CIMSEC Topic Weeks have always been an excellent way to engage our community of defense and foreign policy professionals and academics to highlight issues that deserve greater attention. CIMSEC’s upcoming topic weeks will be listed well in advance in this post to give our prospective authors more lead time to develop their ideas and contribute superb publications. Expect subsequent announcements at the beginning of each month listing specific dates and deadlines for individual topic weeks.
Note: The schedule has been amended to accommodate the Distributed Lethality topic week in February.
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January: The Littoral Arena
Submissions due by Thursday, January 21. Topic Week runs from Monday, January 25 to Sunday, January 31.
The littorals only constitute around 15 percent of the world’s oceanic expanse, yet 60 percent of the world’s urbanized populations are located within sixty miles of the coast, including 80 percent of the world’s capitals. The U.S. Navy has only recently drawn attention to the littoral domain after decades of emphasizing blue water sea control. What are the unique warfighting challenges posed by the littorals? What capabilities and operating concepts best enable power projection in this complex environment? Can navies optimized for blue water operations effectively translate their experience into the littorals?
Iranian midget submarine.
February: Distributed Lethality
Submissions due by Sunday February 21 Topic Week runs from February 22-February 28.
The Distributed Lethality Task Force partnered with CIMSEC to launch a topic week exploring the concept and outlined various lines of inquiry the task force is interested in pursuing. Distributed Lethality is an initiative launched by Navy leadership to explore the warfighting benefits offered by dispersing surface combatants, employing them in new roles, and adding more firepower across the fleet.
PACIFIC OCEAN (May 23, 2014) The guided-missile destroyers USS Halsey (DDG 97), USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) and USS Gridley (DDG 101) are underway in formation during a strait transit exercise. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)
Time and time again, naval forces have performed admirably as first responders to devastating natural disasters. Naval forces can rapidly maneuver to disaster struck areas and facilitate the transfer of millions of pounds of critical supplies in a matter of weeks. The Asia-Pacific is especially prone, with over half a million lives lost and $500 billion in damages incurred within the last decade due to natural disasters. Can HA/DR operations refine warfighting skills? What are the political challenges and benefits of deploying naval forces in support of humanitarian operations? Could demand for naval aid increase as sea levels risen and climate change progresses?
Hospital ship USS Mercy.
April: Sino-Indo Strategic Rivalry
Much has been made of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific, with the U.S. and China considered the main actors, but India is a powerhouse in the making. India’s rapidly growing economy and modernizing armed forces ensures its relevance in the Asia-Pacific. Prime Minister Modi aligned India with U.S. policy towards South China Sea maritime disputes with a joint statement stating “We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region…” Additionally, the Indian peninsula juts 1000 km into the Indian ocean, providing India’s carrier equipped navy superb positioning to affect sea lines of communication flowing towards the straits of Malacca.How might this strategic rivalry evolve, and is there precedent and potential for conflict?
The Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese PLA, Gen. Ma Xiaotian calls on the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Nirmal Verma, in New Delhi on December 09, 2011.
Authors can send get in touch with the editorial team and send their submissions to Nextwar@cimsec.org. Topic weeks are competitive and not all submissions may be accepted, so we encourage thoroughly researched contributions. CIMSEC topic weeks are our opportunity to make our mark as a community on the big discussions, and we look forward to promoting your insights.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Follow us @CIMSEC.
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The US needs a Cyber Corps as a new Service to successfully meet challenges in the cyber domain, but almost as importantly, to harvest military talent in an innovative manner. And we have a blueprint in front of us.
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The emergence and evolution of “cyberspace” as a warfare domain on par with the air, land, maritime, and space domains presents one of today’s fundamental military challenges – although cyberspace is somewhat awkwardly qualified as being “within the information environment.”[1] A new “front” in the cyberspace operations discussion continues to emerge as defense experts call for a separate cyber force, an idea raised notably by retired Admiral James Stavridis as one of his “heretical propositions on US defense policy[2]” and in recent Congressional testimony. With its own domain, acknowledged adversaries, and a continually increasing impact on warfighting, cyberspace should be the principal operating domain for a separate branch of the US Armed Forces, the US Cyber Corps (USCC).
