Tag Archives: Korean Navy

Why the U.S. Should Support South Korea’s Naval Expansion

By Ju Hyung Kim

When people think about the U.S.-ROK alliance, they often envision the Korean Peninsula: joint ground drills, combined air exercises, and the perennial challenge of deterring a North Korean invasion. But the next chapter of this alliance is unfolding at sea. With the U.S. Navy stretched across multiple theaters—from the Mediterranean to the South China Sea—South Korea’s maritime ambitions are no longer a peripheral concern. They are a strategic asset.

The first-in-class destroyer ROKS Gwangaeto the Great (DDH 971), left, and the Chungmugong Yi Sunsin-class destroyer ROKS Dae Jo-yeong (DDH-977), right, sail in formation during Maritime Counter Special Operations Exercise (MCSOFEX) May, 8, 2025. (Photo: Gavin Arnoldhendershot)

South Korea is undertaking a deliberate and ambitious transformation of its navy into a blue water force capable of regional power projection. This evolution is not simply about prestige or symbolism. It is a calculated move rooted in geostrategic necessity. As tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait and Chinese naval power expands across the first and second island chains, Washington should see Seoul’s naval modernization not as redundant or overlapping, but as a critical force multiplier.

This is especially relevant in the Yellow Sea, where a better-integrated U.S.-ROK naval posture could significantly enhance sea denial capabilities South Korea’s geographic proximity to China’s northern coastline presents a strategic opportunity to constrain the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet, which is headquartered in Qingdao and tasked with defending China’s most vulnerable maritime approaches. By jointly developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies focused on the Yellow Sea, the alliance could effectively impose strategic costs on China’s northern naval operations and blunt its access to the first island chain.

The Rise of South Korea’s Blue-Water Navy

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has traditionally played a coastal defense role focused on deterring North Korean provocations in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. But over the past two decades, a combination of economic capability, strategic awareness, and domestic political will has pushed Seoul to rethink its naval posture.

The evolution began with the KDX series of destroyers—KDX-I, KDX-II, and the 10,000-ton KDX-III (Sejong Daewang-class guided-missile destroyers)—equipped with Aegis combat systems, long-range anti-air missiles, and sophisticated sensors. These ships have given the ROKN capabilities far beyond the littorals. More recently, the KDDX program—slated to deploy stealthier, AI-integrated destroyers by the early 2030s—signals an even greater leap in warfighting capability.

Beneath the surface, South Korea is producing the Jangbogo-III class submarines, featuring Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP), advanced sonar, and the ability to launch indigenous cruise missiles. These quiet, long-endurance platforms are designed for regional influence, extending beyond traditional deterrence roles.

Then there is the controversial CVX program, which remains stalled due to political debate and lack of budgetary support. Initially conceived as a 30,000-ton light aircraft carrier to deploy short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B, CVX was intended to give Seoul the ability to project power far from its shores. Critics within Korea have questioned its cost and doctrinal utility, and recent administrations have deprioritized the project in favor of counter-North Korean capabilities. Still, the strategic rationale behind the program reflects Seoul’s growing maritime confidence and its long-term ambition to contribute more meaningfully to regional security.

Strategic Drivers of Naval Expansion

South Korea’s shift toward a maritime posture is driven by three primary strategic imperatives. First, North Korea’s expanding maritime threat has grown increasingly sophisticated. Pyongyang’s development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), its recent experimentation with unmanned maritime strike systems, and its emphasis on asymmetric naval tactics all underscore the need for a robust undersea deterrent. A capable Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is essential not only for defending territorial waters, but also for denying North Korea sanctuary beneath the surface. It is worth noting that the Atlantic Council’s recent report, “A Rising Nuclear Double-Threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II Tabletop Exercises,” demonstrates how a naval skirmish in the Yellow Sea between North and South Korea could plausibly escalate—by 2030—into a dual contingency, triggering simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

This scenario underscores the critical importance of effective naval deterrence and denial capabilities against North Korean maritime threats. It also implies a wider operational logic: improved U.S.-ROK naval integration could serve not only to deter North Korea but also to enhance regional readiness for broader contingencies involving both China and Russia. As Russia’s Pacific Fleet increases its operational tempo in the Sea of Japan—particularly near Vladivostok, its key naval hub—a forward-deployed and interoperable ROK Navy can play a vital role in surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and presence operations. Greater alliance coordination in these waters would enable the U.S. Navy to retain pressure on Russian forces without further stretching its already overtasked carrier and submarine assets.

