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Middle East

Peace in Gaza May Not Mean Peace in the Red Sea

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By Matt Reisener

Since October 2023, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that seized control over much of the country over a decade ago, have waged a campaign against shipping vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Gulf of Aden, attacking over 100 commercial maritime vessels. The Houthis have long cited Israel’s war in Gaza as the raison d’être for its campaign, claiming that the attacks on Israeli ships or any vessels conducting business at Israeli ports are intended to punish Israel for its role in the conflict. However, in the wake of the recent ceasefire in Gaza, one might reasonably expect these attacks to end, particularly since there has already been a decrease in the number of attacks conducted since the Houthis’ May 2025 agreement with the US to avoid targeting American vessels in exchange for an end to US airstrikes on Yemen. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi reportedly ordered a cessation of attacks on ships flying the Israeli flag or docking at Israeli ports, and the group’s message to Hamas’ Qassam Brigades indicating that its campaign against Israel is on hold has been interpreted by some as a sign that the Houthis are shifting their focus away from the Red Sea.

An end to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea would be a welcome development given how disruptive the campaign has been to global commerce. Traffic through the Suez Canal has decreased by roughly 50% due to concerns that ships will be targeted in the Red Sea. Many vessels have instead chosen to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant time and expense to their journeys and contributing to global inflation. Given that as much as 15% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal yearly, the global impact of the Houthi attacks cannot be understated.

However, the Gaza ceasefire may not herald the return of safe and stable maritime commerce in the Red Sea. The ceasefire remains tenuous in the wake of Hamas’ attempt to reassert control in pockets of Gaza City, both sides have already accused the other of violating the agreement. Countless potential pitfalls remain on the path to a permanent peace which could easily prompt the resumption of hostilities, including the return of the remains of the outstanding Israeli hostages, fate of Hamas, and Israel’s willingness to accept a Palestinian state. Even then, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Gaza may be insufficient to permanently end the Houthis’ maritime attacks. The reason for this speaks to the Houthis’ underlying motivations behind their efforts to disrupt Red Sea commerce, which go beyond the group’s stated intent to destroy Israel and support the Palestinian cause.

The Houthis’ Red Sea attacks are primarily intended to address the legitimacy crises the group faces both domestically and abroad. While the Houthis succeeded in capturing Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a and forced the resignation of then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the group remains opposed by Yemen’s internationally recognized government and other armed groups such as the Southern Transitional Council and Yemeni National Resistance which control significant swaths of territory within the country. Within Houthi-controlled territory, the group remains unpopular with much of the population due to its imposition of restrictive social control measures, the poor state of Yemen’s economy, endemic government corruption, and the Houthis’ struggles to pay public sector salaries. Internationally, Iran is the only country to recognize the Houthis as the legitimate ruling government of Yemen, and the group has been diplomatically and economically isolated from most of the global community.

Through this lens, the group’s campaign in the Red Sea can perhaps best be viewed as an effort to strengthen the image of the Houthis as a fully functional governing entity and a powerful geopolitical force capable of waging war against regional and global powers and single-handedly disrupting global commerce. While Houthi attempts at striking the Israeli mainland have been largely unsuccessful, the group identified attacks against maritime vessels as a more achievable means of inserting themselves into the broader conflict against Israel while also elevating their global threat profile. This interpretation is further supported by the Houthis’ decision to offer “safe transit” waivers to ships hoping to transit the Red Sea without being targeted. To the Houthis, every shipping company that applies for such a waiver helps cement the perception of the Houthis as a legitimate governing authority. Similarly, securing a peace agreement with the United States served as a significant propaganda win for the Houthis, allowing them to portray themselves as a peer competitor of the Americans capable of inflicting enough damage on US interests to necessitate such a deal.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Gaza War cause is consistent with the group’s prevailing pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli beliefs, the Houthis also had several strategic reasons to tie their Red Sea campaign to this conflict. First, Houthi involvement in the Gaza War is one of the few policies undertaken by the group that has been widely popular due to the Yemeni public’s widespread opposition to Israel. While 2024 polling from the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies shows that the Houthis themselves remain unpopular in Yemen, it also shows that the attacks themselves have produced positive feelings among Yemenis living in areas of Houthi, government, and divided control. These maritime attacks lend credibility to the Houthis’ claims that they are waging war in support of Palestine on behalf of the Yemeni people, while Yemen’s internationally recognized government has been largely unable to criticize the Houthi campaign since doing so would lend credence to the Houthis’ portrayal of this government as a Western-backed puppet that represents foreign rather than domestic interests. The attacks have also been a boon for recruitment to the Houthi cause. The UN estimates that the number of Houthi fighters increased from 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 in 2024, and successful propaganda campaigns centered around the Houthis’ war against Israel served a major driver of this increased recruitment. Every successful strike and foreign retaliation against the Yemeni homeland in response to these attacks risks producing a rally-around-the-flag effect that engenders greater public sympathy.

