By CAPT Paul W. Nickell, USN, MA, MBA

The Sailor is the Navy. No Navy is better than its Sailors. An unstructured, disconnected leadership continuum is a disservice to our Sailors and our Navy. The ideal Navy starts with the ideal Sailor. Now is the time for a coherent, connected Sailors First leadership continuum.

Introduction

Admiral Caudle provided a systematic build-up to framing his vision (priorities) for how our Navy will fight: C-NOte #1 on Sailors and their Quality of Life to C-NOte #2 on the Foundry and envisioned infrastructure necessary to generate and sustain naval power to the Worldclass Fleet in C-NOte #3 described for the fight: Sailors First–Foundry Always–Worldclass Fleet.¹ 

Now, in C-NOte #4, he outlines the vision for how that force will operate: a Golden Fleet capable of Enhanced Mission Command, delegated autonomy, and winning in a strategic environment (that is) fundamentally different from that of two decades ago. This is a fleet that is built in the foundry and forged to fight. We must assume a new foundry and a new forge – not old legacy ways and means.

Though the vision is sound, it faces a critical obstacle. While the Navy has issued Fighting Instructions in the past to address tactical application, we still lack a coherent philosophical doctrine for warfighting leadership.^2,3  Instructions and notes alone are insufficient to achieve a timeless model for naval warfighting, as exemplified by the United States Marine Corps’ FMFM-1: Warfighting.⁴ 

Doctrine, Notes, Pamphlets aside, we must also win the mind and truly cultivate the cognitive edge of the command leader at sea – Education. Currently, the Navy’s mechanism for winning that mind – our Leadership Development Framework (Enterprise) – is fractured and requires a fresh look.

Unifying Navy’s Leadership Enterprise: A Strategic Imperative for Warfighting Excellence

The fundamental flaw in our current alignment of leader development is not merely bureaucratic; it is philosophical. This creates a strategic category error. By housing the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC) and the Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) within a training command, the Service imposes a mechanistic training framework on an adaptive human problem.⁴ 

To help the reader understand this distinction, we must look to the Navy’s own professional doctrine. The U.S. Naval War College’s primer on the Navy Profession explicitly differentiates between a bureaucracy and a profession. Training is the tool of the bureaucracy; it is skills-based, compliance-based, and focused on the efficiency of resource expenditure through checklists and standard operating procedures (SOPs). This approach is inherently mechanistic, designed for routine work and the known.

In contrast, education is the tool of the profession. It is expert-based, requiring life-long learning to develop the discretion and judgment necessary to achieve mission effectiveness in the face of the unknown.⁶ As Admiral P. Gardner Howe III observed, “a bureaucratic organization will never succeed in combat; only a professional organization can and will.”⁷

By relegating leadership development to a training command, we are effectively using checklists to solve for culture. The result is a force trained for compliance and ill-equipped for the ambiguity of command. This structure restricts our ability to develop leaders who can out-think the adversary because it prioritizes hardware and routines over the development of critical-thinking skills – the primary driver of innovation and adaptability.

To fix the output, Navy must fix the input structure. Reintegrating NLEC and SEA under the USNWC replaces a mechanistic training model with a dynamic educational framework, offering a coherent model from E-1 to O-10.⁸ This move leverages the War College’s research power for adult development (vertical growth) – expanding a leader’s capacity to think in more complex ways – rather than just horizontal learning (adding more technical facts).

Furthermore, this unification restores a massive, currently dormant strategic potential (from the 2013 Navy Leader Development Strategy). Prior to COVID, CNO directed that senior Flag Officers speak to every NLEC class, ensuring that the CNO’s message reached every Triad leader in the Navy. Today, this engagement has greatly diminished, often replaced by administrative or junior Flag representation. Unifying the enterprise under the USNWC would institutionalize the “leaders engaging leaders” model, ensuring that the warfighting goals of C-NOte #4 are forged into the minds of every front-line leader.⁹ This is the human capital solution required to achieve the cognitive overmatch our current strategic environment demands.

Education: The Framework for a Disciplined Mind

True education is what remains after one has forgotten everything they learned in school.¹⁰ It transcends memorizing transitory facts – specific dates, formulas, or administrative procedures – to cultivate lasting, under-the-hood professional skills: critical thinking, problem-solving, empathy, curiosity, and adaptability. While training minimizes variance to prepare us for the expected (the known), education expands our cognitive capacity to handle the unexpected (the unknown). We train for certainty; we must educate for uncertainty.

For a Naval leader, education is how learning transforms the mind to handle life-and-death challenges in complex, high-stakes environments. To achieve this, the Navy must move away from its current bifurcated structure and toward a single, unified enterprise that manages the leadership journey from “Day One” to Flag rank.

The Strategic Advantage of a Single Entity

Currently, leadership development is split: NLEC (E1–O6) and SEA (E7-E9) fall under the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), while the USNWC College of Leadership and Ethics (CLE) handles Flag Officers (O7–O10). Reintegrating NLEC and SEA under the USNWC offers three decisive advantages:

Unified Command of the Continuum: A single entity ensures the Warrior Ethos – a mindset marked by honor, integrity, and resilience – is consistently developed across every career milestone. When the NLEC was established as an Echelon III under the Naval War College in 2014, the intent was to create a single “Home of Thought” for leader development from E1 to O10.¹¹ Returning to this structure resolves the current philosophical disconnect. Furthermore, bringing NLEC and SEA back under one roof mirrors the reality of the Fleet. The CO and CMC do not lead in silos; they lead together as a Triad under a unified vision. Their development should reflect that partnership, rather than separating their educational foundations into disparate training and education

Research-Driven Excellence: The USNWC is a research powerhouse that outshines the bureaucratic focus inherent to NETC’s Street to Fleet mission. In the Service’s own professional doctrine, training is defined as “skills-based” and focused on “efficiency of resource expenditure” within a bureaucracy.¹² While NETC excels at this training – horizontal learning that is designed for technical competence in finite systems – leadership is an infinite human activity that requires vertical development to foster judgment of the unknown.

By keeping NLEC and SEA under a training command, the Navy commits a strategic category error: attempting to apply mechanistic solutions (checklists and administrative procedures) to organic, adaptive problems like culture and trust. Bureaucracies exist to support professions, not the other way around. Housing an educational powerhouse like USNWC under a training command would be a “category error” of the highest order, as it would subject discretionary professional judgment to procedural compliance. As RDML P. Gardner Howe III observed, “a bureaucratic organization will never succeed in combat; only a professional organization can and will.”¹³

Unifying these bodies under the USNWC allows for the expert application of specialized knowledge through the discretion and judgment of the individual leader. NETC’s mission is to efficiently expend resources for routine training. The USNWC’s mission, as tasked by the CNO, is to educate and develop leaders capable of out-thinking the adversary. These missions are complementary but must remain distinct, with the professional educational authority (USNWC) setting the standard for the leadership continuum.

Bridging the Flag Officer Gap: There is currently a significant visibility gap between Flag leadership and the foundational leadership schoolhouse, limiting understanding of NLEC’s role in Navy leadership development. While Flag Officers are intimately aware of the benefits of the USNWC CLE team’s Flag and Executive (FLEX) courses, their understanding of NLEC’s current evolution is often limited to their own past participation in legacy courses.

This gap is evidenced by the decline of the Leaders Engaging Leaders model. Prior to NLEC’s move to a training command, the CNO mandated that senior Four-Star Admirals engage with every NLEC class, ensuring that the CNO’s strategic vision was institutionalized directly into the minds of every Triad leader in the Navy (Howe, 2015).¹⁴ Today, this top-level engagement has largely been replaced by administrative or junior Flag representation.

