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Ocean Governance

Vanished Lobsters, Devastated Reefs: The Question of Chemical Fishing in the Caribbean

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By Dr. David Soud and Dr. Ian Ralby

Law enforcement officials are accustomed to interdicting shipments of precursor chemicals used in drug production. The chemicals used for illegal fishing, however, tend to go unchecked. This is partly because those substances, from bleach to cyanide to fertilizers, have no immediately obvious links to fishing. Yet maritime authorities need to attend more closely to the dangers posed by chemical fishing. The practice is extremely hard to detect, and it inflicts lasting damage on marine environments, both to specific species and to coral reefs. To understand this dynamic, one might begin with the lobster.

The spiny lobster, also known in various places as the rock lobster, Florida lobster, langosta or langostino, sea crayfish, or crawfish, is one of the premier high-value seafood catches in the Caribbean. In the Bahamas alone, the spiny lobster industry is worth nearly USD 100 million, providing employment for thousands of fishers.1 Extrapolate that across the region, and the incentives for illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) lobstering become obvious.

Though there have been efforts at conservation and management, numerous indicators suggest that pervasive overfishing of Caribbean spiny lobsters occurs throughout the region. One recent study identified the spiny lobster as “fully exploited in The Bahamas, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize and Anguilla…[and] overexploited in Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia.”2 Another found that in Jamaica, gaps in reporting and enforcement had led to overfishing.3 And a 2019 OPESCA/CRFM/COPACO report concluded that “IUU fishing is one of the major factors contributing to unsustainable fishing of spiny lobster. However, IUU fishing has not been systematically and reliably quantified in the region.”4

Within this larger issue, a particular form of lobstering merits heightened vigilance: using noxious chemicals to subdue lobsters or force them from hiding and make them easier to collect. While other chemicals have been identified, including a blend of household detergent and gasoline, the most common chemical used in illegal lobstering by far is bleach.5 If one can use chemicals to stun lobsters or force them into the open, one’s catch rate, and hence profits, will grow. Prolonged dipping of lobsters in bleach solution is also used to remove eggs from illegally harvested female lobsters.6 The practice of using chemicals to increase yield appears to have been found nearly everywhere lobsters are harvested and is not limited to the Caribbean. In 2022, the governor of North Carolina issued a proclamation banning the practice, but given the uncertain health of lobster fisheries in the Caribbean, the practice poses a particular challenge in that region.7

Although this technique has been used by poachers for quite some time, the range and scale of bleach lobstering in the Caribbean is impossible to calculate from available data. Certainly, this issue has been deemed significant enough to warrant specific legal measures since the 1980s, as with the Bahamas’ 1986 Fisheries Resources Regulations.8 A 2003 study pronounced the use of bleach and detergent to harvest lobsters in Turks and Caicos as “widespread” but offered no granular data.9 Unfortunately, the activity itself is extremely hard to detect, as only small quantities of bleach or other chemicals, often deposited from small plastic bottles into reef crevices where lobsters den,  are sufficient to force the crustaceans into the open or stun them for easier capture.10 Cases in recent years include the 2021 arrest of three Haitian fishers caught using bleach in Turks and Caicos waters. They were fortuitously caught in the act by Fisheries officers who were taking the Minister of Tourism, Environment, Heritage, Maritime, Gaming and Disaster Management for a tour of the country’s lobster fisheries.11 Social media, however, provide sometimes alarming anecdotal accounts, such as a 2019 Facebook group post by a Florida boater who claimed to have seen bleaching activity in the waters around Bimini: “Another year, another 50 bottles of bleach floating around the ocean during lobster season….we saw about 5 mother ships and dozens of small boats all over Bimini and no BDF (Bahamas Defense Force) to enforce the laws. All our usual spots cleaned out before the season started.”12 Though uncorroborated, anecdotal accounts such as this paint a concerning picture of unchecked illegal lobstering.

Bleach lobstering has negative impacts beyond the detrimental effects it causes on lobster populations and the ability of Caribbean nations to regulate lobster harvest. While bleach has been used fraudulently to conceal spoilage in seafood, placing consumers at risk of potentially deadly bacterial infections, the residual amounts of the active ingredient in liquid bleach, sodium hypochlorite, in a lobster caught using bleach are below that threshold, and well below the levels required for human toxicity.13 Far more problematic is the effect of even modest amounts of bleach on marine environments.

Bleach is devastating to the coral reefs that form the main Caribbean habitat of spiny lobsters. It kills coral and other crucial organisms in reef systems, leading to takeover by algae in what is called a coral-algal phase shift.14 The vibrant, colorful life of a flourishing coral reef gives way to suffocating algae blooms. Worse yet, the effects tend to be long-lasting. One fisheries officer in the Bahamas said that, in 18 years of work with marine ecosystems, he had never seen a reef recover from being chemically bleached.15

It is for this reason that some Caribbean nations have taken steps to dissuade the practice. For example, the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), the two Caribbean jurisdictions where bleaching lobsters has historically been most pervasive, have instituted identical, and steep, penalties for the practice: a fine of USD 50,000 and/or one year in prison, or both. In the Bahamas, Fisheries Act 2020 categorizes bleach as a “noxious substance” that requires written permission from authorities to even possess aboard a boat, while in TCI the possession of bleach while in a fishery, with any intent to use it for capturing marine life, is expressly illegal. Given that lobsters can be field-tested for bleach quickly and reliably, fishers using bleach in particular can be caught after the fact rather than in the act.16 Yet bleaching still occurs.

