Category Archives: Human Capital

A Rising Tide Lifts All Boats: Strengthen the Afloat Community, Strengthen the Coast Guard

By Jasper Campbell and James Martin

As the U.S. Coast Guard undergoes a period of “prolific” acquisitions, the service must resolve a lurking specter: How to fill all of these ships with qualified personnel? At a time when the U.S. Coast Guard afloat community, known as cuttermen, are set to receive the largest influx of cutter classes since the Vietnam War, the Coast Guard is struggling to fill critical billets at the O-3 and O-4 levels, despite projecting having 10,000 afloat billets service wide by 2030. There has been considerable discourse on so-called “sea service attractiveness,” though no discrete proposals have been offered to tackle the problem. The proposals that have been put forward focus less on metrics than conceptual shifts targeting shipboard climate, unit pride, or paradigm shifts in officer promotion and graduate school selections.

But, while the woes of the Coast Guard cutter community continue to make headlines, cuttermen do not face their demise in a vacuum. Their infirmities take place in the context of an organization whose workforce is hemorrhaging across specialties and demographics. These reverberations are felt more acutely in certain demographics, such as women and minorities. Dogged institutional focus on the retention woes of a particular specialty, regardless of its contributions to service culture, ignores systemic issues plaguing the workforce. Therefore, a holistic approach to workforce retention may be the solution to meeting the Coast Guard’s “track line to 10,000” while simultaneously securing the future for myriad specialties. They are: foster geographic stability by creating centralized “hubs” for the Coast Guard workforce, buttressed by increased opportunities for remote and hybrid work and education.

With the release of the newly minted Coast Guard Strategy in October 2022, Commandant Admiral Linda Fagan has touted revolutionizing the Coast Guard talent management system and “transforming the total workforce” to account for modern socioeconomic realities. Employing centralized hubs to promote geographic stability is exactly the sort of initiative this strategy calls for, and the Coast Guard must adopt it as soon as practicable.

Coast Guard “Hubs”

There is hearty debate surrounding a perceived diminished “sea service attractiveness” of the U.S. Coast Guard’s afloat community. The basic line of reasoning goes, the ready availability of viable career paths ashore, stressful moves every several years, and sea tours where service members deploy throughout their tour combine to make sea service increasingly difficult to “sell” to families. Further, service members or their spouses must make tough career compromises to remain competitive in their respective fields. This is exacerbated in the modern age, where spouses typically fall into two categories: a) in the service along with their spouse or b) have their own civilian careers in professional fields. In fact, the number of dual-income households has significantly increased since the 1950s, the era in which the modern personnel system was created.1

A tangible way for the Coast Guard to conduct a meaningful course correction is to reexamine the much-touted concept of “geographic stability.” Geographic stability and centralization should be reimagined at a macroscopic level and seen as a tactic to revitalize the health of the afloat officer corps writ large. By aggressively working to consolidate billets at desirable geographic “hubs” that allow the afloat community to move along linear, successful, and promotable career trajectories, the Coast Guard has the opportunity to stem the growing gap between billets and cuttermen to fill them. These centralization concepts, desperately needed in the afloat specialty, can be replicated elsewhere across specialties.

Key West is the Model

Fortunately, the service need only look to Key West, FL as an ideal model that can be replicated elsewhere. Between a windfall of demanding afloat opportunities across multiple platforms, high-profile staff tour opportunities, and a desirable geographic location, Key West, Florida, represents the model “hub,” which, if emulated elsewhere, would require the following characteristics:

Multiple Fast Response and Medium Endurance Cutters

Sentinel-class, “Fast Response Cutters” (FRC) are O-3 commands and have O-2 Executive Officers. Both an XO and CO tour aboard a “patrol boat” are milestone career tours that afloat officers in the Coast Guard typically must attain to continue to progress in the cutterman community. Medium Endurance cutters (WMEC) also boast multiple junior career milestone billets, from mid-grade department head opportunities to more senior command billets.

Reputable staff tour with multiple O-3 and O-4 billets

Key West is home to both Coast Guard Sector Key West, which has some, but limited “afloat” staff billets, and Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS), which is a joint DoD command that falls under U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Long considered the gold standard of joint operations, JIATFS is home to 13 Coast Guard officer billets spread out across the J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations), J6 (Communications), and J7 (Innovations) directorates. In an increasingly complex world, the Coast Guard is called upon to conduct its work in a crosscutting, interagency fashion. Officers with joint or “purple” experience are prized for this unique experience. In fact, the Commandant’s annual Guidance to promotion boards and selection panels specifically highlights joint and interagency experience as something promotion and graduate school panels should focus on as positive attributes in an officer’s record.

Desirable geographic location

While geographic tastes are diverse, many would consider Key West a highly desirable location, devoid of snow and cold weather. Despite arguments to the contrary, attractive duty locations are an underappreciated recruiting and retention tactic, especially among the junior ranks, where the opportunity to be stationed in a vacation-worthy destination is a worthy tradeoff for the hardships of sea duty. 

Key West, Florida, organically possesses all the ingredients for a centralized hub, where given the right portion of each, an afloat officer and their family can remain in one place for four to ten years and, importantly, remain competitive for promotion by meeting career milestones, including completing reputable staff assignments.

