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History

Vice Admiral Vasili Arkhipov on Soviet Submarine Operations During the Cuban Missile Crisis

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The following translation was conducted by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 14, 1997, Moscow. Source: Kirov Naval Academy (National Naval Academy, Baku) website.

By Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov

Before this conference, there has been a lot written, even though in a veiled form, about the Caribbean crisis. [It was published] in mass media, covered in conferences, symposia, roundtables with participation of representatives from all three sides. However, the first time we were informed about the actions of the submarines of the 69th brigade of the Northern Fleet in the operation codenamed “Kama,” it was in the “democratic” newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in the middle of 1995, under the odious title “In Case of Ambush—Use Nuclear Weapons.” It was written with the goal—as fashionable at the time as it was vile—to denigrate and defame prominent Soviet military and naval leaders, such as Grechko, Gorshkov, Vershinin, Fokin, Rassokho, and of course, to kick the CC CPSU. The article was part of the plan to destroy the Soviet Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, among the forces engaged in Operation Anadyr, the submarines were in the most critical conditions, closest to using their weapons. Their experience is very instructive and has been critically analyzed by the Navy. Here is [an account of] how they acted.

Submarines B-4, B-36, B-59 and B-130 were given the task to sail secretly from the base to the Cuban port of Mariel. The problem was that the speed of movement was set at twice the one that would allow the subs to travel secretly (in practice, to travel secretly, the diesel submarine could only be at the surface for about 1% of its overall time at sea). On the night of 01.10.1962, the submarines left the Kola Bay with the interval of 30 minutes and started their journey.

During the transit to the Bahamas, there were three most dangerous anti-submarine barriers in terms of the likelihood of being discovered: on the border between the Barents and the Norwegian seas between Medvezhii Island and Nordkap; between Iceland and Faroe and Scottish Islands; and between Newfoundland and the Azores.

During the transit, the weather and visibility generally were conducive to keeping the secrecy—stormy weather, low clouds, low visibility, snow squalls, rain.

The first two barriers exhibited ordinary levels of anti-submarine activity, and the subs crossed them undiscovered.

On the third barrier, which was least studied by our side in terms of its equipment and presence of anti-submarine forces, we observed an elevated level of activity of anti-submarine aircraft radiolocation stations working in a short-interval regime. During crossing of that barrier, on October 18, radio intelligence unit on B-59 intercepted a message from a French radio station informing some correspondents that Soviet submarines entered the Atlantic and were now traveling to the American shores. How they discovered the submarine (or submarines) is hard to say.

American sources say nothing about it either. However, one can say with high confidence that the submarine was not discovered with aircraft radar.

Meanwhile, the U.S. President announced the blockade of Cuba in a televised speech in the evening on October 22.

The U.S. Navy command sent additional ships and aircraft to the Cuban shores and to the Atlantic, and stated that any submarine discovered on approach to the Bahamas must surface to be identified. The commanders of U.S. ships were instructed to be ready to attack if the submarine refused to surface.

Next day, on October 23, submarine commanders were ordered by the Navy Central Command Headquarters to take positions in specified quadrants and conduct reconnaissance. The quadrants were set in several dozen miles [from one another] along their route. The same radiogram warned the commanders about possible U.S. provocative actions against Cuba and our transports. They were ordered to be on full alert and to continue to navigate in secret.

The determined quadrants were cut very poorly, because they did not allow the subs to preserve the secrecy of movement, most likely due to the quickly changing military and political situation around Cuba. They were drawn 300 to 350 miles across from the Bahamas maritime straights. In these waters [the United States] deployed experimental deep-water systems for long-distance submarine detection.

Soviet Navy map depicting Foxtrot sub locations near Cuba, late October 1962. Submarine B-59’s position is indicated by the bright red rectangle outside the map itself, at top center of the margin. Click to expand. Source: Digital image by Svetlana Savranskaya.

