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Asia-Pacific

First China-India Maritime Dialogue: Beyond ‘Icebreaking’

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This article originally featured at the National Maritime Foundation. It may be read in its original form here.

By Gurpreet S. Khurana

On 4th February 2016, India and China held their first-ever ‘Maritime Affairs Dialogue’ at New Delhi. While the Indian side was led by the Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs) in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Chinese delegation was led by the Assistant Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Given that the two sides agreed to institutionalize a dialogue, the inaugural event was indeed ‘seminal.’ Although the details of the discussions are not yet available in the public domain, this essay attempts to extrapolate the open-source reports, and ‘look beyond’ it in context of emerging imperatives.

Since the turn of the new millennium, or even earlier, it began to be realized and acknowledged world-wide that the texture of future security and geopolitical environment in the ‘resurgent’ Asia will depend much upon how the two resident regional powers – India and China – will shape their relations at the bilateral level. The two countries have traditionally been continental neighbours. However, since at least a decade ago, the waters of the Indo-Pacific have become an arena for a maritime interface between the two in diverse arenas encompassing geopolitics, economics and security issues. The need, therefore, for the two countries to institutionalize a maritime dialogue has been long overdue. It may be recalled that the foreign ministers of two sides had first decided to initiate the maritime dialogue nearly four years ago in March 2012. Such an arrangement is essential to foster cooperation, while also preventing unproductive competition and confrontation.

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Representatives of India and China meet for inaugural Maritime Dialogue. Photo Source: PRC MFA.

Soon after the first Dialogue, the Indian MEA issued a press-release indicating its essentials. It states: 

“The dialogue covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime security, developments in international regimes such as UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982) and (the other) IMO (-related treaties) and prospects for maritime cooperation”.

The Chinese MFA press-release on the Dialogue states:  

“Both sides introduced their respective maritime development strategies and their respective stance and views on current maritime security situation, and agreed to enhance policy dialogue and expand practical cooperation in such areas as marine scientific research, navy exchanges, fishery and navigation in a joint effort to ensure maritime security and harmony.”

The ‘exchange of views and perspectives on maritime security’ may have begun with the two sides drawing satisfaction from the successful multinational anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, wherein India and China have been coordinating their policies and naval operations since 2008, including at the ‘Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia’ (CGPCS). The discussions may have also included other issues relating to good order at sea in the Indo-Pacific region.

The “international regimes” are likely to have been discussed in the context of the developments in the South China Sea (SCS) relating to the maritime-territorial disputes, freedom of navigation, and resource exploration. These discussions would have been valuable for both sides. For India, it is necessary to tell China its position on its hydrocarbon exploration in the SCS and its growing naval engagements with the other SCS littoral countries. To China, it was an opportunity to present its perspectives, achieve transparency of policies, and allay concerns of the regional countries over its increased politico-military assertiveness in the region.

It seems, however, that the first India-China Maritime Dialogue was essentially an ‘ice-breaker,’ and in their own ways, both sides had envisaged their objectives to be rather limited, rather than symbolic. Since the Indian side was led by a Joint Secretary, the representation from the ‘functional’ agencies/ navy would have been pitched at the ‘Director/ one-star’ level or even below. From China’s perspective, the dialogue seems to have been accorded even lesser significance. The photograph released by the Chinese MFA indicates that the Chinese side did not have any naval representation at all, at least not in uniform.

Notably, two days earlier, a Chinese delegation under the same leadership was in Islamabad for the second China-Pakistan Maritime Dialogue; the first dialogue having been held in Beijing in July 2014. Since Pakistan’s delegation was headed by an Additional Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, functionaries much above the ‘Director/ one-star’ level would have been represented. The Islamabad event itself, the higher level of representation and the indicative scope of the discussions encompassing ‘maritime connectivity’, ‘security of international shipping lanes’ (ISL), ‘marine scientific research’, ‘search and rescue’ and ‘naval and coast-guard cooperation’ reveal the difference.

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Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, Chief of the Naval Staff of Pakistan, arrives in Beijing on an official visit  to China at the invitation of Admiral Wu Shengli, Chief of the PLA Navy in March 2015. [Photo/China.org.cn].
On the Dialogue in New Delhi, neither the Indian nor the Chinese official report mentions any discussion on China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR) initiative, which is surprising. Further, the discussions on ‘practical cooperation’ on each of the issues mentioned in the Chinese MFA report is unlikely to have gone beyond China gauging whether and to what extent India is amenable to the prospect of cooperation on a particular issue. The mention of ‘marine scientific research’ is particularly instructive. It is a pointer to China’s emergence as a major maritime power and its intent to undertake such research in the Indian Ocean, with major strategic implications for India.

