Tag Archives: China

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis

Vietnam and the US Move Closer, But Need to Discuss A2/AD

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Construction on South Johnson Atoll, includes a ramp and a large enclosed storage area where China is thought to have moved PLC-09 122mm self propelled artillery, seen in satellite photos. Source: VietnamNet.vn.
Construction on South Johnson Atoll, includes a ramp and a large enclosed storage area where China is thought to have moved PLC-09 122mm self propelled artillery, seen in satellite photos. (VietnamNet.vn.)

By Zachary Abuza

Since 2014, China has engaged in massive reclamation efforts in the Spratly islands, adding nearly 2,000 acres according to the U.S. Department of Defense. The placement, construction, and capabilities of these islands, including Johnson South, Cuateron, Gaven, Fiery Cross, Subi, Hughes, and Mischief Reefs has given China several strategic advantages and puts many Vietnamese held features in a vulnerable position. As a result of the reclamation approach, China can not only potentially control sea lines of communication and enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), but challenge the status quo control of features in the Spratly Islands through anti-access area denial (A2/AD) operations.

While Chinese assertiveness and lack of transparency have driven Hanoi and Washington closer together, there remain limits to how far the relationship can grow as their strategic concerns and priorities do differ, despite US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s 31 May – 2 June visit to Vietnam where he signed a Joint Vision Statement for Operations. While the United States is focused on freedom of navigation and overflight, Hanoi is primarily concerned about how the potential for China’s reclamation to challenge their Spratly holdings. Hanoi is right to be worried. China’s Military Strategy, released on 26 May 2015, makes clear that its patience for the “militarization” and “illegal occupation” of what it deems its territory is unlikely to be tolerated as it continues to make strategic investments in its maritime capabilities in the sovereign defense of its maritime domain.

Source: South China Morning Post.
Disputed islands in the South China Sea. (South China Morning Post)

Chinese reclamation efforts and their ambiguous territorial claims threaten US interests in freedom of navigation. China has already said that “freedom of navigation definitely does not mean military vessel or aircraft of a foreign country can willfully enter the territorial waters or airspace.” On 25 May, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman put it this way: “The freedom of navigation and over-flight, however, is not tantamount to the violation of the international law by foreign military vessels and aircraft in defiance of the legitimate rights and interests as well as the safety of over-flight and navigation of other countries.” China has warned that US challenge flights and ship passages, which to date have observed a 12NM distance from China’s reclaimed islands, are “irresponsible, dangerous” and risk provoking war.

The United States has signaled that it is going to increase its freedom of navigation and overflight challenges. On 27 May, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter warned Beijing: “There should be no mistake about this: The United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world.” The establishment of territorial waters from artificial islands and the potential declaration of an ADIZ is an absolute redline for the United States.

But for Vietnam, the concern is less about freedom of navigation for the $5 trillion in international trade that passes through the South China Sea, and a more immediate concern about what Chinese reclamation efforts mean for the security of their held features.

Without naming Vietnam, China’s Military Strategy warns that “some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.” And in response to the international media’s focus on Chinese reclamation, their state-controlled media has highlighted Vietnamese efforts. As such, the 2015 white paper makes very clear that the China’s over-riding strategic interests are maritime in nature and that its force development will focus on “critical security domains,” maritime being the first.

China’s white paper singled out external countries that “Maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China,” i.e., the United States, it warned that “some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.” The focus on that “illegal occupation” will be driven by China’s new capabilities garnered through its reclamation efforts.

While China’s white paper reiterates Beijing’s long-held position that it only uses force defensively, Vietnam has an acute understanding of Chinese pre-emptive tactics. The white paper states a goal of “enrich[ing] the strategic concept of an active defense.” This translates into stealthy, proactive and pre-emptive tactics used to “defend” Chinese sovereignty. Their “active defense” strategy also talks about force “flexibility and mobility,” improved joint operations, “concentrat[ion] of superior forces, and the “integrated use of all operational means and methods.” The South China Sea is the proving ground for these new doctrines.

