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Asia-Pacific, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

Assessing the Military Significance of the South China Sea Land Features

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South China Sea Topic Week

By Ching Chang

This article aims to provide a fair assessment of the military significance of the South China Sea land features. The term land feature is intentionally selected to avoid the trouble of arguing whether they are islands, reefs, shoals or rocks. How these land features can be categorized into the terms shown above may possibly cause differences according to the international regimes governing maritime jurisdictions, but not the military significance of the land features alone. Whether these land features may contain military value significant enough to be fought for are never decided by themselves. Other factors such as force, timing and additional characteristics associated with the space will fundamentally define their importance.

The space factor itself may only decide part of the operational conditions for any potential military campaign. Land features within the maritime theater should be assessed together with surrounding waters in the military geographical calculus. Hence, the land features, particularly within the maritime battlespace, are only a portion of geographical variables in the strategic and operational formulas for employing military forces. For the case of the South China Sea, the author would like to present the following points to remind strategic thinkers, political commentators, and military observers never to overstate, or even to overrate, the military significance of the land features in the South China Sea.

It is well proven by history that the land features in the South China Sea are fundamentally irrelevant with the generally perceived freedom of navigation, either in wartime or in relative peacetime. The United States Navy deployed submarine forces to target Japanese shipments in World War Two. Several engagements did occur in the South China Sea though no significant achievement was derived through these efforts.1 Nonetheless, it is pretty sure the land features had no influence on submarine blockade operations for either side.

Further, Operation Pocket Money launched by United States Navy Task Force 77 on May 9, 1972 during the Vietnam war for a naval mining mission was also irrelevant to those land features in the South China Sea, either.2 For these two obvious cases of paralyzing freedom of navigation around the South China Sea, those land features had no relevance within these operations. Only maritime assets, sometimes including air superiority, really mattered in operations aimed at hindering freedom of navigation.

Moreover, there are two maritime campaigns in the last half of the previous century specifically targeted on acquiring these land features. The first was the Battle of the Paracel Islands that occurred on January 19, 1974 between the naval forces of the People’s Republic of China and their maritime adversaries of the Republic of Vietnam Navy. It was originally a battle triggered by the effort of the South Vietnamese Navy to oust the Communist China’s naval vessels in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands. China successfully secured permanent control over the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands after defeating Vietnamese maritime forces.

The second case was the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish between the People’s Liberation Army Navy forces and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Navy vessels. This naval battle took place over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands on 14 March, 1988. China established its active presence around the Spratly Islands right after the decisive victory from a less than thirty-minute maritime engagement. By the end of 1988, China held six footholds on the land features in the Spratly Islands. The important lesson is that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was never affected by these two naval campaigns specifically targeted on obtaining islands but fought with naval vessels to exclude adversary’s maritime presence around these land features.

From the two directions of logic reasoning shown above, the naval operations actually affected the freedom of navigation were irrelevant with the land features within the South China Sea. On the other hand, the naval campaigns for acquiring the land features within the South China Sea by expelling the adversary’s maritime presence around these land features were never relevant to the freedom of navigation, particularly, the maritime commercial transportation in the South China Sea. It only affected the maritime force within the surrounding waters of these land features. Why the territorial disputes fundamentally realized by the land features are so relevant to the freedom of navigation can be well perceived by measuring their locations subsequently introduced by the following second point.

The locations of these land features are away from major sea lines of communication as shown by the picture below.

SCS
South China Sea vessel traffic map. (marinevesseltraffic.com)

We may therefore understand why these land features may not affect freedom of navigation since most maritime commercial transportation is quite distant from these disputed land features. Even land features that may be potential hot spots and could influence maritime campaigns to some extent are hardly a factor in hindering maritime transportation activities on a significant scale. In terms of a maritime campaign in the South China Sea, maritime platforms and air superiority really matter, not these land features.

Some may argue that land-based weapons such as anti-ship missiles may substantially hinder freedom of navigation. Again, the prerequisites of this engagement scenario are maritime transportation activities close enough to these land features. Certain military assets can exercise the sea control function, but never the land features themselves. Without the maritime reconnaissance supporting functions to match with the weapon systems, those land based anti-ship missiles are nothing but a fist with long reach but poor aim.

