By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short notes submitted to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle. 

Authors wrote about a wide variety of topics, including changes to force structure, naval strategy, and the need for more warfighting focus. There were several common themes, including calls for more decisive leadership, a requirement to reconsider old paradigms, and a profound urgency to drive reform.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their contributions.

“Sir, Be Radical,” by Chris Rielage

“The problem is not charting what the new Navy should look like. The problem is acting on it. This is the moment to be radical – for Admiral Caudle to lean fully into the “C-Notes” and make once-in-a-generation changes to how the Navy thinks and works. It is time for the CNO to steer us to the boldest course, despite the risks – we cannot afford anything else right now.”

“Change the Navy’s Narrative: The Future Fight and the Hybrid Fleet,” by Peter Dombrowski

“By articulating a powerful vision statement, the CNO will help unify effort within the Navy and provide insight to the other sea services about how the Navy will conduct its business for the next three years and beyond.”

“Accelerate Human-Machine Teaming in the Maritime Operations Center,” by Michael Posey

“MOCs serve as the decision hubs of numbered fleets, responsible for executing campaigns at sea and managing maritime task forces. As our Navy fights from the seabed to space and through the electromagnetic spectrum, the volume of data demands our watchstanders employ data-enhancing tools that augment, not replace, human judgment.”

“Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors,” by Alan Brechbill

“Their killchains depend on persistent surveillance, tracking and targeting multi-phenomenology satellites, long-range radars, and networked command systems. In other words, they will not win with their missiles, but with their ability to find us. Breaking that killchain is the Navy’s main line of defense. The uncomfortable truth is that Navy leadership still underappreciates this vulnerability.”

“Train to Win Below the Threshold of War,” by Vince Vanterpool

“The actions seen against the Filipinos by the PRC is only the beginning. There may be similar actions against U.S. assets in the future. In order to adequately deter and defeat these future attempts, the Navy Deterrence Concept needs robust tactics and techniques for naval units operating at the tactical level just below the threshold of armed conflict.”

“We are at Risk of Forgetting the Lessons of the 2017 Collisions,” by John Cordle

“Organizational drift to failure is always a risk, and an important protection against it is constant, critical self-assessment. These three mishap reports – viewed holistically – are a perfect opportunity to do just that. The question should not be ‘have we completed all of the CR recommendations?’ But ‘did they work?’ Recent events indicate they might not have.”

“What Unifies the Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad? Warfighting Focus,” by Paul Viscovich

“The CNO has inherited a fleet that has suffered creeping administrative overload for years. Unless the CNO can put an end to the suffocating administrative accretions from decades of poorly prioritized requirements, our next war may feature more ‘victory marks’ on the enemy’s bridgewings and fighter cockpits than on ours.”

“Fix the Navy’s Flawed System of Warfighting Development,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“For the U.S. Navy, the first 30 years of post-Cold War experience featured a major institutional reorientation toward the low-end spectrum of operations in a highly permissive threat environment. This facilitated widespread dysfunction across critical warfighting development functions that are crucial for preparing the Navy for war. The result has been one of the most pivotal eras of decay and atrophy of high-end warfighting skill in the modern history of the U.S. Navy.”

“Revisiting A Modest Proposal for Improving Shipyard Production and Repair Capacity,” by Ryan Walker

“I recommend the Chief of Naval Operations push the 8-4-2-10 as a potential realistic solution rooted in historical insight, operational experience, and a deep respect for the challenges facing the shipyard worker. If implemented thoughtfully, the 8-4-2-10 schedule could become a model for other defense programs, reinforcing readiness while preserving workforce well-being.”

“The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools,” by Andrew Pfau and Bridger Smith

“As shipyard availability delays continue to challenge the submarine force, sailors assigned to the these units require better and more consistent training tools. Sailors must be ready to support at-sea operations and units must quickly transition to a combat-ready state after shipyard periods. Low-cost, high-density training tools like wargames and an “attack center in a box” can provide opportunities for sailors to build and maintain perishable at-sea skills, leading to a more ready and lethal force.”

“A Navy for War in the Age of Intelligent Missiles,” by Craig Koerner

“Unable to hide, the future of conventional air and sea-surface platforms is grim. When fighting competent opponents, those few, valuable, and conspicuous legacy platforms are likely to be destroyed. Modern warfare is not boxing, it is hide-and-seek. We should redesign our forces accordingly.”

“Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR,” by Nicholas Weising

“U.S. Navy operational concepts must make an explicit priority of targeting the C4ISR architecture that fundamentally enables China’s A2/AD approach and have it serve as a core organizing principle for Navy acquisition and force development.”

