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South America

Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Next Stage in the South Atlantic Conflict?

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By Alex Calvo

More than 30 years after the Falklands War, the South Atlantic remains a focus of tension, given Argentina’s refusal to acknowledge the right to self-determination and rule out the use of force. In conventional terms, generally speaking the balance of forces has moved in favour of the UK, despite the current carrier gap (while two Queen Elizabeth II class carriers are being built) and deterioration of amphibious capabilities. British defence planners seem to rely first and foremost on the air and anti-aircraft assets permanently deployed at Mount Pleasant plus the few but powerful Royal Navy units in the region. Together, they seem to be able to deal with Argentina’s current order of battle in the event of an attempted invasion or blockade. For some, this is the end of the story, unless Buenos Aires rearms, starting with modern aircraft, which China and Russia may have offered according to different unconfirmed reports. However, there is no reason why any actor in a given conflict should stick to a particular strategy or mode of warfare. As the saying goes, “the enemy has a vote”, and given British conventional superiority (despite the lack of embarked aviation and deterioration in amphibious capabilities) Buenos Aires may choose to upgrade her strength in this field … or change tack and go asymmetric. Actually, that would not really be a novelty, since in the 1960s and 1970s a number of incidents took place featuring civilians and special operations. In 1966, a nationalist group hijacked a Dakota airplane over Patagonia and landed in Stanley Airport, and 10 years later Argentine forces set up a clandestine weather station on South Thule (South Sandwich Islands), which British authorities detected but kept quiet about to avoid an escalation. An echo of such actions was seen in 2011, when two Argentine civilians attempted to reach the Islands on a kayak.

Furthermore, events in the South China Sea over the last few years are a clear reminder of the many ways in which force can be used in disputed maritime domains. Thus, anybody following the South Atlantic must keep in mind the full spectrum of warfare, from non-conventional to sub-conventional, with all possibilities in between, and their myriad combinations. Defence planners will need to incorporate such assessments in their decisions on training, equipment, doctrine, and Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Otherwise, one may run the risk of preparing to fight yesterday’s war, as historians have more than once accused generals and admirals of doing.

Last year, in the spring and summer, clashes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea / East Sea featured oil rigs protected by a large number of vessels, ranging from coast guard and other state ships to trawlers, while some observers also stressed the presence of naval and air assets. These clashes did not involve exchanges of fire, instead non-lethal kinetic means ranging from water cannons to ramming were used. This was in line with previous clashes between China and Japan and China and the Philippines, yet what was different was the numbers involved, and the deployment of specially-equipped ships. Some reports mentioned more than 100 vessels of different kinds, for example a 24 June 2014 Vietnamese report mentioned “44 coast guard ships, 15 cargo ships, 19 tugboats, 35 fishing vessels and five battleships” guarding a rig. Concerning special equipment, Chinese trawlers with “reinforced prows” featuring a “large metal object” appeared to be much better at pushing and damaging other vessels.

The question is then, could Argentine choose asymmetric non-lethal force over conventional rearmament? A number of scenarios come to mind, from the occupation of a minor island by activists, special forces, or a combination of  both, to the operation of trawlers escorted by non-naval state vessels. Things may get more complex with the involvement of third parties. Could Argentina grant a Chinese company a licence to explore for oil in the Falklands’ EEZ? Or to fish there? Could Buenos Aires then deploy non-naval state vessels (coastguard units or simply law enforcement personnel on board civilian vessels) to protect Chinese trawlers or even a rig?  To make things more complex, Taiwanese trawlers operate in the region, under license by the Falklands Government.

If this happened, British authorities may be faced with some of the dilemmas familiar to governments in the South China Sea. In theory asymmetric tactics may be dealt with by drawing a line in the sand, threatening to respond with conventional force. In practice, however, such a “tripwire” policy can be very difficult to implement given the natural reluctance to risk an escalation and appear as an aggressor before international public opinion if, for example, the life of civilian activists or fishermen was endangered.

