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CNO's Design Week

A New Carrier Strike Group Staff for Warfighting and Warfighters

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CNO’s Design Week

By Capt. Bill Shafley

Introduction

 The Chief of Naval Operations recently released FRAGO 01/2019, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority. The CNO charged senior leaders to simplify their focus. Warfighting, the Warfighter, and the Future Navy are its tenets. At the nexus of these tenets rests the staff of the Carrier Strike Group, where this staff employs the combat power of the premier maneuver arm of the Fleet Commander, the Carrier Strike Group (CSG). To master fleet-level warfare and leverage the power of the integrated fleet as the CNO urges, this staff must be organized, manned, and educated for the complexity of the high-end fight.

The CSG Staff

The CSG staff could benefit from an overhaul. The complexity of the future fight in terms of surveillance, maneuver, and fires call for a level of synchronization and expertise in planning that the current staff is unprepared for. This organization violates the warfare principles of simplicity and unity of effort. The Destroyer Squadron staff, Carrier Air Wing staff, and the niche capability of air defense expertise in the CSG’s resident cruiser provide some hedge against those capability gaps. Yet that expertise comes with a tax of an additional layer of command that adds little tactical value. Every platform in the Carrier Strike Group is multi-mission capable. A destroyer commander has air defense responsibilities to provide the air defense commander. She also has responsibilities as the strike commander and the sea combat commander. Experts in tactics, techniques, and procedures are part of their planning and watch teams. All the while the CSG commander and his staff are inundated with up to three different commander’s views and requirements for the accomplishment of a single mission. This distracts from warfighting. The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structure is fit for purpose as a way to “fight a strike group.” But as a manner of planning for combined and coordinated operations, standing warfare commanders and their staffs may be an artifact of the past.

The amount of warfare areas that must be managed and the density in which they can present in any given tactical scenario require the logical organization of the CWC construct. The point is not to argue that the CWC in execution is flawed. Any given operation requires a C2 structure and a doctrinal manner in which to conduct key tasks in the accomplishment of a mission. As the majority of the units in a CSG (from aircraft to surface ships) are multi-role, multi-function and task organized as such, it may be time to leave the CWC organization to the execution of missions and tasks not as a manner in which to “staff” operations at sea.

If the CSG in a wartime environment is the primary maneuver arm of a fleet-level engagement, the CSG staff in its current organizational construct may not be robust enough in manning and experience to integrate at the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) level. The Fleet staff is organized in a MOC-MHQ construct. It is designed to link into the theater level where campaigning is the order of the day, and operational art (the sequencing of operations in time, space, and force) is truly practiced. A CSG staff is nowhere near organized in the same manner. It may become quickly overwhelmed as the pace and density of operations increases. Without augments, its ability to stay ahead of the Fleet’s fight, synchronize at the operational level of war, or take advantage of tactical opportunity may be overcome.

Today the CWC is the organizing principle behind CSG operations. Common resources are “coordinated” and warfare areas are “commanded.” The CWC organization doesn’t delineate who is responsible for maneuvering the force into position to achieve effect. The CWC organization doesn’t clearly delineate who is responsible for coordinating fires on an objective area and simultaneously protect the carrier from multiple threats in multiple domains. Current practice would suggest this is achieved through warfare commanders working through warfare coordinators in supporting and supported roles. The CSG staff would look for ways to salami slice tasks to the IAMDC, the SCC, the IWC, and CAG. But those structures matter little at echelons above the CSG where in the future fight close coordination will be necessary for managing and resourcing the high-end fight. These stovepipes create missed opportunities for synergy and potentially leave valuable tactical and operational questions unexplored.

Recommendation

The premise behind a new organizational framework lies in the notion that planning for and conducting operations is central. Operations consume readiness and finite resources provided from a common pool. Radar resources, aircraft, fires, intelligence, voice and data communication are necessary components required to place a combat ready, protected Carrier Strike Group in position to achieve an effect. To enable mission command, the commander must have a staff that can translate his understanding of the operational environment and the theory of the fight into actionable orders and tasks across the warfighting functions that can be assessed to ensure mission accomplishment. A new structure for a CSG staff may hold the solution.

