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Asia-Pacific

Charting a Course: Addressing Chinese Maritime Coercion Around Taiwan

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By Anthony Marco and Nils Peterson

On September 13th, 2025, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel entered the restricted waters around the Republic of China’s (ROC) Dongsha Atoll, also known as the Pratas Island, located approximately 400 kilometers southwest of the ROC’s main island of Taiwan. The CCG intrusion prompted a swift response from the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), which consisted of a CGA vessel chasing the CCG intruder from the area. Over the next four days, the CCG mounted four separate incursions into the restricted waters around Dongsha, a worsening symptom of a wider Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maritime gray zone campaign against the ROC in which the CCG has a prominent tool of coercion.

This article employs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) definition of gray zone coercion, the “deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.”

The ongoing coercion by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) aims to erode the ROC’s sovereignty by sending a message to the international community that the CCP has both the capability and the will to exert control over the waters near Taiwan, but this activity also threatens the United States’ national security interests. It is in America’s interest that the ROC remains a political entity distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for two primary reasons. First, at the operational level, Taiwan is a key maritime terrain in the First Island Chain or FIC, forming the foundation of American strategy in East Asia to counter the CCP’s territorial revisionist ambitions from a geographic standpoint. Second, at the strategic level, a CCP takeover of Taiwan would severely undermine the confidence of key regional and treaty allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, in the United States’ ability to defend them against further CCP aggression.

In the immediate term, CCG gray zone activity also displays the potential to endanger hard US economic interests by threatening major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that enter the Taiwanese main island’s major ports at Kaohsiung, Keelung, Mailao, Taichung, and Taipei. Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced semiconductor chips and is the seventh-largest merchandise trading partner of the United States, underscoring the importance of SLOCs entering Taiwan for American economic welfare.

If the PRC expands its gray zone maritime activity in a manner that threatens SLOCs, potentially leading to a maritime quarantine of Taiwan, this presents the US and its Pacific partners with the decision of whether to employ a military response. Recognizing, at a minimum, the economic damage and escalatory risks tied to potential CCP attempts at threatening the vitality of SLOCs, it behooves American policymakers to take steps to deter the expansion of this CCG-spearheaded maritime gray zone campaign.

The Nature of the CCG Threat

Over the past two years, the CCP has taken substantial steps to intensify its maritime gray zone campaign in ROC waters. In February 2024, a Chinese motorboat violated Kinmen’s restricted waters, prompting a CGA-mounted chase, which resulted in the deaths of two Chinese nationals when their boat capsized. The PRC has since used the incident to justify mounting a concerted effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty over the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands–located four miles and six miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China, respectively–by routinely dispatching CCG vessels that violate the islands’ restricted waters: CCG activity reached a total of 85 violations around Kinmen in September 2025.

While Kinmen and Matsu lie just a short boat ride away from the PRC mainland, the CCP’s effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty has more recently extended to Dongsha. According to the CGA, an “unprecedented” flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, numbering six “mother ships” and 29 “smaller boats,” entered restricted ROC waters around Dongsha on February 15th, 2025, prompting a swift response from local CGA vessels.

During this incident, a CCG vessel violated Dongsha’s restricted waters by attempting to intervene in the CGA’s law enforcement response. Since this incident, the CCG has sought to normalize this activity with consistent intrusions into the waters around Donghsa. Although Dongsha, like Kinmen and Matsu, lies on the ROC periphery, its recent targeting by the CCG is demonstrative of a graduated coercive campaign.

The CCG has also recently demonstrated its capacity to perform in a role that is specifically more dangerous to US interests. In a noticeable departure from past practice, the CCG, in what appears to be a PRC attempt to hybridize a potential blockade, debuted in PLA live-fire exercises around Taiwan during Joint Sword 2024-A in May 2024. This was followed up by Joint Sword 2024-B in October 2024, featuring approximately seventeen CCG vessels circumnavigating the Taiwanese main island as part of coordinated blockading drills with the PLAN.

During Joint Sword 2025-B, this year’s inaugural exercises in February, the CCG played a higher profile role that included carrying out mock vessel boardings and inspections–suggestive of potential actions that would interdict commercial shipping, a cardinal feature during a blockade or gray zone “quarantine”–in addition to violating, for the first time, the Taiwanese main island’s 24 nautical mile contiguous area.

Although the CCP has not yet made a serious effort to dispute SLOCs to Taiwan, its multi-pronged gray zone activities suggest an intensifying trend that makes this a growing concern for the future. One potential route entails mounting infrequent CCG patrols of SLOCs that evolve into routine patrols, activities the CCP has attempted to normalize in other places through consistent effort, justified under the auspices of a contrived or provoked maritime incident. Patrols could evolve into the boarding and inspection of international commercial vessels, setting the conditions for a partial or full and temporary or indefinite maritime quarantine of the main island.

From a US standpoint, whether such gray zone maritime activity forms a deliberate, calibrated irregular warfare strategy to achieve unification non-kinetically or broadly aims to isolate Taiwan economically and politically, wherever and whenever the PRC can, any attempt to threaten SLOCs in this manner jeopardizes hard US and partner-nation interests. Thus, taking preventive measures to preserve SLOCs prior to PRC efforts to sever them is necessary, especially since attempting to roll back the latter’s efforts after the fact is more difficult and could risk a more dangerous escalation.

