By Dr. John P. Cordle, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Introduction

There is an episode of Star Trek (S1:E2) that has always chilled me to the bone, called “Armageddon”. The premise is that wars are too costly, so they are gamed out using a computer simulation. Predicted deaths are calculated, then assigned to the general population by lottery. If your number comes up, you report to a central location and are executed. Everyone accepts it as the cost of doing business.

In the military today, a quiet Armageddon is about to occur as we watch the potential separation of up to 5% of the force for a condition known as Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB).

If you are in the military and can’t pronounce it, you need to learn it, because PFB is about to change your life whether you are directly affected or not. At the direction of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, this condition, which has been waiverable for four decades, is now a disqualifying condition for continued service in the armed forces. Depending on the military service, separations will begin as early as now (Air Force), nine months (USMC) or 11 months (Army and Navy). (1)

As a veteran with 30 years service, and a Human Factors Engineer who has researched this topic extensively in collaboration with military dermatologists, I would like to ask Mr. Hegseth to reverse his position against facial hair in the military, specifically for religious and medical reasons. It would be a win-win situation for him and the military.

The Secretary’s often-articulated core values of merit and warrior ethos would seem to lend support rather than opposition to beards, at least for those with religious or medical waivers. In June he stated, as justification for rescinding the requirement for flu vaccinations, that, “We will not force you [to get a flu shot) because your body, your faith and your convictions are not negotiable.” (2)  That is exactly the argument that he could use to support beards; the reasons for beard waivers are also related to individual body characteristics (the medical condition PFB) or religious convictions. If he truly believes in these values, he is missing a huge opportunity when it comes to facial hair.

Despite the sudden prevalence of this issue, many military members and national security members lack familiarity with PFB. A quick primer follows:

PFB is a chronic skin condition primarily associated with the curved shape of the hair follicle and tightly curled hair structure but can be associated with a genetic predisposition. It is triggered by shaving.(3)

There is no “treatment plan” that allows a person with PFB to “return to normal shaving.”  Shaving itself, combined with genetics, is the cause of PFB.

Discussions regarding the separation of service members who cannot shave revolve around force protection and risk-to-mission in contaminated or smoke-filled environments where protective masks must be worn.  However, considerable research demonstrates that there is minimal impact on forced air mask effectiveness for individuals with 1/8” to 1/4” facial hair; they achieved a satisfactory seal to OSHA standards in the vast majority of cases. (3)

While the effect of facial hair is more pronounced for gas masks in a CBRD environment, the setting of MOPP levels can easily incorporate shaving as additional step when gas masks are issued in the event of a real world threat, as I did in command. Effectiveness can be validated by a periodic fit test. Yes, there is risk, but it can be mitigated.

This shows an exceedingly small risk, and one that we have accepted for decades with no recorded injuries due to mask leakage during fires. I spoke with several military members affected by this policy. They, and their families, are under immense stress – especially those deployed and unable to access medical care. Here are a few of their stories:

Vignette 1

“I am a black Naval officer with PFB. I am fairly senior and have dealt with it for my entire career. Up until last week I felt like I was upwardly mobile in my community, but it appears that those days are over – a selection board will take one look at my photo and vote “Zero” regardless of my accomplishments. I’m still trying to wrap my head around the fact that I was able to serve honorably in a multitude of operational assignments for over 29 years with a beard, and suddenly it appears to be disqualifying.  I have made peace with this, and I’m ready to move on. But the impact doesn’t stop there. I have two teenage sons. One of them had decided long ago the Navy was not for him based on watching my career and the things that I had to work through. The second was on the fence, but the new policy essentially shuts the door on him since he has PFB. For me this policy is generational in its impact.”

Vignette 2

“I’m a junior enlisted person who has been in the Navy for six years. I joined the Navy to build a better life. Since joining I have become a naturalized citizen, earned a Bachelor’s and a Master’s degree while working full time on Active Duty. I have PFB and have tried everything but the only thing that works is not shaving. I have applied for a Commissioning program and felt I have a good chance, but the new policy seems to remove that opportunity. I am getting used to the idea that I may have to give up my career because of my PFB, despite having no impact on my performance or ability to do my job. I find the entire process confusing and frustrating. All I want is to do my job and serve my country.”

Vignette 3

“I recently graduated from the United States Naval Academy. Before that I attended NAPS (Naval academy prep school) and that’s when I was originally diagnosed with PFB. They were better with it there, I also wasn’t growing the same amount of facial hair so that could have played a part. They were a lot more understanding at NAPS than what I later experienced at USNA.

