Tag Archives: China

Navigating the Black Ditch: Risks in the Taiwan Strait

As a Christmas gift from our friends at Risk Intelligence, we’re sharing two free articles from the publication Strategic Insights by CIMSECians. This first (also available in Pdf form), by myself, originally appeared in the September 2014 issue and provides a background and maritime risk analysis on the Taiwan Strait.

The author’s sole experience transiting the Taiwan Strait was not a pleasant one. Like many on his ship, a US Navy destroyer, he had earlier in the week gone to sleep expecting to awake anchored in Hong Kong harbour for a few days of liberty to celebrate the American holiday of Thanksgiving. Instead, the Chinese government rescinded permission for the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk Strike Group to enter port, causing the aircraft carrier and its escorting vessels to chart a course back to Japan and leave behind many loved ones who had flown to town to rendezvous. Typhoon-spawned weather heightened the crew’s enjoyment as they headed for the Taiwan Strait to undertake a ‘freedom of navigation’ transit. Seven years later, the relationship between China and the United States has not much improved. But that between China and Taiwan has softened markedly, even as 1,600 Chinese missiles remain arrayed against targets in Taiwan. In fact, this change has resulted in a shift in the geopolitical dangers facing those who ply the strait’s waters. This article will examine the outlook of these threats.

Geography of the Taiwan Strait

Until 10,000 years ago, a land bridge connected the Neolithic people of Taiwan with those of mainland China, until rising sea levels from melting glaciers at the start of the Holocene epoch created the strait. As described by the late Harvard professor Kuangh-chih Chang, over the subsequent ten millennia the strait’s width expanded and contracted in a series of six ‘sea invasions’ and six ‘withdrawals’ as the waters rose and fell. Today the strait runs 330 km north-east to south-west, and ranges in width from 220 km at its widest to 130 km at its narrowest, with an average width of 180 km. It is bounded in the north by the East China Sea and in the south by the South China Sea, circulating waters between the two bodies with an average depth of 60 m. At its deepest in the Penghu Channel the strait reaches 177 m and is a mere 25 m deep at its shallowest near the centre of the strait’s southern mouth – the ‘Taiwan Shoal’ or ‘Taiwan Banks’.

Taiwan_Strait

Seasonal environmental variation has a large impact on the navigability of the strait. The China Coastal Current flows southward in the western part of the strait from a maximum strength in winter months, backed by the northeast monsoon, to its weakest point in the summer. On the eastern side of the strait the northward flowing Kuroshio Branch Current is turned back by the north-east monsoon in the winter after exiting the Penghu Channel, but continues the rest of the year, while reaching its maximum strength in the summer. Each year from July to September, an average of six larger (and, thus, named) tropical storms and typhoons impact the strait. Year-round, the strait is known for strong winds, wave swells, and fog (156.3 days a year of level 6 or higher on the Beaufort Scale), but these effects are amplified during the winter months. Fang Xu and Pingping Chen, writing in Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia by Keyuan Zhou and Shicun Wu, note that these conditions impact “not only challenges to safety at sea but also obstacles for efficient search and rescue.”

The largest group of islands in the Taiwan Strait – and the group most impactful to navigation – is the Penghu Islands, consisting of 64 islets of volcanic origin, also known as the Pescadores for the fishing communities the Portuguese encountered in the 17th century. Situated 120 km from the Chinese mainland and separated by the 45 km-wide Penghu Channel from the south-west Taiwan coast, the Penghu Islands total 127 km2, with the namesake island accounting for roughly half that total area and 70 per cent of the total population of 100,400 inhabitants.

PRC forces on Yiangshan
PRC forces on Yiangshan

Another archipelago of note – the Kinmen Islands – lies just 2 km from the south-eastern coast of Fujian Province in mainland China, yet is also controlled by the government in Taipei. Consisting of 13 islets of 151 km2 and 120,713 people, the Kinmen, or ‘Quemoy’, are low and flat except for hilly Kinmen proper. These islands, along with the 36 Matsu islets at the north end of the strait, were the scene of fierce artillery duels between forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and those of the Republic of China (ROC) in the 1950s during the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. Unlike another pair of island groups in the Taiwan Strait that the ROC controlled at the start of these crises, the Tachen and Yijiangshan islands, the Kinmen and Matsu islands remain under Taiwanese administration.