Additionally, the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause as a justification for its Red Sea attacks has helped deepen its partnership with Iran. Despite the Houthis’ growing capacity to manufacture weapons domestically, Iran remains an invaluable patron for the Houthis which has continued to supply the group with munitions, as evidenced by the Yemeni National Resistance Force’s interception of over 750 tons of Yemen-bound Iranian weapons in July. Iran’s arming of the Houthis was originally intended to oppose the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts to topple the group and prevent Yemen from becoming a proxy state of Iran’s geopolitical adversaries. However, the Houthis’ willingness to wade into the Gaza conflict in opposition to another of Iran’s primary adversaries (Israel) has helped establish the Houthis as a reliable partner worthy of continued support at a time when Iran’s regional proxy network has been significantly degraded following its disastrous Twelve-Day War against Israel.

Furthermore, the Houthis have used the Gaza War as cover for their Red Sea attacks in part to undermine public perceptions of other regional Arab powers. While countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ostensibly supportive of the Palestinian cause, the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted that these states have proven unwilling to match that support with military action, drawing favorable contrasts between this perceived inaction and the Houthis’ successful maritime campaign. In doing so, the Houthis have sought to weaken regional opinion of the countries which once actively worked to topple them after their capture of Sana’a.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause has been largely successful for the group, there is reason to believe they will continue to target commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea even if the conflict in Gaza remains frozen. First, the Houthis could continue to shift the goalposts on their justification for targeting vessels in the Red Sea in opposition to Israel. The road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians will be full of stops and starts, and the Houthis can weaponize each roadblock as a sign of Israeli aggression and resume their Red Sea attacks.

Should the fragile peace in Gaza hold, the Houthis could also adopt the United States as the primary public face of its Red Sea campaign, drawing on the broad unpopularity of the US among Yemenis in the wake of America’s lengthy drone campaign against extremist groups in Yemen. The aforementioned US-Houthi détente may be insufficient to deter future attacks, as evidenced by the Houthis’ March 2024 attack on a Chinese ship despite making similar promises to avoid targeting their vessels. The Houthis’ decades of insurgency experience have made them adept at surviving airstrikes while preserving their ability to conduct maritime attacks. This is not to say that airstrikes against the Houthis have been wholly ineffective. The strikes launched by the US this spring inflicted over $1 billion in damage, killed several prominent Houthi figures, and played a role in bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table, and a recent Israeli strike succeeded in killing Houthi military leader Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Ghamari. However, the Houthis may calculate that they would gain more militarily from the increase in aid they would receive from Iran if they began attacking ships which have made port calls to the United States than they would lose as a result of retaliatory American strikes, especially since such strikes would further encourage more disaffected young men to join the Houthi cause.

Finally, the Houthis’ growing proficiency in carrying out Red Sea attacks may embolden them to continue these efforts. The Houthis have increased their coordination with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Somali extremist group Al Shabaab in recent months. Greater cooperation with these groups could allow the Houthis to extend the range of ships they are able to target in the region and add further risk to ships hoping to hug the coast of Africa to avoid attacks, while also providing the Houthis with additional sources of regional intelligence and material support. Rather than relying exclusively on long-range munitions to harass their targets, recent attacks have also shown the Houthis adopting a greater variety of tactics, including using a combination of both remotely operated ships and vessels crewed by combatants who boarded and planted explosive devices on ships. These tactics suggest that the Houthis can continue harassing ships in the region even if the group’s supply of missiles and drones begins to dry up.

While Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and adjoining waterways may wax and wane in the coming months, safe transit through the Red Sea is unlikely to become a reality in the foreseeable future. The Houthis’ Red Sea campaign is not intrinsically linked to the Gaza conflict and may therefore continue even if that war ends peacefully. The Houthis will likely continue to use these attacks as a leverage point to press for more favorable final-status peace negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government to help secure them a more advantageous political position in Yemen moving forward. Only an end to the decades-long conflict between the Houthis and their enemies within Yemen will bring an end to the group’s efforts to disrupt maritime commerce in the region.

Matt Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor for the Center for Maritime Strategy. He previously served as Senior Program Manager for the Middle East and North Africa for the National Democratic Institute, where he managed international development programs in Yemen.
Featured Image: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Conducts PHOTOEX with ITS Cavour Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea (Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kade Bise Carrier Strike Group Two)
Asia-Pacific

China’s Coming Small Wars

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By Michael Hanson

The world took note of the meteoric growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), both in size and capability. Specifically, the PLA and PLAN’s amphibious capabilities development is impressive and alarming. According to many experts, the reason for this rapid development is the forceful reintegration of the island of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Analysts argue that a PLA cross-strait amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the largest amphibious assault in history, greater in scale and complexity than invasions of Normandy and Okinawa, the largest amphibious operations in each theater during World War II.2

A cross-strait operation would be a serious challenge for a world-class military. Though the Chinese military is quickly reaching peer status with the United States military in many areas, the PLA is not currently ready for a daunting amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The PLA remains untested. Chinese leaders will likely subject their prototype to a series of test runs before committing to such a fateful mission. History and current events show small wars and limited interventions serve as useful training grounds to develop the leadership, processes, and capabilities of military forces for larger designs. At present, North Korean troops are active participants in the war in Ukraine to presumably gain combat experience of their own.3 Likewise, before China embarks on a major war, it will likely hone its edge in small ones.

According to the renowned military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart, “A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.”4 To establish a lodgment, not only does the offensive force have to overcome a defending force, but significant geographic and climatic factors. Once successfully seizing a beachhead, the attacker must break out from it and begin a land campaign in which it can still meet defeat if it does not have adequate logistics to sustain its campaign. Even once ashore, the challenges of sustaining a campaign overseas are significantly greater than doing so overland. It is for these reasons that successful amphibious campaigns have been the domain of a relatively few militaries in modern history.