A fresh structure should make the warfare commanders and their staffs dual-hatted. Upon completion of the maintenance and basic phases at the unit level, the Air Wing, Destroyer Squadron, and Senior Information Warfare Officer assume the duties as one of four Deputy Commander billets: Deputy Commander for Operations, Deputy Commander for Readiness, and Deputy Commander for Support. The Senior Warfare Commander assumes duties as the Chief of Staff. The Cruiser and CVN COs retain duties as unit Commanding Officers. The squadron and wing staffs round out the existing CSG staff with subject matter tactical, technical, and planning expertise.

The Deputy Commander for Operations leads a team of watchstanders and planners across multiple disciplines to manage the current fight, plan for tomorrow’s fight, and resource the plans of the more distant future. This staff section is the engine that affords the CSG commander the space to execute the mission at hand. It is manned by cells organized around the joint warfighting functions of maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, and ISR. The operations team is organized along the COPS, FOPS, and plans construct. It is structured to support the Main and Future Planning Groups and staff TFCC, Sea Combat, IAMD, Strike Cell, and Supplot. The COPS, FOPS, and Plans teams are lead by O5 officers with command and/or significant aircraft type, model, and series experience. The team has Weapons and Tactics Instructors from all the communities and advanced trained operational planners. These subject matter experts form the backbone of a planning team has the capability to synchronize resources in time and space employed in a tactically relevant manner.

The Deputy Commander for Readiness leads a team of operators and logisticians charged with ensuring the Carrier Strike Group’s operational reach is effectively sustained to see mission accomplishment through. The readiness team takes a similar approach to the operations team. It is tasked to look at sustainment across platforms, sources of supply, and time horizons. It has a COPS and FOPS team that support the operational tasking framework described above. These readiness cells are staffed with platform-familiar operators and subject matter experts that understand the technologically advanced systems the CSG takes into combat. The team is also manned with the traditional N1 personnel team and the Senior Medical Officer. These functions serve to ensure that the force is manned and cared through steady state operations and in the event of casualties. The readiness team is staffed with temporary TYCOM liaisons that work hand-in-hand with the strike group maintenance officer for emergent and planned mid-deployment voyage repairs. The strike group’s safety and standards officer is also a part of this team and is charged with maintaining operational safety programs and standards keeping.

There are two remaining staff functions in this plussed-up Carrier Strike Group staff. The Deputy Commander for Support leads a team of subject matter experts among the warfighting functions that provide support for operations and readiness. These subject matter experts include Strike Warfare, Ballistic Missile Defense, Anti-Terrorism, and Force Protection. The senior intelligence officer, the senior communicator, and cryptologist join this team. This team also has a tactical development cell charged with forecasting areas for tactical improvement. The strike group training officer is assigned to this staff section and is charged with maintaining a cadre of trained watchstanders, planners, and subject matter experts during the off-cycle. The training officer also introduces and inculcates a formalized after action review process that feeds back to the team lessons learned to foster continuous learning and trend spotting.

The staff is rounded out by the command group. The flag secretary serves as the staff XO. The flag LT, flag writer, and flag mess along with the judge advocate, chaplain and public affairs officer round out this team. The staff XO reports to the chief of staff as his principal assistant. The flag XO maintains the staff tasker list and staffs all routine CDR-level communication up echelon. The chief of staff is the designated deputy CSG commander.

Conclusion

This new staff organization is designed for high-end operations at-sea. It is an operations-centric organization that is designed to take advantage of maneuver and disaggregation to achieve effects. It blends the subject matter expertise of the Navy’s best junior tacticians and planners with its most experienced commanders. It flattens command and control within the strike group in a manner that allows for true task organization, mission command, and recognizes the multi-mission nature of our platforms. This staff will be robust enough to take full advantage of developing over-the-horizon weapons and surveillance technologies. Finally, it creates a staff where the CSG plans for and executes strike group operations holistically without the lenses of the air wing, the boat, and the small-boys. Warfighting functions break down the current community barriers and make operations truly agnostic. To win in the high-end fight requires a staff structure that puts its best and brightest in a position to produce, execute and assess mission orders. This new structure provides an option.