To maximize the effectiveness of cyberspace operations (to include cyberspace attack and cyberspace counter-attack)[3], a service branch dedicated to and centered upon offensive cyberspace operations would lay the foundation to ensure warfighting success. The obvious historical analogy for the establishment of USCC is the evolution of the US Air Force (USAF), from its beginnings within the US Army to its designation as a service within its own department, including sharing responsibilities in the air domain with the other services. Post-World War II US military operations are difficult to re-imagine without the contributions of a military service primarily focused on the air domain – even if a separate air service seemed incomprehensible to military officers a century ago. However, USCC could have another historical precedent: the Navy-Marine Corps relationship as two services within a single Department. Considering the evolution and broad nature of the cyberspace domain, the Department of the Air Force makes sense as the logical “umbrella” for both the USAF and USCC.
Based on USAF responsibilities in three domains (air, space, and cyberspace) and its core mission of global strike, creating the USCC under the auspice of the Department of the Air Force is a bold and innovative yet natural evolution for the Department. Separating the cyberspace mission from the air and space missions creates an opportunity to fully focus on the unique challenges in cyberspace operations. Placing USCC within the Department of the Air Force capitalizes on USCC-USAF linkages and allows them to share key resources. The Navy-Marine Corps dynamic within the Department of the Navy provides an initial blueprint for the expanded Department of the Air Force.
The principal advantages of establishing USCC as a Service within the Department of the Air Force include:
Fully dedicating a Service’s resources to the cyberspace domain, with a particular emphasis on cyberspace operations as a global strike capability.
Leveraging existing support and relationships with its sister Service in order to maintain existing USAF capabilities and control costs. In addition, the Departments of the Army and Navy would cede some cyberspace responsibilities and associated funding to USCC, offsetting some costs.
Providing a principal Defense Department entity for cyberspace operations to execute and coordinate at the same level as the other Services, particularly with regard to POTUS/SECDEF tasking as well as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
Developing the roles, responsibilities, and authorities required for cyberspace operations, particularly offensive cyberspace operations, in the manner today’s Services do for the other domains.
Creating a new paradigm for accessing, training, educating, retaining, and advancing the talent pool for cyberspace operations.
The new paradigm in personnel management presents perhaps the strongest argument for establishing USCC: providing this new service the latitude to recruit personnel using non-traditional methods and criteria, and then to develop them professionally to be, first and foremost, “cyber operators.” Specific opportunities include:
Capturing talent across the age spectrum by attracting and inducting experienced personnel, not just the 18-25 year old cohort, into the service.
Opening the aperture to include professionals who do not match the typical profile for recruits or officer candidates, including those who may not be world-wide deployable – since USCC would not deploy as other Services do.
Allowing US Air Force Academy graduates to select USAF or USCC as a service assignment and incorporating cyberspace in the Air University curriculum.
Inducting cyberspace/information professionals who have specialized and excelled in those areas within their own Service (inter-service transfers).
Growing true cyberspace professionals who compete for advancement, and thus leadership positions, on a level playing field with peers whose main focus is also the cyberspace domain.
As an alternative to establishing the US Cyber Corps, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) could become more like US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), employing SOCOM’s unique model of Title X responsibilities and authorities mixed with service-supported personnel and acquisition systems.[4] Like SOCOM, CYBERCOM would exercise worldwide responsibilities, plan and execute its special mission sets in coordination with geographic Combatant Commands, and maintain strong roots in each of the Services. However, this enabling option would miss the key opportunity presented in the US Cyber Corps proposal; namely, recruiting, educating, training, and retaining skilled personnel outside the traditional military accession and promotion systems.
PENSACOLA, Fla. (Jan. 25, 2014) Information Systems Technician 1st Class Kyle Gosser, an instructor at the Center for Information Dominance Unit Corry Station, mentors a local high school student participating in the inaugural Cyberthon competition at the National Flight Academy at Naval Air Station Pensacola during the weekend of Jan. 23-25. The Cyberthon competition tests student teams on their abilities to use the computer skills they learned in their classrooms to defend and defeat cyber attacks on websites. (U.S. Navy photo by Ed Barker/Released)
A principal argument against US Cyber Corps is that today’s fiscal environment cannot support additional costs in terms of “bureaucracy.” However, some savings and efficiencies can be certainly be realized by other services divesting some cyberspace responsibilities. Additionally, USCC would need far fewer bases, much less equipment and logistics support, and fewer personnel that its sister services. Training, education, personnel support, and infrastructure can be shared with other services, with much of the support coming from within the Department of the Air Force.
Returning to the historical analogy, the political and fiscal circumstances following World War II also presented a less than ideal time to create a new Armed Service. However, with opportunities and threats in the air domain, the National Security Act of 1947 created the US Air Force – a controversial step at the time that seems inevitable in retrospect. Today’s fiscal circumstances and operational threats echo those post-World War II concerns. Perhaps in 50 years the choice to dedicate a service to the cyberspace domain will also appear to have been self-evident.