“Expand the Navy’s Over-the Horizon Targeting Solutions,” by Richard Mosier

“Since the fielding of the Harpoon missile in the 1970s and the original Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile (TASM) in 1982, maritime over-the-horizon targeting has been an insufficient and largely unresolved ISR capability requirement for the U.S. Navy. The Navy has had limited long-range sensors for detection and tracking, an inability to sustain continuous tracking of targets of interest after detection, and few direct tactical network exchange capabilities to pertinent commands and shooting ships from satellites and primary processing commands.”

“To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting,” by Paul Nickell

“The new CNO’s vision to place the Sailor at the center of the Foundry, the Fleet, and the Way We Fight provides a powerful focus for the U.S. Navy. The enduring question is how we build the intellectual foundation to connect these pillars. While our service possesses an abundance of technical and procedural manuals, we lack a unifying warfighting philosophy that informs Sailors on not just what our forces do, but also how to think about the fundamental nature of combat at sea.”

“The Indian Ocean: An Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China,” by Renato Scarfi and Gian Carlo Poddighe

“The naval instrument is a powerful tool for manifesting shared will and projecting influence, and the theater where this will be most effective is the Indo-Pacific. The main competition will take place in those waters, and marks an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to strengthen its naval cooperation with Europe.”

“Start Building Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue-water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla of innovations.”

“The Imperative for Integrated Maritime Operations,” by Steven Bancroft and Ben Van Horrick

“Beyond the ARG/MEU team, 21st-century naval integration is more than a technological or organizational shift — it is an operational imperative. Combining the agility and expeditionary mindset of the Marine Corps with the firepower and reach of the Navy into a single, lower-level command, the naval service can build a more lethal, resilient, agile maritime force. This integrated approach—exemplified by formations such as TF-76/3, TF 61/2, and TF-51/5—ensures that U.S. naval power projection and dominance remain ready to meet the demands of the modern era. “

“Conduct Legal Preparation of the Battlespace,” by James Kraska

“Much of our collective experience in international law is from the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not operations at sea. We should refocus on the laws that apply throughout the global commons – sea, air, and space – that surround our Homeland and connects us to allies in Asia and Europe.”

“Rugby and Rivalry: Use Sports Diplomacy to Counter China in the South Pacific,” by Jason Lancaster

“Navy rugby matches with Pacific Island teams are an excellent way to provide the administration with exciting and high-profile opportunities to engage with leaders in countries vital to U.S. interests. The PRC can build stadiums, but does not field competitive rugby teams, while the U.S. Navy does. The Navy can use sports diplomacy to demonstrate presence and benefit U.S. regional interests.”

“Technical Interoperability in Contested Environments is a Must,” by Nicholas A. Kristof

“The need for interoperability in naval operations has never been more critical. However, these operations will increasingly be forced to occur in contested communication environments, where data access and connectivity cannot be guaranteed. Balancing these two imperatives—interoperability and resilience in contested conditions—will be vital to successful maritime operations.”

“Navigate the Future Through Maritime Wisdom,” by Roshan Kulatunga

“Cognitive preparation has to be one of the key considerations for the new U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. Knowledge alone is inadequate, it must be developed alongside intellect. By embracing these intellectual traditions and prominently embedding them in military education, navies can ensure their sailors are not just operators of ships, but custodians of an enduring wisdom that continues to guide humanity’s engagement with the sea.”

“Three Focus Areas for the New CNO,” by Jacob Wiencek

The “Davidson Window” is closing and we need the sea service to deliver the crucial component of the Joint Force. Part of the solution is found in better physical health, greater formal training, and emphasizing the importance of cyberspace operations.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Adm. Daryl Caudle, on the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), Feb. 9, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Jacob Wiencek

The U.S. Navy faces multiple, simultaneous pressures that necessitate equal levels of attention. We face legendary shipyard pressures with critical projects far behind schedule. While much physical and digital ink will continue to be spilled on these issues, and deservedly, there are three additional areas that would benefit from CNO attention.

Physical Health. It is no secret the new Secretary of War is laser focused on improving the health of the Joint Force. This is long overdue. Almost 70 percent of all servicemen and women are classified as obese or overweight while a 2019 report found the Navy specifically exhibited an obesity rate of 20 percent. This is unacceptable. An increased focus on physical health should include improving the quality of food, especially for shore galleys, and emphasizing at all levels of command leadership the importance of incorporating daily physical training into the workday.

Unify Naval Education and Training. Despite the promise contained in the landmark Education for Seapower report, that vision reality remains incomplete six years later. This pivot is even more important with the growing importance of great power competition in the cognitive domain. Progress has been made in establishing the U.S. Naval Community College, but other E4S recommendations have stalled or appear to be on permanent hold. The CNO should push to re-establish the Chief Learning Officer position and establish a Naval University to unify naval education efforts. Unifying naval training and education efforts would allow us to achieve greater results in developing warfighter readiness among officers and enlisted.