A unique, informal feature of the Taiwan Strait helps keep the peace between ROC and PRC air and naval forces and prevent misunderstanding by encouraging them to remain on ‘their’ side of the strait. Referred to variously as the Taiwan Strait ‘middle line’, ‘centerline’, or ‘Davis Line’, the 1950s origins – and exact boundary – of this division are murky, but most sources point to its first appearance in 1955 as an incidental by-product of designated American patrol areas. Since the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both sides have in practice mostly followed what remains a tacit understanding between China and Taiwan to prevent their warships and military aircraft from crossing to the other’s side of a line roughly bisecting the strait.

Following remarks by then-Defense Minister Lee Jye in 2004 threatening to shoot down Chinese aircraft crossing the middle line, the Taiwanese Defense Ministry released co-ordinates for their conception of the line. Today, the midline also functions as the jurisdictional boundary for a range of other regimes including the division of responsibility for search and rescue services, although increased cross-strait co-ordination and collaboration is blurring its importance.

Geopolitical Background

While most now know it as the Taiwan Strait, or Strait of Taiwan, the waterway’s aliases are a reflection of its history. The first, ‘The Formosa Strait’, comes from the former Portuguese name for Taiwan, the ilha formosa or ‘beautiful isle’. The origins of this name are shrouded in fascinating tales of doubtful veracity, as depicted in Jonathan Manthorpe’s Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan, but the popularisation – of both the name and the discovery of the island – by Dutch spy Jan Huygen van Linschoten in the 1596 book Iteneratio marked a transition. Whereas the 16th century was filled with Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese, and pirate expeditions and warfare in the strait, the exposure of Portugal’s secret trade routes brought Dutch and Spanish traders into that mix in the 17th century, as well as their attempts at colonisation.

Siege of Zeelandia
Siege of Zeelandia

The European colonisers were soon followed by Chinese forces. Robert Kaplan notes in Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific that although several Chinese dynasties launched earlier expeditions, it wasn’t until the Ming dynasty in the 17th century that an “organic connection” between Taiwan and the mainland was forged. This was achieved first with Cheng Chih-lung’s resettlement of thousands from mainland China’s Fujian province and later with his son Cheng-Kung’s 400-ship, 25,000-troop force to drive out the Dutch, culminating in the 1662 successful siege of Zeelandia.

The second alias for the Taiwan Strait, ‘The Black Ditch’ or ‘Black-water Ditch’, came into use by cross-strait traders by at least the late 17th century. This period, stretching through the 18th century, was a time of increasing integration and trade with mainland China, and the name derived (along with red, white, and green-water ditches) from the colour of the currents crossed during these voyages. In fact, there appear to have been several regional stretches of water called the black ditch, including on either side of the Penghus. One of these is the Penghu Channel, which an 1807 text calls “the most dangerous place in all the ocean. Its depth is unfathomed, and the water is as black as ink,” – but the term has since been applied to the whole of the strait. (For an exploration of the origin of the term ‘The Black Ditch’ and its physical basis see Michael Turton’s online article The Black Water Ditch and the Chinese Claim to the Senkakus from which this quote was taken.)

In the late 1800s, a punitive Japanese military campaign on Taiwan and later French blockade of its ports presaged China’s cession of the island and the Penghus to Japan in 1895 at the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s administration of the island ran until the end of World War II, when Taiwan was returned to Chinese rule under ROC control and has served as the ROC’s seat of government since its 1949 evacuation from mainland China.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred 40 years after the first two, raising the spectre of armed conflict in the strait as PRC military exercises and missile launches were countered by American naval movements over the course of 1995-1996. Following a rocky relationship under Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP, 2000-2008) and fears that he would precipitate a crisis through an unilateral declaration of independence, cross-strait ties have notably warmed with the election in 2008 (and 2012 re-election) of Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang party (KMT).

In December of 2008, direct cross-strait flights and postal services restarted for the first time in 59 years. More importantly for this paper, the ‘third link’ – direct shipping – also resumed and, according to the US Library of Congress’ Global Legal Monitor, now connects 72 mainland ports with 13 in Taiwan. In 2010, China and Taiwan negotiated and signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – covering specific tariff reductions and a general understanding that the two sides will work to further lower trade tariffs and investment barriers across a broad swath of the economy. In the most recent sign of friendlier ties between Beijing and Taipei, the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang Zhijun, met for the first time with Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Minister Wang Yu-Chi in June.