China seeks to join the small pantheon of militaries effective at amphibious operations. However, China’s military last combat experience occurred during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In that conflict Vietnamese militias stymied Chinese offensive thrusts while the bulk of Vietnam’s People’s Revolutionary Army was simultaneously engaged in Cambodia. Though the Chinese never officially acknowledged their casualty figures, independent estimates contend China suffered up to 25,000 killed in action and 37,000 wounded in the month-long war.5

The PLA made enormous strides in the 45 years since its last war. In 1979, China possessed a peasant army organized and equipped for what Mao Zedong called “Peoples’ War,” or guerrilla war.6 However, modern conflict changed China’s calculus. Following the American overwhelming triumph in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, China embarked on a massive military modernization.7 Chinese President Xi Jinping, recently charged the PLA to prepare for war, even uttering the words “dare to fight” during a visit to the Eastern Theater Command, the military district responsible for Taiwan.8,9 Experts assert President Xi is referring to forceful reunification of Taiwan.10

Before undertaking such an enormous and consequential operation the PLA must demonstrate its proficiency. China has conducted numerous exercises and drills, but these displays of military might will not prove sufficient. 11 The crucible of real combat must test PLA leadership, units, and operational methods before attempting an invasion of Taiwan. China’s adversaries should remain attuned to China’s engagement in small wars as means to advance political objectives and test its forces in preparation for a Taiwan invasion.

Contingency operations provide a wealth of knowledge and experience. For these reasons, these limited engagements serve as the most effective training operations. Indeed, throughout history countries have used active battlefields as schoolhouses for improving their combat capabilities, especially engaging in small wars to prepare for a larger one.

From 1937 to 1939, civil war raged in Spain and outside powers supplied troops and equipment to both sides. Though volunteers came to Spain from around the world, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided support with the express purpose of gaining knowledge and experience, and testing equipment and doctrinal methods with an eye on the future. Germany, rearming from the severe restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, exploited this opportunity to test its new tanks and airplanes, while employing new concepts.12 Germany’s famed Condor Legion, a unit consisting of both air and ground elements, was the vessel that gave some 19,000 German soldiers and airmen experience in a warzone.13 This was to be an investment that would pay off handsomely in a few short years.

As German arms and ideas were subjected to experimentation in Spain, the Wehrmacht learned other valuable lessons during Adolf Hitler’s bloodless conquests. In Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, as well as its annexations of Austria, the Sudetenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia, and finally Klaipeda, the Wehrmacht gained valuable experience in these unopposed invasions. These campaigns without battles allowed the German military to execute planned movements to seize objectives and secure key terrain and critical infrastructure. The Germans employed tactical and operational methods to set conditions for mutual support when contested. Though the Germans faced little opposition, they experienced other friction and fog inherent in war. In the process of working through these challenges, the Germans profited enormously, specifically in the areas of mobilization, deployment, logistics, and command and control.14

The United States, in fact, has a long history of developing its military in small wars close to home, but perhaps the most notable are in the period between the world wars known as the Banana Wars. Many American senior commanders in World War II cut their teeth as junior officers in these Latin American interventions, from the soldiers who chased Pancho Villa on the Mexican Border just before World War I, to the Marines who fought bandits in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua during the interwar period. More notable than the personalities who served in these small wars are the lessons in warfighting they brought back with them, such as the Marine development of close air support to tactics in jungle fighting that the “Old Breed” passed to their new recruits in preparation for Guadalcanal.15

More recent small-scale interventions in America’s near abroad have had notable impacts on the American military as well. Early confusion in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada exposed gaps in intelligence, planning, and joint interoperability in execution that helped instigate the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act which dictate high level organizations and processes to this day.16 On the other hand, the rapid success of Operation Just Cause in Panama seemed to validate doctrinal planning and training methods.17 Both short and decisive operations did much to improve America’s military stature in the rough wake of the Vietnam War.

Other countries have learned from limited adventures abroad as well. The severe shortcomings of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia with its rusty leftover Soviet military served as a wake-up call to President Vladimir Putin. The poor performance of Russian leaders, personnel, units, equipment, and procedures led to massive overhaul of the Russian Army, with a modernization program to upgrade all of these areas of disappointment.18 After several years of development, President Putin utilized Syria as a testing ground for new Russian weapons as well as a stage to advertise their capabilities to the world.19 The results of this build-up, combined with Russia’s initial proxy war in Ukraine, served to convince the world of a daunting Russian military machine, an image that was only dashed when Putin squandered these reforms with his ill-advised and poorly planned conventional invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Yet while the Russian war machine is bogged down in cratered and shell-blasted Ukrainian landscapes reminiscent of the battlefields of World War I, China continues developing its own capabilities. Chinese military spending rose significantly in 2024 to $236 billion.20 Recent Chinese developments include the 2022 launch of a Type-003 Fujian aircraft carrier, comparable to an American Nimitz class super carrier.21 In addition to this crown jewel of power projection, the PRC launched their fourth Type 075 Helicopter Landing Dock (LHD) ship, comparable to the American Tarawa and Wasp class amphibious ships, and other amphibious dock landing ships that complement this platform to round out the Amphibious Ready Group construct.22 Like the American Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), these acquisitions give China a suite of crisis response and power projection capabilities. They have even built several classes of at-sea replenishment ships to support their fleet far from home waters.23