Despite the efforts of the Bahamas and TCI to address this unlawful practice, these are merely two jurisdictions among many throughout the Caribbean region. Spiny lobsters inhabit the entire Caribbean. The question therefore becomes whether using bleach, a technique known to generate a higher success rate, is limited to only these fisheries where it has gained some attention, when it could be practiced in any area in the region. Jurisdictions such as Venezuela, which far outranks any other state in Latin America and the Caribbean in the IUU Fishing Index and has reportedly hosted rapacious fishing of protected marine species, largely remain opaque.17  Heightened vigilance for instances of bleach lobstering is therefore warranted. But indicators and evidence of this practice can be challenging to discern.

The reality that coral reefs in the Caribbean are succumbing to a different sort of bleaching due to rising seawater temperatures is one such challenge.  Thus, global warming can serve to conceal the traces of chemical fishing. Another challenge is that the ingredients for this practice are ubiquitous. Tracing supply chains of bleach or gasoline will uncover nothing; nor is a bottle of bleach on a boat likely to draw unwanted attention when relatively few authorities think in terms of its possible use on lobsters. After all, boats need cleaning and disinfecting, too. As a result, the use of bleach, detergent, or gasoline is distinct from other forms of destructive chemical fishing, such as the use of cyanide to stun tropical fish for capture, which kills not only fish but coral, or of phosphates and nitrates to make explosives for “blast fishing,” which kills marine life indiscriminately.18 The latter two are also practiced in the Caribbean, but cannot be easily concealed.

In an ideal scenario, there would be no bleaching of lobsters in the Caribbean. The next best option would see the practice of bleaching limited to one or two fisheries, where competent authorities are aware of the practice and trained to identify and stop it. That appears to be the consensus on the current status of the practice. But given the poor state of monitoring and data collection throughout Caribbean lobster fisheries, the potential profits involved for fishers facing depleted stocks, and the difficulty of catching perpetrators, we cannot truly be sure of the extent of bleach lobstering, any more than we can be certain of the extent to which other forms of illegal chemical fishing are devastating marine ecosystems throughout the Caribbean. Stakeholders in monitoring, enforcement, and conservation across the region should keep this type of destructive fishing activity on their radar screens, and, in consultation with those jurisdictions whose fisheries have already suffered from bleach lobstering, develop effective measures to track and counter its practice.

Dr. David Soud is Head of Resource Responsibility at Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable nonprofit focused on good and just governance, sustainable development, resource stewardship, and human security. He is a leading expert in the criminal exploitation of natural resources, with special expertise in countering illicit activities linked with extractives and fisheries.

Dr. Ian Ralby is President of Auxilium Worldwide and head of its Ocean Governance arm.  He is a globally recognized expert in maritime law and security with particular expertise in identifying and countering threats at sea.

References

1. Marine Stewardship Council. 2025. “The Bahamas Spiny Lobster Fishery.” https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/the-bahamas-spiny-lobster-fishery/

2. FAO. 2019. Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission/FAO Comisión Central de Pesca para el Atlántico Centro-Occidental. 2019. Report of the second meeting of the OSPESCA/WECAFC/CRFM/CFMC Working Group on Caribbean Spiny Lobster, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 21–23 March 2018/Informe de la segunda reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de OSPESCA/COPACO/CRFM/CFMC sobre la Langosta Espinosa del Caribe, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, 21-23 de marzo 2018. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report/Informe de Pesca y Acuicultura. No. 1264. Bridgetown. 68 pp. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

3. Sharon Hutchinson and Alexander Girvan, ‘Jamaica Caribbean Spiny Lobster Value Chain Analysis Report’, CANARI, 2021,  https://canari.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Jamaica-CbeanSpinyLobsterVCA_StewardFish_Final.pdf

4. Joint Report on Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries for the Caribbean Spiny Lobster, June 2019, https://www.fao.org/fi/static-media/MeetingDocuments/WECAFC/WECAFC2019/17/Ref.35e.pdf

5. Wilson, David T., et al. 2006, “A Preliminary Assessment of the Efficacy of a Chlorine Bleach Detection Method for use in Spiny Lobster (Panulirus argus) Fisheries,” 57th Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute, https://proceedings.gcfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/gcfi_57-61.pdf

6. Ibid.

7. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, Proclamation Re: Spiny Lobster – Commercial and Recreational, April 1, 2022, https://www.deq.nc.gov/marine-fisheries/fisheries-management-proclamations/2022/spiny-lobster-commercial-and-recreational/open  

8. Government of the Bahamas, Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) Regulations, Section 19, 1986, https://laws.bahamas.gov.bs/cms/images/LEGISLATION/SUBORDINATE/1986/1986-0010/1986-0010.pdf

9. Rudd, Murray A. “Fisheries Landings and Trade of the Turks and Caicos Islands,” Fisheries Centre Research Reports (2003), https://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/CatchReconstruction/EEZ/TurksCaicos-Rudd-2003.pdf

10. Wilson et al.

11. Hamilton, Deandrea, “Three local fishermen caught bleaching coral reef by Minister & Deputy Premier,” Magnetic Media, August 9, 2021, https://magneticmediatv.com/2021/08/three-local-fishermen-caught-bleaching-coral-reef-by-minister-deputy-premier/

12. Bahamas, Land and Sea, “Ocean pollution during lobster season in Bimini,” Facebook, August 5, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/groups/bahamlandsea/posts/1349017365280115/

13. Chung et al., “Health effects of sodium hypochlorite: review of published case reports,” Environmental Analysis Health and Toxicology 2022; 37(1): March 2022, https://eaht.org/journal/view.php?doi=10.5620/eaht.2022006

