Commander William Spears, U.S. Navy, joins the program to discuss his article, “What Moral Leadership Looks Like,” which examines the philosophical approach of Admiral Stockdale during his time as a POW in North Vietnam.
Stories Due: November 10, 2025
Week Dates: December 1-5, 2025 Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words Submit to: Content@cimsec.org
By Dmitry Filipoff
In annual tradition, CIMSEC will be running a series of short stories looking to explore the nature of conflict and competition through fiction.
Fiction has long served as a powerful means for exploring hypotheticals and envisioning alternatives. Authors can explore the future and flesh out concepts for how potential clashes and warfighting challenges may play out. They can probe the past, and use historical fiction to explore alternative histories. Authors are invited to craft gripping narratives that illuminate the unforeseen and carve realistic detail into visions of future conflict.
Much has been written over the last two decades about how cost-effective naval mine warfare can be for the U.S. Navy in great power war. Mines have demonstrated their utility in the Ukraine conflict by both deterring Russia from executing amphibious landings and interfering with Ukrainian grain exports. China has repeatedly cited it as the “assassin’s mace” and followed through with significant resources to deploy them via traditional means.1 However, the current focus for American offensive naval minelaying is done either as a prelude to open hostilities, or when the U.S. has uncontested air and/or undersea superiority of the battlespace, an unreasonable assumption to maintain against a peer adversary. The U.S. Navy needs a realistic means to quickly deploy naval mines against a peer adversary in a contested environment.
Current U.S. capabilities to deploy mines are limited. B-52s and F/A-18 aircraft can deploy the Quickstrike mine by air and require suppression of enemy air defenses or uncontested airspace to enable minelaying. Undersea deployment via fast attack submarine or ORCA Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) is constrained by a limited number of proficient units available to conduct the mission, restricted abilities when operating in shallow depths, and comparatively slow time to establish the minefield. At the same time, platform survivability is dependent on not being detected, which is a major assumption against adversaries with modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Regaining the ability to deploy mines over the side from surface ships like was done during WWII will be unsuitable against a peer competitor in the missile age unless the vessel has effective protection from attack, is somehow undetected deep in the battlespace, or is deploying them in an area where adversary forces cannot respond in time (essentially an uncontested environment). Helicopter delivery does not offer a better option than already certified air platforms.
Naval mines need a new kind of delivery platform, specifically by either rocket or missile. Mine missiles will be used here to describe this delivery method and differentiate it from rocket-propelled naval mines activated after deployment, like the Chinese EM-52/T-1.
Mine Missile Advantages
Deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method. Interpolating from a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) paper, the fastest means to deploy 40 mines is using two or more B-52 platforms, but it would take over twenty hours to complete (working only at night and accounting for transit time).2
Alternatively, Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped platforms (surface, submarine, or land-based) already forward in the region could deploy the same number of mines in less than an hour, significantly minimizing the window for counterattack or detection while restoring more operational flexibility. Just as planners will rely on Tomahawk and other cruise missiles to eliminate the hardest fixed air defenses to lower the risk of losing attack aircraft, the same argument should apply to offensive mining. Missiles are significantly harder to engage than other mining platforms if detected, and the window to stop them before the delivery of their payload is narrow. By making mining more survivable and shifting the delivery mechanism to penetrating missiles, minefields could be laid in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to traditional delivery platforms.
Possibly the easiest conversion option for a mine-delivered missile would be from existing Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC). The current U.S. ASROC system is capable of carrying a 600-pound payload (based on the weight of Mark 54 Torpedo which would put it on par with the MK 62 Quickstrike mine.3,4 Other nations have ASROC systems with greater throw weight, like the Japanese Type 07 vertical-launch ASROC, which can carry a 700-pound payload (based on the weight of the Type 12 torpedo) to either carry a larger mine or extend the range of mine deployment.5
PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 18, 2016) The forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) launches a vertical launch anti-submarine rocket (VLA) missile from its aft launchers during Valiant Shield 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham)
While these may be the easiest to convert, they suffer from significant range limitations compared to other missile systems and were designed to engage individual contacts rather than work as a salvo for minefield placement. Converting ASROC-like mine missile could still be useful for coastal batteries, where defensive minefields can be deployed within territorial waters, negating the need for extended ranges.