Responding to asymmetric tactics may require a different kind of training, ROEs, and equipment than those designed with conventional operations in mind. An advanced anti-aircraft missile may be very useful in dealing with an inbound bomber, less so when confronting a civilian airplane full of activists. A nuclear submarine is a great asset when facing a surface combatant, not so much when what you see in your periscope is a trawler. To add to these challenges, defending forces must still be ready to engage in conventional operations. Furthermore, there is no reason why the other side cannot combine conventional and asymmetric tactics. By analogy with the USMC “Three Blocks” doctrine perhaps we may need to talk about a “Three Islands” doctrine.

While it may be too early to know what direction the confrontation in the South Atlantic may take, there are reasons to expect Buenos Aires to at the very least consider going asymmetrical. These include a much shorter time frame than that required for conventional rearmament, lower costs, and the possibility to graduate the level of confrontation, in the hope of securing political concessions without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. Concerning the British response, we can already see some evidence that London may be preparing for a new stage in the long-running conflict. In particular, for an scenario where Argentine special forces seize a minor island, which may explain the recent announcement that two Chinook troop-carrying helicopters will be deployed from next year.

 Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work, which includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College,  23 December 2013, available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Working-Papers/Documents/WP1-Calvo.aspx,  can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo

Global Analysis, South America

What is the Future of Navies?

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By Dr. Roberto Pereyra 

In this article I will try to provide a brief summary of my views on the purpose of navies, the need for them, and where they are bound to go.

When a regular citizen thinks of the sea, he conceives its vastness, and in his mind he envisages a horizon, but what he can’t naturally perceive is what awaits beyond that; he probably cannot fathom what lies beneath the ground, on the seabed, at great depths or on the surface.

It is also likely that he’s unaware of the obligations that nation states must fulfill in multiple areas, which include to safeguarding human lives at sea.

The sea is in itself relevant, as two thirds of the planet’s surface is covered by water[1]. The Southern Hemisphere is comprised of only 19% land,  while in the Northern Hemisphere land is 39% of the earth’s surface.

The importance of the seas and oceans for mankind as a source of resources and unity is an assertion which needs not be analyzed or questioned, considering more than 60% of the world’s population lives along a coast should be proof enough.

In America, as in the rest of the world, “the necessities and burdens of the people” are transported by sea, thus leading to motorways of the sea which never collapse, don’t present roadblocks, and are not affected by human activity[2].

It is worth noting that maritime shipping is relevant worldwide (institutionally) and is increasing in earnest.  The Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization, Mr. Efthimios M Mitropoulos during the commemoration of the world maritime day 2005, remarked: “we live in a global society which is supported by a global economy – and that economy simply could not function if it were not for ships and the shipping industry.”[3]

As Keohane and Nye note,[4] “we live in an interdependent world of power, hence practically no nation can consider itself self-sufficient, given that, generally speaking, there is now a “mutual reliance[5]”.

Resources scarcity is progressively heightened in a world population which is estimated to grow fourfold from 1950 to 2050. Thus, we must ruminate on the location of resources if they are not located within our countries.  The wherewithal to transport them, which will most likely be by maritime means, make resource scarcity an unwavering variable.

This same analysis establishing the convenience of the sea has been conducted from a nefarious stand point by those seeking to conduct a widely spread gamut of illegal activities.

There are multiple threats hovering over the maritime realm, and if states are not paying attention, they will domestically become more vulnerable as a result of their maritime negligence.

Offshore oil discoveries are progressively becoming more important; case in point, Brazil’s Blue Amazon (the South Atlantic), not to mention the statements made by several states regarding their continental shelf.

Along the same line, and as we ponder upon the purpose of a navy, let’s take a look at what happens when faced with a game changer, namely a “black swan” type of event as described by Nassim Nicholas taleb[6] in his book by the same title. If we begin to ask ourselves about who is ready to deploy, capable of providing support to an ally lacking an airport to land in, it is generally the navy who is able to get there and respond with its prepared and trained maritime assets. We only need to recall what took place in Haiti, 2010, where the navies were the first to set foot and recover transportation infrastructure, provided first response services and established a command and control system tailored to the emergency.