14. Ibid.

15. Hamilton.

16. Wilson et al.

17. IUU Fishing Risk Index, “2025 Results,” n.d., https://iuufishingindex.net/ranking; Byrd, Nicole, et al. Operation STELLA MARIS: Investigating Shark Fin Trafficking Networks in Latin America and East Asia Through the Lens of Environmental Crime Convergence, Investigative Report, Earth League International, 2024, https://earthleagueinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/ELI-Operation-STELLA-MARIS-Investigative-Report-22-April-2024-1.pdf

18. Waddell, J, and A. Clarke, The State of Coral Reef Ecosystems of the United States and Pacific Freely Associated States: 2008, 2008, NOAA/NCCOS Center for Coastal Monitoring and Assessment, https://coastalscience.noaa.gov/data_reports/the-state-of-coral-reef-ecosystems-of-the-united-states-and-pacific-freely-associated-states-2008/

Featured image: A Caribbean spiny lobster. (NOAA Fisheries)

Culture

The Curious Rise of Military Bullshit

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This article was originally published at The Cove, the Australian Army’s professional military education platform, and is republished with permission.

By Benjamin Gray

Clarity of purpose is a combat multiplier and central to mission command, yet anyone who has spent time in a large headquarters knows that language in the modern Army can sometimes resemble a map overlaid with too many graphics.1

Each symbol intended to clarify, but collectively obscuring the ground truth and making it harder to see what matters. We are using more words to say less, and sometimes nothing at all: orders, briefs, and discussions increasingly seek to synchronize effects, leverage partnerships, and optimize potential across a complex and challenging strategic environment while enabling teams to operate whenever, wherever, and with whomever required. The result is polished language that signals alignment and intellectual weight – but regularly obscures meaning. This paper offers a deliberately tongue-in-cheek look at that phenomenon: the proliferation of empty metaphors, inflated concepts, and managerial phrasing, and what it might mean for warfighting effectiveness.

The inspiration for this reflection comes in part from Harry Frankfurt’s 1988 essay On Bullshit, a short but rigorous philosophical treatment of a word not particularly common in academic journals.2 Frankfurt argues that bullshit is not the same as lying. He asserts that the liar remains tethered to the truth and deliberately departs from it, whereas the bullshitter is indifferent to whether statements are true or false; this indifference is the defining characteristic. In reading Frankfurt, it becomes difficult not to recognize echoes of his idea in contemporary military discourse, where the obligation to brief and conceptually frame problems can outpace genuine understanding. That realization provided the motivation and starting point for this paper.

One way to approach the issue is to develop a taxonomy of military bullshit. The first category is the empty metaphor.3 These are phrases that gesture toward complexity without offering testable meaning: operating in uncertainty, shaping conditions, or delivering effects at scale. Often, they combine convincingly with approved institutional language, producing formulations such as: ‘Army will leverage integrated partnerships to shape conditions across all domains in order to deliver decisive effects in an increasingly complex environment’. It is difficult to disagree with such statements, which is precisely the problem, as they are expansive, adaptable, and largely immune to disproof.4

The second category is concept inflation.5 This occurs when ideas are repeatedly repackaged and elevated through modifiers such as joint, integrated, partnered, and multi-domain. Army operates ‘on the land, from the land and onto the land, across all domains’ as part of the joint team, while Defense must continually adapt and evolve to meet a changing strategic environment. Yet when every activity is framed as integrated and adaptive, the terms risk becoming descriptive wallpaper rather than analytical tools.6 A plan quickly becomes an effort to ‘optimize capability across an integrated enterprise to enable outcomes’, suggesting transformation while describing little that is new.

A third category comprises hollow constructs.7 Terms like targeting, culture, and potential are central to institutional thinking and genuinely important and yet are often described or misapplied in ways that expand rather than clarify. Targeting must be both precise and adaptive across domains; culture must anchor behavior while simultaneously enabling change. In practice, these formulations tend to expand until they are capable of meaning almost anything, while specifying almost nothing about what is actually to be done differently in the next activity or task. When a concept can comfortably describe everything from barracks discipline to joint fires synchronization, it risks becoming less a guide to action than a reassuring slogan; one that sounds authoritative, travels well in briefs, and leaves just enough ambiguity for everyone to quietly interpret it in their own way. Yet such formulations often stop short of specifying how they translate into action. When a concept can accommodate anything and everything, it risks guiding nothing in particular.

Closely related is the overuse of tactical terminology for rhetorical effect. Words like decisive, synchronized, shaping, and effects once had precise analytical meaning (and doctrinally still do). When used liberally, they become verbal amplifiers. Army is a ‘versatile, decisive force’ that ‘integrates capabilities and delivers results’ through ‘teaming behaviors’. Entire passages can read like a synchronization matrix converted into prose, with each activity decisive and every effect coordinated. The reader is left reassured that something important is happening, without being entirely sure what.

Finally, there is the seepage of corporate and managerial language into military discourse. As one critique observes, jargon often emerges to make simple ideas sound sophisticated, spreading across organizations. Defense writing increasingly reflects this tendency: capability is leveraged, outcomes are delivered, and potential is optimized across the enterprise. The cumulative effect is to replace directness with abstraction. Tasks become outcomes, action becomes effect, and responsibility becomes diffused.

At its extreme, this produces a kind of linguistic symphony that is as impressive as it is incomprehensible. I recall, as a commanding officer, a briefing from a higher HQs that confidently stated something along the lines that we would ‘synchronize cross-domain effects by leveraging joint and partnered capabilities to shape the operational environment in advance of decisive activity, while simultaneously enabling adaptive team-based innovation across the enterprise’. I remember looking around the room, half expecting someone to translate. No one did, and we all nodded, which seemed the safest course of action.