A better option against a peer adversary would be a long-range missile system like the existing Tomahawk system. While it has the capability of carrying a 1000-pound payload (equivalent to the MK 63 Quickstrike mine), we should conservatively assume a smaller mine to account for the modifications needed to ensure safe separation from the missile and landing in the water. It still has significant benefits over an ASROC system in that its range is measured in the hundreds of miles, is designed to operate in contested airspace, and the existing strike planning systems could be more easily modified to support minefield planning. Additional value could be gained from a new system if it were possible to develop a missile and mine combination capable of delivering two or more mines per launch. For Tomahawk, this may require not just modifications to the missile but a new mine design with a better form factor to support at least two mines per missile.
Mine missiles would allow any U.S. Navy ship or submarine with VLS capabilities to lay mines, eliminating the need for a dedicated minelaying vessel and greatly expanding the options for delivery platforms. Developing a capability to deliver naval mines via missiles allows more platforms and joint partners to deploy naval mines, including Army and Marine units. Because delivery would be much faster, deploying craft could quickly shift to other tasking or more effectively evade retaliation. Additionally, by expanding mine delivery to VLS, submarines could execute any mining mission both further away from enemy patrols and in deeper waters while making it harder for invading forces to intercept them.
UUVs have been seen as the future of offensive mining, given the reported success of Ukraine’s SeaBaby system in delivering mines against Russian forces.6 But UUVs have limits and restrictions that traditional platforms or mine missiles do not have. Small to midsize UUVs are more susceptible to electronic and cyber warfare attacks that can disable them compared to traditional minelayers. Additionally, in the Ukrainian conflict, 60-70 percent of Ukrainian naval drone attacks were self-assessed to be defeated while fewer missile and rocket attacks were intercepted by Russian air defense systems, making a mine missile a more reliable means to reach the target area, especially as empty coastlines or channels are unlikely to be covered by point defenses.7
A missile-delivered minefield can be an expensive option to deliver a field, given how the cost of the missile is added to the mine. Using the previously cited NPS paper, using two B-52s to deploy 40 mines will cost about $11.6 million, assuming $88,000 per flight hour.8 Considering a single Tomahawk missile costs about $3.8 million (including payload), seeding the same 40 mines would cost $152 million.9 Alternatively, using a cheaper missile like the older RUR-5 ASROC at $1.85 million each (after adjusting for inflation) or $74 million for the field would cost less, though it has other operational drawbacks like reduced range.10 Either option is still cheaper than losing a single aircraft or submarine and related crew if an opponent detects and successfully engages the platform during a mine-laying operation in a contested environment. The loss of an ORCA XLUUV (at an adjusted $124.4 million each) might be more fiscally palatable compared to high-end missiles, however, the limited number of ORCAs expected to join the fleet, the time it takes to bring a new ORCA on station, and the uncertain production plan for replacement units could make their destruction as undesirable as any other platform.11
Concepts of Operation
Developing the mines via missiles allows allied nation coastal batteries under threat of amphibious attack to rapidly reseed an area previously thought cleared. Mines could also be launched against an adversary’s ports to delay the deployment of an invasion fleet without involving other naval units. For added deterrence, coastal mine missile batteries could also be positioned to launch on warning and sow preplanned minefields while causing the enemy to waste ordnance on launchers that have already delivered their payloads, similar to how some nations operationalize nuclear deterrence. These would provide better deterrence against amphibious landings than standard coastal batteries, which could be destroyed by asymmetric platforms before they have the opportunity to engage a target.