Second, South Korea’s economic vulnerability via its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) compels a more active naval presence. As a global trading nation heavily dependent on maritime imports—particularly energy—South Korea is acutely exposed to regional disruptions in maritime routes. Any conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait would pose serious risks to these lifelines, and protecting them requires more than the reach of coast guard patrols.

Third, shifts in U.S. force posture are creating strategic space—and necessity—for capable allies to assume greater responsibilities. As the United States confronts the demands of great power competition and redistributes its naval resources, a strengthened and regionally integrated South Korean navy can help relieve pressure by taking on critical missions in Northeast Asia, thereby enabling U.S. forces to concentrate on high-end deterrence operations elsewhere.

Naval Power and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Historically, maritime coordination has not been the centerpiece of the U.S.-ROK alliance. While Combined Forces Command (CFC) has focused primarily on land and air integration, naval cooperation has traditionally been limited to joint drills and port visits—though this has begun to evolve in recent years with increased trilateral and ASW cooperation. But this is beginning to change.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly calls for networked security architecture, encouraging allied navies to coordinate maritime domain awareness (MDA), logistics, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), and undersea capabilities. South Korea has begun participating more actively in multilateral exercises like RIMPAC and Pacific Vanguard. Trilateral maritime exercises with the U.S. and Japan have also become more routine, despite political sensitivities in Seoul. However, these efforts remain fragmented and largely ad hoc, lacking the continuity and command structure necessary for sustained strategic impact. As the alliance faces increasingly complex, multi-domain maritime challenges—ranging from North Korean subsurface threats to regional contingencies involving China and Russia—the case for deeper institutional coordination becomes compelling. One promising pathway is the establishment of a Combined Maritime Command: a mechanism that could integrate planning, synchronize task force deployments, and enable real-time information fusion.

Unlike the existing ground-focused Combined Forces Command, such a structure would reflect the evolving character of naval warfare and anchor maritime cooperation in a permanent, mission-ready framework. Additionally, both Washington and Seoul are exploring data sharing and co-development in AI-enabled maritime systems. Seoul’s defense sector, spearheaded by companies like Hanwha Ocean and LIG Nex1, has the technological foundation to contribute to next-generation maritime warfare, from unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to AI-supported sonar systems.

Policy Recommendations for Washington

Supporting South Korea’s naval rise requires more than rhetorical endorsement; it demands a set of deliberate and concrete policy actions by Washington. First, the United States should identify opportunities for joint research and development as well as limited technology transfer in key areas such as undersea warfare, autonomous maritime systems, and AI-enhanced command and control. Co-developing these capabilities with a trusted ally like South Korea would not only bolster interoperability but also strengthen Seoul’s defense industrial base.

Second, Washington should work with Seoul to institutionalize robust maritime intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Drawing inspiration from frameworks like the Five Eyes, a Northeast Asian naval intelligence partnership could significantly enhance regional maritime domain awareness and sharpen tactical decision-making across allied navies.

Third, joint training and exercises should be expanded beyond the waters near the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should be regularly included in U.S.-led naval operations throughout the second island chain, including in the Philippine Sea, South China Sea, and broader Western Pacific. Such participation would normalize long-range ROKN deployments and allow the U.S. Navy to maintain presence across a wider expanse without overstretching its own assets.

Finally, the alliance should explore the creation of a combined maritime command structure that parallels the existing Combined Forces Command on land. Although politically sensitive—particularly in light of ongoing discussions around OPCON transfer—such a structure would better reflect the realities of modern maritime warfare and the shared regional burdens that come with it. More concretely, a Combined Maritime Command could offer a standing bilateral mechanism for coordinating patrol areas, real-time sensor fusion, and logistics prepositioning. It would also allow for joint operational planning in response to overlapping threats from North Korea, China, and Russia—threats which increasingly defy traditional geographic boundaries. A permanent command structure would facilitate the joint execution of distributed maritime operations (DMO) and enable more dynamic force employment (DFE) within the alliance, aligning with current U.S. Navy doctrinal trends. However, such an initiative would need to overcome several significant hurdles.

