Emerging Tech Week

Emerging Technologies Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

2 Comments

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week and next week CIMSEC will be featuring submissions sent in response to our call for articles on emerging technologies, issued in partnership with the Naval Warfare Studies Institute and Lockheed Martin, for CIMSEC’s Project Trident.

Emerging technologies have the potential to radically transform naval forces and how they are developed and employed. Yet emerging technologies also pose new risks that can lay undiscovered until an adversary seizes an underappreciated vulnerability. As navies and maritime forces advance in technological sophistication they must be mindful of both opportunities and the risks.

Below are the articles and authors being featured, which will be updated with further submissions as Emerging Technologies Week unfolds.

“The Influence of Technology on Fleet Architecture,” by J. Noel Williams
“Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea Vehicles,” by Ryan Fedasiuk
“Red Cell Analysis of a Mobile Networked Control System Supporting a Ground Force,” by Larry Wigington, Ruriko Yoshida, and Doug Horner
“A Roadmap to Successful Sonar AI,” by LT Andrew Pfau
“Solving Communications Gaps in the Arctic with Balloons,” by Walker D. Mills
“Cognitive Lasers: Combining Artificial Intelligence with Laser Weapon Systems,” by Dr. Bonnie Johnson
“Responding to the Proliferation of Uninhabited Underwater Vehicles,” by Andro Mathewson
“Human Factors Meets New Technology in 2025,” by John Cordle and Robert Sweetman
“Drones and Starlink: Combining Satellite Constellations With Unmanned Navy Ships,” by Brandon Wall and Nicholas Ayrton
“Use Virtual Reality to Prepare Maritime Crews For Terrorist and Piracy Attacks,” by Selina Robinson and Dr. Amy Meenaghan

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Lt. Jeff Kee explores the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Battlespace Exploitation of Mixed Reality (BEMR) lab located at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

Podcast

Sea Control 268 – French Seapower with CAPT Hugues Canuel and Dr. Brian Chao

Leave a comment

By Jared Samuelson

Dr. Brian Chao and CAPT Hugues Canuel join the program for a discussion of rising and falling French seapower. The discussion spans the period from the Pax Britannica until post-World War 2 and includes comparisons of France’s evolving relationship with seapower to China’s rise today.

Sea Control 268 – French Seapower with CAPT Hugues Canuel and Dr. Brian Chao

Links

2. BrianCChao.com

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer and Co-Host of the Sea Control Podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Jonathan Selling.

Europe

The HMS Defender Incident: Lawfare, Optics, and a Changing European Strategic Direction

1 Comment

By Louis Martin-Vézian

On the morning of June 23, 2021, the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Defender departed its port of call in Odessa, Ukraine, and made way for Batumi, Georgia. While in transit, the destroyer conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) near the southwestern tip of Crimea, triggering a Russian reaction comprising at least three ships and dozens of aircraft. The incident is the latest flare-up in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, yet escalation risks from encounters in the maritime domain are often overplayed by inflammatory communiqués. The crux of the matter remains international law, and information warfare, while harmless posturing is simply the most visible outcome. Diving deeper reveals the determinants behind the UK’s actions, from operational imperatives to legal standings, but also a changing European strategic direction.

The Incident at Sea

Prior to the incident, Defender entered the Black Sea along with the Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen to carry out exchanges and exercises with the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Georgian navies. Both ships are part of Carrier Strike Group 21, centered around the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. After departing Odessa, Defender proceeded towards the traffic separation scheme off Cape Florient at the southwestern tip of Crimea. While following the traffic separation scheme, the destroyer briefly entered one of three restricted navigation zones (highlighted in red on the map below) implemented contentiously by Russia within the 12 nautical mile limit of Crimea’s territorial waters.

A map of the events surrounding HMS Defender. Click to expand. (Author graphic)

Upon entering the restricted navigation zone, Russian Coast Guard vessels hailed Defender over the radio and urged it to turn away. After several further communications, a Russian Coast Guard vessel fired three short bursts high into the air, at an angle slightly offset to that of the British destroyer, only after several ‘avoid hit’ commands were given to the gunners. Traditionally, warning shots are fired across the bow of a targeted ship, as they are meant to be noticed and unambiguous. However, for uncertain reasons,1 it appears that in this case the Russian vessel was at least a kilometer behind Defender—hence qualifying the bursts as ‘warning shots’ is a stretch.

