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Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: May 2016 Part Two

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part two of the May 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past two weeks CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including the future role of the Littoral Combat Ship in the U.S. Navy, the continued development of the U.S. military’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the possibility of reducing tensions in the Western Pacific with an international Standing Naval Group, and the development of an undersea second strike capability for India’s nuclear forces. Read Part One here.

Beginning the roundup with a discussion on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Jerry Hendrix for Defense One argues that the U.S. Navy must adapt a procurement strategy that will emphasize a larger fleet and focus on providing the capacity to maintain a sustainable forward presence in multiple contentious maritime environments. Considering current budgetary constraints and the high costs associated with advanced capability ships, such as a $15 billion dollar aircraft carrier or a $2 billion dollar destroyer, acquiring enhanced LCS’s can provide the Navy with a relatively low-cost yet capable platform suitable for growing the size of the fleet. Mr. Hendrix suggests that to achieve an appropriate fleet size of 350 ships (currently 272) and to continue to promote global maritime stability the LCS should be recognized as a priority for the Navy to deploy in significant numbers.

Dave Majumdar, at The National Interest, provides an overview of the Ohio-class Replacement Program (ORP). Mr. Majumdar notes that Electric Boat will be responsible for about 80 percent of the submarines design and production while Huntington Ingalls Newport News will take on the other 20 percent of design and production work. To reduce costs and inefficiencies affiliated with previous ballistic missile submarine construction, the ships’ designers have applied several technologies and systems used in the Virginia-class ­submarines for the ORP. Mr. Majumdar explains that these cost reductions, in addition to the common missile compartment (CMC), will allow for the ORP to be constructed with minimal delays, which should also limit typical cost overruns associated with nuclear submarine production.

Sam LaGrone, at U.S. Naval Institute News, highlights the continued development of Lockheed Martin’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and the current $321 million dollar contract from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Lockheed is operating under to complete the missile’s critical design review (CDR). After completion of the CDR, testing for use of the air-launch variant of the missile by the Boeing B-1B Lancer supersonic bomber and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter will begin. Mr. LaGrone explains that the LRASM program is part of the Pentagon’s process of substantially improving the military’s decades-old gap in anti-surface weapons.

Entering the Asia-Pacific, Lauren Dickey and Natalie Sambhi at Foreign Entanglements discuss cross-strait developments in the context of Taiwan’s new President while also unpacking China’s security policy beyond the South China Sea. The discussion highlighted the attributes of the current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and how her recent public rejection and criticism of mainland China’s one-child policy reflects the pragmatic and pro-independence perspective that she will likely articulate throughout her time in office. Ms. Dickey and Ms. Sambhi also raised the possibility of increased counterterrorism operations in China to meet heightened domestic security concerns in addition to examining China’s role in driving U.S.-Australian relations.

Steven Wills and his colleague Ronald Harris, at U.S. Naval Institute News, discuss the need for an international solution focused on reducing tensions in the Western Pacific. Mr. Wills and Mr. Harris suggest that establishing a Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group (SIPMG) for the purposes of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR), counter-piracy patrols, and general assistance to mariners in distress in international waters can provide a medium through which countries with competing territorial claims in the region can still cooperate and maintain channels of communication. The article explains that the SIPMG would primarily consist of limited capability ships focused on low-threat security operations while the Group’s command structure could be based off of the proven national rotation system used by the Standing North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Maritime Groups.

To conclude the roundup, Harry Kazianis for The Asia Times examines the DF-21D ASBM threat and whether the publicity surrounding the missile in defense circles is warranted. The article references the US-China Economic Security Review Commission Report to highlight the unproven capabilities of the missile, particularly in successfully hitting a moving ship from hundreds or thousands of miles away while the ship is implementing a wide-range of defense and countermeasures against the missile and its targeting systems. The article provides an interesting comparison between the Soviet Union’s development of a submarine-launched ASBM in the 1970’s and China’s current attempt to develop the same long-range ASBM capability. Mr. Kazianis notes that the Soviet Union cancelled the development of the missile due to terminal targeting difficulties, which is an end result that may soon reflect China’s ASBM program. Mr. Kazianis suggests that all contingencies should be prepared for considering Beijing’s access to an advanced satellite and ballistic missile technology base that the USSR lacked over 40 years ago.

CIMSEC Members were active elsewhere in May:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies, international law and defense policy.

