Tag Archives: China

Let’s Change the Name of the South China Sea

Submitted for your consideration (pretend this is a Rod Serling sounding voice).  Imagine that the United States diplomatic corps starting doing the sort of thing all of these less-than-cooperative states like China, Russia, Iran, and Daesh  (the Islamic State) have been doing.  Imagine calling things by a name that suits our purposes, even if it is different than what is on a map.   I propose we quit calling the body of water that is surrounded on most of its many sides by Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Borneo, and Malaysia by another name other the South China Sea.   This was the name was given to it by Europeans, the Chinese simply calling it the “south sea” for most of their own history.   I propose instead we call it the Indochina Sea.  Period.

Why?  Simple—it seems the People’s Republic of China has decided to appeal to a sort of lowest common denominator approach in their neo-maritime imperialist venture.  They have claimed much of the Indochina Sea according to a policy known as the “nine-dash line”—basically using the rationale that it has “our” name on it so it is ours.  What is more fascinating is how effective the Chinese have been in selling their rationale to different audiences, many of them poorly informed about the history and geography of this vital region. In short,  the first purpose in such a re-naming is to try to educate a bit, but educate to suit the purposes of the United States government as it continues in its job of trying to maintain the current international maritime order, which has worked quite well since the UN was created almost 70 years ago—the Cold War notwithstanding.

There is plenty of precedent for the United States (and frankly its many allies) to do this.  In fact, we did it back in 1990.   That was the year that Saddam Hussein invaded and conquered the independent sovereign nation of Kuwait.  Some of you know it as Gulf War I, although historians like the humble author consider it Gulf War II, since the Iran-Iraq War  was really the first of the modern Gulf Wars.   It involved the United States in its closing phases when we conducted operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis in order to protect Gulf shipping.  But which Gulf?  You mean the Persian Gulf?  Well…that was a bit of a problem.  Our Arab allies in 1990 such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria (yes folks, Syria), found Americans’ use of the term “Persian Gulf” offensive because none of them liked Iran (a.k.a. Persia) and—presto chango—it became the Arabian Gulf in all formal diplomatic and military channels ever since.  Seriously, check it out on the internet if you dare.   Of course changing South China Sea to Indochina Sea would probably irritate the Chinese as much as it might make our Southeast Asian partners happy, but I am sure the Iranians were none too pleased either when we renamed “their” body of water.  The point is, there is precedence and two can play this game.

“Oh those Americans, they are so obnoxious,” one might think when hearing this proposal.  If however one wants an example of the forbearance and moderation of Americans one need only look in their own back yard, where sits the Gulf of Mexico.   They could have renamed it the Gulf the United States or Florida, but no, they (we) did not.  Maybe the fact that Mexico has not claimed all of the Gulf of Mexico to some five-dash line or something helps explain why it gets to keep its name for the geography books and in diplomatic and military language. 

Names mean things – China certainly sees it that way, so should we.  Why continue to give her a stick, albeit a rhetorical stick, that she can hit us, her neighbors, and the international community with?  We can and should start simple—at least inside our government and the Department of Defense (DoD).   The essence of information-politics (as opposed to information warfare) as well as strategic communications is to begin to fight back in the war of words in a meaningful, often incremental way.   As long as we are at it, we might label this initiative information diplomacy and, just for giggles, have it come out of the Department of State rather than big, bad DoD.  Sometimes doing something silly can show someone else just how silly they are acting.   A lesson for China perhaps?

John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Professor of Military History and has served on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College since July 2000, retiring from the naval service in 2004.  He earned a Ph.D. in History from Kansas State University in 2007.   He is the author of Agents of Innovation (2008) and co-authored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D.M. Giangreco, an a Military History of Japan (2014).  He was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History in 2011 for “The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation: 1922-1937.”  He is also an adjunct professor for the Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program and with the Military History Masters Program at Norwich University.  A former naval aviator (flying in both EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft), he has completed numerous cruises aboard four different aircraft carriers.  He flew reconnaissance and combat missions during the last decade of the Cold War, the First Gulf War (Desert Storm), Iraq and the Persian Gulf (Southern Watch), and the Balkans (Deliberate Force over Bosnia).   His most recent book, also published by Praeger, is entitled Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns.

