Warfighting Development

Reprioritize SWO Tactical Qualifications for the High-End Fight

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By Seth Breen

As the U.S. Navy pivots toward preparing for high-end maritime conflict, the SWO community must ask itself a difficult question – Are we allocating our limited time to develop the warfighters we need, or are we clinging to legacy requirements that no longer align with the modern threat environment?

Train for the Fight, Not Just the Float

Currently, officers pursuing command at sea are required to be qualified as both Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). In the latest SWO Manual (SWOMAN) COMNAVSURFORINST 1412.7B, both are essential for future commanding officers, but this dual requirement deserves critical reexamination in light of today’s warfighting priorities. While being familiar with the engineering plant of the ship is essential, the EOOW qualification not only consumes a significant amount of time and bandwidth during the formative years of a SWO’s career, that time could be better spent developing tactical competencies that directly affect combat effectiveness, such as Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC) or Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC) qualifications.

For EOOW, the rationale is clear: an officer in command should understand the propulsion plant and engineering systems that keep the ship functioning and maneuverable. As a wise TOPSNIPE once told me when I was ELECTRO, “without engineering, a ship is just a well-armed barge,” and I agree entirely. In theory, EOOW promotes holistic leadership, reinforcing the notion that SWOs should be capable of leading in both engineering and warfighting domains, reinforcing the perception of SWOs as “a jack of all trades.” But as the threat of China looms and the Navy continues to fight in real-world combat operations, such as in the Red Sea, is a jack of all trades what we really need when a TAO, often a LT or LCDR, is the only thing standing between the Fire Inhibit Switch rolling green and a salvo of incoming anti-ship missiles?

EOOW demands intensive amounts of preparation, studying, and a significant number of watches under instruction (U/I) if a SWO is to properly deal with everyday operations and any equipment casualties by knowing the engineering operational casualty controls (EOCC). Yet this qualification is one that most SWOs will likely never stand as department heads in the future, even after they are qualified, except for the 30-day requirement outlined in the SWOMAN. Depending on the ship’s operational schedule and an officer’s timeline, EOOW is typically earned at the expense of a warfare coordinator watch. Officers who excel tactically but have not spent hours in CCS may find themselves disadvantaged in milestone screenings, despite being better prepared for the future fight.
This structure sends the wrong message that time spent tracing lube oil paths is as valued as managing an integrated air defense picture. Every hour spent qualifying for EOOW is an hour not spent studying tactics and rehearsing CIC scenarios. I found myself in a similar situation. As an FCO, despite qualifying as AAWC and Force AAWC, and being on track to qualify for TAO, I had to shift my focus and prioritize EOOW over TAO because it was required for future progression.

Tactical Proficiency: The Real Development Gap

The SWO pipeline offers multiple paths for junior officers to take between their first and second tours. This presents a tactical gap that exists between junior officers as they arrive at Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) for department head school. Those who qualify for a coordinator watch during their divo tours have a major advantage in the future over those who do not. Getting that tactical experience early builds a foundational understanding of warfighting early in an officer’s career. These tactical watches train junior officers to interpret sensor data, build air and surface pictures, manage killchains, and coordinate fires—skills that directly translate to TAO and future command responsibilities. The department head TAO pipeline is only growing more complex and demanding as direct feedback from the fleet is received and lessons learned from current combat operations are applied. This evolving curriculum tests students’ understanding and application of the tactics they have learned. Officers with these tactical backgrounds arrive more confident, capable, and better prepared for the TAO curriculum, as the foundation has already been laid.

The SWO community has a solid groundwork for a better approach. To better align the qualification system with operational imperatives, the Navy should decouple the EOOW qualification from the command qualification. Instead, commands should ensure that the SWO-Engineering PQS is a robust qualification that provides SWOs with a strong familiarity with the engineering plant, but not to the level of a qualified senior enlisted EOOW. Instead, we should incentivize early qualifications in tactical watchstations, such as surface or air, during division officer tours. Unless the junior officer wants to be a Battle CHENG in the future, EOOW should not be a requirement. This reform would not compromise readiness, it would enhance it by placing more weight on tactical skill. Officers would still understand the fundamentals of shipboard engineering, but without the time-intensive watchstanding, they would then be able to devote more focus toward gaining deeper tactical insight and readiness for warfare.