Policy Recommendations

The US Government (USG) should pursue a nested set of policy goals to address the CCG threat to American interests. At the operational level in the immediate term, the objective should be to deter CCG activity that would threaten American SLOCs. At the political level in the immediate term, the USG should accept the unpleasant reality that the existing CCG activity erodes ROC sovereignty, as it lacks the capacity to substantially roll back CCG presence. At the operational and political levels in the future, the objective should be to have a coalition prepared to deter a PRC maritime quarantine of Taiwan.

These policy goals rest on three key assumptions; if any of these is invalidated, the recommendations would no longer hold. First, the CCP does not deploy CCG assets in such numbers that they overwhelm our capacity to defend key SLOCs. Second, the CCP continues its salami-slicing strategy to degrade the operational environment around Taiwan, which involves minimizing direct confrontation between the PLA and foreign coast guard assets in waters that the party views as its own. Third, the CCP leadership thinks it still has time to achieve its political objective to gain control of Taiwan and therefore decides it does not now need to launch a maritime quarantine, blockade, or invasion.

The ROC, on its own, will likely struggle to preserve SLOCs. During a 2024 House Subcommittee Hearing on Transportation and Maritime Security, Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, Captain Eric M. Cooper, USCG (Ret.), estimated that there are a total of 700 CCG vessels operating in the Indo-Pacific. The entirety of the CCG’s complement is not dedicated to gray zone activity against Taiwan, but it has a growing presence deep in the South China and East China Seas. The CGA, on the other hand, maintains a smaller, but not insignificant force of approximately 250 vessels. Since 2018, the CGA has implemented a ten year indigenous shipbuilding program, with a target goal of 141 newly constructed vessels, but it remains and will remain overmatched by the sheer quantitative advantage retained by the CCG. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect the CGA to adequately deter potential CCG activity that jeopardizes SLOCs.

Recognizing the vulnerability of SLOCs, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to preserve them. Already, throughout the Indo-Pacific, the USG maintains a series of bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements (MLEA) that authorize the USCG to carry out activities such as conducting legally protected patrols to help safeguard a partner country’s maritime security.

Traditionally, bilateral MLEAs stipulate that the USCG dispatch personnel and or vessels to assist in maritime law enforcement within a partner country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles), and EEZs (200 nautical miles). For example, as provisioned under a bilateral MLEA, the USCG boarded six vessels illegally fishing within the Cook Islands’ EEZ this past June. The USCG also conducts maritime law enforcement exercises with regional partner countries.

In June 2024, the USCG trained alongside the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the South China Sea to buttress the latter’s law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities. The USCG has also scaled up exercises in the Indo-Pacific region into trilateral events: in June 2025, the USCG, PCG, and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) participated in drills outside Japan’s territorial waters for the first time. According to the senior participating USCG officer, Captain Brian Krautler, “By operating together, we strengthen our collective forces, ensuring readiness against threats to maritime safety and security.”

With the specific intent of maintaining SLOCs entering Taiwan, the USCG should seek to replicate similar activity with the CGA as would be provisioned in a bilateral MLEA. The USCG already has a pre-existing cooperative relationship with the CGA that is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in March 2021. Under this MOU, the USCG and CGA formed a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG) to establish a common understanding of maritime security priorities and advance cooperation between the USCG and CGA. In addition to the dialogues within the CGWG, instances of security cooperation have occurred. For example, in 2024, the USCG dispatched an International Port Security (IPS) Program team to Taiwan to exchange knowledge with CGA officials regarding how to enhance maritime cybersecurity and general port security.

Despite these positive developments, current USCG and CGA cooperation is inadequate, with it being limited to informal bilateral talks, workshops, and occasional practice sharing. Thus, the MOU should be updated to deepen security cooperation or an unofficial agreement, akin to a bilateral MLEA, established that extends USCG authorities in ROC waters, specifically granting the USCG the ability to conduct patrols along SLOCs, sending a clear message to the CCP that the US will protect its interests.

In line with past practice, whenever the US deepens security cooperation with the ROC, the CCP will likely vehemently protest such a move; however, given the recognizable and public economic interests at stake in preserving SLOCs, the USG should frame USCG presence patrols in Taiwanese waters within the context of that specific end rather than communicating an intent to buttress ROC claims to sovereignty, although this would be an undeniably favorable byproduct.

It must be acknowledged that, compared to the CCG, the current and near-term potential force posture of the USCG in the region is problematic. Presently, the USCG has eight vessels forward deployed in the region and possesses another 79 vessels capable of serving in the region, but this would practically amount to the USCG’s entire inventory of high seas vessels. Despite this modest vessel count, the USCG could afford to apportion a couple of cutters and a handful of smaller craft, based on existing deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, communicating the USG’s resolve concerning the preservation of SLOCs.

A comprehensive analysis is warranted to assess the impact this deployment would have on other USCG priorities in the theater. Still, such deployments would communicate the USG’s resolve to preserve SLOCs. This is especially the case due to the escalatory risks the CCP would incur by contemplating a confrontation with a USCG vessel performing its duties. The USG could also establish a shiprider agreement, a type of MLEA, with the CGA, permitting USCG personnel to board CGA vessels: the USG maintains twelve such agreements with regional partners such as Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Vanuatu. Although typically partner force personnel board USCG vessels, USCG personnel have boarded Royal Navy vessels under a shiprider arrangement, which can be replicated with the CGA.

Moreover, the USG should seek ways to internationalize any USCG efforts to preserve SLOCs entering Taiwan. USCG Captain (Ret.) Eric Cooper has made compelling arguments for the establishment of a multilateral maritime law enforcement task force in the form of the US-led Bahrain Combined Maritime Force (CMF). Headquartered in Bahrain and consisting of 46 participating countries, the CMF maintains maritime security in major waterways around the Middle East. Organizing a task force akin to a CMF with the aim of preserving Taiwan’s SLOCs could include countries like Japan and the Philippines, especially when considering these two countries’ significant economic interests linked to these SLOCs and their recent combined participation in USCG-led exercises.