Activity in the Strait

The Taiwan Strait is sometimes touted as a vital shipping route, connecting Asia with the energy supplies of the Middle East. Yet its importance should neither be overstated nor viewed in isolation. Except for cross-strait transits and vessels calling at a port in the immediate vicinity of the strait, the closure of the strait would result in only minor disruptions to Asian and global trade as most international traffic could be re-routed through the Luzon Strait to the west.

maplngbig

What determines the severity of disruption is whether the Taiwan Strait is closed alone or in conjunction with the Luzon Strait. A paper by Henry Kenny for the US government-sponsored think tank CNA (formerly Center for Naval Analyses) describes what a blockade of Taiwan might look like, with “exclusion zones for normal commercial shipping, as well as harassment of ships that approach the exclusion zone. Mines are another possibility, as is strafing of ships that intentionally or inadvertently approach the island.” It too notes that “disruption might be minimized if shipping to and from Northeast Asia steered clear of Taiwan on a wide berth … of the island, entering/exiting the South China Sea off northern Luzon.”

Other analysts focus not on a conflict in the strait but its potential resolution, arguing that a PRC-controlled Taiwan would enable China to extract concessions from Japan by threatening to close the Taiwan Strait and neighbouring Luzon Strait and thereby cripple its economy. Writing in Asia’s Cauldron, Robert Kaplan says Taiwan’s “de facto independence is key to the integrity of the Taiwan Strait that guarantees Japan’s trade routes.” While both the likelihood of these contingencies and their effects are debatable, a PRC in possession of Taiwan and in conflict with Japan would indeed cause serious disruption of Japan’s trade routes. Former Japanese diplomat Hisahiko Okazaki stated in 2003: “In case of emergency, the only safe [shipping route] for Japan in Asia will be the passage through the Lombok Strait in Indonesia through the east coast of the Philippines.” Kaplan is wrong that the Taiwan Strait guarantees Japan’s trade routes, but Taiwan’s de facto independence does keep them affordable.

This is not to say traffic in the strait is negligible. By 2008 the Taiwanese government counted 400 ships transiting the strait every day, along with 5.4 million barrels of crude oil and 0.6 trillion cubic feet of liquid natural gas (LNG) as of 2011 in an analysis by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). In comparison, the EIA showed another 5.6 million barrels of oil and 4.8 trillion cubic feet of LNG headed to South Korea and Japan through the Luzon Strait.

Traffic patterns in the strait have changed since the 2008 resumption of direct shipping. Much of today’s cross-strait traffic used to flow through the strait to enter China indirectly via Hong Kong. Now, not only has crossstrait traffic increased by 10% every year since 2008 as annual bilateral trade between the mainland and Taiwan has risen to nearly $200 billion, the overall traffic density has also reportedly increased, swelling the risks of collision. To handle this increase, the Chinese Ministry of Transport is exploring options for managing vessel traffic in the strait, including traffic separation schemes that may be implemented in the next few years.

Scope for Increased Activity

As busy as the strait is today, there are several possible scenarios that would increase congestion further. The South China Morning Post reports China may attempt physically to bridge the strait, having approved in 2013 two such highway projects, although whether the connections would involve bridges or tunnels in unclear. It is also unlikely that this project will come to fruition until much later stages of political and/or economic integration – according to independent intelligence firm Stratfor, the nearterm prospects for the link remain “largely illusory”. But if at some date it does proceed, the project could have an appreciable impact on strait traffic; on the other hand, once completed it would also divert some of the of crossstrait shipping traffic.

Far sooner than any such infrastructure, two follow-ons to the ECFA are likely to increase cross-strait traffic. The first, the Cross-Strait Services Agreement (CSSA), was signed last year and awaits ratification by Taiwan’s legislature. According to The New York Times, the CSSA opens 80 industries to investment in China and 64 in Taiwan. Although these are primarily service-sector openings, the CSSA does include the potential to boost the cross-strait travel industry. The second ECFA follow-on is the Cross-Strait Goods Agreement (CSGA), a tradein-goods pact still under negotiation that would have an even greater impact on vessel traffic.

Lastly, the EIA reports that Taiwan is working with China’s state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to explore for oil and natural gas in the strait. While these efforts have yet to make any substantial discoveries, and have failed in earlier attempts, any such finds would complicate the strait’s already crowded transit conditions.

Geopolitical Risk Assessment

ROC Marines
ROC Marines

The current state of reduced tensions between China and Taiwan is likely to continue until at least the next presidential administration in 2016, and cross-strait economic integration is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless the risks of a future military conflict in the strait remain real. Scott Kastner of the University of Maryland notes that while even a return to power of the DPP would not dampen the current spirit of co-operation, “the cross-strait relationship has not been fundamentally transformed.” Although economic incentives are increasing for both sides to continue the peaceful status quo, especially given Taiwan’s pragmatic acceptance of ambiguous sovereignty, this does not forestall the potential of a determined policy shift to resolve by force or decree what remains a matter of uncompromising principle – nor of a domestic contingency resulting in an attempt to use the flashpoint issue for political advantage.

