Opinion: It’s Time for the U.S. to take the Lead on ASAT Legislation

Link May 26, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

The United States is undeniably reliant on its robust space-based architecture for both military and commercial operations. Having invested heavily in space for more than forty years now, the United States enjoys what RAND’s Benjamin Lambeth calls “asymmetric advantages” [1] commensurate with that investment. Unprotected and largely unaddressed by international legislation, however, these advantages could quickly become “asymmetric vulnerabilities” were they disabled, destroyed, or otherwise disrupted. The threat to these systems from Anti-Satellite technologies, specifically dual-use anti-ballistic missile (ABM) platforms, is becoming increasingly more acute as more nations develop the capability to disrupt and/or deny the U.S. and its allies use of its extensive space constellation. In order to preserve the favorable balance of power in space it currently enjoys, the United States should lead the development of legally binding international legislation restricting the use of anti-satellite weapons. Such legislation would not only protect the United States’ ability to draw on its considerable space investment, but also protect the peaceful use of and access to space as a global common.

The United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002 opened the door for unfettered development and testing of anti-ballistic missile technologies, some of which retain ASAT capabilities with only minor modifications. Between 2007 and 2008, China and the United States both conducted tests of operational, modified ABM direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons.

The PRC’s 2007 use of a DF-21 modification dubbed SC-19 to destroy their FY-1C weather satellite in High Earth Orbit (HEO) created a cloud of space debris projected to remain in orbit for decades. Shortly thereafter, the United States deployed an SM-3 from the USS Lake Erie to destroy a decaying NRO satellite in low-earth orbit. The 2008 test was successful, and though it didn’t create a cloud of space debris like SC-19, the combination of these tests and following PRC tests (none of which, it should be noted, were against a ‘space object’ as defined by UNOOSA) re-ignited the discussion of the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), dormant since the height of the Cold War.

Existing and proposed legislation on the matter is either too narrowly focused or insufficient in scope to effectively manage the question of PAROS or assure continued access to space as a global common. The United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty, first introduced in 1966, is, along with four other UN treaties and agreements, the extent of existing international legislation on the use of space. Broad and permissively non-specific, the cumulative weight of these treaties and agreements does not serve to affect the development of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons, only assigning responsibility for the damage such a weapon would inflict – a concept totally beside the point were such a weapon to be used operationally. The laudable EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, now in its third draft iteration, is painted in similarly broad-strokes, voluntary, and has thus far received a lukewarm reception from the wider international community. Russia and China have cooperatively presented working papers in 2002 and 2008 to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) concerning the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The Sino-Russian drafts are unattractive to the United States due to their ambiguity and lack of clear diction on dual use systems like SC-19. Restrictions on merely notional co-orbital systems combined with ambiguous language on operational dual-use technologies would be cold comfort to the United States, as its primary interest in space lies in the protection of the status quo, in which it enjoys tremendous advantages.

The United States’ best opportunity to protect this status quo is to take the lead in developing meaningful, specific international legislation restricting not only potential co-orbital weapons but existing dual-use ASAT capabilities as well. The alternative, going on the offensive and stoking the flame of an arms race in space, is too costly both in terms of investment and risk to the continued use of space as a peaceful, accessible global common. At the very least, the financial commitment necessary for continued development of offensive and defensive space-based technologies presents a tremendous cost in an increasingly fiscally restrained environment. This investment could be better applied to the modernization of rapidly-aging air-breathing platforms that will prove essential to the United State’s ability to maintain dominance over near-peer and proto-peer competitors (focusing on counter-A2AD platforms in the Pacific immediately jumps to mind). Further testing of kinetic-kill weapons like the one used to destroy China’s FY-1C weather satellite will create celestial litter that, depending on the orbit of the target, pollute space and pose potential hazards to surrounding constellations, threatening all space stakeholders equally.

NASA Projection of FY-1C Debris Orbital Planes

Lastly, though a “space Pearl Harbor” (to borrow a phrase from the Rumsfeld commission) may seem like an unlikely prospect after only two verified ASAT tests, it isn’t difficult to imagine a scenario in which a demonstrative ASAT launch by the PRC resulting in damage to or disruption of the United States’ overhead constellation could rapidly escalate already heightened tensions, further underscoring the utility of international legislation restricting the use of these weapons.