Reintegration leverages the established trust Flag Officers have in the War College Brand as the Home of Thought to restore this critical engagement. By placing NLEC and SEA back under the NWC, the Navy ensures that senior leaders remain the primary drivers of professional identity for the commanders they lead, restoring the prestige, credibility, and visibility of command-level leadership development across the Navy.

The Cost of a Disjointed Continuum: Lessons from the Press

A fragmented leadership model – where “reins” are split – creates a disconnect between theoretical wisdom and practical application. This disjointed continuum often leads to systemic failures that result in negative press and eroded public trust:

• Institutional “Lessons Noted” vs. “Lessons Learned”: Insights from isolated seminars rarely translate into sustained action, leading to recurring patterns of failure.
• Crisis of Character and Trust: High-profile episodes of misconduct or Command failure often stem from leadership deficits – poor judgment, lack of clear vision, or a “zero-defect” mindset that breeds paralysis.
• Operational Risk: Public crises regarding Sailor Quality of Life – housing, galley facilities, and pay delays – highlight a failure to manage the “Total Force” with a unified leadership mindset.

Institutionalizing CNO Goals: The Untapped Potential

Prior to COVID, the CNO directed each of the Navy’s Four-star Admirals to speak to every NLEC class (14 classes annually). This ensured that both the CNO’s message reached every “Triad” leader in the Navy within a 2-3-year span and that the wisdom and vision of our most senior flag officers across the fleet were shared with our front-line command leaders. Today, that engagement has diminished, with the occasional Four-star engagement largely in the shadows of predominantly administrative and junior Flag representation replacing Fleet leadership – Senior Fleet leaders are not engaging in this dedicated and precious time for thinking with Command (Combat) leaders.

The potential of a unified enterprise is incredible:

• Unmatched Reach: In 2-3 years, a unified message delivered at NLEC and SEA can reach every single triad leader in the entire Navy – a feat that even the War College’s current student body load alone cannot achieve.
• Strategic Hedge: A unified entity serves as a strategic hedge, reducing operational risk by investing in the People who address high-consequence contingencies.
• Single Point of Accountability: Command is an action, not a position. Reintegration ensures that every leader, from the deckplates to the Pentagon, is forged in the same “Foundry” of leadership excellence.

Figure: Enterprise Alignment of Leadership Education

Conclusion: A Warfighting Imperative

Reintegrating NLEC under the U.S. Naval War College is not merely a structural change; it is a strategic and cognitive realignment of how the Navy forges the mind of the warfighter. For too long, the Service has treated leader development as a bureaucratic checklist of skills to be trained rather than a professional capacity to be forged. By unifying the organizational reins, the Navy will achieve a philosophical unity – A Service of Thought – that ensures the Warrior Ethos and the CNO’s warfighting priorities are messaged with one voice from the deckplates to the Pentagon.

As Admiral Caudle reminds us, the Fleet must be built in the foundry. A true foundry does not merely assemble parts; it applies heat and pressure to change the fundamental properties of the material. This is the essence of our new approach: moving beyond the horizontal, skills-based learning of technical facts (better left to the Type Command (TYCOM) schoolhouses) to the vertical development of the mind. This is the work of education, and it requires a unified foundry – one standard, one discipline, and one leader development continuum from the deckplates to the Pentagon.

To build this foundry, the Navy must act with the same decisiveness it expects of its commanders. We must stop fragmenting the development of our most decisive asymmetric advantage – our people. By aligning development under the U.S. Naval War College, we move from a mechanistic model of compliance to a dynamic model of professional excellence. We ensure that every Naval leader is trained for the weapon station and educated for the command.

We build the Leader(ship) not just to float, but to fight and win in the most complex and unpredictable waters ahead – Forged to fight, Tempered in the Fleet.

Captain Paul Nickell recently completed his tour as a Military Professor at the College of Leadership and Ethics within the Naval War College, and before that as an Instructor at the Navy Leadership and Ethics Command, where he facilitated learning of Major Commanders and Commanding Officers, and developed tomorrow’s Joint Force Leaders. Flying the P-3C, P-3SPA, and the P-8A, he has commanded a P-8A squadron and was the Battle Director for CENTCOM Air Operations. He is currently the Prospective Major Commander for Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas. He holds advanced degrees from both the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School, where his thesis explored “How the Navy Can Become A Learning Organization,” and his subsequent research at the Naval War College has focused on learning as it applies to leadership development.

References

1 “Chief of Naval Operations,” January 2026, https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Chief-of-Naval-Operations/.

2 Paul Nickell, To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting | Center for International Maritime Security, September 30, 2025, https://cimsec.org/to-win-the-fight-we-must-first-win-the-mind-create-ndp-1-1-naval-warfighting/.

3  Paul Nickell & Arthur Valeri, “How the Navy Can Become a Learning Organization, Again.” 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/73501

4 Sailors First and the Ideal Navy: Inside the Pentagon with the New CNO, directed by Fed Gov Today, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKaV0iiQ_c0.

5 Martin L. Cook et al., “The Navy Profession,” U.S. Naval War College, April 2, 2016.

6 Cook et al., “The Navy Profession.”

7 P. Gardner Howe, Professionalism, Leader Development Key to Future, May 19, 2015, https://usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/News/Rear-Adm-Howe-Professionalism-leader-development-key-to-future.

8 Walter E. Carter Jr., “President’s Forum,” Article 2, Naval War College Review 67, no. 1 (2014); James Kelly, “Strengthening Our Naval Profession through a Culture of Leader Development,” Article 3, Naval War College Review 67, no. 1 (2014).

9 Howe, Professionalism, Leader Development Key to Future; Daryl Caudle, “Chief of Naval Operations,” https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Chief-of-Naval-Operations/.

10 Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, 3rd ed (Crown/Archetype, 2010).

11 Carter Jr., “President’s Forum.”

12 Cook et al., “The Navy Profession.”

13 Howe, Professionalism, Leader Development Key to Future.

14 Howe, Professionalism, Leader Development Key to Future; “CNO’s Navy Leader Development Strategy Advances at Naval War College,” United States Navy, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/display-news/Article/2265556/cnos-navy-leader-development-strategy-advances-at-naval-war-college/.

Featured Image: The Naval War College, RI. (U.S. Navy photo)

By Bill Bray

In July 1944, at the height of the greatest naval war in human history and arguably the U.S. Navy’s finest hour, a Secretary of the Navy “Board to Study the Methods of Educating Naval Officers” concluded that the process to award appointments to the U.S. Naval Academy was failing to produce “the best possible officer material.” This report agreed with the Academy Superintendent’s Special Post-War Curriculum Committee and the Naval Academy Board of Visitors reports for 1943 and 1944—the Navy must “improve [its] present method of selecting candidates if [it is] ever to obtain the best possible officer material.”¹

In researching the history of the Naval Academy admissions process, I found this not an anomaly—a mere case of the process temporarily falling short, veering off track, or failing to keep pace with changes in American society. In fact, until the latter decades of the 20th century, both Academy and Navy leaders were consistently frustrated at the obstacles they faced in selecting the best and brightest applicants.

This past May, the Secretary of Defense directed the service academies to cease considering race, ethnicity, and gender in admissions—candidates must be evaluated “exclusively on merit.”² This order implied, although did not explicitly state, that at some point in the past “merit-based” admission was the norm and only politically-driven considerations of race, ethnicity, and gender forced the academies to lower the standard and, by extension, weaken the U.S. military’s warfighting capability.

However, no pure merit-based admissions process ever existed—and never will. Set aside the difficulty of agreeing to criteria for a merit-based “whole-person standard” (an Academy goal from its earliest days), a partially subjective admissions process will remain the case even if the new directive did not include a major exception to ensure the Naval Academy’s 36 varsity athletic teams can recruit the talent they need. And some subjectivity in forming each Academy class is a good thing.

