Category Archives: Tactical Concepts

What are the evolving ideals of tactics in maritime and naval affairs.

Tactical Concepts, Uncategorized

Cruisin’ for a Bruisin’

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The following article is special to our International Maritime Shipping Week. While we often discuss the threats to maritime shipping, this week looks at dangers arising from such global trade, and possible mitigations.

International Maritime Shipping Week requires us to invert our usual thinking – instead of considering threats to merchant shipping, we look at how supposedly innocuous ships threaten the broader world.

What could be more innocuous than cruise ships?

Hundreds of sun-chasing, fun-seeking tourists accompanied by a staff of well-dressed entertainers, professional food service staff and smiling sailors. Nothing could possibly go wrong…

Before I continue, I should note (in what I’m sure is a standard disclaimer for International Maritime Shipping Week) that cruise ship companies are very professional organizations, and I am in no way impugning their ability to keep passengers and property secure. The scenarios proposed herein are entirely hypothetical.*

Now to business.

Cruise ships are different from all other shipping in one important respect – their passengers. Any plan to use the cruise industry as an avenue of attack should take advantage of this. To ignore the passengers would be to give up a potential asset and also inject too much uncertainty into terrorist planning, since sometimes people stumble onto things unexpectedly(as recent reports suggest may have been the case aboard the Achille Lauro in 1985, when the crew’s inconveniently-timed delivery of complimentary fruit caused the four Palestinian hijackers to improvise actions for which they were ill-prepared, according to The Independent [UK]).

 

Threatened world with Leonardo DiCaprio. World surrendered.
               Threatened world with Leonardo DiCaprio. World surrendered.

One tactic would be to use passengers passively. Packing hundreds or thousands of individuals aboard a ship provides a terrorist his key asymmetric asset – anonymity among the masses. Additionally, a cruise ship brings together large numbers of people who don’t know one another and would have no idea if a particular individual belonged aboard or not. A terrorist can hide in plain sight aboard the ship during transit in a way that wouldn’t be possible aboard a cargo hauler, where any unfamiliar person is immediately apparent. Then, upon arrival at his target port, he can disembark and simply disappear into the country to make mischief. The crew would surely notice a passenger’s absence, but not until all the tourists had been accounted for, and by then the subject would be long gone.

Imagining a more active scenario, passengers could be used as hostages or human shields as cover for some greater plan. Whatever the terrorists may have in mind, authorities will be reluctant to storm aboard the ship when the threat of civilian casualties is high. This may buy enough time for the hijackers to use the cruise ship itself as a weapons platform or as a diversion to enable some other operation to go forward – such as sending operatives ashore in small craft, as in the 2008 Mumbai attack.

More sophisticated, and potentially far more damaging, would be to use the passengers themselves as threat vectors. A terrorist could infect a cruise ship with a slow-acting pathogen, for example. Passengers would walk off the ship unaware of any symptoms and go to their homes all across the country. Only after their trip would the biological weapon begin to manifest itself – and spread. Conceivably this could be done with computer viruses, as well, though it’s not immediately clear why attacking cruise ship passengers as opposed to some other group would be worth the trouble. But where there’s a weakness, someone will exploit it, and the concentrations of people on cruise ships present a juicy target for the initial phase of a “viral” attack.

That said, the most likely malevolent use of a cruise ship is a good, old-fashioned hijacking in the name of propaganda. Cruise ships offer an enormous number of hostages and are media magnets when trouble hits – review the coverage of the Costa Concordia or the Carnival Triumph, turn it up to eleven, and then add the political and diplomatic ramifications that would result. Hijacking a cruise ship may not be innately useful (possible grounds for a later post), but in skilled hands it can cause many global second-order effects far bigger than the fate of one little ship.

You’ll never see “The Love Boat” the same way again.

 *According to CIMSEC’s crack team of attorneys, by using the word “herein,” I’ve given this disclaimer legal weight.

 

LT Matt McLaughlin is a strategic communications consultant and Navy Reservist whose only cruise ship experience is touring Titanic: The Exhibition. The opinions expressed herein do not represent those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy or his employer.

Future Tech, Tactical Concepts

Wi-Vi: People Radar for Boarding Teams?

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In war, we often take for granted the vast array of systems designed to detect the enemy. From the phased-array on a U.S. Navy DDG to the infrared scope on a soldier, locating the enemy is the first step in gaining a firing solution or determining one’s peril. There is one place, however, where this technology has been rather absent: indoors. Detection of people indoors is often no more advanced than sound or a mirror on a stick (which can be seen). At the highest end we’ve seen thermal imaging or advanced optics systems combined with discrete robotics, conceptually mirrors on a stick on a robot. At MIT, Mr. Fadel Adib and Professor Dina Katabi have developed a potential new weapon for those in the Close Quarters Battle (CQB) environment: the Wi-Vi, an affordable and portable system by which a simple WiFi device can detect motion through walls.

three-persons
Wi-vi signal return showing three distinct sources of movement.