As none of the existing proposals on ASAT legislation are “just right,” what, then, would the United States’ best-case scenario legislation look like? Three pillars of such a proposal might include the following: a clear, discrete definition of what constitutes space, restrictions on dual use technologies being used in an ASAT capacity, and robust verification and reporting regimes. The combination of the first and second pillars (along with the fact that ABM weapons will always have the ability to act in an ASAT capacity) would provide a fail-safe for the U.S. going forward and address critics of ASAT-bans who argue that national security interests could be put in jeopardy by hostile satellites in the future. The United States’ ever-increasing dependence on overhead assets makes cogent and comprehensive action on space an absolute priority for future administrations. The prohibitive cost of engaging in an arms race in outer space (money, this author would argue, that would be much better spent on maintaining terrestrial dominance over near-peer competitors) as well as the risk to peaceful space operations and common access to space as a global common provide compelling reasons for the US to definitely take the lead on anti-ASAT legislation and, in doing so, protect their primacy and currently uncontested advantages in space.

[1] Lambeth, B. (2003). Mastering the ultimate high ground next steps in the military uses of space. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Project Air Force.

Sally DeBoer is an Associate Editor at CIMSEC.

Asia-Pacific

The Royal Thai Navy: Where to Post-Coup?

May 22, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

Guest Post by Paul Pryce

With a coup d’état in May 2014 and the appointment of General Prayut Chan-o-cha as Prime Minister, 2014 proved to be a tumultuous year in Thai politics. Still faced with a deeply divided society, it is difficult for the Thai authorities to articulate foreign policy priorities or a grand strategy for the country. Even so, the Royal Thai Navy may soon have important tools available with which Thailand can make its presence felt internationally

Although often overlooked by most reports in favor of the contributions made by the Chinese and the Russians in years since, Thailand was an important player in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. In response to an increase in Somali-based piracy, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 was established in January 2009 to secure freedom of navigation along international shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Although comprised largely of vessels and crews from NATO member states, Thailand deployed a Pattani-class off-shore patrol vessel and a supply ship to join the force in 2010-2011.

This was an unprecedented move. For the first time, Thailand deployed military assets abroad to defend its interests. HTMS Pattani and HTMS Similan, the supply ship, did not simply serve in token roles: Thai forces engaged in combat against pirates in two separate incidents on October 23^rd, 2010. Beyond hosting ASEAN-related events, such as the 8^th ASEAN Navy Chiefs’ Meeting in 2014, the Royal Thai Navy has since adopted a much more subdued posture, however. This can in part be attributed to the political dominance of the Royal Thai Army through last year’s coup.

Were there to be need for Thai participation in a similar multinational operation in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the world, it is doubtful that the Thai authorities would find the political will to deploy any assets in the near future. But the Royal Thai Navy will soon see its capabilities bolstered. If national unity can be preserved in some way, Thailand could see its international image raised considerably. It has commissioned two stealth-capable corvettes based on the design of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) Gwanggaeto the Great-class destroyers. With a displacement of approximately 3,900 tons, these would be among the largest vessels in Thailand’s arsenal, second only in size to the Royal Thai Navy’s two American-made Knox-class frigates.

Although it is currently unclear when Thailand expects delivery of its two Gawnggaeto the Great variants, the eventual addition of these vessels to the fleet will greatly enhance its capacity to project power in the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea, and beyond. Thailand has no maritime disputes with China; tensions over territory exist only in relation to the land borders with Cambodia and Laos. As such, it is a reasonable assumption that the previous government intended to employ the new vessels not to exert Thai sovereignty, but to appease military elites and to attain international prestige through contributions to future multinational maritime operations. That the current junta has not cancelled this procurement suggests that it too shares these goals.

Of course, achieving the political stability necessary to engage in expeditionary missions will be a tall order, especially as legal action against Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand’s former Prime Minister who was ousted in the May 2014 coup, is ongoing. Until such issues can be resolved and civilian oversight of the military is adequately restored, HTMS Chakri Naruebet, pictured below, may represent the future of the Royal Thai Navy.

The Royal Thai Naval vessel HTMS CHAKRINARUEBET (CVH 911) in the South China Sea. — HTMS CHAKRINARUEBET in the South China Sea.

This vessel, which serves as Thailand’s flagship and is based on the design of the Spanish aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias, spends much of its time docked at Sattahip naval base. No longer able to accommodate Harrier airframes, the Chakri Naruebet can now carry a small complement of helicopters and occasionally serves as a royal yacht. The two stealth corvettes may suffer a similar fate if Bangkok’s palace politics persist.

Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security, NATO affairs, and African regional integration.

Asia-Pacific, Current Operations

From Words to Action in the South China Sea – Updated 5/22

May 21, 2015 Guest Author 3 Comments

Follow @scheneypeters

Update 5/22:

– China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman says U.S. actions in the South China Sea “‘irresponsible, dangerous” and that China’s military drove away the U.S. military aircraft.

– A Pentagon spokesman says the P-8 and naval vessels have not yet gone within 12nm of the islands, but said “that would be the next step.”

– The Washington Free Beacon also reports US officials as saying “China tried to electronically jam U.S. drone flights over the South China Sea in a bid to thwart spying on disputed island military construction.”

