By Benjamin Massengale

Introduction

Much has been written over the last two decades about how cost-effective naval mine warfare can be for the U.S. Navy in great power war. Mines have demonstrated their utility in the Ukraine conflict by both deterring Russia from executing amphibious landings and interfering with Ukrainian grain exports. China has repeatedly cited it as the “assassin’s mace” and followed through with significant resources to deploy them via traditional means.¹ However, the current focus for American offensive naval minelaying is done either as a prelude to open hostilities, or when the U.S. has uncontested air and/or undersea superiority of the battlespace, an unreasonable assumption to maintain against a peer adversary. The U.S. Navy needs a realistic means to quickly deploy naval mines against a peer adversary in a contested environment.

Current U.S. capabilities to deploy mines are limited. B-52s and F/A-18 aircraft can deploy the Quickstrike mine by air and require suppression of enemy air defenses or uncontested airspace to enable minelaying. Undersea deployment via fast attack submarine or ORCA Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) is constrained by a limited number of proficient units available to conduct the mission, restricted abilities when operating in shallow depths, and comparatively slow time to establish the minefield. At the same time, platform survivability is dependent on not being detected, which is a major assumption against adversaries with modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Regaining the ability to deploy mines over the side from surface ships like was done during WWII will be unsuitable against a peer competitor in the missile age unless the vessel has effective protection from attack, is somehow undetected deep in the battlespace, or is deploying them in an area where adversary forces cannot respond in time (essentially an uncontested environment). Helicopter delivery does not offer a better option than already certified air platforms.

Naval mines need a new kind of delivery platform, specifically by either rocket or missile. Mine missiles will be used here to describe this delivery method and differentiate it from rocket-propelled naval mines activated after deployment, like the Chinese EM-52/T-1.

Mine Missile Advantages

Deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method. Interpolating from a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) paper, the fastest means to deploy 40 mines is using two or more B-52 platforms, but it would take over twenty hours to complete (working only at night and accounting for transit time).²

Alternatively, Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped platforms (surface, submarine, or land-based) already forward in the region could deploy the same number of mines in less than an hour, significantly minimizing the window for counterattack or detection while restoring more operational flexibility. Just as planners will rely on Tomahawk and other cruise missiles to eliminate the hardest fixed air defenses to lower the risk of losing attack aircraft, the same argument should apply to offensive mining. Missiles are significantly harder to engage than other mining platforms if detected, and the window to stop them before the delivery of their payload is narrow. By making mining more survivable and shifting the delivery mechanism to penetrating missiles, minefields could be laid in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to traditional delivery platforms.

Possibly the easiest conversion option for a mine-delivered missile would be from existing Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC). The current U.S. ASROC system is capable of carrying a 600-pound payload (based on the weight of Mark 54 Torpedo which would put it on par with the MK 62 Quickstrike mine.^3,4 Other nations have ASROC systems with greater throw weight, like the Japanese Type 07 vertical-launch ASROC, which can carry a 700-pound payload (based on the weight of the Type 12 torpedo) to either carry a larger mine or extend the range of mine deployment.⁵

While these may be the easiest to convert, they suffer from significant range limitations compared to other missile systems and were designed to engage individual contacts rather than work as a salvo for minefield placement. Converting ASROC-like mine missile could still be useful for coastal batteries, where defensive minefields can be deployed within territorial waters, negating the need for extended ranges.

A better option against a peer adversary would be a long-range missile system like the existing Tomahawk system. While it has the capability of carrying a 1000-pound payload (equivalent to the MK 63 Quickstrike mine), we should conservatively assume a smaller mine to account for the modifications needed to ensure safe separation from the missile and landing in the water. It still has significant benefits over an ASROC system in that its range is measured in the hundreds of miles, is designed to operate in contested airspace, and the existing strike planning systems could be more easily modified to support minefield planning. Additional value could be gained from a new system if it were possible to develop a missile and mine combination capable of delivering two or more mines per launch. For Tomahawk, this may require not just modifications to the missile but a new mine design with a better form factor to support at least two mines per missile.