No one within the military chain of command dare shoot at any long range target at sea so blindly without achieving  fully identification. Any case similar to the RMS Lusitania sunk by a German submarine on May 7, 1915 will present a nightmare to military and political decision makers.

W need to scrutinize the relative geographical locations of these land features. Basically, these land features are occupied by various parties and are all tangled together. For any individual land feature, regardless of its size and characteristics, it can only be defined as an isolated spot or foothold. Given the distances among these land features occupied by any single claimant in the South China Sea, it is impossible to form any meaningful defense. As no firepower from any other individual land feature may substantially cover the surrounding waters of other land features held by the friendly force units, the overall defensive posture is fragmented. No organized military operations seem feasible in the environment with the layout of land features as such. No  meaningful military front or defensive zone can be possibly established in this operational space.

All the land features cannot mutually support each other all since the effective range of land-based firepower may not match with the distances between these land features. Without maritime surveillance capability, long range anti-ship missiles may not be operationally relevant in many engagement scenarios. Given the historical experience of the island hopping operational concept successfully employed  in the Pacific theater in WWII, these land features can be easily bypassed because they cannot control any sea lane of communication. In other words, these land features can be ignored in any significant maritime campaign since they cannot form any organized military front or defense zone to support orchestrated military maneuvers.

It is reasonably expected that some may challenge this perspective with the recent developments and construction work occurring on these land features. It is undeniable that the capabilities of each land feature will be significantly enhanced after these improvements are completed. Accompanied with these enhanced capabilities, the logistical loads will also be increased. Although the strategic value of these land features would be seemingly increased, yet, the fundamental question remains the same: whether occupants of these land features may enact any meaningful military operations from these facilities including harbors, runways, berthing sites, and helicopter pads. Again, it will be decided by the distance between these land features and those frequently used maritime transportation routes. Enhancing military capabilities serving no substantial military tasks but only adding logistical burdens may make the land features a “strategic appendix” offering little utility but containing risk.

Last but not least, to answer the fundamental question of the military significance of the South China Sea land features, the question should be “what military operations in this maritime theater would rely on these land features?” Unquestionably, holding these land features may provide certain political leverage for claiming maritime jurisdiction upon adjacent waters. Nonetheless, fortification of these land features will not enhance existing positions on territorial claims, nor military significance for conducting potential operations. Facilities on these land features for supporting force employment and maritime surveillance will not be the most essential elements of any future military contingency within this maritime theater. Maritime assets will still be the core element. These land features can only serve a relatively minor role in a maritime campaign in the South China Sea as they always have in the past.

Chang Ching is a Research Fellow with the Society for Strategic Studies, Republic of China. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Endnotes

1. Heden, Karl E., Sunken Ships World War Two, Branden Books, 2006.

2. Mining of Haiphong Harbor, VietnamWar.net, http://www.vietnamwar.net/HaiphongHarbor.htm

Featured Image: China’s new airstrip built over Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea (CSIS image)

Asia-Pacific

The Scholar as Portent of Chinese Actions in the South China Sea

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South China Sea Topic Week

By Ryan D. Martinson

Chinese leaders, like leaders elsewhere, rely on the advice of outside experts—academics and other professional scholars—to help them cope with the myriad challenges of international politics. Statesmen and scholars, however, come from very different worlds. When leaders craft foreign policy, they place a premium on secrecy. Scholars, by contrast, have powerful motives to share their views and tout their influence.

For those studying an opaque state like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is therefore very tempting to regard the “influential” Chinese scholar, who writes and speaks without reserve, as a proxy for the shy statesman he serves. The lure of this approach is especially strong in the case of the South China Sea, where authoritative—and reliable—statements of PRC intentions are particularly scarce. In the aftermath of the recent ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Case No. 2013-19), the writings of Chinese scholars will no doubt be closely scrutinized for insights about the PRC’s likely response to this desolating blow to its South China Sea claims.

But is this a wise approach?

We must immediately distinguish the advisor from the propagandist. Both have direct connections with the state. Indeed, an individual scholar may serve both functions. As a propagandist, the scholar justifies past and current policy; as an advisor, she seeks to shape future policy. Studying the work of the propagandist has merits: we learn what the PRC wants domestic and international audiences to believe. The statements of the advisor, however, are potentially much more rewarding, for they may suggest future actions. Knowing what a state may do allows one to engage in proactive diplomacy and prepare countermeasures.