While more expensive, unwieldy systems do exist, Wi-Vi is remarkable in its affordability and portability. With little more than a typical wireless router, one has the makings of a rudimentary people radar. Using an encrypted WiFi signal to differentiate the 2.4 GHz signal from white noise, multiple signals are fired into a room, reflected back, and processed. When nothing is moving, the signal is zeroed out. When objects moves, the signal changes. For each thing moving, there is a separate discernible changed return in signal, allowing the system to detect multiple objects or people. USCG and USN boarding teams would find a tactical, deployable version of this system particularly useful.

The ability to detect possible human movement in holds, around hatches, or even in CONEX boxes would be a boon to boarding teams. Tactical movement indoors are often the most dangerous; movements are limited to a small number of paths that can be easily monitored by an opponent. This especially applies to ships, where rooms and passageways are especially constrained. With a tactical version of the Wi-Vi, boarding teams could detect movement and the number of personnel in a room before entering. Wi-Vi could also potentially detect movement within a certain distance in large cargo-holds or eventually for checking CONEX boxes for potential victims of human trafficking as they move inside.

Penetration is the major challenge for shipboard use; although Wi-Vi has been tested on 8″ concrete, terrible shipboard cellphone reception has made Navy and Coast Guard personnel aware of the basic problems of signal propagation. Cellphones operate anywhere from a half GHz to 2GHz, and couldn’t receive a signal inside my patrol craft if life defended on it. The Wi-Vi system operates at 40 GHz: far less penetrating than the 2GHz of shipboard radios. Upon inquiry, Mr. Adib elaborated, “The walls with which we tested (i.e. concrete and hollow walls) have metal support; specifically, they are supported by steel frames. Naturally, most walls have metal support, and this is not a problem for the operation of Wi-Vi. However, the device does not work if the wall is fully covered with a metal sheet.”At this stage of development, then, a tactical version of the device would be best suited for wooden dhows, fiberglass fishing boats, or berthing areas with mostly false bulkheads in large commercial vessels.

It is also worth noting the identification limitations of this technology. Wi-Vi can show the number and relative movement of any objects in motion in space, but neither their specific locations, nor the presence of immobile objects. “Secure for sea” could well be the enemy of Wi-Vi onboard ships. So could complacency; teams untrained in the device might assume a “clear” reading on Wi-Vi means a room is empty as opposed to containing a very still and patient gunman.

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Wi-Vi is an exciting technology for those engaged in the CQB environment – our Marine Corps bretheren may make sooner use of the tech due to the less metallic nature of most urban walls. Wi-Vi may be deployable for hunting for stowaways on a commercial vessel or trafficked humans behind a false bulkheads on dhows. With further development of lower-frequency devices, Wi-Vi might be usable for CONEX boxes and lighter metal areas of ships. The ability to deploy relatively cheap, light-weight human detection systems to the field could mean this novel MIT project is the first snowflake in the avalanche of tactical-gear to come.

 

Matt Hipple is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

h/t to Scott for sending the article.

 

Capability Analysis, Current Operations, Future War, New Initiatives, Strategic Outlook, Tactical Concepts

A Korean Peninsula Combined Fleet

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The ROKS Dokdo and USS George Washington on exercise together.
The ROKS Dokdo and USS George Washington on exercise together.

In my previous entry on the U.S.-ROK naval strategy after the OPCON, I argued for a combined fleet whereby the U.S. and ROK Navies, together with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), may share their unique resources and cultures to develop flexible responses against future threats by Kim Jŏng-ŭn. Since I have been getting mixed responses with regards to the viability of the aforementioned proposal, I felt compelled to flesh out this concept in a subsequent entry. Here, I will examine command unity and operational parity within the proposed combined fleet.

First, as Chuck Hill points out in his response to my prior entry, should the three navies coalesce to form a combined fleet, the issue of command unity may not be easily overcome because “[w]hile the South Korean and Japanese Navies might work together under a U.S. Commander, I don’t see the Japanese cooperating under a South Korean flag officer.” Indeed, given the mutual rancor over historical grievances, and the ongoing territorial row over Dokdo/Takeshima Island, both Japan and the ROK may be unwilling to entertain this this arrangement. However, this mutual rancor, if left unchecked, could potentially undermine coherent tactical and strategic responses against further acts of aggression by Kim Jŏng-ŭn. It is for this reason that Japan and the ROK should cooperate as allies if they truly desire peace in East Asia.