———————————————————————

Last week the Wall Street Journal reported that the United States was considering sending U.S. air and naval assets to conduct freedom of navigation (FoN) transits around China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, specifically the Spratlys – claimed in part or in whole by six nations. Today, CNN released exclusive footage from just such a flight, as a P-8 may have flown within the claimed 12nm of territorial airspace of three of the islands (more on that below), including Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef. I highly recommend watching the video to gain a greater appreciation of the sort of interaction that is likely to occur with increasing regularity, and to see the dredging in action that CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has so ably documented through overhead satellite imagery [full disclosure: I’ve contributed to the site in the past].

One of the questions bedeviling the maritime security community over the past several years has been how to respond to China’s “salami slicing” actions – a question that took on new urgency with the previous year’s massive surge in reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. Among others, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)’s excellent Maritime Strategy Series included several reports devoted to developing options to provide answers for policy makers. Unfortunately, much of the analysis more broadly has struggled to move from generalities of the need to “impose costs” or, conversely, to “develop cooperative strategies” to the specifics of application. And, for those that did, there had until now been little evidence of words being translated into action.

Not everyone is happy. Over at our partners’ site – ASPI’s The Strategist – Sam Bateman questions whether the “US knows what it’s doing” and rightly points out that FoN operations have to be “conducted with ‘due regard’ to the rights of coastal States.” But he also asserts that U.S. action is an indication that the United States has “taken a position on the sovereignty of the claims.” If true, (and that’s not official policy) it belies the first qualm since the United States presumably would not therefore need to take claimed but invalid rights into account. Bateman is on stronger ground in noting that if the Navy is sailing through the territorial waters or flying through the islands’ territorial airspace (it is not clear in the video whether this is the case) – water/airspace granted due to the small fractions of at least Fiery Cross Reef’s natural features that remain above water during high tide – it would do so at risk of violating the “innocent” condition of innocent passage if the vessels were conducting military missions such as intelligence gathering. This is not the case if the island is entirely man-made, if a military vessel refrained from action prejudicial to the coastal state, or if the vessel stayed in an island’s EEZ – outside the 12nm of the territorial waters.

Of course this is all moot if, as Bateman suggests, the United States by these actions is declaring it holds specific island sovereignty claims invalid, rather than waiting any longer for China to explain upon what basis its claims are made. Perhaps the best course of action is for the United States to declare that until China has explained the basis for the nine-dash line claim in a manner in accordance with international law and so adjudicated it will not honor any of China’s South China Seas sovereignty claims or the rights derived thereof. This would cut through some of the legal complexity in providing a basis for the ongoing FoN activities and point to a way for China to take action to resolve the situation. While it is unlikely China will be persuaded to prematurely end its reclamation efforts, the actions undertaken by the Navy may at least demonstrate the likelihood that a declared South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without resolution of outstanding claims will result in a frequent high-profile acts of indifference.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). He is a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, a member of the Truman National Security Project, and a CNAS Next-Generation National Security Fellow.

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

May 19, 2015 Dmitry Filipoff Leave a comment

By Dmitry Filipoff

“The U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.”

Superbly researched and organized, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress by CRS analyst Ronald O’Rourke serves as an excellent resource from which to better understand China’s evolving naval capabilities and how the U.S. Navy can retain its edge in the face of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenge. The scope of the report is wide, with information given on a large variety of platform and weapons procurements. The breadth is matched by depth of analysis, as the author assesses the sophistication of individual systems, offers concepts of employment, describes potential conflict scenarios, and explains how naval modernization is tied to broader policy. The report is broadly organized into sections that cover Chinese platforms and weapons, American policy decisions responding to China’s naval rise, key U.S. Navy acquisition programs, relevant sections from the National Defense Authorization Act, and an appendix providing supplemental readings. Certain sections could be strengthened and new areas could be explored to further flesh out the expanse of information, but nonetheless this fact packed publication has plenty to teach.

The detailed section on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thoroughly informative on China’s maturing navy. Every surface combatant the PLAN fields is covered in the report. Each ship class’s capabilities are described along with their production history and projected numbers. Ships are contrasted with the capabilities of the vessels they are replacing, producing an appreciation of progress. Furthermore, certain ships are highlighted for their ability to enable operations that were not feasible until recently, such as the power projection and humanitarian assistance missions that could be conducted by the new Liaoning carrier and Type 071 vessels. Extensive attention is devoted to the new carrier, including the significant limitations posed by a ski-ramp configuration and the critical research role the vessel will play in familiarizing the PLAN with carrier operations. Information is also given on upcoming and prospective designs such as the Type 055 cruiser, Type 081 amphibious assault ship, and Type 095 nuclear attack submarine. In total, these sections combine to produce a clear trajectory of naval modernization.

The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier. The vessel was commissioned in 2012, and is being used to familiarize the PLA Navy with carrier operations.