Regimes of International Law

The Defender’s transit through Crimean territorial waters came after Russia issued a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR), which suspended the right of ‘innocent passage’ to foreign warships in the three previously mentioned restricted navigation zones from April 21 to October 31, 2021.2 The right of innocent passage is enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 17 to 32. UNCLOS allows for any ships to transit through the territorial waters of another nation if they follow certain broad conditions.

Under UNCLOS Article 25(3), coastal states can implement restrictions on navigation, provided they remain temporary, indiscriminate, and localized. The notice issued by Russia is problematic, not only because it discriminates between “foreign warships and other government ships” and other shipping, but also because it assumes Russia is the coastal state. This latter assumption is rejected both by any reasonable interpretation3 of international law and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262.4

However, another regime of international law is at play in Crimea and would support Russia’s NOTMAR—namely, the law of armed conflict and the law of occupation, as articulated by Prof. Stefan Talmon for GPIL – German Practice in International Law.5 The law of occupation provides the occupying power with a wider range of options to restrict navigation in occupied territorial waters as “land dominates the sea,”6 and an occupying power inherits controlling rights over the occupied territory’s territorial waters. This would appear contradictory to Russia’s position regarding Crimea, as it no longer differentiates between Crimea and the rest of the Russian Federation since the contentious Crimea-Russia annexation treaty7 signed by Vladimir Putin on March 18, 2014, and ratified8 by the Duma and Federation Council on March 20 and 21, respectively.9

This contradiction between Russia’s best efforts to portray the annexation of Crimea as legitimate and effective, while at the same time subtly referencing rights conferred to occupying powers under the law of occupation, is both flagrant and irrelevant—the law of occupation is in effect whether the occupying power admits to its status or not.10

The Russian attempt to restrict navigation off Crimea would therefore appear to satisfy the conditions required under international law, but a final hurdle remains in the way of conferring it full legitimacy; the NOTMAR mentions “Russian territorial waters” while referring to the waters off Crimea, which is currently considered to be under “temporary occupation.” Prof. Talmon points out that the United States issued a similar NOTMAR during the occupation of Iraq, with the notable difference that it had appropriately referred to the waters in question as “Iraqi territorial waters.” Therefore, a state rejecting the annexation of Crimea would be inclined to ignore the Russian NOTMAR despite its otherwise robust legal standing.

Different Optics, Different Objectives

Following the incident, Russian government sources and media announced that Russian vessels and aircraft fired warning shots at Defender and dropped bombs in its path.11 The Russian government also filed a formal protest and summoned the British ambassador and defense attaché in Moscow. London denied both the shooting and the bombing, possibly on the grounds of lexical accuracy—as the Russian vessel fired ‘near’ and not ‘at’ the British ship—and appeared to present the scuffle as an unrelated gunnery exercise conducted by Russia.12 This would be a tongue-in-cheek way of dismissing the shots as coincidental, therefore watering down Russia’s confrontational narrative.

The presence of a BBC crew aboard Defender further enabled London to deny any excessive Russian declarations. Moscow later published a video13 filmed aboard one of its Coast Guard vessels, showing the moment it fired the alleged warning shots. However, evidence of the shooting had already been broadcasted by the BBC, so the Russian footage achieved little beyond showcasing the significant distance between the two ships, thereby bolstering the British narrative that the incident was over-exaggerated by Russia.

Released Russian video of HMS Defender interaction with Russian Coast Guard.

Strategic Context

The waters around Crimea are a niche aspect of the Ukrainian conflict to challenge. In the maritime domain, the most pressing issue remains the blocking of the Kerch Strait since 2018, for which no FONOP is realistically achievable.14 The British intent behind the FONOP is better unraveled through the strategic implications of the ‘special relationship’ between London and Washington than by any development in the Ukrainian conflict. By carrying out this FONOP in the Black Sea and dispatching the first planned Royal Navy carrier strike group in the Indo-Pacific since 1997,15 16 London is marking its return to the geopolitical scene, at home in Europe and abroad in the Indo-Pacific.

For the United States, having a partner willing to commit politically and operationally to a like-minded view of the global rules-based order is valuable, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin alluded to in his comments17 during the 2021 IISS’ Fullerton Lecture in Singapore. U.S. resources are increasingly scarce and being able to rely on a pro-active ally in Europe will prove helpful as the Pentagon shifts much of its focus from Europe to Asia. Finally, far from a unilateral move by Britain pursued in the wake of Brexit, this FONOP was supported by European partners, both in actions and words: in addition to the endorsement of the Netherlands via Evertsen, Germany was quick to officially denounce the Russian claims as a breach of international law after the incident.