Vietnamese lawmakers are raising the concern that once China’s current reclamation efforts are completed, that it will have the military capabilities in place to renew offensive operations and grab other features, such as they did in March 1988 on Johnson Reef.

Yet that is unlikely for two reasons. First, the diplomatic fallout would be too great. A majority of the ever cautious ASEAN would be galvanized to act. There’s nothing that threatens China’s strategy more than a multilateral response and possibly even ASEAN moving forward with a Code of Conduct, without Chinese participation. Until now, as Patrick Cronin put it, China has successfully “relie[d] on this risk-averseness, and resort[ed] to divide-and-conquer tactics any time the 10 Southeast Asian countries appear to be uniting on anything, even a broad statement, that might be construed as antithetical to China’s interests.”

Second, Vietnam’s own military modernization has not gone unnoticed in China. Hanoi has seen the steadiest increase in military expenditure in the region: 314 percent between 2005 and 2014. In that time it has developed the most lethal power projection capabilities in Southeast Asia, including one of the largest navies, with three advanced Kilo-class submarines already delivered and the final three due in service by 2016, two Sigma class corvettes, two Gepard class frigates, with two more with ASW capabilities to be delivered this year, Molniya class corvettes now in indigenous production. Vietnam also has the most sophisticated missile force in the region, which now includes Yakhont and Shaddock anti ship missiles in indigenous production, Brahmos anti-ship missiles and Klub submarine launched missiles that could target Chinese facilities in the Spratlys. While Vietnam could not prevail in a a protracted conflict, it does have the capabilities to significantly raise the costs for China in a short-term exchange.

As such, China will continue to build islands, but by continuing to seize un-occupied and sub-surface features. It has no need to provoke armed conflict by attacking manned islands. Scarborough Shoal, seized in 2012 from the Philippines, should be seen as the template for future Chinese action. No country has China’s capacity for making islands out of nothing. Reclamation efforts will soon be complete and their fleet of dredgers will move on to the next strategic locales.

And it is this that gives Hanoi pause. More than armed conflict and the military seizure of some of the its 19 features with military personnel, is the fear of China becoming emboldened to begin engaging in A2/AD activities, harassing Vietnam from resupplying its small and indefensible concrete structures and some 16 lighthouses and aids to navigation, until diplomatic pressure against them builds and cooling off for a period of time before resuming those operations.

One of Vietnam's two Gerard Class Frigates. Two more will be delivered later this year.
One of Vietnam’s two Gerard Class Frigates. Two more will be delivered later this year.

China is increasingly poised to engage in A2/AD operations against Vietnam in two locales, the Union and Thitu Reefs. The recent reports of self-propelled artillery being deployed on those reclaimed islands, as well as ramps in new structures to store such equipment, only adds to the mounting evidence that China is laying the groundwork for A2/AD operations, should it determine the conditions to be favorable.

For example, the two newly reclaimed islands of Johnson South and Hughes, are located in close proximity (eyesight) to four Vietnamese held features: Sin Cowe Island, Sin Cowe East Island, Collins Reef, and Landsdowne Reef. Sin Cowe is the seventh largest feature in the Spratlys, an eight hectare natural island, which the Vietnamese have built several all weather facilities, a lighthouse and done limited reclamation efforts. The latter two are simply concrete structures built on submerged reefs. While neither Johnson South or Hughes will have an airfield, both have helicopter pads and ports to enforce a maritime siege. Likewise, the newly created Gaven Island poises China to be able to deny access to Vietnam’s Sand Cay, a natural island, but also its small facilities on nearby Namyit, Eldad, and Petley Reefs.

Of even greater, though longer term, concern to Hanoi is the reclamation and construction on Cuateron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, with its 3,000 meter airstrip, which will ultimately give China the ability to project power southwesterly into the Vietnamese-dominated London Reef region.