PLAN Type 75 LHD CNS Hubei during a training exercise. (China Daily photo)

The question remains whether platforms similar to Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Tarawa/Wasp Class helicopter ships, and underway replenishment ships are necessary for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan when the island is already within range of airfields on the Chinese mainland. More likely these are intended for power projection in their near abroad. In other words, the world may witness a coming era of Chinese gunboat diplomacy and small war interventions similar to the Banana Wars during the period of rising American hegemony. With over $1 trillion invested since 2013 and as of 2023, 147 countries signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has lots of opportunities to intervene in overseas contingencies to defend its national interests.24 In line with former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s call for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct “new historic missions,” the PLAN is already at work flexing its muscles abroad.25

Since 2009 the PLAN has participated in international counter-piracy operations in areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Arabian Sea.26 Since the start of the Israel-Gaza War, the PLAN dispatched naval forces to the region following Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the waters off of Yemen.27 While the PLAN routinely operates from a military base in Djibouti, one expert warns this outpost will only be the first of many Chinese overseas military bases.28, 29 Yet Chinese involvement in multilateral military missions extend to the land as well.

In recent years, over 2,000 Chinese troops deployed to conflict zones in Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.30 These deployments are not a recent developments. Since 1992, China has deployed over 50,000 troops to no less than 29 United Nations peacekeeping missions, losing 24 killed in these operations.31 Of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China contributes the most personnel to UN missions. President Xi Jinping offered to provide 8,000 troops to a United Nations standby force in 2015.32 As Chinese sailors, soldiers, and airmen gain experience in overseas contingencies, the Chinese military builds its capability to pursue larger missions, like an invasion of Taiwan.

Conclusion

The world has time before China could attempt to use force to bring Taiwan under its heel. However, every year that passes, they increase their readiness. Drills and training exercises certainly increase a military’s abilities. However, only so much can be learned in sterile, controlled training environments. China will likely test its military might in small wars before embarking on a larger one. The world should take note of China’s entry and actions during a small war. When the People’s Republic of China does engage in a small war, the world will know China is preparing for the forceful reunification of Taiwan.

Major Michael A. Hanson, USMC, is an Infantry Officer serving at The Basic School, where the Marine Corps trains its lieutenants and warrant officers in character, officership, and the skills required of a provisional rifle platoon commander. He is also a member of the Connecting File, a Substack newsletter that shares material on tactics, techniques, procedures, and leadership for Marines at the infantry battalion level and below.

References

[1] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2017) Foreward.

[2] Council on Foreign Relations. “Why China Would Struggle To Invade Taiwan.” https://www.cfr.org/article/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[3] Karolina Hird, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil, “North Korea Joins Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and Northeast Asia,” Institute for the Study of War, last updated October 25, 2024. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications. Accessed July 31, 2025.

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amphibious Operations, JP 3-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 21 January 2021). I-1.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[5] Zhang Xiaoming, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184 (Dec 2005)

[6] Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, Mark Cozad, People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts, (RAND Corporation, 2020). 4.

[7] Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, Mark Cozad, People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts. 4.

[8] Miriah Davis, “President Xi Jinping orders Chinese military to prepare for war over concerns national security is ‘increasingly unstable, uncertain’”, Sky News Australia, November 9, 2022. https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/president-xi-jinping-orders-chinese-military-to-prepare-for-war-over-concerns-national-security-is-increasingly-unstable-uncertain/news-story/db8ca191e86fd81a23b3b794ff4f2a0e. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[9] “China’s Xi Jinping says army must ‘dare to fight’ during military inspection,” The Straits Times, last updated July 6, 2023. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-xi-jinping-says-army-must-dare-to-fight-during-military-inspection. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[10] Brad Dress, “China will be ready for potential Taiwan invasion by 2027, US admiral warns,” The Hill, March 21, 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/china-will-be-ready-for-potential-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-admiral-warns/ar-BB1kjib7. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[11] Kristin Huang, “Chinese military drills simulate amphibious landing and island seizure in battle conditions,” South China Morning Post, July 28, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3142851/chinese-military-drills-simulate-amphibious-landing-and-island. Accessed March 26, 2024;

[12] John T. Hendriz, “The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16:1 (1993). 87-88.

[13] John T. Correll, “The Condor Legion,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, February 1, 2013. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0213condor/. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[14] Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) 152-153.