Captain Bill Shafley is a career Surface Warfare Officer and currently serves as the Commodore, Destroyer Squadron 26 and Sea Combat Commander for Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. He has served on both coasts and overseas in Asia and Europe. He is a graduate of the Naval War College’s Advanced Strategy Program and a designated Naval Strategist. These views are presented in a personal capacity.

Featured Image: Air traffic controllers assigned to the carrier air traffic control center aboard the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman keep a close watch on flight operations. (U.S. Navy photo/Seaman Ryan McLearnon)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The Raisina Dialogues: Naval Convergence in the Indo-Pacific

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By David Scott

The annual Raisina Dialogue, hosted by India since 2016, is useful for highlighting the process of maritime strategic convergence between Australia, France, India, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. The Raisina Dialogue was initially set up by India as a high-level forum for international discussion. Tellingly, Chinese officials have never been invited. For the last three years, from 2018 to 2020, there were panels specifically dealing with the Indo-Pacific that brought together naval leaders from various China-concerned countries. This built on the 2016 and 2017 iterations which brought keynote speeches and warnings from the U.S. naval leadership, alongside a maritime focus from Japan, India, and the U.K. What follows is a review of each year of the Raisina Dialogues, with a focus on the growing scope of collaboration between nations increasingly concerned about China’s Indo-Pacific push.

2016: Opening Talks

This was the first Raisina Dialogue, held from 1–3 March, with a focus on Asian connectivity. One of the participants was Admiral Harry Harris, chief of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), complete with his emphasis that:

“The United States is conducting our strategic Rebalance west to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. You need look no further than last October’s Malabar maritime exercise between India, Japan and the United States to see the security inter-connectedness of the Indian Ocean, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean regions.”

It was significant that he highlighted the strategic unity of both oceans, that he pinpointed America’s own transfer of resources across to the Indo-Pacific, and that he further pinpointed the emergent trilateral maritime partnership between India, Japan, and the U.S. The Malabar exercises had been bilateral India-U.S. affairs since 1992, but Japan was invited as a permanent participant in the October 2015 iteration and thereafter.

Two contextual programs starting in 2015 were China’s creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea (running through the next few years), and PACOM’s initiation of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) around such artificial militarized creations of China, the tempo of which have been increased since 2017 under the Trump administration.

2017: Marine Geography of the Indo-Pacific

In 2017, no specific maritime panel was held at the Raisina Dialogue held on 17–19 January. Nevertheless strong maritime messages were prominent. Prime Minister Modi’s formal address pinpointed that with India “being a maritime nation, in all directions, our maritime interests are strategic and significant”; for which “we believe that respecting freedom of navigation and adhering to international norms is essential for peace and economic growth in the larger and inter-linked marine geography of the Indo-Pacific.” India’s chief of the Western Naval Command Vice Admiral Girish Luthra in a panel on “Evolving Politics of the Asia-Pacific” noted that “the regional order in Indo-Pacific is in transition, particularly in East Asia,” with veiled comments about the “economic blandishments” posed by China’s Maritime Silk Route (MSR) propositions announced by President Xi Jinping in October 2016.

Japan’s Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shunsuke Takei, pinpointed further maritime issues at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue:

“In recent years, we have been witnessing scenes of increasing tensions between States, in the seas of Asia… Absence of the rule of law means giving way to dominance by force. To ensure open and stable seas and freedom of navigation and overflight, Japan underscores the importance of the observation of international law, including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the ‘constitution of the oceans.’ Concrete actions and cooperation based on such a universal law are needed.”

Concrete actions and concrete cooperation, particularly to uphold freedom of navigation, was aimed at China in the South China Sea, and was a call for essentially naval cooperation. The reiteration of the importance of UNCLOS was aimed at China’s rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling against it in various South China Sea UNCLOS issues in July 2016.

