By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short articles submitted in response to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

Authors recommended new naval strategies and approaches to force design, as well as specific efforts to manage personnel retention issues. Authors also offered recommendations on how the Navy can become a better learning organization and seize opportunities posed by emerging capabilities. The U.S. Navy’s new leadership is confronting myriad challenges that could affect the Navy’s competitiveness for years to come.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their excellent contributions. This is an independent CIMSEC initiative and is not produced in partnership with any U.S. Navy organization or entity.

“The United States Navy Needs an Operational Level of War Strategy to Inform Fleet Design,” by Steve Wills

“Admiral Lisa Franchetti should take the initiative to develop a comprehensive, operational level of war maritime strategy that will determine fleet missions, which will subsequently inform a specific fleet size and force design. Forging a stronger connection between warfighting strategy and force design will remain among the most pressing matters for the leadership of the United States Navy.”

“Create a New Doctrine for Applying Learning Strategies to Warfighting Challenges,” by CDR Paul Nickell

“A revised NDP-1 will go beyond teaching warfare principles as an instrument of national power. Indeed, it would provide a timeless model for how to approach complex warfighting challenges with specific learning strategies and campaigns.”

“Focus on Culture for Success in the AI Era,” by Harrison Schramm

“Successful AI culture is a departure from Navy norms. Military culture is based around assured success, but compared to aviation or weaponeering, AI requires far more failure before reaching success.”

“Dusting Off the Z-Gram: Getting Real with Recruiting and Retention,” by Lt. Sam Strauss

“The traditional benefits of naval service – adventure, camaraderie, leadership experience, stable pay, and robust benefits – no longer match the costs associated with a sea-going career. While this may not be the case for every Sailor, personnel numbers indicate a strong correlation. So what do we do?”

“Counter China’s Goal of Displacing American Command of the Sea,” by Robert C. Rubel

“To support its goals, China is creating a navy that it hopes can directly challenge the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the world ocean, something the USSR never aspired to do. The combination of China’s economic and industrial power, and its sweeping global objectives, presents the U.S. with a new and more difficult challenge that previous approaches to security will not properly address.”

“Empowering Division Officers and Enhancing Sailor Stability,” by Lt. Upton Wallace

“These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.”

“Revamp Force Design for Sea Control and Joint Integration,” by Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

“The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.”

“The Navy Must Rediscover its Roots and Recommit to Small Combatants,” by Victor Sussman

“The Navy must recommit to the vital role of small ships in meeting its obligations. A commitment to smaller combatants offers benefits for naval operations, the supporting industrial base, and for leadership development.”

“Capitalize on Allied Capabilities to Succeed at Sea – A View from Spain,” by Gonzalo Vazquez

“With an increasingly complex strategic environment, and a fleet struggling to meet its many operational requirements, the next CNO must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to succeed at sea. Prominent options include strengthening naval cooperation with partners to ensure a permanent presence in all strategically relevant theaters, and bolstering the sharing of naval knowledge among allied naval war colleges.”

“Rebalance the Fleet Toward Being a Truly Expeditionary Navy,” by Anthony Cowden

“Today we have a forward-based navy, not an expeditionary navy. This distinction is important for remaining competitive against modern threats and guiding force design.”

“Organize Campaigns of Learning and Reshape the Defense Analysis Paradigm,” by John Hanley

“Whether it is maintenance and administration, training and education, at-sea exercises, engagement with adversaries and partners (e.g., FONOPS), or creating antifragile naval architectures, if the participants are simply box-checking rather than learning, the effort is falling short. The Navy must be more deliberate about being a learning organization and how it structures its campaigns of learning.”

“Empowering Enlisted Sailors: The Imperative for Expanded Educational Opportunities in the U.S. Navy,” by Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers

“In the pursuit of maritime superiority, the U.S. Navy must prioritize the education and empowerment of its enlisted Sailors. These dedicated individuals are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and their success directly contributes to the U.S. Navy’s overall readiness and effectiveness. By reinforcing and expanding educational opportunities for enlisted Sailors, the U.S. Navy can ensure that they become full, active, and informed participants in the mission.”

“Get Real Get Better about Digital HR for Sailors,” by Artem Sherbinin and Daniel Stefanus

“Consistent errors in their HR experience, often driven by these unreliable digital HR tools, push many Sailors out of the service. Sailors’ digital HR experience is not a quality of service or quality of life issue. Getting HR digital implementation right is a warfighting and readiness imperative.”