When crisis escalates into conflict, can the Navy afford to wait months for department heads to complete lengthy pipelines? They spend six months at SWSC, followed by two to four months learning either AEGIS or SSDS. It could take longer than six months for one department head to arrive on a ship. If they had more tactical experience early in their careers, this would provide more flexibility for senior leadership to buy back risk if a decision needs to be made to truncate some of the DH pipeline during a time of war and surge the fleet. If they have previously qualified on a specific AEGIS baseline, a two or three-week refresher rather than the whole course could accelerate the process of getting warfighters to the fleet faster.

Conclusion

The SWO community has made significant strides in recent years, reforming shiphandling and training, and introducing milestone assessments. However, to truly dominate the high-end fight, we must continue to evolve. That means investing our time, energy, and talent into the watches that matter most – those that prepare our officers not just to lead, but to win at fighting. It is time to prioritize tactical readiness over traditionally engineering-heavy requirements. Let us develop SWOs who are more than shipboard generalists. Let us build lethal warfighters.

Lieutenant Seth C. Breen is currently an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Warfare Tactics Instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School in Newport, Rhode Island. He graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 2012 with a bachelor’s degree in Criminology and enlisted in the Navy in 2013 as a Cryptologic Technician. He subsequently commissioned as an officer in 2017. LT Breen served aboard USS Monterey (CG-61) from 2017 to 2021. He held successive billets as Electrical Officer and Fire Control Officer, completing two deployments to FIFTH and SIXTH Fleets. During these tours, Monterey executed Tomahawk strike operations into Syria, served as Air and Missile Defense Commander and Ballistic Missile Defense Commander with the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, and conducted operations in the Black Sea in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Ashore, LT Breen has served as an exchange officer with the Royal Navy, teaching Air Warfare Tactics to RN Warfare Officers at HMS Collingwood. While ashore, he earned a Master of Arts in International Relations and Global Security from American Military University. 

Featured Image: GULF OF ALASKA (Aug. 23, 2025) Lt. Alex Celestin, from Randolph, Mass., works on a terminal in the combat information center (CIC) aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121) during exercise Northern Edge 2025 (NE25). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Christian Kibler)

Alliances and Partners

It’s Time to Invite Taiwan to RIMPAC

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By Jim Halsell

The Taiwan Strait remains one of the most volatile flashpoints in the world. With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accelerating its coercive behavior aimed at “reunifying” Taiwan with the mainland, the United States must adopt a clearer, more deliberate strategy to bolster deterrence and reassure regional partners. One measure that should be taken is to include Taiwan in the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise – the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Doing so would be consistent with U.S. policy under the Taiwan Relations Act, align with the values of collective defense and democratic solidarity, and signal to Beijing that any use of military force against Taiwan will result in a unified, multinational response.

Taiwan’s Strategic Significance

Taiwan occupies a central position in the First Island Chain and plays a crucial role in the balance of power in East Asia. It is a thriving democratic society of 23.4 million people and a key node in global semiconductor supply chains. Beijing’s claim to the island is tenuous, supported by a campaign of intimidation and “gray zone” tactics that aim to coerce Taiwan into capitulation without war.

Though lacking official recognition as an independent country by the United States and many of its allies, Taiwan is not isolated. U.S. policy, as codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), commits the United States to make available “defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security” of the people of Taiwan. Inclusion in RIMPAC would help operationalize this policy while remaining consistent with the U.S. One China policy.

Why Include Taiwan?