On another occasion, a draft planning directive informed subordinate units that they were to ‘generate readiness by optimizing human capital to deliver capability outcomes aligned to evolving strategic objectives in a contested environment’. After a moment’s reflection, someone quietly asked whether this meant ‘train hard and be ready to deploy’. There was a sense that something important had just been lost in translation, possibly the entire paragraph. I would like to claim detached amusement at these moments, but the truth is less flattering… I have written versions of these sentences myself.

Now, it would be unfair to suggest that this problem exists only in conversation or informal briefings; it is also evident in some of our more formal strategy and concept documents. Consider the language of recent training and operational concepts, which describe the need to ‘unlock the full potential of our people’, ‘generate a qualitative edge’, and ‘synchronize multi-domain effects to create windows of advantage’. Each of these phrases is gesturing toward something important, yet none easily translates into a clear task for a junior commander. As previously mentioned, I have, on more than one occasion, been the author of sentences not entirely dissimilar. It is remarkably easy to be swept along by the current; by the newest concept, the latest popular phrasing, or the most compellingly branded idea. There is a professional gravity to phrases like integrated, multi-domain, or effects-based that is difficult to resist. They promise sophistication, alignment, and intellectual relevance. In reality, they often promise far more than they deliver. Recognizing the problem is one thing; avoiding it is another entirely.

One is left wondering what this might look like in battle. It is difficult to imagine a section commander in the midst of a fighting withdrawal or attack turning to their team and confidently announcing ‘righto, we’re now going to synchronize cross-domain effects to generate a window of local advantage’. More likely, they would default to something short, aggressive, and directive; clipped fire orders delivered at volume and punctuated with the kind of colorful language that leaves no ambiguity about either the task or the urgency. The underlying ideas in these documents are often sound, but the language used to express them frequently expands beyond the point of practical utility. The result is not nonsense, but a kind of polished abstraction that works perfectly on a slide or in a paper yet becomes noticeably less helpful when translated into action at the point where clarity matters most.

Recently, the Deputy Chief of Army has warned that ‘managerial and advertising logic and double speak’ have ‘polluted the profession’, with jargon used to obscure ignorance and detach soldiers from war’s violent reality.8 He criticized euphemisms such as ‘deliver effects’, reminding us that the role of the Army is to ‘seek out, close with, kill, capture, seize, hold and repel attacks’.9 That contrast (between abstraction and reality) goes to the heart of the issue, and there is a larger professional risk. As one Army Journal article argues, unclear writing reflects unclear thinking, and in a military context, that has direct consequences for action.10 Orders must be simple enough to be understood immediately: who goes where, when, and what they are to do when they get there. If officers think in phrases such as ‘interoperability frameworks’ and ‘persistent optimization pathways’, the concern is not literary, it is operational. In many ways, this is also a sort of performative lexicon and informal acceptance of buzzword bingo, in which directors and staff ritualistically ‘circle back’ and ‘touch base’ and ‘pivot’ towards a ‘synergized paradigm shift’ to avoid direct expression. Such jargon serves less to clarify meaning than to signal competence, free up time, or obscure collective uncertainty. The humor and discomfort inherent in this mode of communication emerge most clearly when translated into plain English; for example, a directive to ‘strategically cascade the bandwidth to maximize blue-sky thinking’ is, in practice, an instruction to distribute loosely defined tasks in the hope that some marginally useful outcome eventuates.

Why does this flourish? Frankfurt suggests bullshit emerges when individuals are required to speak beyond what they know. This is a familiar condition in headquarters, where officers must brief complex issues under time pressure while projecting confidence. There is also a signaling function, as language demonstrates alignment and intellectual currency. To speak using the popular terms and phrases of the time signals membership in the institutional mainstream. Yet language fluency can be mistaken for depth of understanding. This matters because military language is operational. It is broadly acknowledged that culture, leadership, and behavior shape capability and performance outcomes. If the language underpinning those functions becomes vague or performative, it risks degrading shared understanding. Unlike a lie, which can be challenged, inflated language is difficult to contest because it is rarely specific enough to be wrong. Military doctrine affirms the requirement for meaningful human control in the use of violence, and this mustn’t become indistinct because terminology fails to specify how decisions are produced or who is accountable. Words decide who is responsible, who can act, and who is blamed when things go wrong.11 Unlike other institutional discourses, military discourse should be shaped by the demands of operational activity, where urgency, hierarchy, and consequence place a premium on clarity, efficiency, and the unambiguous exercise of authority.

A modest response to this issue is not to abandon higher-level concepts, but to impose discipline. There is an enduring story attributed to Napoleon, who would ask a corporal whether his plans made sense after briefing his commanders. If the corporal did not understand them, the plan was reworked. This works, and historical evidence is that if a plan cannot be understood by those expected to execute it, it is unlikely to succeed. If ‘leveraging integrated capability to deliver decisive kinetic and non-kinetic effects to achieve relative asymmetry in a complex environment’ cannot be translated into a clear direction for a junior leader, it may not be useful language at all.

Ultimately, the Army is not uniquely afflicted, but the consequences are uniquely serious. Warfare punishes ambiguity, as such, if we lose discipline in language (and I include myself squarely in that risk), we risk losing discipline in thinking. And in the profession of arms, reality has a way of cutting through language with remarkable efficiency.