There needs to be serious thinking in both Hanoi and Washington about contingency planning should China try to enforce A2/AD policies. To date, China has used both grey hull and white hulled coast guard ships to try to block resupply efforts to the derelict Philippine ship Sierra Madre grounded on Second Thomas shoal, east of Mischief Reef. These newly reclaimed islands give them all the more capabilities for A2/AD operations. China will likely raise the costs for others for what it terms the “illegal occupation” of its national sovereignty. Routine and concerted harassment efforts may become a cornerstone of China’s strategy.

As Vietnam and the United States continue to deepen ties, including the current visit by Secretary of Defense Carter and the June 2015 visit to Washington by Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, the two sides need to seriously discuss the strategic implications of China’s reclamation, and how they may be used to challenge the status quo. Aid for maritime security modernization, including $18 million for patrol craft are insufficient. And while the US and Vietnam have agreed to move forward with arms sales, there will always be limits to how much Hanoi is willing to and can afford to buy; though there are suggestions of some joint production. On 1 June, Secretary Carter  and Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh signed their first “joint vision statement for greater operational cooperation.”

Make no mistake, Hanoi will never formally align itself with Washington against China. But it would be an important signal if this document addressed Chinese A2/AD operations, though unlikely as the bilateral defense relationship is still defined by the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding, which does not include kinetic operations.

And yet, the two sides need to have candid discussions regarding  such scenarios. If China begins to engage in A2/AD activities how will the two sides respond, if at all? Could A2/AD operations against Vietnam pull in the United States? Should, for example, China try to prevent helicopter access to Vietnamese islands, would the US consider that the de facto imposition of an ADIZ? Is the harassment of Vietnamese resupply ships equivalent to trying to prevent international maritime shipping or freedom of navigation challenges by the US Navy?

Vietnam is clearly pleased with a more robust US presence in the South China Sea and its more assertive challenge to Chinese sovereignty claims. But efforts to date failed to deter China from reclamation. The next phase has to be developing a strategy that deters China from using the reclaimed islands to challenge the territorial status quo, freedom of navigation and overflight.

Zachary Abuza, PhD is an independent analyst of Southeast Asian politics and security affairs.  Follow him on Twitter at @ZachAbuza.

Asia-Pacific

The Royal Thai Navy: Where to Post-Coup?

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Guest Post by Paul Pryce 

With a coup d’état in May 2014 and the appointment of General Prayut Chan-o-cha as Prime Minister, 2014 proved to be a tumultuous year in Thai politics. Still faced with a deeply divided society, it is difficult for the Thai authorities to articulate foreign policy priorities or a grand strategy for the country. Even so, the Royal Thai Navy may soon have important tools available with which Thailand can make its presence felt internationally

Although often overlooked by most reports in favor of the contributions made by the Chinese and the Russians in years since, Thailand was an important player in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. In response to an increase in Somali-based piracy, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 was established in January 2009 to secure freedom of navigation along international shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Although comprised largely of vessels and crews from NATO member states, Thailand deployed a Pattani-class off-shore patrol vessel and a supply ship to join the force in 2010-2011.

This was an unprecedented move. For the first time, Thailand deployed military assets abroad to defend its interests. HTMS Pattani and HTMS Similan, the supply ship, did not simply serve in token roles: Thai forces engaged in combat against pirates in two separate incidents on October 23rd, 2010. Beyond hosting ASEAN-related events, such as the 8th ASEAN Navy Chiefs’ Meeting in 2014, the Royal Thai Navy has since adopted a much more subdued posture, however. This can in part be attributed to the political dominance of the Royal Thai Army through last year’s coup.

Were there to be need for Thai participation in a similar multinational operation in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the world, it is doubtful that the Thai authorities would find the political will to deploy any assets in the near future. But the Royal Thai Navy will soon see its capabilities bolstered. If national unity can be preserved in some way, Thailand could see its international image raised considerably. It has commissioned two stealth-capable corvettes based on the design of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) Gwanggaeto the Great-class destroyers. With a displacement of approximately 3,900 tons, these would be among the largest vessels in Thailand’s arsenal, second only in size to the Royal Thai Navy’s two American-made Knox-class frigates.

