Ocean Governance

Strategic Minerals and the False Promise of Seabed Mining

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By Drake Long

On April 29, a small seabed mining enterprise known as The Metals Company (TMC) formally submitted an application to NOAA to commence commercial-scale mining in an area of the ocean known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.

This followed an executive order issued by the White House explicitly ordering the expedition of seabed mining permits in international waters under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act – a little-known law passed in 1980. The Metals Company cited this law in its press release, stating it was submitting its commercial-recovery permit precisely under the terms of that act. On first glance, this would seem a strange, but necessary measure for the U.S. to procure critical minerals it sorely lacks.

There is no firm classification for what counts as a critical mineral. The Energy Act of 2020 defined critical minerals as “minerals, elements, substances, or materials” that were necessary for national or economic security of the United States, and if supply of said material were disrupted in some way, it would have dire implications for the U.S. manufacturing of defense goods or a negative effect on the overall U.S. economy. Nebulous as this category is, critical minerals have taken on new significance as of late due to the overwhelming dominance of China in the extraction and processing of them. As of 2025, China has the outsized ability to cut off, or severely constrain, the supply of 46 out of 84 different materials on the critical mineral list to the United States. Not coincidentally, China has also shown the willingness to use this dominant position in the commodity market, such as by restricting the sale of seven critical minerals to the U.S. back in April.

The seabed mining industry has stepped in and offered themselves as one of several proposed solutions to this problem. Unfortunately, these firms are mostly pitching false promises.

Seabed mining, for research purposes and experimentation, has occurred since 1970. What is unexpected about the current moment in the seabed mining industry is that companies are aggressively pursuing permits for commercial-recovery. That entails mining the seabed for profit – and elevating the practice to an industrial activity at the bottom of the sea.

For the past two years, I have been researching and writing a book on states’ interests in the seabed, and emerging issues affecting those parts of the seabed under international waters that were first dubbed “a common heritage of mankind” at the United Nations in 1967. Commercial activity on the seabed is a touchy subject due to concerns about its effects on deep-sea habitats. During most of my time researching this book project, the wind has been at the back of the environmentalist movement.

There are three types of deep sea environments considered viable for seabed mining: Hydrothermal vents that naturally grow polymetallic sulphides, metalliferous muds in shallower parts of the seabed, and abyssal plains with volcanic crusts or large, scattered deposits of polymetallic nodules. The most notable example of the latter is the Clarion Clipperton Zone, a vast area in the South Pacific under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority, where TMC has applied for a plot to commercially mine in.

Figure 1. Click to expand. Map of the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone, broken down by plots reserved for explorative polymetallic nodule mining. China Minmetals, one of the largest mining conglomerates in the world, has its reserved plots highlighted. (Source: ISA)

All three of these environments are some of the most fragile on the planet, with organisms and ecology completely untouched by human activity until recently. Research over the past five years has shown that everything from dustclouds to the mere noise generated by seabed mining activity can destroy seabed habitats and take an extremely long time to recover from.

The vast, vast majority of undersea life that would be affected by this activity is completely unknown – all scientists I spoke to in the course of research noted that there is insufficient information on undersea life to accurately characterize the environmental impact of seabed mining in the South Pacific, and research continues to reveal the fragility and uniqueness of life deep beneath the sea. Because of this, energy has been building behind a moratorium on seabed mining entirely and as of 2025, 37 countries have joined that movement, with others requesting a likeminded ‘precautionary pause’ instead.

A U.S. permit for commercial mining in the Clarion Clipperton Zone would seem to signal a turn against this anti-mining tide. However, the reality is more nuanced – governments looking to seabed mining for new sources of critical minerals are likely setting themselves up for disappointment and should review the series of events that brought the seabed-watching community here for signs of failure in the future. More than anything else, this latest push by private seabed mining companies is a desperation move to revive a rapidly failing speculative business model.

To start, one should think of the seabed in one of two categories: the international seabed, dubbed ‘the Area’ by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the seabed that a country enjoys economic rights to under UNCLOS, as part of its continental shelf. The International Seabed Authority is a unique international legal body tasked with overseeing the former.

The International Seabed: Tough Crust to Crack

Momentum for seabed mining in international waters died in August 2024 with the election of a new Secretary-General of the ISA. That election capped off a years-long push to expedite commercial-scale seabed mining since June of 2021, when the tiny Pacific Island nation of Nauru said it would grant a license to a subsidiary of The Metals Company to begin seabed mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.

When Nauru threatened to grant TMC its license, it triggered a ‘two-year rule’ within the UN document establishing ISA procedures that stated the ISA had to finalize its regulations, or Mining Code, by the two-year mark after a commercial license was granted. If it failed to do so, it was ambiguous as to what authority the ISA would have to halt operations if The Metals Company went ahead and mined anyway.

Despite the sudden urgency, the Mining Code was not finished by the July 2023 deadline. To stave off the possibility of Nauru and the private sector pushing forward with unregulated, commercial-scale mining, most members of the ISA unified and used that year’s ISA Council meeting to kick the can down the road and issue a revised timeline for the formal adoption of the Mining Code instead. That timeline called for the Mining Code to be finished by the end of July 2025 – and the ISA ultimately did not succeed in doing so, to little surprise to those I have spoken to who regularly observe ISA proceedings.

This was not the best outcome for the private seabed mining industry, especially as the initial pause on deregulated mining occurred nearly concurrent with the finalization of another UN treaty titled the Boundaries Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, which will come into effect in January 2026.

The BBNJ, much like the ISA itself, was created to settle unfinished business from the original conference that established UNCLOS. Namely, how to safeguard and treat all areas of the ocean outside of a country’s allotted maritime territory. This included international waters and the seabed within the ISA’s jurisdiction. While the draft Mining Code contains regulations intended to minimize the environmental impact of extractive activity on the seafloor, the BBNJ Agreement is far more stringent in terms of deterring seabed mining on the basis of protecting deep-sea ecological diversity. With its passage, mining companies already facing one set of regulations now need to contend with an eventual second.

The 2024 ISA Secretary-General election was the final factor signaling the nadir of the international seabed mining enterprise. The previous ISA Secretary-General, frustrations aside, was generally regarded among members as more of a seabed mining enthusiast than not, and for this reason he was nominated for an unprecedented third term by the pro-mining Kiribati even though he was a British citizen. He lost to Leticia Carvalho, who has made it clear she will not rush a Mining Code and has continually stressed the need for proper regulation of seabed mining above all else.

This brings us to the present. Seabed mining under the ISA process in international waters remains an aspiration for now.