If these recommendations are implemented, the following would be benchmarks to measure success: In the immediate future, the continued absence of CCG vessels in key SLOCs. In the longer term, a stable rotational presence of up to three USCG cutters and between five and ten smaller craft regularly operating in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in areas proximate to Taiwan, in conjunction with a CMF-style task force.

The deteriorating security situation around Taiwan due to the CCP-initiated gray zone coercion shows no signs of improvement in the near future. In addition, the United States no longer enjoys being the unrivalled seafaring power in East Asia. In this security environment, the creative employment of USCG assets and personnel in combination with regional partner countries becomes an important policy pathway toward achieving American national interests.

Anthony Marco is a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and holds a BS from the United States Military Academy at West Point and an MA from Reichman University as an Anna Sobol Levy Scholar. He also serves as a special advisor on the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Proxies and Partners Special Project.

Nils Peterson is a Marshall Scholar studying for an MA in Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies and holds a BA in History and Chinese from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He previously led the China Team at the Institute for the Study of War as a War Studies Fellow.

The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or the Army. Appearance of, or reference to, any commercial products or services does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of those products or services. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of the linked websites, or the information, products or services therein.

Featured Image: The Wanshan Vessel formation conduct towing exercises in waters off Huangyan Dao in South China Sea in July, 2024. (China Coast Guard photo)

Middle East

Peace in Gaza May Not Mean Peace in the Red Sea

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By Matt Reisener

Since October 2023, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that seized control over much of the country over a decade ago, have waged a campaign against shipping vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Gulf of Aden, attacking over 100 commercial maritime vessels. The Houthis have long cited Israel’s war in Gaza as the raison d’être for its campaign, claiming that the attacks on Israeli ships or any vessels conducting business at Israeli ports are intended to punish Israel for its role in the conflict. However, in the wake of the recent ceasefire in Gaza, one might reasonably expect these attacks to end, particularly since there has already been a decrease in the number of attacks conducted since the Houthis’ May 2025 agreement with the US to avoid targeting American vessels in exchange for an end to US airstrikes on Yemen. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi reportedly ordered a cessation of attacks on ships flying the Israeli flag or docking at Israeli ports, and the group’s message to Hamas’ Qassam Brigades indicating that its campaign against Israel is on hold has been interpreted by some as a sign that the Houthis are shifting their focus away from the Red Sea.

An end to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea would be a welcome development given how disruptive the campaign has been to global commerce. Traffic through the Suez Canal has decreased by roughly 50% due to concerns that ships will be targeted in the Red Sea. Many vessels have instead chosen to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant time and expense to their journeys and contributing to global inflation. Given that as much as 15% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal yearly, the global impact of the Houthi attacks cannot be understated.

However, the Gaza ceasefire may not herald the return of safe and stable maritime commerce in the Red Sea. The ceasefire remains tenuous in the wake of Hamas’ attempt to reassert control in pockets of Gaza City, both sides have already accused the other of violating the agreement. Countless potential pitfalls remain on the path to a permanent peace which could easily prompt the resumption of hostilities, including the return of the remains of the outstanding Israeli hostages, fate of Hamas, and Israel’s willingness to accept a Palestinian state. Even then, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Gaza may be insufficient to permanently end the Houthis’ maritime attacks. The reason for this speaks to the Houthis’ underlying motivations behind their efforts to disrupt Red Sea commerce, which go beyond the group’s stated intent to destroy Israel and support the Palestinian cause.

The Houthis’ Red Sea attacks are primarily intended to address the legitimacy crises the group faces both domestically and abroad. While the Houthis succeeded in capturing Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a and forced the resignation of then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the group remains opposed by Yemen’s internationally recognized government and other armed groups such as the Southern Transitional Council and Yemeni National Resistance which control significant swaths of territory within the country. Within Houthi-controlled territory, the group remains unpopular with much of the population due to its imposition of restrictive social control measures, the poor state of Yemen’s economy, endemic government corruption, and the Houthis’ struggles to pay public sector salaries. Internationally, Iran is the only country to recognize the Houthis as the legitimate ruling government of Yemen, and the group has been diplomatically and economically isolated from most of the global community.

Through this lens, the group’s campaign in the Red Sea can perhaps best be viewed as an effort to strengthen the image of the Houthis as a fully functional governing entity and a powerful geopolitical force capable of waging war against regional and global powers and single-handedly disrupting global commerce. While Houthi attempts at striking the Israeli mainland have been largely unsuccessful, the group identified attacks against maritime vessels as a more achievable means of inserting themselves into the broader conflict against Israel while also elevating their global threat profile. This interpretation is further supported by the Houthis’ decision to offer “safe transit” waivers to ships hoping to transit the Red Sea without being targeted. To the Houthis, every shipping company that applies for such a waiver helps cement the perception of the Houthis as a legitimate governing authority. Similarly, securing a peace agreement with the United States served as a significant propaganda win for the Houthis, allowing them to portray themselves as a peer competitor of the Americans capable of inflicting enough damage on US interests to necessitate such a deal.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Gaza War cause is consistent with the group’s prevailing pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli beliefs, the Houthis also had several strategic reasons to tie their Red Sea campaign to this conflict. First, Houthi involvement in the Gaza War is one of the few policies undertaken by the group that has been widely popular due to the Yemeni public’s widespread opposition to Israel. While 2024 polling from the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies shows that the Houthis themselves remain unpopular in Yemen, it also shows that the attacks themselves have produced positive feelings among Yemenis living in areas of Houthi, government, and divided control. These maritime attacks lend credibility to the Houthis’ claims that they are waging war in support of Palestine on behalf of the Yemeni people, while Yemen’s internationally recognized government has been largely unable to criticize the Houthi campaign since doing so would lend credence to the Houthis’ portrayal of this government as a Western-backed puppet that represents foreign rather than domestic interests. The attacks have also been a boon for recruitment to the Houthi cause. The UN estimates that the number of Houthi fighters increased from 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 in 2024, and successful propaganda campaigns centered around the Houthis’ war against Israel served a major driver of this increased recruitment. Every successful strike and foreign retaliation against the Yemeni homeland in response to these attacks risks producing a rally-around-the-flag effect that engenders greater public sympathy.

