimized to detect many low-observable, slow, and low-flying objects like OWAD in high-clutter environments. It allows for near-simultaneous tracking of thousands of targets, including low-altitude sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles.22 Moreover, the E-2D is a critical node in the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability network, which enables seamless dissemination of target information with surface vessels and aircraft in the same network. In this role, the E-2D acts as a crucial air battle management center, providing early warning of incoming attacks, coordinating offensive and defensive counter air packages, and threat interception, while helping to deconflict different parties.
Designed to pick out terrain- or wave-top-hugging cruise missiles against ground or sea clutter, modern Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars can also detect low- and slow-flying OWAD at a significant distance beyond what would be possible with a similar terrestrial system.23 Airborne radar can look down into valleys and past hilltops, and other terrain, reducing the effectiveness of terrain-masking, or the use of natural or man-made terrain features to conceal a weapon’s ingress towards a target.
A jet-propelled OWAD resembles a small cruise missile on a radar screen. As Russia and Iran transition away from the older piston-engined Shahed-136 and Geran-2-family OWADs and increasingly employ the faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5, radars’ task of distinguishing a jet-powered OWAD from cars or birds will become substantially easier.24 This could make Counter-OWAD a little more manageable.
Operationally, Russia has adopted medium-altitude (3-6 km) ingress towards targets to avoid, in some places, diverse and dense very-short and short-range ground-based air defense systems.25 This fact again simplifies threat detection and identification for both the terrestrial and airborne radars to pick them up at a greater range.
Implications for the Pacific Theater
Applying observations of E-2D performance in the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific theater poses its own challenges. Unlike in the Middle East, where AEW&C aircraft could operate in a permissive environment, facing little to no threat from Iranian combat air or long-range air defenses, China’s air power poses an entirely different level of threat to the platform’s survivability.
The PLA Rocket Forces possess unparallelled and highly advanced ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that can hold any U.S. or allied military base at considerable risk throughout the first and second island chains.26 In addition, by virtue of its sheer industrial output and control of critical component supply chains, China could rapidly scale production of OWADs to unprecedented levels.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates by far the largest air force in the Asia-Pacific, second overall only to the U.S. Air Force in terms of its actual combat aircraft fleet.27 The PLAAF has become a modern and highly capable force with a rapidly growing number of low-observable fighters, very long-range air-to-air missiles, and supporting electronic warfare aircraft. Operating within the first island chain, the PLAAF poses a significant threat to the U.S. and allied air assets.
High value AEW&C platforms are especially vulnerable and the PLAAF would likely attempt to ambush these aircraft in the air or destroy them on the ground.28 The PLAAF could use long-range, low-observable platforms like the J-20A and advanced long-range air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-15, PL-16 or the extreme long-range PL-17 to shoot down American and allied AEW&C aircraft.29 Due to the sheer velocity and range performance of these missiles, it is very difficult for the slower AEW&C aircraft to evade and escape.
Nevertheless, conflicts in Europe and the Middle East show that an effective early-warning system and a layered sensor and interceptor network are critical to successful defense against the OWAD threat. Ground-based radars alone do not provide sufficient early warning, leaving a limited time window for threat interception. This is especially true in the Pacific where local terrain is often characterized by dense urban environments or mountains, further reducing terrestrial radar’s detection range. Moreover, ground-based radars are often static and would be vulnerable to Chinese air and missile attacks at the outset of a conflict in the Pacific.
Airborne radar offers a more survivable and flexible platform for the role. AEW&C assets provide early warning over distances and terrains that inhibit ground-based radars. Moreover, airborne counter-OWAD creates important defense-in-depth, allowing combat aircraft to engage and thin out incoming drone salvos well before they reach ground-based point defense systems.30
In addition, the aircraft’s air battle management role is central to the Counter-OWAD mission. AEW&C platforms help coordinate among air, ground, and surface air defense assets, and direct those capabilities to intercept incoming threats. The advantage of employing a flying air battle management asset over surface-based alternatives is its ability to act as an effective C2 relay platform, especially in dense electronic jamming environments in the Pacific theater.
China’s offensive counter-air and surface attack doctrine calls for a concentrated use of stand-off jamming, which could significantly degrade ground- and surface-based radars’ ability to detect and track oncoming OWADs.31 AEW&C can provide early warning and disseminate target information to ground-based and surface units, reducing the impact of stand-off jamming.