PRC Marines
PRC Marines

For Taiwan, the growth of economic interdependence and the strength of China’s military have driven the cost of an attempt to alter the status quo to a rationally unacceptable level if it would knowingly invite an armed response from China (see Scott Kastner’s draft paper A Relationship Transformed? Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Taiwan Strait for an excellent analysis of rational calculations and redlines, from which his prior quote was taken). A declaration of independence is highly unlikely in the next decade, yet a future Taiwanese leader may nonetheless face, or believe he/she faces, what Thomas Christensen writing in the journal International Security terms as a “closing window of opportunity” to maximise Taiwan’s position in respect to its freedom of action and international status. Analysts have given a range of dates when China will be able to defeat Taiwan alone or in conjunction with American assistance, with Taiwan itself (and self-interestedly) predicting a lost edge by 2020. All such assessments are a moving target and based on assumptions about military investments that may not hold true, but they might reinforce a perception that the time for Taiwan to act – even modestly – is sooner rather than later.

RisksFor China’s part, this shift in the balance of power in its favour recommends patience. But such patience has its limits. Given the recent perceived violations of promises regarding Hong Kong’s governance and electoral future it is unlikely for a Taiwanese ruler to agree to an accord along Hong Kong’s model of ‘One China, Two Systems’. Further, as the same balance of power increases in China’s favour it places downward pressure on the cost for China of settling the matter by force. Kastner remarks that if this pressure outweighs the countervailing upward pressure from economic integration it could have the destabilizing effect of tempting future decision-makers to act. This is especially so if coupled with beliefs that work towards a peaceful settlement will be an effort in vain. But, as Zachery Keck of The Diplomat points out, if China is acting rationally it also must include in its calculations the likelihood and cost of armed resistance and pacification after the defeat of Taiwan’s armed forces. On balance then, short of internal domestic upheaval in either polity, the strait will remain the premier demonstration of John Mearsheimer’s “stopping power of water” and locus of anti-access, area-denial capabilities – with China’s arrayed to deter the US Navy from entering the strait and Taiwan’s arrayed to prevent China from crossing it – and this arrangement will remain peaceful.

Conclusion

In its current incarnation, the Taiwan Strait is simultaneously a trade super-highway and a moat. As such, its value is undeniably greatest for Taiwan, but its criticality can be overstated for international trade beyond the ports and economies in the immediate strait region, due to the readily available Luzon Strait route as an alternate.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council.

Taiwan Builds a Very Different Cutter X

It’s always nice to see what others are doing.

We have talked about a cutter X before, that is, a cutter larger than the U.S. Webber class, but smaller than the Offshore Patrol Cutter, that would allow more days cruising at a distance from their home ports than is possible for the Webber class.

Focus Taiwan is reporting (it is their video above) that Taiwan is building ships in this class but in a very different form, for a very different purpose. It measures 60.4 meters in length and 14 meters in width, with a crew of 41. It is fast at 38 knots and has a range of 2,000 nautical miles (this is actually less than the range of the Webber class, but if this is quoted for a higher cruise speed, the range could actually be greater than that of the Webber class at the same lower speed). The great beam is the giveaway, the hull is something unusual.

Janes.com has pictures of the hull out of the water. A separate Janes report lists the armament as eight Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) and eight ramjet-powered Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) anti-ship missiles, an “Otobreda 76 mm gun, four 12.7 mm machine guns for close-range ship defence and a Mk 15 Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS) to defeat incoming projectiles and hostile aircraft.”

We have seen a similar hull form before.

This article originally appeared at Chuck Hill’s CG Blog and was cross-posted by permission. Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life-long interest in naval ships and history.

More Nukes Doesn’t Always Mean Better Deterrence

In a short article recently published by The National Interest, Xunchao Zhang argues that blockade is an effective means for the U.S. Navy to conduct a war against China because of its reliance on oil imports and then proposes that China has two options for countering a blockade strategy: vulnerability-reducing and conflict-avoiding. He dismisses the first because the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) does not have the capacity to escort oil tanker convoys half-way round the world and China’s overland pipelines would be vulnerable to US strikes. Zhang therefore argues that a policy of avoiding conflict with the United States entirely is the only means for China to counteract a US blockade strategy. Key to this, he claims, is strengthening the Chinese nuclear deterrent and renouncing the No-First-Use policy. Only then will the Chinese nuclear deterrent be sufficient to prevent conflict with the United States and avoid a blockade which would likely be crippling. But this argument misses a fundamental point about deterrence and any US use of blockade in a war with China.