On October 24, the submarines arrived to the designated areas. And at the same time, as Norman Polmar of the U.S. Naval Institute wrote, Khrushchev stated to the U.S. representative in Moscow, in response to Kennedy’s announcement, that if U.S. ships started searching Soviet merchant ships on the high seas, it would be considered piracy and that he would give orders to the Soviet submarines to destroy U.S. ships. The tactical situation around the submarines started to deteriorate rapidly. The activity of ship-borne and shore-based anti-submarine aviation picked up sharply, and then groups of aircraft-carrier-based search-and-attack groups, ASW, entered the areas of submarine deployment: [the group] led by aircraft carrier “Essex”—to the sub B-130 area; led by ASW aircraft carrier “Randolph”—to sub B-59 area; and helicopter-carrier “Tetis-Bay” with escort ships—to sub B-36 area of deployment.

All of them were searching for submarines with all means available to them: radio location stations, multi-frequency sonars, Julie sonobuoys, towed sono-locators, radio hydroacoustic buoys, sonars and so on; and in addition [used] explosions of grenades as a signal to come to the surface. All this banged and echoed in the sections of the submarines for several days, and had a depressing effect on the personnel. In addition, the living conditions on the submarines deteriorated substantially due to the impossibility to ventilate the compartments.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Randolph (CVS-15) in 1963. The crew displays two Battle Efficiency “E” awards, one awarded to the best anti-submarine carrier, and one the sixth consecutive Efficiency Award presented to the Engineering Department. On deck are aircraft of Carrier Anti-Submarine Air Group 58 (CVSG-58). (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The temperature inside the compartments, due to the high temperature of the sea water of +30-32 C, the work of the regeneration systems, the diesel engines, accumulator batteries and [other] mechanisms, was +50 C; in the diesel compartments and hydroacoustic cabins it reached +60-65 C. On top of that, high humidity, elevated pressure, vapors of fuel, oil, electrolyte, levels of CO2 several times exceeding the norm (1.2%), and lack of drinking water—all this created difficult conditions for the personnel. The submarine mechanisms could not endure the conditions that the men could still bear. The diesels, plugs [pads] for the outboard flaps and valves, water coolers, packing sealants for the shaft lines, broke most often, leading to the seepage of water into compartments and diminishing the depths to which submarines could submerge. Repairing the damage demanded great efforts and perseverance on the part of the personnel. Many sailors, especially engine personnel, were fainting. But then, after some rest and a chance to breathe, they returned to work or reported to watch duty.

In order to avoid giving the audience (or readers) an impression of what kind of battle ships those were, and how they could fight, I have to tell you that failures of equipment were not a rare occurrence and not limited to our country’s ships. For instance, according to the official data, in the period of 1960-1968, the U.S. Navy suffered 35 accidents and catastrophes, not even counting breakdowns (of equipment). Even during the crisis, the ASW aircraft carrier “Randolph” only stayed in the area for several hours and then sent a radio signal “The second main boiler is out of order. I am returning to the base.”

These submarines of the new project, built in 1959-1961, were the best in the world in terms of their combat and technological capabilities. They were armed with 22 torpedos. Their sailing range was up to 26,000 miles; they could sail autonomously for three months and dive to the depth of 300 meters. However, they were still not adapted for sailing in very hot climate, in the conditions of high salinity of water. Their mechanisms were still not fully broken in, tested and lapped. Later, these problems were fixed, and soon after our journey, submarines of this project became the main ships of our Navy on combat duty. And when I am speaking about malfunctions on these submarines, it is only because I want to emphasize the difficult conditions of sailing, under which, for several reasons, it was impossible to fix all the problems, and so they accumulated.

October 28-29, 1962 – Soviet submarine B-59, forced to the surface by U.S. Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba. (Photo via U.S. National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711200)

The submarines had to charge their accumulator batteries with many interruptions as they were trying to avoid being discovered by the anti-submarine forces.

The U.S. Navy had an existing tactical protocol against diesel submarines called “hunt to exhaustion,” analogous to the British tactics of fighting against the German submarine fleet during World War II along the Biscay ASW barrier called “war of attrition.” In that case, these tactics were justified and had led to the logical conclusion.