In the Pacific, the threat of Chinese missiles and drones to air bases in the first island chain is significant. The conflict in the Middle East has clearly demonstrated the difficulty of defeating large-scale mixed missile and drone salvos, even with the help of advanced American or Israeli missile and air defense systems. Moreover, AEW&C and aerial refueling aircraft become lucrative high-impact targets.
To improve the survivability of AEW&C assets in the First Island Chain, the USAF’s concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) or effective dispersion of aircraft from a few large air bases to a larger number of smaller operating locations, could help reduce the risk.32 Moreover, thanks to its short takeoff and landing capability, the USN and Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces’ E-2D aircraft can operate from shorter runways, utilizing smaller local airports, and increasing the number of potential operating locations substantially.33 This may ultimately make them more useful than AEW&C platforms such as the E-7 Wedgetail and Saab GlobalEye, even though these larger aircraft may be more survivable due to their higher operating altitudes and longer endurance.
Importantly, for the counter-OWAD role, AEW&C assets should be primarily bound to land bases. The flexibility to use a more diverse set of operating locations on land increases the type’s survivability, cuts the transit time to operating areas, and reduces the burden on aerial refueling aircraft. For example, Japanese E-2s and reserve, non-carrier air wing-attached USN Hawkeyes could operate out of numerous outlaying islands and smaller local airfields using the ACE principles.
Future Considerations
To improve detection of OWAD-type targets, the U.S. and allied air forces should invest in upgraded or new airborne radars that utilize GaN (Gallium Nitride) semiconductor technology. The GaN allows much higher power per transmit-receive module (TRM) and per element than what is possible with legacy radars employing Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) technology.34 With very high-power output, GaN offers a significant increase in radar efficiency, range, and resolution. The increase in power output and greater frequency and waveform flexibility help GaN radars to detect low-observable targets and targets against ground clutter more easily and at a greater distance, with significant impact on OWAD defense.
Human-machine teaming integrating crewed and uncrewed AEW platforms could futher improve AEW&C platform survivability in the heavily contested Asia-Pacific theater. Uncrewed AEW aircraft like the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation WZ-9 Divine Eagle or the GA-ASI MQ-9B Loyal Eye can loiter for 25-35 hours, offering three to four times longer time-on-station than their crewed counterparts.35 Albeit expensive, a loss of an uncrewed platform is acceptable compared to the risk of losing an aircraft with personnel onboard.
Future crewed-uncrewed teaming (CUC-T) solutions combining E-2D or similar platforms with several uncrewed AEW aircraft will enable a whole new airborne surveillance and air battle management doctrine. In this case, the legacy AEW platform would act as a command and control (the ‘C’ in the AEW&C) hub that assigns patrol areas for uncrewed AEW aircraft and fuses a unified air picture from these different sources, which can then be disseminated to all users. The CUC-T would create a more persistent AEW system, significantly increasing the area of airspace monitored at any given time while keeping the crewed platform at a safe distance from potential threats.36
Operation Epic Fury clearly demonstrated the importance of airborne radar in extending the range at which incoming OWAD salvos can be detected, especially at lower altitudes. Airborne radars provide the necessary early warning and intercept coordination for fighters and GBAD systems to respond to the threat. These observations apply to the Asia-Pacific theater as well, where the U.S. and allies could face similar threats at larger scale thanks to China’s unrivaled manufacturing capacity. AEW&C assets like the E-2D offer a critical capability for the warfighter with the ability to operate from smaller and more austere airfields found in the many islands and local airports of the Pacific theater, increasing their survivability while enabling the fight inside China’s menacing missile and drone threat rings.
Olli Pekka Suorsa is a YCAPS Senior Research Fellow for Air Power and an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates. Before his academic career, Olli worked in defense and aerospace industry in Finland.
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8. Ibid.
9. Combat Aircraft Journal, “Ukraine’s long-range attack drones analyzed”, November 2026. https://www.key.aero/article/ukraines-long-range-attack-drones-analysed. Accessed on November 09, 2026.
10. Ibid.
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29. Barrie, D. “Air-launched missiles: A low-observable numbers game”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 24 April 2020. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2020/04/air-launched-missiles-china-plaaf-j-20-fighter/. Accessed on November 09, 2026.
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36. Osborne, T. “Saab sees demand for GlobalEye-LoyalEye combination”, Aviation Week, 23 August 2026. https://aviationweek.com/defense/sensors-electronic-warfare/saab-sees-demand-globaleye-loyaleye-combination. Accessed on November 09, 2026.
Featured Image: An E-2D Hawkeye, attached to Airborne Command & Control Squadron (VAW) 117, flies over Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)