“My preparation actually came before plebe summer because I was led to believe that the only reason I had PFB was because I was shaving wrong. (No one ever taught me how to shave) So I tried everything: single and multi-bladed razors, magic shave, heated towels and steam. Using the techniques I figured a way to make my shaving better, but it still didn’t get rid of the PFB or the discomfort that came with shaving.

“So, when Plebe summer came around with completing time hacks, I was unable to properly shave not to mention being told to dry shave in front of everyone on the bulkhead if there was any stubble. I tried to toughen it out for a while because I didn’t want to seem different from my peers it wasn’t until an upperclassman from another company saw my neck and face that I was instructed to go to the doctor and get a chit. At this time when you received a chit you couldn’t line your beard up at all. I thought my facial hair was getting out of control and I didn’t think I was presentable or professional so I decided to line my beard up.

“This was a mistake. When my supervisors saw this, they made me shave immediately and then once again there was stubble so I had to dry shave in the hallway. The discomfort with all the training evolutions or just being outside having the sun and my own sweat run across my razor scrapped neck and face was horrible. I was very self-conscious about my face and neck while at the academy the way people stared at it makes you feel unhuman. Then the irritation and pain cause you to focus on your neck when you could be focusing on much more important things like school.

“When you look at PFB it’s usually minorities that have it. I understand that racism is not the intention of the current rules and policies but when usually only one race has PFB and we are told to be in the back while marching or are hidden at certain events it starts to get your mind racing. It just sucks to be singled out because of a medical condition that for some reason has a negative stigma. After a while you understand “it is what it is” and you may not be able to get certain jobs as a flag aide or things of that nature I realized this at the Academy that because of me not being able to shave I will probably miss out on a lot of opportunities in the Navy. Now it appears I may be separated before my career has really begun.”

Vignette 4

“I’m scheduled to promote to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) on September 1. I’ve served for 19 years, enlisting in 2007. Throughout my career I’ve had intermittent medical shaving waivers for pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB). At no point has this condition affected my ability to perform my duties, deploy, qualify, or lead Sailors.

“Early in my career, having a shaving waiver as a white Sailor came with a lot of ridicule. I was routinely told by senior leaders, “You’re not Black. Shave your f****** face.” Wanting to fit in and avoid the attention, I often shaved anyway despite the medical consequences. As I gained experience and advanced in rank, I became more confident advocating for my own health and refused to accept that kind of toxic leadership.

“I made Chief Petty Officer in 2015 and was commissioned as a Limited Duty Officer in 2017.  Across my career I’ve completed 13 operational submarine deployments. During every deployment, once we were underway, no-shave morale chits were standard practice. Neither I nor my teammates were required to shave, and it was never treated as an operational safety concern. Throughout all of those deployments, our ability to accomplish the mission was never questioned because of PFB or facial hair. I have earned numerous personal, campaign and unit awards. I also completed a Bachelor of Science while enlisted and a Master of Arts after commissioning, accomplishing both while serving on active duty and between deployments.

“I share that background because I want to make one point: PFB has never prevented me from deploying, qualifying, leading Sailors, or successfully completing any operational assignment I have been given. My record demonstrates that. When the new policy was announced, I immediately went to Navy Medical to understand my options. Based on the guidance I received, if I continue requesting recurring 90-day shaving waivers, after one year I could be processed for administrative separation. If I accept my promotion to LCDR on September 1, I will incur a three-year service obligation. Yet, based on the guidance I received, I could still face administrative separation before reaching retirement eligibility, despite nearly two decades of honorable service. That leaves me with an incredibly difficult decision. I can accept promotion and resume shaving, knowing it will aggravate a documented medical condition, or I can decline promotion and retire instead.

“For me, this isn’t about wanting to wear a beard. It’s about facing the possibility that a medically documented condition—not my performance, conduct, leadership, or ability to serve—could force me to choose between my health and the career I’ve spent nearly 20 years building.

“I understand the Navy has the authority to establish grooming standards, and I have lived under those standards for my entire career. I am not asking for special treatment. I am simply asking that decades of demonstrated readiness, operational performance, and documented medical evidence be given appropriate weight when determining whether a Sailor remains fit to serve. My concern is that this policy appears to place successful, deployable Sailors with documented medical conditions in an impossible position. I hope my story helps illustrate the very real impact these changes may have on experienced Sailors, their families, and ultimately the retention of proven leaders the Navy has spent years developing.”