Jugular of the economy

Deterrence is about avoiding war. Zhang argues that by strengthening the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the likelihood of war with the United States would decrease, thereby countering the threat of an American blockade. However, the United States is already unlikely to initiate a war, for numerous reasons. What Zhang calls China’s “minimal nuclear deterrent”, the possible world economic consequences, lack of domestic support for such an endeavor, and the historical unwillingness of the United States to be seen as the aggressor all combine to deter the US from attacking China. Any U.S.-China war would be initiated by China, and therefore a strengthening in the Chinese nuclear arsenal, to include abandoning No-First-Use, does not make a compelling case that the likelihood of war with the United States would be decreased. At best it would have no effect, and at worst it would put the Chinese leadership in a position where a stronger nuclear deterrent could simply increase the attractiveness of conducting a conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella.

 Furthermore, if a conflict-avoiding policy fails, an expanded nuclear arsenal would be useless in stopping the United States from imposing a blockade. Nuclear deterrence operates even in the context of war. It is unlikely that China would turn their nuclear weapons against the United States when under even a crippling blockade because the United States could respond overwhelmingly. A severe economic decline would be difficult to face, but nuclear weapons raining down on Beijing and Shanghai are on an entirely different plane. The incentive to not escalate to the point of nuclear warfare would be significant, and both sides understand this. The United States would have free reign to conduct the blockade without concern of nuclear escalation because of mutual deterrence.

Recent events support this view. In the context of the Ukraine Crisis, the United States has leveraged sanctions against Russia, which has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, without fear of escalation. Another one or 10,000 Russian nuclear weapons would not change the fact that economic disruption is very different from physical destruction. If the possible effects of a blockade are as serious as Zhang argues, a strengthened nuclear deterrent is not the way to counter it.

Zhang is correct, however, to argue that China’s best way to counteract a potential blockade by the U.S. Navy is to avoid war entirely. Oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan are highly vulnerable. Hitting fixed targets with precision weapons is a skill the United States military has very nearly perfected, with strikes this summer in Syria from carrier-based aircraft and Tomahawk-toting surface ships again proving the point. He also correctly assesses the PLA Navy as insufficient to protect its maritime trade routes. It has no experience conducting convoy operations and has limited, if slowly improving, antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Despite the effort expended to deploy a task force off Somalia, China does not have the capacity to support the number and array of forces necessary to defend its trade routes.

Not your grandpa’s U-Boot

Furthermore, the geography of East Asia contains numerous maritime chokepoints, U.S. submarines are fast, quiet, and have incredible endurance, the U.S. surface fleet has decades of experience conducting maritime interdiction in some of the same waters it would blockade, and the United States has the ability to intercept maritime traffic far outside the range of PLAN capabilities, interdicting oil tankers at their source in the Persian Gulf. While Air-Sea battle in the face of A2/AD capabilities requires the development of any number of new weapons systems, the U.S. Navy has the capacity now and for the foreseeable future to cripple the Chinese economy in the event of war, at ranges far outside those of any existing or upcoming A2/AD capabilities. There is no simple panacea for China to overcome the threat of blockade in the event of war, but Zhang does get it right when he says that China’s best option is to avoid conflict entirely.

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Ian Sundstrom is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy and holds a master’s degree in War Studies from King’s College London. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the United States Department of Defense.

China’s Nine-Dashed Line Faces Renewed Assault

By Scott Cheney-Peters

China’s ambiguous claim to the South China Sea, approximately demarcated by a series of hash marks known as the “nine-dashed line,” faced objections from an expanding number of parties over the past two weeks. While a challenge from the United States came from an unsurprising source, actions by Indonesia and Vietnam were unexpected in their tone and timing.

8-e48b8c470eOn December 5th, the U.S. State Department released its analysis of the compatibility of China’s nine-dashed line with international law. The report attempted to set aside the issue of sovereignty and explore “several possible interpretations of the dashed-line claim and the extent to which those interpretations are consistent with the international law of the sea.” The analysis found that as a demarcation of claims to land features within the line and their conferred maritime territory, the least expansive interpretation, the claim is consistent with international law but reiterated that ultimate sovereignty is subject to resolution with the other claimants.