Conclusion 

Despite its limited immediate impact, the significance of this FONOP cannot be overstated. Since the end of the Cold War, very few European nations have taken initiatives to upend their strategic interests in the face of powerful adversaries and have instead been relying on the American security umbrella. A multitude of factors are at play to influence this return to geopolitics in Europe, from the specter of Trump’s alienating policies towards America’s allies and partners, to the advent of a multipolar world. Yet this FONOP and renewed European interest in the Indo-Pacific shows that even a strategically independent Europe will remain a natural partner to America for military cooperation and burden-sharing, not just due to shared economic interests, but also common values.

Louis Martin-Vézian is a French student of Economics and Politics at the University of London in Singapore. He has been producing maps and infographics for the past 6 years on his blog, CIGeography, with a focus on defense and security.

References

[1] Okhotnik-class patrol ships have a stated maximum speed of 27 knots, so it is possible they were outran by the 30+ knots of the British destroyer.

[2] https://structure.mil.ru/files/morf/military/files/ENGV_2118.pdf

[3] https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/Marxsen_2014_-_The_crimea_crisis_-_an_international_law_perspective.pdf

[4] https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262

[5] https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2021/05/germany-mistakenly-considers-russias-restrictions-on-navigation-of-warships-in-the-black-sea-to- be-very-problematic-and-in-part-contrary-to-international-law/

[6] https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2910&context=ils

[7] http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/20/guest-post-russia-crimea-treaty/

[8] http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/30069/

[9] The treaty is subject to its own controversies, as under international law, treaties must be signed between a minimum of two states; and the Republic of Crimea was never recognized as a state during its brief, forty-eight hours existence. See: https://digital–commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/view-content.cgi?referer=&httpredir=1&article=1377&context=ils

[10] https://twitter.com/StefanTalmon/status/1409460114592047106

[11] https://tass.com/defense/1306375

[12] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQPress/status/1407672058524413957

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAVRcyndS_g

[14] Even ignoring legal hurdles, a FONOP in the Kerch Strait would be challenging, as a simple scuttling under the Kerch bridge could trap a foreign vessel in the Sea of Azov.

[15] HMS Illustrious during the ‘Ocean Wave 97’ cruise visited Tokyo and Hong Kong. See: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1997/feb/24/ocean-wave-97

[16] In 2013, the HMS Illustrious was also dispatched to the Philippines to carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan; but this deployment was a diversion from its intended course in the Persian Gulf. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/royal-navy-carrier-returns-home-from-philippines

[17] https://twitter.com/jamescrabtree/status/1420164776777240581

Featured image: October 4, 2020 – HMS Defender sailing with the newly assembled, United Kingdom-led Carrier Strike Group 21. (Credit: Royal Navy Photo by LPhot Alker)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Buyer’s Remorse: The Vatican-Beijing Deal Fractured

1 Comment

By Tuan N. Pham

Not surprisingly, Beijing broke its 2018 agreement with the Vatican and is taking steps to ensure Chinese Communism as the one and only religion in China, and the Chinese Communist Party as its one and only church and clergy.

Two years ago, this author on CIMSEC forewarned of a fracturing Vatican-Beijing deal. On September 21, 2018, to the surprise of many, Pope Francis signed a confidential agreement giving Beijing effective control over who chooses church leaders inside China. The faithful, particularly the 12 million Catholics within China, largely viewed the settlement as a risky proposition based on a flawed understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many believed then that the ill-advised accord would be yet another episode of Beijing making hollow promises to buy more time and space to strengthen its positions and weaken the Church’s positions for future political advantages and eventual contract defaults.  

How right they were. By 2021, China broke the controversial deal despite perfunctorily renewing the agreement the year before. Beijing also steadily deepened and widened its oppressive “sinicization” campaign against the Christian faith (with an estimated 90 million Christians within China) as well as other perceived threats to CCP ideology like Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Falun Gong. Party officials assert that Christianity can only exist in China when it is concordant with Chinese culture, which they define as the incontrovertible doctrine of the CCP. As such, Christianity cannot co-exist in Communist China.  

The religious persecution in China presents a spiritual and political dilemma for the Vatican. The question becomes: How should the Holy See respond? With continued willful blindness in the wishful hope of Chinese benevolence or with determined resolve akin to Pope (Saint) John Paul II’s spirited crusade against Soviet Communism? The geostrategic conditions may be right for the latter. Otherwise, Pope Francis risks further alienating persecuted Chinese Catholics and disillusioned Catholics at large; exacerbating the growing perception of his acquiescence to Beijing’s national will; and ceding papal moral authority through his silence on human rights in China.     