The navy is able to deploy from one side of the globe to another in its pursuit to protect its interests, and can additionally do so in order to protect their fellow citizens when they fall victims to a disaster.

The ability to have a hospital ship serve as a first responder providing relief when emergencies strike, carries value that may be underestimated but not denied as a state capability when faced with their own urgencies or demands.

Moreover, we must not lose sight of the founding purpose of a navy as it provided assistance to countries of the hemisphere in their efforts to develop inhospitable areas with their relentless force opening up navigable waterways while ensuring the delivery of supplies into territories that were nearly forgotten.

Globalization has created and increased international linkages. Navies are not lagging behind this trend with international exercises which allow for an exchange of experiences and know-how, while raising teamwork skills and potentially forging an international naval force in the future.  This force is currently seen in the form of various international naval exercises under many different designations dependent upon the participating nations. These exercises conclude with a wealth of lessons learned.

Navies will follow mandates dictated by their civilian authorities; they will be downsized, reorganized or even abolished. Regardless of their fate, nothing will change or deny the reality of things, and what it would mean to not possess a navy, or to have one that is inefficient or inoperable, and how that translates into a lack of awareness regarding the real magnitude of the world stage in which we live, where state interests are what’s at stake and how they can always be supported from the sea.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight the fact that I perceive a clear lack of communication with society regarding naval and maritime operations, and how the need for the sea will not decrease, nor will the need to dispose of the sea as the means for carrying out illegal activities change.  The sea generally provides the ideal means to provide support during domestic and international emergencies.

Lastly, we only realize the importance someone or something holds, until they’re gone, I’m sure any reader can relate to this, so then let’s not allow for this to occur to our navies.

[1]N. del A  CURSO “INTERESES MARÍTIMOS ARGENTINOS”- Ciclo 2005. Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Armada

[2] N. del A. In general here, we need to make an excepcion for Piricy an Terrorism at sea

[3] MITROPOULOS Efthimios, Obtenido del Texto del discurso del Secretario General de la OMI, en el Día Marítimo Mundial 2005. Titulado “el transporte marítimo internacional vehículo del comercio mundial”.

[4]KEOHANE R & NYE J, Poder e Interdependencia, la política mundial en transición. Colección Estudios Internacionales. 1ª Edición. Editor Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. 1988, p 22. Traducido por Franco Heber Cardoso Power and Interdependence, world politics in transition.  Editor Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

[5] Ibidem

[6] Taleb se refiere a casi todos los grandes descubrimientos científicos, hechos históricos, y logros artísticos como “cisnes negro”, – sin dirección e inesperados.

Señala como ejemplo de evento de Cisne Negro los ataques del 11 de septiembre, entre otros. Taleb, The Black Swan, Second Edition, Penguin, 2010, Prologue p xxi

Dr. Roberto Pereyra is a retired rear admiral in the Argentine Navy and senior professor at the Inter American Defense College.

Global Analysis, South America

HACIA DONDE VAN LAS ARMADAS

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By Dr. Roberto Pereyra Bordón

En este breve artículo pretenderé resumir mi pensar sobre el porqué de las armadas, su necesidad y su futuro.

Cuando un ciudadano piensa en el mar, lo ve su vastedad, y en su mente aparece un horizonte, pero lo que naturalmente no percibe es lo que está más allá de éste, probablemente no piense lo que ocurre en su subsuelo, en su lecho, en sus profundidades y en su superficie.

Probablemente, también ignore las obligaciones que los estados, como tales tienen en múltiples áreas, como ser la salvaguarda de la vida humana en el mar.

El mar es en si mismo relevante, porque dos tercios de la superficie del planeta está cubierta por agua[1]. El hemisferio Sur, posee solamente un 19%  de tierra y el Hemisferio Norte, posee un 39%.

La importancia de los mares y los océanos en la vida del hombre, como fuente de recursos y de unión es una verdad en sí misma, que no merece ser analizada, ni cuestionada. Basta sólo pensar que mas del 60% de la población mundial vive sobre las costas.