Finally, Admiral Harry Harris, PACOM chief, in a keynote speech welcomed the developing maritime cooperation between India and the U.S, witnessed in the ever strengthening Malabar exercises. He looked forward to ongoing trilateral India-Japan-U.S. maritime cooperation. China was discernible in his analysis:

“No matter how many bases are built on artificial features in the South China Sea, I say this often but it’s worth repeating: we will cooperate where we can, and be ready to confront where we must… There are those who question the motives for the increasingly cooperative relationship between the U.S. and India. They say that it’s to balance against and contain China. That’s just simply not true. Our relationship stands on its own merits.”

The first point was a direct denunciation of China’s artificial islands created in the South China Sea (the “Great Wall of Sand”) process of pouring sand and concrete onto semi-submerged reefs and atolls, and their subsequent militarization of harbors, airstrips, and missile batteries. The second point was diplomatic to the point of masking. The U.S. and India had various shared interests (democracy, economics, anti-terrorism) but rising concern about China was one important factor in their strategic convergence, even if unstated.

The then-U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson was able to announce at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue that “we have just decided to restore our military presence east of Suez,” where “as our naval strength increases in the next ten years, including two new aircraft carriers, we will be able to make a bigger contribution,” including “in the Indian Ocean, we have a joint U.K.-U.S. facility on Diego Garcia – an asset that is vital for our operations in the region” and that “we oppose the militarisation of the South China Sea and we urge all parties to respect freedom of navigation and settle their disputes peacefully in accordance with international law.”

2018: Uncharted Waters: In Search of Order in the Indo-Pacific

The 2018 Raisina Dialogue, held on 14–16 January, witnessed new developments: (a) a formal Indo-Pacific panel titled “Uncharted Waters: In search of Order in the Indo-Pacific”; (b) made up of naval chiefs from the U.S. (PACOM chief, Admiral Harry Harris), India (Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sunil Lanba), Australia (Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Chief of Navy), and Japan (Chief of Joint Staff, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano). Harris, having given relatively muted warnings in 2016 and 2017 at the Raisina Dialogue, was more explicit at the 2018 Dialogue, arguing that “the reality is that China is a disruptive transitional force in the Indo-Pacific. They are the owners of trust deficit.” Kawano was equally pointed, that “China’s military power is becoming more powerful and is expanding. In the East and South China Seas, China has been ignoring international law. In order to deter Chinese provocations, India, the U.S., Australia and Japan have to cooperate with one another.” Lanba focused on Chinese appearance in the Indian Ocean, particularly at Djibouti and Sri Lanka. Chinese state media was dismissive of the process, with the Global Times (25 January) running articles headlined “New Delhi forum props up ‘Quad’ stance, refuses to listen to China voice.”

2019: Indo-Pacific – Ancient Waters and Emerging Geometries

The 2019 Raisina Dialogue, held from 8–10 January, reflected another twist on strategic geometries as France joined the Quad partners. Consequently, military leaders from Australia (General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force), France (Admiral Christophe Prazuk, Chief of Naval Staff), India (Admiral Sunil Lamba, Chief of Naval Staff), Japan (Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff), and the U.S. (Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson) in the Panel entitled “Indo-Pacific: Ancient Waters and Emerging Geometries.” The official report on their discussion was that it “was all about China’s growing naval profile in the Indo-Pacific region.” Davidson made a point of noting how “the United States was working with Japan, France, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and others in the South China Sea”; and in a nod to fellow panelists noted that that the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific had been “been underwritten in many respects, by the combat credibility of not only the United States forces, but the forces represented here on the panel. I think that’s incredibly important to sustain as we move forward.” Lanba noted that the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. was “a growing relationship, which is robust. It will only grow as time goes by.”

March 2019 witnessed trilateral exercises between Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. in the West Pacific. April witnessed quadrilateral exercising between Australia, France, Japan and the U.S. in the Bay of Bengal; and May witnessed exercising between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. in the South China Sea.