Given the legal and strategic complexities of the issues at stake, Chinese scholars have an important advisory role to play in South China Sea policy. However, among the dozens (hundreds?) of Chinese scholars researching the law and politics of the South China Sea, the vast majority will never speak to or have their work read by men and women in positions of real authority. Thus, if one’s aim is to conjecture about the direction of PRC policy, the works of only a tiny number of Chinese scholars—i.e., those with demonstrable influence—are worth considering.

Researchers at the Hainan Center for South China Sea Policy and Law (海南省南海政策与法律研究中心) fall into this category. Examining this institute—and the work of one scholar in particular—allows us to explore what can and cannot be learned from the writings of “influential” Chinese scholars.

Established in December 2011, the Center is based at the Hainan University School of Law. Its mission is to “research the law of the South China Sea and serve national strategy.” It employs 17 full-time and 15 part-time researchers, all studying issues directly and indirectly related to China’s position in the South China Sea.

The Center is very closely connected to the Chinese government. Indeed, the chair of its academic committee is Gao Zhiguo, who directs a major research unit located within the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). Gao lectures widely on maritime issues, his audiences ranging from small communities of specialists to the most senior members of the Chinese party-state. In sum, the Center is a large, well-connected institute that exists to find answers to the most important questions facing Chinese policy in the South China Sea.

Like all academic institutions, the Center seeks to publicize the achievements of its resident experts. To this end, it posts detailed data about the research grants it  receives. As of October 2015, the Center had been awarded dozens of grants totaling millions of RMB from entities such as the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science (NPOPSS), the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, and the Hainan provincial government.

Such information is valuable in and of itself. Project names and grant amounts suggest which topics are important to the Chinese government. Since 2012, for example, Center researcher Wang Chongmin  received half a million RMB (~$75,000) from SOA in order to do preliminary work on a “maritime basic law,” a comprehensive statement of China’s maritime claims and the roles and responsibilities of state entities charged with defending them. In 2015, Center researcher Chen Yangle was awarded 200,000 RMB (~$30,000) from NPOPSS to examine how China might promote tourism to the disputed Spratly Islands without undermining the “Maritime Silk Road” initiative, a policy aimed at cultivating regional good will. Since 2012, Chen Qiuyun  received 50,000 RMB (~$7,500) from the Ministry of Justice to study how sailing directions (更路簿) supposedly handed down by generations of Chinese fishermen might bolster the legitimacy of PRC claims.

Center researcher Zou Ligang is a special case. From 2010-2012, NPOPSS awarded Zou a total of 120,000 RMB (~$18,000) to complete a project entitled “Research on Legal Issues Associated with the South China Sea Problem and a Program to Resolve It.” This bland title might be easily overlooked, were it not for the fact that NPOPSS appraised Zou’s work as “outstanding”—an honor the Center was eager to promote. Indeed, a closer examination of this project reveals a direct connection between Zou and the highest levels of the Chinese government.

As luck would have it, the Hainan Society of Social Sciences published a lengthy synopsis of Zou’s project. His overall objective was to probe China’s existing South China Sea policy and suggest improvements. One particular focus was the “nine-dashed line,” the undefined cartographical monstrosity that continues to confuse and dismay the coastal states of Southeast Asia. Zou proceeds from the assumption China has “jurisdiction” over all of the two million square kilometers of maritime space within the nine-dashed line. The purpose of his research was to create a legal basis for China to “control” (管控) these waters, and to do so without seriously harming regional stability.

Map of claims in South China Sea (CIA/Wikipedia Commons)
Map of claims in South China Sea (CIA/Wikipedia Commons)

The synopsis outlines Zou’s policy recommendations. Most reflect conventional thinking. For example, China should build and better coordinate its navy, coast guard, and maritime militia and leverage these capabilities in order to increase “routine administrative control” over Chinese-claimed waters. Zou also proposes that China revamp its domestic maritime law—again, a point that many other Chinese experts have been making for years. Other recommendations are less expected. These include taking steps to reduce the Chinese economy’s dependence on foreign powers and paying due regard to the interests of extra-regional powers (such as the U.S.) in the South China Sea.