In conclusion, despite the importance of cyberspace operations as an operational enabler within and across the other domains, each service correctly focuses its acquisition and professional development efforts on winning the fight in its principal domain. A critical first step towards fully exploiting the potential of cyberspace operations is creating the foundation for a Service to “own” cyberspace as a warfighting domain. The formation of USCC would provide a unique approach, especially with respect to developing a professional cyberwarfare community, to enable the global, continuous reach of cyberspace operations.
Captain Donegan is a career surface warfare officer. A native of Hagerstown, MD, he graduated with merit from the United States Naval Academy in 1992 with a Bachelor of Science in History. He is also a graduate of both the American Military University with a Master of Arts in Military Studies (Naval Warfare) and the Naval War College. The views above are the author’s and do not represent those of the US Navy or the US Department of Defense.
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[2] “Incoming: A Handful of Heretical Thoughts,” Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Signal Magazine, 01 Dec 2015.
[3] Delineation of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations is a fuller topic. This article focuses on the need to establish the foundations for offensive cyberspace operations by creating USCC. Each Service retains responsibilities for cyberspace defense of its systems and platforms (analogous to force protection requirements).
[4]USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Service elements include: Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER); Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). Source: US Cyber Command Fact Sheet(Aug 2013),
Sometimes the best resources are not hidden behind a paywall but are freely made available to researchers. Thanks to the Congressional Research Service’s 114-page reportChanges in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O’Rourke, with a recent version released in September 2015, such is the case for those wishing to understand strategic trends in the Arctic from the perspective of the United States. This is especially timely, as US President Barack Obama touredAlaska from August 31, 2015, becoming the first American president to visit America’s Arctic region. On September 4, just days after President Obama arrived in Alaska and the very same day the CRS released its report, five People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels – three surface combatants, an amphibious landing vessel, and a replenishment ship – entered within twelve miles of the Alaskan coastline.
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The report offers a comprehensive overview of legislation and international agreements concerning the Arctic, as well as the economic opportunities yet to be realized in the Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and elsewhere in the region. Although Shell has since cancelled its plans for offshore drilling in the Chukchi Sea, oil and other commodity prices could at some point in the future return to levels where Arctic resource exploitation becomes profitable once again. Arctic shipping is also becoming viable – that much was made clear when MV Yong Sheng became the first container-transporting vessel to transit from its home port in China along the Northern Sea Route, Russia’s Arctic waterways, to reach Rotterdam, Netherlands in August 2013. It is this increased opportunity for business in the region which presents new challenges for the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Navy (USN).
ARCTIC OCEAN (March 21, 2009) Crewmembers of the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Annapolis (SSN 760) man the bridge watch after breaking through the ice during Ice Exercise (ICEX 2009) in the Arctic Ocean. Annapolis and the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Helena (SSN 725) are participating in ICEX 2009 to operate and train in the challenging and unique environment that characterizes the Arctic region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Tiffini M. Jones/Released)
As the report highlights, eight ships were lost in Arctic Circle waters in 2006. Less than a decade later, in 2014, there were 55 ship casualties in these waters. Thus far, the risk to human life and environmental impact of these accidents have been relatively limited, but it is apparent that US maritime forces currently lack the means to respond quickly and effectively to a serious disaster in the country’s Arctic waterways. The CRS highlights two capability gaps: basing and icebreaking.
Currently, the largest USCG base is located at Kodiak Island, which is on the south coast of Alaska near the Aleutian Range. USCG vessels operating from Base Support Unit Kodiak could respond quickly to an incident along existing shipping lanes near the Bering Sea but would need days or even weeks to reach the site of a ship collision or oil spill in the Chukchi Sea or Beaufort Sea. The US Army Corps of Engineers has been investigating the suitability of other Alaskan communities, specifically Nome or Port Clarence, as possible sites for a deepwater port from which USCG vessels could operate in the future. Located much further north along the Alaskan coast – jutting out into the Bering Strait in fact – either location would significantly cut down USCG response times in the Chukchi Sea. Port Clarence is already home to a small USCG presence: a 4,500 foot long paved runway capable of accommodating search-and-rescue (SAR) aircraft. Until a deepwater port is established within range of the Chukchi Sea, however, the US capacity to exert sovereignty in the Arctic will be severely limited.