Historically, the Academy never selected—indeed could not select—only the best candidates based on merit. Two main reasons for this are the statutory requirement for Academy classes to be geographically diverse and the inevitability of political patronage in the nomination process. In one sense, one could claim the Naval Academy admissions process has always been a Congressionally-mandated diversity, equity, and inclusion program.

Geographic Diversity and Academic Qualifications

From its founding as the Naval School in 1845, Congress took into law the Naval Academy’s system for nominations and appointments, ensuring young men from all states and territories had a fair chance at admission—a specific kind of geographic diversity baked into the process at inception. The first legislation, approved 3 March 1845, stated:

“That midshipmen shall hereby be appointed from each State and Territory with reference and in proportion, as near as may be, to the number of representatives and delegates to Congress; that in all cases of appointment, the individual selected shall be an actual resident of the State from which the appointment purports to be made, and that the District of Columbia be considered as a Territory in this behalf.”³

For the citizens of the republic, this type of equity (fairness) was accepted without debate. It did, however, prevent the Naval Academy from selecting the best candidates for admission. First, schools across the nation varied greatly in quality, as did state education laws and standards. There also was no national education department in place to hold states to minimum standards in return for federal support. Many states had no reliable method to certify secondary school completion and proficiency. Because of this, the Academy required candidates with nominations to pass an entrance exam to secure an appointment (later known as the Regular Method of admission). The exam originally tested reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography. It was revised several times and by the 1920s included more advanced subjects, such as plane and solid geometry, physics, and chemistry.

The goal was to ensure candidates could reasonably pass the four-year curriculum (first introduced in 1851 and reformed to something similar in kind to civilian colleges after the Civil War when the Academy returned to Annapolis from Newport). This seemed a reasonable and efficient method to select the most qualified candidates. However, to ensure candidates from all parts of the country had a realistic chance of passing, the examination had to be elementary enough.

By the 1870s, it was clear that simply passing the exam was a poor predictor of subsequent academic success. According to Lieutenant Commander W. G. Greeman, “In 1873, the Board of Visitors found that, during the past ten years, 36 percent of the midshipmen admitted were dropped before they reached the second-class year and less than 46 percent of those remaining graduated.”⁴ The 1879 Board recommended harder exams and the 1884 Board appointed a special committee to investigate the standard of entrance to the Naval Academy.

 By 1897, the Academy, which had followed the advice of later Boards and made the entrance exam more rigorous still, was the target of backlash from members of Congress who believed the exam had been made too difficult and were advocating “adjusting standards of entrance to the average high school curriculum of four years.”⁵ This is another early example of Congress championing fairness in the process—Americans from poorer areas with substandard schools should not be disadvantaged at no fault of their own in gaining an appointment. The exam was not changed substantially again until the 1920s.

By 1920, the Academy was accepting a modest number of fleet sailors and Marines each year (usually from its preparatory school, established in 1915), along with some sons of World War I veterans. Many, if not most, of these candidates would not have competed well against regular candidates from quality high schools or colleges, yet Congress felt it important to give them a “boost” and reward them for their service or their families for their sacrifice. This is laudable and generally uncontroversial, but make no mistake—not all fleet candidates would make it through the rigorous program and those that did not took spots from others who likely would have.

While Academy officials ostensibly had found the right balance for an entrance exam by the early 1900s, another problem had reached a point at which they and Congress felt change was needed—“the evils of cramming in the fitting schools.”⁶ Using previous Naval Academy entrance exams, private tutors offered cramming to prepare candidates for the next exam. They were not cheap, and candidates from affluent families took advantage. Cramming services also created headwinds for another Academy effort to attract higher-quality applicants. Young men already attending college were reluctant to cease their studies for months to relearn material from high school just to pass the exam. Therefore, the Academy was unable to attract many of these better-qualified candidates as well.

The Certificate Method

As the quality of U.S. public education was improving in the early 20th century, the Academy began considering a school certification process as an alternative appointment path to the Regular Method. In 1904, the Board of Visitors recommended “a certificate of graduation from a high school accredited by one of the standardized associations or agencies of the country to be accepted as evidence of the requisite education.”⁷ This recommendation was not formally adopted until 1920, although the Academy did so that year only after it did not have enough applicants to fill the class of 1924. Beginning in 1925, those opting to use the certification method also had to take a substantiating exam in mathematics and English because several states still had unsatisfactory high school certification programs. Nevertheless, two academic paths to an appointment now existed and the Academy again began to incrementally increase the rigor of the entrance exam to try and level the two methods and ensure the quality of candidate each produced.

The 1930s saw substantial changes to the Academy’s academic program, beginning with Superintendent Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart’s reforms that coincided with the Academy being finally accredited to grant the bachelor’s degree. But the problems of geographic diversity and education disparity persisted. Writing in Proceedings in February 1945, the Secretary of the Academic Board at the Academy, Captain Walter C. Ford, had much to say on this topic that is worth quoting at length:

“The methods of qualifying to the Academy, together with the congressional system of appointment, at a glance appear to be very just and reasonable. The general objective of the system is that every boy in the United States, whether from the city, hamlet, or farm, from the university, college, private or public school, or the fleet, will if he desires have a fair and equal opportunity to attend the Naval Academy. The specific objective of this system is to secure for the Navy the best qualified officer material that can be found in the United States, regardless of the candidate’s economic status, social position, race, creed, previous educational opportunities, or political connections. Our democratic form of government as well as the Navy would not tolerate differentiation of any kind. The objectives as stated, therefore, are considered desirable and essential. The question is, however, ‘Does the present system really accomplish its objectives?’ From the point of view of the general objective-of equal representation from all parts of the country—the answer is ‘Yes.’ The present system, however, fails to a considerable extent in the accomplishment of the specific objective. This failure can be largely attributed to three causes: (1) The unequal educational opportunities available to the youth throughout the nation; (2) the present system of Naval Academy entrance examinations; and (3) the lack of authority on the part of the Naval Academy to exercise judgment in the final selection of a candidate…It is a well-known fact that two candidates, one from New England and the other from the South, for example, who submit high school certificates showing the completion of courses in United States History, English, Science, and Mathematics, neither possess knowledge of, nor have covered, the same body of subject matter.”⁸

In the 1930s and 40s, the Academy was consistently required to accept candidates far inferior academically to those from states with better secondary school systems and, despite many initiatives to remediate them while at Annapolis, contributed to a stubborn attrition rate of greater than 25 percent. Given the urgent need for naval officers during these years, a high attrition rate correlated to a flawed admissions process rather than validating the program’s rigor. Ford wrote:

 “. . . 8,358 entered the Academy in the classes from 1934 to 1947, and only 6,232 were graduated. These figures alone reveal that something must be definitely wrong with our present system of selection. If our system were really selecting the best qualified of the 43,547 applicants—which we should assume would be the 8,358 who were admitted—surely the attrition at the Academy should be far less than the approximately 25 per cent which has existed for the past ten years.”⁹

In the decades after World War II, the adoption of better state certification standards, national standards, widespread use of the College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB; and later the SAT and ACT), and a general improvement in U.S. secondary school education combined to minimize the problem that so alarmed Ford. The Academy class of 1963 was the first to be admitted on CEEB scores instead of entrance exam scores.¹⁰

In 1962, the Academy began a more formal process to evaluate a candidate’s character and motivation—the Naval Academy Information Program (known more commonly as the Blue and Gold Program), which began more as a recruiting program before evolving into a character-evaluation interview, the result of which becomes part of a candidate’s whole-person multiple. Evaluating candidates’ moral character prior to 1962 relied on the nominating Congressperson’s judgment and recommendations from teachers and coaches. While hardly scientific, a Blue and Gold Officer interview added another component to the admissions calculus.¹¹

Politics and Patronage

The other built-in facet of the Academy admissions process that makes a pure “merit-based” system impossible is political patronage. This applies not only to the congressional nomination process as defined in statute, but also to the non-congressional appointment allocations, also in statute (the president, vice president, Secretary of the Navy, and few Superintendent nominations). Undoubtedly, any process that relies in part on the judgment of elected politicians who always have favors to repay risks falling short of a merit-based standard. And that is exactly what plagued the Academy for decades.