“Down Select and Commit To Uncrewed Surface Systems,” by LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (ret.)

“After almost a decade of demonstrating the capabilities of MUSVs, the Navy has been slow to establish programs of record to populate the fleet with these workhorses. The Navy should now shift its efforts from prototyping to serial production, given how these vessels have demonstrated their potential.”

“Man The Fleet and Reduce Sailor Exhaustion,” by Capt. John Cordle (ret.)

“In the end, it comes down to setting firm priorities and making the tradeoffs. The best weapons in the world will fall short if they are manned by overworked and exhausted Sailors.”

“Sailors Matter Most: Incentivize Education and Cultivate Learning Leaders,” by Sean F. X. Barrett, Mie Augier, and William F. Mullen, III

“All members of the sea services must help maintain and hone their intellectual edge. They must be able to out-think and out-learn any opponent, especially in dynamic and rapidly changing situations. This is their greatest advantage, but it is also perishable. If it is neglected due to other priorities, it will atrophy and wither away.”

“Lead the Fight Against Climate Change and Transnational Crime in the Indian Ocean,” by Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

“Climate change is transforming the security landscape in the Indian Ocean. It is having a profound impact in fomenting transnational maritime crimes, particularly illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and piracy. Island states are specifically vulnerable to these crimes, which often exploit their maritime boundaries and limited capacity. Recognizing these strategic vulnerabilities and their potential to destabilize the region is paramount.”

“Prototype the Bi-Modal Naval Force,” by Shelley Gallup

“The bi-modal fleet structure includes a combination of small, crewed, and autonomous systems working as a networked flotilla. The crewed LMACCs and uncrewed autonomous surface vessels can be built and armed for much lower costs and greater capability than the cost of building one or two more destroyers or frigates. In this systems view, it is the holistic flotilla network that is the capability, rather than the individual platform.”

“Improve the Culture and Mechanisms of Naval Learning,” by Commander Art Valeri

“A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory.”

“Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide,” by Michael D. Purzycki

“Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph.”

“Be Mindful of JADC2’s Emission Risks,” by Richard Mosier

“The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected]. 

Featured Image: WASHINGTON (Sep. 14, 2023) – Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti answers questions from members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during her confirmation hearing at the Dirksen Senate Office Building. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Amanda R. Gray)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Richard Mosier

The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.

While net-centric concepts such as JADC2 enjoy broad endorsement, the elephant in the room is the underlying risk associated with adversary intelligence collection and exploitation. RF emissions present the best source for channeling enemy wide-area search, classification, and tracking. If U.S. emissions are sufficiently frequent, they provide the basis for maintaining the track continuity required for targeting long-range anti-ship missile strikes. The U.S. should not underestimate the ability of adversaries to take full advantage of the RF opportunity presented by U.S. net-centric operations.

In contrast with the JADC2 concept, service concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) are based on the force being hard-to-find. Recognizing the risk of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the hard-to-find objective is achieved in large measure through operating in RF silence.

The JADC2 net-centric concept and concepts based on being hard-to-find both make sense, but need to be made more complementary. If the enemy does not know where U.S. units are located, the strategy would be to operate in RF silence to remain hard-to-find, thereby avoiding premature engagements and maintaining the advantage of surprise. When the hard-to-find strategy fails and the U.S. force is facing attack, the strategy would be to rapidly transition to unconstrained RF emissions to leverage the substantial advantage of net-centric operations.

The Navy should request that the Defense Intelligence Agency conduct an assessment, with Navy, NSA, and NRO participation, of the risk of Chinese exploitation of JADC2 RF emissions. If the risk is assessed as high, it would serve to persuade JADC2 advocates of the risks of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the necessity to conduct some phases of operations in RF silence, and the need for modifications to the JADC2 concept to integrate both.

Richard Mosier is a retired defense contractor systems engineer, Naval Flight Officer, OPNAV N2 civilian analyst, and OSD SES 4 responsible for oversight of tactical intelligence systems and leadership of major defense analyses on UAVs, signals intelligence, and C4ISR.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Feb. 18, 2019) An E-2D Hawkeye assigned to the “Bluetails” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 121 performs an arrested landing on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Amber Smalley/Released)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Michael D. Purzycki

The civilian-military divide is often framed as a problem of cultural misunderstanding. And certainly, in an era where most Americans have not served in the military, it is natural that those who have served would feel misunderstood by those whose safety and freedom they defend. However, there is another aspect of the divide, one that if addressed forthrightly by military leadership, can narrow the gap in a more tangible way.