Colonel Benjamin Gray is the Director of Training Futures and has served in a range of operations and training appointments within the Australian Army, including overseas service in the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan. He has a Bachelor of Arts, a Masters of Strategy and Security and a Masters of Military and Defense Studies.

Notes

1. ADF-P-0 Command, Edition 1, Commonwealth of Australia, 2024, 26-31

2. Frankfurt H, ‘On Bullshit’, Raritan Quarterly Review, 1986.

3. Empty Metaphor: A phrase that sounds meaningful but no longer explains anything, such that it signals meaning without substantively clarifying the concept it purports to describe.

4. Buckley R, ‘Fuzzy writing and fatalities’, Australian Army Journal, Vol 7 No. 2 Winter, 2010, 10.

5. Concept Inflation: Progressive expansion and rebranding of a concept’s scope beyond its original bounds, such that it loses precision and explanatory utility while appearing to encompass an ever-widening range of use.

6. Patrick A, ‘The military is losing the war again business jargon’, Financial Review, 25 Feb 2025 

7. Hollow Constructs: Term, phrases or concepts that appears meaningful but lacks clear definition, real grounding, or explanatory value, serving mainly as a verbal placeholder rather than a substantive idea.

8. Smith C, Keynote Presentation – Chief of Army’s History Conference, 19 Nov 2025.

9. Smith C, Keynote Presentation – Chief of Army’s History Conference, 19 Nov 2025.

10. Buckley R, ‘Fuzzy writing and fatalities’, Australian Army Journal, Vol 7 No. 2 Winter, 2010, 12-13. 

11. Annett E, Bitterman J, and Giordano J, ‘Precision in Words, Precision in Warfare: Terminology and Control in Military Discourse on Unmanned Systems’ Strategic Insights, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 11 Mar 2026.

Featured image: The Pentagon Press Briefing Room before Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper briefs the media about the department’s COVID-19 response, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 17, 2020. (DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando)

Antarctic, Arctic

Polar Primer: Arctic and Antarctic Governance

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By Jake Brantley

As great power competition expands into new domains and climate change alters global geography, the Arctic and Antarctica have become central pieces of the national security conversation. However, the conversation around these strategic regions often lacks a nuanced understanding of the distinct governance frameworks that regulate each polar region. There is a frequent, yet flawed, tendency to view “the poles” as a single, uniform operational environment.

While both the Arctic and Antarctic regions are remote, extreme, and unforgiving maritime environments characterized by a history of cooperative scientific exploration, their legal, political, and geographic structures are fundamentally different. Navigating these regions requires more than just icebreakers and cold-weather gear; it requires a clear understanding of rules-based order that governs them.

This article provides a comprehensive yet concise overview of the primary governing mechanisms for both the Arctic and Antarctica, aiming to equip national security practitioners with the foundational knowledge necessary to operate within and strategize for these regions. For a deeper understanding, readers are encouraged to dig into the authoritative legal documents governing the Arctic, Antarctic and global maritime trade.

Why Governance Matters

Before analyzing the specific legal mechanisms, it is important to understand why these frameworks matter to the modern national security expert. Both polar regions are transitioning from peripheral zones of scientific curiosity to central arenas of geopolitical competition.

In the North, receding sea ice is opening new trans-polar shipping routes—such as the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage — that drastically reduce transit times between Asia and Europe. Simultaneously, the region is rich in untapped hydrocarbons, critical minerals, and migrating fish stocks. Commercial shipping, resource extraction, and emerging military opportunities will shape the future Arctic geo-strategic environment. These factors have already prompted renewed militarization by Russia and the assertion of “Near-Arctic State” status by China, as both countries seek to secure economic and strategic advantages.

In the South, Antarctica remains a demilitarized global commons, but it is not immune to strategic competition. The proliferation of scientific research stations has raised concerns regarding “dual-use” technologies, where scientific infrastructure—such as satellite tracking facilities—may be leveraged for military intelligence and space operations. Furthermore, the increasing demand for marine resources has tested the limits of Antarctic fisheries management. Understanding how to counter malign behavior in Antarctica requires a firm grasp of the legal architecture that defines norms and acceptable state behavior.

Adding to complexity, revisionist state pressure to undermine the rules-based order is increasing while region-specific enforcement options remain geopolitically limiting. Physically, extreme weather, logistics, and remote geography limit access and response time for nations to protect their interests in both regions. Legally, the Arctic affords relatively broad enforcement choices rooted in sovereign maritime jurisdiction. Conversely, Antarctica’s strict demilitarization restricts enforcement options primarily to diplomatic means—deviations from which risk validating Russian and Chinese “salami-slicing” tactics. To effectively project presence and achieve strategic priorities, security practitioners must account for the tyranny of distance, global narrative control, and legal nuance.

The Arctic

Geographically, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by the sovereign landmasses of eight nations (the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland). Consequently, it is governed primarily by national sovereignty and a multi-layered framework of maritime law and executive agreements.

Given the region’s fundamental nature as a maritime domain, Arctic governance is dominated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS dictates territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, and the rules for defining the extended continental shelf (Article 76)—the mechanism by which many Arctic states lay claim to the seabed and its resources. While the United States has not formally ratified UNCLOS, it recognizes its navigational and maritime zone provisions as customary international law. Alongside UNCLOS, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)—including the specialized IMO Polar Code—are critical to regulating maritime traffic and safety.

