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Notes to New CNO Week

Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors

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Notes to the New CNO Series

By Alan Brechbill

Admiral Caudle’s first message to the fleet outlined three priorities: the Foundry; the Fleet and the way we Fight. These priorities cannot be realized without acknowledging the simple fact that the next war at sea will be decided first in space. Ships and Sailors operating inside lethal weapons engagement zones (WEZs) cannot survive against China’s massed, over-the-horizon precision fires unless the Navy treats space operations and Counter-C5ISRT (C-C5ISRT) as foundational, not auxiliary, to naval warfare.

China has already built an architecture designed to hold U.S. carrier strike groups and logistics convoys at risk from thousands of miles away. Their killchains depend on persistent surveillance, tracking and targeting multi-phenomenology satellites, long-range radars, and networked command systems. In other words, they will not win with their missiles, but with their ability to find us. Breaking that killchain is the Navy’s main line of defense.

The uncomfortable truth is that Navy leadership still underappreciates this vulnerability. Too much emphasis remains on adding incremental capability to surface combatants or fielding exquisite, but fragile platforms, while adversaries are scaling cheap, resilient sensor networks in space. A fleet that cannot hide cannot fight.

The prioritization of space must be ruthless. The CNO must make Navy space and C-C5ISRT operations the primary force enablers across the maritime domain, and should do this across five mutually supporting lines of effort. 

1. Space as a Warfighting Domain, Not a Support Function

The Navy cannot outsource its survival to the Space Force. Maritime space operations must be owned, integrated, and exercised by trained Sailors who understand fleet maneuver. Space control must be as natural to a strike group commander as air defense.

2. C-C5ISRT as the Navy’s First Layer of Defense

Before the first missile is fired, the battle is already underway in the electromagnetic spectrum and across all orbital regimes. We must blind, jam, spoof, or destroy red’s kill web faster than it can refresh. This requires investments in offensive space capabilities, maritime EW, and deception tools that are not “nice-to-have,” but existential to survival.

3. The Foundry Must Build for the Dark

New platforms and payloads must be designed to operate when space enablers are degraded, while simultaneously being able to deny space support to the adversary. Resilience is not redundancy, it is deception, mobility, and adaptability baked into the Fleet from day one.

4. The Fleet Must Train to Disappear

Fleet exercises must not assume persistent U.S. space superiority. Ships must practice emissions control, deception operations, and distributed maneuver under the assumption that they are being hunted from orbit. Only by learning to vanish can they fight to win.

5. Manpower as a Warfighting Weapon

The Navy cannot fight a space war with borrowed manpower and leased expertise. Space dominance demands Sailors who are trained and certified in the lethal art of disrupting red killchains. This is not an auxiliary skillset, but a warfighting specialty. If the Fleet expects to survive, it must invest in dedicated Navy Space operators with the same rigor given to aviators and submariners. Anything less will cost ships and lives.

Conclusion

The Navy’s heritage is about giving Sailors a fighting chance to prevail. In the age of great power competition, saving ships and Sailors’ lives means breaking the enemy’s killchain. Admiral Caudle’s vision will succeed only if the Navy ruthlessly prioritizes space dominance and C-C5ISRT as the bedrock of how we Fight. The Fleet’s survival depends on it.

Captain Alan Brechbill, a Maritime Space Officer, is the Director of Navy Space Command. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the United States Navy or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: The guided-missile destroyer USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79) transits the Atlantic Ocean Sept. 14, 2017. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan Utah Kledzik)

Force Development

A System of Systems Analysis is Needed for Maritime Strike

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By Dick Mosier

The US military is expanding its inventory of long-range maritime strike missiles such as the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), Long-Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM), and Naval Strike Missile (NSM). These capable weapons all have ranges well beyond the effective range of the sensor systems organic to their launch platforms – meaning their effective employment relies on third party targeting data. 

While these missiles all have terminal seekers for target acquisition and aim point selection, they require target location and identification information from deep-reach external sensor systems for mission planning, missile launch decisions, target location updates to in-flight missiles, and battle damage assessments (BDA).

The threat of long-range (400 km/160 nm), hypersonic, air-to-air missiles such as the PLAAF’s new PL-21 indicate that US conventional reconnaissance and targeting aircraft must now operate within protected airspace limiting their ability to target enemy ships out to the maximum ranges of US anti-ship missiles. As a result, targeting for US long-range anti-ship missiles is increasingly dependent on NRO and Space Force satellite reconnaissance and targeting systems.

A fundamental problem facing the US military is that the services have fielded capable, long-range missile systems, but only possesses limited deep-reach Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (ISRT) capabilities, limiting the effective employment of long-range missile systems. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Air Force/Space Force are developing satellite ISRT constellations to address the problem, but the services need to use a ‘Maritime Strike System of Systems’ approach to address the true functionality of US maritime strike capability.

A System of Systems Approach

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems defines a System of Systems (SOS) as: “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” The “Maritime Strike SOS” is the set of systems and human processes integrated into a larger system of systems that provide engagement quality tracks on moving enemy ships within stringent time latency requirements for the successful engagement by the various long-range, anti-ship missiles fielded by the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and the Army.

