Call for Articles: Short Story Fiction

Stories Due: November 10, 2025
Week Dates: December 1-5, 2025

Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

By Dmitry Filipoff

In annual tradition, CIMSEC will be running a series of short stories looking to explore the nature of conflict and competition through fiction. 

Fiction has long served as a powerful means for exploring hypotheticals and envisioning alternatives. Authors can explore the future and flesh out concepts for how potential clashes and warfighting challenges may play out. They can probe the past, and use historical fiction to explore alternative histories. Authors are invited to craft gripping narratives that illuminate the unforeseen and carve realistic detail into visions of future conflict. 

Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org.

For past CIMSEC Fiction Weeks, feel free to view our 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, and 2020 fiction lineups.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Art generated by Midjourney AI. 

It is Time for Naval Mines to Enter the Missile Age

By Benjamin Massengale

Introduction

Much has been written over the last two decades about how cost-effective naval mine warfare can be for the U.S. Navy in great power war. Mines have demonstrated their utility in the Ukraine conflict by both deterring Russia from executing amphibious landings and interfering with Ukrainian grain exports. China has repeatedly cited it as the “assassin’s mace” and followed through with significant resources to deploy them via traditional means.1 However, the current focus for American offensive naval minelaying is done either as a prelude to open hostilities, or when the U.S. has uncontested air and/or undersea superiority of the battlespace, an unreasonable assumption to maintain against a peer adversary. The U.S. Navy needs a realistic means to quickly deploy naval mines against a peer adversary in a contested environment.

Current U.S. capabilities to deploy mines are limited. B-52s and F/A-18 aircraft can deploy the Quickstrike mine by air and require suppression of enemy air defenses or uncontested airspace to enable minelaying. Undersea deployment via fast attack submarine or ORCA Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) is constrained by a limited number of proficient units available to conduct the mission, restricted abilities when operating in shallow depths, and comparatively slow time to establish the minefield. At the same time, platform survivability is dependent on not being detected, which is a major assumption against adversaries with modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Regaining the ability to deploy mines over the side from surface ships like was done during WWII will be unsuitable against a peer competitor in the missile age unless the vessel has effective protection from attack, is somehow undetected deep in the battlespace, or is deploying them in an area where adversary forces cannot respond in time (essentially an uncontested environment). Helicopter delivery does not offer a better option than already certified air platforms.

Naval mines need a new kind of delivery platform, specifically by either rocket or missile. Mine missiles will be used here to describe this delivery method and differentiate it from rocket-propelled naval mines activated after deployment, like the Chinese EM-52/T-1.

Mine Missile Advantages

Deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method. Interpolating from a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) paper, the fastest means to deploy 40 mines is using two or more B-52 platforms, but it would take over twenty hours to complete (working only at night and accounting for transit time).2

Alternatively, Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped platforms (surface, submarine, or land-based) already forward in the region could deploy the same number of mines in less than an hour, significantly minimizing the window for counterattack or detection while restoring more operational flexibility. Just as planners will rely on Tomahawk and other cruise missiles to eliminate the hardest fixed air defenses to lower the risk of losing attack aircraft, the same argument should apply to offensive mining. Missiles are significantly harder to engage than other mining platforms if detected, and the window to stop them before the delivery of their payload is narrow. By making mining more survivable and shifting the delivery mechanism to penetrating missiles, minefields could be laid in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to traditional delivery platforms.

Possibly the easiest conversion option for a mine-delivered missile would be from existing Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC). The current U.S. ASROC system is capable of carrying a 600-pound payload (based on the weight of Mark 54 Torpedo which would put it on par with the MK 62 Quickstrike mine.3,4 Other nations have ASROC systems with greater throw weight, like the Japanese Type 07 vertical-launch ASROC, which can carry a 700-pound payload (based on the weight of the Type 12 torpedo) to either carry a larger mine or extend the range of mine deployment.5

PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 18, 2016) The forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) launches a vertical launch anti-submarine rocket (VLA) missile from its aft launchers during Valiant Shield 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham)

While these may be the easiest to convert, they suffer from significant range limitations compared to other missile systems and were designed to engage individual contacts rather than work as a salvo for minefield placement. Converting ASROC-like mine missile could still be useful for coastal batteries, where defensive minefields can be deployed within territorial waters, negating the need for extended ranges.

A better option against a peer adversary would be a long-range missile system like the existing Tomahawk system. While it has the capability of carrying a 1000-pound payload (equivalent to the MK 63 Quickstrike mine), we should conservatively assume a smaller mine to account for the modifications needed to ensure safe separation from the missile and landing in the water. It still has significant benefits over an ASROC system in that its range is measured in the hundreds of miles, is designed to operate in contested airspace, and the existing strike planning systems could be more easily modified to support minefield planning. Additional value could be gained from a new system if it were possible to develop a missile and mine combination capable of delivering two or more mines per launch. For Tomahawk, this may require not just modifications to the missile but a new mine design with a better form factor to support at least two mines per missile.