At the policy level, the Arctic Council serves as the preeminent high-level intergovernmental forum. It promotes cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the eight Arctic states, six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), and 38 non-Arctic observers. Notably, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that established the Council explicitly excludes matters related to military security. Although the Council does not discuss military matters, there are no legally binding agreements to prohibit military activity. While the Council is highly influential in drafting policy and fostering diplomacy, it is not a regulatory body and does not supersede the authority of sovereign states or legally binding agreements.

The tangible governance of the Arctic is heavily reliant on three principal executive agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council:

1. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic (2011): This 20-article agreement represents the first legally binding instrument negotiated among all eight Arctic states. The vast tyranny of distance and lack of infrastructure in the high north make SAR a daunting operational challenge. Key provisions establish specific regions of SAR responsibility, mandate the development of national capabilities and coordination centers, and provide vital guidelines for joint operations, information sharing, and cross-border assistance during mass-casualty events.

2. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013): As maritime traffic increases, so does the risk of environmental disaster. This 22-article agreement strengthens mutual assistance for oil spill preparedness and response. It requires parties to maintain a robust national response system, proactively notify other nations of pollution incidents, and provides operational guidance for joint response efforts, including the cross-border movement of cleanup assets.

3.  Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017): This agreement aims to facilitate the movement of researchers and equipment across borders. It protects intellectual property, ensures access to research infrastructure and data, and promotes the integration of traditional and local knowledge into scientific endeavors, ensuring that indigenous populations have a voice in the region’s future.

Antarctica

In contrast to the Arctic, Antarctica is a massive continent surrounded by the Southern Ocean. It is a global commons, governed by a single, comprehensive legal regime known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

Originally signed in 1959 at the height of the Cold War by twelve nations (including the US and the Soviet Union), the Antarctic Treaty was a masterclass in diplomatic pragmatism. Today, adhered to by 56 parties, the treaty establishes the legal framework for the entire continent. It is built upon three foundational principles:

1. The use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.

2. The absolute freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation.

3. The mandatory free exchange and availability of scientific observations and results.

The treaty consists of 14 articles. For the national security practitioner, the most consequential are:

Article 1: Explicitly prohibits any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. (Note: It does allow for the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose, which is how militaries operate logistics in the region today).

Article 4: Freezes all historical territorial claims (asserted by seven nations) and prohibits the assertion of new ones while the treaty is in force.

Article 5: Prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Article 7: Establishes a rigorous system of observation. It grants designated observers’ complete freedom of access to all areas, stations, installations, and equipment in Antarctica, as well as to all ships and aircraft discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel, ensuring compliance with the treaty’s demilitarization provisions.

The broader ATS includes subsequent additions that carry immense strategic weight. Most notable is the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (The Madrid Protocol), which designates Antarctica as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science” and outright bans all commercial mining and mineral resource activity. Furthermore, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources governs the region’s fisheries, attempting to balance conservation with the growing global demand for marine resources, such as krill.

Conclusion

Effective planning requires a clear understanding of the operating environment. Without a foundational knowledge of polar legal governance, defense professionals will be unable to develop acceptable and fully informed strategies.

The Arctic is a sovereign maritime domain bordered by the territory of eight nations. It is governed by a multi-layered framework of international maritime law and targeted executive agreements. Security and sovereignty are paramount, and the region is an active theater for great power competition. In contrast, Antarctica is a vast, unpopulated landmass governed by a single, comprehensive treaty system that explicitly prohibits military activity, freezes territorial claims, and bans resource extraction.

This distinction dictates operational legality, the rules of engagement, and informs the strategic approaches required to protect U.S. and Allied polar interests. Both regions demand highly specialized assets to project presence, conduct scientific research, and ensure safety of life at sea. However, presence alone is not enough.

You cannot secure a domain you do not fully understand. As the strategic environment evolves, a working understanding of these complex legal and political landscapes is no longer an academic luxury, but an operational prerequisite for the modern national security professional.

CDR Jake Brantley currently serves as Deputy Chief – Coast Guard Office of Future Plans and Operations (CG-35) at CG Headquarters where he develops CG solutions to global maritime missions. Prior to staff, he served as a CG rescue pilot, civil engineer, and ships officer throughout North America.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the the U.S. Coast Guard or any other organization or official with which the author is affiliated.

Featured image: The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Storis transits to Johns Hopkins Glacier in Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve.(U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Ashly Murphy)

Human Capital

Toward a Navy Fatigue Management Program

1 Comment

By Dr. John P. Cordle, Captain, USN (Ret).

The first week of June 2026 marked a seminal event in the history of sleep and fatigue in the military. The Department of War (DOW) Fatigue Related Management Working Group hosted the first ever Sleep and Fatigue Summit with over 130 experts in the field from all military services, providing a huge burst of momentum in the area of fatigue management as an operational imperative for our warfighters. For the first time in years, there is hope that the military, and especially the Navy, is finally turning a corner in this critical arena.  But there remains much work to be done. 

My relationship with fatigue is a long and storied one. I joined the Navy in 1984 and grew up as a Surface Warfare Officer at a time when fatigue was seen as a badge of honor. Later serving as a Human Factors Engineer, I studied its impact on individual readiness as well as mental health and advocated for changes to Navy policy. As a veteran, I live with the effects of a lifetime of sleep deprivation and non-circadian watch rotations, hooking up to my Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine every evening and dealing with obstructive sleep apnea and the onset of heart disease caused by atrial fibrillation (AFib). This is all tied to a Navy lifestyle and culture that ignored the known effects of fatigue, to the detriment of its sailors. 

I am gratified that there has been solid progress in the understanding and application of fatigue mitigation policies in various parts of the Navy. However, despite both DOD direction and concrete recommendations from many authoritative bodies, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Department of War (DoW), the Navy has still failed to implement an overarching fatigue management program to include education, research, and policy. 