In 1935, the Superintendent, Rear Admiral David Foote Sellers, received a letter from a 16-year-old boy asking for information on how to gain admission. In the letter, the boy wrote, in part: “I hope you can help me get to Annapolis. Does one gain entrance through competitive examinations, by ‘pull’ with some congressman, through early application, or how?”¹² The boy’s suspicion that gaining admission to the Academy might require gaining favor with a congressman was understandable, precisely because that is exactly how many candidates acquired nominations. In fact, in the 1930s and 1940s, approximately 200–300 appointments a year were given to congressional nominees who had not even applied to the Academy.¹³ They were young men who had come to the member’s attention, often through a political donor or other well-connected parent, and nominated to repay a favor or campaign support. This was not always the case, and many of these nominees went on to be fine naval officers, but more than one superintendent petitioned Congress to only designate as their principal nominees the best-qualified as opposed to the best-connected. The refusal of many in Congress to do that, however, was a recurring source of frustration to Academy leaders.

Principal nominees always have had to meet the minimum admission requirements, including passing the entrance examination or meeting the certification standard, and passing a physical examination on arrival (many did not and were sent home), so it is not as though the Academy had to accept clearly unqualified nominees. It was often the case, however, that the Academy preferred alternates who had done far better than the principal on the entrance examination or who were far superior in other categories, only to be forced to accept the principal nominee.

Congress has never relinquished this privilege, and while the process of competing for nominations varies markedly by member, it is often opaque and vulnerable to influence by political donors. In fact, a 2014 USA Today investigation found that nominations often went to:

“children of friends, political supporters and donors to the lawmakers’ campaigns. . . . It is not always a meritocracy. The nominations are open to political influence. There are no consistent standards for nominations. The requirement that each congressional district be represented means that better candidates in more competitive districts sometimes lose out.”¹⁴

Of note, only the Coast Guard Academy does not require congressional nominations and can select the candidates it finds best qualified, regardless from where they come. There is no reason to believe Congress will ever allow the other military service academies to do the same.

Varsity Athletics

While stationed in Newport, Rhode Island, in 2015 as a Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Fellow, I researched officer education and, in that capacity, visited the Naval Academy Preparatory School, from which I had graduated in 1984. As mentioned previously, it was established in 1915 to prepare sailors and Marines in the fleet to attend the Naval Academy. In 1968 it was opened to all candidates. This coincided with a new age in college athletics—now a multibillion-dollar industry in which Division I coaches are paid to win. Coaches need athletes to win, and the “recruited” athlete often, though not always, gains admission ahead of more qualified “whole-person” candidates.

In 2015, there were approximately 250 students (midshipmen candidates) at the prep school and approximately 50 percent of those were recruited athletes (53, or more than 20 percent of the school, were recruited football players). About 35 percent of the most recent prep school class are recruited athletes.¹⁵ The Naval Academy has 36 varsity sports (tied with Stanford and Ohio State for the most, though with a far smaller student body size at 4,400; Stanford has about 7,800 undergraduates and Ohio State 46,000), and approximately 15–20 percent of each incoming class comprises recruited athletes. All recruited athletes must meet a minimum standard to complete the program, and many excel academically and as leaders. In addition, as Navy leaders regularly remind the public, the Academy, unlike a civilian college, has a physical mission. Yet it remains unavoidable that many recruited athletes would not gain an appointment under a process “based exclusively on merit.”¹⁶

The Academy Today

Given this history, the years-long Academy policy to, in limited cases, consider race, gender, or ethnicity in admissions (as a factor but never the factor) should be understood in this context, regardless of one’s views about its justification. Unlike political patronage, which was often blatant corruption that resulted in weaker candidates with nominations gaining appointments, the goal in the affirmative action era was to give extra consideration to candidates from historically marginalized groups to rectify past wrongs and, perhaps more importantly, to ensure an officer corps that represents the nation it serves. A military alone does not go to war—a nation does. Having a broad representation of a nation’s society leading the military increases the will of the population to support the war (no less than Carl von Clausewitz made this point). Should this type of diversity include race, ethnicity, and gender is debatable, but what has been clear from 1845 is that there are larger, good-of-society objectives to consider in recruiting the nation’s military officer corps.

It also should be noted that, despite service academy efforts to increase the percentage of Black and other racial minorities, the results have been somewhat underwhelming for those who place a premium on demographic percentages. Recent Naval Academy classes have been between 6 and 8 percent Black, well under the nearly 14 percent of the population from which they come. This owes to many causes, including the fact that nearly 20 percent of Black Americans (and 17 percent of Hispanic Americans) live in poverty and do not have reliable access to better schools and many other resources that could make them more competitive for service academy appointments.¹⁷

Both parties in Congress are responsible for this as well. In 2021, the Connecticut Veterans Legal Center in collaboration with Yale Law School’s Veterans Legal Services Clinic concluded congressional service academy nominations are far less diverse than U.S. society at large:

“Using nearly 25 years of nomination data obtained from admissions offices at the United States Military Academy (USMA, commonly known as West Point), the United States Naval Academy (USNA), and the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), the report reveals a drastic gap between the nominations of White students and those of students of color to the academies. Black and Hispanic students are distinctly underrepresented, receiving only 6 percent and 8 percent of sitting congressional members’ nominations, respectively. White students, on the other hand, receive an outsized 74 percent of nominations. The report ranks members of the current Congress based on their record of promoting students equitably to these prestigious, taxpayer-funded institutions. The rankings, which include each current member of Congress who has made more than 10 nominations since taking office, reveal that 49 members had not nominated a single Black student as of early 2019.”¹⁸

With the service academies under pressure to increase its population of minority (particularly Black) midshipmen, many Congresses gave academy leaders limited opportunities to do so.

Better Than Ever

Academy leaders, for the most part if not always, have sought to admit the best candidates to form a highly talented brigade. Indeed, from class after class great naval leaders have come, including many who lead the Navy and Marine Corps to victory in World War II. While the debate over what best constitutes the right mix of accomplishments and skills to form a whole-person, merit-based multiple likely will never be settled, the Academy succeeds in seating extremely talented classes each year. These classes are not only geographically diverse but diverse in many ways beyond race, ethnicity, and gender. Most military leaders with whom I served agree that a force populated with Americans from all backgrounds and experiences, who bring different ideas and skills, is a better force and worth pursuing even without considering race, gender, and ethnicity.

Moreover, evaluating character and leadership ability is necessarily subjective and does not account for an individual’s growth potential while at the Academy. All Naval Academy graduates know classmates who struggled mightily in their first year or two only to flourish later in the program and go on to be superb naval officers. No whole-person, merit-based multiple can predict this potential with a high degree of accuracy.