Additionally, the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause as a justification for its Red Sea attacks has helped deepen its partnership with Iran. Despite the Houthis’ growing capacity to manufacture weapons domestically, Iran remains an invaluable patron for the Houthis which has continued to supply the group with munitions, as evidenced by the Yemeni National Resistance Force’s interception of over 750 tons of Yemen-bound Iranian weapons in July. Iran’s arming of the Houthis was originally intended to oppose the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts to topple the group and prevent Yemen from becoming a proxy state of Iran’s geopolitical adversaries. However, the Houthis’ willingness to wade into the Gaza conflict in opposition to another of Iran’s primary adversaries (Israel) has helped establish the Houthis as a reliable partner worthy of continued support at a time when Iran’s regional proxy network has been significantly degraded following its disastrous Twelve-Day War against Israel.

Furthermore, the Houthis have used the Gaza War as cover for their Red Sea attacks in part to undermine public perceptions of other regional Arab powers. While countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ostensibly supportive of the Palestinian cause, the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted that these states have proven unwilling to match that support with military action, drawing favorable contrasts between this perceived inaction and the Houthis’ successful maritime campaign. In doing so, the Houthis have sought to weaken regional opinion of the countries which once actively worked to topple them after their capture of Sana’a.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause has been largely successful for the group, there is reason to believe they will continue to target commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea even if the conflict in Gaza remains frozen. First, the Houthis could continue to shift the goalposts on their justification for targeting vessels in the Red Sea in opposition to Israel. The road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians will be full of stops and starts, and the Houthis can weaponize each roadblock as a sign of Israeli aggression and resume their Red Sea attacks.

Should the fragile peace in Gaza hold, the Houthis could also adopt the United States as the primary public face of its Red Sea campaign, drawing on the broad unpopularity of the US among Yemenis in the wake of America’s lengthy drone campaign against extremist groups in Yemen. The aforementioned US-Houthi détente may be insufficient to deter future attacks, as evidenced by the Houthis’ March 2024 attack on a Chinese ship despite making similar promises to avoid targeting their vessels. The Houthis’ decades of insurgency experience have made them adept at surviving airstrikes while preserving their ability to conduct maritime attacks. This is not to say that airstrikes against the Houthis have been wholly ineffective. The strikes launched by the US this spring inflicted over $1 billion in damage, killed several prominent Houthi figures, and played a role in bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table, and a recent Israeli strike succeeded in killing Houthi military leader Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Ghamari. However, the Houthis may calculate that they would gain more militarily from the increase in aid they would receive from Iran if they began attacking ships which have made port calls to the United States than they would lose as a result of retaliatory American strikes, especially since such strikes would further encourage more disaffected young men to join the Houthi cause.

Finally, the Houthis’ growing proficiency in carrying out Red Sea attacks may embolden them to continue these efforts. The Houthis have increased their coordination with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Somali extremist group Al Shabaab in recent months. Greater cooperation with these groups could allow the Houthis to extend the range of ships they are able to target in the region and add further risk to ships hoping to hug the coast of Africa to avoid attacks, while also providing the Houthis with additional sources of regional intelligence and material support. Rather than relying exclusively on long-range munitions to harass their targets, recent attacks have also shown the Houthis adopting a greater variety of tactics, including using a combination of both remotely operated ships and vessels crewed by combatants who boarded and planted explosive devices on ships. These tactics suggest that the Houthis can continue harassing ships in the region even if the group’s supply of missiles and drones begins to dry up.

While Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and adjoining waterways may wax and wane in the coming months, safe transit through the Red Sea is unlikely to become a reality in the foreseeable future. The Houthis’ Red Sea campaign is not intrinsically linked to the Gaza conflict and may therefore continue even if that war ends peacefully. The Houthis will likely continue to use these attacks as a leverage point to press for more favorable final-status peace negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government to help secure them a more advantageous political position in Yemen moving forward. Only an end to the decades-long conflict between the Houthis and their enemies within Yemen will bring an end to the group’s efforts to disrupt maritime commerce in the region.