[15] Mark R. Folse, “Never Known a Day of Peace,” Naval History 35:4, August 2021. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/august/never-known-day-peace. Accessed March 26, 2024; Joseph H. Alexander, “Close Air Support: The Pioneering Years,” Naval History 26:6, November 2012. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2012/november/close-air-support-pioneering-years. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[16] Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, (Washington, DC, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). 6. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024;

Daniel Bolger, “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics,” Military Review LXVI:7, July 1986. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-Select-Articles/Operation-Urgent-Fury/. Accessed March 27, 2024;

John J. Hamre, “Reflections: Looking Back at the Need for Goldwater-Nichols,” Center For Strategic & International Studies, January 27, 2016. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflections-looking-back-need-goldwater-nichols. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[17] R. Cody Phillips, “CMH PUB No. 70-85-1 Operation Just Cause: The Incursion Into Panama,” U.S. Army Center for Military History 2004, 47-48. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-85-1/cmhPub_70-85-1.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[18] Ariel Cohen Dr. and Robert E. Hamilton Colonel, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (US Army War College Press, 2011), 49-54. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/576. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[19] Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, “The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria,” Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020) 68. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/russias-war-in-syria.pdf. Accessed March 26, 2024:

Anton Lavrov, “Russian Aerial Operations in the Syrian War,” Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020) 93. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/russias-war-in-syria.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[20] Gordon Arthur, “China unveils new defense budget, with a 7.2% increase,” Defense News, March 6, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/03/06/china-unveils-new-defense-budget-with-a-72-increase/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[21] H.I. Sutton, “China Launches First Aircraft Carrier Which Rivals U.S. Navy’s,” Naval News, June 17, 2022. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/china-launches-first-aircraft-carrier-which-rivals-u-s-navys/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[22] Xavier Vavasseur, “China Launches 4th Type 075 LHD For The PLAN,” Naval News, December 14, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/china-launches-4th-type-075-lhd-for-the-plan/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[23] Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/sustaining-the-chinese-navys-operations-at-sea-bigger-fists-growing-legs/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[24] Council on Foreign Relations. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[25] Daniel M. Hartnett, “Chapter 2 The ‘New Historic Missions:’ Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy,” Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College April 1, 2014). 31-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11946.5. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[26] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy’s 14 years of missions in blue waters safeguard intl trade routes, win more overseas recognition,” Global Times, Aug 1, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1271933.shtml. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[27] Aadil Brar, “China Sends Warships to the Middle East,” Newsweek, February 22, 2024. https://www.newsweek.com/china-warship-red-sea-missile-east-houthi-1872284. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[28] Ben Blanchard, “China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti.” Reuters, August 1, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1AH3E1/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[29] Eric A. Miller, “More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/china-military-bases-africa-navy-pla-geopolitics-strategy/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[30] Thomas Dyrenforth, “Beijing’s Blue Helmets: What to Make of China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa,” Modern War Institute, August 19, 2021. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[31] “China touts role in UN peacekeeping, Middle East peace,” Associated Press, June 25, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-middle-east-china-government-and-politics-6014343ada529a978436dec343c1f04e. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[32] Courtney J. Fung, “China’s Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping,” United States Institute of Peace, July 26, 2016. https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping. Accessed March 28, 2024.

Featured Image: Rigged with combat loads, paratroopers assigned to a brigade under the Chinese PLA Army file into a Mi-171E transport helicopter during a parachute training exercise in September 2025. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn/by Hu Qiwu)

South America

The Uruguayan Navy: Preparing for the 21st century

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By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

In a speech to commemorate the service’s sea day (Día de la Fuerza de Mar) on August 21, Uruguayan Navy Captain Daniel Di Bono stated, “Starting today, it is time to start writing another page of this story. Ours, [the story] of the older ones, those of the Frigates, the Minesweepers, the [marine research vessel] Vanguardia, is already coming to an end. The period of modern, agile, and flexible ocean patrol vessels, coastal patrol vessels, and scientific vessels is approaching.”

Navies constantly evolve due to new challenges, objectives, visions, and realities. However, analysts rarely witness a sharp evolution of a Navy and its fleet. The Uruguayan Navy is undergoing that process, and as a reliable U.S. ally, Washington needs to understand what is going on and why.

Out With the Old, In With the New

For decades, the Uruguayan Navy operated one of the oldest fleets in South America. Aside from landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay and not considering Guyana and Suriname (more generally associated with the Caribbean), Uruguay is the only South American country that does not possess submarines. The fleet’s flagship is the Luneburg-class logistics vessel ROU 04 General Artigas, launched in the 1960s. The service has decommissioned several in recent years, including its only frigate, the former ROU 01 Uruguay – formerly Portugal’s Comandante Joao Belo (F480). In other words, currently, the Navy has no main combat ships.

On the other hand, the service is receiving new(ish) vessels. In late 2022, the Uruguayan Navy commissioned three Marine Protector-class patrol boats formerly operated by the United States Coast Guard. The three ships are already operating across Uruguayan waters: ROU 14 Río Arapey, ROU 15 Río de la Plata, and ROU 16 Río Yaguarón. Moreover, after around a decade of negotiations, brand-new ships are on the horizon. In July, the Ministry of Defense announced that two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) will be purchased from a Spanish shipyard. Crucially, the OPVs will be capable of carrying helicopters, an ability that the fleet currently lacks.

Three former Coast Guard cutters, now serving the Uruguay Navy as ROU-14 Rio Arapey, ROU-15 Rio de La Plata and ROU-16 Rio Yaguaron, stop at Coast Guard Sector San Juan Sept. 24, 2022, during their more than two-month transit from Baltimore to Uruguay. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Capt. Robert Pirone)

Uruguay is scheduled to hold general elections in October 2024. Therefore, one can only hope that the OPV acquisition will be confirmed and all necessary agreements signed so the deal does not fall victim to traditional election-related debates and delays.