A Maritime Strike SOS analysis would address the functionality of not only NRO and Air Force/Space Force space systems; but also, the other essential components and processes of the end-to-end architecture, such as requirements submission and adjudication, satellite/constellation tasking, satellite data relay, ground processing and exploitation, and information/data dissemination to tactical forces. The SOS analysis would ensure that the end-to-end architecture and its timeliness will provide the targeting required for effective anti-ship missile engagements.

Without guaranteed performance across this entire architecture—particularly its timeliness—these substantial space investments will fail to enable anti-ship missile engagements.

Maritime Strike SOS Analysis

Missile Range Velocity Service
Naval Strike Missile

 (NSM)

 115 nm 450 kts Navy, USMC
Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) 1000 nm 450 kts Navy, USMC, Army  
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) 200 nm 450 kts Navy, USAF
Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) 350 nm 3334 kts Army
Standard Missile 6

(SM-6)

 130 nm 2334 kts Navy, USMC, Army

The first step in a Maritime Strike SOS analysis is to determine the capability required of the SOS for each type of anti-ship missile and launch platform combination. The objective is to determine the sequence and timing of events from receipt of a mission task by a launch platform to the acquisition of the moving target ship by the missile seeker.

In the final analysis, the missile must arrive at the target ship location area of uncertainty and begin its search before the moving ship has time to exit the area of uncertainty. This analysis will determine the maximum usable time latency from satellite target sensing to entry of the target information into the missile by the launch platform.

The SOS performance requirements are derived from the performance attributes of these five existing missile systems fielded by the Services for use in the context of joint force operations.

Maritime Strike SOS Baseline

Once the SOS performance requirements are defined for each type of missile, the next step is to identify and evaluate the baseline and alternatives. The targeting timeline for the SOS analysis would begin with receipt of a Maritime Strike mission order, and include the following:

  • Processes for the submission of collection requirements
  • Adjudication of collection tasking priorities
  • Planning of satellite mission or constellation coverage
  • Tasking of satellites
  • Time for satellites to access the target area
  • Collection of data by the satellites
  • Dissemination of sensor data to ground/shipboard systems for data processing and image exploitation
  • Dissemination of target information to missile launch platforms

The combination of all these factors has to occur within the maximum allowable time latency for successful missile engagement. 

The SOS Satellite Baseline

Satellite communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and weapons targeting systems are well into the transition from a small number of operational systems to proliferated architectures that take advantage of lower launch costs, and cheaper satellites to form mega constellations of hundreds of satellites. The following satellite mega constellations designed for or capable of supporting anti-ship missile targeting should be included in the baseline SOS analysis.

NRO Proliferated Architecture

On 22 May 2024, the NRO launched the first set of 21 Star Shield imaging satellites into low earth orbit (LEO) in what the NRO calls the NRO Proliferated Architecture. As of 30 April 2025, 179 Star Shield satellites have been launched. According to the NRO, six more launches are scheduled in 2025. Assuming the previous pattern of 21 satellites per launch the constellation is projected to reach approximately 300 three hundred satellites in late 2025. The NRO also indicates that launches will continue through 2029 but has not disclosed specifics on schedule or the total number of launches. The SOS analysis would address the performance of the satellite sensors and the processes and timelines involved from submission of fleet requirements to delivery of the sensed information to the fleet.

Space Force Long-Range Kill Chains Program

In August 2024, the Space Force Long-Range Kill Chains Program was approved for Milestone B indicating that this satellite-based Moving Target Indicator (MTI) constellation designed to track ships and land targets can proceed to acquisition. Program cost, constellation size, and the technical details of the overall architecture and performance are classified. The schedule and performance parameters are established, and the program is funded for an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the early 2030s. The size of this mega-constellation, arrangement of the satellites in space, and the technical details of the overall architecture and performance remain classified.

Space Defense Agency Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA)

The Space Force/Space Development Agency (SDA) is fielding the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) that includes Link 16 and Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) for the dissemination of information to tactical forces. In August 2024, SDA demonstrated the capability to make a PWSA Link 16 connection with a carrier and an aircraft on its deck.

In late summer 2025, the SDA is expected to begin launching its first set of PWSA satellites with limited operational capabilities. This will include 126 Transport Layer data relay satellites, and 28 Tracking Layer satellites, and 4 demonstration satellites for missile tracking. The SOS should determine the role of the PWSA in the overall SOS architecture for targeting anti-ship missiles.

Maritime Strike Command and Control Baseline

Maritime Strike is a mission that now involves platforms and missiles from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and USAF. The Maritime Strike SOS analysis must address the command and control relationships and processes among the components to ensure the arrangements are in place for the sharing of target information; and, for the planning, and execution of coordinated multiple component maritime strike operations.

The Services are fielding systems for the receipt and exploitation of targeting information. The Army is fielding Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) variants for Division and above, and a basic variant for division and below. The Navy and Marine Corps are developing and fielding Navy Maritime Targeting Cells (MTC) ashore and afloat; and, the Marine Corps is fielding a Family of Integrated Targeting Cells (MTC-X, MTC-Mobile, and Tactical Edge Node TEN-X). The details of Navy and Marine Corps MTC systems are classified, but they are expected to have capabilities similar to those of TITAN, e.g., direct satellite tasking, satellite sensor control, direct downlink of satellite data, data processing and analysis for the purpose of weapons targeting. The Maritime Strike SOS analysis would assure that these tactical terminal systems are fully integrated with the overall maritime strike SOS architecture.