One of the last projects that I worked on as a Government Service (GS) Human Factors Engineer  prior to retirement last year was trying to define the Navy’s Fatigue Management program in a single document. As with any large organization, a change like this is likely to meet bureaucratic obstacles, obfuscation, and outright obstruction… and it did. The main challenge to this effort was that no one in the Navy felt compelled to step up and say “I own this problem,” an obstacle that has now been overcome with the designation of the Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) as the process owner. It would be a shame to unlearn the lessons of the ship collisions of the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald, both of which occurred in 2017. The investigations for these separate incidents identified fatigue as a significant factor in the death of 17 Sailors.

Unfortunately, this was not the last collision for which sleep was a contributing factor. In 2025 the USS Harry S. Truman suffered a collision during her deployment to the Middle East. The investigation results cited fatigue as a major factor in the collision. While no one was killed, several sailors came within inches and seconds of losing their lives.  The below figures from the Navy investigation tell the story:

Figure 1. The Risk Management Brief specifically identified fatigue as a risk factor for senior leadership. They would not have been allowed to fly a plane in this condition but can drive a ship. The second figure shows the result.  Source: Navy Investigation of USS Harry S. Truman Collision.

Eerily, (Admiral) Whalen’s investigation stated that, “… fatigue as a human factor in the collision and cited department heads who described a ‘just get it done’ atmosphere aboard the carrier. Both sailors’ lack of sleep and pressure to perform tasks regardless of risk were crucial themes in the 2017 collisions.” The similarities with the 2017 collisions are impossible to miss. And yet, eight years later, little has changed within the U.S. Navy. 

 To be fair, there are policies in place in most of the major warfare areas, and the last two Carrier Strike Groups deployed with sleep monitoring devices on most sailors and a program to provide sleep data to inform individual Sailors, shipboard leaders, and Navy research efforts. Specifically, the Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW) program shows huge promise in collecting sleep and other biometric data and providing feedback to individuals and leadership to inform operational decision making.  There is ongoing research to design more comfortable mattresses that meet material condition and fire safety requirements on board ships. My former colleagues continue to push hard for improvement in this area, but it is still largely a “bottom up” effort – they deserve full policy and financial support. 

To that end, I offer here the below document as a proposed road map, including the key references and directives that should drive two significant outcomes: 

First, the designation of a single entity, responsible for fatigue management in the Navy, to include resource sponsorship (funding) for research and technology. Of note, since the drafting of this article,  this recommendation has occurred. The Office of Warfighting Advantage (OWA) has been designated to do just this.

Second, a formal policy for fatigue management, which includes research, education, and operational guidance for commanders.

I present the below draft document  for consideration by the U.S. Navy to address this critical problem. It was the result of over one year’s collaborative effort between the Navy Sleep expert team, many of whom have moved on or retired without replacement, leaving many key billets that support sleep research and policy unfilled.

The below document represents an 80 percent solution and would provide a starting point. It is ready to download, print, and sign. But who will take that important step? I hope it does not take another deadly collision, with fatigue as a major factor, for someone in Navy leadership to stand up and say, “I will!”

OPNAVINST XXXX

Subj: United States Navy Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management Program 

Ref: (a) Department of Defense Instruction 1010.10, Health Promotion and Disease Prevention (Apr. 28, 2014) (incorporating change 3, effective May 16, 2022). 

(b) Department of Defense, Report to Congressional Armed Services Committees, Study on Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Readiness of Members of the Armed Forces, March 2021

(c) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Next Steps on Suicide Prevention in the Military, March 2023

(d) GAO 24-105917 Military Readiness: Comprehensive Measures needed to Address Service Member Fatigue and Related Efforts. 

(e) USFF Comprehensive Review of Surface Incidents, October 2019. 

Encl. (1) Tables of Requirements and Recommendations 

1. This instruction establishes overarching guidance IAW references (a) through (e) for the implementation of Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management practices to improve warfighting effectiveness across the Navy operational domain. It is intended as a framework based on scientific and operational principles to be tailored by instruction for individual communities based on specific needs of their operators.

2. Background. As described in reference (a) and (b), sleep is considered a protective factor against combat operational stress, and sleep restriction is considered a risk factor for symptoms of combat operational stress. The DOD requires that all commanders consider circadian rhythm—the body’s internal resting or wakefulness schedule over the course of a day—when creating policy related to sleep. For example, watchbills are schedules for when Sailors stand watch for fixed periods of time. Circadian rhythm watchbills are designed so that Sailors stand watch and sleep at the same time each day, allowing the body to follow its natural biological processes on a 24-hour cycle. The Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (ref c) also made recommendations related to sleep. For example, it recommended that duty schedules allow for eight hours of sleep and minimize the frequency of shift changes, and that the department provide education in healthy sleep habits during training and unit formations. The report clearly shows the connection between sleep deprivation and fatigue as contributing factors to stress, anxiety, and even suicidal thoughts and actions. 

3. Extensive research over the past decade has shown the importance of crew endurance and fatigue management to individual readiness and war fighting capability. Research has shown that cognitive ability degrades at a consistent rate as sleep deprivation progresses, with a major impact on decision making, which can prove fatal in battle. Performance starts to degrade after as little as 18 hours of wakefulness, and 24 hours without sleep can have similar impacts on performance to a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent. While operational commitments and manning shortages may challenge leaders to provide their crew with sufficient sleep, every effort must be made through planning, education, and risk management to plan for, account for, and mitigate excessive fatigue in the fleet. This policy supports Operation Total Force and is foundational to Warrior Toughness, Operational Stress Control, and other Culture of Excellence initiatives.