These are real people, with real families. There are over 6000 of them in the Navy alone, and potentially quadruple that across the entire military. They feel betrayed, abandoned, and forgotten by the Navy they have loved and served. How do I know? They told me.

Contradictions

Finally, beards are historically aligned with the warrior ethos that the Secretary of War wants for the military. Navy SEALS  are routinely authorized to have beards, and they are truly amazing warriors. He also once said, “If you want to grow a beard, join the special forces.” He has already associated beards with an elite fighting unit, and expressed willingness to abandon grooming standards if the service-member is of a certain military skillset. This reveals either a lack of consistency or a contradiction in this new policy.

Beards are aligned with warrior ethos, independent of merit, and a historical symbol of strength and religious conviction, which puts them in perfect alignment with his values. Remember, this is not a case where a policy change was recommended by the services and approved by the Secretary; it came from him. But his actions contradict his words; what this policy is saying is, “We will force you (to shave) because your body, your faith and your convictions are negotiable.” This stance is contrary to Secretary of War’s previously stated values regarding bodily autonomy and religious conviction.

Further, many of our NATO Allies,such as Great Britain and Germany, allow beards with no operational or safety impact. Compared to navies around the world, our clean-shaven force is an outlier. 

The Cost to the Service

Most importantly, if the services  follow through with the Secretary’s  plan to separate those service members with PFB, we will be ruining lives and careers, as well as creating gaps in critical skill areas – many more than those separated during the pandemic for refusing the COVID vaccine. Let’s look at the numbers. I’ll focus on the Navy, and the readers can extrapolate the numbers for each service. 

Since the majority of those with PFB are Black, this policy has a disproportionate, if coincidental, racial outcome. This may not be the intent, but it is clearly the impact. Just within the Navy, the new policy will discharge between 6,000 and 12,000 Sailors in the next two years. Demographically that represents between 3-5% of all Sailors, but could exceed 20-25% of Black Sailors, who represent 65-85% of those with waivers. (4)  That is the equivalent of an entire Carrier Strike Group, at a time when our warships are engaged in combat operations and extended deployments with over 10,000 gaps at sea.

The new Navy policy goes a step further, buried in a small sub paragraph in the policy, applying the PFB restriction to new recruits as well. This will effectively shut the door to Navy service for 50% of Black Americans and ultimately change the face of the Navy. It will certainly turn back the clock by undoing the progressive policies of CNO Elmo Zumwalt in the removal of barriers for minorities. But the Secretary can change that by allowing those with PFB to continue to serve on a waiver. 

Talk to Your Experts and Your Sailors

I encourage the Secretary of War to meet with a Dermatologist to discuss the true nature of PFB; then meet with a group of “bearded warriors”, those with approved waivers – over a cup of coffee. Listen to their stories. Look past the beard at the person behind it; they are proud professionals who just want to serve their country, and exactly the type of people we want leading in tomorrow’s wars.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy surface warfare officer (nuclear). He commanded the destroyer USS Oscar Austin and the cruiser USS San Jacinto during his 30-year military career and was recognized with the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

References

1. NAVADMIN 162/26, “Navy Grooming Standards, “(https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/
Portals/55/Messages/NAVADMIN/FACT_SHEETS/Fact_Sheet_NAV_162_26.pdf).

2. “US military service members will no longer be required to get annual flu shot,” The Guardian, 21 April 2026 (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/21/military-flu-shot-
requirement-pete-hegseth).

3. “Review of Treatments for Pseudofolliculitis Barbae,” National Institute of Health, (https://
pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36840647/).

4. Influence of Facial Hair Length, Coarseness, and Areal Density on Seal Leakage of a Tight-
Fitting half-face Respirator, Floyd et al, University of Oklahoma College of Public Health.

5. Transcript of SECDEF Speech to Flag and General Officers, 30 September 2025, (https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/article/4318689/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-
addresses-general-and-flag-officers-at-quantico-v/).

6. New Navy Policy Limits Medical Shaving Waivers to One Year, USNI, July 9, 2026.

Featured image: Fleet Master Chief Petty Officer Raymond D. Kemp, fleet master chief for U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, waits to receive the American flag during the reading of “Old Glory” at his retirement ceremony on Naval Support Activity Naples, Italy, June 4, 2019. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Damon Grosvenor/Released) 

By Dr. John P. Cordle, Captain, USN (Ret).