Revamp Information Warfare. Critical deficiencies are affecting how ready the Navy’s information forces are for war. Congress has previously expressed its strong displeasure over how cyberspace has been subsumed in the broader information warfare framework without the resident expertise to leverage the skillset. Legislatively mandated reforms have had a positive impact, but the CNO should do more. Simply, cyber warfare has long been a domain of warfighting, and the Navy needs to treat it as such. The CNO should work with Congress to re-create Navy Cyber Forces as a Type Command separated from Navy Information Forces. This separate Cyber Warfare Community can then develop the specialized talent necessary to fulfill the objectives of maritime cyber operations.

The “Davidson Window” is closing and we need the sea service to deliver the crucial component of the Joint Force. Part of the solution is found in better physical health, greater formal training, and emphasizing the importance of cyberspace operations.

Jacob Wiencek is a Petty Officer First Class in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed are strictly his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Navy Reserve, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government entity.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Sep. 26, 2025) Sailors raise the jackstaff during a sea-and-anchor evolution aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Ignatius (DDG 117), Sep. 26, 2025. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Bradley Wolff)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Roshan Kulatunga

Subtle intellect remains the most essential trait for individuals steering maritime power. Yet the acquisition of maritime wisdom is not an overnight endeavor, it is cultivated through sustained engagement with centuries of thought, strategic practice, and the lived experiences of sailors, commanders, and statesmen. Renowned military strategists and scholars throughout history, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Kautilya (Chanakya), Niccolò Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, Admiral Raoul Castex, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, and Admiral Wegener, have profoundly influenced the evolution of land, air, and maritime strategies. Their intellectual contributions to statecraft, military tactics, and maritime security continue to shape national strategies and doctrines. Naval officers and sailors in the 21st century should engage with this reservoir of wisdom and embed it into their professional ethos and education. It is vital for addressing today’s challenges posed by traditional and non-traditional threats.

Among the earliest military thinkers, Sun Tzu authored The Art of War approximately 2,500 years ago. Originally inscribed on bamboo strips, the treatise covers topics such as planning, the use of spies, the significance of terrain, and the concepts of strength and weakness. Written during the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BCE), Sun Tzu’s work became fundamental to Chinese martial culture and remains central to modern military education.

Thucydides, an Athenian historian, documented the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), fought between Athens and Sparta, the two dominant city-states of ancient Greece. His work, History of the Peloponnesian War, remains a cornerstone of political realism. Sparta’s eventual victory highlighted the limits of imperial overreach. Thucydides’ insights into fear, honor, and interest continue to shape debates in international relations, especially in contexts like the Gulf War and the post-9/11 era. His reflections provide lasting lessons on the dangers of hubris and the complexities of alliance politics.

In ancient India, Kautilya’s Arthashastra serves as a comprehensive guide to statecraft, diplomacy, and warfare. Spanning fifteen sub-books, 155 chapters, and over 5,000 verses, it articulates doctrines on governance, economics, espionage, and military operations. Central to the text is the “Six-Fold Policy,” which encompasses alliance, neutrality, hostility, preparedness for war, seeking protection, and dual policy, demonstrating a pragmatic approach to international relations. Kautilya’s focus on preparedness and managing alliances resonates strongly in today’s Indo-Pacific maritime landscape.

During the Renaissance, Niccolò Machiavelli, a Florentine diplomat, advanced strategic thought through The Prince and his writings on the art of war. Often regarded as the father of modern political science, Machiavelli emphasized that rulers must master the art of war to defend their states. Chapter 14 of The Prince warns against neglecting military studies, which inevitably leads to a ruler’s downfall. Machiavelli’s practical rules highlighted discipline and adaptability, qualities vital for modern naval officers navigating fluid strategic environments.

In the post-Napoleonic era, Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz established his classic work, On War (1832) with the statement that war is “the continuation of politics by other means.” Clausewitz contended that conflicts stem from irreconcilable political interests, with military force serving as a coercive instrument. Clausewitz’s focus on war’s political dimension remains vital today, reminding navies that maritime operations must be consistent with national policy objectives.

In the late nineteenth century, American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan revolutionized maritime thought with The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890). Mahan argued that control of the sea, achieved through decisive fleet engagements and dominance of maritime commerce, was the foundation of global power. His writings spurred naval expansions in the United States, Britain, Germany, and Japan, placing sea power at the heart of grand strategy.