Deterrence requires both capability and credibility. While Taiwan continues to acquire U.S. military hardware and reform its defense posture, the question of whether the United States and its allies would support Taiwan in a contingency remains deliberately ambiguous. Strategic ambiguity may help manage escalation risk, but it risks failing to deter if Beijing concludes that the costs of aggression are tolerable.

Involving Taiwan in RIMPAC would signal a broader multinational investment in regional peace. Beijing is pursuing two parallel lines of effort to pressure Taiwan: coercion without violence and the looming threat of military force. Both avenues can be countered through stronger integration with partners, transparent signaling, and public commitments to Taiwan’s survival as a free society.

A Republic of China Navy Tuo Chiang-class corvette. (Photo via Ann Wang/Reuters)

The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would not require diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. RIMPAC has previously included diverse participants with some participating only as observers. Taiwan could be invited under a similar framework—e.g., “Taipei Navy—Observer”—that would align with RIMPAC precedent, and would not constitute formal U.S. recognition. It would, however, reinforce the deterrent message that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not remain a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing.

Reinforcing the Taiwan Relations Act

The TRA provides a clear legislative foundation for actions that enhance Taiwan’s defense and deter coercion. The Act affirms that “the United States will consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”1 Participation in exercises like RIMPAC would help Taiwan prepare for defense without crossing the line into formal alliance, thereby avoiding a breach of the One China policy.

Congress continues to reaffirm bipartisan support for Taiwan’s self-defense. The FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes provisions to strengthen military cooperation and enhance deterrence through initiatives like the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. Including Taiwan in exercises alongside Japan, Australia, and other regional partners would be a natural extension of these legislative efforts.

Operational and Symbolic Value

Beyond signaling, there are tangible military benefits. Taiwan’s military operates U.S.-made systems and is transitioning toward an asymmetric defense model, emphasizing survivability and denial. Interoperability with U.S. and allied forces, especially in joint maritime operations, will be essential in any scenario short of or including conflict.

As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, “Taiwan likely doesn’t have the capabilities to defend against a Chinese attack without external support,” despite pledging nearly $20 billion in defense spending for 2025.2 Enhancing operational coordination before a crisis emerges is not only prudent, but operationally essential.

Symbolically, inclusion in RIMPAC would acknowledge the democratic values that Taiwan shares with other regional partners. This is particularly important as Taiwan remains diplomatically isolated, with only eleven countries maintaining official relations. Participation in multinational military activities would help offset this isolation without provoking conflict, provided it is managed diplomatically and clearly communicated.

Would Other Nations Support Taiwan’s Inclusion in RIMPAC?

One of the central concerns surrounding Taiwan’s potential inclusion in RIMPAC is whether key U.S. allies and regional partners would support such a move or whether they would balk at the political risk of antagonizing the People’s Republic of China. However, recent geopolitical trends suggest that support for Taiwan’s participation in multinational defense activities is quietly growing, particularly among Indo-Pacific democracies that share an interest in preserving regional stability and resisting Chinese coercion.

Japan is perhaps the most likely partner to welcome Taiwan’s inclusion. Tokyo has become increasingly vocal about the importance of Taiwan to Japan’s national security, with senior officials, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stating that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have increased coordination with the U.S. military and have participated in bilateral and trilateral exercises that implicitly prepare for scenarios involving Taiwan. Given Japan’s growing anxiety over China’s assertiveness and its own constitutional reinterpretation on collective self-defense, Tokyo would likely support Taiwan’s inclusion in a multilateral setting like RIMPAC, especially if coordinated in advance with careful diplomatic messaging.

Australia has also strengthened its strategic alignment with the United States and Japan, particularly through the AUKUS agreement. Canberra has voiced concerns about China’s regional behavior and recently joined Washington in emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. While Australia might be more cautious about formal diplomatic gestures, it is unlikely to oppose Taiwan’s participation in a non-sovereign capacity, especially if framed as a security-enhancing measure rather than a political endorsement.