Mine missiles would allow any U.S. Navy ship or submarine with VLS capabilities to lay mines, eliminating the need for a dedicated minelaying vessel and greatly expanding the options for delivery platforms. Developing a capability to deliver naval mines via missiles allows more platforms and joint partners to deploy naval mines, including Army and Marine units. Because delivery would be much faster, deploying craft could quickly shift to other tasking or more effectively evade retaliation. Additionally, by expanding mine delivery to VLS, submarines could execute any mining mission both further away from enemy patrols and in deeper waters while making it harder for invading forces to intercept them.

UUVs have been seen as the future of offensive mining, given the reported success of Ukraine’s SeaBaby system in delivering mines against Russian forces.⁶ But UUVs have limits and restrictions that traditional platforms or mine missiles do not have. Small to midsize UUVs are more susceptible to electronic and cyber warfare attacks that can disable them compared to traditional minelayers. Additionally, in the Ukrainian conflict, 60-70 percent of Ukrainian naval drone attacks were self-assessed to be defeated while fewer missile and rocket attacks were intercepted by Russian air defense systems, making a mine missile a more reliable means to reach the target area, especially as empty coastlines or channels are unlikely to be covered by point defenses.⁷

A missile-delivered minefield can be an expensive option to deliver a field, given how the cost of the missile is added to the mine. Using the previously cited NPS paper, using two B-52s to deploy 40 mines will cost about $11.6 million, assuming $88,000 per flight hour.⁸ Considering a single Tomahawk missile costs about $3.8 million (including payload), seeding the same 40 mines would cost $152 million.⁹ Alternatively, using a cheaper missile like the older RUR-5 ASROC at $1.85 million each (after adjusting for inflation) or $74 million for the field would cost less, though it has other operational drawbacks like reduced range.¹⁰ Either option is still cheaper than losing a single aircraft or submarine and related crew if an opponent detects and successfully engages the platform during a mine-laying operation in a contested environment. The loss of an ORCA XLUUV (at an adjusted $124.4 million each) might be more fiscally palatable compared to high-end missiles, however, the limited number of ORCAs expected to join the fleet, the time it takes to bring a new ORCA on station, and the uncertain production plan for replacement units could make their destruction as undesirable as any other platform.¹¹

Concepts of Operation

Developing the mines via missiles allows allied nation coastal batteries under threat of amphibious attack to rapidly reseed an area previously thought cleared. Mines could also be launched against an adversary’s ports to delay the deployment of an invasion fleet without involving other naval units. For added deterrence, coastal mine missile batteries could also be positioned to launch on warning and sow preplanned minefields while causing the enemy to waste ordnance on launchers that have already delivered their payloads, similar to how some nations operationalize nuclear deterrence. These would provide better deterrence against amphibious landings than standard coastal batteries, which could be destroyed by asymmetric platforms before they have the opportunity to engage a target.

The defense of Tawain scenario is an example where mine missiles could be used effectively. As soon as the defenders have indications of PRC attacks, pre-planned minefields are immediately deployed by coastal batteries (ideally by transport-erector-launchers, TELs) either against opposing ports (mustering amphibious forces) or defensively against projected landing locations before the launchers can be destroyed. Any surviving TELs can reposition and reseed the minefields as required.

A possible alternative to the mine missile is conducting missile strikes directly on ships and facilities. However, one of the primary objectives of a minefield is to shape the battlefield and influence enemy psychology, not just eliminate the enemy force. With the proper employment, a limited number of mines properly deployed can redirect forces and remove resupply/repair ports from consideration, or hazard enemy ships more effectively than if those vessels or ports were attacked directly. In WWII, one bomber in October 1943, between two sorties, dropped only six mines, which resulted in two ships destroyed, redirected a convey (allowing it to be mostly destroyed), and closed that port for the rest of the war.¹² In May 1972, 32 mines were dropped into the North Vietnam harbor of Haiphong, a significant shipping hub, under complete observation and anti-aircraft fire. As a result, all shipping through that port was stopped for 300 days.¹³

Both cases show that a modest number of mines were more cost-effective in suppressing enemy operations than a conventional assault because of the deep uncertainty they inflict on the commander’s mind. This effect could be further amplified if a mix of mine missiles and land attack cruise missiles strike a harbor where the adversary is unsure if it shot down a land attack missile or just missed stopping a missile from dropping a mine. Forcing this unknown variable on the enemy commander’s calculations should adequately justify the higher cost to quickly and assuredly deliver the mines in limited quantities.