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Capability Analysis, Tactical Concepts

Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Part Two

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The following article is part of our cross-posting partnership with Information Dissemination‘s Jon Solomon. It is republished here with the author’s permission. It can be read it in its original form here.

Read part one of this series here.

By Jon Solomon

Was U.S. Navy Tactical Deception Effective?

Since Backfire needed pathfinder support, the U.S. Navy’s key to disrupting if not decapitating a raid by the former was to defeat the latter. As part of my thesis research, I came across much circumstantial evidence that the U.S. Navy’s combination of strict Emission Control (EMCON) discipline, decentralized command and control doctrine, occasional use of lower campaign-value warships to simulate high campaign-value warships, and perhaps even occasional use of electronic jamming gave SOSS controllers and Soviet reconnaissance assets fits during real-world operations. Still, I did not come across any authoritative Russian perspectives on whether or how these U.S. Navy counter-targeting efforts affected Soviet doctrine, tactics, or confidence. That’s what makes the following comment from Tokarev so interesting:

“Moreover, knowing the position of the carrier task force is not the same as knowing the position of the carrier itself. There were at least two cases when in the center of the formation there was, instead of the carrier, a large fleet oiler or replenishment vessel with an enhanced radar signature (making it look as large on the Backfires’ radar screens as a carrier) and a radiating tactical air navigation system. The carrier itself, contrary to routine procedures, was steaming completely alone, not even trailing the formation. To know for sure the carrier’s position, it was desirable to observe it visually.”(Tokarev, Pg. 77)

He goes on to describe a special reconnaissance-attack group of sacrificial bombers that might be detached from an inbound raid to penetrate a naval formation and visually identify the primary targets. Only with positive target designations from these pathfinders, or perhaps from TU-95RT Bear-D reconnaissance aircraft preceding the raid, could Backfire crews have any confidence the single missile they each carried was aimed at a valid and valuable target (Tokarev, Pg. 72, 77). Even then, he observes that “Contrary to widespread opinion, no considerable belief was placed in the ability of launched missiles to resist ECM efforts” (Tokarev, Pg. 75), indicating recognition that the countertargeting battle hardly ended with missile launch.

The one exception to the above contact classification and identification problems would have been a war-opening first salvo attack, in which targeting-quality cues could have been provided to Backfires or other anti-ship missile-carrying assets by any tattletale ships following a carrier closely. While noting the tattletale tactic’s high potential efficacy, Tokarev makes clear it could only be used in peacetime and would never again be possible following hostilities’ outbreak:

“Despite the existence of air reconnaissance systems such as Uspekh, satellite systems like Legenda, and other forms of intelligence and observation, the most reliable source of targeting of carriers at sea was the direct-tracking ship. Indeed, if you see a carrier in plain sight, the only problem to solve is how to radio reliably the reports and targeting data against the U.S. electronic countermeasures. Ironically, since the time lag of Soviet military communication systems compared to the NATO ones is quite clear, the old Morse wireless telegraph used by the Soviet ships was the long-established way to solve that problem. With properly trained operators, Morse keying is the only method able to resist active jamming in the HF band… But the direct tracker was definitely no more than another kind of kamikaze. It was extremely clear that if a war started, these ships would be sent to the bottom immediately. Given that, the commanding officer of each had orders to behave like a rat caught in a corner: at the moment of war declaration or when specifically ordered, after sending the carrier’s position by radio, he would shell the carrier’s flight deck with gunfire, just to break up the takeoff of prepared strikes, fresh CAP patrols, or anything else.” (Tokarev, Pg. 80)

Preventing a tattletale from maintaining track on a carrier accordingly reduced the chances for successfully striking that carrier. Additionally, since not all carriers would be operating forward at the time of the first salvo, those withheld in areas tattletales could not readily access would be more or less immune from large-scale attacks. This would leave the Backfires overwhelmingly dependent upon pathfinders in any later raid attempt.

It should be obvious that EW (and its contemporary cousin, cyber warfare) or tactical deception capabilities on their own are not going to deter an adversary from embarking upon some form of conventional aggression. The adversary’s decision to seek war will always be politically-driven, and the possibility of aggression out of desperation vice opportunism cannot be discounted. To the extent that political and military leaders’ latent psychological perceptions of their forces’ strengths and weaknesses influence their war making calculus, though, efforts to erode an opponent’s confidence in his most doctrinally important military capabilities can induce him to raise his political threshold for resorting to war. Tokarev’s observations therefore imply that Soviet commanders understood the likely cost in their crews’ lives that would be necessary just to provide a raid a chance at success, and that complicating variables such as the U.S. Navy’s demonstrated counter-targeting competencies only made the whole endeavor seem more uncertain and costly. The impact upon general deterrence, while immeasurable in any real sense, obviously was not insignificant.