The Continental Shelf: Sovereign, Not Soft

Given their status as glorified start-ups in a speculative industry with a shallow pool of capital to draw from, seabed mining companies making headlines today cannot wait for a Mining Code to be finalized, nor can they deal with all the provisions and legal issues the BBNJ Agreement will saddle them with. For a time, they instead turned to the lower-hanging fruit – mining the continental shelf that is strictly within a country’s jurisdiction.

The ISA, Mining Code, and UNCLOS are complicating factors for seabed mining only in international waters. Within the 200-nautical mile zone of a country’s continental shelf, national governments instead determine whether companies can mine their seafloor.

The logical next step for any company looking to mine the seabed then is to pursue mining licenses on a country’s continental shelf, outside any regulations the ISA or BBNJ could create. To clarify, a country’s continental shelf under UNCLOS is a legal, and not a geophysical, limit. Any country can claim a continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles from their coastline, and this can extend an additional 150 nautical miles outward if certain criteria are met. In the scientific sense, this means a country has economic rights to an area of the deep sea that is inclusive of a continental shelf, continental slope, continental rise – and even the deep seabed. All of these physical features are rolled into one legal definition of a “continental shelf” under UNCLOS.

While somewhat confusing, what this means in practice is that some countries have economic rights to areas of the deep seabed that are ripe for seabed mining. The ideal countries for the entrepreneurial seabed wildcatter to pursue would have massive maritime entitlements under UNCLOS close to known seabed reserves, lax regulation, and a small economy eager for foreign investment.

Traditionally, some Pacific Island countries (PICs) seemed to be auditioning for this role. Countries like Kiribati and the Cook Islands have overtly signaled their openness to the industry. The Cook Islands alone has a massive continental shelf, nearly 2 million square kilometers in size, spread between 15 tiny islands. Its continental shelf abuts the Clarion Clipperton Zone, where most known reserves lie. It held the first ever Underwater Minerals Conference in September to bring industry and governments together solely to discuss the prospects for seabed mining. Kiribati took the extraordinary step of abolishing a 115,000-square mile marine protected area around the Phoenix Islands, partially to allow for the possibility of seabed mining and other extractive activities there. And other Pacific Island countries such as Nauru, as previously mentioned, pushed the ISA to allow for commercial mining as soon as possible.

Probably the most important thing to examine during this period is the failure of private companies to actualize a seabed mining industry in Cook Islands. Despite having considerable history in the country, a very friendly government, and more-than-a-little ability to shape regulations there in their favor, the Cook Islands ultimately chose a different partner for its deep sea mining ambitions – the People’s Republic of China. The two countries signed an MOU in February that prominently featured exploration, extraction, and development of minerals on the Cook Islands’ vast continental shelf.

The reason private companies are now cut out of the Cook Islands market in favor of China is the same reason relaxing regulations on seabed mining ultimately benefits China in the long-run. China offers a suite of sweeteners alongside any mining deals that the private sector cannot compete with. This is as true with its terrestrial mining and oil-gas giants as it is with the speculative seabed mining industry. China simply has more money and capacity.

Wildcatters Versus Titans

Seabed mining is often touted as a means to alleviate the U.S. dependence on China for critical minerals. The Metals Company CEO said as much during his congressional testimony in April. This is heavily misleading. There are substantial reserves of these metals on the seafloor and close to shore in some spots, including on an area of the Gorda Ridge identified by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1980s. But China’s dominance in the rare earths market does not come from its reserves. It comes from its processing capability. Over 80 percent of all rare earths on the world market are processed by Chinese companies. China processes over 90 percent of all graphite, and about 67 percent of the world’s cobalt and lithium, all of which are critical minerals for emerging commercial and military technologies.

The numbers do not differ much, no matter what mineral one looks at. China has cornered the market on simple processing of many different ores, and while other countries such as the DRC, Myanmar, and Australia all have significant reserves of these metals on their own, they overwhelmingly are still shipped to China for processing.

There is little reason to see how opening a new reserve of critical minerals changes this dynamic at all – especially because processing seabed minerals costs quite a bit more. The initial step in processing ore is to simply separate the actual usable mineral from anything else. Water depth, salinity, and a variety of other environmental factors can make deep-sea minerals, even when extracted, difficult to separate out in this way, and processing facilities normally used for terrestrial ore cannot put them on the same production line. This means that any commercial-scale processor for these critical minerals would probably operate at a loss without massive, well-financed state-backing.

This is the sort of thing China, with its vertically-integrated supply chains for all aspects of metal extraction and processing, as well as its patient capital approach to bankrolling initially unprofitable commercial enterprises, would be able to do. It is not something the private sector is prepared to do. Other strong contenders for building a seabed mineral processing industry are Norway, India, and Japan – both countries with well-trod, well-funded industrial policies that fit the scale of the profitability problem with seabed mining. These countries are also non-coincidentally pioneering their seabed mining models with the help of aggressive state-backing and public institutions, crowding out the previous private sector players.

Even if one came into a large processing industry quickly, there are already reserves of critical minerals out there that are not owned by China – and they are terrestrial, not undersea, which points to another aspect of seabed mining that should give pause to advocates. Seabed mining is sometimes described as more environmentally-friendly than the mining that goes on inland. Truthfully, terrestrial mining on land is horrifically destructive, and in areas with large cobalt reserves like the DRC, child exploitation and unsafe working conditions are rampant. If there was a way to limit these activities, that would be a benefit to humankind. Seabed mining advocates state that if their industry were deregulated, terrestrial mining could end, and these minerals could instead be mined off the seafloor.

However, there is no evidence that terrestrial mining would stop even if seabed mining were permitted. In the course of writing a book on the topic, I have not encountered a single person in or familiar with the critical mineral mining industry that believes any mines on land would close if new reserves from the seabed started circulating. There is no incentive for any mining company working in cobalt or REE reserves to do so.

On the contrary, some speculated that it would lead to more, not less, terrestrial mining. If seabed mining introduced new reserves into world markets, mining companies could just cut corners or mine more on-land to ensure they still made a profit – and in many cases may not need to do so, as seabed reserves are slower to introduce to the market and more expensive to extract. Many of the companies backing seabed mining are more traditional mining companies in any case, and nobody I am aware of believes they are investing in the seabed mining industry with the intent to shutter their most profitable enterprises elsewhere. For countries that have large on-land reserves of critical minerals but lack the technology or know-how to engage in seabed mining, the market logic behind halting mining is nonexistent.

Conclusion: The Wild, Wild South Pacific

Most observers of the seabed mining industry I have interviewed are keenly aware of companies like TMC, their business history, and their profit margins. They tend to view their business models as unworkable, and vulnerable to a host of legal and political pressures. Private seabed mining companies do not own their own equipment and ships, instead requiring other companies like Allseas to provide it for their use instead. They are understood to be constantly running out of cash, given how the commercial seabed mining industry is nonexistent, and are thus starving without constant injections of private capital. There is more than a little desperation in the way these companies are working now to secure mineral rights and commercialize seabed mining.