Mine missiles would allow any U.S. Navy ship or submarine with VLS capabilities to lay mines, eliminating the need for a dedicated minelaying vessel and greatly expanding the options for delivery platforms. Developing a capability to deliver naval mines via missiles allows more platforms and joint partners to deploy naval mines, including Army and Marine units. Because delivery would be much faster, deploying craft could quickly shift to other tasking or more effectively evade retaliation. Additionally, by expanding mine delivery to VLS, submarines could execute any mining mission both further away from enemy patrols and in deeper waters while making it harder for invading forces to intercept them.

UUVs have been seen as the future of offensive mining, given the reported success of Ukraine’s SeaBaby system in delivering mines against Russian forces.6 But UUVs have limits and restrictions that traditional platforms or mine missiles do not have. Small to midsize UUVs are more susceptible to electronic and cyber warfare attacks that can disable them compared to traditional minelayers. Additionally, in the Ukrainian conflict, 60-70 percent of Ukrainian naval drone attacks were self-assessed to be defeated while fewer missile and rocket attacks were intercepted by Russian air defense systems, making a mine missile a more reliable means to reach the target area, especially as empty coastlines or channels are unlikely to be covered by point defenses.7

A missile-delivered minefield can be an expensive option to deliver a field, given how the cost of the missile is added to the mine. Using the previously cited NPS paper, using two B-52s to deploy 40 mines will cost about $11.6 million, assuming $88,000 per flight hour.8 Considering a single Tomahawk missile costs about $3.8 million (including payload), seeding the same 40 mines would cost $152 million.9 Alternatively, using a cheaper missile like the older RUR-5 ASROC at $1.85 million each (after adjusting for inflation) or $74 million for the field would cost less, though it has other operational drawbacks like reduced range.10 Either option is still cheaper than losing a single aircraft or submarine and related crew if an opponent detects and successfully engages the platform during a mine-laying operation in a contested environment. The loss of an ORCA XLUUV (at an adjusted $124.4 million each) might be more fiscally palatable compared to high-end missiles, however, the limited number of ORCAs expected to join the fleet, the time it takes to bring a new ORCA on station, and the uncertain production plan for replacement units could make their destruction as undesirable as any other platform.11

Concepts of Operation

Developing the mines via missiles allows allied nation coastal batteries under threat of amphibious attack to rapidly reseed an area previously thought cleared. Mines could also be launched against an adversary’s ports to delay the deployment of an invasion fleet without involving other naval units. For added deterrence, coastal mine missile batteries could also be positioned to launch on warning and sow preplanned minefields while causing the enemy to waste ordnance on launchers that have already delivered their payloads, similar to how some nations operationalize nuclear deterrence. These would provide better deterrence against amphibious landings than standard coastal batteries, which could be destroyed by asymmetric platforms before they have the opportunity to engage a target.

The defense of Tawain scenario is an example where mine missiles could be used effectively. As soon as the defenders have indications of PRC attacks, pre-planned minefields are immediately deployed by coastal batteries (ideally by transport-erector-launchers, TELs) either against opposing ports (mustering amphibious forces) or defensively against projected landing locations before the launchers can be destroyed. Any surviving TELs can reposition and reseed the minefields as required.

A possible alternative to the mine missile is conducting missile strikes directly on ships and facilities. However, one of the primary objectives of a minefield is to shape the battlefield and influence enemy psychology, not just eliminate the enemy force. With the proper employment, a limited number of mines properly deployed can redirect forces and remove resupply/repair ports from consideration, or hazard enemy ships more effectively than if those vessels or ports were attacked directly. In WWII, one bomber in October 1943, between two sorties, dropped only six mines, which resulted in two ships destroyed, redirected a convey (allowing it to be mostly destroyed), and closed that port for the rest of the war.12 In May 1972, 32 mines were dropped into the North Vietnam harbor of Haiphong, a significant shipping hub, under complete observation and anti-aircraft fire. As a result, all shipping through that port was stopped for 300 days.13

Both cases show that a modest number of mines were more cost-effective in suppressing enemy operations than a conventional assault because of the deep uncertainty they inflict on the commander’s mind. This effect could be further amplified if a mix of mine missiles and land attack cruise missiles strike a harbor where the adversary is unsure if it shot down a land attack missile or just missed stopping a missile from dropping a mine. Forcing this unknown variable on the enemy commander’s calculations should adequately justify the higher cost to quickly and assuredly deliver the mines in limited quantities.