There are boundless possibilities when it comes to a career path. Obviously, there are other key considerations, such as graduate school and special “broadening” assignments, that officers aspire to. For those who prize the pressure relief valve on family life that geo-stability can afford, they can pursue it at no detriment to their career. The table below illustrates the versatility and longevity a “hub” can afford an afloat officer in the Key West Area.

Years 0-2 2-4 4-6 6-8
JIATFS Staff (O-3) WMEC OPS FRC CO Transfer
FRC CO (senior O-3) JIATFS Staff

(Make O-4)

WMEC XO Transfer
WMEC OPS (O-3) FRC CO JIATFS Staff

(Make O-4)

WMEC XO
(O-4)
JIATFS Staff (O-3) FRC CO
(Make O-4)
Chief of Enforcement, Sector KW (O-4) Transfer

Table 1. Potential Key West Afloat Officer Trajectory.

While Key West contains many of the ingredients necessary to make it a centralized hub, a cutterman can make a home for more than two years, those ingredients can be expanded upon in certain areas to make an even more fertile hotbed for afloat officers. For one, additional medium endurance cutters and fast response cutters would significantly increase the number of first, second, and third tour junior officer opportunities to go to sea without having to conduct a permanent change of station move.

The Coast Guard could also immediately add a number of O-3 and O-4 staff officer billets to JIATF-S. After all, if the service is set to spend a combined $12 Billion on the Legend Class cutters, the service could make a paltry investment in comparison by adding subject matter experts to the command that is the primary controller of cutters deployed for the counter-narcotics mission. Further, the service could add additional Intel and Cyber billets to the JIATF-S staff. As the Coast Guard cyber and intelligence apparatus matures, having officers who have operated in the joint environment with seasoned intelligence professionals will yield enormous dividends for the service.

Key West is just one of many locations where the Coast Guard can look to implement geographic stability in the afloat officer corps. This “blueprint for success” of multiple opportunities for junior and senior command, a reputable staff tour, and a desirable geographic location can be replicated elsewhere with relative ease. Charleston, Hawaii, Miami, and Newport present opportunities for immediate implementation, all containing elements of the necessary ingredients for successful geographic stability. Others still, like Norfolk, Pensacola, and Los Angeles/Long Beach are missing one crucial element or another that can be easily remedied. 

The Future is Remote:
Realizing “Hubs” Service Wide

Fully remote work and hybrid models are an obvious step towards rapidly scaling “hubs” across operational and mission support communities. Unfortunately, many still distrust the basic premise of remote work, citing that the military should be concerned with winning wars, not “keeping pace with big tech.” Others still acknowledge the manifold benefits of remote work but worry it would exacerbate a gap between “operators” and “supporting elements.” However, few can deny that it represents the future of employment across myriad industries.

Anyone who has visited Coast Guard Headquarters recently can attest to this phenomenon, as the home of nearly 4,000 military, civilian, and contractor staff members have been largely partially manned for the past three years since the emergence of COVID-19. Major mission support commands fulfilling critical C5I, naval engineering, and administrative support functions have performed exceptionally in remote and hybrid work conditions as well.

If willing to deviate from established norms, the Coast Guard is poised to offer hundreds, if not thousands, of enlisted and officer billets that can be staffed completely remotely. This number expands dramatically if it includes “flex” or hybrid billets that, with occasional travel, allow members to maximize geographic stability while maintaining successful, varied career paths. For instance, the C5I community is primed to offer a majority of its O-2 to O-4 billets remotely. Doing so would allow those desiring to maintain a “dual” career track (in a traditionally operational specialty such as afloat or aviation specialties and traditionally “non-operational” e.g. cyber, logistics, or legal specialties) to avoid alternating between the National Capitol region and coastal communities, a major known drawback. Simply put, if the Coast Guard is able to offer expanded remote opportunities, it should.

Geographic flexibility could be further enhanced by de-stigmatizing online advanced education opportunities by Coast Guard leadership (and be extension what promotion and assignment panels value). Additionally, geo-stability should take advantage of nonterminal expanded industry partnerships with major private companies (as opposed to DOD Skillbridge, which servicemembers can take advantage of during their last 180 days of service). Both are useful incentives which, if paired with reasonable corresponding obligatory service requirements, could allow servicemembers to significantly reduce the number of PCS moves made over the course of a full 20-year career while remaining competitive at promotion boards. The table below illustrates the “hubs” concept, expanded by access to fully remote billets, industry partnerships, and a greater acceptance of online graduate school opportunities:

Year Range Tour/Life Event Location Incentive
1-2 Div Tour aboard Offshore Patrol Cutter (O-1) LA/Long Beach, CA N/A – academy payback
3-5 Sector LA/LB Response Officer (shoreside) (O-2) LA/Long Beach, CA
6-7 Information Assurance Grad School

(O-3)

LA/Long Beach, CA Open up more grad programs to online school
8-9 CGCYBER Division Officer tour (O-3)

 

LA/Long Beach, CA

 

Remote work
10-12 Sector LA/LB Enforcement Chief (shoreside, makes O-4)

 

 

LA/Long Beach, CA

 

Centralized Hub

 

13-14 PCS to D.C.: CGHQ tour crafting CG Cyber Policy (O-4)

 

D.C. Hybrid Work

 

15-16 Detached Duty, Pentagon: OSD Cyber Policy (O-5)

 

D.C. Joint Assignment; Centralized Hub
17-18 Response Department Head: Sector Delaware Bay (O-5) Philadelphia, PA Geo-bachelor (minimal weekend commute)
19-19 Industry Partnership at Microsoft (O-5) D.C. Expand industry partnerships program

 

20-21 Special Assignment, National Security Council | The White House: Senior Director for Resilience Policy (traditional CG O-6 billet)

 

D.C. Competitive Special Assignment
22-23 CGCYBER Deputy Tour (O-6)

 

Alexandria, VA (short commute)
24-28 Sector Commander: Sector Hampton Roads (O-6)

 

 

Hampton Roads, V.A.