Matt Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor for the Center for Maritime Strategy. He previously served as Senior Program Manager for the Middle East and North Africa for the National Democratic Institute, where he managed international development programs in Yemen.
Featured Image: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Conducts PHOTOEX with ITS Cavour Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea (Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kade Bise Carrier Strike Group Two)
Asia-Pacific

China’s Coming Small Wars

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By Michael Hanson

The world took note of the meteoric growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), both in size and capability. Specifically, the PLA and PLAN’s amphibious capabilities development is impressive and alarming. According to many experts, the reason for this rapid development is the forceful reintegration of the island of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Analysts argue that a PLA cross-strait amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the largest amphibious assault in history, greater in scale and complexity than invasions of Normandy and Okinawa, the largest amphibious operations in each theater during World War II.2

A cross-strait operation would be a serious challenge for a world-class military. Though the Chinese military is quickly reaching peer status with the United States military in many areas, the PLA is not currently ready for a daunting amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The PLA remains untested. Chinese leaders will likely subject their prototype to a series of test runs before committing to such a fateful mission. History and current events show small wars and limited interventions serve as useful training grounds to develop the leadership, processes, and capabilities of military forces for larger designs. At present, North Korean troops are active participants in the war in Ukraine to presumably gain combat experience of their own.3 Likewise, before China embarks on a major war, it will likely hone its edge in small ones.

According to the renowned military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart, “A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.”4 To establish a lodgment, not only does the offensive force have to overcome a defending force, but significant geographic and climatic factors. Once successfully seizing a beachhead, the attacker must break out from it and begin a land campaign in which it can still meet defeat if it does not have adequate logistics to sustain its campaign. Even once ashore, the challenges of sustaining a campaign overseas are significantly greater than doing so overland. It is for these reasons that successful amphibious campaigns have been the domain of a relatively few militaries in modern history.

China seeks to join the small pantheon of militaries effective at amphibious operations. However, China’s military last combat experience occurred during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In that conflict Vietnamese militias stymied Chinese offensive thrusts while the bulk of Vietnam’s People’s Revolutionary Army was simultaneously engaged in Cambodia. Though the Chinese never officially acknowledged their casualty figures, independent estimates contend China suffered up to 25,000 killed in action and 37,000 wounded in the month-long war.5

The PLA made enormous strides in the 45 years since its last war. In 1979, China possessed a peasant army organized and equipped for what Mao Zedong called “Peoples’ War,” or guerrilla war.6 However, modern conflict changed China’s calculus. Following the American overwhelming triumph in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, China embarked on a massive military modernization.7 Chinese President Xi Jinping, recently charged the PLA to prepare for war, even uttering the words “dare to fight” during a visit to the Eastern Theater Command, the military district responsible for Taiwan.8,9 Experts assert President Xi is referring to forceful reunification of Taiwan.10

Before undertaking such an enormous and consequential operation the PLA must demonstrate its proficiency. China has conducted numerous exercises and drills, but these displays of military might will not prove sufficient. 11 The crucible of real combat must test PLA leadership, units, and operational methods before attempting an invasion of Taiwan. China’s adversaries should remain attuned to China’s engagement in small wars as means to advance political objectives and test its forces in preparation for a Taiwan invasion.

Contingency operations provide a wealth of knowledge and experience. For these reasons, these limited engagements serve as the most effective training operations. Indeed, throughout history countries have used active battlefields as schoolhouses for improving their combat capabilities, especially engaging in small wars to prepare for a larger one.

From 1937 to 1939, civil war raged in Spain and outside powers supplied troops and equipment to both sides. Though volunteers came to Spain from around the world, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided support with the express purpose of gaining knowledge and experience, and testing equipment and doctrinal methods with an eye on the future. Germany, rearming from the severe restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, exploited this opportunity to test its new tanks and airplanes, while employing new concepts.12 Germany’s famed Condor Legion, a unit consisting of both air and ground elements, was the vessel that gave some 19,000 German soldiers and airmen experience in a warzone.13 This was to be an investment that would pay off handsomely in a few short years.

As German arms and ideas were subjected to experimentation in Spain, the Wehrmacht learned other valuable lessons during Adolf Hitler’s bloodless conquests. In Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, as well as its annexations of Austria, the Sudetenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia, and finally Klaipeda, the Wehrmacht gained valuable experience in these unopposed invasions. These campaigns without battles allowed the German military to execute planned movements to seize objectives and secure key terrain and critical infrastructure. The Germans employed tactical and operational methods to set conditions for mutual support when contested. Though the Germans faced little opposition, they experienced other friction and fog inherent in war. In the process of working through these challenges, the Germans profited enormously, specifically in the areas of mobilization, deployment, logistics, and command and control.14

The United States, in fact, has a long history of developing its military in small wars close to home, but perhaps the most notable are in the period between the world wars known as the Banana Wars. Many American senior commanders in World War II cut their teeth as junior officers in these Latin American interventions, from the soldiers who chased Pancho Villa on the Mexican Border just before World War I, to the Marines who fought bandits in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua during the interwar period. More notable than the personalities who served in these small wars are the lessons in warfighting they brought back with them, such as the Marine development of close air support to tactics in jungle fighting that the “Old Breed” passed to their new recruits in preparation for Guadalcanal.15

More recent small-scale interventions in America’s near abroad have had notable impacts on the American military as well. Early confusion in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada exposed gaps in intelligence, planning, and joint interoperability in execution that helped instigate the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act which dictate high level organizations and processes to this day.16 On the other hand, the rapid success of Operation Just Cause in Panama seemed to validate doctrinal planning and training methods.17 Both short and decisive operations did much to improve America’s military stature in the rough wake of the Vietnam War.