Considering race, ethnicity, or gender in admissions may never have been justifiable or wise, or perhaps it was at one time but is no longer needed, or perhaps it was justifiable and is still needed to a degree. Whatever one believes, an argument against considering race, ethnicity, or gender should not be based on returning the admissions process to a purely “merit-based” system that never existed in the first place. Could such a system one day be designed in a way that could gain enough support in Congress to be written into law? I have my doubts. What I know is that contemporary Naval Academy classes have more than 1,000 talented, intelligent, motivated, patriotic midshipmen from all backgrounds and regions of the country. That’s a lot better than it used to be.

Bill Bray is a 1988 U.S. Naval Academy graduate and an adjunct professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. The opinions in this article are expressed in a personal capacity and do not constitute official views of the U.S. government, U.S. Naval Academy, or U.S. Naval Institute.

References

1. CAPT Walter C. Ford, USN, and CDR J. Burrough Stokes, USNR, “The Selection and Procurement of Better Candidate Material for the Naval Academy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 71, no. 2 (February 1945): 131–45.

2. HON Pete Hegseth, “Memorandum for Senior Pentagon Leadership, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities: Certification of Merit-Based Military Service Academy Admissions,” 9 May 2025. 10 U.S. Codes 7442, 7443, 8454, 8456, 9442, and 9443 govern the Congressional and non-Congressional nominating and appointment processes for the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, and U.S. Air Force Academy. These statutes do not direct or constrain how each Congressperson’s office manages their nomination processes—they are free to identify principle nominees, rank-order their alternates, or simply submit a list of (now) 15 nominees to each academy and allow the service academies to select the best qualified and grant appointments to the number of vacancies each Congressperson will have that year (each Congressperson can only have five nominees in each academy at any one time).

3. Ford and Stokes, “The Selection and Procurement of Better Candidate Material,” 132.

4. LCDR W. G. Greenman, USN, “Entrance Requirements, United States Naval Academy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 53, no. 6 (June 1927): 722–32.

5. Greenman, “Entrance Requirements,” 727.

6. Greenman, 727.

7. Greenman, 730.

8. Ford and Stokes, 134.

9. Ford and Stokes, 135.

10. Jack Sweetman, The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 215–16.

11. CDR Roger Lindsay, USNR, “The Blue and Gold Officer—His Naval Academy Commitment,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 96, no. 3 (March 1970): 113–15.

12. CDR A. H. Rooks, USN, “Entrance Requirements of U.S. Naval Academy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 61, no. 10 (October 1935): 1468–8.

13. Ford and Stokes, 134–5.

14. Gregory Korte and Fredreka Schouten, “Pride and Patronage,” USA Today, 15 September 2014.

15. Email from CAPT Tom Clarity, USN, commanding officer of the Naval Academy Preparatory School, 30 May 2025.

16. Hegseth, “Certification of Merit-Based Military Service Academy Admissions.”

17. Emily A. Shrider et al., Report Number P60-273: Income and Poverty in the United States: 2020 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, September 2021).

17. “Congressional Nominations for Military Service Academies Fail to Reflect Nation’s Diversity,” Yale Law School,17 March 2021, law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/congressional-nominations-military-service-academies-fail-reflect-nations-diversity.

Featured Image: ANNAPOLIS, Md. (June 30, 2022) The U.S. Naval Academy welcomes the midshipman candidates, or plebes, of the Class of 2026 during Induction Day 2022. (U.S. Navy photo by Stacy Godfrey)

By Jack Tribolet

Throughout history, war has tested human ingenuity, often deciding the fate of empires, nations, and ideologies. Imagine looking out over an active battlefield, the air thick with tension and kinetic projectiles. Each choice could alter history, and you suddenly have a consequential decision to make with lives on the line. This is not only a hypothetical scenario but a possibility for which junior officers must be mentally prepared. While proficiency in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) is essential, broadening their understanding of the warfighting domains is equally important. This broader understanding can be achieved by studying military theory in a challenging era where the history discipline is contracting.¹

Studying prominent military theorists before mid-level Professional Military Education would give junior officers a comprehensive understanding of the warfighting domains, enhancing their situational awareness and decision-making abilities. By studying theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Boyd before mid-level Professional Military Education (PME), junior officers can enhance their situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, increasing their lethality.

Dominant military theorists such as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Giulio Douhet provided perspective to their respective eras and domains of war, adding clarity and grammar to chaos. Others, such as Antoine Jomini, Julian Corbett, and Boyd, refined and built upon previous theorists, sometimes not amicably. For cadets, midshipmen, and junior officers, delving into the works of these great minds is not merely an academic exercise but an integral piece of their professional development. By studying military theory in officer accession programs, officers could gain additional tools to think critically and lead effectively, ensuring they are well-equipped to face the increasingly complex modern battlefield.

By understanding the evolution of warfare and the application of historical lessons to contemporary conflicts, officers can develop what the French call coup d’œil — “a glance that takes in a general view.”² Clausewitz defined coup d’œil as an “inward eye” enabling a “rapid and accurate decision” that would typically only be perceived “after a long study and reflection.”³ Coup d’œil requires trained observation and an exhaustive look at previous campaigns—strategy, tactics, decision points, technology, and truisms—all best encapsulated by military theory.

The great captains of military history, Caesar, Napoleon, Patton, and Mattis, have demonstrated the value of applied military theory. Each read history voraciously, Napoleon famously stating, “Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of the great commanders.”⁴ Therefore, the early introduction of this practice has infinite potential for the training of junior officers.

Defining Military Theory

Some might question the necessity of studying military theory before attending PME. To answer this, we need to understand the role of theorists. Clausewitz explains, “The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective performance rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the essential, timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them from its temporary features.”⁵

In other words, theorists identify and describe enduring principles of warfare. These principles remain functional across time and space, providing a framework for understanding historical and modern conflicts.

Niccolo Machiavelli, who predated Clausewitz by three centuries, said, “In peace he (the warfighter) should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.”⁶ Machiavelli’s discourse recodified the ancient Roman way of citizen war and reintroduced the Roman practice of applied history. His treatise was placed on the first papal Index of Prohibited Books in 1559 for his effort.⁷ It is ironic that perhaps the premier military theorist, Clausewitz, had suspicions of applied theory, warning, “Theory can never lead to complete understanding, which is an impossibility, but it can strengthen and refine judgment.”⁸ He believed theory should “guide him [the warfighter] to self-education” and hazarded against it accompanying “him on the field of battle.”⁹

Despite Clausewitz’s warnings, studying theorists affords officers essential battlefield grammar: friction, center of gravity, lines of communication, strategic versus tactical bombing, and many more vital employable descriptive terms. Clarity in writing equates to clarity in thought. Many senior leaders use these terms colloquially, sometimes confusing an untrained audience, which prompted their quick introduction into the midshipman’s repertoire at the University of Southern California Naval ROTC unit so that they could decipher “Colonelese.”

Ultimately, studying military theory links the past and present in the officer’s mind, developing an internal timeline for the continuum of conflict and facilitating the identification of timeless principles from precedents. Clausewitz’s emphasis on enduring principles and Machiavelli’s advocacy for continuous study highlights the timeless relevance of military theory in developing critical thinking and decision-making skills.

Historical Context and the Evolution of Warfare

Individual theorists define their age, but more importantly, correspond to their chosen domain of war. Battlespace environments or military domains, defined by physical characteristics, require “unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations.”¹⁰ Consequently, theorist grammar produces the archetypes of their respective warfighting domain, defining the realm and rules for operation.