 

Geo-bachelor (minimal weekend commute)

Table 2. Highlights a theoretical dual officer career path in Cyber and Response Ashore specialties, enabled by centralized hubs, remote/hybrid work, and industry partnerships. As a result, the officer only needs to conduct a permanent change of station (PCS) move one time in a 28-year career.

Final Thoughts

Some will say that the U.S. military should not try to seek parity with private industry. Of course, while there will always be those few whose martial ardor is enough to make familial sacrifices, for many, “love doesn’t pay the bills,” and enthusiasm alone should not be seen as a universal retention tactic. In 2021, only 29% of American youth are eligible for service; the Coast Guard simply cannot afford to put on a “put up or get out” mentality that discredits the valuable service members who simply do not wish to move all the time and have a semblance of normal life in between sea or duty standing tours. What’s more, these attitudes would overwhelmingly affect women and minorities because of the lifestyle flexibility they offer with respect to family planning and make the Coast Guard a less diverse workforce. As the former Commandant, Admiral Schultz stated in the 2020 Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan, part of being the world’s best Coast Guard is being the world’s most diverse Coast Guard.

Ultimately, geographic stability is not a silver bullet to solving afloat retention and bolstering sea service attractiveness. However, it is a simple, meaningful, and easily implemented tool for keeping seagoing officers afloat. The Coast Guard should look to Key West, FL, as a blueprint for success, and replicate this formula elsewhere. What’s more, centralized hubs should be seen as an easily implemented, repeatable, and concrete solution to addressing workforce shortcomings across all Coast Guard work specialties. The concepts illustrated can, in many cases, be easily carried over from the officer to the enlisted world. When bolstered by expanded hybrid and remote work and education options, these “hubs” will remove many service-imposed impediments to “normal lifestyles” that force otherwise willing and capable service members to choose between meaningful service and civilian life. The Coast Guard has all the tools it needs to address the retention crises it faces – it needs only implement them.

Jasper Campbell served on active duty for six years in the afloat and C5I communities. He departed in 2021 to launch a technology company, simplevideo.io, that offers solutions for public safety and healthcare markets. He holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

References

1. Concordia St. Paul, “The Evolution of American Family Structure,” CSP Online, 2022, htps://online.csp.edu/resources/article/the-evolution-of-american-family-structure/

Featured Image: Cutter crewmembers based out of Portsmouth, Va. stand at the pier, ready to assist the USCGC Northland (WMEC 904) moor in Portsmouth on Monday. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Brandon Hillard)

The Value of Variance in the Surface Warfare Officer Qualification Process

By CDR Robert C. Watts IV

In his recent CIMSEC article, Bill Golden argues that there is too much variance in the surface warfare officer (SWO) qualification process and questions whether ship captains have adequate experience to qualify junior officers.To address these perceived problems, he proposes that the Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) commanding officer (CO) administer a qualification test between an officer’s first and second division officer tours. The argument for this change overstates the problems posed by variance in the qualification process, neglects the value of the current method, and does not reckon with how the proposed changes would deviate from the community’s culture, which values diversity of experience and command at sea. 

Variance

For context, the existing process culminates in an oral exam, or board, during which the candidate answers a wide variety of questions from the ship’s department heads, Executive Officer (XO), and CO. Based on completing pre-requisite qualifications and their performance in the board, the captain then decides if the candidate has earned the SWO qualification and presents the SWO pin in a wardroom ceremony.

While it is true that qualification boards vary from ship to ship, this variance is not as wide as Golden suggests. To paraphrase Mark Twain, SWO boards do not repeat themselves, but they often rhyme. The SWO Career Manual emphasizes the importance of maintaining “consistent qualification standards.”2 Despite differences in detail, boards across the fleet are generally similar in approach. Every CO designs their boards based on their experience, both as a candidate and then as a board member, resulting in boards that are generally consistent in scope and scale. Variance typically reflects the CO and board members tailoring questions to the ship’s technical and operational circumstances, an assessment of the candidate’s strengths and weaknesses, and the board members’ own diverse professional backgrounds.

It is unclear whether this variance is a problem. Golden writes that “SWOs yearn for standardization,” but neither defines this desire’s extent, nor cites evidence of it. He suggests several potential benefits of standardization, specifically increasing confidence in the readiness of SWOs and improving other communities’ respect for SWOs. Again, Golden presents no evidence for either issue. With regard to readiness, he does not identify negative outcomes caused by SWO qualification variance. Like him, I have not found any. For example, the 2017 Comprehensive Review following the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain collisions did not point to SWO qualification variance as a contributing factor.Moreover, managing other communities’ perceptions should not shape SWO qualification policy.