Iran is already moving in this direction for mine warfare with the Fajr-5 rocket system, demonstrating the ability to deliver naval mines from a coastal launcher in January 2025.¹⁴ Little is known about the type, number, or size of the naval mines that were deployed, though they appear to be floating mines based on an Iranian state video.¹⁵ The Fajr-5 rocket system has a maximum range of approximately 65 nm, which is useful for standoff deployment in territorial seas and confined waters, but is limited to a 198-pound payload.¹⁶ While light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines, they are still heavier than diver -delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field. Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area. While distressing for nations relying on free transit through the Strait of Hormuz, it does provide an operational example that Taiwan could use in a defensive contingency.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy does not have a strong mining strategy for operating in a contested environment today against a peer adversary. Current air platforms are too vulnerable against modern air defense systems and require enabling capabilities and operations to reach minelaying areas. Submarines might be capable depending on the circumstances, but the consequences of them being sunk in a contested area would discourage all but the most vital mining operations. UUVs might be a viable strategy eventually, but require a radically different procurement plan to develop them cheap and in mass that has not been observed in the ORCA XLUUV. Iran, an adversary best known for asymmetric power projection, is demonstrating interest in this concept and how it could be done cost effectively. It is time for America and like-minded countries to usher naval mines into the missile age.

Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and was the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Center. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

These opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not intended to reflect official views or policies of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.

References

1. Erickson, Andrew S, William S Murray, and Lyle J Goldstein. 2009. Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability. Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7/.

2. Holder, John T., IV, Adrew M Murray, Jason P Pinnow, Grant Rodgers, and Samantha Sperry. 2023. ASSET SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE MINING OPERATIONS. Systems Engineering Capstone Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 77. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72545.

3. Lockheed Martin. 2019. “Baseline VLA Product Card.” Lockheed Martin. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/Baseline_VLA_Product_Card_8.5x11_042219.pdf.

4. U.S. Navy. 2023. MK 54 – Lightweight Torpedo. November 15. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167937/mk-54-lightweight-torpedo/.

5. The Type 12 Torpedo – Japan’s Latest Submarine Killer. May 12. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://therandomjapan.com/type12-torpedo/.

6. Marson, James. 2024. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. June 25. https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?st=rreeu9omyfcpc68.

7. Rennolds, Nathan. 2023. Ukraine’s hi-tech naval attack drones have paralyzed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, spy chief says. Augest 26. Accessed March 13, 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-sea-drones-paralyzed-russia-black-sea-fleet-spy-chief-2023-8.

8. Mizokami, Kyle. 2022. “How Much it Actually Costs to Fly U.S. Military Aircraft.” Popular Mechanics, November 16. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41956551/cost-per-hour-to-fly-us-military-aircraft/.

9. USD Chief Financial Officer. 2024. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request. Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf.

10. Global Security. 2017. RUR-5 ASROC. June 12. Accessed March 11, 2025. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/vla.htm.

11. United States Government Accountability Office. 2022. EXTRA LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE Navy Needs to Employ Better Management Practices to Ensure Swift Delivery to the Fleet. Report to Congress, Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 25. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105974.pdf.

12. Greer, William L, and Bartholomew C James. 1982. Psychological Aspects of Mine Warfare. Professional Paper 365, Naval Studies Group, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 15.

13. Ibid.

14. The Maritime Executive. 2025. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t. January 26. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t.

15. News Military. 2025. Iran Demonstrates Fajr-5 Rocket Launcher for Sea. Febuary 22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGlQe1sRZNY.

16. Army Recognition Group. 2025. Fajr-5 Fadjr-5 333mm MLRS. Febuary 3. https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/artillery-vehicles-and-weapons/multiple-launch-rocket-systems/fadjr-5-333mm-iran-uk.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG-89) launches an RUM-139 VL-ASROC anti-submarine rocket during a live-fire exercise off Guam. (U.S. Navy photo)