Other countries have learned from limited adventures abroad as well. The severe shortcomings of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia with its rusty leftover Soviet military served as a wake-up call to President Vladimir Putin. The poor performance of Russian leaders, personnel, units, equipment, and procedures led to massive overhaul of the Russian Army, with a modernization program to upgrade all of these areas of disappointment.18 After several years of development, President Putin utilized Syria as a testing ground for new Russian weapons as well as a stage to advertise their capabilities to the world.19 The results of this build-up, combined with Russia’s initial proxy war in Ukraine, served to convince the world of a daunting Russian military machine, an image that was only dashed when Putin squandered these reforms with his ill-advised and poorly planned conventional invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Yet while the Russian war machine is bogged down in cratered and shell-blasted Ukrainian landscapes reminiscent of the battlefields of World War I, China continues developing its own capabilities. Chinese military spending rose significantly in 2024 to $236 billion.20 Recent Chinese developments include the 2022 launch of a Type-003 Fujian aircraft carrier, comparable to an American Nimitz class super carrier.21 In addition to this crown jewel of power projection, the PRC launched their fourth Type 075 Helicopter Landing Dock (LHD) ship, comparable to the American Tarawa and Wasp class amphibious ships, and other amphibious dock landing ships that complement this platform to round out the Amphibious Ready Group construct.22 Like the American Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), these acquisitions give China a suite of crisis response and power projection capabilities. They have even built several classes of at-sea replenishment ships to support their fleet far from home waters.23

PLAN Type 75 LHD CNS Hubei during a training exercise. (China Daily photo)

The question remains whether platforms similar to Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Tarawa/Wasp Class helicopter ships, and underway replenishment ships are necessary for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan when the island is already within range of airfields on the Chinese mainland. More likely these are intended for power projection in their near abroad. In other words, the world may witness a coming era of Chinese gunboat diplomacy and small war interventions similar to the Banana Wars during the period of rising American hegemony. With over $1 trillion invested since 2013 and as of 2023, 147 countries signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has lots of opportunities to intervene in overseas contingencies to defend its national interests.24 In line with former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s call for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct “new historic missions,” the PLAN is already at work flexing its muscles abroad.25

Since 2009 the PLAN has participated in international counter-piracy operations in areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Arabian Sea.26 Since the start of the Israel-Gaza War, the PLAN dispatched naval forces to the region following Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the waters off of Yemen.27 While the PLAN routinely operates from a military base in Djibouti, one expert warns this outpost will only be the first of many Chinese overseas military bases.28, 29 Yet Chinese involvement in multilateral military missions extend to the land as well.

In recent years, over 2,000 Chinese troops deployed to conflict zones in Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.30 These deployments are not a recent developments. Since 1992, China has deployed over 50,000 troops to no less than 29 United Nations peacekeeping missions, losing 24 killed in these operations.31 Of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China contributes the most personnel to UN missions. President Xi Jinping offered to provide 8,000 troops to a United Nations standby force in 2015.32 As Chinese sailors, soldiers, and airmen gain experience in overseas contingencies, the Chinese military builds its capability to pursue larger missions, like an invasion of Taiwan.

Conclusion

The world has time before China could attempt to use force to bring Taiwan under its heel. However, every year that passes, they increase their readiness. Drills and training exercises certainly increase a military’s abilities. However, only so much can be learned in sterile, controlled training environments. China will likely test its military might in small wars before embarking on a larger one. The world should take note of China’s entry and actions during a small war. When the People’s Republic of China does engage in a small war, the world will know China is preparing for the forceful reunification of Taiwan.

Major Michael A. Hanson, USMC, is an Infantry Officer serving at The Basic School, where the Marine Corps trains its lieutenants and warrant officers in character, officership, and the skills required of a provisional rifle platoon commander. He is also a member of the Connecting File, a Substack newsletter that shares material on tactics, techniques, procedures, and leadership for Marines at the infantry battalion level and below.

References

[1] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2017) Foreward.

[2] Council on Foreign Relations. “Why China Would Struggle To Invade Taiwan.” https://www.cfr.org/article/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[3] Karolina Hird, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil, “North Korea Joins Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and Northeast Asia,” Institute for the Study of War, last updated October 25, 2024. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications. Accessed July 31, 2025.

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amphibious Operations, JP 3-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 21 January 2021). I-1.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[5] Zhang Xiaoming, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184 (Dec 2005)

[6] Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, Mark Cozad, People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts, (RAND Corporation, 2020). 4.

[7] Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, Mark Cozad, People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts. 4.

[8] Miriah Davis, “President Xi Jinping orders Chinese military to prepare for war over concerns national security is ‘increasingly unstable, uncertain’”, Sky News Australia, November 9, 2022. https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/president-xi-jinping-orders-chinese-military-to-prepare-for-war-over-concerns-national-security-is-increasingly-unstable-uncertain/news-story/db8ca191e86fd81a23b3b794ff4f2a0e. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[9] “China’s Xi Jinping says army must ‘dare to fight’ during military inspection,” The Straits Times, last updated July 6, 2023. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-xi-jinping-says-army-must-dare-to-fight-during-military-inspection. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[10] Brad Dress, “China will be ready for potential Taiwan invasion by 2027, US admiral warns,” The Hill, March 21, 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/china-will-be-ready-for-potential-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-admiral-warns/ar-BB1kjib7. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[11] Kristin Huang, “Chinese military drills simulate amphibious landing and island seizure in battle conditions,” South China Morning Post, July 28, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3142851/chinese-military-drills-simulate-amphibious-landing-and-island. Accessed March 26, 2024;

[12] John T. Hendriz, “The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16:1 (1993). 87-88.

[13] John T. Correll, “The Condor Legion,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, February 1, 2013. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0213condor/. Accessed March 26, 2024.

[14] Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) 152-153.