Prominent theorists can be assigned to domains as follows:

Land Domain

Clausewitz and Jomini, who fought against and with one another in the Napoleonic Wars, endeavored to describe the fundamental nature of war but ultimately became the golden standard for land-centric campaigns. Jomini spent most of his literary career struggling against Clausewitz’s ghost, calling his logic “frequently defective.” However, he provided a valuable counterbalance to Clausewitz’s theories.¹¹

In the scrum of theorists, Clausewitz has emerged as the champion, peerlessly describing war as a “continuation of policy with the addition of other means.”¹² However, while Jomini’s attempt to entirely “sciencefy” war failed, his concepts of interior lines and the application of force are integral to land domain comprehension.¹³

Sun Tzu, who predates Clausewitz and Jomini by two thousand years, remains shrouded in mystery as the author’s existence and when he wrote his treatise fall under scrutiny. However, Sun Tzu provides insight into Chinese war grammar and way of thought, which is valuable in light of the inevitable Taiwan Crisis. His use of creative naturalistic dialectical metaphors to tether common sense principles to practices is absent in Western literature. Using dialectical oppositional pairs to capture a concept challenges the Western military mind and provides insight into the pacing threat.¹⁴

Other prominent land theorists include Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Miyamoto Musashi, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Mentecuccoli, Maurice Marshal de Saxe, Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Henry Lloyd, Helmuth von Moltke, B.H. Liddell Hart, and Heinz Guderian—an all-star lineup of some of history’s finest commanders.

Maritime Domain

Mahan and Corbett clashed on naval warfare in the age of the ever-enlarging capital ship, taking opposing views on employing fleets. Mahan advocated for decisive fleet-on-fleet battles involving capital ships, believing such engagements would determine naval supremacy. In contrast, Corbett viewed maritime power as a means to support land operations, emphasizing the importance of controlling sea lines of communication to ensure the movement and supply of land forces. These differing perspectives continue to influence modern naval strategy, as seen in the strategic deployment of carrier strike groups and the protection of critical maritime routes.

Other prominent maritime theories/theorists include La Jeune École, John and Philip Colomb, Herbert Richmond, and Hyman G. Rickover. However, due to the nature of maritime combat, naval theorists are as much technologists as strategists.

Air and Space Domains

Douhet, John Boyd, and John Warden arose in the 20^th century with the advent of air power and had the difficult task of describing a rapidly shifting air domain. Douhet recognized the game-shifting application of air power in WWI and addressed the future of strategic bombing campaigns, which would shape Allied strategy in WWII. Boyd and Warden penned their concept of Strategic Paralysis in the aftermath of the precise bombing campaign of the Gulf War. Unsurprisingly, Boyd and Warden recognized the value of striking critical command and control centers; however, despite this leap in targeting capabilities, the priority of tactical versus strategic bombing remains in question, and both are seen in the current Ukraine War.¹⁵

Other prominent air theorists include Hugh Trenchard, William Mitchell, Thomas C. Schelling, and Robert J. Aumann. Unlike other domains, air power exists on an exponential technological curve, representing a formidable challenge for an air theorist to stay ahead of innovation.

Cyber and Informational Domains

Newest to the fight, these domains remain up for grabs for a future military theorist. The recently published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 made a significant leap forward in informational doctrine, recognizing the new dimension of social media and access to information witnessed in the current Ukraine and Israeli Wars. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 must become required reading for all military members, regardless of position or rank, as it concisely captures a new aspect of modern warfare.

In culmination, the warfighting domains encapsulate the entirety of warfare, each with unique doctrines, responsible organizations, and history. Participants in these domains must endeavor to comprehend their battlefield and dissect their associated theorists to gain situational awareness to develop a refined intuition.

Strategic and Tactical Proficiency

Unlike standard military history, theorists exist in the realm of application, deducing principles from precedents. Mahan cautioned against mistaking precedent with principle, “a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success.”¹⁶

Principles of war guide the development and refinement of TTPs. For example, understanding the “economy of force” principle can help officers allocate resources more effectively during operations.¹⁷ By grasping the theoretical foundations of their TTPs, officers can enhance their tactical proficiency and make more informed decisions in the heat of battle. TTPs ultimately reflect the handed-down knowledge from competent predecessors, thus representing an ever-changing chain of lessons learned.

For example, at the Battle of Midway, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky intuitively understood the Mahanian principle of a decisive naval battle enabled by his superior coup d’œil. Dangerously low on fuel, he continued the search for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers, putting his squadron into fuel extremis, knowing that he had to break his TTPs for the chance of decisive victory. McClusky’s actions at Midway demonstrate the practical application of Mahanian principles, underscoring the value of understanding military theory for effective decision-making. The IJN were strict adherents to Mahanian theory, and they forced Midway to become a decisive battle, just not in the manner they expected.¹⁸

Leadership and Decision-Making

Dominant battlefield methodology develops directly from technological innovation, and the rate of change increases the complexity of battlefield TTPs. Consequently, TTPs serve as a lagging indicator of technological progress. Increased complexity has downstream effects; as Clausewitz would say, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”¹⁹ The increased situational awareness gained by studying timeless military principles gives officers the required perspective in a fluctuating scenario to make critical decisions. “Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.”²⁰

When becoming an aircraft commander, pilots are expected to learn their systems in and out—limits, emergency procedures, and TTPs—which become second nature through study. The end state of this learning profile enables the aircraft commander to understand when and how to break procedures as McClusky did. This analogy applies to learning domain warfare—by understanding the domain paradigm—junior officers have the foundational knowledge to understand the cause and effect of sometimes necessary TTP rule-breaking in warfare decision-making.

Beyond domain comprehension, some theorists provide critical insight into the decision-making process. Boyd’s OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) exemplifies how theoretical frameworks can enhance rapid decision-making, a crucial skill for junior officers in dynamic combat situations. For instance, during aerial combat, pilots who quickly observe the enemy’s actions, orient themselves to the situation, decide on the best course of action, and act swiftly are more likely to succeed. When internalized and practiced, this process can significantly enhance an officer’s ability to make rapid and effective decisions under pressure.

Case Studies and Practical Applications

Theory provides the realm of possibility, the domain’s boundaries, enabling a scenario-driven decision point. One example of a scenario-driven event is the Decision Forcing Cases (DFC) model used in the United States Marine Corps. DFCs represent a valuable tool for training cadets, midshipmen, and young officers. These scenarios encourage situational learning and critical thinking and facilitate stress through time restrictions and real-time instructor feedback.

However, instruction must include a deep dive into historical campaigns to maximize scenario-based theory learning and understand possibility boundaries. For example, an in-depth look at Napoleon’s conquest of Europe includes grand strategies such as logistical considerations and pairs them with tactical decision-making. Where do you apply force, and how?

Furthermore, what were the consequences of critical decisions made in the historical context? In 1812, Napoleon’s intuition failed him due to a lack of temperance. His Russian campaign provides a clear example of the importance of strategic decision-making. Initially aiming for a quick victory, Napoleon pressed on past his initial objectives, leading his troops deeper into Russia with Moscow in sight. This decision resulted in severe logistical challenges as supply lines stretched beyond their limits. The harsh winter compounded these issues, ultimately leading to an apocalyptic retreat where only 100,000 men of the 612,000 that crossed the border returned.²¹ Analyzing this campaign helps officers understand the critical balance between ambition and logistical feasibility in military strategy and should provide a warning to pair objectives with temperance.

A deep understanding of the continuum of change in war enables officers to identify truisms and trends, which expands their ability to anticipate further evolution—”Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war.”²² The current conflict in Ukraine has spotlighted the real-time evolution of drone warfare. Consequently, future drone theorists and AI integration arbiters are likely already in the service or will soon be joining. These fundamental changes to warfare outline a ripe opportunity to deliver the grammar of these technologies into doctrine, thus necessitating these future service doctrine-writing members to have a firm grasp on previous theories as they initiate the testing phase.