The synopsis also sketches Zou’s conclusions about the “legal status” of the nine-dashed line. Zou admits that within China there exists no consensus on this question. However, since the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is based on the principle that “the land dominates the sea,” Zou concludes that China’s maritime boundaries in the South China Sea should be largely determined by Chinese-claimed islands and other features. However, Zou asserts, this principle should not “impede China from claiming historic rights to certain specified waters within the nine-dashed line.” Taken together, Zou seems to be recommending that China use UNCLOS to claim as much space within the nine-dashed line as possible, and then use another argument based on “historic rights” to buttress Chinese claims to the remaining space.

If, as Zou suggests, offshore islands should largely determine China’s maritime rights in the South China Sea, the approach China adopts to draw baselines around these islands takes on tremendous importance. Zou has much to say on this topic. While China was correct to draw straight baselines around all of the Chinese-controlled Paracel Islands, this method would not work for the Spratlys because they are too widely dispersed. Thus, Zou recommends using the same approach that China applied to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. That is, China should draw baselines around different clusters of features within the archipelago, with zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction extending from them. The synopsis does not say which. However, in a 2013 journal article published under this grant number, Zou recommends that China center these clusters on Itu Aba (currently occupied by Taiwan), Thitu Island (the Philippines), West York Island (the Philippines), Spratly Island (Vietnam), and Mischief Reef (China).

Zou’s project was not funded for the sake of truth and knowledge. Its findings were intended to serve as a resource for policymakers. The synopsis states that, aside from journal articles like the one cited above, Zou also produced (or helped produce) 26 research reports for internal consumption. Among these reports, 10 were directly “adopted” by Hainan province, which administers all Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea (we do not learn which 10). Even more important, some of Zou’s reports landed on the desks of national Party officials. Three in fact were read and approved with comment (批示) by Xi Jinping and other members of the Politburo. The synopsis cites their titles: 1) “Views on Certain Issues Related to Maritime Law,” 2) “Legal Thinking with Respect to Resolving the Maritime Disputes,” and 3) “Strategic Research on Building the Maritime Silk Road.”

To sum up, we have learned that the Hainan Center for South China Sea Policy and Law is a major research institute producing policy-relevant analysis on the South China Sea for the direct benefit of the Chinese government at both the provincial and national levels. We know the names of individual projects and have the means to track down journal articles produced under specific grant numbers. In the particular case of Zou Ligang, we know that several of his reports were read and approved by the Politburo during a period of great flux in Chinese foreign policy. By reading articles published under this grant number, we can speculate about the advice Zou and his colleagues directly provided China’s most important decision makers.

We might ask, would knowledge of Zou’s proposals have enabled a foreign analyst to anticipate Chinese actions in the 2-3 years since they were submitted? That is, given Zou’s demonstrated advisory role on South China Sea issues, would it have been wise to regard his work as a portent of Chinese policy to come?

To be sure, China has pursued some of the policies recommended in Zou’s reports. It has invested heavily in its navy, coast guard, and militia. It has sought to enhance its control over claimed land and sea. In pushing forward with the drafting of a maritime basic law, it has taken steps to improve the maritime legal regime. However, these proposals reflect mainstream thinking in China. At most, then, Zou merely endorsed the existing consensus.

The legal status of the Spratly Islands, a much debated topic in China, is a more interesting test case. It is still too early to know for sure how China will draw baselines in the Spratlys. However, a recent article published in the PLA Daily under the byline of a research institute within the Central Party School suggests that China could ultimately settle on an approach that approximates Zou’s proposal. The article says that the “most likely and most appropriate” method for drawing baselines in the Spratlys is that used for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Such an approach, the article goes on, would center baselines around Itu Aba, Thitu Island, West York Island, Spratly Island, and Mischief Reef—the very same features recommended by Zou. If China does ultimately take this path, it is very possible that Zou Ligang will have played a significant role in this decision.

Still, one must acknowledge the limits of this approach. If one had relied on Zou’s work as a guide to future Chinese policy one would fail to foresee by far the most provocative Chinese action in recent memory:  the conversion of tiny Spratly outposts into major military bases. Zou proposed policies that he believed would allow China to realize its aims without destabilizing the region. In choosing to construct new Spratly facilities, PRC leaders are plainly operating on an entirely different set of assumptions.