Conclusion

The SOS analysis could consist of a relatively modest approach based on the integration of the detailed architectures of each of the components of the SOS as should be available from the NRO, NGA, Space Force, and the Services/Joint Force components. The investment in this analysis is justified given the looming conflict with China over Taiwan, one dominated by anti-ship missile operations. The SOS analysis would ensure that the anti-ship missiles operated by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will have the timely and comprehensive targeting support required for their effective use against moving ships.

Dick Mosier served as a Naval Flight Officer (VQ and VP); OPNAV N2 civilian intelligence analyst; OSD (Intelligence and Space Policy); SES 4 ASD(C3I) Director Tactical Intelligence Systems; and Deputy Director of a support activity leading OSD studies on space and unmanned airborne ISRT system alternatives. His career-long interest in improving the effectiveness of US Navy tactical operations, with a particular focus on the challenges of assuring the integration of national-tactical ISRT combat support capabilities. The article represents the author’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government department or agency.

Featured Image: RED SEA (Sept. 19, 2021) Fire Controlman (Aegis) 2nd Class Garrett Town stands watch in the combat information center aboard guided-missile destroyer USS O’Kane (DDG 77) in the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Elisha Smith)

Space

The Influence of Naval Strategy on the Future of Spacepower

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By Dylan “Joose” Phillips-Levine and Trevor Phillips-Levine

Turmoil has engulfed the Galactic Republic. The taxation of trade routes to outlying star systems is in dispute. Hoping to resolve the matter with a blockade of deadly battleships, the greedy Trade Federation has stopped all shipping to the small planet of Naboo, rich in raw materials vital to the economic health of the Republic.1

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away… Trade Federation officers must have read Alfred Thayer Mahan’s naval classic, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. In true Mahanian fashion, the Trade Federation massed their capital battleships to blockade Naboo.2 The Trade Federation pays homage to the East India Company that once controlled the trade routes and paved the way for Britain to become a world power.3,4 In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan believed that sea control could be gained in part by blockades – an observation borne out by Great Britain’s ascent as an economic and military powerhouse.5 Renowned navalist Milan Vego offers further guidance of how to ensure sea control in his canonical book, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice.6 In it, Vego demonstrates through historical examples that sea control can be achieved by strategically positioning forces in straits and chokepoints. Mahan’s focus on blockades combined with Vego’s theory for sea control in straits and chokepoints can guide United States interplanetary grand strategy as the United States, China, India, Russia, the European Union, and countless others shift their sights towards the final frontier.

Straits and Chokepoints

Vego asserts that sea control, in its simplest form, is the ability for a nation to use a given part of the sea and associated air (and space) across the spectrum of conflict to deny the same to the enemy.7 Applying Vego’s definition of sea control and its application to specific geographic regions, the importance of straits becomes evident. Straits or “chokepoints” are a textbook case of sea control limited to a specific region and have remained of great importance throughout history. Nations that control these chokepoints can asphyxiate the enemy by halting commerce causing major economic impacts or denying freedom of maneuver in wartime. During the Napoleonic War, the British had a vested interested in ensuring a neutral Denmark and thus neutral Danish Straits. The plains to the north provided timber for the British and French Navy and were also critical for transporting grain amongst other vital commerce. A century later, Germany’s de facto control of the Danish Straits prevented Britain from reinforcing its Russian ally during the First World War. During the Second World War, the occupation of Denmark allowed Germany to leverage the full economic resources of Scandinavian countries while denying the Royal Navy access to the Baltics.8 Even in a galaxy far, far away the Trade Federation realized the importance of blockading Naboo by placing their battleships in key locations with the goal to leverage the full economic resources of the planet.

Admiral John Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy and founding father of the Dreadnought battleship, identified the strategic importance of Straits when positing this rhetorical question, “Do you know that there are five keys to the world? The Strait of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope. And every one of these keys we hold.”9,10 Although oversimplified, his aphorism still rings true today. In March of 2021, the M/V Ever Given became lodged in the Suez Canal disrupting commerce and causing an estimated 9.6 billion dollars of economic damage per day.11 Ships once waiting in line to transit the Suez Canal extended their voyage and incurred additional fuel and crew costs by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to their destinations.12,13

Fig. 1. Ships sailing around the Cape of Good while the Suez Canal was blocked in March incurring extra fuel, time, and crew costs. (BBC graphic)