The American perspective is captured as well. The report documents in numbers the changes being made to the Navy’s force posture and forward basing in order to operationalize the Asia Pivot. The Air Sea Battle concept is discussed along with the operational goal of disrupting kill chains in the electromagnetic spectrum. An especially insightful subsection describes the variety of nuances that should inform comparisons between the U.S. and Chinese navies, and naval forces in general. A unique strength of CRS reports, relevant legislation is included, providing key information into how Congress is influencing policy towards China and America’s own naval modernization. These sections in the National efense Authorization Act (NDAA), will help the reader better understand how Congress perceives the implications of China’s naval modernization, and which ongoing U.S. Navy procurement programs have Congressional priority towards meeting the A2/AD challenge. The NDAA also identifies certain knowledge gaps and requires reports be drafted in order to raise awareness, offering a glimpse into potential weaknesses and priorities.

There are certain key points and gaps of information within the report that need to be addressed in order to fully appreciate the increasing modernity of China’s Navy and A2/AD abilities. For example, the author states “Changes in platform capability have been more dramatic than changes in platform numbers” but this is contradicted by ONI Officer Jesse Karotkin’s testimony that is included in the appendix: “China is implementing much longer production runs of advanced surface combatants and nuclear submarines, suggesting a greater satisfaction in their recent ship designs.” The tables provided by the author on yearly ship comissionings support this conclusion, marking a new and more confident phase of modernization that is gaining momentum. This trend highlights an aspect of modernization that requires greater attention, China’s increasingly formidable shipbuilding industrial base.

China’s naval modernization can be subsumed under a greater A2/AD aspiration, and the author stresses that proper assessment of a potential maritime conflict includes understanding “maritime relevant capabilities that are outside their navies.” Information is included on land based platforms such as backfire bombers procured from Russia, UAV’s, ASBMs, and even EMPs. However, if it is the intent to draw awareness towards addressing the A2/AD threat as a whole, primary attention should be given to China’s robust cruise missile inventory, which is the most significant weapon system towards enabling land based A2/AD. Although the author takes note throughout the report which platforms can field ASCMs and LACMs, the ASCM section lacks information on the precise range and speed of China’s cruise missiles and their advantages relative to comparable weapons fielded by American surface combatants. There is also no information provided on LACM types and capabilities.

The author writes “China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.” Yet these topics received hardly any attention, and are arguably more critical to the maturity of the PLAN than capabilities borne from more modern platforms and systems.

When it comes to logistics, underway replenishment vessels are the foundation of blue water power projection. The number of these vessels in a Navy’s inventory is indicative of broader policy and the priority placed on projecting presence far from home. China possesses eight such ships, with three constructed from 2012-2014. The five type 903A “Fuchi” class vessels are relatively modern, with the first pair of ships launched in 2004. These ships may be among the most operationally experienced vessels in China’s navy. Since China began its anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 there have been twenty deployments, and a replenishment vessel has accompanied every task force sent. The PLAN also operates two type 904 general stores ships, which have delivered necessities to installations in the Spratly Islands.

Type 903 Fuchi class vessel conducts simultaneous replenishment of Type 071 landing dock vessel and Type 052C guided missile destroyer

The PLAN is clearly committed to producing personnel with the high degree of technical proficiency necessary to operate modern warfighting platforms and systems, and such investments are already paying off in active operations. The PLAN is partnered with thirteen universities, and financial aid given to enrolled students was doubled to ten thousand RMB in 2009. Beginning in 2012, the PLAN launched programs partnering with specialized vocational schools from which high school graduates chosen through a competitive process would receive senior technical certifications following graduation, and be inducted as NCOs. Skill redundancy is achieved by requiring more technical proficiencies be acquired as an enlisted sailor rises in rank, resulting in units with greater shared expertise. In 2011, technical evaluation stations were stood up in an effort to standardize assessment of NCO performance, and operate at the level of local units.

Author Ron O’Rourke writes “China’s naval modernization is a broad based effort with many elements” and China’s Naval Modernization certainly captures many of them. However, analysis of China’s military has been dominated by more observable material developments such as ship acquisition and weapons procurement. The trend has been made clear, and now it is as much a given for China to be continually introducing better platforms as it is for the United States. But these developments are subsidiary to more immaterial initiatives. Key elements such as doctrine, organization of forces, personnel education, operational experience, interoperability, and exercises are all more meaningful indicators of the growth of the PLA Navy than new equipment. And all of these areas have undergone their own changes in tandem with procurement programs. The challenges posed by the effective implementation and evaluation of these reforms need to be acknowledged, but this institutional development of the PLA Navy is what will ultimately best empower it to function as an enabler of policy.

Dmitry Filipoff is an Associate Editor with CIMSEC.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.