On the night of October 25, U.S. destroyers detected submarine B-130, after which, according to all the American documents, all other ASW forces were directed at it, and the pursuit started. After the accumulator battery got discharged, the submarine came to the surface in the ASW area patrolled by the aircraft carrier “Essex.” As it became known from the memoirs of John Kennedy’s brother Robert Kennedy, the President was informed about the discovery of the submarine on the morning of October 27. This made everybody deeply anxious. He writes: “I think these minutes were the time of gravest concern for the President.” He said, “ Isn’t there some way we can avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine— almost anything but that?” But right after that a message came that the Soviet ships stopped. This stage of crisis was over.

However, after this incident, the pursuit [of the submarines] was intensified. And approximately in the same circumstances, submarines B-36 and B-59 were detected, and after three days of pursuit, they had to come to the surface.

I would like to focus on the actions of B-59 as the most typical of them.

Upon surfacing, it discovered [the following]: an aircraft carrier, nine destroyers, four airplanes of Neptune type, three of Trekker, encircled by three concentric circles of coast guard forces. This submarine experienced the entire range of provocative activities of the U.S. forces. Overflights by planes just 20-30 meters above the submarine’s conning tower, use of powerful searchlights, fire from automatic cannons (over 300 shells), dropping depth charges, cutting in front of the submarine by destroyers at a dangerously [small] distance, targeting guns at the submarine, yelling from loudspeakers to stop engines, etc.

We would not need to talk about this except for one crucial question: Why did the submarine not use its weapons?

The battle instructions for the commander state [in] point 8: “during the sea passage, weapons should be in a battle-ready state. Use of conventional weapons— upon the order from the Navy Commander-in-Chief, or in case of an armed attack at the submarine.” Therefore, to use or not to use the weapons depended on how you read the situation: is the fire from the aircraft cannon an armed attack or not? At that time, the events could have developed in the following way: after the first salvo from an aircraft cannon, the commander could have instinctively, without contemplation ordered an “emergency dive”; then after submerging, the question whether the plane was shooting at the submarine or around it would not have come up in anybody’s head. That is war.

But the plane, flying over the conning tower, 1 to 3 seconds before the start of fire turned on powerful searchlights and blinded the people on the bridge so that their eyes hurt. It was a shock. And the commander physically could not give any orders, could not even understand what was happening. And when he blinked and blinked his eyes and could see again, it became clear that the plane was firing past and along the boat. And the subsequent similar actions (there were 12 overflights altogether) were not as worrisome any longer.

To explain the behavior of the commanders, one has to understand the context in which they had to make their decisions. In practice, the submarines had unreliable communications with the Central Command Headquarters. They learned about the developments around Cuba from short intermittent radio intercepts of the U.S. public broadcasting stations. From that information, they made a conclusion that the situation was tense; however, that it was on the verge of war, they only learned after their return to the base, when member of the Military Council of the Northern Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sizov told them during the meeting with the submariners of the 69th submarine brigade: “We did not even expect you to come back alive.”

Conclusions.

1. This was the first encounter between Soviet submarines and the entire complex of the U.S. anti-submarine warfare forces and equipment; in the area, which was extremely unfavorable for our submarines and very favorable for U.S. anti-submarine forces. This encounter led to a reassessment of the U.S. anti-submarine forces both by the Soviet Navy and in the United States. Detection of the submarines became possible as a result of massive concentration of all anti-submarine forces and efforts, which is only possible to sustain for a short period of time. That is understood in the United States as well. This [conclusion] is supported by the fact that both B- 36 and B-59, after completing the charging of their accumulator batteries, were able to get away from their pursuers with relative ease, and submarine B-4, which was spotted by the ASW aviation, after charging its battery was able to successfully escape from the search area.

2. The command of the United States and NATO made certain conclusions from the actions of ASW against the submarines of the 69th brigade, and rapidly increased the number of military exercises of anti-submarine forces. Thus, just in September-October of the following year [1963] they held seven comprehensive military exercises, and the number was increased in the subsequent years.

3. Conclusions and suggestions on the basis of the submarine operations were reported to the command of the 4th submarine squadron and to the Northern Fleet after the submarines’ return to the base. There is no need to repeat them now, because that was the last encounter when the Soviet leadership and the Armed Forces of the USSR stood up to defend its interests as equals with the United States.

4. The journey of the submariners of the 69th brigade deserves appreciation and admiration of the courage, perseverance and patriotism of sailors, non- commissioned staff and officers in extreme conditions of their sail.

Thank you for your attention

Former Chief of Staff of the 69th submarine brigade
Vice-Admiral, Retired,
V. Arkhipov.

Featured Image: Photograph of Soviet submarine B-59 close-up with Soviet crew visible, taken by U.S. Navy photographers, circa 28-29 October, 1962 Source: U.S. National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711201

Human Capital

Make Racist Behavior a UCMJ Offense

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By CAPT John P. Cordle, USN (ret.) and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, USN (ret.)

A survey of the past few years tells us the military continues to grapple with racism and extremism in its ranks:

  • A Marine General uses a racial slur in an exercise field.1
  • A noose is found hanging in a Black soldier’s locker.2
  • A Navy Admiral uses profanity and makes “racially insensitive comments” on an aircraft carrier bridge.3

While most people would characterize this behavior as patently racist, (prejudiced against or antagonistic toward a person or people on the basis of their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group), the laws governing military personnel do not capture these egregious breaches of respect and trust.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is intended to create a consistent and consistently enforceable code of law to deal with military members accused of crimes, misconduct, or other infractions that must be dealt with in a manner unique to the military and outside the scope of the civilian legal system. Under the UCMJ, however, there is no codified enforcement mechanism for these transgressions. This article will explore codifying a UCMJ article to punish racist behavior and acts in pursuit of protecting service members, improving accountability, and supporting leaders.

The Proposed Article

By combining the expertise and experience of a former commanding officer, a military lawyer, and someone who has experienced racism firsthand, we propose the following language for a UCMJ article codifying racist behavior.

Article XXX: Racist Behavior, defined as prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against a person or people based on their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group, typically one that is a minority or marginalized, is prohibited under this article. This offense may take the form of jokes, slurs, use of divisive symbols, or specific actions up to and including violence directed at an individual because of their particular racial or ethnic group.

Next, we will explore the background of addressing racism in the U.S. military and why an addendum to the UCMJ is necessary.

Historical Context

The U.S. Navy took dramatic actions to address racism, diversity, and inclusion in the 1970s. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt overcame significant resistance to curtail discriminatory practices. While Admiral Zumwalt is heralded as one of the Navy’s all-time great reformers, his work was unfortunately incomplete. Several decades later, the Navy established “Task Force One Navy” in the wake of the spate of highly publicized police brutality incidents in the summer of 2020. The Task Force’s stated goal was to “examine barriers to minorities and make recommendations to improve diversity and inclusion within the U.S. Navy.” The Task Force completed its final report in December 2020 and made over 50 tangible recommendations. Unfortunately, an opportunity was missed when the final report did not include concrete recommendations to address racism and accountability in the Navy. However, there is no reason that their work cannot lay a solid foundation for a tangible next step: a concrete and prosecutable definition of racist actions and behavior.

The UCMJ was signed by President Harry S. Truman in May 1950 within the broader context of Jim Crow laws, pervasive in the American South until 1965. Given this backdrop, in conjunction with the UCMJ being signed on the heels of an Executive Order to integrate the U.S. military, including “racism” in the document may have been viewed as a bridge too far. Despite the equal opportunity movement of the 1960s and 1970s, no significant inroads toward codifying racism were made. 

Existing Punitive Legal Framework

Within the current legal architecture, individuals who use racist language or engage in racist acts would likely be prosecuted under another UCMJ Article, such as an orders violation (Article 92, UCMJ) or, for officers, Conduct Unbecoming (Article 133, UCMJ). Alternatively, in some cases, racist misconduct could be prosecuted under the so-called General Article (i.e., Article 134), which serves as a catchall and could theoretically allow military prosecutors to use hate crime statutes. None of these statutes is designed to orient investigators and prosecutors toward the uniquely insidious evils of racism – and actions that result from it – in the ranks.

A Judge Advocate General officer (military lawyer) shared that there are several references in place that explicitly address racist acts:

    • UCMJ Article 132 defines “unlawful discrimination” as “discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Also, see RCM 1001, which allows “evidence in aggravation” to be presented to the members on sentencing (after the accused has been found guilty): “In addition, evidence in aggravation may include evidence that the accused intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.
    • DoDI 1325.06, Enclosure 2 lists statutory provisions that could be used to address racist behavior.4
    • MILPERSMAN 1910-160 allows for administrative separation for “supremacist and extremist conduct,” which addresses misconduct related to “illegal discrimination based on race…color.”

Policy Rationale for Codifying Racist Actions and Behavior as a Specific Offense

Given this, why not leave things alone? After all, changing the UCMJ would not merely be a small definition change in regulation; it would constitute a change in military law. Despite this weighty prospect, given the documented persistent problems with racism and extremism in the military, Congress and the President should send a clear message by codifying a specific UCMJ offense that proscribes racist conduct uniformly across the U.S. military. 

There are several reasons that a specific article would improve accountability and support commanders in charging individuals with racist behavior as well as educating the force, which may not understand the implications of their actions. These include:

  1. Disincentivizing behavior through legal proscription serves a valuable purpose: specific and general deterrence.5 In other words, showing tangible consequences for specific actions can deter some individuals from doing them and others from tolerating them.
  2. Promote consistency and predictability throughout the services, enabling commanders to foster healthy, respectful, and inclusive climates at the unit level. The presence of a concise definition of the word “racist behavior” would make it clear to all where the line is and how not to cross it. Some examples would help. For example, certain words are widely accepted as “racist slurs” if used to describe another person or symbols that might be racist in nature (for example, a “KKK” medallion or a noose in a workplace).
  3. Injecting expediency and removing ambiguity into investigations into alleged racist misconduct. One of us has directly experienced racism, and one of us has been accused of racist actions. You may be surprised to learn that in both cases, it was me – Mr. Green. In the first case, the Sailor’s informal, without merit complaint dragged on due to a lack of clarity in the UCMJ and was in the end discredited; in the second case, involving an accusation brought by a Black civilian, I was exonerated because the evidence did not support it. In both instances, a clear definition of racist actions in the UCMJ would have saved a lot of work, uncertainty, and distress and sped up the final adjudication. Cordle: I often hear my (white, male) peers share that “I never saw racism in my command,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that just because they did not witness it firsthand did not mean it had not occurred. These changes would take racist behavior out of the subjective and provide a clear and actionable definition. These examples are evocative of Justice Potter Stewart’s famous definition of pornography, “I know it if I see it.” Fortunately, with a codified UCMJ article addressing racist actions, unit commanders and service members would not have to rely on pithy turns of phrase but on comprehensive military law.
  4. It would allow Commanders to move prosecution to a higher level, such as courts-martial, where they could be more properly adjudicated and legally defended on appeal. Commanders are warfighters, not legal experts. They are also human and may be subject to bias (“but he is my best technician”). Similar to the recent changes in the sexual harassment arena, where the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and related crimes have been removed from the chain of command. This change would allow commanders to focus on their given mission while giving investigations into allegations or racist actions or behavior the time, attention, and independence they demand.
  5. It would enable the compilation of statistical data on the prevalence and frequency of racist behavior. It is critical to note that the absence of discrete data does not mean the issue does not exist. The Center for Naval Analyses 2022 Study on Violent Extremism notes, “this issue is an exceptionally challenging one for several reasons including, but not limited to: little existing data on the problem, poorly defined key terms, and a high degree of politicization.” The graph below (focus on the needle vice the background) illustrates this phenomenon.

    Figure 1. A recent study by the Center for Naval Analysis cited “poor data quality and availability” as a barrier to determining the extent to which racist behavior is punished (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)
  6. It would allow the service to identify and remove service members whose racist actions are prejudicial to the good order and discipline of military units. In his 2020 Lawfare article Why Extremism Matters to the U.S. Military, Navy Captain Keith Gibel, wrote that criminalizing behavior does not make it go away, “Prosecution will not stop extremist beliefs or racist behavior.” What Captain Gibel overlooks, however, is that, unlike society, the military has the option of removing a service member whose behavior is prejudicial to good order and discipline and detract from the units and, broadly, the military services from executing their missions.
  7. The ability to build a library of case law and establish legal precedent. The legal world is built on a foundation of precedent. Since, as we have noted, there is no data or established process, it is difficult to provide waypoints to steer by. Changing the UCMJ would begin the process of building a library of case law and established legal precedent.
  8. It would send a signal to minority service members that they are being looked out for. The weight of George Floyd and Ahmaud Arbery still weighs heavy on the 31% of active-duty racial minorities. As a friend and mentor, former Fleet Master Chief Raymond Kemp wisely said, “for there to be a real change, there must be a compassionate ear from the unimpacted.” Giving leaders in the U.S. military both the knowledge and ability to remove the cancer of racism in the ranks will be a powerful signal to those who have been made to feel less than. It will communicate to a generation of Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsman, and Guardians that they are valued and heard, and actions against them based on their creed, color, or religion will not be tolerated. The below graph applies a concept – one that has been well vetted in the area of sexual harassment and sexual assault – to the racism conversation. The same rules apply – acceptance of small examples of bad behavior can lead to much worse – if left unchecked. 
Figure 2: Racial Extremism Continuum of Harm. (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)

Conclusion

The Center for Naval Analyses report on violent extremism ends with a candid assessment and recommendation, “Most critical, at this pivotal moment, is the recognition that the problem of racial extremism is not one of a few bad apples, but is, in fact, a more pervasive challenge that—like sexual harassment and sexual assault—will require a more comprehensive set of solutions.” One of these would be: to make racist actions and behavior a discrete UCMJ offense. Even though making racism a UCMJ offense would undoubtedly draw partisan ire, it is a necessary change at a critical moment. Doing so will provide clarity regarding unacceptable behavior, enable a legally defensible adjudication for cases, enable the judicial system to provide guidance for commanders and individuals alike, and provide much-needed transparency in an area that has not been clearly defined for more than seventy years.

Captain John Cordle retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), retiring as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic. He received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010, the Surface Navy Literary Award, and Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year Award in 2019. Recently, he has teamed with his co-author, LCDR Green, in an effort to promote diversity and inclusion in the military, authoring several articles and featured as speakers on the topic at various Navy and affinity group DEI symposia over the past two years. 

Lieutenant Commander Keith Green retired in 1997 after serving 22 years in the Navy. He served four department head tours, including as Executive Officer in USS Gemini (PHM-6). He is a former Legal Yeoman, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, and leadership Instructor, and was commissioned in 1984 via Officer Candidate School. He has an MS degree in Human Resources Development. His memoir Black Officer,White Navy was acquired by a University Press and a revised edition will be republished in 2023.

References

1. Alex Horton, Two Star Marine General fired after allegations he used racial slur around subordinates, Military Times, October 2020.
2. Zelie Pollon, African American soldier says noose strung outside barracks, Reuters, June 2011
3. Linda Thomas, Navy’s Reason for discipline of Bremerton-Based Admiral, Navy Times, April 2013.
4.Appropriate courts-martial sentencing considerations include, but are not limited to, “promot[ing] adequate deterrence of misconduct.” Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1002(f)(3)(D). Thus, the R.C.M. identify deterrence as an important punishment consideration of courts-martial with an eye toward maintaining good order and discipline.
5. McBride, Megan, Racial Extremism in the United States: A Continuum of Harm, Center for Naval Analyses, January 2022.

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION NORFOLK (Oct. 4, 2012) Lt. Cmdr. James Raymond, center, operations officer for Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9, stands with his squadron during a change of command ceremony. Cmdr. Brad L. Arthur relieved Cmdr. Brian K. Pummill as commanding officer of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Walter/Released)

Alliances and Partners

The Best Defense is Alliance

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By LTJG Andrew Bishop and 1stLt Alexander Huang

Perhaps it is instilled in the American spirit, or maybe the country has grown accustomed to it, but reliance on the offense-first mentality of the Navy and Marine Corps will cost the United States. From World War II to the mid-2000s, the U.S. Navy waged war on the premise that “the best defense is a good offense.” However, with the return of peer competitors, the Navy cannot merely rely on a “good offense” anymore — the country needs an impenetrable and unshakable defense based on reliable alliances. Advantage at Sea, the United States’ Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, maintains that alliances and partnerships are key to long term strategic success. For the U.S. Navy to accomplish an “alliance-first” strategy, it must strengthen current relationships with Asian and South American countries, build a strong alliance with India, and incorporate more training for naval officers to become familiar with partner nations early in their careers.

The Navy and Marine Corps are the power projection arm of the U.S. military. For decades, the services have become comfortable with their position “commanding the seas.” However, this position is not guaranteed, and power projection through almost 20 years of continuous operation in Central Command and in the Western Pacific has stretched the U.S. Navy thin. Now, with the rise of China’s military power, the United States’ ability to claim offensive dominance, and by default a strong defense, is waning. In his ode to sea power, Alfred Thayer Mahan surmised that the key to power projection was control of the maritime domain. He believed the means of power projection were interlaced with the size of the fleet and its ability to blockade and overpower adversaries. China has adopted Mahanian thinking for use in the 21st Century, taking cues from former naval powers. China has the largest navy in the world, surpassing the United States in sheer number of vessels. Although this is by no means a signal of true naval dominance, it is one of many indicators of a rapidly advancing naval force. Despite the American fleet’s comparative advantage in the ability to project power far beyond the homeland, war games against China in a kinetic fight for Taiwan often end in a sobering military defeat for the United States.

According to the recently declassified “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” the United States is determined to maintain “strategic primacy” in the maritime domain. However, in doing so, the United States could easily overextend its capabilities, while China simply needs to focus on raising the costs of U.S. power projection into its sphere of influence. Therefore, unilateral force projection and an offense-based mindset may no longer be the answer. Senator Bernie Sanders cautioned that “organizing our foreign policy around a zero-sum global confrontation with China … will fail to produce better Chinese behavior and be politically dangerous and strategically counterproductive.” With serious issues such as ship collisions and aircraft crashes plaguing the U.S. Navy, many of these due to an overextension of the force and significant operational demands, it would be beneficial to rely on our international partners to shoulder more of the burden.

The recent conflict between Ukraine and Russia has shown the NATO alliance is a powerful deterrent. Additionally, U.S. intelligence sharing with the “Five-Eyes” countries has been useful in countering China, often drawing China’s ire. The success of the U.S. alliance network demonstrates that it should be at the forefront of the National Defense Strategy, as should the Navy’s role in building this network. With the capability to move thousands of miles in a matter of days, the Navy can project diplomacy anywhere. Some examples of the Navy’s tools to build alliances include port calls, transits, freedom of navigation operations, and force-level changes. These tools can help build alliances by demonstrating U.S. support for specific countries or regions. For example, the USS Carl Vinson visited De Nang, Vietnam in 2018. This was the first carrier visit since the Vietnam War and a signal to China that ties between the United States and Vietnam are improving. Furthermore, the mere presence of a U.S. vessel close to smaller island nations in the Pacific is significant because these countries have serious concerns about China’s illegal fishing activities, backed by a naval militia, taking a major part of their livelihood. The Navy also has the capability to provide humanitarian aid and exert influence by the presence of ships or forces in a disputed area. Notorious British General Oliver Cromwell famously stated, “A man o’ war is the best ambassador.”

An alliance-first strategy centered on the U.S. Navy should focus, first and foremost, on strengthening existing alliances. If the United States can count on its allies in the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan, it can hold less of the responsibility for directly countering China while forcing China to deal with several different offensive problems at once. Bolstering these alliances is essential, especially through enhanced defense cooperation and helping these allies utilize technology, such as autonomous swarms, smart mines, and cheap anti-ship missiles. A clear purpose with respect to China is key, and this can be achieved through focusing on an interest-centric alliance versus a threat-based one.

Simultaneously, the United States must seek to build more robust relationships with core South American countries, such as Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. This can also be done through defense cooperation; however, investment in capital projects and infrastructure improvement would help bolster the relationship between the United States and key South American countries as well. China has already shown significant economic and military interest in much of this region, which aligns with its goal of total global influence, especially in the western hemisphere. China will often build commercial ports in a specific region and then expand the projects into use as “strategic strong points” with potential for the Chinese Navy to access. There are currently port projects underway in several countries, including Peru and Ecuador. If the U.S. Navy wishes to counter the Chinese threat within the first and second island chain, it cannot allow China to exert pressure through a growing presence, maritime or otherwise, in countries so close to home.

Second, an alliance-first strategy should focus aggressively on creating new alliances to counter China directly. For example, India’s military has rapidly grown into a capable force, and China has recently shown it is willing to antagonize India over its border dispute. Additionally, India has taken significant steps to overhaul its military forces and defend against China and Pakistan. With its number of forces second only to China and a huge population, India is a growing economic and military power and could prove an asset in the future. Right now, the United States’ relationship with one of the largest democracies in the world is classified as a strategic partnership, but it is time to make it a real alliance. The Navy can help forge this partnership by directly increasing participation in Indian-led exercises, such as Exercise Milan. In 2022, the first year that the U.S. Navy has participated, the USS Fitzgerald and a P-8A Poseidon were sent, showing the potential to increase maritime cooperation.

Finally, an alliance-first strategy should include training naval officers to become better “diplomats” on the international stage. This can be done through officer exchange programs and devoting more of basic officer training to the study of U.S. partners and their priorities. For example, in the Naval Academy curriculum, the required courses and learning objectives barely touch on the state of current alliances and partners. There are excellent opportunities to become involved in learning about international affairs through study abroad programs, foreign affairs conferences, and summer training; but there is no standardized curriculum or course. Midshipmen learn about U.S. Navy capabilities and goals, but an emphasis on the capabilities and primary concerns of U.S. partners would be beneficial. A required course could be added to the curriculum and taught by a Foreign Area Officer or former civilian diplomat.

The harsh reality is that, simply due to proximity, a conflict near the South China Sea would give a distinct advantage to China. An alliance-first strategy focused on bolstering existing alliances in Asia, building new alliances in South America, and aggressively nurturing an alliance with India would diminish this advantage, forcing China to extend itself beyond its comfort zone both financially and geographically while dealing with multiple problems at once. More emphasis needs to be placed on alliances in U.S. Naval strategy. The United States cannot do it alone. 

LTJG Andrew Bishop is a 2019 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He attended the Naval Postgraduate School immediately after commissioning and earned his Master’s in Aerospace Engineering. He then entered the aviation training pipeline and was selected for the maritime patrol community. He is currently stationed with VP-30 in Jacksonville, FL.

1stLt Alexander Huang is a 2019 Political Science graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a Field Artillery Officer and deployed to the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility with 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. He has participated in numerous joint and combined exercises in the Indo-Pacific region.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. government.

Featured image: USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) sails in formation with allies and partners during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022 on July 28. (U.S. Navy photo)

Podcast

Sea Control 386 – Tanks in the Surf with Matt Graham

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By Jared Samuelson

Major Matt Graham joins Sea Control to discuss amphibious doctrine, historical case studies of Army-led amphibious operations and a future role for the Army in amphibious operations.

Major Matthew Graham is an active-duty armor officer with combat experience in Afghanistan and is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies. He previously served as an Art of War Scholar at the Command and General Staff College.

Download Sea Control 386 – Tanks in the Surf with Matt Graham

Links 

1. “Tanks in the Surf – Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team,” by Major Matthew W. Graham, Association of the United States Army, Land Warfare Paper 147, July 2022.
2. Sea Control 181 – The “Amphibious” 8th in the Pacific War, by Jared Samuelson with Major General Pat Donahoe and Don Chisholm, CIMSEC, June 7, 2020.
3. Sea Control 198 – Australian Amphibious Capability with Colonel Kim Gilfillan, by Jared Samuelson, CIMSEC, September 6, 2020.

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Nathan Miller.