During 2018, Australian vessels, HMAS Anzac, HMAS Toowoomba and HMAS Success had been challenged by the Chinese Navy in April 2018 when sailing through the South China Sea, i.e. across China’s 9-dash line. Australia’s Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull reiterated that Australia would keep deploying under its “right of freedom of navigation.” Similarly the French Defence Minister Florence Parly at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018 had noted continued pressure by China on French ships sailing into Chinese-claimed territorial waters, which France considered international waters. In September the UK’s HMS Albion was in some confrontation with the Chinese navy over its freedom of navigation operation around the Paracels. Macron’s visit to Australia and the Pacific had brought his invocation of an “Indo-Pacific axis” (axe Indo-Pacifique) involving France, Australia, Japan, and India. 

2020: Fluid Fleets: Navigating Tides of Revision in the Indo-Pacific

The 2020 Raisina Dialogue, held on 14–16 January included a panel titled “Fluid Fleets: Navigating Tides of Revision in the Indo-Pacific.” The panel discussion drew together five military leaders from India (Chief of Naval Staff, Karambir Singh), Australia (Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral David Johnston), Japan (Chief of Staff, General Koji Yamazaki), France (Deputy Director of Strategy at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, Luc de Rancourt) and the UK (Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Tony Radakin). This represented a clear example of what the conference booklet described as “new strategic geographies from the Indo-Pacific.”

A China shadow was palpably present at the 2020 Raisina Dialogue, with China “looming large” according to the South China Morning Post; and where the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as a divisive U.S. plot to “contain China.” The panel subtitle title “tides of revision” would seem perhaps implicitly coined with China in mind.

At the 2020 panel discussion, India’s Admiral Singh noted of China that “they have 7 –8 warships in the Indian Ocean at any given time […] We are watching. If anything impinges on us, we will act”; to which he gave the example of the Indian Navy escorting Chinese ships out of their sensitive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the Andaman and Nicobar islands in December 2019. France’s Luc de Rancourt stated “we see China rising. We are seeing what it can do in South China Sea,” and reiterated French readiness to conduct freedom of navigation exercising there. Rancourt also spoke about “the importance of working together to promote a free, secure and open Indo-Pacific with our partners from the region with whom we share common values.” Japan’s Admiral Yamazaki admitted that “we are closely watching the situation” with regard to possible war between China and Japan. The U.K.’s Radakin announced a “greater role” for the U.K. in the Indo-Pacific, specifically including greater use of Diego Garcia. This was the notionally joint base between the U.K. and U.S., but mostly used by the U.S.; facing increasing U.N. pressure in 2019 with the advisory vote by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February and the non-binding General Assembly vote in May calling for U.K. decolonization.

The context for the “fluid fleets” was three-fold, China’s aircraft carrier program, and local responses by Japan, at a time of re-emerging U.K. capability. All three states will have doubled their aircraft carrier capability in short order. This will put them into the elite class (or rather for the U.K., re-enter her into the class) of countries able to field aircraft carriers.

With regard to China, the key event was the commissioning of China’s second aircraft carrier, the Shandong, in December 2019 – an event attended by President Xi Jinping. This is a medium-sized aircraft carrier, displacing around 55,000 tons, and set to carry around 36 J-15 fighter jets. Homeported at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan island, the Shandong gives Chinese extra naval reach into the South China Sea and beyond. Commentary at the Peoples Daily was pointed, in that “the main strategic focus of the Shandong will be on waters around the South China Sea”; because “recently, military vessels and aircraft from some nations have been carrying out so-called freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, stirring up trouble and challenging China’s national sovereignty”; and that “the aircraft strike group headed by the Shandong will be deployed to the South China Sea. It is very likely that it will have face-to-face encounters with foreign military vessels.” Further deployment into the Indian Ocean will be more easily facilitated by this southern orientation. 

Chinese diplomats argued that “the Shandong aircraft carrier service illustrated not only the achievements of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the cause of [a] its modernization, but also [b] the firm stand in safeguarding China’s security and unity and [c] promoting world peace.” These points may have been true enough to China, but whether it represented a step in promoting world peace is questionable.

The Chinese military was exultant, “the commissioning of the new carrier marks a new height in China’s carrier development and is a major milestone in China’s warship construction history”; and that “deploying the new carrier in Sanya means it will play a critical role in safeguarding national maritime interests, as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.” The Chinese state media argued that “this shows China’s comprehensive national strength, with a very high level of naval equipment and technologies applied.”