Experience

Golden asserts that COs – of all ranks – are not the most experienced officers available and suggests that the SWSC CO, a post-major command Captain, is the most experienced and would therefore be the ideal qualification authority. Although a ship CO may not be “the best available,” COs of all ranks have sufficient naval experience – and command perspective – to lead a rigorous and fair qualification process that is consistent with community policy. Some COs may have more experience, but even an O-4 CO has served at sea as a division officer, department head and XO, just like any other CO. Although the SWSC CO and staff have extensive experience, they are removed in time and space from afloat operations, inevitably causing their shipboard experiences to atrophy and perspectives to shift.

Benefits

The existing system benefits the candidate, the board members, and the wardroom in ways that would diminish or disappear under the proposed overhaul. For the candidate, qualifying during the first division officer tour provides a significant goal to pursue (and achieve) during that assignment. The oral board format presents a perhaps unfamiliar challenge, but some scholars argue that, unlike a written test, it enables the candidate to demonstrate mental agility and to be treated like someone “who [has] interesting things to say and can handle being put on the spot.”4 Completing the qualification during their first tour also gives them the opportunity to “grow into” their new role as a warfare-qualified officer and report to their second tour as a “full up round.”

For the board members, each board offers opportunities to reinforce and improve their own knowledge, while also considering how they might run boards themselves when in command. For the rest of the wardroom, preparing a candidate for SWO qualifications is a team effort that includes accomplishments to publicly recognize and collectively celebrate. These “pinning” events affirm the qualification’s significance, commend the effort made to earn it, and help build community identity. If centralized ashore at SWSC, preparing for qualification would remain a team effort until the candidate leaves the ship, but the team would lose that direct connection to, and positive feedback from, the new SWO’s milestone accomplishment.

Culture

Golden’s premise also raises important fundamental questions: What does a SWO pin mean? What is the culture of the surface warfare community? What should both be in the future?

The SWO qualification represents that the wearer not only achieved pre-requisite qualifications – most notably officer of the deck underway – but also built a foundation of knowledge, has the aptitude to continue their professional development, can confidently discuss complex naval concepts, and will well represent the community. A SWO pin earned through a standardized, bibliography-based, written test and shiphandling assessment, as Golden advocates, would not necessarily represent the wearer’s holistic foundation for future growth.

Culturally, the current qualification process is consistent with the community’s long-standing character, which values diversity of experience and upholds command at sea as the pinnacle of responsibility and trust. The members’ wide variety of perspectives and experiences enrich SWO boards and increase their rigor. Furthermore, it is only natural that the CO bears responsibility for training and qualifying junior officers on their ship, not just in a division officer’s capstone SWO board, but also throughout their time onboard. The CO observes and guides an officer’s qualification progress and, over time, builds trust in them as a watchstander and confidence in them as a future SWO before making the qualification decision. The Navy entrusts the captain to lead a warship and its crew. It would be logically inconsistent to remove qualifying junior officers from their responsibilities. Such a change would undermine the community’s commitment to the importance of command at sea. 

Conclusion

The surface warfare qualification is a critical career milestone and symbolizes an officer’s identity as a SWO. Golden rightly examines how to improve the SWO qualification process, but standardizing the process and centralizing it ashore would not be as beneficial as he argues and would be contrary to the community’s character. If the SWO community desires to standardize the qualification process, it should first consider refining the current approach. For example, just as the SWO Career Manual outlines what topics should be included in a command qualification board, this instruction could also describe in more detail what a CO should include in a SWO board.5 Although worthwhile to assess through the “Get Real, Get Better” lens how officers earn the surface warfare qualification, the existing process maintains a sufficiently consistent standard, benefits both the candidate and the wardroom, and reinforces the culture of the SWO community.

CDR Rob Watts is the Current Operations Director at U.S. Pacific Fleet and most recently commanded USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53). He holds a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and History from the University of Virginia and a Master’s in Public Policy from Princeton University. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

References

[1] William Golden, “Get Real, Get Better: Revamping Surface Warfare Officer Qualification,” Center for International Maritime Security, 25 October 2022, https://cimsec.org/get-real-get-better-revamping-surface-warfare-officer-qualification/.

[2] U.S. Navy, “Surface Warfare Officer Career Manual,” Commander, Naval Surface Forces Instruction 1412.7A, 22 November 2021, p. 3-1.

[3] U.S. Navy, Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/11/02/document-navy-comprehensive-review-surface-forces.

[4] Molly Worthen, “If it was Good Enough for Socrates, it’s Good Enough for Sophomores,” New York Times, 2 December 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/opinion/college-oral-exam.html.

[5] U.S. Navy, “Surface Warfare Officer Career Manual,” p. 5-4 to 5-6.

Featured image:  Lieutenant Junior Grade Shamaal Fletcher submerges his SWO pin into the Norwegian Sea as part of his pinning ceremony aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), Sept. 20, 2022. (Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Almagissel Schuring)

Get Real, Get Better: Revamping Surface Warfare Officer Qualification

By Bill Golden

First awarded in 1975, the SWO pin was created to identify a cadre of professional mariners who operate U.S. warships, largely in response to the insignia worn by aviators and submariners.1 As a result of the evolution in naval warfare in World War II, the SWO community was competing with the submarine and aviation communities for talented officers. The new insignia helped the SWO community reestablish its identity and instill a sense of pride within the SWO wardroom.