Iran is already moving in this direction for mine warfare with the Fajr-5 rocket system, demonstrating the ability to deliver naval mines from a coastal launcher in January 2025.14 Little is known about the type, number, or size of the naval mines that were deployed, though they appear to be floating mines based on an Iranian state video.15 The Fajr-5 rocket system has a maximum range of approximately 65 nm, which is useful for standoff deployment in territorial seas and confined waters, but is limited to a 198-pound payload.16 While light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines, they are still heavier than diver -delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field. Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area. While distressing for nations relying on free transit through the Strait of Hormuz, it does provide an operational example that Taiwan could use in a defensive contingency.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy does not have a strong mining strategy for operating in a contested environment today against a peer adversary. Current air platforms are too vulnerable against modern air defense systems and require enabling capabilities and operations to reach minelaying areas. Submarines might be capable depending on the circumstances, but the consequences of them being sunk in a contested area would discourage all but the most vital mining operations. UUVs might be a viable strategy eventually, but require a radically different procurement plan to develop them cheap and in mass that has not been observed in the ORCA XLUUV. Iran, an adversary best known for asymmetric power projection, is demonstrating interest in this concept and how it could be done cost effectively. It is time for America and like-minded countries to usher naval mines into the missile age.

Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and was the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Center. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

These opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not intended to reflect official views or policies of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.

References

1. Erickson, Andrew S, William S Murray, and Lyle J Goldstein. 2009. Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability. Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7/.

2. Holder, John T., IV, Adrew M Murray, Jason P Pinnow, Grant Rodgers, and Samantha Sperry. 2023. ASSET SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE MINING OPERATIONS. Systems Engineering Capstone Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 77. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72545.

3. Lockheed Martin. 2019. “Baseline VLA Product Card.” Lockheed Martin. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/Baseline_VLA_Product_Card_8.5x11_042219.pdf.

4. U.S. Navy. 2023. MK 54 – Lightweight Torpedo. November 15. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167937/mk-54-lightweight-torpedo/.

5. The Type 12 Torpedo – Japan’s Latest Submarine Killer. May 12. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://therandomjapan.com/type12-torpedo/.

6. Marson, James. 2024. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. June 25. https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?st=rreeu9omyfcpc68.

7. Rennolds, Nathan. 2023. Ukraine’s hi-tech naval attack drones have paralyzed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, spy chief says. Augest 26. Accessed March 13, 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-sea-drones-paralyzed-russia-black-sea-fleet-spy-chief-2023-8.

8. Mizokami, Kyle. 2022. “How Much it Actually Costs to Fly U.S. Military Aircraft.” Popular Mechanics, November 16. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41956551/cost-per-hour-to-fly-us-military-aircraft/.

9. USD Chief Financial Officer. 2024. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request. Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf.

10. Global Security. 2017. RUR-5 ASROC. June 12. Accessed March 11, 2025. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/vla.htm.

11. United States Government Accountability Office. 2022. EXTRA LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE Navy Needs to Employ Better Management Practices to Ensure Swift Delivery to the Fleet. Report to Congress, Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 25. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105974.pdf.

12. Greer, William L, and Bartholomew C James. 1982. Psychological Aspects of Mine Warfare. Professional Paper 365, Naval Studies Group, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 15.

13. Ibid.

14. The Maritime Executive. 2025. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t. January 26. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t.

15. News Military. 2025. Iran Demonstrates Fajr-5 Rocket Launcher for Sea. Febuary 22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGlQe1sRZNY.

16. Army Recognition Group. 2025. Fajr-5 Fadjr-5 333mm MLRS. Febuary 3. https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/artillery-vehicles-and-weapons/multiple-launch-rocket-systems/fadjr-5-333mm-iran-uk.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG-89) launches an RUM-139 VL-ASROC anti-submarine rocket during a live-fire exercise off Guam. (U.S. Navy photo)

Countering the People’s Republic of China’s Maritime Insurgency in the South Pacific

By Jason Lancaster

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.1

The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process. 

The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.2

Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.

Countering IUUF

The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty,3 the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance. 

China’s fishing fleet activity, 2019-2021. (Graphic via Oceana/Global Fishing Watch)

Pacific Fusion Center

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.”4 The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.

Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels.5 The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.6 

Improving Capacity

Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC.7 The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024.8 Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025.9 Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.10

The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.

PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.

The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.

The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.

To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.

Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.

Endnotes 

1. Commander Jennifer Runion, “Fishing for Trouble: Chinese IUU Fishing and the Risk of Escalation,” Proceedings 149, no. 2 (February 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/february/fishing-trouble-chinese-iuu-fishing-and-risk-escalation. Geoffrey Till, “At War with the Lights Off,” Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/war-lights.

2. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent: Implementation Plan 2023–2030*. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Mar. 2024, https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2050-Strategy-Implementation-Plan_2023-2030.pdf#:~:text=This%20first%20Implementation%20Plan%20for%20the%202050%20Strategy,and%20levels%20of%20ambition%20of%20the%202050%20Strategy. Accessed 5 Sept. 2025.

3. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fishing in the Blue Pacific, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our-development-cooperation-partnerships-in-the-pacific/case-studies/fishing-in-the-blue-pacific.

4. Pacific Fusion Centre, Home, Pacific Fusion Centre, n.d., accessed June 11, 2025, https://www.pacificfusioncentre.org/.

5. Micah McCartney, “Argentina Deploys Military as PRC Leads Fishing Swarm Near Waters,” Newsweek, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/argentina-deploys-military-atlantic-fishing-swarm-PRC-spain-korea-taiwan-2035671.

6. CDR Mike Holland, “Overview: Maritime Domain Awareness, Securing the Seas: 12 Global Tides and Currents of Maritime Domain Awareness,” The Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea 63, no. 3 (2006).

7. Australian Defence Forces, Australian Defence Forces Pacific Maritime Security Program, n.d., https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/maritime-capability.

8. Max Walden, “RFNS Timo Sustains Damage during Docking,” ABC News, December 22, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-23/fiji-navy-vessel-gifted-australia-sustains-damage-docking/104757584.

9. Ana Madigibuli, “RFNS Timo Completes First Patrol,” Fiji Times, April 16, 2025, https://www.fijitimes.com.fj/rfns-timo-completes-first-patrol/.

10. U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Sector Pacific Area, n.d., accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Cutters/.

Featured Image: Twelve Chinese fishing boats are banded together with ropes on December 21, 2010 to try to thwart an attempt by a South Korean coast guard ship to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea. (Photo by Park Young-Chul, Agence France-Press)

Design, Decide, Forget: Why the Navy Needs a Lessons-Learned Center for Shipbuilding

By Marcus Jones

In March 2025 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Ronald O’Rourke, naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service since 1984, sharpened an excellent recommendation he has raised over more than a decade: the U.S. Navy should establish a dedicated institutional mechanism for systematically capturing, analyzing, and transmitting lessons learned from its shipbuilding programs.1

Although the U.S. Navy has accumulated an extraordinary body of experience in ship design and construction over more than two centuries, it continues to make avoidable mistakes in major acquisition programs such as proceeding into construction with incomplete designs, integrating immature technologies, projecting unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and eroding accountability structures once a program becomes politically or industrially “too big to fail.” These errors are not unique to the Navy, but they are particularly consequential in the context of shipbuilding, where program timelines are long, platforms are few and expensive, and consequences are measured in strategic as well as fiscal terms.

O’Rourke’s solution is a “lessons-learned center” for naval shipbuilding: a dedicated, continuous, and institutionalized effort to capture knowledge from past programs, distill it into accessible form, and ensure it informs future design, acquisition, and oversight decisions. The value of such an entity, he argues, would lie in its ability to prevent repeated mistakes, reduce waste, improve program outcomes, and help sustain the Navy’s long-term force design and industrial base goals. It addresses key features of the Navy’s acquisition environment: the discontinuous and generational nature of major shipbuilding programs; the structural fragmentation of knowledge across commands, contractors, and government agencies; and the absence of an educational or doctrinal home for critical institutional memory.

Unlike weapons or aircraft programs, which may see dozens or hundreds of iterations within a single career, major ship classes are often designed and constructed once every 20 or 30 years. The effect of this long cycle time is that most individuals involved in a new class of ships – whether program managers, naval architects, flag officers, or congressional staffers – may have had no direct role in the last one. What should be institutional memory therefore becomes diffuse personal recollection, vulnerable to retirement, reassignment, or obsolescence. Moreover, the knowledge necessary to understand past program outcomes is distributed across a complex web of organizations: Program Executive Offices, NAVSEA and its affiliated labs and centers, shipyards and primes and sub-tier contractors, OPNAV resource sponsors, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and various congressional committees and watchdogs. Each retains only partial and often incompatible records, and there is little incentive or mechanism for aggregating these into a unified analytic understanding. While internal program reviews, GAO reports, and RAND studies may document lessons after the fact, there has never been an entity within the Navy tasked with curating, synthesizing, or teaching these insights.

Interestingly, O’Rourke does not propose a narrowly bureaucratic mechanism but envisions a range of possible instantiations, from a structured repository of documents to a more active, curriculum- and wargame-integrated enterprise. But what matters in his framing is not form but function: the institutionalization of a reflective capacity for learning from experience and applying that learning prospectively in ways that materially improve outcomes.