Fractured Deal (Contract Defaults)

Having secured the Vatican’s unwitting assistance in weakening the Chinese Catholic Church (largely driven underground), CCP Chairman Xi Jinping quietly and incrementally reneged on the commitments. Last November, shortly after speciously renewing the 2018 deal, Beijing issued Order No. 15, comprised of new administrative rules for religious affairs to include a nondescript article for establishing a “Chinese process” for the selection of Catholic bishops in China after May 1, 2021. The new policy makes no proviso for any papal role in the selection process, not even a papal right to approve or veto pontifical appointments in China, a key concession to the Vatican in the 2018 agreement.

The new rules mandate the clergy to “adhere to the principle of independent and self-administered religion in China.” The specific language complies with a longstanding passage in the membership pledge of the so-called Chinese Patriotic Catholic Church (CPCC), which all Chinese clergy are required to sign. In practical terms, they must now be autonomous from the Vatican. The new rules also require that CPCC-aligned clergy support the CCP and promote “social harmony” by which Beijing means conformity with the Party’s thinking. Rule enforcement is assured by a statute directing that those entering religious vocations “be regulated through strict gatekeeping, verification of identity, and registration.” Registration is managed by a national database of certified (vetted) clergy whose ecclesiastical behavior is governed by a rigid social system of rewards and punishments. In other words, the new rules aim to transform Christianity into another political and social apparatus of the CCP.

To date, the Vatican has kept quiet and not publicly commented on Beijing’s duplicity. Dealing with China is a risky game because the CCP does not play by the established rules or social norms. Beijing often makes empty promises to achieve its short-term objectives and buy time and space to set the conditions to realize its long-term goals. Beijing accordingly honors bilateral agreements to the extent that they serve its ends. Beijing has no qualms about breaking its end of a bargain after the other party has fulfilled its obligations.

Flawed Papal Assumptions

The Vatican wrongly assumes that Beijing’s public acknowledgment of pontifical authority matters in Communist China and falsely hopes that the Catholic Church will eventually have greater influence and freedom in church affairs within the authoritarian Chinese state. Church leaders, like many secular contemporaries, still cling to the discredited political theory (flawed policy assumption) that China’s economic rise and concomitant social development will eventually lead to democratic reforms. They simply do not understand the true nature of the CCP and underestimate and underappreciate its foremost priority – the survival of the Party. The CCP will not tolerate anyone or any organization (institution) undermining its ruling legitimacy and authority as evidenced by its unrelenting drive to ensure everyone is loyal to the atheist CCP before anything else. 

Church leaders inexplicably still do not acknowledge (or perhaps conveniently ignore) the philosophical dichotomy between Catholic and CCP doctrines. The authoritative role of the Church as both a religious and temporal power providing spiritual guidance to the masses will always challenge Beijing’s authoritative rule that holds there is a natural harmony of universal order. In effect, conflict exists over who should be responsible for developing humanity in China, underscored by CCP officials stating that “Christianity does not belong in China.”

All in all, Beijing believes that Chinese Communism is the one and only true religion in China, and the CCP is its one and only church and clergy. For the Party, all religious issues have a bearing on “social harmony, ethnic solidarity, and national security” and therefore all religions within China must adapt themselves to the socialist society and by extension to the CCP doctrine. The “sinicization” of religions is part of a larger effort to reinforce the “CCP’s control over all aspects of Chinese life to include religious faith, culture, and public discourse.” Those deemed threatening to the Chinese state are sent to “political sessions” for reprogramming as part of the CCP’s crackdown on unsanctioned religious activity.

Papal Considerations

The geostrategic conditions may be right for a more assertive Vatican. The international community is wary and resentful of China’s complicity in the global coronavirus pandemic, and therefore, more attentive to the genocide of the Uyghurs, suppression of Hong Kong, intimidation of Taiwan, predatory loan practices (Belt Road Initiative), opportunistic vaccine diplomacy, and aggression in the South China Sea.

Moving forward, the Vatican would be prudent to consider the following 10 measures to impose costs and deny benefits to Beijing for violating the conditions and principles of the 2018 agreement. Otherwise, inaction risks rewarding bad behavior and encouraging more bad behavior.