Although it is currently unclear when Thailand expects delivery of its two Gawnggaeto the Great variants, the eventual addition of these vessels to the fleet will greatly enhance its capacity to project power in the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea, and beyond. Thailand has no maritime disputes with China; tensions over territory exist only in relation to the land borders with Cambodia and Laos. As such, it is a reasonable assumption that the previous government intended to employ the new vessels not to exert Thai sovereignty, but to appease military elites and to attain international prestige through contributions to future multinational maritime operations. That the current junta has not cancelled this procurement suggests that it too shares these goals.

Of course, achieving the political stability necessary to engage in expeditionary missions will be a tall order, especially as legal action against Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand’s former Prime Minister who was ousted in the May 2014 coup, is ongoing. Until such issues can be resolved and civilian oversight of the military is adequately restored, HTMS Chakri Naruebet, pictured below, may represent the future of the Royal Thai Navy.

The Royal Thai Naval vessel HTMS CHAKRINARUEBET (CVH 911) in the South China Sea.
HTMS CHAKRINARUEBET  in the South China Sea.

This vessel, which serves as Thailand’s flagship and is based on the design of the Spanish aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias, spends much of its time docked at Sattahip naval base. No longer able to accommodate Harrier airframes, the Chakri Naruebet can now carry a small complement of helicopters and occasionally serves as a royal yacht. The two stealth corvettes may suffer a similar fate if Bangkok’s palace politics persist.

Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security, NATO affairs, and African regional integration.

Asia-Pacific, Current Operations

From Words to Action in the South China Sea – Updated 5/22

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Update 5/22:

– China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman says U.S. actions in the South China Sea “‘irresponsible, dangerous” and that China’s military drove away the U.S. military aircraft.

– A Pentagon spokesman says the P-8 and naval vessels have not yet gone within 12nm of the islands, but said “that would be the next step.”

– The Washington Free Beacon also reports US officials as saying “China tried to electronically jam U.S. drone flights over the South China Sea in a bid to thwart spying on disputed island military construction.”

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InterceptLast week the Wall Street Journal reported that the United States was considering sending U.S. air and naval assets to conduct freedom of navigation (FoN) transits around China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, specifically the Spratlys – claimed in part or in whole by six nations. Today, CNN released exclusive footage from just such a flight, as a P-8 may have flown within the claimed 12nm of territorial airspace of three of the islands (more on that below), including Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef. I highly recommend watching the video to gain a greater appreciation of the sort of interaction that is likely to occur with increasing regularity, and to see the dredging in action that CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has so ably documented through overhead satellite imagery [full disclosure: I’ve contributed to the site in the past].

interphoto_1428568832One of the questions bedeviling the maritime security community over the past several years has been how to respond to China’s “salami slicing” actions – a question that took on new urgency with the previous year’s massive surge in reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. Among others, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)’s excellent Maritime Strategy Series included several reports devoted to developing options to provide answers for policy makers. Unfortunately, much of the analysis more broadly has struggled to move from generalities of the need to “impose costs” or, conversely, to “develop cooperative strategies” to the specifics of application. And, for those that did, there had until now been little evidence of words being translated into action.

Spratly_Islands-CIA_WFB_MapNot everyone is happy. Over at our partners’ site – ASPI’s The Strategist – Sam Bateman questions whether the “US knows what it’s doing” and rightly points out that FoN operations have to be “conducted with ‘due regard’ to the rights of coastal States.” But he also asserts that U.S. action is an indication that the United States has “taken a position on the sovereignty of the claims.” If true, (and that’s not official policy) it belies the first qualm since the United States presumably would not therefore need to take claimed but invalid rights into account. Bateman is on stronger ground in noting that if the Navy is sailing through the territorial waters or flying through the islands’ territorial airspace (it is not clear in the video whether this is the case) – water/airspace granted due to the small fractions of at least Fiery Cross Reef’s natural features that remain above water during high tide – it would do so at risk of violating the “innocent” condition of innocent passage if the vessels were conducting military missions such as intelligence gathering. This is not the case if the island is entirely man-made, if a military vessel refrained from action prejudicial to the coastal state, or if the vessel stayed in an island’s EEZ – outside the 12nm of the territorial waters.