The defense of Tawain scenario is an example where mine missiles could be used effectively. As soon as the defenders have indications of PRC attacks, pre-planned minefields are immediately deployed by coastal batteries (ideally by transport-erector-launchers, TELs) either against opposing ports (mustering amphibious forces) or defensively against projected landing locations before the launchers can be destroyed. Any surviving TELs can reposition and reseed the minefields as required.
A possible alternative to the mine missile is conducting missile strikes directly on ships and facilities. However, one of the primary objectives of a minefield is to shape the battlefield and influence enemy psychology, not just eliminate the enemy force. With the proper employment, a limited number of mines properly deployed can redirect forces and remove resupply/repair ports from consideration, or hazard enemy ships more effectively than if those vessels or ports were attacked directly. In WWII, one bomber in October 1943, between two sorties, dropped only six mines, which resulted in two ships destroyed, redirected a convey (allowing it to be mostly destroyed), and closed that port for the rest of the war.12 In May 1972, 32 mines were dropped into the North Vietnam harbor of Haiphong, a significant shipping hub, under complete observation and anti-aircraft fire. As a result, all shipping through that port was stopped for 300 days.13
Both cases show that a modest number of mines were more cost-effective in suppressing enemy operations than a conventional assault because of the deep uncertainty they inflict on the commander’s mind. This effect could be further amplified if a mix of mine missiles and land attack cruise missiles strike a harbor where the adversary is unsure if it shot down a land attack missile or just missed stopping a missile from dropping a mine. Forcing this unknown variable on the enemy commander’s calculations should adequately justify the higher cost to quickly and assuredly deliver the mines in limited quantities.
Iran is already moving in this direction for mine warfare with the Fajr-5 rocket system, demonstrating the ability to deliver naval mines from a coastal launcher in January 2025.14 Little is known about the type, number, or size of the naval mines that were deployed, though they appear to be floating mines based on an Iranian state video.15 The Fajr-5 rocket system has a maximum range of approximately 65 nm, which is useful for standoff deployment in territorial seas and confined waters, but is limited to a 198-pound payload.16 While light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines, they are still heavier than diver -delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field. Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area. While distressing for nations relying on free transit through the Strait of Hormuz, it does provide an operational example that Taiwan could use in a defensive contingency.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy does not have a strong mining strategy for operating in a contested environment today against a peer adversary. Current air platforms are too vulnerable against modern air defense systems and require enabling capabilities and operations to reach minelaying areas. Submarines might be capable depending on the circumstances, but the consequences of them being sunk in a contested area would discourage all but the most vital mining operations. UUVs might be a viable strategy eventually, but require a radically different procurement plan to develop them cheap and in mass that has not been observed in the ORCA XLUUV. Iran, an adversary best known for asymmetric power projection, is demonstrating interest in this concept and how it could be done cost effectively. It is time for America and like-minded countries to usher naval mines into the missile age.
Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and was the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Center. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.
These opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not intended to reflect official views or policies of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.
References
1. Erickson, Andrew S, William S Murray, and Lyle J Goldstein. 2009. Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability. Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7/.
2. Holder, John T., IV, Adrew M Murray, Jason P Pinnow, Grant Rodgers, and Samantha Sperry. 2023. ASSET SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE MINING OPERATIONS. Systems Engineering Capstone Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 77. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72545.
4. U.S. Navy. 2023. MK 54 – Lightweight Torpedo. November 15. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167937/mk-54-lightweight-torpedo/.
5. The Type 12 Torpedo – Japan’s Latest Submarine Killer. May 12. Accessed March 5, 2025. https://therandomjapan.com/type12-torpedo/.
6. Marson, James. 2024. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide in the Battle of the Black Sea. June 25. https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa?st=rreeu9omyfcpc68.
7. Rennolds, Nathan. 2023. Ukraine’s hi-tech naval attack drones have paralyzed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, spy chief says. Augest 26. Accessed March 13, 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-sea-drones-paralyzed-russia-black-sea-fleet-spy-chief-2023-8.