Other Indo-Pacific states, such as India, Philippines, and Vietnam, have growing interests in counterbalancing Chinese maritime assertiveness. India has long advocated for a multipolar Asia and may view Taiwan’s inclusion as consistent with its own efforts to build regional coalitions. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has deepened security ties with the United States and allowed expanded access to military bases in response to PRC aggression in the South China Sea. Vietnam, while traditionally wary of foreign alignments, has clashed with China over maritime claims and may be open to Taiwan’s inclusion in an observer or limited functional role.

European states that have participated in recent RIMPAC iterations such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also increasingly signaled concern over Taiwan’s security. They conducted transits of the Taiwan Strait, and their defense white papers mention the Indo-Pacific as a zone of strategic interest. While these countries may not be vocal advocates for Taiwan’s inclusion, they would be unlikely to withdraw or protest if the decision were led by the United States with appropriate multilateral coordination.

Ultimately, the determining factor may be how the invitation is framed. If Taiwan’s participation is defined not as a sovereign equal to other states but rather as a security partner or “participant entity,” other nations could find it diplomatically palatable. This would mirror Taiwan’s existing participation in multilateral forums such as the Olympics, the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, where it joins under the name “Chinese Taipei.”

RIMPAC’s Flexible Participation Model

RIMPAC’s long history as a multinational exercise underscores its diplomatic flexibility. Since its inception in 1971, RIMPAC has included a diverse array of participants, including states with varying degrees of political alignment with the United States, non-ally partners, and even, at times, strategic competitors. This precedent offers a viable pathway for Taiwan’s inclusion without triggering a fundamental break in U.S. policy or alienating key participants.

A notable example is the People’s Republic of China, which was invited to participate in RIMPAC in both 2014 and 2016. Despite growing tensions in the South China Sea and concerns about Chinese military transparency, the Obama administration included the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in an effort to promote professional military dialogue and reduce the risk of miscalculation. China sent surface combatants, auxiliary vessels, and observers to participate in non-combat aspects of the exercise. This inclusion was reversed in 2018 following the continued militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea, but the precedent remains: even states that do not share U.S. values or alliance structures have participated in RIMPAC under constrained formats.

Similarly, RIMPAC has welcomed non-allied or non-aligned states such as Vietnam, India, and Brunei, each of which participated in observer or limited operational capacities. These arrangements allowed for diplomatic inclusivity without compromising the exercise’s core focus on interoperability and security cooperation. India was first invited as an observer in the early 2000s before gradually expanding its participation, culminating in the deployment of naval assets by the 2010s. This incremental approach demonstrates RIMPAC’s capacity to accommodate partners with unique diplomatic statuses or sensitivities.

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), established under the Taiwan Relations Act as the vehicle for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, could serve as the conduit for managing Taiwan’s RIMPAC participation. AIT-coordinated representation would allow the United States to maintain consistency with its One China policy while exercising its commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense.

Managing PRC Backlash

Inevitably, Beijing would likely respond harshly to Taiwan’s inclusion in RIMPAC, as it has to other perceived infringements on its sovereignty claims. Large-scale military drills, economic sanctions, diplomatic condemnation, and cyber operations are all part of the PRC’s well-established retaliation playbook. Yet the United States and its partners must resist the temptation to let their Taiwan policy be dictated by fears of PRC outrage. This reactive posture grants Beijing a de facto veto over democratic decision-making and emboldens further coercion.

China has escalated its pressure campaign on Taiwan even in the absence of provocations. Since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, Beijing has employed what Richard Bush calls “coercion without violence,” a deliberate campaign to wear down Taiwan psychologically, politically, and economically without firing a shot.3 This has included near-daily air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), cyberattacks on government agencies, diplomatic isolation, and targeted disinformation campaigns.

These actions have continued even as Taiwan’s leadership has treaded cautiously. President Tsai’s tenure was marked by efforts to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and avoid unilateral declarations of independence. Her successor, President Lai Ching-te, has pledged to do the same, calling for “dialogue instead of confrontation” in his 2024 inauguration address. Nevertheless, Beijing has continued to characterize Lai as a “separatist” and launched punitive military exercises following both his inauguration and Taiwan’s National Day celebrations.