Thus, even when we are certain that a particular expert has the ear of Chinese leaders, we cannot know which proposals—if any—will ultimately be adopted. On any single issue, Chinese leaders no doubt consult a number of scholars. It is impossible to know whose ideas will have purchase. Moreover, outside academics are not the only source of ideas influencing Chinese policy. Experts employed directly by the state (and writing mostly or entirely for internal audiences) may convince Chinese leaders they have a better grasp of the issues at stake. Ultimately, facts and logic may not even be decisive: domestic politics or intangible factors like “national dignity” might trump expertise.

In conclusion, analyzing the work of “influential” Chinese scholars may help gauge the trajectory of Chinese policy in the South China Sea. This approach is bound to be most fruitful when the products of specific research projects can be directly linked to PRC decision makers. In such cases, policy recommendations may reflect actual policy options under consideration by those in positions of power. However, one must recognize that Chinese academics represent only one source of ideas. By fixating on the work of the scholars, we risk exaggerating their influence. Indeed, too much emphasis on this single source may go a long way to explain the failure of the American China studies community to foresee recent PRC actions—above all, the decision to build the new Spratly facilities that have so dramatically altered the regional balance of power.

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Featured Image: National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS)

Asia-Pacific

South China Sea Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC is publishing a series of articles on the South China Sea in response to a call for articles issued last month. Our authors assessed the response to the ruling issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, discussed military developments in the South China Sea, and provided other relevant insights. We thank our authors for their contributions. 

Below is a list of articles featuring during the topic week. It will be updated as the topic week rolls out and as additional publications are finalized.

The Scholar as Portent of Chinese Actions in the South China Sea by Ryan D. Martinson
Assessing the Military Significance of the South China Sea Land Features by Ching Chang
Sea Control 122 – The PCA Ruling with CAPT James Fanell by Sally DeBoer
The Undersea Dimension of Strategic Competition in the South China Sea by Elsa B. Kania
Clash of Core Interests: Can One Mountain Hold Two Tigers? 核心利益的冲突：一山，不容，二虎? by Tommy Jamison

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nexwar@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: Soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy patrol in the Spratly Islands. (China Stringer Network/Reuters)

Capability Analysis, Europe

Putting it Back Together Again: European Undersea Warfare for the 21st Century

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The following article is adapted from a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Undersea Warfare in Modern Europe.

By Andrew Metrick

Increasing Russian submarine operations over the past several years have caused considerable concern in capitals across Europe and in the United States. The resurgence of the Russian Navy in the undersea domain prompted a senior U.S. naval official to declare that we are now in the midst of the “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.”1 Such pronouncements may overstate, to some degree, the extent of Russia’s reemergence,  however, they helpfully shine a light on the dramatic decline of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities across NATO and key partner nations, including Sweden and Finland.2 As part of a recently released study on the challenges posed by Russian undersea capabilities across Northern Europe, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed the extent of the decline in U.S., allied, and partner capabilities,  and offered recommendations to reverse it in a timely, cost-effective, and strategic manner.

The CSIS report highlights two incidents that demonstrate how far NATO and partner capabilities have fallen. In a widely publicized 2014 episode, the Swedish Navy spent a week scouring the Stockholm archipelago for an alleged Russian submarine believed to be operating inside Swedish territorial waters.3 The intruder was never publicly identified, though the circumstantial evidence overwhelming suggests it was, in fact, a Russia submarine. In years past, Sweden arguably maintained the best shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in the world. This incident, however, calls that status into question. The UK was likewise confronted with a similar incident in late 2014 when the Royal Navy (RN) suspected that Russia was operating a submarine in close proximity to Faslane, the home of the RN’s nuclear submarine force. Given the UK’s lack of fixed-wing ASW platforms, it was forced to request allied assistance to protect this vital military installation—a less than proud moment for the former maritime heavyweight.4 The UK has since announced that it will be investing in nine P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.  