Given that the military is one of the most highly regarded public institutions in American society, its members are well-positioned to ask for material sacrifice from the general public. This would give civilians a chance to go beyond saying, “Thank you for your service,” and contribute in a financially meaningful way to the nation’s defenses. In an era of frequent budgetary uncertainty, any step that could help ensure a reliably funded military is worth considering.

For example, the Navy could point to the amount of petroleum it would need at its disposal to fight and win a conflict with the People’s Liberation Army over the fate of Taiwan. It could then ask Congress for a specific number of barrels of petroleum to be taken out of the civilian economy and added to Navy reserves, to ensure there is no gap between the fuel needed and the fuel available for contingencies. In the process of this request, it could quantify the increase in gasoline prices American drivers could expect to experience. Similar initiatives could be applied to other militarily significant resources and assets.

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph. Evoking past Americans’ experience of rationing, Victory Gardens, war bonds, and the introduction of income tax withholding, while asking today’s Americans to endure a little pain at the pump, could narrow the civ-mil divide as well as help prepare the nation for future major conflict. As politically difficult as requests for sacrifice from ordinary Americans will be, scrambling to adequately resource America’s defenses in the midst of a war would likely be even more difficult.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. In addition to CIMSEC, he has been published in Divergent Options, Merion West, the Washington Monthly, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki. The views expressed here are his own.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct. 3, 2023) Sailors load a MK-46 torpedo into a surface vessel torpedo tube on the boat deck aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86) while conducting routine operations in the Sea of Japan, October 3. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commander Art Valeri

The “Get Real Get Better” campaign initiated a transformative process to address performance shortfalls in the spirit of increasing readiness. However, the practical method of achieving that readiness deserves more attention in considering broad naval mission sets and thoughtfully influencing change within the Navy.

Addressing such a varied group of personnel and missions across the spectrum of being, and supporting, the warfighter is challenging. It may prove beneficial to widen the scope beyond a negatively focused look at poor performance at sea. Although the study of catastrophic failures is absolutely necessary, other industries suggest ways to improve organizational performance. An interdisciplinary approach might uncover the behaviors and practices of units delivering preferred outcomes despite limited resources across both line and staff communities. The Navy might appreciate ways to emulate success as equally valuable in our approach to readiness, rather than strive to narrowly avoid irreversible failure. As much as we “embrace the red,” we might also “perceive the green.” Although difficult, we might even aspire to rediscover a tolerance toward recoverable failures as opportunities to learn.

A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory. Across the Navy, such victory might represent better surgical outcomes in the operating room, improved liaison relationships with partner nations, and commanding officers unafraid to emphasize boundary spanning, all of which reinforce asymmetric advantages. Although often a short-term advantage, a reliance on superior technology is not enough to ensure victory. Institutions should sense and steer the mechanisms that support individual and organizational learning, manage the barriers and pitfalls that inhibit this learning, and invest in better learning and leading methods.

For the Navy, this approach requires a new way of thinking. It must be permissive in nature and firmly grounded in becoming a learning organization. To effect such a change, a doctrinal publication formally instituting learning as a strategic priority is a necessary and natural complement to Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare as a first step. This articulated position would serve to orient all naval communities to embrace, value, and reward those activities necessary to our survival despite modern and forthcoming challenges. Without such a fundamental reference to socialize these concepts into the organization, the bureaucracy which is the U.S.  Navy might unintentionally stifle performance, slow its momentum, and limit its potential to make progress. The Navy must become a better learning organization if it is to realize its warfighting potential and sustain its competitive edge.

Commander (Dr.) Art Valeri is an Operative Dentist and Naval Postgraduate School PMBA student stationed at NMRTC Great Lakes serving as Dental Department Head, Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher Medical and Dental Clinic, Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center, North Chicago, IL.

Featured Image: Naval Aircrewman (Helicopter) 3rd Class Taquan West, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, keeps watch over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and the fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) on June 28, 2022. (U.S. Navy Photo)