[15] Mark R. Folse, “Never Known a Day of Peace,” Naval History 35:4, August 2021. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/august/never-known-day-peace. Accessed March 26, 2024; Joseph H. Alexander, “Close Air Support: The Pioneering Years,” Naval History 26:6, November 2012. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2012/november/close-air-support-pioneering-years. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[16] Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, (Washington, DC, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). 6. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024;

Daniel Bolger, “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics,” Military Review LXVI:7, July 1986. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-Select-Articles/Operation-Urgent-Fury/. Accessed March 27, 2024;

John J. Hamre, “Reflections: Looking Back at the Need for Goldwater-Nichols,” Center For Strategic & International Studies, January 27, 2016. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflections-looking-back-need-goldwater-nichols. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[17] R. Cody Phillips, “CMH PUB No. 70-85-1 Operation Just Cause: The Incursion Into Panama,” U.S. Army Center for Military History 2004, 47-48. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-85-1/cmhPub_70-85-1.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[18] Ariel Cohen Dr. and Robert E. Hamilton Colonel, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (US Army War College Press, 2011), 49-54. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/576. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[19] Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, “The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria,” Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020) 68. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/russias-war-in-syria.pdf. Accessed March 26, 2024:

Anton Lavrov, “Russian Aerial Operations in the Syrian War,” Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020) 93. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/russias-war-in-syria.pdf. Accessed March 27, 2024.

[20] Gordon Arthur, “China unveils new defense budget, with a 7.2% increase,” Defense News, March 6, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/03/06/china-unveils-new-defense-budget-with-a-72-increase/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[21] H.I. Sutton, “China Launches First Aircraft Carrier Which Rivals U.S. Navy’s,” Naval News, June 17, 2022. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/china-launches-first-aircraft-carrier-which-rivals-u-s-navys/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[22] Xavier Vavasseur, “China Launches 4th Type 075 LHD For The PLAN,” Naval News, December 14, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/china-launches-4th-type-075-lhd-for-the-plan/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[23] Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/sustaining-the-chinese-navys-operations-at-sea-bigger-fists-growing-legs/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[24] Council on Foreign Relations. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[25] Daniel M. Hartnett, “Chapter 2 The ‘New Historic Missions:’ Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy,” Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College April 1, 2014). 31-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11946.5. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[26] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy’s 14 years of missions in blue waters safeguard intl trade routes, win more overseas recognition,” Global Times, Aug 1, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1271933.shtml. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[27] Aadil Brar, “China Sends Warships to the Middle East,” Newsweek, February 22, 2024. https://www.newsweek.com/china-warship-red-sea-missile-east-houthi-1872284. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[28] Ben Blanchard, “China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti.” Reuters, August 1, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1AH3E1/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[29] Eric A. Miller, “More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/china-military-bases-africa-navy-pla-geopolitics-strategy/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[30] Thomas Dyrenforth, “Beijing’s Blue Helmets: What to Make of China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa,” Modern War Institute, August 19, 2021. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[31] “China touts role in UN peacekeeping, Middle East peace,” Associated Press, June 25, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-middle-east-china-government-and-politics-6014343ada529a978436dec343c1f04e. Accessed March 28, 2024.

[32] Courtney J. Fung, “China’s Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping,” United States Institute of Peace, July 26, 2016. https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping. Accessed March 28, 2024.

Featured Image: Rigged with combat loads, paratroopers assigned to a brigade under the Chinese PLA Army file into a Mi-171E transport helicopter during a parachute training exercise in September 2025. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn/by Hu Qiwu)

South America

The Uruguayan Navy: Preparing for the 21st century

1 Comment

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

In a speech to commemorate the service’s sea day (Día de la Fuerza de Mar) on August 21, Uruguayan Navy Captain Daniel Di Bono stated, “Starting today, it is time to start writing another page of this story. Ours, [the story] of the older ones, those of the Frigates, the Minesweepers, the [marine research vessel] Vanguardia, is already coming to an end. The period of modern, agile, and flexible ocean patrol vessels, coastal patrol vessels, and scientific vessels is approaching.”

Navies constantly evolve due to new challenges, objectives, visions, and realities. However, analysts rarely witness a sharp evolution of a Navy and its fleet. The Uruguayan Navy is undergoing that process, and as a reliable U.S. ally, Washington needs to understand what is going on and why.

Out With the Old, In With the New

For decades, the Uruguayan Navy operated one of the oldest fleets in South America. Aside from landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay and not considering Guyana and Suriname (more generally associated with the Caribbean), Uruguay is the only South American country that does not possess submarines. The fleet’s flagship is the Luneburg-class logistics vessel ROU 04 General Artigas, launched in the 1960s. The service has decommissioned several in recent years, including its only frigate, the former ROU 01 Uruguay – formerly Portugal’s Comandante Joao Belo (F480). In other words, currently, the Navy has no main combat ships.

On the other hand, the service is receiving new(ish) vessels. In late 2022, the Uruguayan Navy commissioned three Marine Protector-class patrol boats formerly operated by the United States Coast Guard. The three ships are already operating across Uruguayan waters: ROU 14 Río Arapey, ROU 15 Río de la Plata, and ROU 16 Río Yaguarón. Moreover, after around a decade of negotiations, brand-new ships are on the horizon. In July, the Ministry of Defense announced that two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) will be purchased from a Spanish shipyard. Crucially, the OPVs will be capable of carrying helicopters, an ability that the fleet currently lacks.