Evolving Challenges

A fact mentioned earlier deserves more analysis – the Uruguayan Navy does not possess subs and currently does operate heavy warships in its fleet. As discussed in Captain Di Bono’s speech, that era is ending for this service. Geopolitics is a reason for this statement: Uruguay borders two countries, Argentina and Brazil, and bilateral relations are quite strong. For example, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has donated M41C Walker Bulldog tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery platforms to the Uruguayan Army. The likelihood of an inter-state war is minimal; therefore, as the Uruguayan officials have also stated, the Navy’s necessity to operate cruisers and minesweepers is similarly minimal. Dr. Andrea Resende, associate professor at Brazil’s University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNIBH), explained to CIMSEC that “there is some tension between Argentina and Uruguay, however not like in the previous decades. Yet, Brazil has always played a third party during conflicts and tensions in the region because the stability of its borders frontiers depends on a peaceful environment.”

To promote close military relations, from September 11-15, the navies of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay carried out a new iteration of an academic exercise on trilateral warfare (Juego de Guerra Trilateral) in Carrasco, Uruguay. “The Trilateral War Game, carried out annually, was designed to allow interaction in the formulation, analysis and solution of international crisis problems in the South Atlantic region, based on a fictitious situation, using naval forces,” explains the Argentine Navy’s publication Gaceta Maritima.

Nowadays, the Uruguayan Navy is evolving into a smaller, faster, more modern fleet. What are its challenges? Controlling the country’s vast maritime waters is critical to combat illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing and other maritime crimes like drug trafficking and smuggling. In other words, protecting Uruguay’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from non-interstate threats is critical.

Having OPVs that carry helicopters will also be helpful for interdiction operations and search-and-rescue missions. Smaller craft can also operate along some of Uruguay’s rivers for security and patrol operations and to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions. It is worth noting that the Navy has created a tactical operations center (Centro de Operaciones Tácticas: COT) that oversees the deployment of surface and aerial assets to combat illegal maritime activities.

Dr. Resende warned of a potential spillover effect from the other side of the Atlantic: “While piracy, robbery, and hijacking are major problems in the Gulf of Guinea, they can overflow across the entire region, so there is a need for the South Atlantic navies to be ready and to participate in joint exercises and operations,” to maintain their readiness and to be able to work together. In other words, having a smaller fleet does not mean giving up some capabilities, particularly regarding maritime law enforcement and patrol.

With that said, there will always be a need for heavier, more specialized ships. Science is a good reason for having them. The Uruguayan Navy has an active role in scientific and oceanographic research, but unfortunately, the scientific vessel ROU 22 Oyarvide was decommissioned in 2022 without a replacement ready. While not a priority as compared to the OPVs, Montevideo must assign financial assets to acquire a new scientific vessel soon. Moreover, Uruguay has a robust presence in Antarctica, and General Artigas participated in the country’s recent 2022/2023 Antarctic campaign. Upon its return to Montevideo in February, Defense Minister Javier García noted, “[Artigas] was a ship that had not sailed since 2018, which was overhauled, the things that needed to be fixed were fixed, and it once again provided an essential service in an Antarctic mission.” In other words, the Uruguayan Navy has a critical role in scientific operations across Uruguayan and Antarctic waters; therefore, scientific and polar-capable vessels must be components of the future fleet.

The service has yet to disclose when the ancient Artigas will be decommissioned. The ship is currently the fleet’s heaviest vessel, so a similar platform will be needed to replace it for local transportation operations and Uruguay’s future Antarctic campaigns.

Montevideo-Washington Relations: Moving Forward

Finally, a word about U.S.-Uruguay naval relations is necessary. They may not be as constant as the U.S. Navy’s and U.S. Coast Guard’s presence across the Greater Caribbean, but they exist. The donation of the Marine Protector vessels to the Uruguayan Navy and helicopters to the Uruguayan Air Force over the past two years are an excellent example of close bilateral defense relations.

Moreover, in February, the U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter Stone’s (WMSL-758) visit to Montevideo port coincided with the 70th anniversary of the mutual defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1953. “The agreement served as the foundation for the long history of cooperation between the two democracies in defense equipment, training, and peacekeeping operations around the world that continues to thrive today,” explained the U.S. embassy in Uruguay in a press release.

Given the ongoing war in Ukraine (and news of successful attacks against Russian ships and submarines), tensions with China, and regular incidents at sea with Iran, it may appear puzzling for Washington that a Navy can operate without frigates or submarines. However, the geopolitics of Latin America and the Caribbean differ from other areas of the world. In particular, inter-state relations between Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil remain strong in the South Atlantic. The participation in joint exercises by these three militaries is an effective confidence-building mechanism.

“One can never predict the future [but a military service must be] prepared for whatever may come. And this is the case for Uruguay. Even if we live in a relative state of peace, the maritime space is threatened daily with cyberattacks, IUU fishing, piracy, and illegal trafficking,” concluded Dr. Resende. Smaller but faster and more modern ships, with more interdiction and surveillance capabilities, will be the pillars of the Uruguayan Navy’s fleet in the 21st century. The threats may be changing, but the mission remains the same.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

Featured Image: The Uruguayan naval frigate Uruguay (ROU 1) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker.)