Such a capability, if properly implemented, would amount to a kind of strategic memory for the Navy, one able to withstand changes in leadership, budget, and political context, while enabling the service to treat shipbuilding not as a sequence of isolated procurements but as a continuous and evolving system of practice. It is not, therefore, a technocratic fix for acquisition inefficiencies, but a cultural transformation within the Navy’s approach to its own history of design, development, and production. It holds out the prospect that the Navy would not only save money and avoid failure, but reaffirm its preferred identity as a thinking, adaptive, and strategically serious organization. It is this deeper institutional value – far beyond process improvement – that makes O’Rourke’s proposal for a naval shipbuilding lessons-learned center important and long overdue.

Joint Lessons on Lessons Learned

The idea has modest precedent and ample justification. One of the most robust models of institutional learning in the defense sector is the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), established in 1985 in response to the operational shortcomings revealed during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. CALL’s mission was to systematically collect, analyze, and disseminate operational and tactical lessons. Over time, it became fully integrated into Army doctrine and planning, fielding collection teams, producing analytic bulletins, and shaping professional military education. But of particular relevance to the Navy’s shipbuilding enterprise is a less widely known but equally instructive initiative: the Center for Army Acquisition Lessons Learned (CAALL), housed within the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity.2

Established following the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, which cited the absence of a centralized mechanism for analyzing acquisition successes and failures, CAALL provides an authoritative source for acquisition-specific lessons across the Army’s program offices. It operates a web-enabled Acquisition Lessons Learned Portal (ALLP) through which project teams submit concise, structured, and searchable lessons, each tagged by acquisition phase, milestone, cost and schedule impact, and functional category.

These are not vague observations, but distilled from real program experience and embedded in metadata-rich formats that support both searchability and trend analysis. CAALL analysts conduct deep-dive studies of recurring issues, such as documentation burden, Earned Value Management failures, or test duplication, and prepare “just-in-time” lesson packages for project managers entering specific acquisition phases. The Center also engages in outreach, publishes bulletins, curates spotlight topic zones, and supports internal Army decision-making with synthesized data on the top five systemic challenges facing Army programs. It demonstrates that institutional learning is within reach but requires structured data, a deliberate submission pipeline, professional analytical support, and educational integration. It also shows how lessons can be transformed from static reflections into dynamic inputs for decision support, policy revision, and curriculum development. Most importantly, CAALL demonstrates that such a capability can be sustained over time, through leadership endorsement, modest staffing, and the aggressive use of digital tools.

A shipbuilding-focused counterpart – scaled appropriately to the Navy’s size, resourced modestly, and empowered to draw insight from both current and historical programs – would not need to reinvent the wheel. It would only need to learn how others have made their institutions learn.

Other models further underscore the feasibility and necessity of such a capability. The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) applies a five-phase process – discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination – to lessons arising from joint exercises, operations, and experiments. Its information system, JLLIS, acts as a system of record for tracking, archiving, and analyzing lessons that affect force development and joint capability planning.3

A more technical and directly relevant precedent is found in NASA’s Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS).4 NASA’s LLIS arose from the hard-won awareness, following the Challenger and Columbia disasters, that high-stakes engineering efforts demand not only risk management tools but a durable culture of reflection and improvement. NASA’s system integrates lessons into program planning and design reviews and allows for long-term traceability of decisions and failures. The agency’s approach, emphasizing root cause analysis, organizational memory, and education, aligns with the intended mission of an NSLLC to translate the history of naval shipbuilding experience into anticipatory guidance for future programs. Like NASA, the Navy deals with one-off, bespoke, high-cost platforms with life cycles spanning decades. The discipline required to learn systematically from such endeavors is the same.

Even in the commercial sector, complex system integrators such as Boeing, Airbus, and multinational energy firms have turned to lessons-learned systems, both formal and ad hoc, to analyze catastrophic failures and to course-correct future programs. The Construction Industry Institute’s lessons-learned repositories, used by engineering and construction firms to improve execution of large-scale infrastructure projects, is still another model for post-project analysis and feedback. These efforts are often grounded in shared technical taxonomies, design decision trees, and “causal maps” that allow construction organizations to relate performance outcomes to earlier architectural or managerial choices. The Navy’s shipbuilding community, which is distinguished by even greater system and technological complexities and similar exposure to path-dependent design choices, lacks such a coherent and systematized mechanism. An NSLLC would hold out the promise of that capability.