The next round of the India-China Maritime Dialogue is planned to “be held in Beijing on a mutually convenient date.” The agenda for this – and the ensuing dialogues – may need to be more ‘encompassing’, and include key issues that hold the key to a ‘harmonious’ maritime interface between the two countries. Most of these substantive issues broadly relate to China’s strategic intent in the Indian Ocean. These include ironing out the prevailing ambiguities of China’s MSR initiative, the rationale behind its emphasis on cooperating on ‘marine scientific research’’, and an agreement on a naval code of conduct for both force deployments and unintended tactical encounters, which could then be reciprocated by India with regard to its own naval units in the western Pacific.  

To address these issues, Dr. Ouyang Gouxing of China’s Hainan Academy for World Watch (HNIWW) aptly recommends a 2+2 Dialogue, wherein both sides are represented at the apex level by their respective foreign and defence ministries. He adds that the Chinese delegation would need to include a PLA Navy contingent from its South Sea Fleet (SSF), which is being integrated to the South War Zone responsible for China’s Indian Ocean strategy. India may also need to upgrade its naval participation accordingly. Hopefully, in due course, the two sides would be able to transcend bilateral issues and develop sufficient mutual trust to contribute to maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

Featured Image: Rear Admiral Han Xiaohu, Commander PLAN Training Ship Task Group, and Rear Admiral Li Jianjun, Assistant Chief of Staff and Political Commissar of PLA Dalian Naval Academy visited the  Headquarters, Eastern Naval Command to meet with Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Navy on May 19, 2014. Source: Indian Navy.

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

Positioning Naval HA/DR in India’s Image Making

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Naval HA/DR Topic Week

By Vidya Sagar Reddy

The frequency and intensity of natural disasters that beset the Indian Ocean region is rising, owing to both natural and man-made causes. The sectarian and geopolitical complications undermining the stability of West Asia is also bearing direct economic and security problems for this region. The incapacity of least developed countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal etc. at responding effectively to these disasters compounds the problem.

India is playing a decidedly critical role in this context. Its geographic position in the Indian Ocean, diasporic relations and energy dependence on West Asia, economic interdependence with East Asia, requisite for a stable and developing neighborhood, and the availability of a dedicated navy are key natural imperatives for the country to assume responsibility during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) contingencies.

Prompt and efficient HA/DR relief across this vast region is best guaranteed through the deployment of naval assets owing to their global reach via the maritime global commons. Naval ships of various countries deployed for routine goodwill, flag-showing and trade protection tasks on the high seas can immediately be called upon to provide relief. India’s Operation Sukoon is a case in point where naval ships returning from a goodwill visit to the Mediterranean were redeployed to evacuate civilians from the 2006 Lebanon crisis.

Immediate requirements such as communications, airlift logistics, search and rescue, and command and control can be secured with minimum delay as shipboard weather and communication posts are resilient and have secure access to space-based assets. More importantly, the personnel are trained to serve under pressing circumstances.

The prompt response by the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson ordered to relieve Haiti devastated by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 2010 and the resilience of Australian patrol boats HMAS Advance, HMAS Assail, and the submarine HMS Odin in relieving the city of Darwin after it was struck by cyclone Tracy stand as two key examples. The teamwork of US airmen, Pakistani soldiers, and Ukrainian aid workers unloading relief supplies from a Russian military transport plane marks the optimism in coordination and communication that can be achieved between rival militaries during natural disasters.

The relief operations undertaken by the Indian Navy (IN) during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is a watershed moment for both the service and the country. Although itself a victim, India simultaneously mounted three external relief operations sending naval ships with medical supplies, food and water, and electric generators towards Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia.

These operations earned India international recognition and opened new avenues for cooperation. India was invited to join the United States, Japan and Australia forming a ‘core group’ for relieving the tsunami disaster. Its recovery efforts have been praised as “reversing historic patterns of vulnerability and discrimination.” As such, India’s capabilities and HA/DR management proved its emerging reliability in handling such contingencies across the region.