Arctic

Why the US is Losing The Race for the Arctic and What to Do About It

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By Josh Caldon

Almost weekly there is another story insinuating that the US is losing the “race for the Arctic.” Those who support the claim that the US is losing this race often highlight that the Arctic ice is melting and that this environmental change is opening up potential trade routes and making natural resources more ripe for exploitation. Others then point out that Russia has increasingly re-militarized the Arctic and that China has also made inroads to establish itself in the region. 

One key point these articles often make is the United States’ relative lack of icebreakers compared to its competitors. What is missing from this conversation, however, is an explanation of why the US has fallen behind its competitors in the Arctic. This article fills in that gap by attempting to explain why the US is behaving as it does. It then argues that paradoxically falling behind in this regional competition may actually improve America’s overall security and international influence when compared to Russia and China.

Geography

The US is relatively fortunate in its geography. It has large coastlines with natural harbors on both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Its rivers largely flow southward to southern ports. It also shares borders with Mexico and Canada, two countries that do not threaten the US in a conventional sense. This geography serves to protect the US from foreign invasion and allows it to readily deploy military forces to foreign locales, without use of the Arctic.

With the advent of intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers, the Arctic became more important to the US militarily during the Cold War. This pushed the US to erect now largely defunct early warning stations across northern Alaska, Greenland, and Canada. More recently, it established incipient missile defense systems in the Arctic to deal with increased threats emanating from Russia, China, and North Korea and improved its ability to monitor the region. However, these systems have never been designed to control the Arctic, but instead to protect America, and its NATO allies, from foreign military threats coming from, or through, the Arctic. This is an important distinction.

Russia does not share America’s fortunate geographic position. Instead, its geographic positioning and acrimonious international relationships have pushed it to “conquer the Arctic.” It has few “warm-water” ports and shares large land borders with many adversarial states. Russia’s only ports that are free from year-round ice are located in Sevastopol (Crimea), Tartus (Syria), and in the Baltic and Barents Seas. Significantly, Russia has recently fought to maintain control over Sevastopol and Tartus, but still faces possible blockades by adversarial forces in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s attempt to join NATO, Finland’s recent accession to the alliance and Sweden’s standing bid to join, along with the West’s attempts to overthrow Russia’s surrogate in Syria, Bashar Assad, have heightened Russia’s longstanding fear in this regard.

As a result, since the disastrous Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and especially during WW I and WW II,* and the Cold War, Russia has militarized the Arctic. This is something that it has taken up with renewed vigor under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Russia’s militarization of the Arctic has especially occurred in two spots. The first one is the ice-free Barents Sea, which Russia has relied on to access the world’s oceans so that it can better protect its territory and international interests from foreign threats, and the second one is under the Arctic ice cap where its nuclear submarines have an icy bastion that protects them from NATO forces.

Economics

The US largely has a free-market economy with strong interest groups that challenge its willingness to expand its commercial footprint in the Arctic. This has overwhelmingly kept it from attempting to control the Arctic like Russia has done and China is increasingly attempting to do. It is important to look at the times when American commercial interests have focused on the Arctic to understand America’s overall lack of interest in this region. The three times the US has been economically drawn to the Arctic were to exploit temporarily scarce resources. This occurred with whale oil and seal skins during the 18th and 19th century, gold at the end of the 19th century, and oil during the mid-twentieth century. These intense periods of economic interest in the Arctic resulted in America’s purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and the development of Alaska in the decades afterwards. Notably, however, it is expensive and difficult to operate in the Arctic. As Canadian Arctic expert, Michael Byers highlights, even as the Arctic ice slowly melts, the region remains in complete darkness for half of the year and melting ice is dangerously unpredictable. The Arctic is also austere and quite far from the largest population centers of the world. As such, the intermittent economic demands for the region’s natural resources have relatively quickly resulted in substitutes being found for these goods in less austere places.

Subsequently, the only portions of Alaska that are significantly developed are in the sub-Arctic portion of the state, with the exception of the oil fields of Prudhoe Bay – which also appear to be winding down with the advent of fracking and renewable energy. Increasing environmental concerns (most of Alaska is situated in nationally owned wilderness preserves) and native groups’ claims prohibitively increase the price of resource extraction from most of Arctic Alaska even further. Many Americans believe the region should be left to nature and to indigenous groups. The US also does not have a great need to develop the sea routes in the Arctic to improve its international trade. It has a transnational road and railway system and easy access to maritime trade routes which are connected through the recently enlarged Suez Canal. These circumstances mean that the US has very little motivation to establish sea routes through the largely uninhabited, relatively shallow, and dangerously unpredictable Arctic Ocean. Finally, Russia’s aggression over the last two decades, and increasing pressure from environmentally-based NGOs, have pushed American-based companies even further away from Russia’s Arctic.

All told, since the US has only marginal economic incentives to pursue the Arctic, it has not felt the need to develop harbors, settlements, transport infrastructure, or icebreakers to increase its footprint in the region. As such, it has relatively little capability to “conquer the region,” but also relatively little to defend in the region.

This is not the case for Russia or China. Russia suffers from what Hill and Gaddy call the Siberian Curse. Its geography is not as economically favorable as America’s, which has forced it to turn towards the Arctic to improve its economic circumstances. However, it has also traditionally operated a state-controlled economy that uses slave labor and nationally owned corporations to mask the economic, environmental and demographic costs of operating in the Arctic. Beginning with the czars, and accelerating under Russia’s Soviet dictators, Russia forcibly sent millions of people to develop and “conquer the Arctic.”