Today, there is demonstrated, acknowledged variance in the execution of requirements for a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) to earn their qualification and warfare insignia, the SWO pin. The breadth of knowledge needed to be a successful SWO today is different than when the SWO pin was established. Olympian Steve Prefontaine was at the top of the track world in 1975 when he died (and when the SWO pin was created). Runners still use many of the same tools as they did almost 50 years ago but have advanced their processes to be faster today. Organizationally, through standardization, SWOs will evolve many of their proven tools and also learn how to run faster. The SWO community has the opportunity to authentically embrace “Get Real, Get Better” by better standardizing the path to, and final assessment for, SWO qualification.2

SWOs can get real by acknowledging the varying degrees of experience and warfare expertise among COs who award SWO pins. A lieutenant commander with 12 years of experience in early command has the same authority to award a SWO pin as the captain of a cruiser, who has over 20 years of experience and is a warfare commander. SWOs need to Get Better by standardizing and aligning the qualification process ensuring our assessors are the best available. To do so, the SWO community must centralize awarding the SWO pin at Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) or the Type Commander (TYCOM) to reduce variance in the requirements for qualification and unite SWO identity across the Navy.

Today, the requirements to earn a SWO pin are codified in Commander, Naval Surface Forces Instruction 1412.7A, “Surface Warfare Officer Career Manual.” Ultimately, however, the authority to award the SWO pin rests with each Commanding Officer. The SWO corps is diverse and experience of these commanders is varied; the process of earning a SWO pin is similarly diverse and varied on each warship. This variance must be leveraged to distill the very best practices, making clear the identification of SWOs as professionals. Standardizing SWO pin qualifications in this manner will also allow Commanding Officers to focus on shipboard watchstanding qualifications, where they have the most skin in the game.

The SWO Pin’s Roots

When the U.S. Navy was established, new officers received on the job training (OJT) as midshipmen on warships. Formal school-based training was not part of the path to become an officer or earn command of a warship. This process was fundamentally altered in 1845, with the establishment of the U.S. Naval Academy.3 Recognizing the need for formal training in weapons, engineering, and operations, the Naval Destroyer School was created in 1961 in Newport, Rhode Island. Destroyer School evolved into Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officer Course (SWOSDOC), which was a six month course launched in 1975 and provided baseline training for all newly commissioned SWOs.4

In 2003, the Navy eliminated SWOSDOC and created SWOS-At-Sea.5 SWOS-At-Sea changed the Navy’s accession training to mirror the system in place in 1845; newly commissioned SWOs learned their trade, again, through OJT. Since that regression, the SWO community has returned to providing new SWO ensigns formal classroom training before they report to their ships. Today, in 2022, a newly commissioned SWO attends Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC) and Officer of the Deck Phase I (several months of classroom training) to learn the foundational tenants of seamanship, navigation, and leading sailors at sea. These courses have been received positively by SWOs of all ranks, and the change has proven invaluable in improving at-sea bridge watchstanding performance. The formalization and evolution of training refined what it means to be a SWO and provided a superior product at each step of the way: an officer better prepared to operate and lead at sea.

The SWO community experienced an identity crisis in the 1960s, losing officers to the other line communities. When Admiral Zumwalt became CNO in 1970, SWO retention was at 14 percent. Admiral Zumwalt created a group of junior SWOs to study factors causing poor retention, the SWO Retention Study Group. This group recommended “more rigorous standards, better schooling, and a surface warfare pin equivalent to the dolphins worn by submariners or the wings by the aviators.”6 By 1975, retention had improved to 35 percent. Firmly establishing the identity of a SWO, through uniformity in training and awarding of insignia, improved the SWO wardroom. Continuing to refine our SWO training processes, by standardization of the SWO pin, will increase confidence in the readiness of SWOs and strengthen respect of the SWO community across other line officer designators.

The SWO Pin of the Future

The process for standardizing the SWO pin already exists; it simply needs to be tailored to a more junior cohort. The Command Assessment, administered between department head tours, screens midgrade SWO lieutenants before they are considered for Commander Command. The Command Assessment includes a written assessment, tactical assessment, and shiphandling practical. A similar process should be used to award the SWO pin to officers in between their first and second division officer tours and after earning their OOD underway qualification, contingent upon a recommendation from their current Commanding Officers.

In between a SWO’s first and second division officer tours, he or she attends Advanced Division Officer Course (ADOC). This new SWO pin assessment, which could be called the Surface Warfare Qualification Exam (SWQE), will consist of written exams and a shiphandling practical, to be conducted immediately before ADOC. The SWQE will not include a tactical assessment as first tour division officers have mostly focused on shiphandling and divisional leadership. To prepare for the exam, new SWOs will receive a bibliography at BDOC to guide their preparation for the written exam. Additionally, this bibliography will inform the officer training curricula for ship COs and XOs. Again, like the Command Assessment, first tour division officers will be expected to prepare in simulators throughout their tours prior to their shiphandling practical. After passing the SWQE, a newly minted SWO will receive his or her warfare insignia from the Commanding Officer of SWSC, a leader within the SWO community.