En América, como en el resto del mundo las “necesidades de los pueblos, sus cargas”, se transportan por via marítima, siendo el mar el que permite la creación de grandes autopistas, que nunca colapsan, que no tienen cortes y que no se ven afectadas por la actividad humana[2].

Es conveniente resaltar que en el tema transporte marítimo existe a nivel mundial (institucional) una permanente atención, en tal sentido, el Secretario General de la Organización Marítima internacional sr. Efthimios Mitropoulos, en relación al Día Marítimo Mundial 2005, dijo: “vivimos en un mundo globalizado que se sustenta en una economía globalizada, economía que no podrá funcionar de no ser por los buques y el sistema del transporte marítimo”[3]

Tal como mencionan Keohane y Nye[4]  vivimos en un mundo de poder e interdependiente, en tal sentido, prácticamente ninguna nación puede afirmar que es autosuficiente, ya que existe, en términos genéricos una “dependencia mutua[5]”.

Los recursos son cada vez mas escasos en una población mundial que crecerá cuatro veces desde 1950 al 2050, nos debemos entonces preguntar, dónde están los recursos y cómo los trasladaremos hacia nuestros paises, si es que no los tenemos, seguramente mayoritariamente será por via marítima, esto hace que ésta variable no cambie.

Éste mismo análisis, sobre la utilidad del mar,  es hecho por quienes desde una perspectiva oscura tratan de efectuar negocios ilícitos de todo tipo.

Multiples amenazas se ciernen sobre el escenario marítimo, si alguien no las toma en cuenta los estados serán cada vez mas vulnerables en su interior producto del descuidar sus mares.

Los descubrimientos de petróleo en el mar, cada vez son mas importantes, recordemos la Amazonia Azul de Brasil, también no debemos olvidadar las presentaciones que los estados están haciendo sobre su plataformas continentales.

Siguiendo nuestro hilo conductor, y pensando en el para qué de una marina, miremos que sucede ante un gran cataclismo, ante la aparición de un evento tipo cisne negro, tema que fue descripto por Nassim Nicholas Taleb[6] en su libro con el mismo nombre, si nos preguntamos  quienes están en capacidad de trasladarse, quienes tienen la capacidad apoyar al país hermano, que no tiene un aeropuerto a donde aterrizar, las armadas generalmente siempre pueden llegar, los medios marítimos preparados adiestrados, dan respuesta. Vasta pensar en Haití, 2010. Las marinas fueron quienes dieron el punta pie inicial y lograron el restablecimiento de las vías de comunicaciones, brindado primeros auxilios y estableciendo un sistema de comando y control adecuado a la emergencia.

Una marina que puede desplegarse de una  parte del  globo a otra para proteger sus intereses, también es capaz de hacerlo para asisitr a sus propios connacionales cuando éstos, en su propio territorio, se ven afectados por catástrofes.

La capacidad de trasportar hospitales flotantes, de ser  el primer socorro ante una emergencia son valores que podrán ser no considerados como tales, pero que no pueden negarse como una capacidad del estado ante emergencias o necesidades propias.

Por otro lado tampoco debemos olvidar el concepto fundacional que tuvieron las armadas, cuantos de los países del hemisferio han desarrollado zonas inhóspitas debido al esfuerzo abnegado de las marinas que se ocuparon en abrir rutas navegables y asegurar el abastaecimiento a territorios casi olvidados.

La globalizacion ha generado y aumentado la vinculación internacional y las marinas no se han quedado atrás, ejercicios internacionales, permiten compartir vivencias, experiencias, aumentar la capacidad de trabajar en equipo y de poder constituir a futuro una posible fuerza naval internacional, que hoy en el hemisferio de se ve plasmada en multiples ejercicios internacionales navales, con multiples nombres y denominaciones segun los paises que intervienen. Ejercicios que dejan nutridas agendas de lecciones aprendidas.