The first week of June 2026 marked a seminal event in the history of sleep and fatigue in the military. The Department of War (DOW) Fatigue Related Management Working Group hosted the first ever Sleep and Fatigue Summit with over 130 experts in the field from all military services, providing a huge burst of momentum in the area of fatigue management as an operational imperative for our warfighters. For the first time in years, there is hope that the military, and especially the Navy, is finally turning a corner in this critical arena.  But there remains much work to be done. 

My relationship with fatigue is a long and storied one. I joined the Navy in 1984 and grew up as a Surface Warfare Officer at a time when fatigue was seen as a badge of honor. Later serving as a Human Factors Engineer, I studied its impact on individual readiness as well as mental health and advocated for changes to Navy policy. As a veteran, I live with the effects of a lifetime of sleep deprivation and non-circadian watch rotations, hooking up to my Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine every evening and dealing with obstructive sleep apnea and the onset of heart disease caused by atrial fibrillation (AFib). This is all tied to a Navy lifestyle and culture that ignored the known effects of fatigue, to the detriment of its sailors. 

I am gratified that there has been solid progress in the understanding and application of fatigue mitigation policies in various parts of the Navy. However, despite both DOD direction and concrete recommendations from many authoritative bodies, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Department of War (DoW), the Navy has still failed to implement an overarching fatigue management program to include education, research, and policy. 

One of the last projects that I worked on as a Government Service (GS) Human Factors Engineer  prior to retirement last year was trying to define the Navy’s Fatigue Management program in a single document. As with any large organization, a change like this is likely to meet bureaucratic obstacles, obfuscation, and outright obstruction… and it did. The main challenge to this effort was that no one in the Navy felt compelled to step up and say “I own this problem,” an obstacle that has now been overcome with the designation of the Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) as the process owner. It would be a shame to unlearn the lessons of the ship collisions of the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald, both of which occurred in 2017. The investigations for these separate incidents identified fatigue as a significant factor in the death of 17 Sailors.

Unfortunately, this was not the last collision for which sleep was a contributing factor. In 2025 the USS Harry S. Truman suffered a collision during her deployment to the Middle East. The investigation results cited fatigue as a major factor in the collision. While no one was killed, several sailors came within inches and seconds of losing their lives.  The below figures from the Navy investigation tell the story:

Figure 1. The Risk Management Brief specifically identified fatigue as a risk factor for senior leadership. They would not have been allowed to fly a plane in this condition but can drive a ship. The second figure shows the result.  Source: Navy Investigation of USS Harry S. Truman Collision.

Eerily, (Admiral) Whalen’s investigation stated that, “… fatigue as a human factor in the collision and cited department heads who described a ‘just get it done’ atmosphere aboard the carrier. Both sailors’ lack of sleep and pressure to perform tasks regardless of risk were crucial themes in the 2017 collisions.” The similarities with the 2017 collisions are impossible to miss. And yet, eight years later, little has changed within the U.S. Navy. 

 To be fair, there are policies in place in most of the major warfare areas, and the last two Carrier Strike Groups deployed with sleep monitoring devices on most sailors and a program to provide sleep data to inform individual Sailors, shipboard leaders, and Navy research efforts. Specifically, the Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW) program shows huge promise in collecting sleep and other biometric data and providing feedback to individuals and leadership to inform operational decision making.  There is ongoing research to design more comfortable mattresses that meet material condition and fire safety requirements on board ships. My former colleagues continue to push hard for improvement in this area, but it is still largely a “bottom up” effort – they deserve full policy and financial support. 

To that end, I offer here the below document as a proposed road map, including the key references and directives that should drive two significant outcomes: 

First, the designation of a single entity, responsible for fatigue management in the Navy, to include resource sponsorship (funding) for research and technology. Of note, since the drafting of this article,  this recommendation has occurred. The Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) has been designated to do just this.

Second, a formal policy for fatigue management, which includes research, education, and operational guidance for commanders.

I present the below draft document  for consideration by the U.S. Navy to address this critical problem. It was the result of over one year’s collaborative effort between the Navy Sleep expert team, many of whom have moved on or retired without replacement, leaving many key billets that support sleep research and policy unfilled.

The below document represents an 80 percent solution and would provide a starting point. It is ready to download, print, and sign. But who will take that important step? I hope it does not take another deadly collision, with fatigue as a major factor, for someone in Navy leadership to stand up and say, “I will!”

OPNAVINST XXXX

Subj: United States Navy Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management Program 

Ref: (a) Department of Defense Instruction 1010.10, Health Promotion and Disease Prevention (Apr. 28, 2014) (incorporating change 3, effective May 16, 2022). 