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Return of the Clandestine Merchant Raider?

By Chuck Hill

Since before recorded history, merchant vessels have been adapted for offensive purposes by navies, pirates, and privateers to destroy enemy commerce or to launch attacks ashore. Frequently they employed disguise and deception. The UK employed Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) during the 1982 Falklands War, the Malaysian Navy has converted two container ships into pirate hunters, and the US Navy has leased ships to support special operations, but I think the last time they were used to attack commerce was WWII. By the end 1943, it appeared that technology, primarily in the form of reliable radios, plus robust challenge-and-reply procedures, a comprehensive naval control of shipping organization, and a seemingly impervious blockade of the German coast, had made this type of  warfare very dangerous, but new technology may now be working in favor of using converted merchant ships as clandestine warships.

The German Experience

During World Wars I and II, the German Navy achieved considerable success using armed merchant ships as clandestine merchant raiders. At small cost they sank or captured a large number of allied merchant vessels, tied down a number of warships searching for the raiders, and even managed to sink allied warships.

In World War I, three raiders, Wolf, Moewe, and Seeadler (a full rigged sailing ship), sank or captured 78 ships totaling 323,644 tons. In addition to the merchant ships they captured or sank directly, merchant raiders proved effective mine layers. One victim of a mine laid by the raider Moewe was the pre-dreadnought battleship EdwardVII, sunk on 6 January, 1915.

In World War II nine German Merchant raiders, Atlantis, Komet, Kormoran, Michel, Orion, Pinguin, Stier, Thor, and Widder, sank or captured 129 ships, totaling 800,661 tons. While this pales in comparison to the sinkings by U-boats, they were far more effective than the regular navy surface raiders, including the vaunted pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, that managed to sink or captured only 59, totaling 232,633 tons. The merchant raider Kormoran even managed to torpedo and sink the light cruiser HMAS Sidney, before the Kormoran herself was also sunk.

Typically, the raiders of WWII were equipped with six obsolescent 5.9″ guns and large numbers of torpedoes to allow ships to be sunk rapidly. Most were also equipped with aircraft and some with torpedo boats.  They were also equipped to change their appearance while underway.

Several of their voyages were extraordinarily long. Michel’s first voyage was 346 days. Orion’s was 510 days. Thor was away 329 days and managed to sink HMS Voltaire, an armed merchant cruiser. Pinguin for 357 days. Komet for 512 days. Kormoran for 350 days before her fatal encounter with HMAS Sydney. The ships were refueled and rearmed by supporting vessels that also took their prisoners. Raiders were also used to resupply submarines.

Perhaps surprisingly, none of these WWII raiders were underway when the war began, when they might have been most effective. They were sortied in two waves in 1940 and 1942.

End of the Merchant Raider

Despite their successes, by the time the last German raider at sea was sunk on 7 September, 1943, by a US submarine shortly after it had sortied from Japan, it had become impossible for ships to sortie from Germany and make it to open sea. Komet and a tenth raider were both sunk attempting to do so.  Three of the nine, Atlantis, Pinguin, and Kormoran, were sunk in distant seas by British cruisers. One, Stier, was sunk by the Naval Armed Guard on the Liberty ship Stephen Hopkins. One was destroyed by a nearby explosion while moored in Yokohama. Two, Orion and Widder,  survived their career as raiders long enough to return to Germany and be repurposed.

Rebirth–Weapons and Sensors, Old and New

Technological changes in the form of containerized cruise missiles, satellites and UAVs and other Unmanned Vehicles may have made the merchant cruiser once again a viable option.

Cruise missiles mean that the raider no longer needs to come with visible range of the their victim. With sufficient range and use of way points, the shooter can be over 100 miles from its victim and the missile can come from any direction, not necessarily from the direction of the raider. Plus they can now attack land targets as well as ships. The US has begun to think seriously about the threat of a cruise missile attack on the US and innocent looking container ships are a possible source.