Of course, these precedents cannot simply be imitated wholesale, but they offer essential lessons in form, function, and value. Each succeeds not by relying on passive documentation and informal processes, but by embedding structured learning into the decision cycles and professional cultures of their organizations. What an NSLLC must do is adapt this logic to the particularities of U.S. naval shipbuilding: its long timelines, institutional fragmentation, industrial dependencies, and strategic visibility. It must provide an analytic and educational platform that helps naval leaders and engineers reason more effectively about cost, capability, risk, and design. It must produce continuity across ship classes and across generations of acquisition professionals. And it must do so not as a retrospective archive alone, but as a living resource embedded in professional education, program governance, and future planning.

Over the past several decades, the U.S. Navy has been the subject of repeated and increasingly urgent calls to establish a formal mechanism for doing just that, all of which have, time and again, failed to take root. While the service has often acknowledged the recurrence of major programmatic mistakes – most notably in high-profile acquisition efforts such as the Littoral Combat Ship, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier – it has not developed a durable, institutionalized capacity for engineering and acquisition-oriented organizational learning. This failure has not gone unremarked. A lineage of initiatives, proposals, and critiques – some internal, some external, some aspirational, others postmortem – has identified the absence of such a capacity as a root contributor to the Navy’s persistent shipbuilding troubles.

Perhaps the most compelling of these efforts is a 2022 MIT thesis by naval engineer Elliot Collins, which deserves attention not only for its technical sophistication but for its diagnosis of a deep institutional shortcoming.5 Collins, a Navy officer serving in the DDG(X) design program, observed firsthand what he describes as a structural absence of organizational memory in Navy ship design and acquisition. His thesis, written under the auspices of MIT’s Naval Construction and Engineering program, proposes the creation of a Navy Design Notebook System (NDNS): a digital, structured, and lifecycle-aware framework for recording and organizing design decisions, assumptions, lessons, and engineering rationale across a ship’s development. Drawing inspiration from both Toyota’s engineering notebook practice and the best traditions of systems engineering, Collins lays out a clear taxonomy and architecture for capturing knowledge in real time and rendering it useful across multiple programs and decades. Crucially, the NDNS is not just a data storage concept, but a model for how design reasoning can be institutionalized so that the lessons of one generation are accessible and intelligible to the next.

The significance of Collins’s proposal lies in the lineage of failed or underdeveloped efforts that it implicitly seeks to redeem. As far back as the 1970s, the Navy undertook an informal initiative known as the REEF POINTS series, pamphlet-style reflections on acquisition experience intended to help incoming program officers.6 But the REEF POINTS effort lacked formal backing, consistent authorship, or archival permanence, and it quickly faded as personnel rotated out and no office assumed responsibility for sustaining it. Later assessments, including a 1993 Department of Defense Inspector General report, found that the Navy lacked a centralized system for capturing acquisition lessons learned, and more critically, that it made little practical use of the systems it did possess. Data were gathered, but not applied; observations made, but not preserved; patterns noted, but not internalized.7 The diagnosis repeated itself in a 2002 analytical review commissioned by the Army’s War College, which found that across the Department of Defense, lessons-learned programs often failed not for lack of insight but for lack of organizational stewardship, cultural support, and procedural integration.8

Why, then, despite these longstanding recognitions, has the Navy failed to institutionalize a lasting lessons-learned capability in its shipbuilding enterprise? The reasons are multiple and reflect a misalignment between the operational culture of the Navy and the administrative and engineering demands of ship design. Unlike the tactical communities of naval aviation or undersea warfare – where debriefing, checklist revisions, and iterative training are ingrained – the acquisition enterprise lacks a comparable feedback loop. Moreover, the Navy’s engineering education pathways, from undergraduate technical training to postgraduate systems curricula, have not systematically incorporated acquisition case studies or design failures into their pedagogy. There is no consistent mechanism to bring shipbuilding experience into the classroom, the wargame, or the design studio. Lessons remain tacit, siloed, and anecdotal.

That the Navy has lacked such a capacity for so long is a failure of imagination and institutional design, but it not an irremediable one. The architecture of such a capability already exists in other domains, from NASA to the Army to the commercial nuclear sector. The Navy does not need to invent a solution from whole cloth; it needs to adapt proven models to its own technical and cultural context. What is required is not another ad hoc study or retrospective review, but the establishment of a permanent Naval Shipbuilding Lessons-Learned Center, a durable institutional home where technical memory, engineering reasoning, and acquisition insight can be collected, structured, and applied. The central question, then, is not whether such a center is needed, but what it should consist of, how it should function, and where it should reside.

The Devil in the Details

To be more than a bureaucratic corrective or another forgotten archive, a shipbuilding lessons-learned program must fulfill a set of core functions as intellectually rigorous as the failures it seeks to prevent and not just catalog what has gone wrong in previous programs or indulge in generalities about process improvement. The first and most essential function is to identify and preserve actual lessons: not loose observations or platitudes, but knowledge with clear causal content, derived from real program experience, and supported by traceable evidence.