(b) Department of Defense, Report to Congressional Armed Services Committees, Study on Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Readiness of Members of the Armed Forces, March 2021

(c) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Next Steps on Suicide Prevention in the Military, March 2023

(d) GAO 24-105917 Military Readiness: Comprehensive Measures needed to Address Service Member Fatigue and Related Efforts. 

(e) USFF Comprehensive Review of Surface Incidents, October 2019. 

Encl. (1) Tables of Requirements and Recommendations 

1. This instruction establishes overarching guidance IAW references (a) through (e) for the implementation of Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management practices to improve warfighting effectiveness across the Navy operational domain. It is intended as a framework based on scientific and operational principles to be tailored by instruction for individual communities based on specific needs of their operators.

2. Background. As described in reference (a) and (b), sleep is considered a protective factor against combat operational stress, and sleep restriction is considered a risk factor for symptoms of combat operational stress. The DOD requires that all commanders consider circadian rhythm—the body’s internal resting or wakefulness schedule over the course of a day—when creating policy related to sleep. For example, watchbills are schedules for when Sailors stand watch for fixed periods of time. Circadian rhythm watchbills are designed so that Sailors stand watch and sleep at the same time each day, allowing the body to follow its natural biological processes on a 24-hour cycle. The Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (ref c) also made recommendations related to sleep. For example, it recommended that duty schedules allow for eight hours of sleep and minimize the frequency of shift changes, and that the department provide education in healthy sleep habits during training and unit formations. The report clearly shows the connection between sleep deprivation and fatigue as contributing factors to stress, anxiety, and even suicidal thoughts and actions. 

3. Extensive research over the past decade has shown the importance of crew endurance and fatigue management to individual readiness and war fighting capability. Research has shown that cognitive ability degrades at a consistent rate as sleep deprivation progresses, with a major impact on decision making, which can prove fatal in battle. Performance starts to degrade after as little as 18 hours of wakefulness, and 24 hours without sleep can have similar impacts on performance to a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent. While operational commitments and manning shortages may challenge leaders to provide their crew with sufficient sleep, every effort must be made through planning, education, and risk management to plan for, account for, and mitigate excessive fatigue in the fleet. This policy supports Operation Total Force and is foundational to Warrior Toughness, Operational Stress Control, and other Culture of Excellence initiatives.

4. Enclosure (1) Tables 1-3 provide a summary of DOD requirements and recommendations.  They were used to produce the required actions in this instruction and are provided here for easy reference.

5. Action. This instruction does not dictate a particular watchbill or schedule but is designed to provide a set of guiding principles upon which to build a policy and tailored instruction at the Echelon III level. Collaboration is encouraged. While primarily applicable to ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines, the basic tenets apply to other teams such as staffs, guard forces and watch floors. The following precepts will be incorporation into each Type Commander’s instructions:

a. Focus on alert watch standers.

b. Implement a circadian watchbill based on a 24-hour schedule (i.e., watch, work and sleep periods occur at the same time each day).

c. Promote a sleep environment that considers complete darkness, good ventilation, ambient temperature control, and low noise levels.

d. Adjust working hours, meal hours, and daily routines to support watch standers and maintenance personnel at sea and ashore.

e. Establish periods of protected sleep to equal at least eight hours in every 24.

f. Consider individual fatigue as a risk factor for all evolutions, including go/no-go criteria for both operations and maintenance.

g. Allow additional sleep during ramp up to mission and recovery times following periods of extreme sleep deprivation or during period of high operational tempo.

h. Establish metrics and measures to track implementation of this policy at the unit level. Wearable technology is encouraged to support this effort.

i. Establish go/no-go criteria to stop or delay evolutions when fatigue poses an unacceptable risk.

j. Implement sleep and crew endurance education and training in all levels of officer and enlisted pipeline training for each community.

k. Assign one individual per unit as a sleep expert for training and support of sleep-related policies. 

l. Promote good nutrition and moderation in caffeine and energy drinks into programs like Warrior Toughness, Basic Training, and command training programs.

m. Establish policies and procedures to incorporate wearable sleep monitoring technology, data collection, analysis and display commensurate with security requirements.

n. Develop guidelines for training programs which may include periods of intentional sleep deprivation to prevent inflicting harm on personnel in a training environment.

o. Develop and maintain an online repository of sleep related research and best practices. 

p. One size does not fit all – Commanders should obtain analysis of watch rotations and schedules from experts such as the Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Health Research Laboratory.