Private seabed mining companies have tried two approaches so far. Step one was to work the international institutions to get a favorable regulatory environment, which has failed so far. Step two was to work with sovereign nations to mine their continental shelf, which is endangered by the entry of bigger players.

The third step appears to be finding legal loopholes. To clarify, commercial mining in international waters under the ISA process is not possible right now. But the United States did not ratify UNCLOS, and is not a member of the ISA. This is why TMC submitted a permit under a domestic U.S. law, and not through the ISA. Any permit it grants a private company to mine in the Clarion Clipperton Zone, which is under the ISA’s jurisdiction, would be legally dubious and represents the private sector taking advantage of that grey area to get around the normal approval process – an approval process that was actually crafted by the United States during UNCLOS negotiations in the first place.

Using domestic U.S. law to mine international waters is dubious. Legal analysts are looking at the viability of this for the time being, and the emerging consensus is that TMC may be opening itself up to a raft of punitive measures by UNCLOS signatories that it, its business partners, its supply chain partners, and any other affiliated bodies, operate in. Any minerals it extracts could be of dubious value at best.

Yet the strongest national security argument against commercial seabed mining remains an understanding of who actually benefits from it. The leaders of a seabed mining industry will not be the first-movers like TMC, or any other small private actor.

The largest, most well-funded seabed mining company would be China Minmetals, a highly-prominent Chinese state-owned enterprise pumping an incredible amount of money into seabed mining technology and with its own exploration licenses issued by the ISA. If the purpose of permitting seabed mining is to reduce dependence on China, what does it mean when China also enters the seabed mining industry, and to great success? Companies like Minmetals also have the benefit of a processing and final product assembly supply chain tied to its terrestrial mining component.

While smaller companies like TMC have already conducted exploratory mining, there is no profitable path toward commercial-scale seabed mining for them. They are start-ups still in a speculative industry. They have tested and proven the technology, but for the reasons stated above, they would make less of a profit and at a steep cost than any terrestrial mining company. While intermittently backed by mining and large maritime shipping companies, there is not a consistent flow of capital to maintain operations forever, nor is it reliable enough to scale into a profitable industry from. Maersk notably abandoned TMC in 2023 after environmental concerns over seabed mining heated up and the broader seabed mining enterprise started to come into question.

The current step toward permitting under U.S. law should not be considered wind in the sails of the private seabed mining sector. It is instead a desperation move, and not one guaranteed to work out. Absent state backing, these companies cannot survive, and it is for this reason they continually sell to unaware countries the promise that with a little reciprocal support, they can turn into leaders of a new, emerging industry.

But this is not likely to happen. The smaller companies testing the technology now instead seem to be paving the way for a much larger company, such as Minmetals or its Japanese, Indian, or perhaps Norwegian counterparts, to move in the future and successfully scale upward to the commercial level.

Drake Long is currently writing a book on international seabed issues, the deep-sea domain, and security. He is also a non-resident Senior Associate with the China Warfighting Initiative, Marine Corps War College. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent official views of Marine Corps University or any government department.

Featured Photo: Manganese nodules embedded in the seabed (mage courtesy of the NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, 2019 Southeastern U.S. Deep-sea Exploration)

Human Capital

Building Tactical Excellence: How SWCTC Supports LT Breen’s Call for Higher SWO Proficiency

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By LCDR Jeffrey Bolstad (ASW/SUW WTI) and LT Matthew Bain (ASW/SUW WTI)

In his recent CIMSEC article, “Reprioritize SWO Tactical Qualifications for the High-End Fight,” LT Seth Breen underscores a pressing challenge for the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community – achieving tactical proficiency commensurate with the demands of great power conflict. While his argument addresses officer qualification prioritization, his call to action aligns directly with the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC), which provides a structured framework to elevate tactical readiness across the fleet. Designed to address this very need, SWCTC delivers a standardized and measurable, career-long training curriculum that develops tactical surface warfare watchstanders at every stage of their service.

The need to invest in tactical proficiency at both the individual and watchteam levels is central to driving the surface force to the next level of lethality and tactical mastery. From the inception of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) in 2015, SWCTC was identified as a critical initiative to address this requirement. Since then, it has grown into a comprehensive, career-spanning tactical training program. Today, SMWDC’s Commander, RDML T. J. Zerr, is advancing this vision by leveraging SWCTC to shape the structure and delivery of tactical training across all surface communities, from schoolhouses to operational commands—ensuring the fleet remains tactically ready and combat effective.

Two key relationships are central to understanding the power and importance of SWCTC. First is the link between individual readiness and overall watchteam performance. The higher the individual proficiency is raised and maintained, the more capable and consistent the team becomes, reducing variability from watch to watch and ship to ship. In combat, preventable errors carry unacceptable consequences, and consistent proficiency across watchteams minimizes seams adversaries can exploit. Second, SWCTC formally distinguishes between qualification and proficiency. Before the recent rollout for CRUDES Tactical Action Officers (TAOs), there was no standardized force-wide method to ensure qualified watchstanders had completed enough repetitions to remain proficient. SWCTC addresses this gap by establishing clear standards and tracking individual performance rigorously.

SWCTC’s approach is much like training for a marathon, where most do not wake up on the day of the run without any preparation. It takes months and even years to properly prepare before meeting the desired standard, especially when that standard is winning great power conflict. As we approach the projected timelines for potential great power conflict, we must adopt a similar approach of increasing our tactical edge in a standardized, long-term, and measured method. Tactical excellence is not achieved in a single event, but developed steadily over a SWO’s career. The watchstander, as the key to employing a ship’s weapons systems, must build and maintain cadence, confidence, and familiarity with those systems and their tactics to be truly prepared for combat. From foundational courses such as the Basic and Advanced Division Officer Courses, Department Head School, and Combat Systems baseline training in Dahlgren, VA, to onboard Personnel Qualification Standards, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and deployment certifications, SWCTC integrates seamlessly with existing curricula and operational milestones to ensure sustained proficiency.

Surface Tactical Training Syllabus (STTS)

The April 2024 issuance of COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3502.9 formalized this approach by creating the Surface Tactical Training Syllabus (STTS) for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The instruction institutionalizes the five pillars of Maritime Warfare Proficiency (MWP) — Knowledge, Skill, Experience, Aptitude, and Currency—as the foundation for measuring readiness. Watchstanders are assessed not simply on whether they have checked a box for qualification, but on whether they have retained the knowledge, demonstrated the skills, accumulated the necessary experience, shown aptitude for progression, and sustained their currency through consistent practice. The culmination of these factors represents a level of individual tactical readiness, referred to as MWP, that we must continuously make efforts to optimize.