Lagrange Points and Halo Orbits

The same analogy holds true for space travel. Despite the incomprehensible distance, times, and vastness required for interplanetary travel, the chokepoints of sea control can also be distilled down to Lagrange points for space control.14 Lagrange points are specific points (orbits) between any two orbiting celestial bodies where gravitational and centrifugal force negate each other, resulting in orbits that can be maintained with little to no propulsion.15 In simpler terms, only five Lagrange points (labeled L1 through L5) exist between planets and their respective moons or the Sun and its planets.16 Due to the gravity-stable properties and low fuel requirements of Lagrange points, they are ideal for satellites and are understandably well known by space agencies. In 2017, the Director of NASA’s Planetary Science Division, Dr. Jim Green, proposed the radical idea of placing a magnetic dipole shield at Lagrange point L1 in the Sun-Mars system to create an artificial magnetosphere, shielding Mars from solar winds and radiation. This shield would allow the volcanic activity on Mars to continually build up the atmosphere until a point of self-sustainment.17 If a state or non-state actor saturates or even blockades critical Lagrange chokepoints, the ramifications could range from economic depression and collapse of critical space infrastructure to the loss of interplanetary colonies that may eventually inhabit the cosmos.18

Closer to home, satellites from both NASA and the European Space Agency have already made home in earth-system Lagrange points. Lagrange points, specifically L1, L2, and L3, can also host an ecosystem of satellites through halo orbits.19 Although halo orbits are dynamically unstable and require more fuel than the stable Lagrange points at L4 and L5, satellites in halo orbits at L2 can serve as communication relays from the dark side of the moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies. In May of 2018, China placed the first-ever lunar relay satellite, Queqiao, into a halo orbit at the Earth-Moon L2. The following year, China landed their Chang’e 4 rover on the far side of the moon using Queqiao as a communication relay.20 In addition to China, NASA and the European Space Agency have already placed satellites in Lagrange point L2 while countries such as Russia, India, and Japan have their own Lagrangian aspirations.21 Because Lagrange points and associated halo orbits can only host a limited number of spacecraft, the contest for this limited real estate by spacefaring nations can have terrestrial consequences.22,23 These important areas in space are not treatise to international norms and measures yet will be essential for lunar and interplanetary space lines of communication.24

Fig. 2. The Five Lagrange points, L1 through L5. M1 represents the larger celestial body and M2 represents any celestial body whose orbit is anchored to it. If M1 represents the sun, M2 represents the planets. If M1 represents the planets, M2 represents its moons. Source: http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/Mechanics/lagpt.html

Access to Resources

The Trade Federation blockaded Naboo in an attempt to leverage the rare economic resources found in the planet. Similar to here on Earth, access to resources is necessary to lift countries and their populations’ standard of living. It is unlikely that much of the world will sacrifice their consumerism to live in harmony with each other and Mother Nature, leaving the limited resources on Earth to support an ever-growing consumer economy. Governments in the future are likely to look to space to solve their growth problems, much as European colonization looked to supplement sapped domestic resources in the 17th and 18th centuries. Beyond Lagrange chokepoints serving as potential flashpoints for real-estate between countries launching satellites, Martian trojan asteroids make home in the gravity-stable environment at Lagrange points L4 and L5 in the Mars-Sun system.25 The imperative of space lines of communication is not necessarily scientific exploration or protection of desirable orbits, but the ability to leverage the vast resources that abound in space. One asteroid floating between Mars and Jupiter is assessed to contain over 10 quintillion dollars of precious metals, more than 10,000 times larger than the 2019 global economy, far more wealth than Han Solo could have ever imagined.26,27

Interplanetary Transport Network and Space lines of Communication

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s unmistakable first lines in the Influence of History Upon Sea Power state:

“The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world.”28

While the great highway, wide common, and well-worn paths refer to the sea, his quote can be analogous to Star Wars as well. The hyperspace routes in Star Wars, or trade routes, link the major worlds in the galaxy like an intergalactic superhighway. The routes are safe and account for traveling without colliding into celestial bodies including their gravitational pull. Han Solo couldn’t just punch it when blockade running from Imperial Cruisers. As the Imperial Cruisers closed on him, he quipped to a young Luke Skywalker that, “Traveling through hyperspace ain’t like dusting crops, boy! Without precise calculations we could fly right through a star or bounce too close to a supernova and that’d end your trip real quick, wouldn’t it?”29

Fig. 3. Punch it! Still from “Star Wars: Episode V”. Copyright Lucasfilm Limited. Used under the terms of Fair Use per 17 U.S. Code § 107.

Although hyperspace only remains a reality in the Star Wars Universe, a great highway through our solar system already exists. Lagrange points serve as interplanetary straits, connecting celestial bodies in our solar system through the Interplanetary Transport Network (ITN).30 The halo orbits around Lagrange points can be used to alter spacecraft and satellite trajectories to arrive at any point in the solar system with minimal energy, although reaching Mars could take a millennium using the ITN – far longer than the record breaking 12 parsec Kessel Run flown by Han Solo in the Millennium Falcon.31,32 However, the slowness of ITN trajectories can be modified with external speed injections. In 2003, Cal-Teach professors introduced a Multi-Moon Orbiter concept.33 The concept proposed that a spacecraft could use Lagrange points to modify its trajectory to survey the moons of Jupiter with a final touch down on Europa where NASA speculates both water and life could exist.34 Lagrange points will serve as the keys to unlock the universe that could transform mankind into a multi-planetary species.