In part three of the series, an examination of the deception tactics that might have been employed by Backfire raids.

Jon Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at jfsolo107@gmail.com. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Future Tech

Naval Applications for Slack: The Collaboration Tool

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Naval Applications of Tech

The following article is the first in CIMSEC’s newest column: Naval Applications of Tech. Written by Terence Bennett, Naval Applications of Tech will discuss how emerging and disruptive technologies can be used to make the U.S. Navy more effective. It will examine potential and evolving developments in the tech industry, communication platforms, computer software and hardware, mechanical systems, power generation, and other areas.

“The most damaging phrase in the language is ‘We’ve always done it this way!’” — Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper in an interview in Information Week, March 9, 1987, p. 52

By Terence Bennett

The Navy has spent many years looking at how to bring the newest information technology to operating forces. A U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article from 1998 criticized the Navy’s resistance to change and recommended setting up local slack-logo_large-1024x403area networks (LAN) using the built-in capabilities of Win95.[1] Technology has come a long way since then, but the use of floppy disks aboard this author’s ship in 2012 indicates that the Navy still has some progress to make. An application, Slack, may be just what the Navy needs.

Microsoft gave us Outlook and PowerPoint and the Navy has not questioned their dominance for 20 years. This author argues that traditional email services are no longer helping a ship’s crew effectively communicate. Leaders may be familiar with sitting in their stateroom or office to send and receive emails, but it is no longer an effective or efficient form of communication. Many organizations, the Navy included, have outgrown this tool for much of its internal communication, though they may not be aware of this. McKinsey, a consultancy, estimated that high-skill knowledge workers (including managers) spend 28 percent of the workweek managing email and 20 percent of the day looking for internal information or tracking down individuals who can help with a specific task (doesn’t that sound familiar…at least we have the 1MC.)[2]

Navy leadership takes pride in the autonomy and independence of a Commanding Officer at sea. But the autonomy of leadership is challenged by the business of meeting the bureaucratic operational and training standards of today’s navy. Leaders are so burdened by relentless requirements and tasks, they are forced to ‘fight the closest fire.’ This is not only a Navy problem. Many civilian companies struggle under the burden of hundreds of emails a day and the reactionary mindset such an environment creates. The McKinsey report finds, “when companies use social media internally, messages become content; a searchable record of knowledge can reduce, by as much as 35 percent, the time employees spend searching for company information.”[3] Slack, an application already available on the open market, facilitates this.

slack-desktop-integrations.0 (1)
Sample Slack window. Image: The Verge.

Slack is a communication tool set  designed by software engineers to streamline their own team’s communication. In that spirit, it is very deliberately built, intuitive to use, and efficiently designed. More relevant to any commander or unit leader looking to streamline their team’s communication, Slack works without the need for any installation or system integration. Users log in and build a team through the Slack website. That’s it.

Time magazine enthusiastically uses Slack in its office, stating:

“Venture-capital darlings Airbnb, BuzzFeed and Blue Bottle Coffee use it. So do Fortune 500 firms like Comcast and Walmart. Teams at NASA and the State Department are on Slack. (More than 2,000 people use Slack at Time Inc., which publishes this magazine and many others.) Not in a generation has a new tool been adopted more quickly by a wider variety of businesses or with such joy.”[4]

Email messages are often hard to follow, thus making tracing decision-making logic more difficult. Email can become especially cumbersome when checking in with teammates, getting updates, or when trying to get a quick ‘RGR.’ Slack is literally changing the way companies operate. It allows all communication to be controlled in one place, integrated cheaply and easily over commercial web browsers on existing architecture. Imagine if all of a ship’s internal email communication was immediately pre-categorized into channels that were searchable. Companies that have successfully integrated Slack now use traditional email only for external communication. As with chat software, organizations use big public channels, private groups, and one-on-one channels. Although many of the embedding features for mobile users and coders may not be useful for the Navy, there are exciting ways to integrate cloud storage, like Dropbox, in the future. The enterprise pricing options start at $8 per month and scale upward.