The STTS codifies a deliberate progression of training events, structured across six levels of increasing complexity. 100-level tasks establish theory and fundamentals, 200-level events build systems knowledge, 300-level tasks emphasize watchstation actions, 400-level events integrate the unit team, 500-level evolutions advance to multi-ship coordination, and 600-level exercises test command-level operations. This crawl-walk-run progression allows SWOs to develop steadily and measurably across their careers.

Proficiency is further captured in mastery levels ranging from Level 1 (Introductory) to Level 4 (Advanced). A Tactical Action Officer (TAO) at Mastery Level 2 can effectively execute single-ship operations, while a Level 4 TAO demonstrates advanced competence leading multi-unit engagements. Importantly, this system accounts for atrophy. Watchstanders who fail to meet periodic training requirements risk losing proficiency levels, underscoring how tactical readiness must be sustained through practice, not assumed. This emphasizes a key aspect of SWCTC – understanding that there is a difference between being qualified and being proficient.

One of the most significant aspects of the instruction is its explicit requirement for currency and recurring requalification. Under the STTS, TAOs and other tactical watchstanders must complete biennial written exams and oral boards to maintain certification. This ensures tactical decision-makers remain accountable and up-to-date, rather than relying on a one-time qualification that can fade with atrophy. The model reflects lessons long institutionalized in aviation, nuclear, and submarine communities, where loss of currency immediately removes an officer from critical duties. By adopting this standard, the surface force now demands the same level of accountability for its tactical leaders.

Training and Readiness (T&R) Matrix

At the core of this development cycle is the Training and Readiness (T&R) matrix, which tracks individual performance against clearly defined tactical tasks across warfare areas – Surface (SUW), Anti-Submarine (ASW), and Air (AW). Tasks are executed on recurring cycles and structured by proficiency levels ranging from Basic to Advanced, including multi-ship operations. Each level includes multiple tasks designed to sustain proficiency through repetition, highlight weaknesses for improvement, and provide unit commanders with an accurate baseline of watchstander readiness. This periodicity ensures both individual and unit-level tactical proficiency remains current.

The T&R matrix also creates a continuous, data-driven feedback loop that identifies knowledge gaps and informs adjustments to training syllabi, as well as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Tools like the Jupiter and Surface Training and Readiness Management System (STRMS) dashboards enhance this process by enabling commands to monitor individual and team performance, tailoring training to address fleet-wide trends and unit-specific needs. SWCTC combines data analytics with standardized training milestones to ensure performance shortfalls are not only identified and corrected, but also tracked over time across large datasets and then fed back to training stakeholders to address gaps in training and knowledge retention.

Focusing on the Individual Watchstander

The individual watchstander plays a critical role in employing a ship’s complex combat system. However, under the current Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual (SFTRM), Certification Exercises (CEs) and Repetitive Exercises (REs) are tracked only at the watchteam level, with no visibility into who makes up that team. For instance, the Training and Operational Readiness Information Service (TORIS) might show that two watchteams completed an AW RE (Conduct Coordinated Air Warfare)—but it does not capture whether those teams were staffed by the same TAOs repeatedly. As a result, some qualified TAOs may miss opportunities to gain repetitions, causing their proficiency to decline and reducing the ship’s overall tactical readiness.

With SWCTC, ship Commanding Officers can identify an individual’s areas of deficiency and prioritize training accordingly, while ISICs and fleet commanders gain an in-situ snapshot of each watchstander’s level of mastery—allowing them to better understand risk when assigning a specific ship or individual to a specific mission.

Fleet Feedback

SWCTC will provide commanders with objective measurements of watchstander proficiency, ensuring the fleet sustains its tactical edge in today’s complex operational environment. Fleet feedback is key and has been overwhelmingly positive, citing best practices such as use of tactical simulators and integration with real-world exercises and operations as proof of SWCTC’s adaptability and increasing relevance.

The success of SWCTC will continue to depend on feedback from the fleet. SMWDC needs to hear about any barriers to execution so we can identify where senior leadership advocacy is required. Whether it is limitations with synthetic trainers, recommendations for requirements during the Maintenance Phase, challenges executing SWCTC while deployed, or gaps in the scenario library—we can help. Your input ensures the program evolves to meet real operational demands and delivers the readiness our fleet requires.

Conclusion

The Navy regularly tracks routine maintenance, program updates, casualty control, casualty reports, and tech support for combat systems. But previous to SWCTC, the surface fleet did not systematically track the tactical proficiency of the people making critical decisions in combat. Now with SWCTC, the surface fleet has a system to track, measure, and sustain watchstander readiness at the individual level, ensuring they are prepared to defend their ship and execute combat operations when it matters most.

LT Breen’s article rightfully highlights the urgent need to elevate tactical training and qualifications, a need SWCTC is designed to meet. By combining structured career-long training, rigorous assessment, and continuous feedback, SWCTC drives lethality, accountability, and mission readiness. The program ensures our Sailors are fully prepared and proficient for the high-end fight, ultimately securing a decisive tactical advantage in complex operational environments. As the fleet continues to confront evolving threats, SWCTC remains an essential foundation, cultivating the tactical excellence that underpins surface warfare success. In short, SWCTC is how we transform individual watchstander proficiency into fleet-wide warfighting advantage.

LCDR Jeff Bolstad is a native of Bellevue, WA and joined the Navy in 2002 as a Damage Controlman. He served ship tours onboard USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG-57) as Leading Petty Officer of Repair Division, USS INGRAHAM (FFG-61) as Combat Information Center Officer and later as ship’s Navigator under a single-longer tour, USS PREBLE (DDG-88) as Weapons Officer, and USS McCAMPBELL (DDG-85) as Plans and Tactics Officer. Jeff has served tours ashore at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) as a student, Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island, (now TUSWC) as Training Officer, and is currently at Surface Mine Warfighting Development Center as the Lead Warfare Tactics Instructor in Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum. Jeff attended the University of Washington with a BA in Global Studies focusing on China, and later at NPS wrote a thesis titled “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Is the League’s Security Scheme Able to Effectively Thwart Terrorist Attacks?”