Fig. 4. Artist’s depiction of the ITN that connects our solar system. Abrupt changes in trajectory are due to Lagrange points. Image credit: NASA/JPL

The Line between Prescient and Far-fetched

While critics may point to the astronomical costs and technological gaps that make interplanetary travel an impossibility, the critique is confined to now. In 1945, some mainstream scientists felt that satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles were fool hardy errands that would be too technologically complex and cost prohibitive to develop.35 Less than twelve years later, Sputnik orbited the planet and within fifteen years, intercontinental missiles rested in silos. The once lone small metal ball named Sputnik launched by the Russians in 1957 has given way to a world that depends on complex networks of satellites. While GPS has become a household name in a few short decades, Russia’s GLONASS, China’s Beidou, and Europe’s Galileo systems offer competing location services with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) receivers. The recent out-of-control Chinese rocket shows that China’s Communist Party is serious about becoming a space-based power and willing to pursue this capability at all costs without due regard for safety.36 Even more recently, the Chinese landed their Zhurong rover on Mars where President Xi Jinping proudly praised all involved by saying, “You were brave enough for the challenge, pursued excellence and placed our country in the advanced ranks of planetary exploration.”37 On July 11th, 2021, Richard Branson along with five other crewmates flew to space aboard the VSS Unity proving the viability of space tourism.38,39 The following week, Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin followed suit in achieving spaceflight in the New Shephard.40

The rapid pace of artificial intelligence (AI) advancement and Space X’s Falcon 9 rockets, Starhopper, and now Starship all show that a manned mission to Mars is a matter of when, not if, and might occur as soon as 2024. SpaceX has plans to colonize Mars with one million people by 2050.41,42

To sustain and develop a Martian colony and more, established and secure space lines of communication will be of critical importance. Interplanetary pursuits are being pursued at a break-neck pace by both allies and adversaries, including China, Russia, India, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and European Union.43 As each country pursues its own interests among the solar system, the United States must develop a grand strategy in the solar system to protect US interests against both state and non-state actors. The reflection of this reality came to fruition on June 7th, 2021, when Congressman Ted Lieu introduced the Space Infrastructure Act which will “issue guidance with respect to designating space systems, services, and technology as critical infrastructure.”44

Fig. 5. The success of Martian colonies will require an intelligent space strategy. Artist’s illustration of SpaceX Starships on Mars. Image credit: SpaceX.

Conclusion

The blockade of Naboo never happened, but it does have historical precedents and very real implications for space exploration and exploitation. As countries vie to expand their resources, they not only gaze across the vast oceans but upwards towards the final frontier. The increased focus on Mars and beyond demands a robust US interplanetary strategy to protect the United States’ interests in the cosmos. While the United States is rightly focused on earth-based priorities, Milan Vego’s canonical book Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice, can provide guidance for interplanetary strategy in ensuring a “a free and open [solar system] in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition.”45 If the United States neglects interplanetary strategy, the United States will be left behind as other countries not only develop but execute their interplanetary strategies.46 If Admiral Fisher was alive today, he would ask, “Do you know that there are five keys to the solar system?” We need to ask ourselves, who will control these keys?

Lieutenant Commander Dylan “Joose” Phillips-Levine is a naval aviator and serves with TACRON-12.  His Twitter handle is @JooseBoludo.

Lieutenant Commander Trevor Phillips-Levine is a naval aviator and serves as a department head in Strike Fighter Squadron Two. His Twitter handle is @TPLevine85.

Endnotes

1. George Lucas, 1999, ¨Star Wars: Episode I The Phantom Menace”, Lucasfilm Limited.

2. “Databank Naboo,” Star Wars, https://www.starwars.com/databank/naboo.

3. Tim Veekhoven, “The Trade Federation And Neimoidians: A History,” Star Wars (14 October 2014), https://www.starwars.com/news/the-trade-federation-and-neimoidians-a-history.

4. Erin Blakemore, “How the East India Company became the world’s most powerful business,” National Geographic, (6 September 2019) https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/british-east-india-trading-company-most-powerful-business.

5. Dr. Milan Vego, “Naval Classical Thinkers And Operational Art” Naval War College (2009) 3 Naval War College https://web.archive.org/web/20170131144505/https:/www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/85c80b3a-5665-42cd-9b1e-72c40d6d3153/NWC-1005-NAVAL-CLASSICAL-THINKERS-AND-OPERATIONAL-.aspx.

6. Dr. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice, Routledge; 1st edition, (14 April 2016), 189 https://www.amazon.com/Maritime-Strategy-Sea-Control-Practice-ebook/dp/B019H40ST2

7. Ibid, 24

8. Ibid 188

9. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “John Arbuthnot Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher,” Encyclopaedia Britannica https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Arbuthnot-Fisher-1st-Baron-Fisher.

10. Dr. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice, Routledge; 1st edition, (14 April 2016), 188 https://www.amazon.com/Maritime-Strategy-Sea-Control-Practice-ebook/dp/B019H40ST2

11. Kshitij Bhargava, “Single ship stuck causing Suez Canal ‘traffic jam’ may cost $9.6 billion per day,” Financial Express (26 March 2021) https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/single-ship-stuck-causing-suez-canal-traffic-jam-may-cost-9-6-billion-per-day/2220575/.

12. Daniel Stone, “The Suez Canal blockage detoured ships through an area notorious for shipwrecks,” National Geographic (29 March 2021) https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/suez-blockage-detoured-ships-through-cape-good-hope-notorious-shipwrecks.