6. Nothing in this instruction precludes a Commander from executing the mission assigned. Conflict with a peer competitor may be characterized by a long duration of high stress operations; the ability of Sailors and Marines to continue to operate at peak performance over long periods is critical. It is imperative that everyone from the Commanding Officer to the most junior watch stander be capable of sustaining peak performance, and sleep is a necessary prerequisite for that requirement.

Enclosure (1) Tables of DOD Requirements and Recommendations 

Table 1. Military Service Responsibilities set forth in ref (a), DOD Instruction 1010.10 Table 2. Recommendations from Reference (b), DOD Study of Fatigue in the Military.

Table 3. Sleep Policy Recommendations from the DOD Suicide Prevention and Response Review Committee Report (2022).

The recommendations in the above instruction are grounded in existing documents; they are clear, actionable, and they will save lives. Most can be implemented with minimal cost. All it needs is a signature. But whose? 

We now have an answer. The Office of Warfighting Advantage has been designated as the process owner for Fatigue Management in the Navy. They can now take ownership of the process from policy, instructions (like the above) to research and (importantly) as a budget priority. The current CNO and VCNO have well-established records of advocacy for Sailor Wellness and of recognizing the importance of sleep to mental health, physical fitness, and warfighter readiness. CNO Caudle even added Dr. Matthew Walker’s excellent book Why We Sleep to his 2026 Reading List! This is a perfect opportunity for the CNO to put his “stamp” on this service-wide safety and performance issue by demanding action – and accountability – across the force with a formal policy; maybe even a “CNOte” titled “Sleep as a Weapon!”

Certainly there are obstacles to implementing such an instruction, such as manning shortages and excessive OPTEMPO. But like rust, fatigue doesn’t care how important or busy you are; it eats away at the foundation of readiness and, if unchecked, will eventually lead to failure. The instruction above must be accompanied by strong institutional resolve; it must come with education, funding, and a culture of learning to address the “get ‘er done” and excessive “can do” attitude that contributed to both the 2017 and 2024 collisions. This instruction must be more than “checking a block”; it needs to come with a strong commitment to drive real change.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy surface warfare officer (nuclear). He commanded the destroyer USS Oscar Austin and the cruiser USS San Jacinto during his 30-year military career and was recognized with the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

References

1. Captain John Cordle, U.S. Navy and Dr. Nita Shattuck, “A Sea Change in Standing Watch,” USNI Proceedings, January 2013, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/sea-change-standing-watch

2. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Fatigue is the Navy’s Black Lung Disease,” USNI Proceedings, January 2020,  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/fatigue-navys-black-lung-disease

3. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Go Circadian Now!”, USNI Blog, September 2017,  https://blog.usni.org/posts/2017/09/22/go-circadian-now

4. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Improve Sleep-Disorder Treatment for Service Members and Veterans,” USNI Proceedings, September 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/improve-sleep-disorder-treatment-service-members-and-veterans

5. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Make Crew Endurance an Operational Warfighting Imperative,” CIMSEC, 23 September 2019,  https://cimsec.org/make-crew-endurance-an-operational-warfighting-imperative/

Featured image: Red lights glow from the primary flight control room aboard the USS Ronald Reagan during a darken ship period. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ryan McFarlane)

By LCDR Jeffrey Bolstad (ASW/SUW WTI) and LT Matthew Bain (ASW/SUW WTI)

In his recent CIMSEC article, “Reprioritize SWO Tactical Qualifications for the High-End Fight,” LT Seth Breen underscores a pressing challenge for the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community – achieving tactical proficiency commensurate with the demands of great power conflict. While his argument addresses officer qualification prioritization, his call to action aligns directly with the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC), which provides a structured framework to elevate tactical readiness across the fleet. Designed to address this very need, SWCTC delivers a standardized and measurable, career-long training curriculum that develops tactical surface warfare watchstanders at every stage of their service.

The need to invest in tactical proficiency at both the individual and watchteam levels is central to driving the surface force to the next level of lethality and tactical mastery. From the inception of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) in 2015, SWCTC was identified as a critical initiative to address this requirement. Since then, it has grown into a comprehensive, career-spanning tactical training program. Today, SMWDC’s Commander, RDML T. J. Zerr, is advancing this vision by leveraging SWCTC to shape the structure and delivery of tactical training across all surface communities, from schoolhouses to operational commands—ensuring the fleet remains tactically ready and combat effective.