So how can the three countries successfully achieve command unity within the combined fleet? One solution would be for an American admiral to assume command of the fleet. However, while it is true that the ROKN and the JMSDF have participated in joint exercises under the aegis of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, this arrangement would stymie professional growth of both the ROKN and JMSDF admirals who lack professional expertise comparable to their American counterparts. In particular, given that ROKN admirals will assume wartime responsibility for their fleets after the 2015 OPCON transfer, such arrangement would be unhealthy for the ROKN because it would only lead to further dependence on the U.S. Navy.

Instead, a more viable solution, as Hill suggests, would be for the three navies to operate on a “regular rotation schedule…with the prospective commander serving as deputy for a time before assuming command.” This arrangement would somewhat alleviate the existing tension between the ROKN and JMSDF officers. Furthermore, the rotation schedule may serve as an opportunity for ROKN and JMSDF admirals to prove their mettle as seaworthy commanders.

One successful example that demonstrates the efficacy of the above proposal is the ROKN’s recent anti-piracy operational experience with the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 in the Gulf of Aden from 2009 to the present. In 2011, ROKN SEALs successfully conducted a hostage rescue operation against Somali pirates. ROKN admirals also assumed command of the Task Force twice, in 2010 and 2012 respectively.[1] According to Terrence Roehrig, the ROKN’s recent anti-piracy operational experience has “provide[d] the ROK navy with valuable operational experience [in] preparation for North Korean actions, while also gaining from participating in and leading multilateral operations.”[2]

However, it should be noted that it is “unclear whether ROK counter-piracy operations [with CTF 151] had a significant deterrent effect and, if so, it [was] likely to be limited.”[3] While CTF 151 may provide a plausible model for command unity for the combined fleet concept, it does not fully address potential operational and logistical problems in the event of another armed conflict on the peninsula. Moreover, while frequent joint exercises and exchange programs have lessened operational and linguistic problems, so long as the ROKN continues to be overshadowed by the Army-centric culture and structure within the ROK Armed Forces, it cannot function effectively as a vital component of the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance in deterring future aggression by Kim Jŏng-ŭn.

To achieve operational parity within the combined fleet, I recommend the following. First, the United States could help bolster the naval aviation capabilities of both navies. The JMSDF has been expanding its number of helicopter carriers, while the ROKN is expanding its fleet of Dokdo-class landing ships, supposedly capable of carrying an aviation squadron or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in addition to its naval air wing. However, the absence of carrier-based fighter-bomber capabilities may pose problems for the combined fleet concept because it deprives the fleet of flexible tools to respond expeditiously to emergent threats. Thus, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps could equip the two navies with the existing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets or the new F-35s.

Second, both Japan and the ROK should bolster their amphibious and special operations forces (SOF) capabilities. As the successful hostage rescue operation in January, 2011, of the crew of the Korean chemical tanker Samho Jewelry by the ROKN SEAL team demonstrates, naval SOF capabilities may provide the combined fleet with a quick reaction force to deal with unforeseen contingencies. Furthermore, amphibious capabilities similar to the U.S. MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) may provide both the ROK and Japan with the capabilities to proactively deter and not merely react to future DPRK provocations. That the Japanese Rangers[4] have recently trained for amphibious landing with U.S. Marines, while the ROK MND (Ministry of National Defense) has granted more autonomy to the ROK Marines, can be construed as steps in the right direction. As if to bear this out, there are reports that the ROK MND plans to establish a Marine aviation brigade by 2015 to enhance the ROKMC’s transport and strike capabilities.

In this blog entry, I examined command arrangement and operational parity to explore ways in which a combined U.S.-ROK-Japanese fleet may successfully deter potential DPRK threats. Certainly, my proposal does not purport to offer perfect solutions to the current crisis in the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, it is a small step towards achieving a common goal—preserving peace and stability which all East Asian nations cherish.

Jeong Lee is a freelance international security blogger living in Pusan, South Korea and is also a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat’s Asia-Pacific Desk. Lee’s writings have appeared on American Livewire, East Asia Forum, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, and the World Outline.
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[1] Terrence Roehrig ‘s chapter in Scott Snyder and Terrence Roehrig et. al. Global Korea: South Korea’s Contributions to International Security. New York: Report for Council on Foreign Relations Press, October 2012, p. 35
[2] ibid., pp. 41
[3] ibid.
[4] Japan does not have its own Marine Corps.

Strategic Outlook, Tactical Concepts

Update on Polish Navy Progress

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Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers are mod 2.
Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers come in mod 2.