13. Peter S. Goodman and Stanley Reed, “With Suez Canal Blocked, Shippers Begin End Run Around a Trade Artery,” New York Times (26 March 2021, Update 29 March 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/business/suez-canal-blocked-ship.html.

14. Lead Authors: Clementine G. Starling, Mark J. Massa, Lt Col Christopher P. Mulder, and Julia T. Siegel With a Foreword by Co-Chairs General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Secretary Deborah Lee James in collaboration with: Raphael Piliero, Brett M. Williamson, Dor W. Brown IV, Ross Lott, Christopher J. MacArthur, Alexander Powell Hays, Christian Trotti, Olivia Popp, “The Future of Security in Space: A Thirty-Year US Strategy” Atlantic Council (April 2021) 35 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf.

15. NASA/WMAP Science Team, “What is a Lagrange Point?,” NASA (27 March 2018) https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/resources/754/what-is-a-lagrange-point/.

16. Shane D. Ross, “The Interplanetary Transport Network,” American Scientist, Volume 94 (April 2006) 234 http://www.dept.aoe.vt.edu/~sdross/papers/AmericanScientist2006.pdf.

17.Matt Williams, “NASA proposes a magnetic shield to protect Mars’ atmosphere,” Universe Today (3 March 2017) https://phys.org/news/2017-03-nasa-magnetic-shield-mars-atmosphere.html.

18. Lead Authors: Clementine G. Starling, Mark J. Massa, Lt Col Christopher P. Mulder, and Julia T. Siegel with a Foreword by Co-Chairs General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Secretary Deborah Lee James in collaboration with: Raphael Piliero, Brett M. Williamson, Dor W. Brown IV, Ross Lott, Christopher J. MacArthur, Alexander Powell Hays, Christian Trotti, Olivia Popp, “The Future of Security in Space: A Thirty-Year US Strategy” Atlantic Council (April 2021) 35 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf.

19. Ibid 70.

20. Luyuan Xu, “How China’s lunar relay satellite arrived in its final orbit,” Planetary (15 June 2018) https://www.planetary.org/articles/20180615-queqiao-orbit-explainer

21. Lead Authors: Clementine G. Starling, Mark J. Massa, Lt Col Christopher P. Mulder, and Julia T. Siegel with a Foreword by Co-Chairs General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Secretary Deborah Lee James in collaboration with: Raphael Piliero, Brett M. Williamson, Dor W. Brown IV, Ross Lott, Christopher J. MacArthur, Alexander Powell Hays, Christian Trotti, Olivia Popp, “The Future of Security in Space: A Thirty-Year US Strategy” Atlantic Council (April 2021) 35 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf.

22. Ibid 70.

23. Ibid 10.

24. Ibid 72.

25. Jesse Emspak, Are Mars’ Trojan Asteroids Pieces of the Red Planet?,” Space (July 24, 2017) https://www.space.com/37565-mars-trojan-asteroids-pieces-of-the-planet.html.

26. Adam Smith, “Asteroid Worth $10 Quintillion Could Be Only One of Its Kind,” Independent (29 October 2020) https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/asteroid-10-quintillion-psyche-19-iron-nickel-b1419635.html.

27. “Star Wars IV: A New Hope Quotes,” Movie Quote Database, https://www.moviequotedb.com/movies/star-wars-episode-iv-a-new-hope/quote_29904.html.

28. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,” Dover Publications; Revised ed. edition (November 1, 1987) https://www.amazon.com/Influence-History-1660-1783-Military-Weapons/dp/0486255093.

29. “Star Wars IV: A New Hope Quotes,” Movie Quote Database, https://www.moviequotedb.com/movies/star-wars-episode-iv-a-new-hope/quote_29894.html.

30. Shane D. Ross, “The Interplanetary Transport Network,” American Scientist, Volume 94 (April 2006) 230 http://www.dept.aoe.vt.edu/~sdross/papers/AmericanScientist2006.pdf.

31. Ibid 236.

32. Kyle Hill, “How the Star Wars Kessel Run Turns Han Solo into a Time-Traveler,” Wired (12 February 2013) https://www.wired.com/2013/02/kessel-run-12-parsecs/.

33. Ross, S. D. and Koon, W. S. and Lo, M. W. and Marsden, J. E. “Design of a Multi-Moon Orbiter,” Spaceflight Mechanics 2003. Advances in the Astronautical Sciences. No. 114. American Astronautical Society, 1. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101007-131136558

34.“ Ingredients for Life?,” NASA https://europa.nasa.gov/why-europa/ingredients-for-life/

35. John. A. Olsen, “A History of Air Warfare,” Potomac Books Incorporated (2010), audiobook. Part 5 Chapter 16, time: 16:42.

36. Alison Rourke, “‘Out-of-control’ Chinese rocket falling to Earth could partially survive re-entry,” The Guardian (4 May 2021) https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/may/04/out-of-control-chinese-rocket-tumbling-to-earth.

37. Jonathan Amos, “China lands its Zhurong rover on Mars,” BBC (15 May 2021) https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-57122914.