Nevertheless, some commentators were not impressed; the new aircraft carrier was a “paper tiger” according to David Axe; being little more than a copied version of the Soviet period design of China’s first aircraft carrier the Liaoning, brought from the Ukraine and commissioned in 2017 for training purposes. Indeed China may now be pulling back its planned aircraft carrier program. In December 2019, citing technical issues and a slowing economy, China reportedly put on hold plans for a fifth and possibly sixth carrier. Instead of speeding ahead with the development of a six-carrier fleet – two each for the northern, eastern and southern fleets – the Chinese Navy could stop after acquiring its fourth flattop. Here, while the envisaged third and fourth carriers reportedly will have catapults, allowing them to launch heavier planes, Beijing’s long-term ambition to develop nuclear-powered flattops seems on hold. While China may have ongoing problems catching up with U.S. aircraft carrier strength (11 nuclear flat-top carriers and nine usable further carriers), at the local level China’s naval program threatens to overshadow Japan and India.

With regard to Japan, on 30 December 2019 the Japanese Ministry of Defense approved the 2020 budget that will finance the refurbishment, i.e. the conversion, of the Izumo-class helicopter carriers for fixed wing F-35B stealth fighter operations; for which 42 are being purchased. The context is of course China’s push for aircraft carrier capability; where Japan’s two carriers are on the smaller side at 27,000 tons, but will have more powerful aircraft capabilities of fifth generation F-35Bs versus fourth generation J-15s. The decision in principle had been taken in December 2018, and now is being implemented. Deployment areas will include the South China Sea and Indian Ocean where the two carriers have already deployed, including JDS Kaga in 2018 and JDS Izumo 2019.

Finally with regard to the U.K., it commissioned its second aircraft carrier, the HMS Prince of Wales, in December 2019. It has a displacement of 72,000 tons, and is due to carry 24 F-35Bs by 2024. Simultaneously her sister ship the HMS Queen Elizabeth, commissioned in December 2017 with similar specifications, left Portsmouth for air trials with UK fighters in January 2020. What these two events show is that the gap in U.K. carrier capability is being filled. With full operational capability being completed in 2020, the way is becoming clear for aircraft carrier group deployment centered around the Queen Elizabeth in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific in early 2021, with much speculation over whether this will include a U.K. deployment into the South China Sea.

During 2019 there was renewed determination by these countries to operate in the South China Sea. As the French Defence Minister Florence Parly noted at the Shangri-La Dialogue in July 2019, “we will continue to sail more than twice a year in the South China Sea. There will be objections, there will be dubious manoeuvres at sea” from China; “but we will not be intimidated into accepting any fait accompli, because what international law condemns, how could we condone? We will also call for all those who share this view to join in.” The “emerging geometries” noted in January at the 2019 Raisina Dialogue had been manifest during 2019 in various joint exercising.

Conclusion

The Raisina process has moved from bilateral U.S.-India maritime cooperation, to trilateral India-Japan-U.S. cooperation, to still wider Australia-India-France-Japan-U.K.-U.S. focus on maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout this process, there remained a tangible rising concern about China’s growing challenge to the region. The Raisina process reflects this maritime strategic convergence, but also affects the process through reinforcing and strengthening a convergence of views. Such flexible patterns of Indo-Pacific naval cooperation mirror the political cooperation between these like-minded Indo-Pacific maritime actors.

David Scott is an Indo-Pacific analyst for the NATO Defense College Foundation, and a regular lecturer at the NATO Defense College. A prolific writer on maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].

Featured Image: Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Adm. Phil Davidson, answers questions during a panel discussion, 9 Jan. 2018, at the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi.  (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Robin Pe)

Future Tech

Tech Trends and the Navy-Marine Corps Team

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By Christian Heller

Soon after a new year, it is worth considering again the forecasts of futurists and the impacts their predictions may have on the naval services. Predictions about the future of war have often been inaccurate and sometimes detrimental to military institutions. For instance, H.G. Wells correctly predicted the emergence of aviation and bombing, but incorrectly predicted widespread militarized societies and the willing capitulation of defeated combatants. Kori Schake explains this recurrence of failure: “Futurists of warfare suffer from the same failures of imagination that frequently shackle their brethren in other professions: They overemphasize present trends and assume that their society’s cultural norms will similarly bind their adversaries.”