With this process, an established learning center will be the responsible custodian for qualification, removing the self-induced pressure on COs to qualify a poor performing division officer. While there is inequity in the opportunities to prepare for the current Command Assessment, the process is overwhelmingly viewed as objective and fair; the same cannot be said regarding the current path to SWO qualification.

During the existence of the SWOS-At-Sea program, SWOs were required to attend a finishing course, Advanced Shiphandling and Tactics (ASAT), at SWSC after attaining their officer of the deck underway qualification but before earning their SWO pins. The SWQE process is not the same as ASAT. In the legacy system, the responsibility to award the SWO pin rested with the Commanding Officer and attrition at ASAT was negligible. With the SWQE, every SWO pin in the Surface Navy will be awarded by SWSC.

While this will remove some responsibility from afloat Commanding Officers, it empowers them to focus on the most critical qualification awarded by a ship captain, Officer of the Deck underway. Additionally, this course will add one week to a training pipeline for junior SWOs. Rotation between first and second division officer tours can still follow the current model (24, 27, or 30 months) but be based on OOD underway qualification. The SWQE will allow officers to pursue additional shipboard qualifications (e.g. EOOW and TAO), and the success rate of officers throughout the assessment will inform ship captains regarding the efficacy of their training programs.

Creating a single standard for SWO qualification will make clear to the community what is expected of a qualified SWO. SWSC is well positioned to evolve exam material and influence shipboard officer training programs throughout the fleet. As additional leadership assessment programs gain maturity, they can be rolled into the SWQE. Data from performance at the SWQE will empower PERS-41 to understand which rising second tour division officers show promise to grow into senior SWOs and enable targeted retention packages before these officers have the opportunity to resign their commissions.

Conclusion

The military hinges on the ability of units to react with one another; units are expected to act according to established tactics, techniques, and procedures. Units that have been trained to the same standard are able to operate interchangeably because their capabilities are uniform. Aviators use the Air Combat Training Continuum to ensure each of their officers is able to operate at a codified level of expertise on their designated aircraft in any squadron in the Navy. SWOs not only need this same level of standardization in their officers, they yearn for it.

If the SWQE is established, it will require more resources and planning. Forecasting the appropriate number of accessions each year, scaling and budgeting for an additional assessment, and managing the timing of division officers (which is already a challenge) will be harder. Removing qualification from ships also removes the relationship between that officer, captain, and crew.

One possible alternative to centralizing all SWO qualifications at SWSC is designating an ISIC (e.g. PHIBRON or DESRON) in each port as the executive agent for SWO qualification, or conducting the assessments at the TYCOM with the training department (N7) as the executive agent. This will allow officers to be pinned on their ships after passing and decrease the variance that exists today, but it will not reduce variance to the same extent as having all officers assessed at SWSC. The proposed SWQE is imperfect with many details requiring refinement.

None of these factors outweigh the benefits of standardizing SWO qualification. Since 1845, the SWO community has reduced variance within its ranks and imbued a clearer identity in its officer corps through more robust, formalized training. To take this to the next level, the SWO community must standardize SWO qualification such that it incorporates the very best of what we already know about what SWOs need as warfighters and leverages the most experienced officers as assessors.

LCDR Bill Golden was commissioned as a Surface Warfare Officer in 2008. He has served on five warships and operated in the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh fleets. He holds a B.S. in Mathematics from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. in Systems Engineering from the University of Virginia.

References

1. Robinson, J.T. (2008). Initial Training of Surface Warfare Officers: A Historical Perspective from World War II to 2008. [Master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College].

2. “Get Real, Get Better.” U.S. Navy,  https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Blogs/Detail/Article/2894808/get-real-get-better/

3. “History of USNA.” The U.S. Naval Academy, https://www.usna.edu/USNAHistory/index.php.

4. Wills, S. (2016, April 6). CIRCLES IN SURFACE WARFARE TRAINING. Center for International Maritime Security. Retrieved October 2017, from https://cimsec.org/circles-surface-warfare-training/

5. Wills.

6. Robinson.

Featured Image: April 29, 2021 – Ensign Soon Hyung Kwon receives his surface warfare officer pin aboard USS Cole, as U.S. Fleet Forces Command head, Admiral Christopher Grady, looks on. (Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Theodore Green/Navy)

Make Racist Behavior a UCMJ Offense

By CAPT John P. Cordle, USN (ret.) and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, USN (ret.)

A survey of the past few years tells us the military continues to grapple with racism and extremism in its ranks:

  • A Marine General uses a racial slur in an exercise field.1
  • A noose is found hanging in a Black soldier’s locker.2
  • A Navy Admiral uses profanity and makes “racially insensitive comments” on an aircraft carrier bridge.3

While most people would characterize this behavior as patently racist, (prejudiced against or antagonistic toward a person or people on the basis of their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group), the laws governing military personnel do not capture these egregious breaches of respect and trust.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is intended to create a consistent and consistently enforceable code of law to deal with military members accused of crimes, misconduct, or other infractions that must be dealt with in a manner unique to the military and outside the scope of the civilian legal system. Under the UCMJ, however, there is no codified enforcement mechanism for these transgressions. This article will explore codifying a UCMJ article to punish racist behavior and acts in pursuit of protecting service members, improving accountability, and supporting leaders.