The unique capabilities of a naval ship once again came to light when the water generation plant in the Maldivian capital became dysfunctional in December 2014 affecting over 100,000 people. India dispatched the large fleet tanker INS Deepak with 900 tons of packed water and provided the capability of producing 100 tons of water every day using onboard reverse osmosis equipment. It joined INS Sukanya which had already been rushed to Male with 35 tons of packed water. While the Maldives issued distress calls to the US, China, and Sri Lanka, prompt response from New Delhi was vital. A statement from the Ministry of External Affairs highlights India’s proactive attitude towards relieving HA/DR problems in its immediate neighborhood.

In 2008, when the military rulers of Myanmar refused permission for the American warship USS Essex and a host of international aid agencies during cyclone Nargis, India managed to send two naval ships INS Rana and INS Kirpan which braved rough seas to provide relief. Thereafter, India was able to impress upon Myanmar’s military administration the need to accept international aid. This highlights India’s growing confidence in utilizing diplomacy for securing the trust of its extended neighborhood.

West Asia is one broader geographic realm that preoccupies India’s HA/DR resources. India has experience in evacuating citizens amid armed conflicts where local governments could have been overthrown as well as negotiating transport corridors such as in Kuwait in 1990, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. India has mounted proactive relief operations, exemplified by Operation Raahat.

The IN ships Mumbai, Tarkash and Sumitra were the front-line platforms that braved shelling to evacuate civilians and escort other ships reaching safe zones from war-torn Yemen during March-April 2015. India also deployed the Minister of State for External Affairs, Gen. V. K. Singh, to Djibouti for coordinating the operations.  Along with 4,748 Indians, 1,962 foreign nationals from 26 countries including Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Myanmar, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the US were also rescued. Although possessing a large forward deployed fleet and other assets in the region, the US urged its citizens to approach the Indian officials for safe evacuation. This mission won hearts and minds of many countries across the world for India.The successful conclusion of this operation is also a graduation for the country marking its ability to offer assistance even for the developed world in such dire humanitarian situations. 

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Indian Navy personnel registering Indian citizens evacuating from Yemen. Source: Indian Navy.

While these operations have already been conceptualized into the ‘benign role’ to be performed by the IN, its leadership is taking proactive, region-wide measures in this realm. India’s chief of naval staff attended the recent Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in Bangladesh and presented a guideline document for setting up a framework for coordinating HA/DR activities in the Indian Ocean region. This is in line with the principle objective of IONS for developing interoperability between member navies in terms of capabilities and operational procedures.

IN ships routinely participate in HA/DR simulations conducted within the services as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises like Varuna, Milan, ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise, and RIMPAC for proving readiness. The IN could respond to disasters in landlocked circumstances by flying in experienced medical teams, divers, and salvage experts who have fought the 2013 Uttarakhand floods, 2014 Kashmir floods, 2015 Nepal earthquake, and the recent floods in southern India.

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Sailors aboard the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier wave to the Indian Navy destroyer INS Ranvijay during the annual Exercise Malabar, April 16, 2012. LORI D. BENT/U.S. NAVY.

India’s image has been elevated from an aid recipient country to that of an international donor owing to these developments. However, the most impressive achievements can only be perceived at home. The political class in New Delhi is willing to assign the IN for HA/DR response across the Indian Ocean region and the bureaucracy has become comfortable with executing these operations. The IN continues to exercise a high level of joint readiness with sister services and relevant civilian organizations in this domain.

India’s success at breaking through rigid political barriers during critical periods can certainly be attributed to its altruistic ideology of peace and friendship, and by respecting territorial sovereignty of other countries, a common source of contention during HA/DR operations. The IN’s operating mindset and responsibility has made it a dependable partner for ensuring peaceful development, bolstering regional stability, and enhancing the international prestige of India.

Vidya Sagar Reddy is a researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Featured image: INS Vikramaditya in Baltic Sea during her trials in 2013. Source: Indian Navy. 

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: March 2016 Part One

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part one of the March 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including an increase in Russian naval activities and deployments, recent U.S. naval exercises demonstrating the Fleets’ application of the distributed lethality concept, laser technologies and the U.S. defense acquisition program and as usual, the increasingly tense security environment in the Asia-Pacific.  