This pattern reveals a key truth: Beijing’s escalatory behavior is not a response to specific actions by Taipei or Washington, but part of a long-term strategy to bring Taiwan under PRC control. As such, restraint has not yielded peace; resolve may. Integrating Taiwan into multinational military exercises like RIMPAC would impose reputational and strategic costs on Beijing’s aggression by signaling that Taiwan’s security is a shared interest among responsible stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Ultimately, deterrence fails when adversaries perceive inaction as weakness. Taiwan’s participation in multinational exercises is not merely symbolic. It is a necessary step to ensure that coercion is met with collective resolve. The message to Beijing must be unmistakable: the democratic world will not stand by while one of its own is bullied into submission.

It is time for the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies to move from passive deterrence to active deterrence. The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would send an unmistakable message to Beijing: any aggression against Taiwan risks triggering a multilateral response from a network of regional powers united by shared values and interests. Including Taiwan in RIMPAC would fulfill the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, enhance deterrence, and stand as a visible affirmation of America’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Lieutenant Commander James Halsell is a submarine warfare officer. His most recent assignment at sea was engineer officer on board the USS Topeka (SSN-754). He is the Federal Executive Fellow at the U.S. Naval Institute, and a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, researching the potential impact of deep-seabed mining on maritime sovereignty assertions.

References

1. Lawrence, Susan V. 2024. “Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, IF10275, updated December 26, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.

2. Maizland, Lindsay, and Clara Fong. 2025. “Why China–Taiwan Relations Are So Tense.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

3. Bush, Richard C. 2024. “Why Does the U.S. Security Partnership with Taiwan Matter?” Brookings Institution, September 16, 2024.

Featured Image: Multinational ships sail in formation July 22, 2024, off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)

Announcements

Call for Notes to the New CNO

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Submissions Due: September 12, 2025
Week Dates: September 22-26, 2025
Submission Length: 500 words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

In 500 words or less, what do you want the new Chief of Naval Operations to know? CIMSEC is launching a special series featuring short articles that look to convey pressing points to the U.S. Navy’s new top leadership.

Admiral Daryl Caudle was sworn in as the U.S. Navy’s 34th Chief of Naval Operations on August 25, 2025. In his speech, Caudle articulated:

“The Sailor will be front and center in my vision throughout my tenure as CNO…To ensure that they are ready to fight and win decisively–today, tomorrow, and well into the future—we will view everything we do we through an operational lens focused on three priorities: the foundry, the fleet, and the way we fight.”

How can Admiral Caudle accomplish these priorities? What challenges are underappreciated by Navy leadership and deserve stronger priority? How can the new CNO make major reforms to better meet great power threats? Contributors can address these questions and more as they convey their message.

Given the broadly international nature of the U.S. Navy’s mandate and the numerous partners and allies that closely work with American naval forces, international contributors are highly encouraged to share their perspectives.

Send all contributions for consideration to Content@cimsec.org. 

This is an independent CIMSEC initiative and is not produced in cooperation with any U.S. Navy entity. Read previous editions of “Notes to the New CNO” for the 33rd and 32nd Chiefs of Naval Operations. 

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: Adm. Daryl Caudle assumes duties as the 34th chief of naval operations during an assumption of office ceremony at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 25. (MCS Joe J. Cardona Gonzalez/U.S. Navy)

Force Development

A System of Systems Analysis is Needed for Maritime Strike

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By Dick Mosier

The US military is expanding its inventory of long-range maritime strike missiles such as the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), Long-Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM), and Naval Strike Missile (NSM). These capable weapons all have ranges well beyond the effective range of the sensor systems organic to their launch platforms – meaning their effective employment relies on third party targeting data. 

While these missiles all have terminal seekers for target acquisition and aim point selection, they require target location and identification information from deep-reach external sensor systems for mission planning, missile launch decisions, target location updates to in-flight missiles, and battle damage assessments (BDA).