The Proposed Article

By combining the expertise and experience of a former commanding officer, a military lawyer, and someone who has experienced racism firsthand, we propose the following language for a UCMJ article codifying racist behavior.

Article XXX: Racist Behavior, defined as prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against a person or people based on their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group, typically one that is a minority or marginalized, is prohibited under this article. This offense may take the form of jokes, slurs, use of divisive symbols, or specific actions up to and including violence directed at an individual because of their particular racial or ethnic group.

Next, we will explore the background of addressing racism in the U.S. military and why an addendum to the UCMJ is necessary.

Historical Context

The U.S. Navy took dramatic actions to address racism, diversity, and inclusion in the 1970s. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt overcame significant resistance to curtail discriminatory practices. While Admiral Zumwalt is heralded as one of the Navy’s all-time great reformers, his work was unfortunately incomplete. Several decades later, the Navy established “Task Force One Navy” in the wake of the spate of highly publicized police brutality incidents in the summer of 2020. The Task Force’s stated goal was to “examine barriers to minorities and make recommendations to improve diversity and inclusion within the U.S. Navy.” The Task Force completed its final report in December 2020 and made over 50 tangible recommendations. Unfortunately, an opportunity was missed when the final report did not include concrete recommendations to address racism and accountability in the Navy. However, there is no reason that their work cannot lay a solid foundation for a tangible next step: a concrete and prosecutable definition of racist actions and behavior.

The UCMJ was signed by President Harry S. Truman in May 1950 within the broader context of Jim Crow laws, pervasive in the American South until 1965. Given this backdrop, in conjunction with the UCMJ being signed on the heels of an Executive Order to integrate the U.S. military, including “racism” in the document may have been viewed as a bridge too far. Despite the equal opportunity movement of the 1960s and 1970s, no significant inroads toward codifying racism were made. 

Existing Punitive Legal Framework

Within the current legal architecture, individuals who use racist language or engage in racist acts would likely be prosecuted under another UCMJ Article, such as an orders violation (Article 92, UCMJ) or, for officers, Conduct Unbecoming (Article 133, UCMJ). Alternatively, in some cases, racist misconduct could be prosecuted under the so-called General Article (i.e., Article 134), which serves as a catchall and could theoretically allow military prosecutors to use hate crime statutes. None of these statutes is designed to orient investigators and prosecutors toward the uniquely insidious evils of racism – and actions that result from it – in the ranks.

A Judge Advocate General officer (military lawyer) shared that there are several references in place that explicitly address racist acts:

    • UCMJ Article 132 defines “unlawful discrimination” as “discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Also, see RCM 1001, which allows “evidence in aggravation” to be presented to the members on sentencing (after the accused has been found guilty): “In addition, evidence in aggravation may include evidence that the accused intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.
    • DoDI 1325.06, Enclosure 2 lists statutory provisions that could be used to address racist behavior.4
    • MILPERSMAN 1910-160 allows for administrative separation for “supremacist and extremist conduct,” which addresses misconduct related to “illegal discrimination based on race…color.”

Policy Rationale for Codifying Racist Actions and Behavior as a Specific Offense

Given this, why not leave things alone? After all, changing the UCMJ would not merely be a small definition change in regulation; it would constitute a change in military law. Despite this weighty prospect, given the documented persistent problems with racism and extremism in the military, Congress and the President should send a clear message by codifying a specific UCMJ offense that proscribes racist conduct uniformly across the U.S. military. 

There are several reasons that a specific article would improve accountability and support commanders in charging individuals with racist behavior as well as educating the force, which may not understand the implications of their actions. These include:

  1. Disincentivizing behavior through legal proscription serves a valuable purpose: specific and general deterrence.5 In other words, showing tangible consequences for specific actions can deter some individuals from doing them and others from tolerating them.
  2. Promote consistency and predictability throughout the services, enabling commanders to foster healthy, respectful, and inclusive climates at the unit level. The presence of a concise definition of the word “racist behavior” would make it clear to all where the line is and how not to cross it. Some examples would help. For example, certain words are widely accepted as “racist slurs” if used to describe another person or symbols that might be racist in nature (for example, a “KKK” medallion or a noose in a workplace).
  3. Injecting expediency and removing ambiguity into investigations into alleged racist misconduct. One of us has directly experienced racism, and one of us has been accused of racist actions. You may be surprised to learn that in both cases, it was me – Mr. Green. In the first case, the Sailor’s informal, without merit complaint dragged on due to a lack of clarity in the UCMJ and was in the end discredited; in the second case, involving an accusation brought by a Black civilian, I was exonerated because the evidence did not support it. In both instances, a clear definition of racist actions in the UCMJ would have saved a lot of work, uncertainty, and distress and sped up the final adjudication. Cordle: I often hear my (white, male) peers share that “I never saw racism in my command,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that just because they did not witness it firsthand did not mean it had not occurred. These changes would take racist behavior out of the subjective and provide a clear and actionable definition. These examples are evocative of Justice Potter Stewart’s famous definition of pornography, “I know it if I see it.” Fortunately, with a codified UCMJ article addressing racist actions, unit commanders and service members would not have to rely on pithy turns of phrase but on comprehensive military law.
  4. It would allow Commanders to move prosecution to a higher level, such as courts-martial, where they could be more properly adjudicated and legally defended on appeal. Commanders are warfighters, not legal experts. They are also human and may be subject to bias (“but he is my best technician”). Similar to the recent changes in the sexual harassment arena, where the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and related crimes have been removed from the chain of command. This change would allow commanders to focus on their given mission while giving investigations into allegations or racist actions or behavior the time, attention, and independence they demand.
  5. It would enable the compilation of statistical data on the prevalence and frequency of racist behavior. It is critical to note that the absence of discrete data does not mean the issue does not exist. The Center for Naval Analyses 2022 Study on Violent Extremism notes, “this issue is an exceptionally challenging one for several reasons including, but not limited to: little existing data on the problem, poorly defined key terms, and a high degree of politicization.” The graph below (focus on the needle vice the background) illustrates this phenomenon.

