By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short notes submitted to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle. 

Authors wrote about a wide variety of topics, including changes to force structure, naval strategy, and the need for more warfighting focus. There were several common themes, including calls for more decisive leadership, a requirement to reconsider old paradigms, and a profound urgency to drive reform.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their contributions.

“Sir, Be Radical,” by Chris Rielage

“The problem is not charting what the new Navy should look like. The problem is acting on it. This is the moment to be radical – for Admiral Caudle to lean fully into the “C-Notes” and make once-in-a-generation changes to how the Navy thinks and works. It is time for the CNO to steer us to the boldest course, despite the risks – we cannot afford anything else right now.”

“Change the Navy’s Narrative: The Future Fight and the Hybrid Fleet,” by Peter Dombrowski

“By articulating a powerful vision statement, the CNO will help unify effort within the Navy and provide insight to the other sea services about how the Navy will conduct its business for the next three years and beyond.”

“Accelerate Human-Machine Teaming in the Maritime Operations Center,” by Michael Posey

“MOCs serve as the decision hubs of numbered fleets, responsible for executing campaigns at sea and managing maritime task forces. As our Navy fights from the seabed to space and through the electromagnetic spectrum, the volume of data demands our watchstanders employ data-enhancing tools that augment, not replace, human judgment.”

“Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors,” by Alan Brechbill

“Their killchains depend on persistent surveillance, tracking and targeting multi-phenomenology satellites, long-range radars, and networked command systems. In other words, they will not win with their missiles, but with their ability to find us. Breaking that killchain is the Navy’s main line of defense. The uncomfortable truth is that Navy leadership still underappreciates this vulnerability.”

“Train to Win Below the Threshold of War,” by Vince Vanterpool

“The actions seen against the Filipinos by the PRC is only the beginning. There may be similar actions against U.S. assets in the future. In order to adequately deter and defeat these future attempts, the Navy Deterrence Concept needs robust tactics and techniques for naval units operating at the tactical level just below the threshold of armed conflict.”

“We are at Risk of Forgetting the Lessons of the 2017 Collisions,” by John Cordle

“Organizational drift to failure is always a risk, and an important protection against it is constant, critical self-assessment. These three mishap reports – viewed holistically – are a perfect opportunity to do just that. The question should not be ‘have we completed all of the CR recommendations?’ But ‘did they work?’ Recent events indicate they might not have.”

“What Unifies the Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad? Warfighting Focus,” by Paul Viscovich

“The CNO has inherited a fleet that has suffered creeping administrative overload for years. Unless the CNO can put an end to the suffocating administrative accretions from decades of poorly prioritized requirements, our next war may feature more ‘victory marks’ on the enemy’s bridgewings and fighter cockpits than on ours.”

“Fix the Navy’s Flawed System of Warfighting Development,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“For the U.S. Navy, the first 30 years of post-Cold War experience featured a major institutional reorientation toward the low-end spectrum of operations in a highly permissive threat environment. This facilitated widespread dysfunction across critical warfighting development functions that are crucial for preparing the Navy for war. The result has been one of the most pivotal eras of decay and atrophy of high-end warfighting skill in the modern history of the U.S. Navy.”

“Revisiting A Modest Proposal for Improving Shipyard Production and Repair Capacity,” by Ryan Walker

“I recommend the Chief of Naval Operations push the 8-4-2-10 as a potential realistic solution rooted in historical insight, operational experience, and a deep respect for the challenges facing the shipyard worker. If implemented thoughtfully, the 8-4-2-10 schedule could become a model for other defense programs, reinforcing readiness while preserving workforce well-being.”

“The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools,” by Andrew Pfau and Bridger Smith

“As shipyard availability delays continue to challenge the submarine force, sailors assigned to the these units require better and more consistent training tools. Sailors must be ready to support at-sea operations and units must quickly transition to a combat-ready state after shipyard periods. Low-cost, high-density training tools like wargames and an “attack center in a box” can provide opportunities for sailors to build and maintain perishable at-sea skills, leading to a more ready and lethal force.”