Two key relationships are central to understanding the power and importance of SWCTC. First is the link between individual readiness and overall watchteam performance. The higher the individual proficiency is raised and maintained, the more capable and consistent the team becomes, reducing variability from watch to watch and ship to ship. In combat, preventable errors carry unacceptable consequences, and consistent proficiency across watchteams minimizes seams adversaries can exploit. Second, SWCTC formally distinguishes between qualification and proficiency. Before the recent rollout for CRUDES Tactical Action Officers (TAOs), there was no standardized force-wide method to ensure qualified watchstanders had completed enough repetitions to remain proficient. SWCTC addresses this gap by establishing clear standards and tracking individual performance rigorously.

SWCTC’s approach is much like training for a marathon, where most do not wake up on the day of the run without any preparation. It takes months and even years to properly prepare before meeting the desired standard, especially when that standard is winning great power conflict. As we approach the projected timelines for potential great power conflict, we must adopt a similar approach of increasing our tactical edge in a standardized, long-term, and measured method. Tactical excellence is not achieved in a single event, but developed steadily over a SWO’s career. The watchstander, as the key to employing a ship’s weapons systems, must build and maintain cadence, confidence, and familiarity with those systems and their tactics to be truly prepared for combat. From foundational courses such as the Basic and Advanced Division Officer Courses, Department Head School, and Combat Systems baseline training in Dahlgren, VA, to onboard Personnel Qualification Standards, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and deployment certifications, SWCTC integrates seamlessly with existing curricula and operational milestones to ensure sustained proficiency.

Surface Tactical Training Syllabus (STTS)

The April 2024 issuance of COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3502.9 formalized this approach by creating the Surface Tactical Training Syllabus (STTS) for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The instruction institutionalizes the five pillars of Maritime Warfare Proficiency (MWP) — Knowledge, Skill, Experience, Aptitude, and Currency—as the foundation for measuring readiness. Watchstanders are assessed not simply on whether they have checked a box for qualification, but on whether they have retained the knowledge, demonstrated the skills, accumulated the necessary experience, shown aptitude for progression, and sustained their currency through consistent practice. The culmination of these factors represents a level of individual tactical readiness, referred to as MWP, that we must continuously make efforts to optimize.

The STTS codifies a deliberate progression of training events, structured across six levels of increasing complexity. 100-level tasks establish theory and fundamentals, 200-level events build systems knowledge, 300-level tasks emphasize watchstation actions, 400-level events integrate the unit team, 500-level evolutions advance to multi-ship coordination, and 600-level exercises test command-level operations. This crawl-walk-run progression allows SWOs to develop steadily and measurably across their careers.

Proficiency is further captured in mastery levels ranging from Level 1 (Introductory) to Level 4 (Advanced). A Tactical Action Officer (TAO) at Mastery Level 2 can effectively execute single-ship operations, while a Level 4 TAO demonstrates advanced competence leading multi-unit engagements. Importantly, this system accounts for atrophy. Watchstanders who fail to meet periodic training requirements risk losing proficiency levels, underscoring how tactical readiness must be sustained through practice, not assumed. This emphasizes a key aspect of SWCTC – understanding that there is a difference between being qualified and being proficient.

One of the most significant aspects of the instruction is its explicit requirement for currency and recurring requalification. Under the STTS, TAOs and other tactical watchstanders must complete biennial written exams and oral boards to maintain certification. This ensures tactical decision-makers remain accountable and up-to-date, rather than relying on a one-time qualification that can fade with atrophy. The model reflects lessons long institutionalized in aviation, nuclear, and submarine communities, where loss of currency immediately removes an officer from critical duties. By adopting this standard, the surface force now demands the same level of accountability for its tactical leaders.

Training and Readiness (T&R) Matrix

At the core of this development cycle is the Training and Readiness (T&R) matrix, which tracks individual performance against clearly defined tactical tasks across warfare areas – Surface (SUW), Anti-Submarine (ASW), and Air (AW). Tasks are executed on recurring cycles and structured by proficiency levels ranging from Basic to Advanced, including multi-ship operations. Each level includes multiple tasks designed to sustain proficiency through repetition, highlight weaknesses for improvement, and provide unit commanders with an accurate baseline of watchstander readiness. This periodicity ensures both individual and unit-level tactical proficiency remains current.

The T&R matrix also creates a continuous, data-driven feedback loop that identifies knowledge gaps and informs adjustments to training syllabi, as well as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Tools like the Jupiter and Surface Training and Readiness Management System (STRMS) dashboards enhance this process by enabling commands to monitor individual and team performance, tailoring training to address fleet-wide trends and unit-specific needs. SWCTC combines data analytics with standardized training milestones to ensure performance shortfalls are not only identified and corrected, but also tracked over time across large datasets and then fed back to training stakeholders to address gaps in training and knowledge retention.