Best-selling book lists are replete with futurologists and their latest texts about the changing decades of warfare ahead. Thinkers like Paul Scharre lead the way at the intersection of artificial intelligence and national security. The works of P.W. Singer and David Sanger are near canon for information and cyber warfare. Authors such as these are widely reviewed and familiar to many. Two lesser-known books about the overall changing trends in the world today are reviewed here to add a wider societal and cultural context to the rapidly advancing technologies the Navy and Marine Corps are adapting to. Both raise important questions not so much about the systems and weapons of the future services, but about the processes, interactions, societies, and operating environments of the next decades.

The Industries of the Future by Alec Ross

Alec Ross, a former State Department advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, wrote The Industries of the Future based largely on his travels and experience while working in government. As Secretary Clinton’s advisor for innovation, Ross identified and assessed trends he saw emerging outside of the United States, most of which happened in disadvantaged countries. The topics of the book range from artificial intelligence and cybersecurity to genomics and education. Ross keeps the chapters in narrative form to talk about possible changes for governments and societies without distracting the reader with technical details.

Ross addresses how mobile phones and digital apps have accelerated the rates of development in poor nations by skipping entire phases such as hardwired telephone lines. He also repeats the common alarm about the security perils of digitization, and how all data-dependent systems are inherently vulnerable to cyberattack. One of Ross’s most interesting contributions is his insights into urbanization and innovation. Alongside their economic development, vibrant and growing cities are necessary centers of innovation due to their accumulation of financial and intellectual capital. Closed and authoritarian societies have largely forfeited their access to these potential innovation hubs. While countries like Saudi Arabia spend enormous amounts of money in grand projects to establish domestic ‘Silicon Valleys,’ Ross argues that societal features like cultural openness and independence from government censorship are some of the most important and underappreciated factors in technological advancement.

Ross also raises multiple issues which may influence the future Navy and Marine Corps. He highlights how advanced global data algorithms failed to correctly predict the scope of the Ebola outbreak in Africa because the programs could not monitor information in the local languages. This big data vulnerability could easily be at play in any of the Navy’s operational areas, and raises the importance of maintaining human oversight in intelligence and operational analysis. He also covers how smaller countries are making rapid advances in technology and innovation, like in Estonia where children learn to code and use robots in primary school.

Ross continues, “What I have seen in Africa makes me believe that industries of the future will have more broadly distributed centers of innovation and wealth creation than was the case in the past 20 years, when Silicon Valley dominated all comers.” This fact reinforces the observed changes to the Navy and Marine Corp’s future operating environment. Operational theaters of the future will be anything but vast, open expanses with freedom to maneuver and the ability to affect societies and geography how we see fit. Instead, the populations we fight amongst may very well be more advanced technologically than the Marines and Sailors deployed there. This dispersion of knowledge also means the dispersion of power, and the government and militaries which the U.S. has spent decades supporting and building relationships with may prove unreliable partners or outright antagonists in a time of conflict.

The Inevitable: Understanding The 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future by Kevin Kelly

Instead of focusing on case studies like Ross, Kevin Kelly, a co-founder of Wired, writes about 12 technological trends taking place amongst societies as a whole in The Inevitable: Understanding The 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future. Instead of pointing to specific outcomes or endpoints, Kelly describes the trends with  verbs and points to how they are changing various facets of our lives. The chapters describe trends like “cognifying” (the addition of smart technology, artificial intelligence, and the cloud to everything), “flowing” (all information becomes non-stop, real-time, and on-demand), and “screening” (every surface is an interactive space of some sort and can change at our will).

The Navy is already driving towards some of the trends which Kelly investigates.”Accessing,” or the trend of placing information and services in the cloud to be accessed anywhere at any time, is familiar to the force as it pursues cloud technologies. “Remixing,” i.e. breaking down existing products into individual pieces to re-assemble for new purposes, is familiar to any Sailor or Marine with Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), or operational experience in which units are task-organized to meet combatant commander needs.