The other capability gap identified in the report relates to the USCG’s shrinking fleet of icebreakers. After USCGC Polar Sea suffered an engine casualty in June 2010, the US has only the heavy polar icebreaker USCGC Polar Star and the medium polar icebreaker USCGC Healy at its disposal. Although Polar Star was refurbished and re-entered service in December 2012, this is only expected to extend the vessel’s service life until approximately December 2022. Unless Polar Sea is repaired or the White House significantly steps up efforts to acquire a new heavy polar icebreaker, the USCG could soon find itself unable to reach the US’ northernmost waterways due to sea ice cover. Much as the USCG is currently under-equipped to project American power in the Arctic, the USN also suffers a capability gap. The updatedNavy Arctic Roadmap for 2014-2030, which was release in February 2014, acknowledges that opportunities for Arctic transits will be limited in the near term but commits to obtaining the capability necessary to operate for sustained periods in the Arctic by the 2020’s.
How the USN intends to attain this capability in the mid-term is unclear. In 2002, the Norwegian Coast Guard gained the icebreaking-capable offshore patrol vessel Svalbard, which has ensured a permanent presence for Norway in the Barents Sea and the Arctic waterways surrounding the Svalbard Islands. By spring 2018, the Royal Canadian Navy will begin taking delivery for the first of its new Harry DeWolf-class Arctic offshore patrol ships, a fleet of five to six vessels with some limited icebreaking capabilities and a similarly sustained presence in Canada’s expansive Arctic territory. The USN will presumably need vessels with characteristics closely resembling those of the Harry DeWolf-class and Svalbard-class; ice strengthening ships from the Military Sealift Command (MSC) as proposed in the Arctic Roadmap would very likely be insufficient, especially when China has demonstrated a willingness to engage in freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in American-claimed waters and the Russian Federation is aggressively expanding its already impressive icebreaking capabilities.
The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), which was established in October 2015, will ensure some level of security for Arctic shipping and may even go toward reducing tensions in the region. Canada, which chaired the Arctic Council from 2013 until April 2015, endeavoured to establish just such a forum for exchange among the coast guards of the Arctic Council’s eight member states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the US) but was unable to bring the Russians to the negotiating table. The US, which will chair the Arctic Council until April 2017, is clearly willing to assemble a toolbox of so-called ‘confidence and security-building measures’ (CSBM’s) to ensure any future disputes in the Arctic are resolved peacefully. With the conclusion of an Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement (ASARA) in 2011, which clarifies which states have responsibility for SAR operations in certain Arctic waterways, there is clearly a growing interest in cooperatively policing Arctic waterways.
As outlined here, the CRS report is a valuable resource for those wishing to gain a strong basis of understanding with regards to the Arctic. Readers are fortunate, then, that an updated edition of the report continues to be released almost quarterly.
Paul Pryce is a Senior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada and a Board Member at the Far North Association. He is also a long-time member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).
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This post originally featured on The Diplomat and was republished with permission. You may read it in its original form here.
By Col Michael W. “Starbaby” Pietrucha
Last year, the Air Force achieved a little-noticed aviation milestone: the first-ever drop of a winged, precision guided aerial mine. Almost fifty years after Texas Instruments slapped a laser guidance kit on a M117 dumb bomb, the Air Force added a guidance kit to a dumb mine, and greatly expanded the potential for aerial mining. The late arrival of precision capabilities to the antiship mine is no less revolutionary than it was for the advent of precision bombs in the first place, allowing precise placement of mines and improving the survivability of the employing platform. This development has the potential to revitalize aerial mining and add immeasurably to joint countermaritime operations.
Figure 1: Flounder 004, an inert GBU-62Bv(1)/B Quick Strike ER awaits loading on a B-52H at Guam (Col Mike Pietrucha, USAF)
The Mines
Since Vietnam, the standard naval bottom mine has been a variation of the 500-lb. Mk-82 or 1000-lb. Mk-83 General Purpose bomb. The same bomb bodies are used for Laser Guided Bombs (GBU-12 and GBU-16) or JDAMs (GBU-38 and GBU-32). The change that turns a bomb into a mine is the replacement of the fuze (which detonates the bomb on or just after impact) with a target detection device (TDD), which detonates the mine when a ship passes within lethal range. Mine assembly is completed with the addition of a safe/arm device in the nose and a parachute-retarder tailkit in the back (see Fig. 2), turning a 500-lb. Mk-82 into the Mk-62 Quickstrike and the 1000-lb. Mk-83 into a Mk-63 Quickstrike. All Quickstrike mines are air-delivered.