38. Chelsea Gohd, “Virgin Galactic launches Richard Branson to space in 1st fully crewed flight of VSS Unity,” 12 July 2021) SPACE.COM https://www.space.com/virgin-galactic-unity-22-branson-flight-success

39. Mike Wall, “ Virgin Galactic Unveils New SpaceShipTwo Unity for Space Tourists,” Scientific American (23 February 2016) SPACE.COM https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/virgin-galactic-unveils-new-spaceshiptwo-unity-for-space-tourists/.

40. Paul Rincon, “Jeff Bezos launches to space aboard New Shepard rocket ship,” BBC (20 July 2021), BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-57849364

41. Hanneke Weitering, “Elon Musk says SpaceX’s 1st Starship trip to Mars could fly in 4 years,” Space (16 October 2020) https://www.space.com/spacex-starship-first-mars-trip-2024.

42. Morgan McFall-Johnsen and Dave Mosher “Elon Musk says he plans to send 1 million people to Mars by 2050 by launching 3 Starship rockets every day and creating ‘a lot of jobs’ on the red planet,” Business Insider (17 January 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-plans-1-million-people-to-mars-by-2050-2020-1.

43. “Once a two-country race, Mars missions now on radar of multiple nations,” Times of India (18 February 2021) https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/once-a-two-country-race-mars-missions-now-on-radar-of-multiple-nations/articleshow/81096583.cms.

44. Mr. Lieu, “Space Infrastructure Act,” House of Representatives (17 May 2021) https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/LIEU_172_xml.pdf.

45. The Deparment Of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” Department of Defense (1 June 2019) https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

46. Brien Flewelling, “Securing cislunar space: A vision for U.S. leadership,” Space News (9 November 2020) https://spacenews.com/op-ed-securing-cislunar-space-a-vision-for-u-s-leadership/.

Feature Image: Still from “Star Wars: Episode I” depicting the blockade of Naboo. Copyright Lucasfilm Limited. Used under the terms of Fair Use per 17 U.S. Code § 107.

Space

The Space Force Needs Policy and Strategy, Part 3

3 Comments

By Tuan N. Pham

Part one of this three-part series revisited past recommendations for a new space policy and strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means. It made the case for America to guarantee the freedom of space, embrace space preeminence, and adopt a broader and more complete approach toward space deterrence.

Part two took a step back for strategic context and re-examined a conceptual framework characterizing the dynamics that contribute to instability and stability in the space domain. All in all, instability arises when there is a real or perceived lack of order and security, while stability arises when there is a real or perceived sense of order and security.

Part three concludes the series and completes the circle with a relook on how America (through the Space Force) can mitigate instability and strengthen stability in space, while prolonging U.S. space preeminence into the 21st century.

Challenges for the Space Force

Preeminence Puzzle. As the guarantor of the global economy and provider of security, stability, and leadership because of its powerful military and vast network of allies and partners, the United States delivers global public services that others cannot. Thus, there is a strong need going forward for a comparable guarantor of the freedom of space to ensure the free flow of space commerce. If so, just as maritime preeminence is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the seas, so too is space preeminence needed to guarantee the freedom of space. The puzzle for American policymakers is whether it may be more cost-effective to invest now and maintain space preeminence or pay more later to make up for diminished space capabilities and capacities while accepting greater strategic risk in the interim and possibly ceding space preeminence to strategic competitors like China (and Russia) in the long term. If the former, then the answer to the puzzle is the Space Force, whose preeminent presence – enabled by a vast network of allies and partners – guarantees the freedom of space and ensures the free flow of space commerce for all.

Domain Dilemma. America fundamentally has two space deterrent and response options – threaten to respond (or actively respond) in the same domain, or threaten cross-domain retaliation to underwrite the deterrence of attacks on U.S. space capabilities (or respond across domains as retaliation). The scope, nature, and degree of these two courses of action must ultimately strike the delicate balance between the need to demonstrate the willingness to escalate and the imperative to not provoke further escalation in order to maintain space stability. The dilemma for the United States is where, when, and how best to deter; and if deterrence fails, where, when, and how best to respond. The Space Force lessens the dilemma by providing a flexible and capable deterrent and response force to keep the common peace.   

Reliance/Resilience Riddle. Enhancing and securing space-enabled services is essential to U.S. national security, a daunting task considering that space has become more and more “congested, contested, and competitive,” less and less permissive for the United States, and increasingly disproportionate in reliance on space capabilities and vulnerable to growing attack vectors. The riddle for America is how best to manage the dichotomy between reliance and vulnerability through resilience. The Space Force tackles the riddle by better and more informed management of and advocacy for mission-focused space requirements to enhance and protect U.S. critical capabilities in space.      