UAVs can provide over the horizon targeting and are likely to be undetected by the target.

Satellites may help or hurt potential raiders. If they have the support of satellites, it may help them find their pray. If the defenders are sufficiently sophisticated (and they are looking in the right place) they may be able to recognize a missile launch as the first step in finding, fixing and destroying the raider.

Similarly the Automatic Identification System may help the raider or the defender. It may help the raider find targets, but it may also help the defender react more swiftly to an attack or help him identify the raider from among all the other ships in the area. There is always the possibility the information may be bogus. Unmanned Surface Vessels might be used to create false targets. We might want to plan for a system of encrypted information for contingencies. Limiting use of the systems is an option that may require careful consideration.

Mines are still potentially effective. The large carrying capacity of cargo ships means they could potentially lay large mine fields. A raider could knowing a war will start soon might lay a large field to be activated when hostilities begin. If hostilities have already begun, the raider is unlikely approach a port closely enough to lay the mines itself, but mobile mines already exist, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles or even simple semi-submersible unmanned vessels that can lay an minefield should be relatively easy technology.

China, Perpetrator or Target

From an American point of view, China with its huge merchant fleet and large inventory of cruise missile may appear a possible user of Merchant Raiders, but their large merchant fleet and need to import may also make them vulnerable to this this type of warfare if employed by weaker nations.

We know China has a Naval Militia. that will allow them to rapidly increase the size of their naval force. China has recently said it would require its ship builders to incorporate features that would make them usable for military purposes in wartime. These requirements are to be applied to five categories of vessels – container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk.  What these additional features are to be, is not clear. This could mean upgraded communications, either external or internal. It could mean improved survivability, greater speed, or foundations for weapons upgrades. They may only be thinking of using these ships to support amphibious operations, but these improvements may also make a large number of ships potential merchant raiders.

China’s large merchant fleet and need to import raw materials may make her vulnerable to Guerre d’Course. In the kind of low intensity conflict we have seen between China and her neighbors, it has seemed China has had all the advantages, but if they are pushed too far, China’s neighbors might see this form of warfare as a way to push back.

Non-State Actors

There is also the possibility of terrorist organizations attempting something similar, but they are more likely to attack highly visible targets of a symbolic nature, such as port facilities or major warships. Cruise missile could of course be used to attack major landmarks. They may also be less interested in living to fight another day.

Conclusion: I don’t think we have seen the end of offensive use of Merchant vessels.

Sources:

Addendum:

Some photos of vessels that are being used for military purposes:

MSC has chartered the MV Craigside to support SOCOM requirements. It is undergoing conversion in Mobile.

SD Victoria lifts boats and supports crews for UK Special Forces (SBS and SAS).

Malaysian auxiliary warship Bunga Mas Lima

Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life-long interest in naval ships and history.

Call for Articles: Future of Naval Aviation Week, Sep 14-18

Week Dates: 14-18 Sept 15
Articles Due: 9 Sept 15
Article Length: 500-1500 Words
Submit to: nextwar(at)cimsec(dot)org

Back in January, CAPT Jerry Hendrix (USN, Ret) and CDR Bryan McGrath (USN, Ret) had a stirring debate on the future of Aircraft Carriers. However, the debate quickly shifted from the carrier itself to the nature of the airwing it carried. Indeed, the carrier is nothing more than a host for the platforms provided by naval aviation – and only one of many ships that can carry aviation assets.

That discussion, driving into the world of the carrier air wing, was the inspiration for this week of discussion on naval aviation in general. From the maritime patrol aircraft deployed from the reclaimed Chinese reefs in the South China Sea, to US Army Apaches operating from amphibious assault ships, to 3-D printed drones flown off a Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel, to manned and unmanned ideas for the carrier air wing as carriers proliferate around the Pacific  -we want your ideas and observations on where global naval aviation will and can go next.