To qualify as such, a lesson must demonstrate causal specificity: what precisely caused the outcome it describes, and why. It must be replicable or at least transferable across contexts, suggesting how it might inform other ship types or acquisition models. It must be traceable to primary sources – engineering drawings, test data, milestone reviews – so that its logic can be reconstructed and its authority verified. It must be actionable, capable of informing future decisions, whether at the level of design margin, contract structure, or policy architecture. And ideally, it should possess counterfactual depth: the ability to show not only what happened, but what might have happened differently under other choices.

When filtered through this lens, the lessons that matter and that a center must preserve fall broadly into five categories. First are design integration lessons, insights into how complex systems interact within the hull, and how early design assumptions or immature technologies can generate cascading failures, as in the DDG-1000’s power system or the Ford-class’s EMALS launch mechanism. Second are construction and manufacturing lessons, which speak to the translation of design into physical product: the timing of block assembly, the thresholds at which digital coordination outperforms paper-based workflows, the effects of workforce experience on productivity. Third are program management and acquisition lessons (perhaps the most politically fraught) concerning contract type selection, milestone pacing, and the dangers of concurrency. Fourth are industrial base and supply chain lessons, which trace how changes in the broader defense industrial ecosystem—supplier attrition, workforce bottlenecks, fragility in the materials base—constrain program execution in ways the Navy and its private shipbuilders often fail to anticipate. And finally, there are historical, strategic, and doctrinal lessons, which reveal how misalignments between strategic ambition and industrial reality (fleet design concepts that outpace build capacity, for instance) can derail even well-managed programs.

Still, it is not enough just to identify them; lessons must be preserved and organized within a structure that allows them to be used. Here, the Navy can draw on models such as that proposed by Collins in his thesis: a digital, lifecycle-aware knowledge framework that tags and stores design decisions, assumptions, and lessons in a manner that makes them accessible not only to current program staff but to future generations. Such a system would form the backbone of the NSLLC’s information architecture: structured, searchable, phase-referenced, and durable. It would allow engineers working on SSN(X) to understand not just that the Virginia-class succeeded or stumbled in certain areas, but why, under what constraints, and according to which tradeoffs. It would enable program sponsors to distinguish between lessons that were context-specific and those that reflect deeper structural patterns.

Ultimately, the most critical function of the NSLLC, however, is not archival but pedagogical. Lessons, to be meaningful, must be taught as part of a living curriculum, and not simply as dry memoranda or summary slides. The center must work directly with educational institutions to embed lessons into the professional formation of officers, policy officials, engineers, and acquisition professionals. This means developing decision-forcing cases that place students in the shoes of historical program leaders, confronting them with the actual dilemmas and constraints those leaders faced. It means designing wargames and exercises that test tradeoffs in acquisition, industrial surge, and fleet composition. It means seeding capstone projects, research initiatives, and faculty development efforts with questions drawn from real program history. And it means, above all, creating a culture in which experience is not simply remembered but used as a guide to reasoning, as a check against institutional hubris or forgetfulness, and as a source of comparative advantage in a strategic environment where time and resources are finite. Finally, the Center must function diagnostically on behalf of Navy decision-makers, as a resource for the review of future program plans, bringing to bear its corpus of structured knowledge to identify early warning signs of known failure modes, or to highlight opportunities for constructive borrowing across ship classes. This is not a matter of punitive oversight, but of anticipatory guidance and bringing past reasoning to bear on present decisions in a way that deepens accountability and reduces risk.

What this amounts to is a knowledge institution, not in the narrow academic sense but in the most operationally vital sense of the term. The NSLLC would exist to ensure that the U.S. Navy no longer builds its ships without memory. It would translate past pain into future prudence, and costly failure into usable foresight. And it would mark, at last, the point at which naval shipbuilding began to behave not just as a procurement function, but as a learning system worthy of the stakes it bears.

The Way Ahead

What would such a center look like in practice? If the value of a Naval Shipbuilding Lessons-Learned Center lies in the integrity and usability of its knowledge, then its organizational structure must be equally deliberate. It should not replicate the diffuse and stovepiped landscape of existing program oversight offices, but rather bridge engineering, acquisition, policy, and education communities. And in keeping with the realities of today’s defense fiscal environment, it must be lean, digitally enabled, and architected from the start to minimize overhead. The NSLLC should be organized as a small, hybrid analytical and educational unit with as small a group of affiliated personnel as circumstances permit, including naval engineers with experience in major design and production programs; acquisition professionals familiar with contracting and program management dynamics; historians of technology and naval policy who can trace institutional lineages and doctrinal consequences; and digital knowledge architects to manage its structured repository and analytic tools. Core activities would be augmented by short-term fellows – rotating billets for officers, civilians, or academics on sabbatical or detail – who would conduct targeted case studies, contribute to curriculum development, or lead diagnostic reviews of current programs. Rather than attempt to recreate or replace existing program data flows, the Center should connect to them and draw from NAVSEA, PEO Ships and Submarines, CRS, GAO, and DoD IG reports, but synthesize across them with the purpose of creating pedagogically and analytically coherent insights.