8. Mizokami, Kyle. 2022. “How Much it Actually Costs to Fly U.S. Military Aircraft.” Popular Mechanics, November 16. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41956551/cost-per-hour-to-fly-us-military-aircraft/.
9. USD Chief Financial Officer. 2024. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request. Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf.
10. Global Security. 2017. RUR-5 ASROC. June 12. Accessed March 11, 2025. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/vla.htm.
11. United States Government Accountability Office. 2022. EXTRA LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE Navy Needs to Employ Better Management Practices to Ensure Swift Delivery to the Fleet. Report to Congress, Washington: United States Government Accountability Office, 25. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105974.pdf.
12. Greer, William L, and Bartholomew C James. 1982. Psychological Aspects of Mine Warfare. Professional Paper 365, Naval Studies Group, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 15.
13. Ibid.
14. The Maritime Executive. 2025. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t. January 26. https://maritime-executive.com/article/the-naval-show-of-force-that-wasn-t.
Featured Image: The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG-89) launches an RUM-139 VL-ASROC anti-submarine rocket during a live-fire exercise off Guam. (U.S. Navy photo)
Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.1
The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process.
The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.2
Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.
Countering IUUF
The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes.
Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty,3 the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance.
China’s fishing fleet activity, 2019-2021. (Graphic via Oceana/Global Fishing Watch)
Pacific Fusion Center
The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.”4 The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.
Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.
The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels.5 The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.6
Improving Capacity
Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC.7 The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024.8 Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025.9 Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.
The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.10
The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs.
Eradicating IUUF
Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.
PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence.
Healthcare and Pacific Partnership
Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.
The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.
The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.
Conclusion
The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.
The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.
To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.
Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.
Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer.He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.
Endnotes
1. Commander Jennifer Runion, “Fishing for Trouble: Chinese IUU Fishing and the Risk of Escalation,” Proceedings 149, no. 2 (February 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/february/fishing-trouble-chinese-iuu-fishing-and-risk-escalation. Geoffrey Till, “At War with the Lights Off,” Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/war-lights.
2. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent: Implementation Plan 2023–2030*. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Mar. 2024, https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2050-Strategy-Implementation-Plan_2023-2030.pdf#:~:text=This%20first%20Implementation%20Plan%20for%20the%202050%20Strategy,and%20levels%20of%20ambition%20of%20the%202050%20Strategy. Accessed 5 Sept. 2025.
3. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fishing in the Blue Pacific, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our-development-cooperation-partnerships-in-the-pacific/case-studies/fishing-in-the-blue-pacific.
4. Pacific Fusion Centre, Home, Pacific Fusion Centre, n.d., accessed June 11, 2025, https://www.pacificfusioncentre.org/.
5. Micah McCartney, “Argentina Deploys Military as PRC Leads Fishing Swarm Near Waters,” Newsweek, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/argentina-deploys-military-atlantic-fishing-swarm-PRC-spain-korea-taiwan-2035671.
6. CDR Mike Holland, “Overview: Maritime Domain Awareness, Securing the Seas: 12 Global Tides and Currents of Maritime Domain Awareness,” The Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea 63, no. 3 (2006).
7. Australian Defence Forces, Australian Defence Forces Pacific Maritime Security Program, n.d., https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/maritime-capability.
8. Max Walden, “RFNS Timo Sustains Damage during Docking,” ABC News, December 22, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-23/fiji-navy-vessel-gifted-australia-sustains-damage-docking/104757584.
9. Ana Madigibuli, “RFNS Timo Completes First Patrol,” Fiji Times, April 16, 2025, https://www.fijitimes.com.fj/rfns-timo-completes-first-patrol/.
10. U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Sector Pacific Area, n.d., accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Cutters/.
Featured Image: Twelve Chinese fishing boats are banded together with ropes on December 21, 2010 to try to thwart an attempt by a South Korean coast guard ship to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea. (Photo by Park Young-Chul, Agence France-Press)