Las marinas, seguirán los mandatos que sus autoridades civiles dicten, se reducirán, se reorganizaran o podrán desaparecer, independientemente de lo que suceda, nada cambiará o podrá negar la realidad, de lo que significa no contar con una marina o contar con una marina ineficiente o inpoperante, ello implica no comprender la real magnitud del escenario mundial en que vivimos, donde lo importante son los intereses de los estados, y siempre estos podrán ser apoyados desde el mar.

Para concluir, me gustaria resaltar que percibo una clara falta de comunicación del quehacer naval y marítimo a la sociedad, que la necesidad del mar no decrecerá, como tampoco decrecerá el uso del mar como elemento utilizado para actividades ilícitas, y que el mar es el canal generalmente idóneo para el apoyo ante emergencias propias y de otros países.

Finalizando, sólo nos damos cuenta de la importancia de  alguien-algo en el momento que no podemos contar con el, cualquier lector habrá pasado por esto,  pues entonces tratemos de que estó no nos ocurra.

1]N. del A. Las referencias numéricas fueron obtenidas del CURSO “INTERESES MARÍTIMOS ARGENTINOS”- Ciclo 2005. Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Armada

[2] N. del A. Por lo general, aquí tendremos que hacer una excepción con la piratería y el terrorismo marítimo.

[3] MITROPOULOS Efthimios, Obtenido del Texto del discurso del Secretario General de la OMI, en el Día Marítimo Mundial 2005. Titulado “el transporte marítimo internacional vehículo del comercio mundial”.

[4]KEOHANE R & NYE J, Poder e Interdependencia, la política mundial en transición. Colección Estudios Internacionales. 1ª Edición. Editor Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. 1988, p 22. Traducido por Franco Heber Cardoso Power and Interdependence, world politics in transition.  Editor Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

[5] Ibidem

[6] Taleb se refiere a casi todos los grandes descubrimientos científicos, hechos históricos, y logros artísticos como “cisnes negro”, – sin dirección e inesperados.

Señala como ejemplo de evento de Cisne Negro los ataques del 11 de septiembre, entre otros. Taleb, The Black Swan, Second Edition, Penguin, 2010, Prologue p xxi

Dr. Roberto Pereyra is a retired rear admiral in the Argentine Navy and senior professor at the Inter American Defense College.

Global Analysis

Maritime Coordination and Inter-American Cooperation in the South

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By Sabrina Medeiros

When the Inter-American Defense Board created the Maritime Coordination Area for the South Atlantic in 1959, cooperation had a different scope for enhancing maritime security and promoting Maritime Domain Awareness. Nevertheless, the changing scenario as late as 2015 shows a dedicated reinforcement of protocols and regimes to guarantee that states can cover the actual vulnerabilities that challenge maritime transportation and security. Naval Control of Shipping is one of the main problems for the development of a region such the Americas and cooperation agreements have been playing an important role to permit states have the same guidance and work together to deal with the remarkable difficulties around security of the transnational commerce.

In that sense, controlling variables that may threaten maritime situation awareness is one of the aspects that are commonly included in the hemisphere regional organizations, but also, specialized ones as to make inter-agency work at a lower level, based on strengthening protocols and the valuation of common standards. In this respect, the Americas have been from the various types of organizations, some dealing with a necessary institutional renewal, others looking for the complex agenda states are involved in. In addition to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – signed in 1947, Rio de Janeiro – theCDMALogosome decades ago projected a plan for the inter-American defense coordination of the maritime traffic (Plan para la Coordinación de la Defensa del Tráfico Marítimo Interamericano – PLANDEFTRAMI, 1959). The CODEFTRAMI substituted the first plan by the end of 1996 and it has divided the areas into four groups: North Atlantic, South Atlantic, North Pacific and South Pacific. Whereas differently oriented, the process of institutionalization was effective for the Atlantic South Area, called AMAS (Área Marítima del Atlántico Sur), that was formed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