Of course this is all moot if, as Bateman suggests, the United States by these actions is declaring it holds specific island sovereignty claims invalid, rather than waiting any longer for China to explain upon what basis its claims are made. Perhaps the best course of action is for the United States to declare that until China has explained the basis for the nine-dash line claim in a manner in accordance with international law and so adjudicated it will not honor any of China’s South China Seas sovereignty claims or the rights derived thereof. This would cut through some of the legal complexity in providing a basis for the ongoing FoN activities and point to a way for China to take action to resolve the situation. While it is unlikely China will be persuaded to prematurely end its reclamation efforts, the actions undertaken by the Navy may at least demonstrate the likelihood that a declared South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without resolution of outstanding claims will result in a frequent high-profile acts of indifference.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). He is a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, a member of the Truman National Security Project, and a CNAS Next-Generation National Security Fellow. 

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

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By Dmitry Filipoff

“The U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.”

Superbly researched and organized, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress by CRS analyst Ronald O’Rourke serves as an excellent resource from which to better understand China’s evolving naval capabilities and how the U.S. Navy can retain its edge in the face of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenge. The scope of the report is wide, with information given on a large variety of platform and weapons procurements. The breadth is matched by depth of analysis, as the author assesses the sophistication of individual systems, offers concepts of employment, describes potential conflict scenarios, and explains how naval modernization is tied to broader policy. The report is broadly organized into sections that cover Chinese platforms and weapons, American policy decisions responding to China’s naval rise, key U.S. Navy acquisition programs, relevant sections from the National Defense Authorization Act, and an appendix providing supplemental readings. Certain sections could be strengthened and new areas could be explored to further flesh out the expanse of information, but nonetheless this fact packed publication has plenty to teach.

The detailed section on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thoroughly informative on China’s maturing navy. Every surface combatant the PLAN fields is covered in the report. Each ship class’s capabilities are described along with their production history and projected numbers. Ships are contrasted with the capabilities of the vessels they are replacing, producing an appreciation of progress. Furthermore, certain ships are highlighted for their ability to enable operations that were not feasible until recently, such as the power projection and humanitarian assistance missions that could be conducted by the new Liaoning carrier and Type 071 vessels. Extensive attention is devoted to the new carrier, including the significant limitations posed by a ski-ramp configuration and the critical research role the vessel will play in familiarizing the PLAN with carrier operations. Information is also given on upcoming and prospective designs such as the Type 055 cruiser, Type 081 amphibious assault ship, and Type 095 nuclear attack submarine. In total, these sections combine to produce a clear trajectory of naval modernization.

The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier. The vessel was commissioned in 2012, and is being used to familiarize the PLA Navy with carrier operations.

The American perspective is captured as well. The report documents in numbers the changes being made to the Navy’s force posture and forward basing in order to operationalize the Asia Pivot. The Air Sea Battle concept is discussed along with the operational goal of disrupting kill chains in the electromagnetic spectrum. An especially insightful subsection describes the variety of nuances that should inform comparisons between the U.S. and Chinese navies, and naval forces in general. A unique strength of CRS reports, relevant legislation is included, providing key information into how Congress is influencing policy towards China and America’s own naval modernization. These sections in the National efense Authorization Act (NDAA), will help the reader better understand how Congress perceives the implications of China’s naval modernization, and which ongoing U.S. Navy procurement programs have Congressional priority towards meeting the A2/AD challenge. The NDAA also identifies certain knowledge gaps and requires reports be drafted in order to raise awareness, offering a glimpse into potential weaknesses and priorities.  