LT Matthew Bain is a native of Belmont, NC and joined the Navy in 2016 as an Ensign. He served ship tours onboard USS PINCKNEY (DDG-91) as the Repair Officer of Repair Division and USS MONSOON (PC-4) as the ship’s Navigator, Operations Officer and Executive Officer. Matt has served tours ashore at the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) as a SWATT Planner in Fleet Training Pacific and member of the Surface Warfare Integration Office. He is currently at SMWDC as a Warfare Tactics Instructor in the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum. Matt attended the Hampton University with a BS in Aviation focusing on Flight Education.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (April 9, 2024) Fire Controlman 2nd Class Nathan Ritchie, from Murrieta, California, stands watch in the combat information center aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) while conducting operations in the north Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Samantha Oblander)

Industrial Base

Made In China 2025’s Impact on Chinese Shipbuilding

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By Dan Katz

Ten years ago, the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, introduced two major policy initiatives: Made in China 2025 and military-civil fusion. Each represents an upgrade of existing policies aimed at boosting China’s economic and military strength, and now receives more attention and resources. Made in China 2025 aims to establish China as the world’s leading advanced manufacturer in ten key sectors by 2025, while military-civil fusion seeks to foster a closer, innovation-driven relationship between defense and civilian industries. Much was written about both, but there is little analysis of how these policies impacted Chinese shipbuilding. While there is extensive writing on Chinese shipbuilding overall, few sources examine the true goal of Made in China 2025 beyond capturing market shares and making China more technologically innovative.

To help address the gap, this article will delve deeper into the capabilities of China’s dominant shipbuilding industry, rather than focusing on typical discussion points such as its total production and market share. Instead, this article aims to highlight the significant technological advancements the sector has made in the years since the announcement of Made in China 2025. It will also highlight the military-civil fusion implications from the commercial sector’s innovative capacity. With the naval balance in the Indo-Pacific rapidly shifting, such work will become increasingly crucial as policymakers determine how current trends will persist and how their countries might be affected.

Made in China 2025 and Military-Civil Fusion

For China’s shipbuilding industry, Made in China 2025 aimed to develop five globally competitive companies, capture a 40 percent share of the maritime equipment market, attain a 50 percent market share in high-tech ship design and manufacturing equipment, and reach an 80 percent parts localization rate for advanced vessels. It also sought to create a comprehensive supply chain that included design, assembly, equipment, and service for ships and marine engineering tools. The initiative encouraged Chinese shipyards to move into more complex vessel types, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, green-fuel-powered ships, cruise liners, and roll-on/roll-off (RORO) vessels. Although Made in China 2025 is mainly an economic growth strategy, it has significant military implications for shipbuilding and naval capability. Generally, a country’s economy has a direct influence on its hard and soft power, as well as its economic security.

Source: Dick K. Nanto, “Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Services, January 4, 2011, p. 6. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R41589.pdf.

Made in China 2025 clearly influences China’s economic and soft power, but its military-civil fusion policy amplifies its impact on military power. In short, military-civil fusion aims to enhance the integration of China’s commercial and defense sectors, thereby supercharging their respective technology ecosystems. The intent is to make both more technologically advanced and innovative, thereby driving greater economic and military capability growth. While the policy was formally launched in 2015, the ideas of military-civil fusion are not new. There were various formulations for decades, but the concept has proven challenging to execute. China’s shipbuilding industry is deeply intertwined with the civil-military construct, with all of China’s naval shipbuilders engaging in major commercial production, generating billions of dollars in revenue from foreign orders. Satellite imagery of these yards regularly shows merchant vessels being constructed alongside large surface combatants such as aircraft carriers. Honed through commercial enterprise, expertise, revenue, manufacturing capacity, and vertically integrated supply chains are easily converted into satisfying military objectives.

Much like military-civil fusion seeks to create symbiosis between the defense and civilian economies, Made in China 2025 is a complementary policy aimed at enhancing China’s innovation and increasing its comprehensive national power. Therefore, analysts and researchers should not investigate one without considering the other when viewing sectors covered by both policies, including shipbuilding. The connections between commercial maritime powers and naval powers are well established. Naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings are widely discussed in China, and his theories have been incorporated into their naval development.

Chinese Shipbuilding in 2015: Vast and Simple

By the time of Made in China 2025’s announcement, China had already established itself as a shipbuilding superpower. In 2010, China became the world’s largest shipbuilder after the government established an industrial policy designating the industry as a priority years earlier. As a result, the sector received at least $90 billion in subsidies by 2013, mostly in entry subsidies that encouraged companies to enter the sector. By 2015, China received 27.6 percent of global new ship orders. Still, orders were mainly at the lower end of the shipbuilding value chain and excluded complex ship types such as LNG carriers. For example, China only had one shipyard capable of producing large LNG carriers as late as 2019. Generally, Chinese shipbuilders produced simpler vessels, particularly in larger ship categories. Although China produced large numbers of containerships, the average tonnage was under 60 percent of the world average.

Additionally, China had not begun major construction of medium-sized passenger vessels. Prime Chinese shipyards were less productive and underperformed relative to those of South Korea and Japan, according to one study. Similarly, a 2019 article highlighted that Chinese shipyards were still reliant on foreign partners for advanced technology and production methods, and that they were unable to design and build specialized vessels, such as LNG carriers or those for offshore drilling. Chinese workers were also found to be between seven and 17 percent as productive as Japanese workers. The statistic highlights that as Chinese shipbuilders expanded into more technologically advanced ships, traditional advantages declined due to increased labor costs, the appreciation of the renminbi, and the growing importance of innovation in competitiveness.

Note: Compensated gross tonnage is the most widely used measure of shipbuilding capacity and reflects the value added in any given vessel, thereby indicating its complexity beyond just its size. Source: Sue Hall and Audrye Wong, “Key Factors in Chinese Shipyards’ Development and Performance,” in Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course, ed. Andrew S. Erickson (Naval Institute Press, 2016), 100.

Chinese shipbuilders were also exiting the doldrums of their post-2008 Financial Crisis downturn. The Chinese government has shifted its strategy from encouraging market entry to facilitating sector consolidation, aiming to eliminate underperforming firms, better allocate capital, and foster globally competitive companies. A key action was the 2014 release of a “white list” of shipbuilders who met specific performance requirements and therefore qualified for government support, such as export tax rebates and easier access to credit. By 2016, shipyards on the list handled about 90 percent of all Chinese vessel deliveries.

Chinese Shipbuilding in 2025: Goals Met and Goals Not Met

By 2025, China’s shipbuilding market share and manufacturing had continued to grow. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Chinese shipbuilders received new orders for 113.05 million deadweight tonnage in 2024, a 58.8-percent year-on-year increase. Other statistics highlight China’s current capacity dominance. In 2024, China accounted for 53.3 percent of global shipbuilding, and state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation alone produced more commercial vessels by tonnage in one year than the United States has since the end of World War II. Overall, China dominated new orders in 2024 for bulk carriers, tankers, and container ships, surpassing South Korea in new orders for liquefied petroleum gas carriers, with a share of 48 percent to 46 percent. Analysts also expected additional orders in offshore vessels and other subsectors. South Korea maintained its lead in liquefied natural gas carriers, with 62 percent of new orders, while China continued to narrow the gap due to improvements in quality and capacity. Chinese production of offshore support vessels increased 256 percent year-on-year due to consistent growth in quality and production efficiency. Chinese output of roll-on-roll-off (RORO) vessels is set to increase drastically, with orders for as many as 200 ships placed as of October 2023, to be delivered between 2023 and 2026. China completed its first cruise liner in 2023. According to Chinese state-affiliated media, the value of marine engineering equipment delivered in 2023 increased 50 percent year-on-year through the first three quarters of 2023, making up 64.3 percent of the global market, and its marine offshore engineering market made “solid breakthroughs” in the 2020s.

