Articles Due: January 18, 2027
Series Dates: February 15-19, 2027
Article Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

By Brian Kerg

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the maritime domain and naval warfighting. From automated target recognition systems enabling autonomous swarm attacks in the Black Sea and the Red Sea, to predictive maintenance models keeping aging surface combatants mission-ready, artificial intelligence is expanding across naval operations.

Yet, as AI transitions into a core instrument of naval power, it introduces structural vulnerabilities and escalation risks that military leaders and policymakers are only beginning to grapple with.

These vulnerabilities have drawn sharp attention on Capitol Hill. In debates over recent defense legislation, U.S. congressional leaders and defense committees expressed rising alarm regarding the unvetted deployment of military AI. Lawmakers warn that rushing unverified algorithms onto the digital high seas could result in unintended escalation, catastrophic system failures, or friendly-fire events. These risks have led Congress to demand strict AI assessment frameworks, mandatory cyber-governance rules, and sandboxed testing environments before systems are fielded.

Whether considering opportunities or risks, the operational integration of AI offers profound implications for naval operations and doctrine. Given the many promises and dangers of AI to naval warfare, how should leaders respond?

How should the Navy balance the operational demand for rapid fielding of AI with the rigorous testing and sandboxed environments necessary for safe deployment as mandated by Congress? How should adversary AI deployments and escalations affect our own escalation calculus and rules of engagement? How do we reform the training of our warfighters to prevent a dangerous gap between rapid AI adoption and actual warfighter understanding, ensuring operators at the tactical edge have the readiness to effectively trust, override, or troubleshoot autonomous actions in combat circumstances?

Authors are invited to consider these topics and more as they explore the benefits and dangers of naval AI. Authors can cover matters of technology, strategy, ethics, policy, or any other related area. Authors should strive to go beyond solely identifying risks and propose thought-provoking, concrete solutions to the issues they raise.

Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.

Brian Kerg is CIMSEC’s Managing Editor.

Featured image: Art created with Midjourney AI. 

Articles Due: June 1, 2026
Week Dates: June 15-19, 2026
Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

The United States and Iran are at war, with a vital waterway dominating strategic concerns. A fight over the Strait of Hormuz has been a prominent naval scenario for more than 40 years since the U.S. and Iran fought in the tanker wars of the 1980s. Now this scenario has become reality, with the U.S. and Iran attempting to reestablish the flow of seaborne commerce on their own terms.

Despite a significant presence of U.S. naval forces in the region, Iran has effectively contested control of the Strait with asymmetric means. The distributed forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy have posed a persistent threat, while a wide variety of drones and munitions have helped Iran make its presence felt in the waterway. These methods may be demonstrating new facets of the evolving character of naval warfare and hinting at the future.

Another vital waterway has exerted major influence on the operational maneuver of forces. The circuitous route of the George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group around the entire continent of Africa, and the Ford strike group’s confinement to the northern reaches of the Red Sea, mark critical strategic effects reaped by the the Houthis. U.S. carrier strike groups have been effectively deterred from transiting the Bab El Mandeb strait, allowing the Houthis to inflict a major logistical price against U.S. naval forces.

Despite considerable tactical success and relatively few losses, the U.S. has struggled to translate combat outcomes into strategic results. The linkage between tactics and strategy has proven tenuous in this war, with the Navy’s contributions being subsumed under questionable strategy. It is also questionable how well the U.S. Navy can help secure vital sea lines of communication, a strategic role that has dominated its mission set for generations. The Navy’s challenges in controlling two major waterways against third-world adversaries may cast doubt on how well it can fulfill its strategic purpose.

At the same time, the operational effects of the war offer significant insights for the employment of Marine Corps forces in contested maritime terrain. Iran has been achieving disproportionate operational effects by using lethal, low signature, mobile forces operating within contested maritime spaces to disrupt U.S. plans and deny the U.S. freedom of maneuver. This is the Marine Corps’ Stand-in Forces concept made manifest, and potential lessons for refinement of this concept abound. As speculation continues about the seizure of key maritime terrain such as Kharg Island, the war compels the Marine Corps to look at its own concepts from and determine how to conduct amphibious operations in a highly contested maritime environment. As two amphibious readiness groups remain present in the region, the role and viability of the USMC in this war and modern conflict writ large could be put to the test.

The Iran war offers a rich set of lessons on the exercise of maritime power and naval force. How are combat operations highlighting changes in the character of warfare? How else may the fight over the maritime domain unfold? What does this war reveal about controlling the maritime domain with force and for strategic effect? Authors are invited to consider these questions and many more as this war unfolds.

Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: The Strait of Hormuz as viewed from space. (NASA photo)

Articles Due: December 8, 2025
Week Dates: January 5-9, 2026
Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

By Dmitry Filipoff

The U.S. Surface Warfare Officer community has operated on a generalist career path since 1899. SWOs are responsible for matters of both operational and material readiness, while the surface fleets of other navies, as well as some other U.S. naval warfare communities, have specialized career tracks. While SWO Warfare Tactics Instructors specialize in specific warfare areas, the vast majority of Surface Warfare Officers have no distinct specialization.

The career path of a community holds major implications for that community’s ability to raise its warfighting standards, and sets the limits of what knowledge and skill can be reasonably expected of its officers. A 2021 GAO study surveyed SWOs on the topic, and found that 65 percent believe specialized career paths would best prepare them for their duties, while 16 percent believed the current generalist model is best. That same year, the Surface Warfare Officer Leadership Enhancement Act was proposed by members of Congress and included specialized career tracks.

Arguments in favor of the generalist career path often claim it facilitates cross-functional expertise that better prepares SWOs for higher levels of responsibility. Arguments for specialization often claim that technical and tactical matters have reached a level of complexity that outstrips the ability of generalists to effectively keep pace with, resulting in officers who are too stretched thin to achieve higher readiness across multiple areas.

Should the U.S. Surface Warfare Officer community specialize? Is the generalist career track effectively pacing the threat environment and the growing complexity of surface platforms? How does the generalist track compare against the specialized tracks of other warfare communities and surface navies? Authors are invited to consider these questions and more as they weigh in on the SWO specialization debate.

Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Nov. 12, 2017) The guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90), right, leads USS Stethem (DDG 63), the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Sampson (DDG 102) while transiting in formation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cole Schroeder)

Stories Due: November 10, 2025
Week Dates: December 1-5, 2025
Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

By Dmitry Filipoff

In annual tradition, CIMSEC will be running a series of short stories looking to explore the nature of conflict and competition through fiction. 

Fiction has long served as a powerful means for exploring hypotheticals and envisioning alternatives. Authors can explore the future and flesh out concepts for how potential clashes and warfighting challenges may play out. They can probe the past, and use historical fiction to explore alternative histories. Authors are invited to craft gripping narratives that illuminate the unforeseen and carve realistic detail into visions of future conflict. 

Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.

For past CIMSEC Fiction Weeks, feel free to view our 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, and 2020 fiction lineups.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Art generated by Midjourney AI.