There are certain key points and gaps of information within the report that need to be addressed in order to fully appreciate the increasing modernity of China’s Navy and A2/AD abilities. For example, the author states “Changes in platform capability have been more dramatic than changes in platform numbers” but this is contradicted by ONI Officer Jesse Karotkin’s testimony that is included in the appendix: “China is implementing much longer production runs of advanced surface combatants and nuclear submarines, suggesting a greater satisfaction in their recent ship designs.” The tables provided by the author on yearly ship comissionings support this conclusion, marking a new and more confident phase of modernization that is gaining momentum. This trend highlights an aspect of modernization that requires greater attention, China’s increasingly formidable shipbuilding industrial base.

China’s naval modernization can be subsumed under a greater A2/AD aspiration, and the author stresses that proper assessment of a potential maritime conflict includes understanding “maritime relevant capabilities that are outside their navies.” Information is included on land based platforms such as backfire bombers procured from Russia, UAV’s, ASBMs, and even EMPs. However, if it is the intent to draw awareness towards addressing the A2/AD threat as a whole, primary attention should be given to China’s robust cruise missile inventory, which is the most significant weapon system towards enabling land based A2/AD. Although the author takes note throughout the report which platforms can field ASCMs and LACMs, the ASCM section lacks information on the precise range and speed of China’s cruise missiles and their advantages relative to comparable weapons fielded by American surface combatants. There is also no information provided on LACM types and capabilities.

The author writes “China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.” Yet these topics received hardly any attention, and are arguably more critical to the maturity of the PLAN than capabilities borne from more modern platforms and systems.

When it comes to logistics, underway replenishment vessels are the foundation of blue water power projection. The number of these vessels in a Navy’s inventory is indicative of broader policy and the priority placed on projecting presence far from home. China possesses eight such ships, with three constructed from 2012-2014. The five type 903A “Fuchi” class vessels are relatively modern, with the first pair of ships launched in 2004. These ships may be among the most operationally experienced vessels in China’s navy. Since China began its anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 there have been twenty deployments, and a replenishment vessel has accompanied every task force sent. The PLAN also operates two type 904 general stores ships, which have delivered necessities to installations in the Spratly Islands.

Type 903 Fuchi class vessel conducts simultaneous replenishment of Type 071 landing dock vessel and Type 052C guided missile destroyer
Type 903 Fuchi class vessel conducts simultaneous replenishment of Type 071 landing dock vessel and Type 052C guided missile destroyer

The PLAN is clearly committed to producing personnel with the high degree of technical proficiency necessary to operate modern warfighting platforms and systems, and such investments are already paying off in active operations. The PLAN is partnered with thirteen universities, and financial aid given to enrolled students was doubled to ten thousand RMB in 2009. Beginning in 2012, the PLAN launched programs partnering with specialized vocational schools from which high school graduates chosen through a competitive process would receive senior technical certifications following graduation, and be inducted as NCOs. Skill redundancy is achieved by requiring more technical proficiencies be acquired as an enlisted sailor rises in rank, resulting in units with greater shared expertise.  In 2011, technical evaluation stations were stood up in an effort to standardize assessment of NCO performance, and operate at the level of local units.

Author Ron O’Rourke writes “China’s naval modernization is a broad based effort with many elements” and China’s Naval Modernization certainly captures many of them. However, analysis of China’s military has been dominated by more observable material developments such as ship acquisition and weapons procurement. The trend has been made clear, and now it is as much a given for China to be continually introducing better platforms as it is for the United States. But these developments are subsidiary to more immaterial initiatives. Key elements such as doctrine, organization of forces, personnel education, operational experience, interoperability, and exercises are all more meaningful indicators of the growth of the PLA Navy than new equipment. And all of these areas have undergone their own changes in tandem with procurement programs. The challenges posed by the effective implementation and evaluation of these reforms need to be acknowledged, but this institutional development of the PLA Navy is what will ultimately best empower it to function as an enabler of policy.

Dmitry Filipoff is an Associate Editor with CIMSEC.