The threat of long-range (400 km/160 nm), hypersonic, air-to-air missiles such as the PLAAF’s new PL-21 indicate that US conventional reconnaissance and targeting aircraft must now operate within protected airspace limiting their ability to target enemy ships out to the maximum ranges of US anti-ship missiles. As a result, targeting for US long-range anti-ship missiles is increasingly dependent on NRO and Space Force satellite reconnaissance and targeting systems.

A fundamental problem facing the US military is that the services have fielded capable, long-range missile systems, but only possesses limited deep-reach Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (ISRT) capabilities, limiting the effective employment of long-range missile systems. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Air Force/Space Force are developing satellite ISRT constellations to address the problem, but the services need to use a ‘Maritime Strike System of Systems’ approach to address the true functionality of US maritime strike capability.

A System of Systems Approach

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems defines a System of Systems (SOS) as: “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” The “Maritime Strike SOS” is the set of systems and human processes integrated into a larger system of systems that provide engagement quality tracks on moving enemy ships within stringent time latency requirements for the successful engagement by the various long-range, anti-ship missiles fielded by the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and the Army.

A Maritime Strike SOS analysis would address the functionality of not only NRO and Air Force/Space Force space systems; but also, the other essential components and processes of the end-to-end architecture, such as requirements submission and adjudication, satellite/constellation tasking, satellite data relay, ground processing and exploitation, and information/data dissemination to tactical forces. The SOS analysis would ensure that the end-to-end architecture and its timeliness will provide the targeting required for effective anti-ship missile engagements.

Without guaranteed performance across this entire architecture—particularly its timeliness—these substantial space investments will fail to enable anti-ship missile engagements.

Maritime Strike SOS Analysis

Missile Range Velocity Service
Naval Strike Missile

 (NSM)

 115 nm 450 kts Navy, USMC
Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) 1000 nm 450 kts Navy, USMC, Army  
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) 200 nm 450 kts Navy, USAF
Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) 350 nm 3334 kts Army
Standard Missile 6

(SM-6)

 130 nm 2334 kts Navy, USMC, Army

The first step in a Maritime Strike SOS analysis is to determine the capability required of the SOS for each type of anti-ship missile and launch platform combination. The objective is to determine the sequence and timing of events from receipt of a mission task by a launch platform to the acquisition of the moving target ship by the missile seeker.

In the final analysis, the missile must arrive at the target ship location area of uncertainty and begin its search before the moving ship has time to exit the area of uncertainty. This analysis will determine the maximum usable time latency from satellite target sensing to entry of the target information into the missile by the launch platform.

The SOS performance requirements are derived from the performance attributes of these five existing missile systems fielded by the Services for use in the context of joint force operations.

Maritime Strike SOS Baseline

Once the SOS performance requirements are defined for each type of missile, the next step is to identify and evaluate the baseline and alternatives. The targeting timeline for the SOS analysis would begin with receipt of a Maritime Strike mission order, and include the following:

  • Processes for the submission of collection requirements
  • Adjudication of collection tasking priorities
  • Planning of satellite mission or constellation coverage
  • Tasking of satellites
  • Time for satellites to access the target area
  • Collection of data by the satellites
  • Dissemination of sensor data to ground/shipboard systems for data processing and image exploitation
  • Dissemination of target information to missile launch platforms

The combination of all these factors has to occur within the maximum allowable time latency for successful missile engagement. 

The SOS Satellite Baseline

Satellite communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and weapons targeting systems are well into the transition from a small number of operational systems to proliferated architectures that take advantage of lower launch costs, and cheaper satellites to form mega constellations of hundreds of satellites. The following satellite mega constellations designed for or capable of supporting anti-ship missile targeting should be included in the baseline SOS analysis.