The Coordination for the South Atlantic Area (CAMAS) would have a biennial rotated command occupied by one of the members from the highest Navy authority (a position currently alternating among Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay). At this point we might ask what is the key position such an organization has nowadays based on the fact that multidimensional tasks are taking place. Although helping to create a sense of developing both technical systems and institutional capabilities, AMAS is still a step back compared to forums where different agents can contribute to the success of a variety of circumstances, legal arrangements and diffuse actors. Also, its public visibility is short, with a limited confluence to the regional approach on borders reinforcement and security.  A coverage  to the cited gap could be the CAMAS proposal on promoting cooperation with ZOOPACAS Organization, to enhance cooperation reaching the area bordering Africa (Uruguay, XXVI Reunion de COLCO). Considering the multidimensionality of those efforts, one of the main causes for the diminishing interest in promoting institutionalization is how the lack of capabilities and resources affects the management of correlated institutions in crossing themes and areas.

The Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur (CPPS), built after the Declaración de Santiago, 1952, is an example of this eventual overlapping compromises that fall onto some of the other regional engagements in course, proposing itself on behalf of the Seguridad Integral Marítima, an even broader understanding of maritime security. While focused on maritime sustainable development more than security and the use of maritime routes, the CPPS played an important role helping Chile and Peru, both founding members, provoke diplomatic discussions on the maritime limits harmonization in the South America Pacific, and clearly is a way to deal with the main topics that the Pacific South and North Maritime Areas inside CODEFTRAMI could ultimately cover. Furthermore, CPPS has done a memorandum of understanding with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that enables it to join the international maritime regime as a legitimate observer actor, as well as did ALADI (Asociación on Latino-Americana de Integracion), CARICON (Caribbean Community) and OAS (Organization of American States) in the Americas.

Then, the CAMAS initiative has still an important responsibility in the South Atlantic and it still can be the best means to improve South-South Cooperation, as it can even command the maritime area if members decide. As the way to integration has been from micro-level agency cooperation to the macro-level of state’s foreign relations institutions and vice-versa, we can state that the multidimensionality paradigm may become the next source of CAMAS tasks on the region. Correspondingly, this can guarantee a better participation in other forums whenever the level of cooperation is open to other nations from inside or outside of the continent. A good example is the combined exercise for maritime control (Ejercício Naval de Tráfico Marítimo), named TRANSOCEANIC Exercise, which is being held over years together with Mexico, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and South Africa, and can clearly provide protocols and common guidance to the other actors and common platforms.  CAMAS also participate annually in the COAMAS exercise and the biannual TRANSAMERICA Exercise (as part of Plan CODEFTRAMI), where there are other Americas countries together with AMAS members:  Mexico, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. For better and constant communications, recent improvements that can be cited include the already implemented system called REDE AIS DA AMAS, from where protocols and cases can be shared to partners.

One trending topic that can be cited as a way to articulate the different locus of technical cooperation and, ultimately, stirring accountability on maritime security is also deepening communication standards. Over time, communications has been a central topic when considering the possibilities of maintaining security with the prevalence of states’ authority in its respective area. That is how technical cooperation has been built in the South America zone making possible arrangements that fulfill needs and commit exchange of information based on equivalent systems. Guaranteeing that those institutions be maintained and integrated as observers in each other’s initiative is a way to boost cooperation without losing focus and the micro-level decision making process. A sub-regional seminar on surveillance systems is a good example, as proposed this year to Brazil by IMO (International Maritime Organization) and counting as members on the Portuguese speaking countries of Africa and, as observer, the South Atlantic Area Coordination and the Guinea Gulf Center for Maritime Security.

One of the results that could be part of the initiatives above is the recognition of a transition from controlling to cooperating, which not only was proposed by NATO on its willingness to approximate the commercial shipping community, but also can be seen in the South America as a prevailing policy. When talking about outcomes, there is also a consciousness that regional integration in the macro level has in someway helped those micro-agencies projects succeed, when domestic political actors would reinforce that direction.

Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros is a professor at IADC-OAS (Washington, DC), Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Marítimos – Escola de Guerra Naval and PPGHC-UFRJ (Brazil).  She received a PhD in Political Science at IUPERJ and her main area is international cooperation and reputation.