One big impetus for a shift to Slack is its mobile integration. With the Navy’s move towards the eSailors program and making ships wireless, leaders will have opportunities to stay mobile and work on the move. Putting a tablet in the hands of every Sailor will likely change some of our operations and maintenance procedures. Such connectivity will undoubtedly change the way we communicate and organize. Slack can be the first controlled step towards bringing the Navy into this new and empowering world. Leadership challenges in the Navy may become increasingly difficult under budget constraints and operational requirements, but the new Sailors enlisting in the Navy today have the technological skills to face those challenges. Leadership has an obligation to give them the tools and opportunities to do just that.

LT Bennett is a former Surface Warfare Officer and current Intelligence Officer. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

[1] Michael Junge, “Paperless Navy …Pshaw!“, 124 Proceedings Magazine, Jul. 1998.

[2] Michael Chui, James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles Roxburgh, Hugo Sarrazin, Geoffrey Sands, and Magdalena Westergren; The Social Economy: Unlocking Value and Productivity Through Social Technologies, McKinsey Gloval Institute, July 2012.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Samuel Jacobs, “How E-mail killer Slack Will Change the Future of Work“, Time Magazine, Oct. 29, 2015.

Current Operations

May Recap

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CIMSEC

Announcements and Updates
India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week Wraps up on CIMSEC by Dmitry Filipoff
Call for Articles: The Future of Undersea Competition Topic Week by Sally DeBoer
CIMSEC April Recap by Dmitry Filipoff
CIMSEC DC’s May Chapter Meetup by Scott Cheney-Peters
CIMSEC 2016 Election Nominations Now Open by CIMSEC Team
The Future of Undersea Competition Topic Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC by Dmitry Filipoff

Future of Undersea Competition Topic Week
India’s Submarine Situation: Evolving Capabilities and Opportunities by Vidya Sagar Reddy and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Information Management in Next Generation Anti-Submarine Warfare by Michael Glynn

Podcasts
Sea Control 117- Niger Delta Pirates Declare War? with Matt Hipple and Dirk Steffen
Sea Control 118- ISIS Capabilities Against Civil Aviation with Matthew Merighi and Max Leitschuh

Interviews
CIMSEC Interviews Captain Mark Vandroff Program Manager DDG 51 by Dmitry Filipoff
Part One
Part Two
Comic Books & War: An Interview with Dr. Cord A. Scott by Christopher Nelson
A Converation with G. William Weatherly, Author of Sheppard of the Argonne by Sally DeBoer

Members Roundup
Members’ Roundup: April 2016 by Sam Cohen
Members’ Roundup: May 2016 Part One by Sam Cohen

Events
9-14 May 2016 Maritime Security Events by Emil Maine

Naval Affairs
The End of Uniformed Naval Strategic Study? by Steve Wills
Wargaming Distributed Lethality by LT Megan Mcculloch
MK VI: The Next Generation of Interdiction by Lawrence Hajek
Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence by ADM. Jon Greenert
crossposted from National Defense University JFQ
Assessing the Usefulness of the American Large Deck Carrier by Ben Ho Wan Beng
Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Part One by Jon Solomon
crossposted from Information Dissemination

Asia-Pacific
Asymmetric Maritime Diplomacy: Involving Coastguards, Maritime Militias in China Dealings by Alex Calvo
Turbulence for the Philippines: Blimps Over the South China Sea by Vidya Sagar Reddy
From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt. 2 by Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson
The Concept of “Reach” in Grasping China’s Active Defense Strategy Part One by VADM. Pradeep Chauhan (ret)
crossposted from Bharat Shakti
Cam Rahn International Port Visits in Strategic Context by Zachary Abuza and Nguyen Nhat Anh
America’s Expectation versus India’s Expediency: India as a Regional Net Security Provider by Gurpreet S. Khurana
crossposted from the National Maritime Foundation
The Criticality of the IONS Maritime Security Construct by VADM. Pradeep Chauhan (ret)

Europe
Unsafe Mixed Migration By Sea: The Case of the Mediterranean Region by Evmorfia-Chrysovalantou Seiti

Cyber
A Cyber-Information Operations Offset Strategy to Counter the Surge of Chinese Power by Jake Bebber
Part One (Apr.)
Part Two

Reviews
Sheppard of the Argonne: Alternative History Naval Battles of WWII by Sally Deboer
Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates by CDR Greg Smith
The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea by Ching Chang
Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century by G. Parthasarathy

Featured Image:  ATLANTIC OCEAN (April 21, 2016) The future guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) transits the Atlantic Ocean during acceptance trials April 21, 2016 with the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). (U.S. Navy/Released)