This legacy continues today as Putin pushes and subsidizes Russia’s economic ministries and state-controlled corporations to extract more resources from the Arctic and to expand the infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route (with the numerous powerful icebreakers needed to navigate this waterway) to transport these resources to distant markets. Unlike American corporations, Russia’s economic pursuits in the Arctic are not concerned with environmental or indigenous considerations either. Furthermore, Russia’s extreme sacrifices in the Arctic have made developing and controlling it symbolic for its people and leadership. As such, Russia has much more to defend materially and ideationally in the Arctic than the US does. Even with these factors pushing Russia to conquer the Arctic, Russia’s regional ambitions have been challenged by fiscal, demographic, and environmental hurdles. Most recently, the war in Ukraine has forced it to curtail its ambitious Arctic railway and icebreaker projects and to mobilize and sacrifice a significant proportion of its Arctic troops for combat in Ukraine. Additionally, many of its Arctic cities have rapidly de-populated, and the Arctic melt has paradoxically threatened its existing Arctic infrastructure.

Like Russia, China’s companies are largely nationalized and it also does not have the environmental or indigenous concerns in the Arctic that the US does. It has spent the last two decades increasing its manufacturing sector and its international trade ties. This has increased its needs for natural resources and trade routes, resulting in its plans to establish a “Polar Silk Road,” under its greater Belt and Road Initiative, in order to link the Arctic to China’s greater network of international trading posts and manufacturing centers. As Russia has lost access to Western markets and technology over the last two decades, it has increasingly turned towards an eager China to help it build out its Arctic economic footprint. As such, China also has more economic interests to defend in the Arctic than the US does.

What Does This Mean for the US?

The United States is not truly interested in competing for the Arctic. It has relatively less military, economic, or ideational interest in the region when compared to Russia or China. Its strategic plans for the region have become increasingly assertive in reaction to Russia’s and China’s efforts, but lack funding or prioritization. However, this lack of genuine interest carries some benefits for the US when considering the larger geopolitical context of the international system.

America’s lack of interest in the region has paradoxically pushed the other Arctic states to increase their security ties with the US and to take on more security responsibilities for the region. Similar to World War II, when Iceland and Denmark invited the US to help protect their territory from foreign adversaries, Russia’s aggression pushed Sweden and Finland to formally petition to join the US-dominated NATO. The inclusion of these states into the organization means that half of the Arctic will soon be administered by NATO member states.

Specifically, the Nordic states of Norway, Sweden and Finland have significant capabilities and economic stakes in the region that will make up for America’s relative lack of willingness and ability to contain Russia’s and China’s ambitions in the region. These countries’ capabilities will be further complemented by Denmark and Canada, and the other non-Arctic NATO states that have recently increased their defense spending to deal with Russian aggression. This collective defense in the Arctic will allow the US to better focus on domains like space, cyberspace, the Americas, and the Indo-Pacific, which are more important than the Arctic to America’s most critical national interests.

Economically speaking, the Arctic will likely remain a backwater for market-driven economies for the foreseeable future. The relatively high costs of extracting resources and transporting goods from the Arctic means the region is unlikely to become much more attractive for Western companies, even if the ice continues to retreat (which has slowed in recent years) and icebreakers improve, except in times when specific resources are in sharp demand or when there are long-term bottlenecks in other trade routes. 

The resources that Russia and China extract from the Arctic will contribute to the overall global supply of these resources and decrease their overall price for American consumers. As such, Americans will gain many of the benefits of Russia’s and China’s efforts in the Arctic while Russia and China absorb the costs. In the case of scarce rare-earth minerals that have spiked in demand and are monopolized by China, it appears Sweden may fill this void for the US with its own Arctic resources, even as companies search for substitutes for these critical resources.

Overall, the US should not ignore the Arctic, and it should put to rest the notion that this region is a unique zone of peace in an otherwise quite turbulent world. That being said, Americans should also not deem that losing the “race for the Arctic” will critically threaten America’s larger national interests. By not attempting to compete head-to-head with Russia or China to “conquer” the region, the US has incurred some advantages against these competitors.

As the US has been reminded again in Iraq and Afghanistan, and through its observation of Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, conquering territory comes with significant costs that can weaken the material strength and ideational attractiveness of a country. This, in turn, weakens a country’s ability to secure its most significant national interests. The US should continue to diplomatically, militarily, and economically challenge Russia’s and China’s actions in the Arctic on humanitarian and environmental grounds, but it also should identify that China’s and Russia’s actions in the Arctic come with high economic and soft power costs that may relatively benefit the US. Doing so will allow the US to increase its ability to collectively defend its interests in the Arctic with its allies and to prioritize its attention and resources on domains that are more important to it than the Arctic.

Josh Caldon is an adjunct professor at the Air University where he instructs courses in national security. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Albany and is a veteran of the USAF. The views in this article are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Government, or its subsidiary agencies.

* Interestingly, the US was responsible for a significant portion of Russia’s militarization of the Arctic during World War II and went from supplying friendly Russian forces through the Arctic during WW I to fighting them in the Russian Arctic after the Bolshevik Revolution.

Featured Image: A U.S. Coast Guard ship breaks ice near Nome, Alaska. (Credit: Charly Hengen/USCG)