Other trends remain elusive from the naval services. Decentralized collaboration on a mass scale maximizes small group power, what Kelly dubs “Sharing,” is a perennial struggle for the Navy, Marine Corps, and other branches, and usually half-heartedly pursued in some form of enhanced integration or coordination. Such issues are natural in stove-piped bureaucracies, and the best efforts of the services to overcome them have had limited success. “Interacting” and changing how users engage with systems and computers, likely via augmented reality, is an exciting new area which has been pursued on a limited scale, primarily for training purposes.

“Questioning” builds off of the other existing trends to drive institutions and individuals forward. As artificial intelligence, cloud data, and increased networks make answers easily available, developing the right questions will become even more important for organizational development. It is in this trend that the Navy and Marine Corps are most seriously lacking. Some of the traits of a good question include “not concerned with a right answer…cannot be answered immediately…challenges existing answers…” Such questions drive real innovation. These traits are largely unfamiliar in an organization which prides itself on repeatable tasks and exercises with little time or resources for in-depth experimentation.

Some of the examples used in the book have direct pertinence to future military operations. The digitization of and access to information could reform professional military education (PME). Dematerialization, which is the lightening of objects as materials become lighter and more durable, will impact every facet of the military from Marines’ body armor to the airframes of naval aircraft. Blockchain technologies are already being researched for uses other than finance like communication networks and policy agreements. Future developments could play a major role in the next generation of naval information systems. Localized networks of cellphones (Kelly highlights FireChat) which can speak to each other directly can also provide a possible communications solution for operations in denied or degraded communications environments.

Two Takeaways from Two Books

The two most important questions these books raise for the Navy and Marine Corps are hinted at by Ross and highlighted by Kelly: Ross talks at length about decentralization and Kelly provides additional context. Kelly writes, “Community sharing can unleash astonishing power…The community’s collective influence is far out of proportion to the number of contributors. That is the whole point of social institutions: The sum outperforms the parts.” While no observer can argue that a group of individuals can equal the firepower or presence of a formal naval task force, the inability to mass cooperation or share information between commands, units, and fleets sustains situations like Afghanistan where two decades of war are split into 20 different one-year battles.

But is it possible to freelance or crowdsource security? In some context, partnerships and coalitions in places like the Arabian Gulf and Asia-Pacific do just that. On an administrative level, the ability to flexibly leverage the manpower of the reserves seems like a worthwhile goal. Establishing a program where reserves (or ex-military members with the requisite knowledge) can augment units on an ad hoc basis (see apps like Upwork or Taskrabbit) could greatly benefit the operational readiness of staffs by reducing the administrative burden placed upon commands.

Finally, a recurrent theme in both books is the future of world economies. Innovation, new technologies, and data are the lifeblood of future financial strength. In historic eras, navies were created to physically protect a nation’s flagged vessels as they traded around the world. If the future American economy involves a smaller portion of physical trade and relies instead on services and information, the Navy may need to re-think its role in the defense of these networks and institutions. While cyber policies and authorities have been assigned between military commands and civilian services, the Navy may need to continually refine its role if the defense and support of American trade is to remain a primary mission in the next era of warfare.

Christian Heller is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and University of Oxford. He currently serves as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. Follow him on Twitter, @hellerch. The opinions represented are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the United States Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 20, 2016) Ensign Margaret Graves scans the horizon in the pilot house of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). (U.S. Navy photo)

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Sea Control 155 – Humanity at Sea and Naval Responses with Dr. John Sherwood

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By Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca

In this episode, Dr. John Shewood, U.S. Navy Historian at the Naval History and Heritage Command, joins Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca, CIMSEC’s Social Media Coordinator, to examine the EU and NATO response to the raging migration and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean.

Download Sea Control 155 – Humanity at Sea and Naval Responses with Dr. John Sherwood

Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca is CIMSEC’s Social Media Coordinator.

Contact the Sea Control podcast team at [email protected].