Conclusion: Preparing Junior Officers for Modern Warfare

Integrating military theory into early education—officer ascension programs, and training would equip junior officers with essential principles for effective leadership and decision-making— coup d’œil. Officer Candidacy School, ROTC, and the academies must strive to add the study of theorists to curriculums inside and outside the classroom. Furthermore, this instruction must continue into active units, which could be as simple as guided discussion groups led by unit commanders. Military theory provides a framework for understanding historical and contemporary conflicts by distilling complex concepts into coherent truisms. Effective decision-making lies at the heart of officership, and studying military theory refines and strengthens this critical skill. As the adage goes, “He who desires peace should prepare for war.”²³

By incorporating military theorists into their early education, junior officers and officer candidates engage with the primary sources of war, which better prepares them to lead confidently in the challenges of modern warfare.

Lieutenant Jack Tribolet is Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Southern California ROTC and is the course coordinator for Seapower and Maritime Affairs. He is a naval aviator.

References

¹ Bret Devereaux, “The History Crisis Is a National Security Problem, Foreign Policy, March 10, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/10/the-history-crisis-is-a-national-security-problem/

² Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “coup d’oeil,” accessed July 8, 2024, https://www.oed.com/

³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 102.

⁴ Kevin Kinley, “Thumbing through the Napoleonic Wars: The Words of Napoleon and Others Who May Have Influenced His Methods,” The Napoleon Series, Accessed July 17, 2024. https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c_quotes.html

⁵ Clausewitz, On War, 11.

⁶ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriott, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2017), 62.

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (Westminister: UK, Penguin Books, 2018) 110.

⁸ Clausewitz, On War, 193.

⁹ Clausewitz, On War, 4.

¹⁰ Michael P. Kreuzer, “Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age,” The Strategy Bridge, July 8, 2021. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/8/cyberspace-is-an-analogy-not-a-domain-rethinking-domains-and-layers-of-warfare-for-the-information-age

¹¹ Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008) 127.

¹² James Holmes, “Everything You Know About Clausewitz Is Wrong,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2012. https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/

¹³ Jomini, The Art of War, 77.

¹⁴ Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 66.

¹⁵ David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1995) 13, 23.

¹⁶ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Boston: Little Brown, 1902), 7.

¹⁷ Paul Murdock, “The Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force,” Parameters 32, no. 1 (May 2002): 86.

¹⁸ Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 215-216.

¹⁹ Clausewitz, On War, 119.

²⁰ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2015) 69.

²¹ T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “French invasion of Russia,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 11, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/French-invasion-of-Russia.

²² Giulio Douhet, The Command of The Air, trans. Dino Ferari (Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2020), 30.

²³ John Clarke, “De Rei Militari by Flavius Vegetius Renatus” in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time, edited by Thomas R. Phillips, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 124.

Featured Image: Painting “Rescue of the crew of Achille during the Battle of Trafalgar,” by Richard Brydges Beechey, 1884. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

By Philip Garrow, Ed.D.

From major universities to community colleges, the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated innovative thinking and flexible changes at American institutions of higher learning. In the span of two weeks, the United States Naval Academy (USNA) went from never before offering a remote course to shifting its entire undergraduate curriculum online. To accomplish this, it can be surmised that USNA’s most senior leaders employed adaptive leadership techniques to accomplish its primary mission of safely graduating and commissioning midshipmen on schedule. The rapid pivot to an online learning environment reflected the positive aspects of adaptive leadership theory, especially with respect to defining an institutional vision and incorporating feedback from faculty. Yet other actions exposed some of adaptive leadership’s dangers, such as administrators’ tendencies to favor policy uniformity at the expense of instructor autonomy as well as the proclivity to rush decisions in the face of time constraints. In the end, USNA’s transition to remote instruction is best characterized as a missed opportunity to reexamine minimum professional competency levels (i.e., “commissioning standards”) for military service. Although USNA leadership successfully harnessed adaptive leadership to meet its graduation objectives, it failed to see the pandemic response as a larger chance to assess, evaluate, and revise commissioning requirements and faculty practices.

Adaptive leadership ¹ is a relatively new subject in leadership theory; in Dinh et al.’s 2013 review of 752 articles published in ten widely-cited academic journals, adaptive leadership was only explored in five pieces.² While Nelson and Squires contend that adaptive leadership was originally developed for commercial applications,³ Heifetz and Linsky outlined its uses in the realm of education.⁴ A more concise framing from Campbell-Evans et al.⁵ summarized Heifetz et al.’s 2009 book on adaptive leadership by asserting the term explains the skills and strategies necessary to address gnarly situations, immediate problems, and changing conditions.⁶

With its wide-ranging impacts across all industries and professions, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic represented a challenge of the highest order.⁷ Contending with it on “the Yard” (USNA’s informal nickname for its campus) fell primarily to USNA’s Superintendent and Provost. The Superintendent is a generally a three-star, active duty Navy Vice Admiral whose positional responsibilities are similar to those of a university president.⁸ The Provost, meanwhile, oversees curriculum design and delivery for the entire campus as well as personnel issues such as faculty hiring, review, and promotion.⁹ From March to August 2020, both released a series of emails notifying USNA personnel of institutional virus response efforts and remote learning support options. The plan as promulgated kept the institution on track to meet its annual timelines but did not offer a chance to reflect on which aspects of the traditional commissioning path were truly necessary.

USNA leaders displayed adaptive leadership by promulgating a cautious, flexible model for remote classes by clearly articulating an organizational vision.¹⁰ In light of rising COVID-19 cases nation-wide, in early March 2020 the Provost sent a pandemic-related email to faculty, simply passing along information on international travel.¹¹ The day after, approximately 4,500 midshipmen left the campus on what they expected to be a week-long spring break. A few days later, the Provost sent another email, asking faculty to brainstorm strategies for shifting courses to online formats (such as Zoom or GoogleMeet) and to push those ideas up through their department leadership.¹² Also, acting on information received firsthand from Maryland’s governor, the Superintendent announced that students would remain off campus for an additional two weeks.¹³ The decision was intended to give the faculty time to adjust their lesson plans for remote learning, which was employed for the rest of the semester and the summer term that followed.

One Provost email update acknowledged the challenges presented by a world-wide virus and admitted to looking to models from other institutions across the country.¹⁴ This made the decision-making process transparent and “user-centric”¹⁵ by soliciting faculty feedback – an improvement-science approach to adaptive leadership. The Provost exhibited a clear belief that unforeseen challenges required unprecedented solutions. But all emails were in service of a simple goal defined by the Superintendent: safely completing the semester (from a public health perspective) and getting midshipmen commissioned on time.¹⁶ As campus operations were streamlined, there did not seem to be much organized reflection about how minimal commissioning standards had long been defined and perpetuated. With Physical Fitness Assessments paused Fleet-wide for the second cycle of 2020, how defensible were the traditional USNA higher-than-the-Fleet standards for running, swimming, and the like?

Despite the laudable efforts outlined above to meet Fleet manning requirements safely, two drawbacks of the adaptive model emerged in USNA’s transition to online learning: the process became less user-centric and more directive over time, and last-minute changes in the name of improvement resulted in unnecessary staff and student burdens. Both the spring and summer 2020 terms were executed with students residing off-campus and completing only online coursework. Although the Provost solicited and acted on faculty feedback initially, as evidenced by his decision to shift school hours to the right in consideration of students living in the Pacific Standard Time zone,¹⁷ requests for suggestions from staff dwindled as the weeks wore on. Faculty autonomy with respect to attire¹⁸ or meeting synchronously or asynchronously¹⁹ were increasingly restricted by prescriptive directions. Rather than ask why the institution did things the way it traditionally had, the focus was on returning to pre-COVID standards and practices as soon as possible.