Paul Pryce begins the roundup in the Asia-Pacific with a discussion, on what he refers to as, the new era in Singaporean defense procurement. In his article at Offiziere, Mr. Pryce highlights that previous procurement strategies for the country’s Navy have focused on acquiring mainly European designed vessels, either built specifically for Singapore or purchased following a short period of service in the initial European country. However, the planned construction of eight indigenous Independence-class littoral mission vessels beginning in 2016 and the expected procurement of a domestically built light aircraft carrier through 2021 suggests that the Singapore’s shipbuilding capacity and overall maritime force projection capabilities are becoming increasingly strengthened – a significant implication for Singapore’s role in South East Asian security dynamics.

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Alex Calvo, for Asian Military Review, discusses the challenge Taiwan faces in securing a replacement for its four aged hunter-killer submarines (SSKs), two of which are vintage Tench-class World War II boats while the other two were commissioned in the Netherlands in 1987 and 1988. Mr. Calvo explains how Europe has become reluctant to support Taiwanese military procurement needs for fear of angering China while the United States no longer produces SSKs. He suggests that Taiwan may look to Japan as an alternative source for its SSK replacement largely due to recent efforts by the Japanese shipbuilding industry to win the contract for the Royal Australian Navy’s SSK procurement requirements while also noting a lack of other feasible alternatives.

Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, discusses China’s plans to establish aircraft carrier battle groups tasked with defense of the country’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and overseas interests both regionally and perhaps globally. Mr. Mizokami highlights the nature of China’s first operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, as he explains its training role and limited capacity to carry large numbers of combat capable aircraft. However, he also notes that China has confirmed the construction of the Dalian carrier, which will have more hangar space for support and combat aircraft – but will still only displace about 50 000 tons, or half that of a modern U.S. carrier.

Leaving the Asia-Pacific, Dave Majumdar outlines the implications of Russia’s planned massive live-fire nuclear exercise being conducted by two Project 955 Borei-class ballistic missile submarines deployed with the Northern Fleet. In his article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar explains how one of the missile boats will sequentially launch all sixteen of its RSM-56 Bulava missiles at a depth of 164ft while highlighting that such an exercise, whether a U.S. or Russian ballistic missile boat, would only launch their entire payload in conflict as part of full-scale retaliatory or offensive nuclear strike. In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar discusses the spotting of a Russian Project 667 BDRM Delfin-class ballistic missile submarine near French territorial waters – the boat carries sixteen missiles capable of carrying four nuclear warheads each with a range of 7500 miles.

Bryan McGrath, for the War on the Rocks, provides the ‘First Principles’ that will help guide the difficult task of structuring the U.S. Navy’s future fleet. Mr. McGrath emphasizes that the Navy must be sized and shaped into a fleet that allows for both combat-credible and presence forces to be positioned globally in a manner that secures national interests while effectively deterring major power conflict. He also mentions the implementation of the distributed lethality concept, where individual platform lethality is increased even as the force becomes geographically dispersed. On this point, Mr. McGrath argues that an individual combat capacity increase should not compel policy makers to reduce the size of the fleet, as one does not necessarily balance the others strategic importance. On the same topic at The National Interest, Dave Majumdar describes a recent test of the SM-6 missile where it was revealed that the system now retains effective anti-surface capability, a major step for distributed lethality implementation across the fleet.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of March:

CIMSEC has also recently (February) published a compendium discussing a range of strategies, challenges and policy options concerning Distributed Lethality. You can find a download link for all of the articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

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Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: February Part Two

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part two of the February 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including a rapid increase in naval modernization in the Indian Ocean, China’s recent South China Sea military deployments, challenges within the U.S. defense acquisition program and the evolving China-Taiwan political and security relationship in East Asia.

Beginning the roundup at Popular Mechanics, Kyle Mizokami discusses the U.S. Navy’s interests in the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and the importance of acquiring the weapon system quickly. Mr. Mizokami explains that the increasing threat of modernized surface fleets with advanced weapon systems, particularly from Russia and China, requires the U.S. Navy to deploy a weapon more capable than the current U.S. Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) – the Harpoon missile. He also outlines technical features of the missile, including its use of Artificial Intelligence, data links, an ability to avoid static threats by use of fluid way points and the platforms that can deploy the weapon system – currently the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-35C, B1 and the U.S. Navy’s standardized Mk.41 Missile Silo.