NRO Proliferated Architecture

On 22 May 2024, the NRO launched the first set of 21 Star Shield imaging satellites into low earth orbit (LEO) in what the NRO calls the NRO Proliferated Architecture. As of 30 April 2025, 179 Star Shield satellites have been launched. According to the NRO, six more launches are scheduled in 2025. Assuming the previous pattern of 21 satellites per launch the constellation is projected to reach approximately 300 three hundred satellites in late 2025. The NRO also indicates that launches will continue through 2029 but has not disclosed specifics on schedule or the total number of launches. The SOS analysis would address the performance of the satellite sensors and the processes and timelines involved from submission of fleet requirements to delivery of the sensed information to the fleet.

Space Force Long-Range Kill Chains Program

In August 2024, the Space Force Long-Range Kill Chains Program was approved for Milestone B indicating that this satellite-based Moving Target Indicator (MTI) constellation designed to track ships and land targets can proceed to acquisition. Program cost, constellation size, and the technical details of the overall architecture and performance are classified. The schedule and performance parameters are established, and the program is funded for an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the early 2030s. The size of this mega-constellation, arrangement of the satellites in space, and the technical details of the overall architecture and performance remain classified.

Space Defense Agency Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA)

The Space Force/Space Development Agency (SDA) is fielding the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) that includes Link 16 and Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) for the dissemination of information to tactical forces. In August 2024, SDA demonstrated the capability to make a PWSA Link 16 connection with a carrier and an aircraft on its deck.

In late summer 2025, the SDA is expected to begin launching its first set of PWSA satellites with limited operational capabilities. This will include 126 Transport Layer data relay satellites, and 28 Tracking Layer satellites, and 4 demonstration satellites for missile tracking. The SOS should determine the role of the PWSA in the overall SOS architecture for targeting anti-ship missiles.

Maritime Strike Command and Control Baseline

Maritime Strike is a mission that now involves platforms and missiles from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and USAF. The Maritime Strike SOS analysis must address the command and control relationships and processes among the components to ensure the arrangements are in place for the sharing of target information; and, for the planning, and execution of coordinated multiple component maritime strike operations.

The Services are fielding systems for the receipt and exploitation of targeting information. The Army is fielding Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) variants for Division and above, and a basic variant for division and below. The Navy and Marine Corps are developing and fielding Navy Maritime Targeting Cells (MTC) ashore and afloat; and, the Marine Corps is fielding a Family of Integrated Targeting Cells (MTC-X, MTC-Mobile, and Tactical Edge Node TEN-X). The details of Navy and Marine Corps MTC systems are classified, but they are expected to have capabilities similar to those of TITAN, e.g., direct satellite tasking, satellite sensor control, direct downlink of satellite data, data processing and analysis for the purpose of weapons targeting. The Maritime Strike SOS analysis would assure that these tactical terminal systems are fully integrated with the overall maritime strike SOS architecture.

Conclusion

The SOS analysis could consist of a relatively modest approach based on the integration of the detailed architectures of each of the components of the SOS as should be available from the NRO, NGA, Space Force, and the Services/Joint Force components. The investment in this analysis is justified given the looming conflict with China over Taiwan, one dominated by anti-ship missile operations. The SOS analysis would ensure that the anti-ship missiles operated by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will have the timely and comprehensive targeting support required for their effective use against moving ships.

Dick Mosier served as a Naval Flight Officer (VQ and VP); OPNAV N2 civilian intelligence analyst; OSD (Intelligence and Space Policy); SES 4 ASD(C3I) Director Tactical Intelligence Systems; and Deputy Director of a support activity leading OSD studies on space and unmanned airborne ISRT system alternatives. His career-long interest in improving the effectiveness of US Navy tactical operations, with a particular focus on the challenges of assuring the integration of national-tactical ISRT combat support capabilities. The article represents the author’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government department or agency.

Featured Image: RED SEA (Sept. 19, 2021) Fire Controlman (Aegis) 2nd Class Garrett Town stands watch in the combat information center aboard guided-missile destroyer USS O’Kane (DDG 77) in the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Elisha Smith)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.