How will the littoral navies of the world change with new, lower-cost unmanned aviation assets? Are carriers armed with legions of long-range unmanned drones the future for global powers – will these technologies exponentially increase the importance of smaller carriers – or is unmanned technology a limited path that may be resisted (rightfully?) by pilots and their communities? Will surface fleets embrace the potential from easily produced drone swarms deployed from ships of the line… should they? What is the future of land-based naval aviation? What innovations will be ignored, what will be embraced, and what will the air assets of future fleets around the world look like? What will the institutions, the leadership, and C2 structures that support all these assets of their varied nations look like? The topic is purposefully broad to bring forward a myriad of topics and inspire future topic weeks on more specific subjects.

Contributions should be between 500 and 1500 words in length and submitted no later than 9 September 2015. Publication reviews will also be accepted. This project will be co-edited by LT Wick Hobson (USN) and, as always, Sally DeBoer from our editorial pool.

Matthew Hipple, President of CIMSEC, is a US Navy Surface Wafare Officer and graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He hosts the Sea Control podcast and regularly jumps the fence to write for USNI and War on the Rocks.

Chinese Military Strategy Week: The Conclusion

By Dmitry Filipoff

The CIMSEC Chinese Military Strategy topic week ran from August 3-7 and featured experts from around the globe and representing various military branches. Through their work we were exposed to numerous interpretations, challenges, and means to produce meaningful progress as China defines its role.  

Numerous questions abound on how to manage the complex rise of China in the Asia-Pacific. How can China militarily rise with power commensurate with defending one of the world’s great economies, while not producing a more uncertain status quo ripe for miscalculation? How can the United States and China both increase their influence in the Asia-Pacific without appearing to contain one another? We should bear in mind the historical origins of trends, areas of convergence and divergence, and competing philosophies on the role of nations as our authors have so eloquently discussed.

The CIMSEC team would like to thank all the authors who responded to our call for articles and used CIMSEC as a platform for their excellent analysis. We would also like to thank guest editor Eric Murphy who handled the numerous details  and challenges in executing the topic week. 

Keep on the lookout for future calls for articles, and at any time prospective contributors are free to contact the CIMSEC team at [email protected] to see what we can accomplish.

Thank you again to our topic week contributors, and below is an ordered list of all their articles that featured during the CIMSEC Chinese Military Strategy topic week.

Monday

Xu Qiliang (L), vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, salutes China's President Xi Jinping (C) during the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 13, 2014. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon

The Influence of Han Feizi on  China’s Defence Policy

 By Paul Pryce

DF21D_Artists_ConceptionFrom Expediency to the Strategic Chinese Dream?

By Sherman Xiaogang Lai

Tuesday

Carrier-SunsetWhere You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: U.S. & Chinese Strategic Views

By Daniel Hartnett

U.S. President Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a plenary session during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Beijing, Reuters.

Bear, Dragon & Eagle: Russian, Chinese & U.S. Military Strategies

By Chad M. Pillai

Wednesday

Avoiding Conditions for an Asia-Pacific Cold War

By Jack McKechnie

President Obama, left, meets with China's President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Seoul, South Korea in November. The Chinese leader comes to Washington this week.

Reviewing Charles Glasers’ “China-U.S. Grand Bargain”

By Peter Marino

Thursday

A PLAN honor guard on board the Liaoning in 2012, Xinhua News Agency Photo.Beyond the Security Dilemma? De-Escalating Tension in the South China Sea       

By Jan Stockbruegger

china-military-strategy-2

A Grain of Contextual Salt in the Chinese Military Strategy

By Chang Ching

 

Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

By Eric Gomez

Friday

DF-4-and-5Assessing China’s Nuclear Ambitions

By Debalina Ghoshal

chinaSOAThe Unnamed Protagonist in China’s Maritime Objectives

By Amanda Conklin

China's Maritime Silk Road

A Pacific Rebalance with Chinese Characteristics

By Justin Chock

Saturday

Becoming a Maritime Power? The First Chinese base in the Indian Ocean?

                                         By Xunchao Zhang

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Follow us @CIMSEC

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