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Bryan Clark, for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, explains that the U.S. Military’s defense requirements need to be balanced with realistic and appropriate budgets and schedules. He highlights that since 1970 major DoD Defense Acquisition Programs have increased in cost from 20-60 percent while new weapon systems are on average fielded 20 percent later than originally planned. Mr. Clark suggests that eliminating overly ambitious requirements for new capabilities is key to reducing acquisition malpractice while the limitations of competition within the defense industry need to be understood to allow for DoD’s buying power to improve.

Entering the Asia-Pacific, Harry Kazianis for The National Interest explains that Washington’s FONOPs in the South China Sea are not intended to halt Chinese dominance in the region, but rather to defend freedom of navigation and maritime legal principles. Mr. Kazianis highlights that regardless of the intent of the operations, China has remained firm on its artificial island construction and militarization in addition to strengthening its security apparatus in the region. This has been evident with the deployment of the HQ-9 air-defense system atop the newly constructed islands and the drastic increase in PLA-N deployments in the region. In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Kazianis identifies the possibility that China may deploy several of its 24 recently purchased Russian Su-35 fighters to the airfields that have been constructed on these same islands.

Lauren Dickey, for The Council on Foreign Relations, provides the perspective that China’s recent deployment of surface-to-air missile launchers and radar systems to the contested Woody Island not only represents China’s ambitions for challenging U.S. regional presence but also to forward a broader agenda of modernizing the capabilities of the PLA. Ms. Dickey also highlights President Xi’s planned reforms for the PLA likely to result in a leaner, stronger fighting force, an enhanced power projection capability and an increased ability to deter threats along the country’s periphery.

Michal Thim, for The Diplomat, discusses the recent meeting between foreign affairs officials from both the Chinese and Taiwanese government. Mr. Thim explains that these representatives have met before in other unofficial non-governmental forums, but this meeting represents the first time in six decades that officials from the two governments have met in their official capacities. He also notes that although this meeting may reflect a positive change in the dynamic of China-Taiwan relations, significant security tensions still exist between the two countries with the Taiwan Strait missile crisis still fresh in-mind and current Chinese missile deployments near the Taiwan theatre threatening Taiwanese regional defense posture.

To conclude the roundup, Vijay Sakhuja for Nikkei Asian Review discusses the high-tech naval buildup in the Indian Ocean from a regional perspective, focusing on India, Pakistan, Iran, South Africa, Australia and Indonesia. Mr. Sakhuja notes that these powers have been supporting diplomatic multilateral institutions, such as the Indian Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, to jointly address piracy concerns and to train for potential mine countermeasure operations.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the second part of February:

  • Shawn VanDiver, for Task and Purpose, discusses the threat climate change poses to U.S. National Security, noting its destabilizing effects in hotspot regions and its resulting security implications for nearby deployed personnel. He also explains how climate change poses a direct threat to the homeland, with increasing sea levels, larger wild fires, longer and more frequent droughts and heating-cooling strains on the domestic power grid.
  • Robert Farley, for The National Interest, provides an analysis on a recent RAND wargame exercise that demonstrated NATO’s inability to prevent Russian forces from occupying the Baltic States if it relied only on conventional forces currently available. However, Mr. Farley highlights that NATO’s primary deterrent is not necessarily its ability to counter any initial attack, rather to escalate any notional conflict beyond the parameters of Russian tactical abilities or political will.
  • Ankit Panda, for The Diplomat, discusses China’s Ministry of Defense statement that construction on support facilities for the PLA-N in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, has begun construction. Mr. Panda highlights that the Chinese government has refrained from calling its Djibouti facility as a ‘naval’ or ‘military’ base. In a second article at The Diplomat, Panda discusses South Korea’s interest in deploying Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear and satellite tests.
  • Sam LaGrone, at USNI News, explains how China’s deployment of an advanced high-frequency radar array as part of a wider detection network in the South China Sea may put U.S. stealth aircraft at risk while reducing their operational capacity. In a second article at USNI News, LaGrone discusses comments released by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) suggesting that the U.S. would ignore a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
  • Dave Majumdar, for The National Interest, highlights the U.S. Navy’s ‘undersea crisis’ with only 41 attack boats planned to be in active service by 2029 while China plans to have nearly 70. Even more concerning, the article suggests that while Russia and China are both continuing to build the volume of their undersea fleet, Russia has already begun construction on higher-end submarines that pose specific operational issues for the U.S. submarine fleet.

CIMSEC has also recently published a compendium discussing a range of strategies, challenges and policy options concerning Distributed Lethality. You can find a download link for all of the articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

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