Three former Coast Guard cutters, now serving the Uruguay Navy as ROU-14 Rio Arapey, ROU-15 Rio de La Plata and ROU-16 Rio Yaguaron, stop at Coast Guard Sector San Juan Sept. 24, 2022, during their more than two-month transit from Baltimore to Uruguay. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Capt. Robert Pirone)

Uruguay is scheduled to hold general elections in October 2024. Therefore, one can only hope that the OPV acquisition will be confirmed and all necessary agreements signed so the deal does not fall victim to traditional election-related debates and delays.

Evolving Challenges

A fact mentioned earlier deserves more analysis – the Uruguayan Navy does not possess subs and currently does operate heavy warships in its fleet. As discussed in Captain Di Bono’s speech, that era is ending for this service. Geopolitics is a reason for this statement: Uruguay borders two countries, Argentina and Brazil, and bilateral relations are quite strong. For example, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has donated M41C Walker Bulldog tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery platforms to the Uruguayan Army. The likelihood of an inter-state war is minimal; therefore, as the Uruguayan officials have also stated, the Navy’s necessity to operate cruisers and minesweepers is similarly minimal. Dr. Andrea Resende, associate professor at Brazil’s University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNIBH), explained to CIMSEC that “there is some tension between Argentina and Uruguay, however not like in the previous decades. Yet, Brazil has always played a third party during conflicts and tensions in the region because the stability of its borders frontiers depends on a peaceful environment.”

To promote close military relations, from September 11-15, the navies of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay carried out a new iteration of an academic exercise on trilateral warfare (Juego de Guerra Trilateral) in Carrasco, Uruguay. “The Trilateral War Game, carried out annually, was designed to allow interaction in the formulation, analysis and solution of international crisis problems in the South Atlantic region, based on a fictitious situation, using naval forces,” explains the Argentine Navy’s publication Gaceta Maritima.

Nowadays, the Uruguayan Navy is evolving into a smaller, faster, more modern fleet. What are its challenges? Controlling the country’s vast maritime waters is critical to combat illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing and other maritime crimes like drug trafficking and smuggling. In other words, protecting Uruguay’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from non-interstate threats is critical.

Having OPVs that carry helicopters will also be helpful for interdiction operations and search-and-rescue missions. Smaller craft can also operate along some of Uruguay’s rivers for security and patrol operations and to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions. It is worth noting that the Navy has created a tactical operations center (Centro de Operaciones Tácticas: COT) that oversees the deployment of surface and aerial assets to combat illegal maritime activities.

Dr. Resende warned of a potential spillover effect from the other side of the Atlantic: “While piracy, robbery, and hijacking are major problems in the Gulf of Guinea, they can overflow across the entire region, so there is a need for the South Atlantic navies to be ready and to participate in joint exercises and operations,” to maintain their readiness and to be able to work together. In other words, having a smaller fleet does not mean giving up some capabilities, particularly regarding maritime law enforcement and patrol.

With that said, there will always be a need for heavier, more specialized ships. Science is a good reason for having them. The Uruguayan Navy has an active role in scientific and oceanographic research, but unfortunately, the scientific vessel ROU 22 Oyarvide was decommissioned in 2022 without a replacement ready. While not a priority as compared to the OPVs, Montevideo must assign financial assets to acquire a new scientific vessel soon. Moreover, Uruguay has a robust presence in Antarctica, and General Artigas participated in the country’s recent 2022/2023 Antarctic campaign. Upon its return to Montevideo in February, Defense Minister Javier García noted, “[Artigas] was a ship that had not sailed since 2018, which was overhauled, the things that needed to be fixed were fixed, and it once again provided an essential service in an Antarctic mission.” In other words, the Uruguayan Navy has a critical role in scientific operations across Uruguayan and Antarctic waters; therefore, scientific and polar-capable vessels must be components of the future fleet.

The service has yet to disclose when the ancient Artigas will be decommissioned. The ship is currently the fleet’s heaviest vessel, so a similar platform will be needed to replace it for local transportation operations and Uruguay’s future Antarctic campaigns.

Montevideo-Washington Relations: Moving Forward

Finally, a word about U.S.-Uruguay naval relations is necessary. They may not be as constant as the U.S. Navy’s and U.S. Coast Guard’s presence across the Greater Caribbean, but they exist. The donation of the Marine Protector vessels to the Uruguayan Navy and helicopters to the Uruguayan Air Force over the past two years are an excellent example of close bilateral defense relations.

Moreover, in February, the U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter Stone’s (WMSL-758) visit to Montevideo port coincided with the 70th anniversary of the mutual defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1953. “The agreement served as the foundation for the long history of cooperation between the two democracies in defense equipment, training, and peacekeeping operations around the world that continues to thrive today,” explained the U.S. embassy in Uruguay in a press release.

Given the ongoing war in Ukraine (and news of successful attacks against Russian ships and submarines), tensions with China, and regular incidents at sea with Iran, it may appear puzzling for Washington that a Navy can operate without frigates or submarines. However, the geopolitics of Latin America and the Caribbean differ from other areas of the world. In particular, inter-state relations between Uruguay with Argentina and Brazil remain strong in the South Atlantic. The participation in joint exercises by these three militaries is an effective confidence-building mechanism.

“One can never predict the future [but a military service must be] prepared for whatever may come. And this is the case for Uruguay. Even if we live in a relative state of peace, the maritime space is threatened daily with cyberattacks, IUU fishing, piracy, and illegal trafficking,” concluded Dr. Resende. Smaller but faster and more modern ships, with more interdiction and surveillance capabilities, will be the pillars of the Uruguayan Navy’s fleet in the 21st century. The threats may be changing, but the mission remains the same.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

Featured Image: The Uruguayan naval frigate Uruguay (ROU 1) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker.)