Educational systems are prone to return to previous methods and ways of operating,²⁰ while leaders often face great temptation to issue unilateral solutions when achieving group consensus proves difficult.²¹ The ever-increasing volume of additional written instructions – in the form of USNA Academic Dean Notices – demonstrated that the adaptive flexibility of the early weeks of the pandemic gave way to the institution’s natural inclination to codify and standardize. The transparency of the thought process behind the early emails mutated into less forthcoming initiatives, such as a process for students to share course concerns with Associate Deans directly while bypassing the faculty and the chairs of academic departments.²²

The extended nature of the pandemic eventually encouraged a tendency to think about how to return to old ways of doing things in the new environment, rather than stimulate improvement-science driven initiatives to ask what procedures deserved to be permanently eliminated.²³ After expending considerable funds to outfit classrooms with remote learning tools like OWL camera and microphone devices, faculty were forbidden post-pandemic to use such devices rather than arrange for in-person substitutes. The insistence on returning to pre-COVID business-as-usual denied faculty the chance to refine and hone remote teaching skills they acquired during the crisis. At the very least, a better adaptive leadership approach would suggest faculty be given autonomy to decide when an in-person sub versus a remote session best suits their needs. The administration’s quiet shift from adaptive leadership to a more directive style caused problems that might otherwise have been avoided.

Another problem with adaptation and flexibility is that it can prove too tempting to continue to tinker with changes past the point where further adjustments are no longer optimal. After weeks of changes, a plan was made to teach remotely for the first two weeks of class and then divide students into “blue/gold” sections in order to decrease class sizes by half and facilitate six feet of separation between student desks.²⁴ A week later, that plan was heavily modified such that only the first two days of class were mandated as remote and departments were under increased pressure to find teaching spaces large enough to accommodate regular class-sizes.²⁵ Worse, student assignments to course sections were constantly in flux, with some First Year Composition English courses experiencing a full 50% change in assigned students as late as the afternoon before the first day of class.²⁶ Such adjustments meant that some students were making two or three return trips to the campus bookstore in order to ensure they possessed the correct text for the instructor they were assigned.²⁷ Curiously, most texts on adaptive leadership do not warn that flexibility can be carried too far. By failing to recognize the point at which further changes, even in the interest of optimization, were likely to cause unnecessary frustration and stress, USNA administrators placed too great a premium on top-down adaptation at the expense of efficiency and common sense.

The COVID-19 pandemic is the sort of gnarly, “multifaceted”²⁸ problem that adaptive leadership is well poised to resolve. Yet USNA leadership delivered a mixed result, properly emphasizing shared goals and stakeholder buy-in during the initial response stages but succumbing to centralized and directive solutions as time progressed. The chance to question what elements of commissioning were truly required was overlooked and the opportunity to afford faculty greater voice in post-pandemic teaching options was missed. While it is important not to judge too harshly in light of the pandemic’s complexity, it is clear in retrospect that a summer stand down to reflect on the process and jointly reevaluate the options for the fall semester would have been well-advised, as would a similar reflective session at the conclusion of the COVID-19 crisis. USNA is a model of adaptive leadership; sometimes it just does not know when to stop adapting.

Lieutenant Commander Philip Garrow, USN, is a career Surface Warfare Officer and has completed guided missile cruiser, frigate, littoral combat ship, and destroyer squadron afloat tours. He holds a B.A. from Tulane University, M.A. degrees from Salve Regina University, the U.S. Naval War College, and the University of Maryland: College Park, and a doctorate in Entrepreneurial Leadership in Education from Johns Hopkins University. He currently serves as an Assistant Professor of English at the United States Naval Academy.

All views expressed and comments provided in this article are my own thoughts and opinions based on my professional and academic experience and expertise. They do not constitute (nor should be construed as reflecting) DOD, DON, or USNA official policy or endorsement.

Endnotes

¹ Ali Baltaci and Ali Balci, “Complexity Leadership: A Theoretical Perspective,” International Journal of Educational Leadership and Management 5, no. 1 (2017): 30-58, doi: 10.17583/ijelm. 2017.2435; Glenda Campbell-Evans, Jan Gray, and Bridget Legett, “Adaptive Leadership in School Boards in Australia: An Emergent Model,” School Leadership & Management, 34, no. 5 (2014): 538-552, doi: 10.1080/13632434.2014.938038; Tenneisha Nelson and Vicki Squires, “Addressing Complex Challenges through Adaptive Leadership: A Promising Approach to Collaborative Problem Solving,” Journal of Leadership Education 16, no. 4 (2017): 111-123, doi: 1012806/V16/I4/T2.

² Jessica E. Dinh, Robert G. Lord, William L. Gardner, Jeremy D. Meuser, Robert C. Linden, and Jinyu Hu, “Leadership Theory and Research in the New Millennium: Current Theoretical Trends and Changing Perspectives,” The Leadership Quarterly 25, (2014): 36-62, doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.11.005.

³ Nelson and Squires, “Addressing Complex.”

⁴ Ronald Heifetz and Marty Linsky, “When Leadership Spells Danger,” Educational Leadership 61, no. 7 (April 2004): 33-37, https://www.wisconsinrticenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/6.3-When-Leadership-Spells-Danger.pdf.

⁵ Campbell-Evans et al., “Adaptive Leadership.”

⁶ Ronald A. Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Kinskey, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2009), 251.

⁷ Charles A. Goldman and Rita T. Karam, “College in America could be changed forever,” CNN, July 7, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/perspectives/higher-education-pandemic/index.html; Annie Grayer, “Administrators prepared for Covid-19 to change life on campus, but students partied anyway,” CNN, August 21, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/21/us/ university-college-covid-19-partying-quarantine-pandemic/index.html.

⁸ United States Naval Academy 2015 Faculty Handbook, 2015, https://www.usna.edu/ Academics/Faculty-Information/Faculty%20Handbook/ 15%20Faculty%20Handbook.pdf.

⁹ United States Naval Academy 2015 Faculty Handbook.

¹⁰ David J. O’Connell, Karl Hickerson, and Arun Pilluta, “Organizational Visioning: An Integrative Review,” Group & Organization Management 36, (2011), 103, doi: 10.1177/1059601110390999.

¹¹ Andrew T. Phillips, personal communication, March 5, 2020.

¹² Phillips, personal communication, March 11, 2020.

¹³ Sean S. Buck, personal communication, March 12, 2020.

¹⁴ Phillips, personal communication, March 11, 2020.

¹⁵ Anthony S. Bryk, Louis M. Gomez, Alicia Grunow, and Paul G. LeMahieu, Learning to Improve: How America’s Schools can Get Better at Getting Better, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2015).

¹⁶ Sean S. Buck, personal communication, March 12, 2020.

¹⁷ Andrew T. Phillips, personal communication, March 20, 2020.

¹⁸ Andrew T. Phillips, personal communication, May 22, 2020.

¹⁹ Sharon Hazelton, personal communication, May 9, 2020; Jennifer Waters, personal communication, June 1, 2020.

²⁰ Nelson and Squires, “Addressing Complex.”

²¹ Heifetz and Linsky, “When Leadership.”

²² Michelle Allen-Emerson, personal communication, April 20, 2020.

²³ Bryk et al., Learning to Improve.

²⁴ Samara Firebaugh, personal communication, August 4, 2020.

²⁵ Samara Firebaugh, personal communication, August 11, 2020.

²⁶ Philip Garrow, personal communication, August 18, 2020.

²⁷ Temple Cone, personal communication, August 19, 2020.

²⁸ Campbell-Evans et al., “Adaptive Leadership,” 542.

Featured Image: The U.S. Naval Academy holds the fourth, socially-distanced swearing-in event for the Class of 2020 on May 18, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Stacy Godfrey)