Chinese shipyards have accelerated their transition to green and intelligent shipbuilding, developing their domestic design and industry-supporting capabilities, particularly in LNG carriers, car carriers, core components, and new materials. In the first nine months of 2024, Chinese shipyards received 70 percent of global green-energy ship orders across all major vessel types. Their yards additionally significantly reduced construction times and costs. Aside from green-energy technology, Chinese shipyards appear to be matching their foreign competitors in technologies such as smart adaptive sails, autonomous container vessels, and “Industry 4.0” manufacturing processes.

Market consolidation continued in the years following Made in China 2025’s announcement, with China State Shipbuilding Corporation and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation merging in 2019 (and finalized in July 2025). However, new companies are entering the market. China’s global market share will also likely hold steady if not increase, as most of its shipyards are fully booked for the next three to four years.

How Innovative Is The Sector Now?

China has met most of its Made in China 2025 maritime goals, moving up the value chain and developing and implementing advanced technologies. China’s significant expansion in building LNG carriers is a clear sign of China’s growth, as for years, only one Chinese shipyard could produce them. China’s increasing dominance in constructing alternative-fueled vessels (76.9 percent of new orders in 2024) is possibly a more significant indicator of the industry’s growing innovativeness. These include independently developed pure-electric container ships, hydrogen fuel cell-powered vessels, and methanol fuel engines. Foreign competitors are feeling this progress, with half of respondents to a survey of European companies in China’s maritime sector reporting lost market share in general or for at least one product since 2015, while 80 percent said that Chinese competitors could create substitute products. Made in China 2025 has proven highly successful based on China’s performance across the market’s sectors overall, with China becoming a market leader in 14 of 18 ship types.

Data Source: “Made In China 2025: The Cost of Technological Leadership,” European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, March 2025, https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/china-manufacturing-2025.

Despite China’s rapid entry into higher-value sectors, it has yet to achieve a dominant market share in these more advanced sectors. It has not surpassed South Korea and achieved its goal of a 50 percent market share in specialized vessels, such as LNG carriers. China saw less success with other complex vessel types such as cable-laying ships, drilling ships, and luxury yachts. It just entered the cruise liner market, with its second domestically built cruise liner nearing completion in early 2025. Additionally, these early cruise liners have a parts localization rate (the percentage of their parts made in China) of 30 percent, a problem broadly faced in Chinese shipbuilding, which continues to rely on foreign technology for components such as engines and propellers.

Academic publication and patent activity exhibited rapid growth, but are also accompanied by persistent shortcomings. Data from the Emerging Technology Observatory shows that China published over four times as many articles on marine engineering in the past five years as the following country, but trails behind multiple countries in average yearly citations. Chinese universities and organizations also dominate the top ten lists for publication numbers and articles funded in that period (with all of its top publishing universities in the field having close People’s Liberation Army ties). Furthermore, China became the leading publisher of vessel design research around 2018 and has since established a significant lead, accounting for 18.11 percent of total publications since 2000. However, its citation-to-publication ratio was lower than that of other leading publishers. Conversely, a separate study found that China has been the leading publisher of high-quality research on autonomous underwater vehicles, advanced undersea wireless communication, air-independent propulsion, autonomous systems operation technology, advanced robotics, and all the advanced materials and manufacturing fields reviewed by the report, for at least the past five years. China is a leader in shipbuilding-related patents, with state-owned China Shipbuilding Group reportedly publishing the seventh-highest number of patents worldwide from June 2024 to May 2025. By 2021, China’s low- and zero-emission maritime technology patenting had matched Europe’s collective contribution for the global lead. According to one market report, China leads in shipbuilding patent issuance, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the total.

Signs of progress also exist in naval shipbuilding. A 2020 assessment by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) found that Chinese design bureaus were already utilizing modern software, design practices, machinery, and ship construction methods comparable to those of U.S. shipyards. The assessment further stated:

“China builds both domestic and foreign (under license) machinery, control systems, and other ship components. Almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced in-country, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems. Chinese naval ship design and material quality are, in many cases, comparable to USN ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”

While China long struggled to develop indigenous marine propulsion technology, a 2018 U.S. Department of Defense report declared that China had reached near-total self-sufficiency in naval gas turbine technology. However, continued efforts to acquire foreign propulsion technology suggest that China believes itself to be still lacking in this technology. Challenges developing indigenous propulsion systems also persist with submarine propulsion, with many Chinese diesel-powered submarines being reliant on imported, license-produced engines.

How one evaluates Made in China 2025’s successes is also important, such as determining whether China has met the specific goals of Made in China 2025 or how well and efficiently it has achieved the broader goal of creating a more advanced industry. For instance, there are doubts regarding the quality of China’s production. While nearly half of European companies surveyed in China’s maritime sector reported a loss in market share, only 26 percent reported their Chinese competitors could create products of an equivalent or higher standard, with only half reporting their competitors could do so at a better price.

Many analysts also question whether the returns on the massive investment in the sector have been worthwhile. One study found that despite the amount of innovation promotion subsidies provided, there was limited statistical evidence of productivity improvements or of an increase in patenting rates and profitability measures among recipients. Another 2022 study found that China’s quantity-based subsidies could theoretically cause reductions in productivity and public welfare. Such findings suggest that the low productivity improvements from earlier subsidies have persisted. Considering that China spent an estimated $231 billion on industrial subsidies overall in 2019 alone, and with the policy seemingly generating minimal productivity gains, many question whether the funds for Made in China 2025 could have been better spent elsewhere. The ongoing surge in market entrants and expansion in shipbuilding capacity in China also risks “involution,” or an intense competition resulting in damaging price wars that undercut profitability, productivity, and innovation. Involution is currently occurring in the electric vehicle sector, which enjoyed broad government support and numerous entrants.

There are additional signs that Made in China 2025 and military-civil fusion are falling short in naval modernization. Many Chinese technical journals discuss issues related to shipboard electronic defense technology, particularly in the context of command and control technology. China continues to face challenges with submarine propulsion systems and quieting technology. The fact that there are problems with the former important technology, which is intended to benefit from Made in China 2025 and military-civil fusion policies, whereas submarine-related technology more broadly would not, further highlights the shortcomings of these policies.