How did once-capable ASW nations like Sweden and the UK find themselves in this position? In the mid-to-late 1990s, NATO shifted its focus from internal territorial defense to external conflict management and stability operations. We now see that this change was overly pronounced and negatively impacted investments in both platforms and skills needed for undersea warfare in and around NATO waters. For example, in 2000, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the United States operated 136 submarines, with the European nations accounting for roughly half of the force.5 By 2016, the combined fleet had shrunk to 109 vessels, with the United States accounting for 65 percent of the total.6 More worrisome, a good portion of the European submarine fleet may now not be effective against the most modern Russian subs. Similar trends emerge when comparing past and present totals related to ASW-capable surface vessels and aircraft. In this case, no platform better showcases the overly executed shift in NATO priorities than the new German frigates, the F125 Baden-Wurttemberg-class. These frigates, the largest surface combatants built by Germany in over 60 years, have little to no high-end naval warfighting capabilities, including ASW.7

Beyond capabilities and platforms, ASW warfighting skills have similarly atrophied. Given highly complex operating environments, many of these skills require consistent realistic training to build and subsequently maintain. There is now an entire generation of naval officers without a detailed know-how to counter and defend against Russian undersea activities in the North Atlantic and Baltic Seas. There are signs that navies across NATO are beginning to recognize these shortcomings and are taking steps to address them. The increased frequency of NATO’s Dynamic Mongoose ASW exercise is one such example. However, nations will have to commit to robust training beyond annual NATO exercises in order to create and maintain a culture of ASW excellence.8 Dynamic Mongoose and similar exercises should not be viewed as the panacea to current training shortfalls, but rather as the culminating event for separate national training programs.

Exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE - All participants ships in formation - 27 JUN 2016 - Photo by WO C. ARTIGUES (HQ MARCOM PHOTOGRAPHER)
Exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE – All participants ships in formation – 27 JUN 2016 – (WO C. ARTIGUES/ MARCOM)

In order to meet these challenges, NATO and partners will not only have to recommit to the platforms and people required for ASW and undersea warfare, but also to working together in an operationally effective manner. There are two tasks that NATO and its partners must complete as soon as possible. First, relevant nations must establish mechanisms to bridge the organizational gap that results from critical ASW partners Sweden and Finland not being in NATO. The creation of a framework that respects the sovereignty and neutrality of Sweden and Finland while enabling close tactical and operational collaboration is vital. The deepening security relationships between these nations and NATO provides an opportunity for greater collaboration on ASW issues, which could potentially be expanded within a NATO-NORDEFCO format. Second, and looking beyond the Baltic Sea region, NATO needs to create an operationally effective theater ASW framework that distributes roles and responsibilities in a way that best leverages differing national capabilities and commitments. Such a framework will likely require changes to one of the standing NATO maritime groups, improvements to information sharing across the alliance, and continued integration of ASW elements in NATO and regional exercises. The goals represent the first steps of a longer process of rebuilding ASW capabilities across Europe. What is clear is that effective integration of national capabilities is required if the current Russian challenge is to be met.

Read the full report here.

Andrew Metrick is a research associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and one of the authors of Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe. His work has covered a broad range of issues, including amphibious warfare, maritime capabilities, and unmanned systems. 

1. James Foggo III and Alarik Fritz, “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” Proceedings, June 2016, 142.6, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016-06/fourth-battle-atlantic.

2. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russian shipbuilding still in trouble,” Russian Military Reform, January 19, 2016, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2016/01/19/russian-shipbuilding-still-in-trouble/.  

3. Peter Walker, “Sweden Searches for Suspected Russian Submarine off Stockholm,” The Guardian, October 19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/19/sweden-search-russian-submarine-stockholm.

4. Ben Farmer, “Britain Forced to Ask NATO to Track ‘Russian Submarine’ in Scottish Waters,” Telegraph, December 9, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11283926/Britain-forced-to-ask-Nato-to-track-Russian-submarine-in-Scottish-waters.html.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2000–2001 (London: IISS, 2000).

6. IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: IISS, 2016).

7. “F125 Baden-Wurttemberg Class Frigate, Germany,” naval-technology.com, accessed on: July 18, 2016, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/f125-frigate/.

8. “NATO launches antisubmarine warfare exercise in Norwegian Sea,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 20, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132596.htm.

Featured Image: Norwegian submarine in the Fjord near Bergen (NATO/MARCOM)