Focusing on the Individual Watchstander

The individual watchstander plays a critical role in employing a ship’s complex combat system. However, under the current Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual (SFTRM), Certification Exercises (CEs) and Repetitive Exercises (REs) are tracked only at the watchteam level, with no visibility into who makes up that team. For instance, the Training and Operational Readiness Information Service (TORIS) might show that two watchteams completed an AW RE (Conduct Coordinated Air Warfare)—but it does not capture whether those teams were staffed by the same TAOs repeatedly. As a result, some qualified TAOs may miss opportunities to gain repetitions, causing their proficiency to decline and reducing the ship’s overall tactical readiness.

With SWCTC, ship Commanding Officers can identify an individual’s areas of deficiency and prioritize training accordingly, while ISICs and fleet commanders gain an in-situ snapshot of each watchstander’s level of mastery—allowing them to better understand risk when assigning a specific ship or individual to a specific mission.

Fleet Feedback

SWCTC will provide commanders with objective measurements of watchstander proficiency, ensuring the fleet sustains its tactical edge in today’s complex operational environment. Fleet feedback is key and has been overwhelmingly positive, citing best practices such as use of tactical simulators and integration with real-world exercises and operations as proof of SWCTC’s adaptability and increasing relevance.

The success of SWCTC will continue to depend on feedback from the fleet. SMWDC needs to hear about any barriers to execution so we can identify where senior leadership advocacy is required. Whether it is limitations with synthetic trainers, recommendations for requirements during the Maintenance Phase, challenges executing SWCTC while deployed, or gaps in the scenario library—we can help. Your input ensures the program evolves to meet real operational demands and delivers the readiness our fleet requires.

Conclusion

The Navy regularly tracks routine maintenance, program updates, casualty control, casualty reports, and tech support for combat systems. But previous to SWCTC, the surface fleet did not systematically track the tactical proficiency of the people making critical decisions in combat. Now with SWCTC, the surface fleet has a system to track, measure, and sustain watchstander readiness at the individual level, ensuring they are prepared to defend their ship and execute combat operations when it matters most.

LT Breen’s article rightfully highlights the urgent need to elevate tactical training and qualifications, a need SWCTC is designed to meet. By combining structured career-long training, rigorous assessment, and continuous feedback, SWCTC drives lethality, accountability, and mission readiness. The program ensures our Sailors are fully prepared and proficient for the high-end fight, ultimately securing a decisive tactical advantage in complex operational environments. As the fleet continues to confront evolving threats, SWCTC remains an essential foundation, cultivating the tactical excellence that underpins surface warfare success. In short, SWCTC is how we transform individual watchstander proficiency into fleet-wide warfighting advantage.

LCDR Jeff Bolstad is a native of Bellevue, WA and joined the Navy in 2002 as a Damage Controlman. He served ship tours onboard USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG-57) as Leading Petty Officer of Repair Division, USS INGRAHAM (FFG-61) as Combat Information Center Officer and later as ship’s Navigator under a single-longer tour, USS PREBLE (DDG-88) as Weapons Officer, and USS McCAMPBELL (DDG-85) as Plans and Tactics Officer. Jeff has served tours ashore at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) as a student, Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island, (now TUSWC) as Training Officer, and is currently at Surface Mine Warfighting Development Center as the Lead Warfare Tactics Instructor in Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum. Jeff attended the University of Washington with a BA in Global Studies focusing on China, and later at NPS wrote a thesis titled “Enhancing the NFL’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Is the League’s Security Scheme Able to Effectively Thwart Terrorist Attacks?”

LT Matthew Bain is a native of Belmont, NC and joined the Navy in 2016 as an Ensign. He served ship tours onboard USS PINCKNEY (DDG-91) as the Repair Officer of Repair Division and USS MONSOON (PC-4) as the ship’s Navigator, Operations Officer and Executive Officer. Matt has served tours ashore at the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) as a SWATT Planner in Fleet Training Pacific and member of the Surface Warfare Integration Office. He is currently at SMWDC as a Warfare Tactics Instructor in the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum. Matt attended the Hampton University with a BS in Aviation focusing on Flight Education.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (April 9, 2024) Fire Controlman 2nd Class Nathan Ritchie, from Murrieta, California, stands watch in the combat information center aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) while conducting operations in the north Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Samantha Oblander)