Dynamite Idea! USS Vesuvius’ Dead End

The following is part of Dead Ends Week at CIMSEC, where we pick apart past experiments and initiatives in the hopes of learning something from those that just didn’t quite pan out. See the rest of the posts here

These days, the Spanish-American War is mostly remembered for Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, “Remember the Maine!” and America’s emergence upon the world stage. Within the maritime domain, we also remember it as a showcase for the United States’ new steel navy and the technical innovations which laid the groundwork for the Great White Fleet and beyond. All the basics were there – steam power, electricity, large-caliber guns, and armor plating.

But they also had some things that didn’t quite make it.

Among them was the USS Vesuvius. Vesuvius was commissioned in 1890 as a unique animal in the navies of the world – a dynamite gun cruiser. The 900-ton ship’s main battery was composed of three guns that fired dynamite-filled rounds using compressed air. The rationale for the pneumatic system was a reduced chance of prematurely detonating the ordnance from the shock of firing. Depending on the weight of ordnance launched, Vesuvius’s range was anywhere from 2000 to 4000 yards. A major drawback was that the guns were fixed, so aiming required maneuvering the entire ship.

Dynamite gun muzzles aboard Vesuvius

Dynamite gun muzzles aboard Vesuvius

Despite the weapons’ short range and difficulty with targeting, Vesuvius still saw remarkable success during the war in Cuba. Although primarily used as a dispatch vessel, owing to her small size and high speed (21 knots!), Vesuvius still participated in eight shore bombardments of Santiago. It would quietly sneak near shore under cover of darkness and, with no more noise than a sound “like a cough,” would launch several dynamite rounds into the city. Because of the silence of the guns, there was no warning before the explosions came. It is doubtful the bombardments had much practical effect on Spain’s technical ability to fight, but it had a devastating psychological effect on Spanish troops in the city –troops who went on to lose the war at the Battle of Santiago.

The dynamite gun didn’t last past the war in the U.S. Navy, though. USS Vesuvius was removed from service in September 1898 and repurposed as a torpedo-testing vessel. Torpedo tubes replaced the pneumatic tubes, and the ship enjoyed a happy life plying the waters off of Newport, Rhode Island, into the 1920s.

The three dynamite guns below deck on Vesuvius

The three dynamite guns below deck on Vesuvius

And with that, the dynamite gun’s brief chapter in naval history was closed. But, whether intentional or not, it still managed to demonstrate two principles that would only grow in importance as time passed.

At a technical level, the same basic pneumatic technology that launched rounds packed with dynamite is also what launches torpedoes today, from both surface ships and submarines – just one of a myriad of systems to which compressed air is critical.

Vesuvius underway in 1891

Vesuvius underway in 1891

At a strategic level, the dynamite gun’s employment in the Spanish-American War anticipated, at a very small scale, the use of terror weapons such as the Paris Gun, area bombing, V-1 and V-2 in later decades. Vesuvius clearly had no ability to hit a specific target, but its ability to impact a general area was unrivaled due to its “stealth” qualities. Whether any Spanish troops were actually killed by Vesuvius is tough to say – but without a doubt, the city of Santiago feared the night.

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant who has fired air guns before, but none quite this big. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense or his employer.

You Can’t Get Far Without a Few Dead Ends

Welcome to Dead Ends Week at CIMSEC, where we will pick apart past experiments and initiatives that just didn’t quite pan out. Some of them you may have heard of – others will be quite obscure. All will be informative, and hopefully a little entertaining.

A couple of ideas inspired Dead Ends Week and inform all the pieces to a certain extent. First, success is an iterative process. A lot of different things will get tried along the way to a winning solution, and many of them just won’t work out – but even those dead ends offer lessons in how to succeed later. Where appropriate, these posts will attempt to capture at least some of the lessons learned.

And second, to invert a famous quote, failure was an option in most of the examples examined here. Obviously no one likes to fail – however, failure in any one of these small initiatives would not have doomed an entire country or military strategy (with a possible exception in czarist Russia, as you’ll see later this week). The point being, if a prerequisite to success is some educational failure, then failure needs to be affordable. And if it’s affordable, then chances are you have the resources to hedge your bets and have a parallel project with a different approach to the same problem.

The paradoxical upshot: if failure is truly not an option at the macro level, be prepared to accept some failure at the micro level.

Over the coming week, you will see genius, idiocy, gallantry, cowardice, sailing ships, steam ships, circles, sonar domes, gun decks, poop decks, trapeze acts and Nigel Tufnel.

And if that doesn’t sound like a parade of spectacular failure… well, I guess my writing ability has hit a dead end.

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant and strategic communications consultant who grew up on a cul-de-sac, which isn’t quite a dead end but is pretty close. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense or his employer.

Sea Control 27 – International Law, Crimea, and China

seacontrolemblemProfessor Anthony Clark Arend joins us to discuss International law. We discuss some basic definitions, and their influence on international actors, using the lens of Crimea and the Chinese ADIZ. I also learn later that my mic input has been the crummy laptop mic all month, explaining all my audio quality frustrations. Remember, subscribe on iTunes or Stitcher Stream Radio. Leave a comment and five stars!

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 27- International Law, China, and Crimea

CIMSEC’s Weekend Longreads – March 21st, 2014

Welcome to the Inaugural edition of CIMSEC’s Weekend Longreads, bringing you the three most impactful pieces from the past week, as voted by CIMSEC’s members.

Russian Roulette: The Invasion of Ukraine

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNKsLlK52ss?list=PLw613M86o5o5zqF6WJR8zuC7Uwyv76h7R&w=560&h=315]

Simon Ostrovsky – VICE News – 2 hours 10 minutes (16 dispatches)

Simon Ostrovsky chronicles the crisis in Crimea as it unfolds, highlighting the ambiguity, tensions, and absurdities enveloping the peninsula with VICE’s characteristic blend of improbable interviews and unrivaled access. Coverage remains ongoing.

Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study

Commander Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy – 53 min (10k words)

Commander Snodgrass offers an insightful look into the Navy’s looming retention crisis, drawing on historical examples, Fortune 500  firms’ talent retention efforts, and decades of experience to deliver a set of compelling and actionable recommendations, with relevance well beyond the USN.

Silicon Valley’s Youth Problem

Yiren Lu – New York Times – 35 minutes (7k words)

Yiren Lu explores the implications of the divide between young and old in Silicon Valley. Serves as an interesting corollary to the proliferation of JO lead innovation efforts within DoD, and highlights the need to integrate a range of experience to bring meaingful innovation to both infrastructure, and end-user processes. 

 

Austin Price is an Army Cadet studying at George Mason University, with a healthy interest in East Asia and an unhealthy appetite for Sichuan Hotpot. 

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.