Overall, Made in China 2025 achieved success in most of its official metrics and made significant progress in advancing China’s shipbuilding industry. However, it fell short of reaching the more abstract goals of becoming a broadly advanced, efficient, and productive manufacturing sector. As with many of its economic challenges over the years, China achieved success primarily through scale and persistent effort, even if it meant generating vast amounts of waste along the way.

Why This Matters

The numerous, yet incomplete, successes of Chinese shipbuilding and the Made in China 2025 initiative are important from both economic and military perspectives. First and foremost, the sector’s advancements mean it will likely maintain its global dominance for the foreseeable future; however, its continued weaknesses provide opportunities for other nations to establish or maintain their shipbuilding industries. The volume of relevant research conducted, combined with continued government support, indicates that China will continue to advance up the value chain and develop new technologies. This will further strengthen China’s control over and distort the market, precluding a competitively healthy global industry, and risk an additional avenue for economic coercion, as seen with rare earth elements. A more innovative sector will also help offset the influence of a shrinking labor force on Chinese shipbuilding and maintain its manufacturing capacity.

Regarding military-civil fusion, the commercial dominance of Chinese shipyards provides ample resources that can fund military-relevant capital investments and research and development, as illustrated by the fact that some of the largest Chinese commercial shipbuilders also build the preponderance of their warships. As commercial yards adopt and perfect advanced manufacturing practices and technologies, such as modular construction and digital design, military-civil fusion and dual-use shipyards facilitate their application in naval yards. Greater manufacturing capacity and more advanced vessels also result in greater surge capacity for naval shipbuilding, especially as more commercial vessels are built to naval specifications. Such capacity will be most relevant for support and auxiliary vessels, rather than major surface combatants, which have greater complexity. These vessels could supplement naval ships in amphibious operations, gray zone operations, and underway replenishment, thereby improving China’s power projection capabilities. More advanced shipyards would also be capable of handling some naval maintenance and repair work, freeing up naval yards for more complex tasks and helping to overcome the greatest challenge of maintaining a large fleet – maintenance and sustainment costs. And while the purely commercial shipyards might not be capable of producing Type 055 and 052D destroyers, they could potentially make other combatants, such as the Type 022 missile boat, or retrofit commercial vessels with shipping container-based missile systems. This would further shift the military balance in China’s favor, even if by quantity rather than quality.

Source: J. Michael Dahm, “China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China’s Military Activities, 2023,” CMSI China Maritime Reports, February 8, 2024, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/35/.
Note: O&S refers to Operations & Sustainment Costs
Source: Christopher P. Carlson, “China Maritime Report No. 10: PLA(N) Force Structure Projection Concept, A Methodology for Looking Down Range,” CMSI Maritime Reports, No. 10, November 3, 2020, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/10/.

For policymakers and members of the global shipbuilding industry, the impact of Made in China 2025 on Chinese shipbuilding presents important lessons, as well as a cautionary warning. Shipbuilding nations, or those aspiring to be, can gain insight into which policies are likely to benefit their industries and those that will not. A central element in the success of Chinese shipbuilding is the official and de facto subsidies that have contributed to their cost advantage over other major shipbuilders, such as South Korea, Japan, and those in Europe, as well as the freeing up of funds for research and development and capital investments to move up the value chain. These include the billions of dollars the government pays to subsidize shipyard costs and critical inputs such as steel, and the revenues generated by dominating the global export market. These funds, along with government-driven industry consolidation, enabled the relocation of assets to the largest and most productive shipbuilders, such as the relocation of the Jiangnan and Hudong-Zhonghua shipyards to Changxing Island. Such policies enhance the benefits of clustering effects, create opportunities to implement the latest best methods and manufacturing technologies, and can speed up the diffusion of technology.

China’s example, therefore, shows how government support can generate incredible results in shipbuilding growth, but also how costly such endeavors can be. That most countries are ill-positioned to spend tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars on their shipbuilding industries reinforces the need for targeted and strategic policies and investments to maintain and grow the most efficient and innovative shipyards. The lack of such funds and a command economy like China’s means that similar policies will not be plausible for most countries to emulate. Therefore, government support, such as subsidies or tax rebates, should be tied to the adoption of efficiency-enhancing techniques and technologies, like additive manufacturing and “cobots,” to maximize returns on limited funds and the relative lack of economic control most governments possess.

Similar analyses of China can help shipbuilding nations identify areas of comparative advantage to focus on, like South Korea’s LNG tanker production. They can also serve as a warning to sectors and companies that could increasingly face Chinese competition in the coming years. Players in those sectors should take measures now to prepare for such eventualities. For those concerned about the implications for the maritime balance of power, greater research and focus must be devoted to uncovering the military-civil fusion ties in the sector and how seemingly innocuous investments and purchases could be undermining that balance.

Dan Katz is a graduate student in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, with a focus on the intersection of emerging technology and Indo-Pacific security. He works full-time as a consultant in the Washington, D.C. area. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Featured Photo: A Chinese shipyard. (NurPhoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Notes to New CNO Week

Notes to the New CNO Series Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short notes submitted to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle. 

Authors wrote about a wide variety of topics, including changes to force structure, naval strategy, and the need for more warfighting focus. There were several common themes, including calls for more decisive leadership, a requirement to reconsider old paradigms, and a profound urgency to drive reform.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their contributions.

“Sir, Be Radical,” by Chris Rielage

“The problem is not charting what the new Navy should look like. The problem is acting on it. This is the moment to be radical – for Admiral Caudle to lean fully into the “C-Notes” and make once-in-a-generation changes to how the Navy thinks and works. It is time for the CNO to steer us to the boldest course, despite the risks – we cannot afford anything else right now.”

“Change the Navy’s Narrative: The Future Fight and the Hybrid Fleet,” by Peter Dombrowski

“By articulating a powerful vision statement, the CNO will help unify effort within the Navy and provide insight to the other sea services about how the Navy will conduct its business for the next three years and beyond.”

“Accelerate Human-Machine Teaming in the Maritime Operations Center,” by Michael Posey

“MOCs serve as the decision hubs of numbered fleets, responsible for executing campaigns at sea and managing maritime task forces. As our Navy fights from the seabed to space and through the electromagnetic spectrum, the volume of data demands our watchstanders employ data-enhancing tools that augment, not replace, human judgment.”

“Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors,” by Alan Brechbill

“Their killchains depend on persistent surveillance, tracking and targeting multi-phenomenology satellites, long-range radars, and networked command systems. In other words, they will not win with their missiles, but with their ability to find us. Breaking that killchain is the Navy’s main line of defense. The uncomfortable truth is that Navy leadership still underappreciates this vulnerability.”