“A Navy for War in the Age of Intelligent Missiles,” by Craig Koerner

“Unable to hide, the future of conventional air and sea-surface platforms is grim. When fighting competent opponents, those few, valuable, and conspicuous legacy platforms are likely to be destroyed. Modern warfare is not boxing, it is hide-and-seek. We should redesign our forces accordingly.”

“Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR,” by Nicholas Weising

“U.S. Navy operational concepts must make an explicit priority of targeting the C4ISR architecture that fundamentally enables China’s A2/AD approach and have it serve as a core organizing principle for Navy acquisition and force development.”

“Expand the Navy’s Over-the Horizon Targeting Solutions,” by Richard Mosier

“Since the fielding of the Harpoon missile in the 1970s and the original Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile (TASM) in 1982, maritime over-the-horizon targeting has been an insufficient and largely unresolved ISR capability requirement for the U.S. Navy. The Navy has had limited long-range sensors for detection and tracking, an inability to sustain continuous tracking of targets of interest after detection, and few direct tactical network exchange capabilities to pertinent commands and shooting ships from satellites and primary processing commands.”

“To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting,” by Paul Nickell

“The new CNO’s vision to place the Sailor at the center of the Foundry, the Fleet, and the Way We Fight provides a powerful focus for the U.S. Navy. The enduring question is how we build the intellectual foundation to connect these pillars. While our service possesses an abundance of technical and procedural manuals, we lack a unifying warfighting philosophy that informs Sailors on not just what our forces do, but also how to think about the fundamental nature of combat at sea.”

“The Indian Ocean: An Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China,” by Renato Scarfi and Gian Carlo Poddighe

“The naval instrument is a powerful tool for manifesting shared will and projecting influence, and the theater where this will be most effective is the Indo-Pacific. The main competition will take place in those waters, and marks an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to strengthen its naval cooperation with Europe.”

“Start Building Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue-water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla of innovations.”

“The Imperative for Integrated Maritime Operations,” by Steven Bancroft and Ben Van Horrick

“Beyond the ARG/MEU team, 21st-century naval integration is more than a technological or organizational shift — it is an operational imperative. Combining the agility and expeditionary mindset of the Marine Corps with the firepower and reach of the Navy into a single, lower-level command, the naval service can build a more lethal, resilient, agile maritime force. This integrated approach—exemplified by formations such as TF-76/3, TF 61/2, and TF-51/5—ensures that U.S. naval power projection and dominance remain ready to meet the demands of the modern era. “

“Conduct Legal Preparation of the Battlespace,” by James Kraska

“Much of our collective experience in international law is from the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not operations at sea. We should refocus on the laws that apply throughout the global commons – sea, air, and space – that surround our Homeland and connects us to allies in Asia and Europe.”

“Rugby and Rivalry: Use Sports Diplomacy to Counter China in the South Pacific,” by Jason Lancaster

“Navy rugby matches with Pacific Island teams are an excellent way to provide the administration with exciting and high-profile opportunities to engage with leaders in countries vital to U.S. interests. The PRC can build stadiums, but does not field competitive rugby teams, while the U.S. Navy does. The Navy can use sports diplomacy to demonstrate presence and benefit U.S. regional interests.”

“Technical Interoperability in Contested Environments is a Must,” by Nicholas A. Kristof

“The need for interoperability in naval operations has never been more critical. However, these operations will increasingly be forced to occur in contested communication environments, where data access and connectivity cannot be guaranteed. Balancing these two imperatives—interoperability and resilience in contested conditions—will be vital to successful maritime operations.”

“Navigate the Future Through Maritime Wisdom,” by Roshan Kulatunga

“Cognitive preparation has to be one of the key considerations for the new U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. Knowledge alone is inadequate, it must be developed alongside intellect. By embracing these intellectual traditions and prominently embedding them in military education, navies can ensure their sailors are not just operators of ships, but custodians of an enduring wisdom that continues to guide humanity’s engagement with the sea.”

“Three Focus Areas for the New CNO,” by Jacob Wiencek

The “Davidson Window” is closing and we need the sea service to deliver the crucial component of the Joint Force. Part of the solution is found in better physical health, greater formal training, and emphasizing the importance of cyberspace operations.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Adm. Daryl Caudle, on the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), Feb. 9, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo)