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Human Capital

Make Racist Behavior a UCMJ Offense

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By CAPT John P. Cordle, USN (ret.) and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, USN (ret.)

A survey of the past few years tells us the military continues to grapple with racism and extremism in its ranks:

  • A Marine General uses a racial slur in an exercise field.1
  • A noose is found hanging in a Black soldier’s locker.2
  • A Navy Admiral uses profanity and makes “racially insensitive comments” on an aircraft carrier bridge.3

While most people would characterize this behavior as patently racist, (prejudiced against or antagonistic toward a person or people on the basis of their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group), the laws governing military personnel do not capture these egregious breaches of respect and trust.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is intended to create a consistent and consistently enforceable code of law to deal with military members accused of crimes, misconduct, or other infractions that must be dealt with in a manner unique to the military and outside the scope of the civilian legal system. Under the UCMJ, however, there is no codified enforcement mechanism for these transgressions. This article will explore codifying a UCMJ article to punish racist behavior and acts in pursuit of protecting service members, improving accountability, and supporting leaders.

The Proposed Article

By combining the expertise and experience of a former commanding officer, a military lawyer, and someone who has experienced racism firsthand, we propose the following language for a UCMJ article codifying racist behavior.

Article XXX: Racist Behavior, defined as prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against a person or people based on their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group, typically one that is a minority or marginalized, is prohibited under this article. This offense may take the form of jokes, slurs, use of divisive symbols, or specific actions up to and including violence directed at an individual because of their particular racial or ethnic group.

Next, we will explore the background of addressing racism in the U.S. military and why an addendum to the UCMJ is necessary.

Historical Context

The U.S. Navy took dramatic actions to address racism, diversity, and inclusion in the 1970s. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt overcame significant resistance to curtail discriminatory practices. While Admiral Zumwalt is heralded as one of the Navy’s all-time great reformers, his work was unfortunately incomplete. Several decades later, the Navy established “Task Force One Navy” in the wake of the spate of highly publicized police brutality incidents in the summer of 2020. The Task Force’s stated goal was to “examine barriers to minorities and make recommendations to improve diversity and inclusion within the U.S. Navy.” The Task Force completed its final report in December 2020 and made over 50 tangible recommendations. Unfortunately, an opportunity was missed when the final report did not include concrete recommendations to address racism and accountability in the Navy. However, there is no reason that their work cannot lay a solid foundation for a tangible next step: a concrete and prosecutable definition of racist actions and behavior.

The UCMJ was signed by President Harry S. Truman in May 1950 within the broader context of Jim Crow laws, pervasive in the American South until 1965. Given this backdrop, in conjunction with the UCMJ being signed on the heels of an Executive Order to integrate the U.S. military, including “racism” in the document may have been viewed as a bridge too far. Despite the equal opportunity movement of the 1960s and 1970s, no significant inroads toward codifying racism were made. 

Existing Punitive Legal Framework

Within the current legal architecture, individuals who use racist language or engage in racist acts would likely be prosecuted under another UCMJ Article, such as an orders violation (Article 92, UCMJ) or, for officers, Conduct Unbecoming (Article 133, UCMJ). Alternatively, in some cases, racist misconduct could be prosecuted under the so-called General Article (i.e., Article 134), which serves as a catchall and could theoretically allow military prosecutors to use hate crime statutes. None of these statutes is designed to orient investigators and prosecutors toward the uniquely insidious evils of racism – and actions that result from it – in the ranks.

A Judge Advocate General officer (military lawyer) shared that there are several references in place that explicitly address racist acts:

    • UCMJ Article 132 defines “unlawful discrimination” as “discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Also, see RCM 1001, which allows “evidence in aggravation” to be presented to the members on sentencing (after the accused has been found guilty): “In addition, evidence in aggravation may include evidence that the accused intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.
    • DoDI 1325.06, Enclosure 2 lists statutory provisions that could be used to address racist behavior.4
    • MILPERSMAN 1910-160 allows for administrative separation for “supremacist and extremist conduct,” which addresses misconduct related to “illegal discrimination based on race…color.”

Policy Rationale for Codifying Racist Actions and Behavior as a Specific Offense

Given this, why not leave things alone? After all, changing the UCMJ would not merely be a small definition change in regulation; it would constitute a change in military law. Despite this weighty prospect, given the documented persistent problems with racism and extremism in the military, Congress and the President should send a clear message by codifying a specific UCMJ offense that proscribes racist conduct uniformly across the U.S. military. 

There are several reasons that a specific article would improve accountability and support commanders in charging individuals with racist behavior as well as educating the force, which may not understand the implications of their actions. These include:

  1. Disincentivizing behavior through legal proscription serves a valuable purpose: specific and general deterrence.5 In other words, showing tangible consequences for specific actions can deter some individuals from doing them and others from tolerating them.
  2. Promote consistency and predictability throughout the services, enabling commanders to foster healthy, respectful, and inclusive climates at the unit level. The presence of a concise definition of the word “racist behavior” would make it clear to all where the line is and how not to cross it. Some examples would help. For example, certain words are widely accepted as “racist slurs” if used to describe another person or symbols that might be racist in nature (for example, a “KKK” medallion or a noose in a workplace).
  3. Injecting expediency and removing ambiguity into investigations into alleged racist misconduct. One of us has directly experienced racism, and one of us has been accused of racist actions. You may be surprised to learn that in both cases, it was me – Mr. Green. In the first case, the Sailor’s informal, without merit complaint dragged on due to a lack of clarity in the UCMJ and was in the end discredited; in the second case, involving an accusation brought by a Black civilian, I was exonerated because the evidence did not support it. In both instances, a clear definition of racist actions in the UCMJ would have saved a lot of work, uncertainty, and distress and sped up the final adjudication. Cordle: I often hear my (white, male) peers share that “I never saw racism in my command,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that just because they did not witness it firsthand did not mean it had not occurred. These changes would take racist behavior out of the subjective and provide a clear and actionable definition. These examples are evocative of Justice Potter Stewart’s famous definition of pornography, “I know it if I see it.” Fortunately, with a codified UCMJ article addressing racist actions, unit commanders and service members would not have to rely on pithy turns of phrase but on comprehensive military law.
  4. It would allow Commanders to move prosecution to a higher level, such as courts-martial, where they could be more properly adjudicated and legally defended on appeal. Commanders are warfighters, not legal experts. They are also human and may be subject to bias (“but he is my best technician”). Similar to the recent changes in the sexual harassment arena, where the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and related crimes have been removed from the chain of command. This change would allow commanders to focus on their given mission while giving investigations into allegations or racist actions or behavior the time, attention, and independence they demand.
  5. It would enable the compilation of statistical data on the prevalence and frequency of racist behavior. It is critical to note that the absence of discrete data does not mean the issue does not exist. The Center for Naval Analyses 2022 Study on Violent Extremism notes, “this issue is an exceptionally challenging one for several reasons including, but not limited to: little existing data on the problem, poorly defined key terms, and a high degree of politicization.” The graph below (focus on the needle vice the background) illustrates this phenomenon.

    Figure 1. A recent study by the Center for Naval Analysis cited “poor data quality and availability” as a barrier to determining the extent to which racist behavior is punished (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)
  6. It would allow the service to identify and remove service members whose racist actions are prejudicial to the good order and discipline of military units. In his 2020 Lawfare article Why Extremism Matters to the U.S. Military, Navy Captain Keith Gibel, wrote that criminalizing behavior does not make it go away, “Prosecution will not stop extremist beliefs or racist behavior.” What Captain Gibel overlooks, however, is that, unlike society, the military has the option of removing a service member whose behavior is prejudicial to good order and discipline and detract from the units and, broadly, the military services from executing their missions.
  7. The ability to build a library of case law and establish legal precedent. The legal world is built on a foundation of precedent. Since, as we have noted, there is no data or established process, it is difficult to provide waypoints to steer by. Changing the UCMJ would begin the process of building a library of case law and established legal precedent.
  8. It would send a signal to minority service members that they are being looked out for. The weight of George Floyd and Ahmaud Arbery still weighs heavy on the 31% of active-duty racial minorities. As a friend and mentor, former Fleet Master Chief Raymond Kemp wisely said, “for there to be a real change, there must be a compassionate ear from the unimpacted.” Giving leaders in the U.S. military both the knowledge and ability to remove the cancer of racism in the ranks will be a powerful signal to those who have been made to feel less than. It will communicate to a generation of Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsman, and Guardians that they are valued and heard, and actions against them based on their creed, color, or religion will not be tolerated. The below graph applies a concept – one that has been well vetted in the area of sexual harassment and sexual assault – to the racism conversation. The same rules apply – acceptance of small examples of bad behavior can lead to much worse – if left unchecked. 
Figure 2: Racial Extremism Continuum of Harm. (Source: Center for Naval Analyses)

Conclusion

The Center for Naval Analyses report on violent extremism ends with a candid assessment and recommendation, “Most critical, at this pivotal moment, is the recognition that the problem of racial extremism is not one of a few bad apples, but is, in fact, a more pervasive challenge that—like sexual harassment and sexual assault—will require a more comprehensive set of solutions.” One of these would be: to make racist actions and behavior a discrete UCMJ offense. Even though making racism a UCMJ offense would undoubtedly draw partisan ire, it is a necessary change at a critical moment. Doing so will provide clarity regarding unacceptable behavior, enable a legally defensible adjudication for cases, enable the judicial system to provide guidance for commanders and individuals alike, and provide much-needed transparency in an area that has not been clearly defined for more than seventy years.

Captain John Cordle retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), retiring as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic. He received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010, the Surface Navy Literary Award, and Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year Award in 2019. Recently, he has teamed with his co-author, LCDR Green, in an effort to promote diversity and inclusion in the military, authoring several articles and featured as speakers on the topic at various Navy and affinity group DEI symposia over the past two years. 

Lieutenant Commander Keith Green retired in 1997 after serving 22 years in the Navy. He served four department head tours, including as Executive Officer in USS Gemini (PHM-6). He is a former Legal Yeoman, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, and leadership Instructor, and was commissioned in 1984 via Officer Candidate School. He has an MS degree in Human Resources Development. His memoir Black Officer,White Navy was acquired by a University Press and a revised edition will be republished in 2023.

References

1. Alex Horton, Two Star Marine General fired after allegations he used racial slur around subordinates, Military Times, October 2020.
2. Zelie Pollon, African American soldier says noose strung outside barracks, Reuters, June 2011
3. Linda Thomas, Navy’s Reason for discipline of Bremerton-Based Admiral, Navy Times, April 2013.
4.Appropriate courts-martial sentencing considerations include, but are not limited to, “promot[ing] adequate deterrence of misconduct.” Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1002(f)(3)(D). Thus, the R.C.M. identify deterrence as an important punishment consideration of courts-martial with an eye toward maintaining good order and discipline.
5. McBride, Megan, Racial Extremism in the United States: A Continuum of Harm, Center for Naval Analyses, January 2022.

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION NORFOLK (Oct. 4, 2012) Lt. Cmdr. James Raymond, center, operations officer for Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9, stands with his squadron during a change of command ceremony. Cmdr. Brad L. Arthur relieved Cmdr. Brian K. Pummill as commanding officer of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Walter/Released)

Alliances and Partners

The Best Defense is Alliance

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By LTJG Andrew Bishop and 1stLt Alexander Huang

Perhaps it is instilled in the American spirit, or maybe the country has grown accustomed to it, but reliance on the offense-first mentality of the Navy and Marine Corps will cost the United States. From World War II to the mid-2000s, the U.S. Navy waged war on the premise that “the best defense is a good offense.” However, with the return of peer competitors, the Navy cannot merely rely on a “good offense” anymore — the country needs an impenetrable and unshakable defense based on reliable alliances. Advantage at Sea, the United States’ Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, maintains that alliances and partnerships are key to long term strategic success. For the U.S. Navy to accomplish an “alliance-first” strategy, it must strengthen current relationships with Asian and South American countries, build a strong alliance with India, and incorporate more training for naval officers to become familiar with partner nations early in their careers.

The Navy and Marine Corps are the power projection arm of the U.S. military. For decades, the services have become comfortable with their position “commanding the seas.” However, this position is not guaranteed, and power projection through almost 20 years of continuous operation in Central Command and in the Western Pacific has stretched the U.S. Navy thin. Now, with the rise of China’s military power, the United States’ ability to claim offensive dominance, and by default a strong defense, is waning. In his ode to sea power, Alfred Thayer Mahan surmised that the key to power projection was control of the maritime domain. He believed the means of power projection were interlaced with the size of the fleet and its ability to blockade and overpower adversaries. China has adopted Mahanian thinking for use in the 21st Century, taking cues from former naval powers. China has the largest navy in the world, surpassing the United States in sheer number of vessels. Although this is by no means a signal of true naval dominance, it is one of many indicators of a rapidly advancing naval force. Despite the American fleet’s comparative advantage in the ability to project power far beyond the homeland, war games against China in a kinetic fight for Taiwan often end in a sobering military defeat for the United States.

According to the recently declassified “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” the United States is determined to maintain “strategic primacy” in the maritime domain. However, in doing so, the United States could easily overextend its capabilities, while China simply needs to focus on raising the costs of U.S. power projection into its sphere of influence. Therefore, unilateral force projection and an offense-based mindset may no longer be the answer. Senator Bernie Sanders cautioned that “organizing our foreign policy around a zero-sum global confrontation with China … will fail to produce better Chinese behavior and be politically dangerous and strategically counterproductive.” With serious issues such as ship collisions and aircraft crashes plaguing the U.S. Navy, many of these due to an overextension of the force and significant operational demands, it would be beneficial to rely on our international partners to shoulder more of the burden.

The recent conflict between Ukraine and Russia has shown the NATO alliance is a powerful deterrent. Additionally, U.S. intelligence sharing with the “Five-Eyes” countries has been useful in countering China, often drawing China’s ire. The success of the U.S. alliance network demonstrates that it should be at the forefront of the National Defense Strategy, as should the Navy’s role in building this network. With the capability to move thousands of miles in a matter of days, the Navy can project diplomacy anywhere. Some examples of the Navy’s tools to build alliances include port calls, transits, freedom of navigation operations, and force-level changes. These tools can help build alliances by demonstrating U.S. support for specific countries or regions. For example, the USS Carl Vinson visited De Nang, Vietnam in 2018. This was the first carrier visit since the Vietnam War and a signal to China that ties between the United States and Vietnam are improving. Furthermore, the mere presence of a U.S. vessel close to smaller island nations in the Pacific is significant because these countries have serious concerns about China’s illegal fishing activities, backed by a naval militia, taking a major part of their livelihood. The Navy also has the capability to provide humanitarian aid and exert influence by the presence of ships or forces in a disputed area. Notorious British General Oliver Cromwell famously stated, “A man o’ war is the best ambassador.”

An alliance-first strategy centered on the U.S. Navy should focus, first and foremost, on strengthening existing alliances. If the United States can count on its allies in the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan, it can hold less of the responsibility for directly countering China while forcing China to deal with several different offensive problems at once. Bolstering these alliances is essential, especially through enhanced defense cooperation and helping these allies utilize technology, such as autonomous swarms, smart mines, and cheap anti-ship missiles. A clear purpose with respect to China is key, and this can be achieved through focusing on an interest-centric alliance versus a threat-based one.

Simultaneously, the United States must seek to build more robust relationships with core South American countries, such as Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. This can also be done through defense cooperation; however, investment in capital projects and infrastructure improvement would help bolster the relationship between the United States and key South American countries as well. China has already shown significant economic and military interest in much of this region, which aligns with its goal of total global influence, especially in the western hemisphere. China will often build commercial ports in a specific region and then expand the projects into use as “strategic strong points” with potential for the Chinese Navy to access. There are currently port projects underway in several countries, including Peru and Ecuador. If the U.S. Navy wishes to counter the Chinese threat within the first and second island chain, it cannot allow China to exert pressure through a growing presence, maritime or otherwise, in countries so close to home.

Second, an alliance-first strategy should focus aggressively on creating new alliances to counter China directly. For example, India’s military has rapidly grown into a capable force, and China has recently shown it is willing to antagonize India over its border dispute. Additionally, India has taken significant steps to overhaul its military forces and defend against China and Pakistan. With its number of forces second only to China and a huge population, India is a growing economic and military power and could prove an asset in the future. Right now, the United States’ relationship with one of the largest democracies in the world is classified as a strategic partnership, but it is time to make it a real alliance. The Navy can help forge this partnership by directly increasing participation in Indian-led exercises, such as Exercise Milan. In 2022, the first year that the U.S. Navy has participated, the USS Fitzgerald and a P-8A Poseidon were sent, showing the potential to increase maritime cooperation.

Finally, an alliance-first strategy should include training naval officers to become better “diplomats” on the international stage. This can be done through officer exchange programs and devoting more of basic officer training to the study of U.S. partners and their priorities. For example, in the Naval Academy curriculum, the required courses and learning objectives barely touch on the state of current alliances and partners. There are excellent opportunities to become involved in learning about international affairs through study abroad programs, foreign affairs conferences, and summer training; but there is no standardized curriculum or course. Midshipmen learn about U.S. Navy capabilities and goals, but an emphasis on the capabilities and primary concerns of U.S. partners would be beneficial. A required course could be added to the curriculum and taught by a Foreign Area Officer or former civilian diplomat.

The harsh reality is that, simply due to proximity, a conflict near the South China Sea would give a distinct advantage to China. An alliance-first strategy focused on bolstering existing alliances in Asia, building new alliances in South America, and aggressively nurturing an alliance with India would diminish this advantage, forcing China to extend itself beyond its comfort zone both financially and geographically while dealing with multiple problems at once. More emphasis needs to be placed on alliances in U.S. Naval strategy. The United States cannot do it alone. 

LTJG Andrew Bishop is a 2019 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He attended the Naval Postgraduate School immediately after commissioning and earned his Master’s in Aerospace Engineering. He then entered the aviation training pipeline and was selected for the maritime patrol community. He is currently stationed with VP-30 in Jacksonville, FL.

1stLt Alexander Huang is a 2019 Political Science graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a Field Artillery Officer and deployed to the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility with 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. He has participated in numerous joint and combined exercises in the Indo-Pacific region.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. government.

Featured image: USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) sails in formation with allies and partners during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022 on July 28. (U.S. Navy photo)

Podcast

Sea Control 386 – Tanks in the Surf with Matt Graham

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By Jared Samuelson

Major Matt Graham joins Sea Control to discuss amphibious doctrine, historical case studies of Army-led amphibious operations and a future role for the Army in amphibious operations.

Major Matthew Graham is an active-duty armor officer with combat experience in Afghanistan and is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies. He previously served as an Art of War Scholar at the Command and General Staff College.

Download Sea Control 386 – Tanks in the Surf with Matt Graham

Links 

1. “Tanks in the Surf – Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team,” by Major Matthew W. Graham, Association of the United States Army, Land Warfare Paper 147, July 2022.
2. Sea Control 181 – The “Amphibious” 8th in the Pacific War, by Jared Samuelson with Major General Pat Donahoe and Don Chisholm, CIMSEC, June 7, 2020.
3. Sea Control 198 – Australian Amphibious Capability with Colonel Kim Gilfillan, by Jared Samuelson, CIMSEC, September 6, 2020.

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

This episode was edited and produced by Nathan Miller.

Capability Analysis

Depth from Above: Reinventing Carrier ASW

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By Ben DiDonato

With the return of great power competition, the threat posed by hostile submarines has garnered renewed attention. Russia’s submarine fleet in particular has been regarded as a serious threat for decades and its latest SSNs are reportedly nearly as quiet as their American counterparts. Similarly, while China’s nuclear submarines have yet to reach this level, China’s access to Russian technology, rapid improvements in other areas, and capacity for mass production suggest it is likely to become a serious threat in the relatively near future. Furthermore, while SSNs are obviously the most serious threat due to their range and speed, diesel submarines cannot be overlooked, with many highly lethal designs widely distributed across the globe. In order to compete effectively against near-peer states armed with these submarines, the United States Navy must have the ability to find, track, and sink them.

As in the Cold War, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a challenging area of operations, requiring close cooperation between a wide variety of assets to win what would inevitably be a worldwide campaign. This problem was thoroughly studied and, at least in broad strokes, solved by the end of the Cold War, so this strategy provides a useful guide. That review immediately reveals a critical weakness in current American force structure. Submarines and maritime patrol aircraft are still available for independent hunting, surface combatants for close screening, and helicopters for prosecuting targets, but since the retirement of the S-3 Viking, the U.S. Navy has lacked an organic aircraft for initial detection of submarines approaching the aircraft carrier.

The current stopgap solution is pressing the land-based P-8 Poseidon into this role, but that is far from ideal. Tying P-8s to carriers largely squanders their capabilities, preventing the limited supply of these aircraft from doing their real job of patrolling broad stretches of ocean and protecting other ships. Furthermore, relying on land-based support imposes serious constraints on the carrier strike group, which must operate within range of the P-8 and would almost certainly suffer from periods of vulnerability.

This means the current lack of fixed-wing carrier-based ASW capability should be addressed to provide the required coverage without distracting the P-8 force. While there has been some discussion of reactivating the S-3 Viking to restore this capability, that can only ever be a stopgap measure due to the age of the airframes. A long-term solution is needed to restore fixed-wing ASW capability, and fiscal reality demands this solution be flexible and affordable. Rather than build a new dedicated ASW aircraft, it may be better to instead develop a series of ASW pods and a more flexible aircraft suitable for both ground attack and ASW since either type of store can be carried on the pylons with equal ease.

Podded ASW Systems

A minimum of four specialized systems are required to support fixed-wing ASW: a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), a sonobuoy dispenser, a sonobuoy receiver, and an air-droppable lightweight torpedo. The Mk 54 torpedo already meets the offensive needs on other aircraft, so it should not require substantial modification to fill this role. Similarly, a sonobuoy dispenser is such a simple system that it does not require explanation beyond pointing out that it would ideally come in a variety of sizes for different aircraft/pylons and have variants which incorporate a sonobuoy receiver to minimize pylon consumption.

Therefore, the only system which requires major development is the MAD pod. To enable normal aircraft operation, particularly safe takeoff and landing, this pod would almost certainly need to use a towed MAD rather than the more common boom-mounted system. This would allow the sensor to be trailed a sufficient distance behind the aircraft when needed and retracted when not in use.

Of course, this podded approach is also ideally suited to incorporating future systems as they become available. A wide variety of unmanned systems and new weapons are in development or have been proposed, and all of them could easily be integrated as additional pods. Whether new payloads for sonobuoy dispensers, a single large UAV/UUV on a pylon, some new cluster system, or a novel idea not yet conceived, stuffing it in a pod and hanging it from an existing aircraft will always be faster and cheaper than trying to cram it into an existing airframe, assuming that is even possible. Therefore, while this approach provides an easy path for incorporating future technologies, the four proven systems discussed above can be immediately developed into an effective ASW capability and should be the short-term priority.

In order to provide an affordable near-term capability and maximize long-term utility, both the MAD and sonobuoy pods should be compatible with the new MQ-25 Stingray UAV. In conjunction with the current MH-60R, this would provide a limited standoff detection, prosecution, and engagement capability to the carrier which could be further supplemented by F/A-18s carrying torpedoes, MAD pods, and additional sonobuoys to engage submarines if needed. While this combination is certainly suboptimal, especially considering the problems caused by using F/A-18s as tankers, the MQ-25 would truly come into its own as an ASW platform once the new fixed-wing aircraft proposed below enters service and can use it as a loyal wingman to greatly improve coverage or direct MQ-25 wolfpacks to aggressively prosecute contacts.

A Pod-Carrying Aircraft

Unfortunately, this pod-based approach to ASW is fundamentally incompatible with the S-3 airframe. It cannot carry the number and variety of pods or ground attack weapons required on its two underwing hardpoints, especially when we consider future podded systems. Although its weapons bays contain another four hardpoints, their internal placement would likely interfere with the operation of most pods. Remediating this deficiency by adding new pylons in a major refit is likely impractical due to interference from the under-wing engines. The integrated nature of the S-3’s ASW systems also prevents it from using much of its payload capacity for non-ASW missions. It is simply not possible to replace these fixed systems with ground attack or anti-ship weapons when using the aircraft in other roles, leaving it limited to only six weapons hardpoints for these missions.

Shifting to the budgetary side, integrated systems are generally more expensive to maintain and upgrade than podded systems. Furthermore, the Navy presumably lacks the resources to operate both integrated and podded systems, likely costing the carrier air wing the flexibility to task non-ASW aircraft with ASW missions. Budgetary pressures also make this alternate role critical because the S-3 probably would have survived the global war on terror if it doubled as a low-cost ground attack platform. Therefore, long-term use of the S-3 would be costly and inflexible, so a new solution is needed.

The obvious solution is a completely new aircraft. While this is certainly an option and would presumably produce an excellent aircraft with plenty of capacity, numerous pylons, and a low operating cost, there are two major problems with it. The first is that going through the full development and adoption cycle would take a very long time, likely more than could realistically be covered by a stopgap S-3 reactivation. The second is that major projects like this are politically challenging, with a serious risk of cancelation – assuming they get started at all. While it may be possible to overcome these issues, they are serious enough to merit an examination of alternative options.

The most obvious alternative is to adapt an existing carrier aircraft to take on the role. Within the current carrier air wing, there are two possible airframes, the E-2/C-2, and the V-22.

The E-2/C-2 would obviously make an excellent mono-mission platform since it is already configured to carry a large support crew. However, that same large crew would limit its payload and make risking it in other roles like ground attack unappealing. The only other role it could realistically take on is general airborne drone control, but this can already be performed by the E-2 and fighters so there seems to be little value here, especially since these aircraft can also relay drone datalinks to surface ships. While none of this detracts from an E-2/C-2 derivative’s ability to take on the mission, it does mean it fails to realize the additional flexibility promised by this podded approach, so a different platform is preferable.

The V-22, or more accurately the CMV-22B, may be a better candidate. The ability to transition to helicopter mode would be useful for prosecuting targets, and its unsuitability to ground attack is less of an issue since it is already a cargo aircraft, although the flipside of that is that is that there is less leeway to retask between these two missions than between ASW and ground attack. Unfortunately, payload integration may be an issue, both due to questions about retrofitting pylons on the rotating wing assembly and its more limited digital backbone, and overall external stores capacity would likely be limited after the necessary upgrades based on published payload and range figures. Therefore, while it is certainly worth performing a more detailed study to better understand the true costs, capabilities, and limitations of an ASW V-22 variant, it also seems suboptimal for this pod-based approach.

The final alternative is adapting a land-based aircraft for naval service. While there have certainly been serious problems adapting aircraft in the past, there have also been notable successes like the YF-17’s evolution into the F/A-18 family and the SH-60 family’s decent from the Army’s UH-60. Furthermore, the C-130 famously proved able to operate from the USS Forrestal without modification, and based on a recent interview with the pilot, the flying seems to have been fairly straightforward. While the C-130 itself is obviously too big for regular deck handling, this success strongly implies any aircraft designed to operate from short/rough airfields would be an excellent candidate for marinization, especially with a Super Hornet-style redesign.

There are too many aircraft to go through individually, but desired capabilities narrow the field to a smaller slate. The ideal aircraft would be small enough to operate from a carrier, have short/rough field capability, good payload, plenty of pylons, good fuel efficiency, low maintenance requirements, and excellent handling at low speed and altitude. While most aircraft cannot meet this challenging set of desires, there is one candidate suitable for adaptation into a pod-based multirole ASW aircraft. Not only does this aircraft meet all these desires, but it also has an exceptional ground attack record, proven flexibility in other roles like counter-Fast Attack Craft/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (counter-FAC/FIAC) and combat search and rescue support, and, most importantly, very strong political support to carry the program through budget battles. This aircraft is, of course, the A-10.

The SA-10D Seahog

With an A-10 variant identified as the best option for carrying ASW pods, considering both capability and timeline, we now turn our attention to a brief discussion of what that would look like. The most likely approach is a redesign comparable to the Hornet’s “upgrade” to the Super Hornet because that allows any necessary changes to be incorporated relatively easily. That said, the A-10’s unusually simple airframe may allow boneyard aircraft to be modified for service, even if only as prototypes or a wartime contingency, so that possibility will be discussed here as well. Of course, the program office is not obligated to pick just one option. They could develop both a modification package and a new-build design to improve the competition and provide maximum value to the taxpayer.

Since this aircraft will be largely optimized for affordably hauling underwing stores as a byproduct of this pod-based approach to ASW, that payload can be used in a variety of other roles beyond the obvious close air support. This could entail utility duties like backup tanking, combat support roles like standoff missile carrier, and majority Air Force missions like laying Quickstrike sea mines to further support the rest of the air wing, increase the carrier’s flexibility, and improve the lethality of the joint force.

One other intriguing advantage of using the A-10 as a baseline for the ASW pod carrier is that its short/rough field performance suggests it may be possible to fly it from smaller, simpler ships like amphibs, especially if thrust reversers are added. This would give the joint force the ability to rapidly build new ASW hunter-killer groups if needed and could give the Marines an alternate air support option for amphibious operations if desired. Similarly, this would allow commercial ships to be converted into useful escort carriers in wartime, freeing purpose-built carriers for frontline duties. Finally, this would open up the ability to fly from smaller dedicated aircraft carriers and, while it seems unlikely the United States would build any, a number of its allies operate CVLs and may be interested in acquiring these SA-10Ds to provide organic ASW capability and additional strike capacity to their own carriers.

From a programmatic standpoint, using a few minimally modified A-10A’s from the boneyard could serve to reduce risk and accelerate introduction by entering flight testing prior to delivery of the first full prototype, although this is obviously not required. Most usefully, up to three aircraft could be modified to add a second seat for the ASW systems operator and at least simulated electronics to demonstrate operational effectiveness and begin developing tactics and procedures for the fleet ahead of delivery. The other, less important, conversion would validate performance and carrier suitability by adding a new launch bar and a strengthened arresting hook to a single aircraft.

Naturally, the subject of airframe modification entices interest, so we will now move into a brief exploration of the most interesting changes and options, although basics like more modern engines will be omitted. That said, it is critical to bear in mind that this SA-10D concept is fully dependent on the previously discussed podded systems for ASW operations, so those systems are more important than anything discussed here even though this section will likely generate more discussion.

First and most importantly, the aircraft must have a second seat like the old YA-10B prototype. Modern computers should allow a single person to manage all the ASW equipment instead of the multiple operators required on the S-3, as well as direct any supporting drones, but there is no way the pilot would be able to handle that workload on top of flying the aircraft. It should also be noted that this second crewmember can be swapped for another specialist such as a forward air controller when required for the mission at hand, further improving the air wing’s flexibility. Therefore, whether this is a conversion of old airframes or a new build, a single seat is simply unworkable for the mission.

Closely related to this is electronics. To reduce development costs and streamline maintenance, it is strongly recommended that the F-35’s electronics be reused as close to wholesale as possible. The A-10’s simple airframe should make it relatively easy to integrate these systems, especially if it is a new-build variant, and the commonality would bring new capability and simplify future upgrades. Beyond providing a digital backbone to host the ASW systems, this would make the SA-10D a potent networked shooter by hauling large numbers of long-range missiles and seamlessly communicating with F-35Cs further forwards. This could be further exploited by a new-build aircraft which would likely be larger to further increase capacity and could add dedicated AIM-9X sidewinder rails to provide defensive fire against hostile aircraft.

Folding wings would not ordinarily merit separate discussion because it is obvious a new-build aircraft would include them and that the A-10’s straight wings will allow a dramatic width reduction, but the modification of existing airframes is unusual enough to merit special attention. Unlike most aircraft, the A-10 only carries fuel in its inner wing and is designed with very simple, robust structures with extensive left/right interchangeability. This means the A-10 is in the unusual situation of being able to easily accept folding wings in an upgrade, so modified boneyard aircraft are a feasible option even though they were never intended to operate from carriers.

Of course, any time the A-10 comes up, its gun is a major discussion point so it must be addressed here even if it is not relevant to ASW. Unfortunately, while the GAU-8 has given excellent service, it would almost certainly have to be abandoned for marinization in favor of the F-35’s 25mm GAU-22. While the resulting commonality would streamline shipboard logistics, this change is primarily driven by the fact that the GAU-8’s mounting forces the nose wheel off-center on the A-10, which is unacceptable for catapult launch and results in asymmetric turning circles which may complicate deck handling. One potential upside to this change is that it allows an increase in total stowed ammunition and possibly even the installation of a second gun if desired. This could extend the effective range of the weapon by firing enough explosive rounds to effectively saturate the larger dispersion area, potentially allowing the gun(s) to be effective in the counter-FAC/FIAC role from beyond the range of any man-portable air defense systems they may carry.

The A-10’s armor is similarly a regular point of discussion, although in this case there is no clear answer to be had. If old -A models were to be modified for this new role, it would likely prove more practical to simply leave the armor in place even if it is not particularly useful for the aircraft’s new role since it is integrated into the load-bearing structure. Of course, a new build would not face this restriction, so the armor would almost certainly be omitted to save weight. However, modern materials could allow some level of protection to be retained without much of a weight penalty if desired. Ultimately, the details would have to be worked out between the contractors and the program office, so a definitive answer cannot be given here.

One final exotic option for a new-build aircraft is to integrate a laser weapon to shoot down incoming missiles, or at least provide room for one to be added in the future. The technical risks and costs of this are obvious, but with laser weapons entering service and rapidly maturing, it should at least be considered.

Conclusion

As has been shown, the critical vulnerability left by the retirement of the S-3 can be rapidly and affordably filled to ensure the carrier’s survivability against submarines, and by extension its relevance in great power competition or war. A series of podded sensors would allow the MQ-25 and current aircraft to provide some ASW capacity, while a new SA-10D Seahog can be rapidly developed to fully fill the ASW gap using those podded systems and improve the flexibility of the carrier air wing.

Ben DiDonato is a volunteer member of the NRP-funded LMACC team lead by Dr. Shelley Gallup. He originally created what would become the armament for LMACC’s baseline Shrike variant in collaboration with the Naval Postgraduate School in a prior role as a contract engineer for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. He has provided systems and mechanical engineering support to organizations across the defense industry from the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) to Spirit Aerosystems, working on projects for all branches of the armed forces.

Featured Image: An air-to-air front view of three S-3A Viking aircraft from Air Anti-submarine Squadron 31 (VS-31) as they pass over the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69) (Photo by PH3 Houser, via U.S. National Archives)