Domestically, South Korea’s evolving but cautious posture on OPCON transfer and joint command structures could stir political controversy, especially amid ongoing debates over military sovereignty. Bureaucratically, the absence of a tradition of joint maritime commands within South Korea’s naval doctrine would necessitate a paradigm shift in command culture and planning processes. Operationally, issues such as legal authorities, peacetime rules of engagement, and joint logistics would need to be ironed out. To navigate these complexities, a phased approach may be prudent—starting with joint maritime planning groups, mission-specific task forces, and gradually evolving toward a permanent Combined Maritime Command as trust, interoperability, and strategic alignment mature.

Why the U.S. Needs a Strong South Korean Navy

Critics may ask whether the U.S. really needs another blue-water ally when it already works closely with Japan and Australia. But the answer lies in geography, capability specialization, and political flexibility. Japan’s navy is world-class in terms of technology and training, fielding advanced destroyers, submarines, and even F-35B-capable carriers. Yet it remains politically constrained by constitutional limitations—most notably Article 9—and cautious public sentiment that continues to shape the scope of Japan’s overseas military activities. Even after the 2015 legislative reforms and revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, Tokyo’s ability to engage in high-intensity or preemptive operations remains narrowly defined and heavily restricted. Australia, meanwhile, boasts potent naval assets but is geographically removed from key Northeast Asian flashpoints. South Korea, by contrast, offers an increasingly capable and politically willing partner, situated at the frontline of regional hotspots: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and even the Taiwan Strait. Its navy is not only modernizing rapidly but is also unconstrained by many of the domestic limitations that hinder its allies.

Moreover, South Korea brings industrial capacity to the table. Its shipbuilding firms are already among the best globally. If the U.S. seeks to build a coalition-based maritime deterrent in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul is indispensable—not just as a consumer of U.S. systems, but as a producer of regionally relevant platforms.

At a time when the U.S. Navy is confronting widening capability gaps, the need for trusted, interoperable allies is more pressing than ever. Chronic delays in shipbuilding—exacerbated by industrial base constraints, workforce shortages, and budget uncertainty—have slowed the delivery of key platforms like the next-generation DDG(X) destroyers and the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. Meanwhile, maintenance backlogs have reduced the operational availability of existing surface combatants and submarines, straining fleet readiness. Carrier strike groups are being over-deployed to meet simultaneous demands in the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific, often without sufficient dwell time, degrading both materiel and personnel endurance. Amphibious readiness is also under pressure, with debate continuing over the future of the LPD and LHA programs. In this environment, having a capable ally like South Korea—with Aegis-equipped destroyers, modern submarines, and ambitions for its own light aircraft carrier—is not a luxury or symbolic gesture. It is a strategic necessity. Seoul’s platforms are increasingly interoperable with U.S. systems, and their regional positioning allows the ROK Navy to help secure key maritime corridors and reinforce deterrence at precisely the time and place where U.S. naval bandwidth is most strained.

Conclusion: A Maritime Alliance for the Indo-Pacific Era

The U.S.-ROK alliance was forged in ground combat but will be tested in maritime competition. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the primary arena of strategic contestation in the 21st century, navies—not just armies—will shape deterrence outcomes.

Washington must therefore adapt its mindset. Supporting South Korea’s naval expansion is not about shifting the burden, but about co-creating a more resilient, integrated, and capable maritime network. Seoul is rising to meet the challenge. The U.S. should meet it alongside.

From undersea sensors to carrier decks, the next phase of alliance credibility will be forged at sea. It is time to set sail together.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute—a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly—led a study commissioned by the South Korean Navy titled ‘Regional Naval Modernization Trends and Future Directions for the ROK Navy’s Core Capabilities.’

The Evolution of Maritime Strategy and Naval Doctrines in North East Asia

By Pawel Behrendt

Great power competition and arms races are back, especially in Asia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Asia and Oceania countries in 2017 were responsible for 27 percent of global military expenditures. In absolute numbers it totalled U.S. $477 billion. Three out of the 15 top spenders are located in North East Asia: China ($228 billion), Japan ($45.4 billion), and South Korea ($39.2 billion).

Given the role of maritime trade for the economies of these three powers it is no surprise that navies are an important part of their military budgets. But maintaining old and ordering new warships is not everything. The shape of naval force employment is dependent on doctrine and strategy. These in turn depend on threat perception, political and economic needs, as well as  ambitions.