Offensive Counter-Space (OCS) Conundrum. Space warfare is intrinsically offense-inclined due to the vulnerability, predictability, and fragility of space assets. Ever-increasing OCS capabilities are able to threaten and destroy space systems. The latter can be destabilizing (warfighting capability) or stabilizing (deterrence) depending on one’s perspective. Hence, the conundrum for the United States is not whether or not to possess OCS capabilities, but how best to use them to deter and retaliate if deterrence fails. The United States must consider what type, how much, and to what extent should OCS capabilities be publicly disclosed, and how to leverage the existing international legal framework and accepted norms of behavior to manage them without constraining or hindering one’s own freedom of action. OCS capabilities continue to grow in number and sophistication driven by the “offense-offense” and “defense-offense” competition spirals. OCS developments to defeat defensive counter-space (DCS) measures drive further OCS developments for fear of falling behind in offensive capabilities and encouraging a first strike by an adversary, while DCS developments to mitigate OCS measures drive further OCS developments to remain viable as deterrent and offensive tools. The Space Force addresses the conundrum by providing a strategic framework to better direct and synchronize OCS and DCS operations (balanced management).  

Opportunities for the Space Force

Sustain and Enhance Space Preeminence. Just as maritime preeminence is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the seas, so too is space preeminence needed to guarantee the freedom of space. To do otherwise invites strategic misalignment and  miscommunications and encourages strategic competitors to further advance their counter-balancing efforts. Put simply, if the United States does not preserve its current strategic advantages in space through a Space Force, a rising power like China may gradually eclipse America as the preeminent power in space which will have cascading strategic ramifications on Earth. Recall that China already has a Space Force – the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

Develop Cross-Domain Deterrence Options. Deterrence across the interconnected domains may offer the best opportunity to deter attacks on U.S. space capabilities, and if deterrence fails, retaliate across domains to deter further attacks. Prudence then suggests the need for some level of active planning prior to the onset of increased tensions and hostilities. American policymakers and defense planners should have on hand a broad set of potential cross-domain responses to the threats of space attack or the space attack itself for timely execution by the Space Force. 

Strengthen Space Governance. Since the elimination of OCS capabilities is unlikely, attention and efforts should be placed on managing them instead. The extant international legal framework and accepted norms of behavior offer some ways and means to reduce OCS capabilities to a manageable level, restrict their proliferation, and establish constraints and restraints on their employment. Space powers should review the existing international agreements (treaties) and legal principles, and determine what additional conventions or provisions are needed to set the acceptable limits of OCS capabilities. This can include efforts to establish confidence building measures to include verification, and limit the possession of OCS capabilities to select space powers and out of the hands of space “pariah” states (North Korea and Iran) and undesirable non-state actors (terrorist, criminal, and business groups). The Space Force, dedicated and committed to monitoring and checking emerging threats in the space domain, will better inform U.S. policymakers and diplomats as they navigate the legal and diplomatic minefields to establish new international agreements to further universal space stability and safeguard U.S. national interests.

Continue to Invest in OCS Capabilities. The heart of the matter remains what type of OCS capabilities (reversible, irreversible, or both) and how much may be needed by the Space Force. Regarding the latter, some argue none or limited quantities are required while others call for robust OCS capabilities. Whatever the right answer may be, it is difficult to see how the Space Force can deter or retaliate if deterrence fails without “some” OCS capabilities, especially considering that strategic competitors like China (and Russia) are actively developing their own OCS capabilities to challenge U.S. space preeminence and by extension U.S. terrestrial preeminence. 

Continue to Increase Resiliency. Strengthening the resiliency of the U.S. national security space architecture may offset the offensive inclination of space warfare by lessening the vulnerability and fragility of space assets, assuring retaliatory capabilities, and denying the benefits of OCS operations. Hence, three suggested resilience lines of operations for the Space Force can include building up space protection capabilities to decrease the vulnerability and fragility of high-value space assets by presenting more targets, hiding targets and maneuvering targets, and ensuring mission continuity in a disrupted space environment.  

Continue to Expand Partnerships. The extant strategic guidance calls for building enduring partnerships with other space-faring nations, civil space organizations, and commercial space entities to share benefits, costs, and risks. Strategic guidance also encourages efforts to strengthen existing alliances through increased cooperation across the various space sectors, spreading space services reliance to others, and providing greater space deterrence and stability through collective defense. That being said, partnerships also carry with them opposing risks and concerns. Risks include the unpredictability of horizontal escalation and greater potential damages and unintended consequences. Concerns center around autonomy, operational security, legality, and the interoperability of disparate space systems. All things considered though, the benefits outweigh the costs, risks and concerns are manageable in varying degree, and partnerships can ultimately be a stabilizing influence if done right. The Space Force, where the rubber meets the road, can help get it right. The Space Force will ultimately be where the preponderance of the complex working relations between allies and partners will be managed on a day-to-day basis. Future U.S. space leaders (military and civilian) and foreign counterparts will now have intersecting careers paths (touchpoints) to meet and cultivate enduring friendships that will translate into deeper international collaboration.

Conclusion

All major space-faring nations increasingly rely on space capabilities, but none more so than the United States. America presently has a lot more to lose, and therefore must take all necessary measures to protect its critical strengths in space and preserve its economic prosperity on Earth. Hence, to direct and guide the new Space Force, U.S. policymakers must develop a new space policy and strategy to sustain and enhance U.S. space preeminence in accordance with the new muscular National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Otherwise, America risks losing in space and consequently losing on Earth.

Tuan Pham has extensive professional experience in the Indo-Pacific, and is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The views expressed are his own.

Featured Image: View of a rocket launch from the rocket garden of Cape Canaveral museum. (USAF Museum)