“Train to Win Below the Threshold of War,” by Vince Vanterpool

“The actions seen against the Filipinos by the PRC is only the beginning. There may be similar actions against U.S. assets in the future. In order to adequately deter and defeat these future attempts, the Navy Deterrence Concept needs robust tactics and techniques for naval units operating at the tactical level just below the threshold of armed conflict.”

“We are at Risk of Forgetting the Lessons of the 2017 Collisions,” by John Cordle

“Organizational drift to failure is always a risk, and an important protection against it is constant, critical self-assessment. These three mishap reports – viewed holistically – are a perfect opportunity to do just that. The question should not be ‘have we completed all of the CR recommendations?’ But ‘did they work?’ Recent events indicate they might not have.”

“What Unifies the Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad? Warfighting Focus,” by Paul Viscovich

“The CNO has inherited a fleet that has suffered creeping administrative overload for years. Unless the CNO can put an end to the suffocating administrative accretions from decades of poorly prioritized requirements, our next war may feature more ‘victory marks’ on the enemy’s bridgewings and fighter cockpits than on ours.”

“Fix the Navy’s Flawed System of Warfighting Development,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“For the U.S. Navy, the first 30 years of post-Cold War experience featured a major institutional reorientation toward the low-end spectrum of operations in a highly permissive threat environment. This facilitated widespread dysfunction across critical warfighting development functions that are crucial for preparing the Navy for war. The result has been one of the most pivotal eras of decay and atrophy of high-end warfighting skill in the modern history of the U.S. Navy.”

“Revisiting A Modest Proposal for Improving Shipyard Production and Repair Capacity,” by Ryan Walker

“I recommend the Chief of Naval Operations push the 8-4-2-10 as a potential realistic solution rooted in historical insight, operational experience, and a deep respect for the challenges facing the shipyard worker. If implemented thoughtfully, the 8-4-2-10 schedule could become a model for other defense programs, reinforcing readiness while preserving workforce well-being.”

“The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools,” by Andrew Pfau and Bridger Smith

“As shipyard availability delays continue to challenge the submarine force, sailors assigned to the these units require better and more consistent training tools. Sailors must be ready to support at-sea operations and units must quickly transition to a combat-ready state after shipyard periods. Low-cost, high-density training tools like wargames and an “attack center in a box” can provide opportunities for sailors to build and maintain perishable at-sea skills, leading to a more ready and lethal force.”

“A Navy for War in the Age of Intelligent Missiles,” by Craig Koerner

“Unable to hide, the future of conventional air and sea-surface platforms is grim. When fighting competent opponents, those few, valuable, and conspicuous legacy platforms are likely to be destroyed. Modern warfare is not boxing, it is hide-and-seek. We should redesign our forces accordingly.”

“Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR,” by Nicholas Weising

“U.S. Navy operational concepts must make an explicit priority of targeting the C4ISR architecture that fundamentally enables China’s A2/AD approach and have it serve as a core organizing principle for Navy acquisition and force development.”

“Expand the Navy’s Over-the Horizon Targeting Solutions,” by Richard Mosier

“Since the fielding of the Harpoon missile in the 1970s and the original Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile (TASM) in 1982, maritime over-the-horizon targeting has been an insufficient and largely unresolved ISR capability requirement for the U.S. Navy. The Navy has had limited long-range sensors for detection and tracking, an inability to sustain continuous tracking of targets of interest after detection, and few direct tactical network exchange capabilities to pertinent commands and shooting ships from satellites and primary processing commands.”

“To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting,” by Paul Nickell

“The new CNO’s vision to place the Sailor at the center of the Foundry, the Fleet, and the Way We Fight provides a powerful focus for the U.S. Navy. The enduring question is how we build the intellectual foundation to connect these pillars. While our service possesses an abundance of technical and procedural manuals, we lack a unifying warfighting philosophy that informs Sailors on not just what our forces do, but also how to think about the fundamental nature of combat at sea.”

“The Indian Ocean: An Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China,” by Renato Scarfi and Gian Carlo Poddighe

“The naval instrument is a powerful tool for manifesting shared will and projecting influence, and the theater where this will be most effective is the Indo-Pacific. The main competition will take place in those waters, and marks an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to strengthen its naval cooperation with Europe.”

“Start Building Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue-water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla of innovations.”

“The Imperative for Integrated Maritime Operations,” by Steven Bancroft and Ben Van Horrick

“Beyond the ARG/MEU team, 21st-century naval integration is more than a technological or organizational shift — it is an operational imperative. Combining the agility and expeditionary mindset of the Marine Corps with the firepower and reach of the Navy into a single, lower-level command, the naval service can build a more lethal, resilient, agile maritime force. This integrated approach—exemplified by formations such as TF-76/3, TF 61/2, and TF-51/5—ensures that U.S. naval power projection and dominance remain ready to meet the demands of the modern era. “

“Conduct Legal Preparation of the Battlespace,” by James Kraska

“Much of our collective experience in international law is from the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not operations at sea. We should refocus on the laws that apply throughout the global commons – sea, air, and space – that surround our Homeland and connects us to allies in Asia and Europe.”

“Rugby and Rivalry: Use Sports Diplomacy to Counter China in the South Pacific,” by Jason Lancaster

“Navy rugby matches with Pacific Island teams are an excellent way to provide the administration with exciting and high-profile opportunities to engage with leaders in countries vital to U.S. interests. The PRC can build stadiums, but does not field competitive rugby teams, while the U.S. Navy does. The Navy can use sports diplomacy to demonstrate presence and benefit U.S. regional interests.”

“Technical Interoperability in Contested Environments is a Must,” by Nicholas A. Kristof

“The need for interoperability in naval operations has never been more critical. However, these operations will increasingly be forced to occur in contested communication environments, where data access and connectivity cannot be guaranteed. Balancing these two imperatives—interoperability and resilience in contested conditions—will be vital to successful maritime operations.”

“Navigate the Future Through Maritime Wisdom,” by Roshan Kulatunga

“Cognitive preparation has to be one of the key considerations for the new U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. Knowledge alone is inadequate, it must be developed alongside intellect. By embracing these intellectual traditions and prominently embedding them in military education, navies can ensure their sailors are not just operators of ships, but custodians of an enduring wisdom that continues to guide humanity’s engagement with the sea.”

“Three Focus Areas for the New CNO,” by Jacob Wiencek

The “Davidson Window” is closing and we need the sea service to deliver the crucial component of the Joint Force. Part of the solution is found in better physical health, greater formal training, and emphasizing the importance of cyberspace operations.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Adm. Daryl Caudle, on the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), Feb. 9, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.