As a national boundary, the report went on, the line “would not have a proper legal basis under the law of the sea,” due to its unilateral nature and its inconsistent distance from land features that could confer maritime territory. Alternately, although many commentators have indicated China bases its claims on “historic” rights pre-dating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, the report argued that the history China points to does not fit the narrow “category of historic claims recognized” in UNCLOS under which historic rights may be conferred. Lastly, the report noted that as China has filed no formal claim supporting its nine-dashed line, the ambiguity over the exact nature and location of the line itself undermines under international law China’s argument that it possesses maritime rights to the circumscribed waters, concluding:

“For these reasons, unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those land features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the LOS Convention, its dashed-line claim does not accord with the international law of the sea.”

Although such analysis reflects prior U.S. policy positions, less expected were the pointed signals from Indonesia, which has built a reputation as a mediator among ASEAN states in dealing with China and striven to downplay the overlap by the nine-dashed line of its own claimed exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea from Natuna Island. On Tuesday at the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, senior Indonesian presidential advisor Luhut Binsar Panjaitan emphasized that the country was “very firm” that its “sovereignty cannot be negotiated,” while stressing the importance of dialogue to peacefully manage matters. Further, in response to a question from an audience member, Panjaitan stated (56:00 mark in the video below) that the development of gas fields offshore Natuna in cooperation with Chevron would “give a signal to China, ‘you cannot play a game here because of the presence of the U.S.’” Meanwhile Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti noted that after sinking Vietnamese vessels the Indonesian Navy said it had captured illegally fishing she was considering sinking 5 Thai and 22 Chinese vessels also caught.

As Prashanth Parameswaran notes at The Diplomat, Indonesia is playing a balancing act – seeking at the same time to protect its sovereign interests as it attempts to align new president Joko Widodo (Jokowi)’s “Maritime Axis”/“Maritime Fulcrum” initiative with Xi Jinping’s “Maritime Silk Road” and play a leading role in China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. To some observers, sinking the Thai and Chinese boats is now necessary to preserve Indonesia’s image of impartiality, while others believe such action may be redundant if China heeds the warning that such behavior will no longer be tolerated.

Vietnam too took surprise action over the nine-dashed line, in a move long-mooted but unexpected in its timing. Vietnam’s foreign ministry announced last week that it had filed papers with the Hague arbitral tribunal overseeing the case submitted by the Philippines, asking that its rights and interests be considered in the ruling. Vietnam supported the Philippines position arguing that China’s nine-dashed line is “without legal basis.” While a regional source in The South China Morning Post noted that the action was as much about protecting “Vietnamese interests vis-à-vis the Philippines as it is directed against China,” and Professor Carlyle Thayer described it as “a cheap way of getting into the back door without joining the Philippines’ case,” Thayer also told Bloomberg News that it “raises the stature of the case in the eyes of the arbitrational tribunal.”

China-Vietnam-RigIf the actions taken by the United States, Indonesia, and Vietnam were surprising, China’s reactions were not. On December 7th, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a white paper of its own on the Philippines’ arbitration case. The document states that China’s policy, as established in its 2006 statement on UNCLOS ratification, is to exclude maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration. Additionally, the paper says that while the current arbitration is ostensibly about the compatibility of China’s nine-dashed line with international law, “the essence of the subject-matter” deals with a mater of maritime delimitation and territorial sovereignty. The paper goes on to say that until the matter of sovereignty of the land features in the South China Sea is conclusively settled it is impossible to determine the extent to which China’s claims exceed international law.

In effect, China is taking the position that only after it has conducted and conclude bilateral sovereignty negotiations will its nine-dashed line be open to critique. While the foreign ministry may be right that the Philippines is attempting to force the issue of territorial sovereignty, its argument that this prevents scrutiny of the nine-dashed line’s accordance with international law rings hollow.

At the end of the day, China has repeatedly stated, and its new policy paper affirms, that it will “neither accept nor participate in the arbitration” initiated by the Philippines. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei likewise remarked of Vietnam’s filing with the tribunal that “China will never accept such a claim.” So it is prudent to ask what benefit will come of the legal maneuvers. Some, such as Richard Javad Heydarian, a political-science professor at De La Salle University, point to the economic harm already incurred by the Philippines in opportunity costs and the danger of having created a worse domestic and international environment for settling the disputes. Yet given the lengthening list of states willing to stake a legal position on the matter and the moral weight of a potential court ruling, China can claim and attempt to enforce what it wants, but it will be increasingly clear that it is doing so in contravention of international law.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council.