4. Enclosure (1) Tables 1-3 provide a summary of DOD requirements and recommendations.  They were used to produce the required actions in this instruction and are provided here for easy reference.

5. Action. This instruction does not dictate a particular watchbill or schedule but is designed to provide a set of guiding principles upon which to build a policy and tailored instruction at the Echelon III level. Collaboration is encouraged. While primarily applicable to ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines, the basic tenets apply to other teams such as staffs, guard forces and watch floors. The following precepts will be incorporation into each Type Commander’s instructions:

a. Focus on alert watch standers.

b. Implement a circadian watchbill based on a 24-hour schedule (i.e., watch, work and sleep periods occur at the same time each day).

c. Promote a sleep environment that considers complete darkness, good ventilation, ambient temperature control, and low noise levels.

d. Adjust working hours, meal hours, and daily routines to support watch standers and maintenance personnel at sea and ashore.

e. Establish periods of protected sleep to equal at least eight hours in every 24.

f. Consider individual fatigue as a risk factor for all evolutions, including go/no-go criteria for both operations and maintenance.

g. Allow additional sleep during ramp up to mission and recovery times following periods of extreme sleep deprivation or during period of high operational tempo.

h. Establish metrics and measures to track implementation of this policy at the unit level. Wearable technology is encouraged to support this effort.

i. Establish go/no-go criteria to stop or delay evolutions when fatigue poses an unacceptable risk.

j. Implement sleep and crew endurance education and training in all levels of officer and enlisted pipeline training for each community.

k. Assign one individual per unit as a sleep expert for training and support of sleep-related policies. 

l. Promote good nutrition and moderation in caffeine and energy drinks into programs like Warrior Toughness, Basic Training, and command training programs.

m. Establish policies and procedures to incorporate wearable sleep monitoring technology, data collection, analysis and display commensurate with security requirements.

n. Develop guidelines for training programs which may include periods of intentional sleep deprivation to prevent inflicting harm on personnel in a training environment.

o. Develop and maintain an online repository of sleep related research and best practices. 

p. One size does not fit all – Commanders should obtain analysis of watch rotations and schedules from experts such as the Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Health Research Laboratory.

6. Nothing in this instruction precludes a Commander from executing the mission assigned. Conflict with a peer competitor may be characterized by a long duration of high stress operations; the ability of Sailors and Marines to continue to operate at peak performance over long periods is critical. It is imperative that everyone from the Commanding Officer to the most junior watch stander be capable of sustaining peak performance, and sleep is a necessary prerequisite for that requirement.

Enclosure (1) Tables of DOD Requirements and Recommendations 

Table 1. Military Service Responsibilities set forth in ref (a), DOD Instruction 1010.10 Table 2. Recommendations from Reference (b), DOD Study of Fatigue in the Military.

Table 3. Sleep Policy Recommendations from the DOD Suicide Prevention and Response Review Committee Report (2022).

The recommendations in the above instruction are grounded in existing documents; they are clear, actionable, and they will save lives. Most can be implemented with minimal cost. All it needs is a signature. But whose? 

We now have an answer. The Office of Warfighting Advantage has been designated as the process owner for Fatigue Management in the Navy. They can now take ownership of the process from policy, instructions (like the above) to research and (importantly) as a budget priority. The current CNO and VCNO have well-established records of advocacy for Sailor Wellness and of recognizing the importance of sleep to mental health, physical fitness, and warfighter readiness. CNO Caudle even added Dr. Matthew Walker’s excellent book Why We Sleep to his 2026 Reading List! This is a perfect opportunity for the CNO to put his “stamp” on this service-wide safety and performance issue by demanding action – and accountability – across the force with a formal policy; maybe even a “CNOte” titled “Sleep as a Weapon!”

Certainly there are obstacles to implementing such an instruction, such as manning shortages and excessive OPTEMPO. But like rust, fatigue doesn’t care how important or busy you are; it eats away at the foundation of readiness and, if unchecked, will eventually lead to failure. The instruction above must be accompanied by strong institutional resolve; it must come with education, funding, and a culture of learning to address the “get ‘er done” and excessive “can do” attitude that contributed to both the 2017 and 2024 collisions. This instruction must be more than “checking a block”; it needs to come with a strong commitment to drive real change.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy surface warfare officer (nuclear). He commanded the destroyer USS Oscar Austin and the cruiser USS San Jacinto during his 30-year military career and was recognized with the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

References

1. Captain John Cordle, U.S. Navy and Dr. Nita Shattuck, “A Sea Change in Standing Watch,” USNI Proceedings, January 2013, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/sea-change-standing-watch

2. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Fatigue is the Navy’s Black Lung Disease,” USNI Proceedings, January 2020,  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/fatigue-navys-black-lung-disease

3. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Go Circadian Now!”, USNI Blog, September 2017,  https://blog.usni.org/posts/2017/09/22/go-circadian-now

4. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Improve Sleep-Disorder Treatment for Service Members and Veterans,” USNI Proceedings, September 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/improve-sleep-disorder-treatment-service-members-and-veterans

5. Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy (ret.), “Make Crew Endurance an Operational Warfighting Imperative,” CIMSEC, 23 September 2019,  https://cimsec.org/make-crew-endurance-an-operational-warfighting-imperative/

Featured image: Red lights glow from the primary flight control room aboard the USS Ronald Reagan during a darken ship period. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ryan McFarlane)