Japans’ maritime strategy and naval doctrine has been very stable during the last half century. Recent changes that aim to grow the capability of the Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) are rather minor. On the flipside, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) underwent radical development in the past two decades, reshaping them from brown water into green water navies with the eventual ambition to become blue water forces. Many of these changes are, especially in the case of South Korea, surprising and unexpected.

Japan

“Generally, naval power was born from the need to preserve freedom of the seas, enabling sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) and economic growth to prosper and expand.”1 – Admiral Tomohisa Takei (MSDF)

Protecting SLOCs along with “Defense of Surrounding Waters” is the most important task of the MSDF. Given Japan’s dependence on sea trade it is no surprise, however the current doctrine is equally the result of the experience of World War II and post-war pressure by the United States as a political-economic calculation. During the war the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare by the U.S. Navy were devastating to the merchant marine of Japan. The protection of merchant shipping proved to be inadequate, nearly 85 percent of the pre-war tonnage had been sunk.2

After the war the protection of sea lanes was advanced as a priority to be fulfilled by rebuilding the naval forces of Japan. Thus till the late 60s lasted an intensive debate between supporters of a strong navy oriented toward SLOC protection and a limited ant-invasion force. The main potential invader was then the Soviet Union. Finally the dispute resulted in a more balanced fleet, capable of both effective escort operations at range and the defense of its own coast. Such doctrine was supported by the Pentagon. The U.S. Navy needed an efficient ally, able to protect naval bases, but simultaneously able to secure SLOCs in the Pacific. Such a division of tasks would allow the devoting of more U.S. forces for offensive operations.3 At the same time the growing Japanese economy became more dependent on maritime shipping and a better understanding of the importance of SLOCs emerged.4 Japan has become a crucial and indispensable ally of the U.S. in East Asia, fomenting a deep interoperability between the U.S. Navy and MSDF.

Geopolitical changes after 1991 at first did not greatly influence the naval doctrine of Japan. An Escort Flotilla has remained up until today the main unit. Currently there are four such Flotillas (1-4) based in Yokosuka, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Kure. Each unit is grouped around a helicopter destroyer and two Aegis destroyers plus five smaller combatants, usually frigates. Changes came during the 90s and early 2000s. Expanding international activities, terrorism, and the rise of China pressed the MSDF to pursuit new capabilities. The first visible sign of changing attitude was the procurement of Ōsumi-class amphibious landing ships. For the first time since World War II Japan was capable of power projection. Next was the refueling mission during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where MSDF logistics ships refuelled coalition ships in the Indian Ocean, and anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somali. This latter mission brought the first Japanese overseas base in Djibouti and a larger appreciation of unconventional threats at sea.5

LST-4003 Kunisaki Osumi-class landing ship. (Wikimedia)

Now the main challenge has become China, who also strongly depends on maritime transportation. The growing quantity and quality of the People’s Liberation Army Navy only strengthened its ability to protect SLOCs. What’s more, fear of potential invasion has returned and is more and more visible in the military planning of Japan.6 This new threat perceptino gained the name of “Counterbalancing China.”7 Hence, despite growing rivalry between both states and Japan’s pursuit of power projection capability, escort tasks and coastal defense continue to be the main duties of MSDF.

The People’s Republic of China

During the last 20 years the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has come a long way. Since 1949 there were two main missions for Chinese naval forces: reunification (invasion) of Taiwan and coastal defense. During the 80s lack of funds and concentration on continental threats led Admiral Liu Huaqing8 to the “offshore defense” doctrine. It focused on operations within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), what admiral Liu characterized as the Yellow Sea, South, and East China Seas, as well as waters around Taiwan and Okinawa. An additional task was nuclear deterrence. However, the main tasks of the PLAN largely stayed the same in spite of these ambitions. During the 90s economic changes, U.S. led operations in Iraq, Serbia, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 gave impetus to change. Admiral Liu and his adherents were given arguments to expand the bounds of maritime capabilities beyond coastal waters. It resulted in the doctrine of “distant sea defense.” It asserted an intensive naval buildup and was defined not by geographical limitations but by the PRC’s maritime needs.9

A turning point for the PLAN was the year 2004, when President Hu Jintao called for pursuit of capability to sustain a maritime presence in strategic locations, in hostile conditions, and for extended periods. The doctrine of “distant sea defense” still encompassed the Taiwan issue and coastal defense but now also the distant protection of maritime sovereignty. This helped intensify the East and South China Seas disputes, and provided China with a long-term goal of effective defense of crucial SLOCs and in the future (perhaps around 2050) of becoming a global naval power.10