    Figure 1. A recent study by the Center for Naval Analysis cited “poor data quality and availability” as a barrier to determining the extent to which racist behavior is punished (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)
  6. It would allow the service to identify and remove service members whose racist actions are prejudicial to the good order and discipline of military units. In his 2020 Lawfare article Why Extremism Matters to the U.S. Military, Navy Captain Keith Gibel, wrote that criminalizing behavior does not make it go away, “Prosecution will not stop extremist beliefs or racist behavior.” What Captain Gibel overlooks, however, is that, unlike society, the military has the option of removing a service member whose behavior is prejudicial to good order and discipline and detract from the units and, broadly, the military services from executing their missions.
  7. The ability to build a library of case law and establish legal precedent. The legal world is built on a foundation of precedent. Since, as we have noted, there is no data or established process, it is difficult to provide waypoints to steer by. Changing the UCMJ would begin the process of building a library of case law and established legal precedent.
  8. It would send a signal to minority service members that they are being looked out for. The weight of George Floyd and Ahmaud Arbery still weighs heavy on the 31% of active-duty racial minorities. As a friend and mentor, former Fleet Master Chief Raymond Kemp wisely said, “for there to be a real change, there must be a compassionate ear from the unimpacted.” Giving leaders in the U.S. military both the knowledge and ability to remove the cancer of racism in the ranks will be a powerful signal to those who have been made to feel less than. It will communicate to a generation of Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsman, and Guardians that they are valued and heard, and actions against them based on their creed, color, or religion will not be tolerated. The below graph applies a concept – one that has been well vetted in the area of sexual harassment and sexual assault – to the racism conversation. The same rules apply – acceptance of small examples of bad behavior can lead to much worse – if left unchecked. 
Figure 2: Racial Extremism Continuum of Harm. (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)

Conclusion

The Center for Naval Analyses report on violent extremism ends with a candid assessment and recommendation, “Most critical, at this pivotal moment, is the recognition that the problem of racial extremism is not one of a few bad apples, but is, in fact, a more pervasive challenge that—like sexual harassment and sexual assault—will require a more comprehensive set of solutions.” One of these would be: to make racist actions and behavior a discrete UCMJ offense. Even though making racism a UCMJ offense would undoubtedly draw partisan ire, it is a necessary change at a critical moment. Doing so will provide clarity regarding unacceptable behavior, enable a legally defensible adjudication for cases, enable the judicial system to provide guidance for commanders and individuals alike, and provide much-needed transparency in an area that has not been clearly defined for more than seventy years.

Captain John Cordle retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), retiring as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic. He received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010, the Surface Navy Literary Award, and Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year Award in 2019. Recently, he has teamed with his co-author, LCDR Green, in an effort to promote diversity and inclusion in the military, authoring several articles and featured as speakers on the topic at various Navy and affinity group DEI symposia over the past two years. 

Lieutenant Commander Keith Green retired in 1997 after serving 22 years in the Navy. He served four department head tours, including as Executive Officer in USS Gemini (PHM-6). He is a former Legal Yeoman, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, and leadership Instructor, and was commissioned in 1984 via Officer Candidate School. He has an MS degree in Human Resources Development. His memoir Black Officer,White Navy was acquired by a University Press and a revised edition will be republished in 2023.

References

1. Alex Horton, Two Star Marine General fired after allegations he used racial slur around subordinates, Military Times, October 2020.
2.
Zelie Pollon, African American soldier says noose strung outside barracks, Reuters, June 2011
3. Linda Thomas, Navy’s Reason for discipline of Bremerton-Based Admiral, Navy Times, April 2013.
4.Appropriate courts-martial sentencing considerations include, but are not limited to, “promot[ing] adequate deterrence of misconduct.” Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1002(f)(3)(D). Thus, the R.C.M. identify deterrence as an important punishment consideration of courts-martial with an eye toward maintaining good order and discipline.
5. McBride, Megan, Racial Extremism in the United States: A Continuum of Harm, Center for Naval Analyses, January 2022.

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION NORFOLK (Oct. 4, 2012) Lt. Cmdr. James Raymond, center, operations officer for Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9, stands with his squadron during a change of command ceremony. Cmdr. Brad L. Arthur relieved Cmdr. Brian K. Pummill as commanding officer of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Walter/Released)