Last week was a good one for Polish Navy. A few things happened which look minor if considered separately, but put together show a glimpse of how the Polish Navy will look in the future. As publicly available information about military matters in Poland is still scarce, there is also room to put these events in broader perspective and explore their philosophical underpinnings.

The week started with information that REMUS 100 won a tender to provide 2 systems for harbor-defense use by the naval bases in Swinoujscie and Gdynia. Later, at the Maritime Systems and Technologies 2013 Europe (MAST) conference and the NATO Naval Armaments Group meeting, both taking place in Gdansk, participants had the opportunity to see a live demonstration of Maritime Infrastructure Protection Systems, a multi-sensor maritime-monitoring system designed by CTM Gdynia. The next day, the Polish MoD issued a Request For Information (RFI) for just such a system, and, the very same day issued an RFI for patrol ships and corvettes. Little is known about these ships but the patrol ship is supposed to be in the range of 1,700 tons and possess the “capability to search and destroy naval mines and other dangerous underwater charges”. The corvette, which is officially called the Coastal Defense Ship, is expected to carry among other things weapons for “precision strike of land targets”. In parallel, the MoD prepared a tender for highly publicized project of Air and Anti-missile Defense, which will consist of 6 medium-range (100 km) and 11 short-range (25 km) batteries. Although that was not a predominantly naval development, the Navy’s modernization plan foresees 2 short-range batteries to be included in force structure. Add to that announcement the following and the overall picture becomes clearer: the newly commissioned Nadbrzezny Dywizjon Rakietowy (Coastal Defense Battery), equipped with Kongsberg NSM missiles will be extended to have a 2nd unit, there are rumors that planned submarines should be armed with “deterrence weapons”, and an ambitious plan that 3 new mine-hunters should join the fleet starting from 2016.

The first impression that comes to mind is that the protection of infrastructure and naval bases is viewed as a critical priority. This is also the message from the recently concluded mine-counter measures (MCM) exercise, IMCMEX 2013 – “It is more than just MCM”. The logic is simple – Two naval bases, one Swinoujscie and one in Gdynia, requires two sets of defensive weapons and systems. Taking a step back, the MoD seems to be building A2/AD fleet or modern version of Jeune Ecole, which is not surprising for a continentally oriented armed forces. At this point I start to have some problems with terminology in defining what kind of navy the Polish Navy will be. If we measure distance between major ports or naval bases in the Baltic Sea in a straight line we get following results:

Szczecin to Kiel, Germany: 147nm
Szczecin to Korsoer, Denmark: 139nm
Gdynia to Karlskrona, Sweden: 144nm
Gdynia to Baltijsk (In Kaliningrad, Russia): 47.5nm

Too close for comfort, or sea control.
Too close for comfort, or sea control.

This situation is not unusual in narrow waters but raises the question as to what degree we can speak about “area denial” when this area is congested, contested, and probably beyond control for anybody. In such a case the term “sea control” should have a very Corbettian meaning: “here and now”. In the extreme case of Gdynia and Baltijsk we observe a sort of direct contact within the range of modern artillery. It becomes hard to speak about any area to deny.

On the other hand if we use term Jeune Ecole, which heavily relied on torpedo boats, then another question emerges: how effective was this asymmetrical weapon of époque against an enemy battle force? Sir Julian Corbett, as Prof. James Holmes recently reminded us, was very concerned by the fact that the first torpedo-armed flotillas made fleets structureless, the weapons greatly empowering small craft and upsetting defined roles. Can we say something more on that subject after 100 years of experience? My not very scientific and brief review of Conway’s Battleships reveals that out of roughly 194 battleships constructed and commissioned (including a few completed as aircraft carriers), only three have been sunk as a result of torpedo attacks of surface flotilla ships [Scott C-P did an unscientific review last year of all types of sinkings]. These were Szent Istvan, Fuso and Yamashiro. In addition four were torpedoed and sunk by submarines, which at least at the time of Corbett’s writing were considered flotilla vessels. They were Barham, Royal Oak, Courageous, and Shinano. This produces a total of 3.6% — not much, and an invitation to reconsider the viability of a coastal navy focused on asymmetric weapons only. We need some symmetry in force structure as well.

The conceptual roots of the Polish Navy maybe lies in von Clausewitz’s thesis that defense is a stronger form of war than offense, but seeks an opportunity to switch to offense as soon as possible. Using Sir Julian Corbett’s subtitle from his “Green Pamphlet”, this Navy will seek a decision on land engaging in “offensive operations used with a defensive intention”. It leads me to my final and perhaps banal conclusion that the closer to the coast the Navy acts, the more land-warfare theories apply.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country