Even more attention has been paid to naval forces since Xi Jinping came to power. His “Belt and Road Initiative” greatly emphasizes the value of maritime communication. Under BRI China has invested about $44 billion in port infrastructure both at home and in other countries while further foreign investments of nearly $20 billion were declared for the near future. Especially interesting projects are the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, along with highways, railways, and pipelines connecting the coastal regions of Myanmar with Yunnan province and Kra Canal in the Malaya Peninsula. All of these aim in part to solve the “Malacca Dilemma” and reduce China’s dependence on the maritime chokepoints of Southeast Asia.11 Still it does not diminish the role of the South China Sea as a crucial waterway leading through the chokepoints in Indonesia and Malaya. Hence strengthening military presence in the region and pursuit for the capability to control it fuels China’s policy in the SCS dispute as well as prestige issues and protecting national resources.

More military-oriented aspects of BRI are growing PRC naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the great expansion of the PLAN Marine Corps which is expected to increase fivefold. This force now numbers 20,000 soldiers organized into two brigades, but the goal is as many as 100,000 troops in six brigades. This does not mean only the formation of new units, as it was reported that two brigades from the Ground Force had been subordinated to the Navy. The main task of this huge force would be the protection of the maritime thread of the New Silk Road and defense of the overseas interests of the PRC. The Chinese Marines are already stationed in Djibouti and have appeared in Gwadar, Pakistan. Both garrisons are rumored to have as many as 10,000 soldiers. Still such a great buildup causes many problems. The PLAN Marine Corps lacks experience in expeditionary missions and does not have sufficient equipment. What is more, a force that has spent years preparing mainly for an invasion of Taiwan and operations in nearby waters of South and East China Seas requires a thorough reorganization to face new, global tasks.12

All of this concerns the whole PLAN as well. As of January 2018 the PLAN had in service 26 Type 054A class frigates13 and 39 Type 056 class corvettes.14 These escort vessels are the real workhorses of the Chinese Navy. Both classes are more developed toward the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission. As was unofficially disclosed in the perception of the Chinese admiralty one of the biggest threats to both military and merchant ships are submarines, especially the conventionally-powered vessels of the MSDF. Thus the development of ASW capability has become a top priority.15 On the other hand experience in escort missions was gained during the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. The permanent presence of the PLAN in the Horn of Africa is also a key milestone in the process of building a blue water navy.”16

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a very interesting case. Despite the location on the Asian mainland, in geopolitical terms it is effectively an island. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) separates South Korea from the rest of the Asian mainland. Also in economic terms the ROK is virtually an island nation, 99 percent of its exports and imports go via sea.17 Since the end of the Korean War the main task of South Korean naval forces was the defense of littoral areas against the North and securing the EEZ against intrusions of foreign fisherman.18

Similarly as in China the situation changed in the 90s. One of the results of its economic boom was a deepening dependence on SLOCs as well as growing overseas interests. In 1995 then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral An Byoung-Tae called for the construction of a blue water navy. Admiral Byoung-Ta’s ambitions were endorsed by President Kim Young-Sam and he in effect became to the ROKN the same as Admiral Liu Huaqing was to PLAN.

However, the vision of President Kim remains quite far from the concepts of military planners from China and Japan. Kim defined two areas of operations: East Asia for the long term and the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz for short term missions. He emphasized participation in multinational coalitions and thus giving South Korea more influence on the international arena and better ability to shape near and far political environments.19

During the last 20 years South Korea has now built naval power second in East Asia only lesser than that of China and Japan. Thanks to several landing ships, three Aegis destroyers, and nine smaller destroyers the ROKN has gained noticeable power projection capability. The recent arming of destroyers with cruise missile has built a credible deterrence capability against not only DPRK but also China, Japan, and Russia.20 However, ASW and mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities lay far behind. According to the MSDF, South Korean naval forces are unable to protect the crucial link to the ROK’s economy, the Tsushima Strait. The solution to this situation could be closer cooperation with Japan, but it is greatly hampered by strong anti-Japanese sentiment and several territorial disputes.21

Insufficient ASW and MCM capabilities were noticed and addressed by ordering new frigates and mine hunters. Still, in the case of frigates more attention was paid to include them into the national anti-missile defense system than increasing their ASW capabilities. Such a stance is incomplete given the threat posed by DPRK’s midget and small submarines. An example here is the fate of the Cheonan corvette that was sunk by a North Korean submarine.22

Conclusion

The SLOCs are lifelines for the dynamic economies of East Asia. As CSIS estimates any long closing of the Strait of Malacca would generate costs, about $350 million after one month, that would have an impact not only in regional but also in global scale.23 Thus the protection of merchant shipping and the secure delivery of hydrocarbons remain crucial tasks of nearly all mentioned naval forces.