From antiquity to the modern era, these strategists show that maritime wisdom transcends time and geography. It is not limited to technical seamanship or naval hardware, but represents an intellectual tradition that combines politics, economics, and military art. For 21st century officers and sailors, understanding this tradition is vital for confronting conventional challenges, as well as piracy, illegal fishing, climate-driven insecurity, cyber threats, and hybrid tactics in the maritime domain.

Cognitive preparation has to be one of the key considerations for the new U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. Knowledge alone is inadequate, it must be developed alongside intellect. By embracing these intellectual traditions and prominently embedding them in military education, navies can ensure their sailors are not just operators of ships, but custodians of an enduring wisdom that continues to guide humanity’s engagement with the sea.

Dr. (Commander Retd.) Roshan Kulatunga is a maritime security expert and a retired senior officer of the Sri Lanka Navy, with over 22 years of operational and strategic experience at sea and ashore. He specialises in maritime intelligence, naval operations, and countering transnational maritime threats. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Peradeniya, where he currently conducts research on maritime strategy, sea power, maritime diplomacy, and the security of small island states. He also serves as a Research Associate at the Indo-Pacific Study Centre, Australia, contributing to policy discussions on regional maritime affairs. Additionally, Dr. Kulatunga lectures at universities, institutions, and conferences.

Featured Image: The Battle of Actium, by Lorenzo A. Castro (1672), Museo Marítimo Nacional. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Nicholas A. Kristof

In his remarks at his assumption of office ceremony, Admiral Caudle stated that, “Great power competition is sharpening, threats and capabilities are proliferating, technological disruption is accelerating, the maritime domain is increasingly contested and the margin for error is shrinking. To prevail in this environment, we must build and sustain a Navy that is resilient, agile, globally present, and credible in combat.”

To accomplish this, the Navy must ruthlessly pursue two seemingly disparate capabilities – technical interoperability and the capability to operate in contested communications environments. The need for interoperability in naval operations has never been more critical. However, these operations will increasingly be forced to occur in contested communication environments, where data access and connectivity cannot be guaranteed. Balancing these two imperatives—interoperability and resilience in contested conditions—will be vital to successful maritime operations.

Interoperability enables coalition and joint forces to share information, coordinate actions, and execute missions with speed and precision. In a security environment where no single nation can address threats alone, it allows navies from different countries to communicate and share situational awareness and use common data standards and communication protocols. It also allows forces to integrate sensors and weapons systems for combined lethality and efficiency. Naval operations today—conducted with NATO partners, regional partnerships, or ad-hoc coalitions—depend on interoperability for command and control, intelligence sharing, and battle management.

Despite advances in networking and communications, contested conditions remain a harsh reality. Adversaries will employ electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and other anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies to disrupt communications and links. Operating effectively in these conditions requires resilient systems that degrade gracefully, continue core functions autonomously, and then reconstitute automatically. It also requires bandwidth efficient communications protocols that send only the minimum number of bits required to accomplish the mission. Forces also need data prioritization and edge processing, enabling platforms to process and act on information locally when disconnected from the network.

Systems that possess these capabilities exist today. But these principles have not served as first-order design considerations for many systems, and the Navy acquisition enterprise is not well-organized to test novel solutions from industry.

The challenge is to design and field systems that support improved interoperability yet can still remain effective in communications-degraded environments. This demands modular, open architectures that allow systems to plug and play across nations while still functioning independently when disconnected. It also requires distributed C2 models to ensure that no single point of failure can collapse operational effectiveness. Zero-trust cybersecurity frameworks will help maintain data integrity even when network control is lost.

Despite “interoperability” being a buzzword for years, the Navy and Marine Corps team, and the wider Joint force, has been extremely slow to improve. Stovepiped acquisitions, lip service instead of ruthless prioritization, and institutional inertia all stand in the way of much needed change. Worse still, recent acquisitions have focused on bandwidth-heavy, compute-intensive, headquarters-focused systems that are doomed to fail in contested communication environments and leave commanders blind and unable to communicate with their forces. In some of these cases, Navy leadership has been won over by fancy and buzzworthy pitches for capabilities that do not actually operate as marketed.

Admiral Caudle must provide forceful and clear direction to the naval acquisition enterprise that he ultimately oversees. That enterprise must prioritize systems that maximize interoperability when conditions permit, and the ability to operate alone and unafraid when necessary.

Nicholas A. Kristof is a 1996 graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a retired submarine officer. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (Feb. 2, 2022) Operations Specialist 2nd Class Adrian Godinez, left, from Athens, Alabama, and Operations Specialist 3rd Class Dorian Soto, from Houston, Texas, stand watch on the Anti-Surface/Subsurface Tactical Air Control (ASTAC) console in the Combat Information Center as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) conducts routine underway operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Benjamin A. Lewis)