Publicly call out Beijing for its broken promises. Take and hold the information high ground by dictating the strategic narrative, seizing the strategic initiative, and exercising strategic clarity. Respond strongly, unambiguously, and credibly to the expected Chinese backlash of diplomatic, media, and information operations activities. Prepare for potential Chinese overreactions like a nationwide crackdown of the Catholic faith in China (more closure of churches, increased imprisonment of clergy, formal ban on worship, etc.). Highlight the damaging overreach to underscore the CCP as a repressive state that persecutes all perceived threats to its authoritarian rule. Undermine the carefully cultivated Chinese image (brand name) as a benevolent global power that respects human rights. Underscore the blatant hypocrisy.   

Accept responsibility for the ill-advised deal and take steps to regain the trust and confidence of the many disillusioned faithful. Be again that “shining city upon the hill” – the undisputed spiritual authority and moral compass for the 1.2 billion Catholics across the globe. Take to heart the proverb “evil triumphs when good men do nothing.”     

Apply pressure asymmetrically to keep Beijing off-balanced. Expand diplomatic ties with Taiwan and encourage more diplomatic recognition from the other  countries. Give more economic aid to developing countries to promote good governance and increase their resiliency and resistance to Chinese malign influence. Expect and prepare for Chinese asymmetric counter-pressures across the diplomatic and economic realms. Strengthen cybersecurity posture and take active measures to counter likely cyber-espionage of diplomatic communications and cyber-attacks on infrastructure and financial systems.           

Take counsel from informed strategic thinkers like retired Cardinal Joseph Zen, the much-respected former archbishop of Hong Kong who intimately understands the true nature of the CCP and has fearlessly challenged them for decades. Identify, develop, and empower the next Cardinal Zen(s). Do not select (propose) candidates based on Beijing’s preference or political expediency. Rather, select bold and resolute spiritual leaders that will guide and shepherd the flocks within China and the greater Indo-Pacific.      

Use the papal pulpit for strategic communications. Beijing will employ public diplomacy, media, social media, and information operations (United Front) to control the narratives. Reciprocate in kind but maintain the moral high ground. Be clear, resolute, and consistent in public and private statements. Do not make statements that send the wrong strategic signal to Beijing. Avoid defeatist statements like the “Church has no positive contribution to make in Hong Kong.”    

Follow in Pope John Paul II’s footsteps and launch a “global revolution of the spirit” to actively confront Chinese Communism. Partner with political, economic, and social leaders and organizations to persuade, and when necessary, compel China to become a responsible and contributing stakeholder in the international community. One promising collaborative opportunity may be Washington’s growing campaign to counter Beijing by highlighting its blatant violations of democratic rights. U.S. President Biden can frame the geopolitical contest as a confrontation of democratic values, while Pope Francis can frame the socio-theological contest as a confrontation of moral values. Both leaders and their allies and partners can and should stand up against this “model of authoritarian repression that China seeks to impose on the rest of the world.” 

Conduct a papal tour of and periodic visits to Asian countries with large Catholic populations (China, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, and India). Exhort regional governments, rally the faithful, and marshal a consensus of like-minded state and non-state actors to dissuade China from trying to change the global status quo and undermine the rules-based liberal international order that has provided global security and prosperity for over 70 years.

Form a religious coalition (communion) of persecuted faiths in China. Unify collective actions to highlight the many Chinese human rights violations. Initiate and sustain a global “name and shame” campaign against Beijing and any state and non-state actors that support and enable China’s bad behavior.

Be wary of Chinese “sharp power” to infiltrate and undermine Vatican politics, while furtively promoting a positive image of China and misrepresenting or manipulating information to engender favorable policy outcomes from the Holy See.

Be wary of future Chinese settlement offer(s). Do not rush again into negotiations or settle too early. Vatican negotiators would be well-served to heed Chinese promises privately made across the negotiating table and assurances publicly given in the open press. Beijing often gives expedient guarantees during negotiations but rarely offers much that is substantive and enduring in the end. Signing an agreement is merely the start of the real negotiations for the Chinese. Demand transparency (full public disclosure). Publish the entire signed agreement, not just the summary as Beijing has insisted in the past. Be mindful of the adage “fool me once, shame on you…fool me twice, shame on me.”

At the end of the day, Beijing does not seek win-win, they seek win-lose; and when it comes to the battle for the heart and soul of the Chinese people, there can only be one winner – the CCP.

Tuan Pham is a widely published strategic thinker and strategist with over 20 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed here are personal and do not reflect any positions other than his own.

Featured Image: A worshipers waves the flag of China as Pope Francis leaves following the weekly general audience at St. Peter’s square in the Vatican in June. (Photo AFP)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.