To reduce cost and footprint, the Center must leverage digital tools aggressively. A cloud-based digital architecture, modeled in part on the NDNS framework, would form the heart of the operation: a searchable, metadata-tagged, phase-referenced archive of lessons that supports analysis, instruction, and red-teaming of future programs. Visualization tools like interactive timelines, decision trees, and traceability matrices should be prioritized over staff-intensive publishing or editorial operations. Whenever possible, the Center’s materials should be reusable across formats: a single case study might underpin a midshipman seminar, an acquisition wargame, and a policy memo to ASN(RDA). In this sense, the Center is less a physical institute than a virtual and modular capability: one that enables reflection, instruction, and anticipatory decision support wherever shipbuilding is debated or taught.

As to its location, the author will admit to a conflict-of-interest, being a longtime member of the U.S. Naval Academy faculty. It may, therefore, sound parochial to suggest that the NSLLC be housed at Annapolis. That said, there are good reasons, symbolic and practical, why the Naval Academy may be a fitting institutional home. The Academy is the Navy’s enduring schoolhouse, the place where generations of officers are introduced not just to the fleet, but to the long arc of naval experience. It offers a rare confluence of technical education, historical reflection, and leadership formation.

Moreover, it sits proximate to the Washington-area institutions with which the NSLLC would regularly interact – NAVSEA, the Navy labs and warfare centers, OPNAV and the Secretariat organization, and the various acquisition and oversight bodies headquartered in the capital region. Perhaps most importantly, the Academy is a place not just of training, but of memory. To locate the Center there would signal that lessons are not just compliance artifacts or after-action musings, but a core component of professional identity. It would allow the Center’s work to be integrated directly into engineering coursework, capstone design, fleet seminars, and acquisition electives. And it would give midshipmen, from the beginning of their careers, access to a body of knowledge that has existed until now only in fragments.

But what matters is not the administrative chain but the Center’s function: to make memory usable, to make learning permanent, and to help the Navy move from a culture of crisis improvisation to one of cumulative, adaptive competence. Wherever it is housed, a Naval Shipbuilding Lessons-Learned Center should embody the values it seeks to cultivate: frugality, clarity, and strategic discipline. And in doing so, it may just help the Navy build not only better ships, but a better institution.

Dr. Marcus Jones is an associate professor in the history department at the United States Naval Academy

Endnotes

1. Ronald O’Rourke (11 March 2025), “Statement before the Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing on ‘The State of U.S. Shipbuilding’” (Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700) pp.1-3.

2. Iracki, Jill, 2014. “Army acquisition lessons learned,” Defense AT&L (September–October 2014) pp.36-40.

3. Thomas, J.T. and Schultz, D.L. (2015), “Lessons about Lessons: Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program.” Joint Forces Quarterly 79, pp.113-120.

4. Ganopol, A., Oglietti, M., Ambrosino, A., Patt, F., Scott, A., Hong, L. and Feldman, G., 2017. “Lessons learned: an effective approach to avoid repeating the same old mistakes.” Journal of Aerospace Information Systems14(9), pp.483-492; Also Miller, S.B., 2005. “Lessons Learned or Lessons Noted: Knowledge Management in NASA.” In ASTD 2005 Research-to-Practice Conference Proceedings (p. 140).

5. Collins, E.J., 2022. “A Method for Organized Institutional Learning in the Navy Shipbuilding Community” (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

6. Wellborn Jr, R.M., 1976. “Formulation and Use of Lessons Learned in NAVSEASYSCOM Acquisition Programs” (Project Report, Defense Systems Management College)

7. Reed, D.E., Gimble, T.F., Koloshey, J.L., Ward, E.J. and Alejandro, J.K., 1993. “Acquisition-Type Lessons-Learned Programs Within the Military Departments” (No. IG-DOD-93173).

8. Snider, K.F., Barrett, F.J. and Tenkasi, R., 2002. “Considerations in acquisition lessons-learned system design.” Acquisition Review Quarterly9(1), pp.67-84.

Featured Image: The USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. under construction at Bath Iron Works in July 2023. (Photo via Bath Iron Works)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.