Pawel Behrendt is a Political Science Ph.D. candidate at the University of Vienna. He is an expert at the Poland-Asia Research Center and is the deputy chief-editor of konflikty.pl. Find him on Twitter @pawel_behrendt.

References

[1] Tomohisa Takei, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era, Tokyo 2008, p. 2.

[2] Takei, p.3.; more on SLOCs in the doctrine of Imperial Japanese Navy: Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter of Life and Death?, New York 2006, pp. 63-89.

[3] Graham, pp. 118-120.

[4] IGraham, pp.123-129

[5] Graham, pp.185-200, Alessio Patalano, Japan as a Seapower: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities under Three Defence Reviews, 1995–2010, in: Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 37, 2014 – Issue 3: Rising Tides: Seapower and Regional Security in Northeast Asia, pp. 403-441.

[6] Yuji Kuronuma, Japan’s military chief warns on China naval expansion, Nikkei Asian Review, 19.01.2018 (www.asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-s-military-chief-warns-on-China-naval-expansion)

[7] Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise, in: Asian Security Volume 10, 2014 – Issue 1, pp. 1-21.

[8] Liu Huaqing (1916-2011), known as the father of modern Chinese Navy, more about his life and theories: Daniel Hartnett, The Father of the Modern Chinese Navy—Liu Huaqing, Center for International Maritime Security (www.cimsec.org/father-modern-chinese-navy-liu-huaqing/13291)

[9] Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy. A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics., Suitland 2009, pp. 5-6.

[10] Hartnett; Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy. New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, Suitland 2015, pp. 5-9.

[11] Pawel Behrendt, The Maritime Silk Road, Centrum Studiów Polska-Azja, 10.08.2017 (www.polska-azja.pl/analiza-cspa-13-morski-jedwabny-szlak/).

[12] Pawel Behrendt, The Growing Dragon: The Radical Reorganization of the PLA, 03.05.2018 (https://cimsec.org/?s=growing+dragon)

[13] Gabriel Dominguez, PLAN inducts Type 054A frigate into North Sea Fleet, Jane’s 360, 15.01.2018 (www.janes.com/article/77048/plan-inducts-type-054a-frigate-into-north-sea-fleet).

[14] Henri Kenhmann, Bientôt 40 corvettes Type 056 dans la marine chinoise, East Pendulum 16.01.1018 (www.eastpendulum.com/bientot-40-corvettes-type-056-marine-chinoise).

[15] Kenhmann, La marine chinoise multiplie les moyens anti-sous-marins, East Pendulum 20.11.2016 (www.eastpendulum.com/marine-chinoise-multiplie-moyens-anti-sous-marins)

[16] Emanuele Scimia, Anti-piracy mission helps China develop its blue-water navy, in: Asia Times 08.01.2018 (www.atimes.com/anti-piracy-mission-helps-china-develop-blue-water-navy/)

[17] Mingi Hyun, South Korea’s Blue-water Ambitions, The Diplomat 18.11.2010 (www.thediplomat.com/2010/11/south-koreas-blue-water-ambitions/)

[18] Paul Pryce, The Republic of Korea Navy: Blue-Water Bound?, Center for International Maritime Security 28.01.2016 (www.cimsec.org/the-republic-of-korea-navy-blue-water-bound/21490).

[19] Hyun.

[20] Adam M. Maciejewski, Skrzydlate pociski manewrujące Republiki Korei, in: Wojsko i Technika 12/2017, pp. 30-37.

[21] Pryce.

[22] Pryce

[23] CSIS China Power Project, , How much trade transits the South China Sea? (www.chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/).

Featured Image: Chinese Navy sailors take part in an international fleet review to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in Qingdao, Shandong province in this April 23, 2009. (REUTERS/Guang Niu)